

IV

(Informacje)

INFORMACJE INSTYTUCJI, ORGANÓW I JEDNOSTEK ORGANIZACYJNYCH
UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ

PARLAMENT EUROPEJSKI

PYTANIA PISEMNE Z ODPOWIEDZIĄ

Pytania pisemne skierowane przez posłów do Parlamentu Europejskiego i odpowiedzi
na te pytania udzielone przez instytucję Unii Europejskiej

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**Frågor för skriftligt besvarande E-002607/13
till kommissionen
Amelia Andersdotter (Verts/ALE)
(6 mars 2013)**

Angående: Uppföljning av USA:s Special 301-rapporter i förhållande till EU:s utvecklingspolitik

Vad gäller de effekter som USA:s Special 301-rapporter får för länder som tar emot utvecklingsstöd från EU har jag tagit upp frågan om att utvecklingsstödet för institutionell stabilitet och utbildningssystem eventuellt inte får önskad effekt.

I kommissionsledamot De Guchts svar på min fråga E-011001/2012 uppgav han följande: "Kommissionen övervakar inte systematiskt och har inte utvärderat de bilaterala diplomatiska förbindelserna i fråga om immateriella rättigheter mellan USA och andra tredjeländer, inbegripet de som tar emot utvecklingsbistånd från EU. Dessutom har inga [fall rapporterats] till kommissionen [...]".

Om kommissionen inte systematiskt övervakar de faktorer som kan inverka på dess politik, och dessa faktorerers effekt på användningen av skattebetalarnas pengar, kan den då förklara vad som görs för att se till att utvecklingsstödet inte spenderas på ett sätt som omintetgörs genom andra länders åtgärder?

Med tanke på att kommissionen har medgett att det inte finns något övervakningssystem och att stödmottagarna inte rapporterar några problem som skulle kunna leda till att deras stöd ifrågasätts, kan kommissionen då förklara vilka åtgärder den har vidtagit för att se till att de länder som erhåller utvecklingsstöd faktiskt är på väg mot institutionell stabilitet, bättre tillgång till utbildning och yttrandefrihet på en nivå som åtminstone motsvarar den som finns i EU?

**Svar från Karel De Gucht på kommissionens vägnar
(3 maj 2013)**

Kommissionen har inga belägg eller upplysningar som ger fog för parlamentsledamotens oro för att en amerikansk rapport om immateriella rättigheter kan leda till negativa effekter på EU:s utvecklingspolitik eller den institutionella stabiliteten, tillgången till utbildning och yttrandefriheten i länder som får utvecklingsstöd från EU.

EU och dess medlemsländer ger omfattande stöd som rör immateriella rättigheter till utvecklingsländerna och de minst utvecklade länderna, eftersom länderna ofta efterfrågar den här typen av stöd för att främja sin utveckling ⁽¹⁾.

Kommissionen kontrollerar regelbundet om partnerländerna har blivit bättre på bland annat goda styrelseformer och ekonomisk förvaltning. Rapporterna från de oberoende utvärderingarna av kommissionens program finns på webbplatsen: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/index_en.htm

⁽¹⁾ Mer information om EU:s och medlemsländernas program för tekniskt stöd avseende immateriella rättigheter finns på GD Handels webbsidor: <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=328>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002607/13
to the Commission
Amelia Andersdotter (Verts/ALE)
(6 March 2013)**

Subject: Follow-up to US Special 301 Reports in relation to EU development policy

Regarding the impact of United States Special 301 Reports on countries receiving EU development aid, I have raised the issue that development aid for institutional stability and educational systems might not be having the desired effect.

Commissioner De Gucht's answer to my Written Question E-011001/2012 stated that: 'The Commission does not systematically monitor and has not made an evaluation of the bilateral diplomatic relations in the area of intellectual property between the United States of America and other third countries, including those benefiting from EU development aid. Additionally, no cases have been reported to the Commission [...].'

If the Commission does not systematically monitor the factors that might have an impact on its policies, and the effect of those factors on the usage of taxpayers' money, can it explain what means are in place to ensure that development aid is not being spent in ways that are made useless by other countries' actions?

Moreover, as the Commission has admitted that there is no monitoring system and that the aid recipients themselves do not report issues that might call their aid into question, can it explain what measures have been taken in order to ensure that the countries benefiting from development aid are in fact on the road towards institutional stability, better access to education and a level of freedom of speech or expression that is at least on a par with that of the EU?

**Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission
(3 May 2013)**

The Commission has no evidence or information to support the Honourable Member's concerns about the potential negative impact that a United States report on intellectual property may have on the European Union's development policies or on the institutional stability, access to education and freedom of speech or expression in countries benefiting from EU development aid.

The EU and its Member States are actually major providers of aid to developing and least developed countries in the areas of intellectual property, as this kind of assistance is often requested by these countries to support their development ⁽¹⁾.

The Commission regularly monitors the progress of its partner countries in areas such as good governance and financial management. It has a comprehensive programme of independent evaluation of its programmes and the final reports of these strategic evaluations are published on its website at:
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/index_en.htm

⁽¹⁾ Detailed information about the EU and Member State technical assistance programmes dedicated to IPR is available at DG Trade's websites:
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=328>

(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-002608/13
an die Kommission**

Brian Simpson (S&D), Saïd El Khadraoui (S&D), Michael Cramer (Verts/ALE), Georges Bach (PPE), Michel Dantin (PPE), Ismail Ertug (S&D), Nathalie Griesbeck (ALDE), Jörg Leichtfried (S&D), Eva Lichtenberger (Verts/ALE), Hubert Pirker (PPE), Dominique Riquet (PPE) und Sabine Wils (GUE/NGL)
(6. März 2013)

Betrifft: Informationen und Untersuchungen zu längeren und schwereren Fahrzeugen

Bei der öffentlichen Anhörung zur Überarbeitung der Richtlinie 96/53/EG im Jahr 2012 hat die Kommission ausdrücklich erklärt, dass ihre Haltung zu längeren und schwereren Lastkraftwagen bezüglich Infrastruktur, Verkehrssicherheit, Umwelt und Verlagerung auf alternative Verkehrsträger nicht ausgereift sei und sie das Thema der Erweiterung/Einschränkung des Einsatzes von schwereren und/oder längeren Fahrzeugen daher nicht antasten wolle.

Hat die Kommission in der Zwischenzeit weitere Untersuchungen vorgenommen oder plant sie dies? Verfügt die Kommission mittlerweile über Informationen, die ihr tiefere Einblicke in die Auswirkungen längerer und schwererer Fahrzeuge auf die Infrastruktur, die Verkehrssicherheit, die Umwelt und die Verlagerung auf alternative Verkehrsträger verschaffen?

Wenn ja, wie sehen die erwarteten Auswirkungen auf die Infrastruktur, die Verkehrssicherheit, die Umwelt und die Verlagerung auf alternative Verkehrsträger aus?

In ihrer Antwort auf die schriftliche Anfrage E-010127/2012 vom 15. Januar 2013 erklärt die Kommission ausdrücklich, dass sie über neue Entwicklungen in Mitgliedstaaten, in denen längere Lastkraftwagen auf Dauer eingesetzt werden, sowie über sämtliche Entscheidungen, die im Rahmen von Versuchen mit Fahrzeugen, die die Höchstmaße überschreiten, getroffen werden, informiert sei. Die Kommission gibt ebenfalls an, dass sie bereit sei, diese Informationen zeitnah mit dem Parlament zu teilen. Wann wird die Kommission dies tun?

Antwort von Herrn Kallas im Namen der Kommission
(6. Mai 2013)

Im Einklang mit den Schlussfolgerungen der öffentlichen Anhörung von 2012 hat die Kommission beschlossen, in ihren Vorschlag ⁽¹⁾ zur Änderung der Richtlinie keine Bestimmungen aufzunehmen, die die in Artikel 4 vorgesehenen Ausnahmen dahin gehend ändern würden, den Verkehr von längeren oder schwereren Fahrzeugen auszuweiten oder einzuschränken. Wie vom Parlament bei mehreren Anlässen im vergangenen Jahr gefordert, nutzte die Kommission allerdings die Gelegenheit zur Präzisierung des Wortlauts von Artikel 4 im Sinne ihrer Rechtsauslegung des bestehenden Textes, die dem Parlament in dem Schreiben von Vizepräsident Kallas vom 13. Juni 2012 mitgeteilt wurde. Die Bestimmung lässt die derzeitige Bedeutung der Richtlinie unberührt und hat somit keine wirtschaftlichen oder sonstigen Auswirkungen. Daher wurden auch keine weiteren Studien zu dem Thema in Auftrag gegeben.

Am 23. April 2013 stellte Vizepräsident Kallas den Vorschlag im Ausschuss für Verkehr und Fremdenverkehr (TRAN) vor, und die Kommission ist bereit, dem Parlament alle weiteren Informationen über Entwicklungen und Erfahrungen aus Versuchen mit längeren Lkw mitzuteilen, sobald ihr solche Informationen vorliegen.

⁽¹⁾ Vorschlag für eine Richtlinie des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates zur Änderung der Richtlinie 96/53/EG vom 25. Juli 1996 zur Festlegung der höchstzulässigen Abmessungen für bestimmte Straßenfahrzeuge im innerstaatlichen und grenzüberschreitenden Verkehr in der Gemeinschaft sowie zur Festlegung der höchstzulässigen Gewichte im grenzüberschreitenden Verkehr, KOM(2013)195.

(Version française)

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-002608/13
à la Commission**

**Brian Simpson (S&D), Saïd El Khadraoui (S&D), Michael Cramer (Verts/ALE), Georges Bach (PPE),
Michel Dantin (PPE), Ismail Ertug (S&D), Nathalie Griesbeck (ALDE), Jörg Leichtfried (S&D),
Eva Lichtenberger (Verts/ALE), Hubert Pirker (PPE), Dominique Riquet (PPE) et Sabine Wils (GUE/NGL)**
(6 mars 2013)

Objet: Informations et études sur les véhicules plus longs et plus lourds

À l'occasion de sa consultation publique de 2012 sur la révision de la directive 96/53/CE, la Commission a clairement précisé que, dans le domaine des camions plus longs et plus lourds, elle n'avait pas arrêté sa position concernant les infrastructures, la sécurité routière, l'environnement et le transfert modal, et qu'elle ne se pencherait donc pas sur la question de savoir s'il convient d'étendre ou de réduire l'utilisation des véhicules plus longs et/ou plus lourds.

La Commission a-t-elle réalisé d'autres études entre-temps ou prévoit-elle de le faire? Dispose-t-elle désormais d'informations qui lui permettent de mieux comprendre l'incidence des véhicules plus longs et plus lourds sur les infrastructures, la sécurité routière, l'environnement et le transfert modal?

Dans l'affirmative, quelle est l'incidence escomptée dans ces différents domaines?

Dans sa réponse à la question écrite E-010127/2012 du 15 janvier 2013, la Commission indique clairement avoir connaissance d'éléments nouveaux sur l'utilisation habituelle de camions plus longs dans certains États membres, ainsi que de toutes les décisions relatives aux essais de véhicules dépassant les dimensions maximales. La Commission déclare également qu'elle est disposée à communiquer ces informations au Parlement en temps utile. Quand la Commission compte-t-elle le faire?

Réponse donnée par M. Kallas au nom de la Commission
(6 mai 2013)

La Commission a décidé, dans la droite ligne des conclusions de la consultation publique qu'elle a menée en 2012, de ne pas introduire, dans sa proposition ⁽¹⁾ de révision de la directive, de dispositions qui modifieraient la portée des dérogations au titre de l'article 4 de la directive dans le sens d'une extension ou d'une limitation du recours à des véhicules plus longs et/ou plus lourds. Comme l'a demandé le Parlement à plusieurs reprises l'année dernière, la Commission a cependant saisi l'occasion pour clarifier le texte de l'article 4 conformément à l'interprétation juridique qu'elle a faite du texte existant et que le Vice-président, M. Kallas, a communiquée au Parlement dans sa lettre du 13 juin 2012. Dès lors que cette disposition préserve tout simplement le sens existant de la directive, elle n'entraîne aucune nouvelle incidence, qu'elle soit économique ou autre. Aucune nouvelle étude sur la question n'a donc été commandée.

M. Kallas a présenté la proposition à la commission TRAN le 23 avril 2013, et la Commission est disposée, si des informations pertinentes venaient à paraître, à partager avec le Parlement toute information nouvelle en sa possession concernant le déroulement et les enseignements de la mise en circulation à titre expérimental des méga poids lourds.

⁽¹⁾ Proposition de directive du Parlement européen et du Conseil modifiant la directive 96/53/CE du 25 juillet 1996, fixant, pour certains véhicules routiers circulant dans la Communauté, les dimensions maximales autorisées en trafic national et international et les poids maximaux autorisés en trafic international, COM(2013)195.

(Nederlandse versie)

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002608/13
aan de Commissie**

Brian Simpson (S&D), Saïd El Khadraoui (S&D), Michael Cramer (Verts/ALE), Georges Bach (PPE), Michel Dantin (PPE), Ismail Ertug (S&D), Nathalie Griesbeck (ALDE), Jörg Leichtfried (S&D), Eva Lichtenberger (Verts/ALE), Hubert Pirker (PPE), Dominique Riquet (PPE) en Sabine Wils (GUE/NGL)
(6 maart 2013)

Betref: Informatie over en onderzoeken naar ecocombi's (LZV's)

In haar openbare raadpleging over de herziening van Richtlijn 96/53/EG heeft de Commissie duidelijk verklaard dat haar standpunt over langere en zwaardere vrachtautocombinaties — oftewel ecocombi's — nog niet weloverwogen was met betrekking tot infrastructuur, verkeersveiligheid, het milieu en de verschuiving tussen vervoerswijzen, en dat zij daarom nog geen uitspraken kon doen over de uitbreiding/vermindering van het gebruik van zwaardere en/of langere vrachtautocombinaties.

Heeft de Commissie in de tussentijd aanvullende onderzoeken uitgevoerd, of is zij dat van plan? Beschikt de Commissie nu over informatie die haar in staat stelt een grondiger inzicht te ontwikkelen in de effecten van ecocombi's op de infrastructuur, verkeersveiligheid, het milieu en de verschuiving tussen vervoerswijzen?

Zo ja, wat zijn de verwachte effecten op de infrastructuur, verkeersveiligheid, het milieu en de verschuiving tussen vervoerswijzen?

In haar antwoord op schriftelijke vraag E-010127/2012 van 15 januari 2013 verklaart de Commissie duidelijk dat zij op de hoogte wordt gebracht van nieuwe ontwikkelingen in de lidstaten die op permanente basis gebruikmaken van langere vrachtautocombinaties en van eventuele besluiten die worden genomen op het vlak van proeven met voertuigen die de maximale afmetingen overschrijden. Voorts zegt de Commissie dat zij bereid is dergelijke informatie te zijner tijd met het Parlement te delen. Wanneer gaat de Commissie dit doen?

Antwoord van de heer Kallas namens de Commissie
(6 mei 2013)

Overeenkomstig de conclusies van de openbare raadpleging van 2012 heeft de Commissie besloten om geen bepalingen toe te voegen aan haar voorstel ⁽¹⁾ tot herziening van de richtlijn die de werkingssfeer van de vrijstellingen krachtens artikel 4 van de richtlijn zouden wijzigen met het doel het gebruik van langere of zwaardere voertuigen uit te breiden of te beperken. Zoals het Parlement het voorbije jaar verschillende keren heeft verzocht, heeft de Commissie van de gelegenheid gebruikgemaakt om de tekst van artikel 4 te verduidelijken overeenkomstig de juridische interpretatie van de Commissie van de bestaande tekst zoals die is meegedeeld in de brief van vicevoorzitter Kallas van 13 juni 2012. Aangezien in deze bepaling de bestaande betekenis van de richtlijn wordt behouden, heeft ze dus geen economische of andere gevolgen. Derhalve is geen opdracht gegeven tot aanvullende onderzoeken over dit onderwerp.

Op 23 april 2013 heeft vicevoorzitter Kallas het voorstel gepresenteerd aan de TRAN-commissie. De Commissie blijft bereid informatie over ontwikkelingen en ervaringen op het gebied van proeven met lange vrachtwagens met het Parlement te delen, zodra zulke ervaring beschikbaar wordt.

⁽¹⁾ Voorstel voor een richtlijn van het Europees Parlement en de Raad tot wijziging van Richtlijn 96/53/EG van 25 juli 1996 houdende vaststelling, voor bepaalde aan het verkeer binnen de Gemeenschap deelnemende wegvoertuigen, van de in het nationale en het internationale verkeer maximaal toegestane afmetingen, en van de in het internationale verkeer maximaal toegestane gewichten.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002608/13
to the Commission**

Brian Simpson (S&D), Saïd El Khadraoui (S&D), Michael Cramer (Verts/ALE), Georges Bach (PPE), Michel Dantin (PPE), Ismail Ertug (S&D), Nathalie Griesbeck (ALDE), Jörg Leichtfried (S&D), Eva Lichtenberger (Verts/ALE), Hubert Pirker (PPE), Dominique Riquet (PPE) and Sabine Wils (GUE/NGL)
(6 March 2013)

Subject: Information and studies on longer heavier vehicles (LHVs)

In its 2012 public consultation on the revision of Directive 96/53/EC, the Commission clearly stated that its position on longer and heavier lorries was not a mature position as regards infrastructure, road safety, the environment and modal shift, and that as such the Commission would not touch on the issue of extending/reducing the use of heavier and/or longer vehicles.

Has the Commission undertaken any further studies in the meantime, or does it plan to do so? Does the Commission now hold information that allows it to develop a more in-depth understanding of the impact of LHVs on infrastructure, road safety, the environment and modal shift?

If so, what are the expected impacts on infrastructure, road safety, the environment and modal shift?

In its answer to Written Question E-010127/2012 of 15 January 2013, the Commission clearly states that it is informed of new developments in Member States using longer trucks on a permanent basis and of any decisions taken in the field of trials with vehicles exceeding the maximum dimensions. The Commission also states that it is 'ready to share such information with the Parliament in due course'. When will the Commission do so?

Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission
(6 May 2013)

In line with the conclusions of the public consultation carried out in 2012, the Commission has decided not to introduce any provisions in its proposal ⁽¹⁾ to revise the directive which would modify the scope of the derogations under Art. 4 of the directive with the aim of extending or limiting the use of longer or heavier vehicles. As requested by the Parliament on numerous occasions over the past year, the Commission did however take the opportunity to clarify the text of Art. 4 in line with the Commission's legal interpretation of the existing text as communicated to the Parliament by VP Kallas' letter of 13 June 2012. Since this provision merely preserves the existing meaning of the directive, it has no economic or other impact. Therefore no further studies on the subject have been commissioned.

Vice-President Kallas presented the proposal before the TRAN committee on 23.4.2013 and the Commission remains available to share any further information it possesses with the Parliament on developments and experiences from trials regarding longer trucks as relevant information becomes available.

⁽¹⁾ Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 96/53/EC of 25 July 1996 laying down for certain road vehicles circulating within the Community the maximum authorised dimensions in national and international traffic and the maximum authorised weights in international traffic, COM(2013) 195.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002609/13

alla Commissione

Mario Borghezio (EFD)

(6 marzo 2013)

Oggetto: La Commissione vieti l'utilizzo dell'aspartame

Uno studio svolto dai ricercatori dei National Institutes of Health statunitensi ha rilevato come le depressioni siano più frequenti tra i consumatori di bevande edulcorate artificialmente rispetto ai consumatori di bevande zuccherate. L'aspartame, già accusato di provocare tumori, sarebbe quindi alla base anche di altre patologie.

La Commissione, alla luce delle ricerche che ne hanno ampiamente dimostrato la tossicità per l'organismo umano, non ritiene opportuno vietare l'utilizzo di tale sostanza all'interno dell'UE?

Risposta di Tonio Borg a nome della Commissione

(18 aprile 2013)

La Commissione ha dato incarico all'Autorità europea per la sicurezza alimentare (EFSA) di effettuare una nuova valutazione sulla sicurezza dell'aspartame entro Maggio 2013.

In base alle conclusioni di questa futura valutazione la Commissione prenderà all'occorrenza i provvedimenti adeguati così da garantire ai consumatori la sicurezza nell'impiego dell'aspartame come dolcificante.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002609/13
to the Commission**

Mario Borghezio (EFD)

(6 March 2013)

Subject: The Commission should ban the use of aspartame

A study carried out by researchers from the US National Institutes of Health has found that depression occurs more frequently among consumers of artificially sweetened drinks than among consumers of sugared drinks. It therefore appears that aspartame, already accused of causing cancer, is also responsible for other illnesses.

In the light of the studies that have amply demonstrated the toxicity of this substance for humans, does the Commission not consider that its use within the EU should be banned?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission

(18 April 2013)

The Commission has mandated the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) to carry out a full re-evaluation of the safety of aspartame by May 2013.

Based on the conclusions of this full re-evaluation, the Commission will, if needed, take appropriate measures to ensure that the use of aspartame as a sweetener remains safe for the consumer.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002610/13
alla Commissione
Mario Borghezio (EFD)
(6 marzo 2013)**

Oggetto: La Commissione provveda a risolvere il problema dei ritardi di pagamento della pubblica amministrazione in Italia

La differenza fra i tempi di pagamento da parte delle pubbliche amministrazioni ai loro fornitori fra l'Italia e i Paesi europei è in costante aumento. In Italia occorrono 180 giorni per saldare una fattura, in Germania 37 giorni, in Gran Bretagna 43, in Svezia 24. Al momento si è giunti a 100 miliardi non riscossi dalle imprese per crediti nei confronti degli enti pubblici.

L'Italia è stata la prima nazione a ratificare la direttiva 2011/7/UE relativa alla lotta contro i ritardi di pagamento nelle transazioni commerciali che obbligherebbe la pubblica amministrazione a saldare i pagamenti entro 30 giorni, ma in Italia alcuni decreti — quali quello firmato da Enrico Bondi — hanno permesso ad ospedali e alle aziende sanitarie locali di ritardare i pagamenti fino a 120 giorni.

La Commissione intende aprire una procedura di infrazione nei confronti dell'Italia per correggere questa situazione?

**Risposta di Antonio Tajani a nome della Commissione
(30 aprile 2013)**

La direttiva 2011/7/UE stabilisce che gli enti pubblici sono tenuti a effettuare i pagamenti relativi agli scambi di beni e servizi entro 30 giorni o, in casi eccezionali, entro 60 giorni. A causa della situazione particolare del sistema sanitario tuttavia l'articolo 4, paragrafo 4, della direttiva contempla la possibilità di posticipare il pagamento fino a 60 giorni per gli «enti pubblici che forniscono assistenza sanitaria e che siano stati debitamente riconosciuti a tal fine». In caso di deroga lo Stato membro è tenuto a presentare una relazione alla Commissione entro il 16 marzo 2018.

Per quanto riguarda il caso dell'Italia, il 9 novembre 2012 il governo ha recepito la direttiva sopracitata col decreto legislativo n. 192/2012. Nei mesi di dicembre 2012 e marzo 2013 la Commissione ha scritto al Ministro dello sviluppo economico, delle infrastrutture e dei trasporti chiedendo delucidazioni in merito ad alcuni aspetti della normativa italiana. La Commissione sta procedendo ad un'analisi giuridica dei documenti ricevuti dal governo italiano nell'intento di verificare che i provvedimenti nazionali siano conformi alla direttiva.

La Commissione ha indicato al governo italiano di essere disposta a discutere riguardo agli ulteriori aspetti tecnici con gli enti nazionali competenti.

Se l'analisi giuridica non sarà conforme alle condizioni di cui alla direttiva in quanto garante del trattato la Commissione potrà prendere provvedimenti e, all'occorrenza, iniziare procedimenti per infrazione.

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(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002610/13
to the Commission**

Mario Borghezio (EFD)

(6 March 2013)

Subject: The Commission should resolve the problem of late payments by the public administration in Italy

The difference between Italy and other European countries in terms of the time taken by public administrations to pay their suppliers is constantly increasing. In Italy it takes 180 days to pay an invoice; in Germany it takes 37 days, in the United Kingdom 43 days, and in Sweden 24 days. Currently, there is a total of EUR 100 billion in outstanding debts owed to businesses by public administrations.

Italy was the first country to ratify Directive 2011/7/EU on combating late payment in commercial transactions, which would oblige the public administration to make payments within 30 days. However, in Italy certain decrees — such as the one signed by Enrico Bondi — have allowed hospitals and local health authorities to delay payments by up to 120 days.

Does the Commission intend to initiate infringement proceedings against Italy to remedy this situation?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission

(30 April 2013)

Directive 2011/7/EU obliges public authorities to pay for goods and services within 30 calendar days or, in very exceptional circumstances, within 60 days. Due to the particular challenges in the healthcare systems, however, Article 4(4) of the directive states that countries may extend the time-limits up to a maximum of 60 calendar days for 'public entities providing healthcare which are duly recognised for that purpose'. If a Member State decides to grant this derogation, it should send a report to the Commission by 16 March 2018.

As regards the particular case of Italy, the government transposed the directive on 9 November 2012, by Legislative Decree No 192/2012. In December 2012 and March 2013, the Commission wrote to the Minister of Economic Development, Infrastructure and Transport, asking for clarifications on some aspects of the Italian legislation. The Commission is currently undertaking a legal analysis of the clarification received by the Italian Government, to verify whether the national measure conforms with the directive.

The Commission has also informed the Italian Government about the Commission's availability to further discuss any technicality with the competent national authorities.

Should the legal assessment reveal non-compliance with the requirements of the directive, the Commission, in its role as Guardian of the Treaty, may take the necessary action, including where appropriate infringement procedures.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002611/13

alla Commissione

Mario Borghezio (EFD)

(6 marzo 2013)

Oggetto: La Commissione protegga il miele europeo

Le recenti decisioni in materia di etichettatura del miele, e la decisione di rivedere la proposta di direttiva, dopo gli studi di impatto che sono stati intrapresi dalla Commissione su richiesta del Parlamento europeo, indicano la necessità di applicare norme a tutela della produzione europea di miele. Attualmente ben il 40 % del miele consumato nell'Unione europea, è importato da Paesi extra-UE quali la Cina e l'Argentina.

Quali controlli sanitari impone la Commissione a tali importazioni e con quali risultati?

La Commissione non ritiene che sia necessaria una etichettatura più restrittiva per il miele importato, onde garantire la piena e completa visibilità nel caso siano presenti componenti contenenti OGM?

La Commissione intende contrastare l'uso di mescolare miele di provenienza extra-UE con miele UE onde garantire la completa tracciabilità del prodotto?

Risposta di Tonio Borg a nome della Commissione

(25 aprile 2013)

1. Il miele può essere importato solo dai paesi terzi che abbiano un piano di sorveglianza dei residui approvato per tale prodotto di base e figurino nell'elenco di cui all'allegato della decisione 2011/163/UE della Commissione ⁽¹⁾. I paesi terzi sono tenuti a presentare i loro piani ed i risultati della sorveglianza dei residui su base annua. Gli Stati membri sono inoltre tenuti a campionare le partite di miele al punto d'importazione nell'UE (nell'ambito di applicazione della direttiva 97/78/CE sui controlli veterinari). Eventuali risultati non conformi devono essere riportati tramite il sistema di allarme rapido per gli alimenti ed i mangimi (RASFF) ⁽²⁾. Da gennaio 2010 fino ad oggi sono stati riportati venti risultati non conformi per residui di medicinali ad uso veterinario, quattordici dei quali riguardavano il miele importato da paesi terzi. In tale situazione gli Stati membri sono tenuti a prendere i provvedimenti del caso.

2. La Commissione ritiene che le norme di etichettatura per gli organismi geneticamente modificati autorizzati nell'UE sancite dalla relativa legislazione ⁽³⁾, compresa la soglia di etichettatura dello 0,9 %, siano applicabili al miele come a qualsiasi altro prodotto alimentare. Non esistono ragioni obiettive per trattare il miele come un'eccezione.

3. Le norme in tema di tracciabilità sono applicabili al miele come a qualsiasi altro prodotto alimentare. A norma della direttiva 2001/110/CE del Consiglio concernente il miele ⁽⁴⁾, il paese o i paesi d'origine in cui il miele è stato raccolto devono essere indicati sull'etichetta; se tuttavia il miele è originario di più Stati membri o paesi terzi l'indicazione può essere sostituita, a seconda del caso, da «miscela di mieli originari della CE», «miscela di mieli non originari della CE» o «miscela di mieli originari e non originari della CE».

⁽¹⁾ GUL 70 del 17.3.2011, pag. 40.

⁽²⁾ Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/rapidalert/index_en.htm).

⁽³⁾ Regolamento (CE) n. 1829/2003 relativo agli alimenti e ai mangimi geneticamente modificati, GUL 268 del 18.10.2003.

⁽⁴⁾ GUL 10 del 12.1.2002, pag. 47.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002611/13
to the Commission**

Mario Borghezio (EFD)

(6 March 2013)

Subject: The Commission should protect European honey

Recent decisions on the labelling of honey, and the decision to review the proposal for a directive — following the impact studies undertaken by the Commission at the request of the European Parliament — highlight the need to apply rules to protect the European honey sector. Currently, as much as 40% of honey consumed in the European Union is imported from non-EU countries such as China and Argentina.

What public health controls does the Commission apply to these imports, and what have the results been?

Does the Commission not believe that more restrictive labelling is needed for imported honey, to ensure full and complete visibility in cases where it includes ingredients containing GMOs?

Does the Commission intend to combat the practice of mixing honey from outside the EU with EU honey, so as to ensure the full traceability of the product?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission

(25 April 2013)

1. Honey can only be imported from third countries which have an approved residue monitoring plan for this commodity and are listed in the annex to Commission Decision 2011/163/EU ⁽¹⁾. Third countries must submit their plans and results of residues monitoring on an annual basis. Additionally the Member States must sample consignments of honey at the point of import into the EU (within the scope of the veterinary checks Directive 97/78/EC). Non-compliant results are to be reported under the RASFF ⁽²⁾. From January 2010 to date, 20 non-compliant results for residues of veterinary medicines have been reported, 14 of which concerned honey imported from third countries. The Member States are obliged to take measures in such situation.
2. The Commission considers that the labelling rules for EU authorised GMOs set out in the GMO legislation ⁽³⁾, including the 0.9% labelling threshold, apply equally to honey as to any other foodstuff. There is no objective reason to make an exception for honey.
3. Traceability rules apply to honey as to any other foodstuff. In accordance with Council Directive 2001/110/EC ⁽⁴⁾ relating to honey, the country or countries of origin where the honey has been harvested shall be indicated on the label; however if the honey originates in more than one Member State or third country that indication may be replaced as appropriate by 'blend of EC honeys', 'blend of non-EC honeys' or 'blend of EC and non-EC honeys'.

⁽¹⁾ OJ L 70/40, 17.3.2011.

⁽²⁾ Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/rapidalert/index_en.htm).

⁽³⁾ Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 on GM food and feed; OJ L 268, 18.10.2003.

⁽⁴⁾ OJ L 10, 12.1.2002, p.47.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002612/13
alla Commissione**

Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)

(6 marzo 2013)

Oggetto: Chiusura di stabilimento a Bari, iniziative europee per il suo rilancio

Un noto produttore giapponese di pneumatici ha comunicato pochi giorni fa la sua decisione di chiudere, entro il 2014, la sua fabbrica a Modugno, in provincia di Bari (Italia), dove lavorano attualmente 950 persone. Lo stabilimento in questione è uno degli 8 impianti della nota marca di pneumatici in Europa: gli altri si trovano in Spagna, Francia, Polonia ed Ungheria. La scelta è stata presa a seguito della crisi economica che ha colpito duramente il settore, e in particolare dell'andamento dei profitti dell'azienda in questione. In Europa le vendite di gomme per auto sono calate da quota 300 milioni di unità nel 2011 a 261 milioni nel 2012, con una flessione del 13 % e a fronte di previsioni che non danno come probabile un ritorno ai livelli del 2011 almeno fino al 2020.

Data, infine, la competizione dei produttori dei Paesi emergenti nel settore dei pneumatici di primo livello, le priorità di produzione dell'azienda sono cambiate per concentrarsi su segmenti di produzione diversi. Proprio questa svolta nella strategia di fabbricazione, insieme alle perdite di bilancio, starebbe alla base della decisione di chiudere l'impianto di Modugno.

Tutto ciò premesso:

1. vista l'importanza occupazionale che l'azienda riveste per la regione, valuterà la Commissione ogni possibilità per evitare la chiusura dello stabilimento, anche attraverso l'impegno specifico di fondi europei (fondi FESR stanziati ma non ancora spesi, fondi Horizon 2020, intervento della BEI)?
2. Quali ulteriori iniziative intende assumere al fine di garantire il rilancio dell'attività industriale e i livelli di occupazione nella zona industriale di Modugno (Bari)?

Risposta di Johannes Hahn a nome della Commissione

(30 aprile 2013)

1. Qualsiasi aiuto concesso all'impresa cui fa riferimento l'onorevole deputato costituirebbe un aiuto di Stato ai sensi del trattato e dovrebbe essere autorizzato dalla Commissione. Prima del rilascio di una simile autorizzazione non è possibile stanziare fondi.
2. Per quanto concerne il Fondo europeo di sviluppo regionale (FESR), il programma regionale Puglia e il programma nazionale Ricerca e competitività offrono un'ampia varietà di misure per promuovere le attività economiche in Puglia. Per quanto concerne il Fondo sociale europeo, il programma dell'FSE può intervenire con misure volte a promuovere la riqualificazione dei lavoratori in mobilità o ad aggiornare le loro competenze in vista di possibili cambiamenti nel sistema di produzione. In linea con il principio di gestione condivisa usato per l'attuazione della politica di coesione, la selezione dei singoli progetti da cofinanziarsi ad opera del FESR o dell'FSE rientra nelle responsabilità delle autorità di gestione dei programmi summenzionati, a livello regionale e nazionale.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002612/13
to the Commission**

Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)

(6 March 2013)

Subject: Closure of a factory in Bari — EU initiatives for its reopening

A few days ago, a well-known Japanese tyre manufacturer announced its decision to close, by 2014, its factory at Modugno in the province of Bari (Italy), which currently employs 950 people. The factory in question is one of the manufacturer's eight European plants; the others are in Spain, France, Poland and Hungary. The decision was taken as a result of the economic crisis, which has hit the sector badly, and particularly because of the company's falling profits. In Europe, sales of car tyres have fallen by 13% from around 300 million units in 2011 to 261 million in 2012, with forecasts suggesting that there will be no return to 2011 levels until at least 2020.

In view of the competition from producers in the emerging countries in the premium tyre sector, the company has switched its production priorities to concentrate on different product segments. It is this change of manufacturing strategy, together with the loss of profit, that appears to lie behind the decision to close the Modugno plant.

Can the Commission answer the following questions:

1. Given this company's importance for the region in terms of employment, will the Commission look into every possible option for avoiding the closure of the factory, including the specific commitment of European funds (ERDF funds allocated but not yet spent, Horizon 2020 funds, intervention by the EIB)?
2. What other measures does the Commission intend to take to revive industrial activity and employment in the industrial zone of Modugno?

Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission

(30 April 2013)

1. Any aid to the company to which the Honourable Member refers, would constitute state aid in the sense of the Treaty and would have to be authorised by the Commission. Prior to such authorisation, no EU funds can be allocated.
 2. As far as the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) is concerned, the Apulia regional programme and the national Research & Competitiveness programme offer a wide variety of measures to promote economic activities in the Apulia region. As far as the European Social Fund is concerned, the ESF programme can intervene through measures aimed at fostering the requalification of workers in mobility or at adapting their skills to possible changes in the production system. In line with the shared management principle used for the implementation of cohesion policy, the selection of individual projects to be co-financed by the ERDF or the ESF is the responsibility of the managing authorities of the aforementioned programmes, at regional and national level.
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(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002613/13
alla Commissione
Roberta Angelilli (PPE)
(6 marzo 2013)

Oggetto: Caso di sottrazione internazionale di due minori

In seguito alla separazione di un cittadino tedesco, residente in Belgio, e di una cittadina olandese, due minori (di 9 e 6 anni) sono stati portati via dalla madre dal luogo di residenza abituale in Olanda.

A conclusione del procedimento svoltosi dinanzi al tribunale competente in Olanda, la sentenza ha stabilito il divieto per la donna di lasciare il paese senza il previo accordo del padre, avendo i genitori l'affido congiunto dei figli.

Nonostante il divieto impostole dalla sentenza, la madre ha portato i bambini, presumibilmente, in Francia e da allora il padre non ne ha più avuto alcuna notizia.

Alla luce di quanto precede, può la Commissione far sapere:

1. se la normativa europea applicabile in materia di riconoscimento di sentenze straniere sia di applicazione nel caso in esame;
2. nel caso positivo, quali siano le misure concrete previste dalla legislazione europea affinché sia disposto il rientro dei minori presso la loro residenza abituale nei Paesi Bassi;
3. se la legislazione europea applicabile al caso in esame imponga altresì alle autorità degli Stati membri coinvolte tempi brevi predefiniti per la risoluzione di tali controversie?

Risposta di Viviane Reding a nome della Commissione
(22 maggio 2013)

Le informazioni fornite dall'onorevole deputato non consentono alla Commissione di stabilire se il regolamento (CE) n. 2201/2003 ⁽¹⁾ (il regolamento Bruxelles II bis) sia applicabile al caso dei due minori.

La Commissione non è pertanto nella posizione di esprimersi in merito a possibili misure concrete per risolvere il caso in oggetto.

I casi di trasferimento illecito o mancato ritorno del minore in uno Stato membro diverso da quello in cui tale minore aveva la sua residenza abituale immediatamente prima del suo trasferimento o del suo mancato rientro sono disciplinati dal regolamento Bruxelles II bis. Il regolamento in oggetto stabilisce norme uniformi in materia di sottrazione di minori transfrontaliera nell'UE e mette a disposizione del genitore leso nei suoi diritti una procedura rapida per il rientro di un minore coinvolto in un trasferimento illecito o in un mancato ritorno. A tal fine, per ottenere una decisione dell'autorità giurisdizionale in merito al rientro del minore, il regolamento prevede un periodo massimo di sei settimane a partire dalla presentazione della domanda per il ritorno del minore. Il regolamento stabilisce inoltre un periodo di un mese a partire dall'emanazione di un provvedimento contro il ritorno per l'inoltro dei documenti del caso all'autorità giurisdizionale o all'autorità centrale nello Stato membro di origine del minore.

⁽¹⁾ GUL 338 del 23.12.2003, pag. 1.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002613/13
to the Commission
Roberta Angelilli (PPE)
(6 March 2013)

Subject: Case of international abduction of two children

Following the separation between a German man, resident in Belgium, and a Dutch woman, two children (aged 9 and 6) were taken away from the mother from their place of habitual residence in the Netherlands.

At the conclusion of the proceedings before the competent court in the Netherlands, the woman was prohibited from leaving the country without the prior consent of the father, given that the parents shared custody of their children.

Despite the ban imposed on her by the judgment, the mother took the children, presumably to France, since when the father has not heard from them.

In light of the above, can the Commission say:

1. whether the applicable European legislation regarding recognition of foreign judgments also applies in the present case;
2. if so, what concrete measures does European legislation provide so as to order the return of the children to their habitual residence in the Netherlands;
3. whether the European legislation applicable to this case also imposes strict timeframes on the authorities of the Member States involved to resolve such disputes?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(22 May 2013)

On the basis of the information provided by the Honourable Member, the Commission is not in a position to establish whether Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003⁽¹⁾ ('the Brussels IIa regulation') is applicable in the case of the two minors.

The Commission is therefore not in a position to advise on concrete measures that could be taken to resolve the case in point.

In cases of wrongful removal or retention of a child in a Member State other than the Member State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the wrongful removal or retention, the Brussels IIa regulation applies. This regulation lays down uniform rules on the subject of cross-border parental child abduction in the EU and makes available to a left-behind parent an expeditious procedure for obtaining the return of a child who has been wrongfully removed or retained. To this end, it provides for a maximum period of six weeks for obtaining a decision from the court on the return of the child, starting from the lodging of a return application, and a one-month deadline for the transmission of documents to the court with jurisdiction or the central authority in the Member State of origin of the child after a non-return order is issued.

⁽¹⁾ OJ L 338, 23.12.2003, p. 1.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002614/13

alla Commissione
Roberta Angelilli (PPE)

(6 marzo 2013)

Oggetto: Giurisdizione applicabile

Un cittadino italiano e una cittadina britannica hanno contratto matrimonio in Italia, ivi stabilendo la residenza coniugale. Dalla coppia è nato un figlio. La nascita è avvenuta in Gran Bretagna per volere della madre e con il consenso del padre. La moglie ha trascorso i mesi precedenti al parto in Gran Bretagna presso la propria famiglia di origine e dopo la nascita del figlio non ha fatto più ritorno in Italia. A seguito di questa situazione si è creato un conflitto sulla giurisdizione applicabile.

In effetti l'articolo 8 del regolamento (CE) n. 2201/2003 sancisce, ai fini della determinazione della giurisdizione applicabile, il principio della «residenza abituale del minore esistente al tempo della proposizione della domanda» quale titolo attributivo della competenza, allorquando, nei casi di divorzio, separazione personale ed annullamento del matrimonio, la domanda verta anche sui profili della responsabilità genitoriale.

Nel caso di specie, il minore non è mai stato in Italia, è cittadino britannico e ha la residenza abituale in Inghilterra, dove stabilmente vive fin dalla nascita.

D'altra parte l'articolo 3 del suddetto regolamento sancisce che sono competenti a decidere sulle questioni inerenti al divorzio, alla separazione o all'annullamento del matrimonio le autorità giurisdizionali dello Stato membro nel cui territorio si trova la residenza abituale dei coniugi o l'ultima residenza abituale dei coniugi se uno di essi vi risiede ancora.

Potrebbe la Commissione chiarire:

1. se la legislazione dell'Unione ed in particolare il regolamento (CE) n. 2201/2003 sono sufficienti a dirimere un caso come quello in esame oppure vi sia una incongruenza nella normativa europea;
2. nel caso positivo, quale dei due principi definiti dal regolamento (CE) n. 2201/2003 relativi alla decisione sulla competenza giurisdizionale dovrebbe prevalere;
3. nel caso negativo, se intende presentare proposte legislative al Parlamento ed al Consiglio volte a precisare meglio i criteri per l'attribuzione della competenza sulla giurisdizione applicabile in casi simili a quello in esame?

Risposta di Viviane Reding a nome della Commissione

(22 maggio 2013)

Nell'ambito del diritto di famiglia, il regolamento (CE) n. 2201/2003⁽¹⁾ (il regolamento Bruxelles II bis) stabilisce norme chiare e lineari sulla competenza giurisdizionale e sul riconoscimento e l'esecuzione delle decisioni in materia matrimoniale e in materia di responsabilità genitoriale, al fine di risolvere le controversie transfrontaliere sull'affidamento all'interno dell'UE.

Le disposizioni in materia di giurisdizione di cui all'articolo 3 del regolamento Bruxelles II bis si limitano a disciplinare il divorzio, la separazione personale dei coniugi e l'annullamento del matrimonio. Non vi è nessuna sovrapposizione con la competenza giurisdizionale in materia di responsabilità genitoriale, che è sancita dall'articolo 8 e succ. del medesimo regolamento.

La Commissione sta svolgendo il primo riesame periodico del regolamento Bruxelles II bis. Sulla base degli esiti di tale riesame, la Commissione valuterà la necessità di ulteriori interventi legislativi.

⁽¹⁾ GUL 338 del 23.12.2003, pag. 1.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002614/13
to the Commission
Roberta Angelilli (PPE)
(6 March 2013)

Subject: Applicable jurisdiction

An Italian man and a British woman were married in Italy, establishing their marital residence there. A son was born to the couple. The birth took place in the United Kingdom at the behest of the mother and with the father's consent. The wife spent the months prior to the birth in the United Kingdom with her family of origin and after the son's birth did not return to Italy. This has led to a conflict over the applicable jurisdiction.

Indeed, Article 8 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 lays down, for the purpose of determining the applicable jurisdiction, the principle of 'habitual residence of the child when the application was made' as a title conferring jurisdiction, whereas, in cases of divorce, legal separation and marriage annulment, the application also concerns aspects of parental responsibility.

In this case, the child has never been in Italy, is a British citizen and has his habitual residence in the United Kingdom, where he has lived ever since birth.

On the other hand, Article 3 of the regulation states that the courts of the Member State in whose territory the spouses are habitually resident — or were last habitually resident insofar as one of them still resides there — are competent to decide on matters relating to divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment.

Could the Commission clarify:

1. whether EU legislation, in particular Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003, is sufficient to settle a case such as this, or whether there is an inconsistency in EU legislation;
2. if so, which of the two principles laid down in Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 concerning applicable jurisdiction should prevail;
3. if not, whether it intends to propose legislation to Parliament and the Council to clarify the criteria for conferring applicable jurisdiction, in cases such as the present one?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(22 May 2013)

In the area of family law, Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003⁽¹⁾ ('the Brussels IIa regulation') provides for clear and consistent rules on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matters of parental responsibility to settle cross-border custody disputes within the EU.

The jurisdiction rules set out in Article 3 of the Brussels IIa regulation are limited to divorce, legal separation and marriage annulment. There is no overlap with the grounds of jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility, which can be found in Article 8 et seq. of the Brussels IIa regulation.

The Commission is currently in the process of carrying out the first regular review of the Brussels IIa regulation. Based on this assessment, the Commission will examine the need of any further legislative action.

⁽¹⁾ OJ L 338, 23.12.2003, p. 1.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002615/13

à Comissão

Diogo Feio (PPE)

(6 de março de 2013)

Assunto: Portugal e Irlanda: acordo de princípio — extensão dos prazos de pagamento

Os ministros das Finanças da União Europeia chegaram no dia 5 de março de 2013 a um acordo de princípio com vista à extensão dos prazos para pagamento dos empréstimos solicitada por Portugal e pela Irlanda, no quadro dos respetivos programas de assistência financeira.

Os 27 concordaram em solicitar à «troika» que avance agora com uma proposta com as melhores opções possíveis para cada um dos dois países, tanto para os empréstimos concedidos ao abrigo do Fundo Europeu de Estabilização Financeira (FEEF) como do Mecanismo Europeu de Estabilidade Financeira (MEEF).

Assim, pergunto à Comissão:

1. Como avalia o acordo de princípio alcançado no dia 5 de março de 2013, nomeadamente quanto à sua necessidade e oportunidade?
2. Em seu entender, que novas condições devem constar dos programas de assistência financeira?

Resposta dada por Olli Rehn em nome da Comissão

(18 de abril de 2013)

Uma extensão dos prazos de vencimento dos empréstimos da UE a Portugal e à Irlanda poderá ser útil, dado que tal contribuirá para suavizar os perfis de amortização da dívida de ambos os países e isentar o período pós-programa de amortizações para o MEEF e o FEEF, facilitando o regresso duradouro aos mercados. As grandes necessidades anuais de financiamento podem ser uma fonte de vulnerabilidade para o acesso ao mercado em condições razoáveis, especialmente quando os níveis da dívida são já elevados (como é o caso da Irlanda e de Portugal). O restabelecimento do financiamento privado é um dos principais objetivos de ambos os programas.

Neste contexto, o Conselho Ecofin mandou a Troica e o FEEF para analisar opções para a extensão dos prazos de vencimento dos empréstimos do MEEF e do FEEF (comunicação Ecofin de 5 de março) e o Eurogrupo acordou prolongar o prazo dos empréstimos do FEEF (ver declaração de 16 de março do Eurogrupo). A análise deve ser apresentada na reunião do Ecofin de 23 de abril.

A eventual decisão de prolongar os prazos de vencimento dos empréstimos está nas mãos dos Estados-Membros e das instituições da UE, no que diz respeito ao FEEF e ao MEEF.

Ambos os países são atualmente objeto de um programa de ajustamento económico. Os programas destinam-se a restabelecer a sustentabilidade orçamental, favorecer o crescimento económico e a salvaguarda da estabilidade financeira.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002615/13
to the Commission**

Diogo Feio (PPE)

(6 March 2013)

Subject: Portugal and Ireland: agreement in principle on extending payment deadlines

On 5 March 2013, EU finance ministers reached an agreement in principle on the extension of loan-repayment deadlines requested by Portugal and Ireland, in the context of their respective financial assistance programmes.

The 27 agreed to ask the Troika to suggest the best possible options for each of the two countries, for loans granted under the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM).

1. What is the Commission's view of the agreement in principle of 5 March 2013, particularly in terms of whether it is necessary and appropriate?

2. What does it think the new conditions for the financial assistance programmes should be?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission

(18 April 2013)

An extension of the maturity of EU loans to Portugal and Ireland could be useful because this will help to smooth the debt redemption profiles of both countries and free the post-programme period from EFSM/EFSF redemptions, thereby facilitating a resumption of durable market access. Large financing needs in single years can be a source of vulnerability for market access at reasonable terms, especially when debt levels are already high (as it is the case in Ireland and Portugal). Re-establishing private funding is a key objective of both programmes.

Against this background, the Ecofin Council mandated the Troika and the EFSF to look into options for lengthening the maturities of EFSM and EFSF loans (Ecofin statement of 5 March) and the Eurogroup agreed to a lengthening of EFSF loans in principle (see Eurogroup statement of 16 March). The analysis shall be presented the Ecofin meeting on 23 April.

The eventual decision to lengthen the maturities of these loans is in the hands of the EU Member States and the EU institutions, as regards the EFSF and the EFSM.

Both countries are currently subject to an economic adjustment programme. The programmes aim at restoring fiscal sustainability, enhancing economic growth and safeguarding financial stability.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002638/13
to the Commission
Nigel Farage (EFD)
(6 March 2013)**

Subject: EUROGENDFOR X

On 24 January 2013, the *New Statesman* magazine reported that in Greece, during the past few weeks, offices of the governing parties and homes of pro-government journalists have been firebombed and the headquarters of the Prime Minister's conservative New Democracy party sprayed with machine-gun fire, and that, days later, a bomb exploded at a shopping mall belonging to the country's second wealthiest citizen.

A former Greek Ambassador, Leonidas Chrysanthopoulos, predicts that an 'explosion' of civil unrest will occur when retroactive and sizeable tax bills come due in the coming months.

The Greek army has reportedly promised not to intervene, and the Greek Government has turned to private security firms rather than trust the underpaid Greek police to keep order.

How does the Commission propose to ensure the safety of the Troika on its visits to Greece, given that on the occasion of Chancellor Merkel's visit to Athens the Greek Government felt it necessary to flood the streets with more than 7 000 police officers?

**Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the Commission
(15 April 2013)**

It should be noted that as regards the visits of the Troika, the Commission is responsible for ensuring security of the Commission representatives within the Troika.

In order to ensure their security when travelling or staying in Greece, security measures are carried out by the competent Commission services in close cooperation with the Greek police authorities and with the security departments of the other Troika members on the basis of security assessments conducted in view of each particular mission.

Depending on the identified safety and security threats, security measures can range from discreet monitoring actions up to a more visible close protection scheme.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης P-002640/13

προς την Επιτροπή

Theodoros Skyllakakis (ALDE)

(6 Μαρτίου 2013)

Θέμα: Αύξηση δανεισμού πολιτικών κομμάτων χωρίς τραπεζικά κριτήρια

Στην ερώτησή μου E-011048/2011, σχετικά με την χρηματοδότηση των πολιτικών κομμάτων, στην οποία ερωτάτο η Επιτροπή αν θεωρεί σημαντικό «να αποτρέψει να χρησιμοποιηθούν τα χρήματα των ευρωπαϊών φορολογουμένων για νέα δάνεια χωρίς τραπεζικά κριτήρια στα κυβερνητικά κόμματα, που θα αλλοιώσουν την ανεπηρέαστη έκφραση της βούλησης του ελληνικού λαού», η Επιτροπή δήλωσε ότι ανησυχεί για κάθε ενδεχόμενο ηθικού κινδύνου που σχετίζεται με το πρόγραμμα για την Ελλάδα και δεσμεύτηκε ότι «Όσον αφορά την αναμενόμενη ανακεφαλαιοποίηση των τραπεζών, θα ληφθούν μέτρα για να διασφαλιστεί η τήρηση των αρχών της δίκαιης μεταχείρισης, της αμεροληψίας και της ανεξαρτησίας από πολιτικές επιρροές». Σύμφωνα με τους ισολογισμούς της Νέας Δημοκρατίας και του ΠΑΣΟΚ, το 2012 τα δύο κόμματα, εμφανίζουν αύξηση του δανεισμού τους (και τα δύο μαζί, σχεδόν 30 εκ. ευρώ), παρά το γεγονός ότι ήδη από το 2011 ήταν υπερδανεισμένα και ήταν προφανές ότι δεν επρόκειτο να πληρώσουν τα χρέη τους. Η αύξηση του δανεισμού την εκλογική χρονιά, όταν με τραπεζικά κριτήρια έπρεπε να χρησιμοποιήσουν την κρατική επιχορήγηση για την εξυπηρέτηση των δανείων τους, είναι μια παραβίαση της ουσίας της δημοκρατικής διαδικασίας.

Τα δύο κόμματα, με τα δάνεια που πήραν από τις τράπεζες, (οι οποίες ήταν σε απόλυτη εξάρτηση από το κράτος και από την χρηματοδότηση με ευρωπαϊκούς πόρους) είχαν εκλογικά το οικονομικό πλεονέκτημα όχι μόνο σε θέματα διαφήμισης αλλά ακόμα και στην μεταφορά των ψηφοφόρων τους, επηρεάζοντας έτσι αθέμιτα την έκφραση της βούλησης του ελληνικού λαού.

Ουσιαστικά, επιτράπηκε στα δύο κόμματα, να αυξήσουν το δανεισμό τους, παραβιάζοντας τα θεμελιώδη τραπεζικά κριτήρια, παρά τη δέσμευση της Επιτροπής για το αντίθετο, παρά το γεγονός ότι στο τέλος του 2011 ήδη ο δανεισμός τους ξεπερνούσε τα 230 εκ. ευρώ και παρά το γεγονός ότι την ίδια χρονιά η πιστωτική επέκταση του ιδιωτικού τομέα μειωνόταν.

Θεωρεί η Επιτροπή ότι τήρησε την ως άνω δέσμευσή της;

Θεωρεί ότι οι ανωτέρω εξελίξεις θίγουν και το οικονομικό συμφέρον της ΕΕ (μέσω του δανεισμού των κομμάτων χωρίς τραπεζικά κριτήρια, από τράπεζες οι οποίες είναι εξαρτημένες από την ΕΚΤ και τον Ευρωπαϊκό Μηχανισμό Σταθερότητας «ESM»);

Απάντηση του κ. Rehn εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής

(18 Απριλίου 2013)

Όσον αφορά την αναμενόμενη ανακεφαλαιοποίηση των τραπεζών, η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή ανταποκρίθηκε στη δέσμευσή της να λάβει μέτρα για να διασφαλιστεί η τήρηση των αρχών της δίκαιης μεταχείρισης, της αμεροληψίας και της ανεξαρτησίας από πολιτικές επιρροές.

Το ζήτημα αυτό συζητήθηκε με τις ελληνικές αρχές κατά την πρώτη επανεξέταση του δεύτερου προγράμματος οικονομικής προσαρμογής για την Ελλάδα, η οποία ολοκληρώθηκε τον Δεκέμβριο του 2012. Τα μέτρα που ελήφθησαν στο πλαίσιο της ανακεφαλαιοποίησης των βασικών τραπεζών, σύμφωνα με το μνημόνιο συμφωνίας, παράγραφος 3.4.2. (διασφαλίσεις για τη σταθερότητα και τη βιωσιμότητα του χρηματοπιστωτικού συστήματος), περιλαμβάνουν το διορισμό εντολοδόχων παρακολούθησης σε όλες τις τράπεζες που τελούν υπό αναδιάρθρωση (το μεγαλύτερο μέρος του ελληνικού τραπεζικού συστήματος).

Οι εντολοδόχοι παρακολούθησης άρχισαν τη δραστηριότητά τους στις 16 Ιανουαρίου 2013 και δραστηριοποιούνται στο πλαίσιο αυστηρώς καθορισμένων καθηκόντων ώστε να ελέγχουν και να παρακολουθούν εκ του σύνεγγυς τις τραπεζικές δραστηριότητες. Ακόμη και ελλείψει εγκεκριμένου σχεδίου αναδιάρθρωσης, οι εντολοδόχοι επαληθεύουν επί του παρόντος την ορθή διακυβέρνηση και τη χρήση κριτηρίων εμπορικής βάσης σε σημαντικές αποφάσεις πολιτικής (συμπεριλαμβανομένης και της δανειοδότησης). Αυτό περιλαμβάνει επίσης την παρακολούθηση των πράξεων δανειοδότησης των πολιτικών κομμάτων.

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-002640/13
to the Commission**

Theodoros Skylakakis (ALDE)

(6 March 2013)

Subject: Increase in borrowing by political parties without being subject to credit criteria

My Question E-011048/2011 on the funding of political parties asked the Commission whether it considered it important 'to prevent European taxpayers' money being used for new loans to the governing parties, without these being subject to credit criteria, which would stand in the way of the free expression of the will of the Greek people'. In its answer, the Commission stated that it was 'concerned about any risk of moral hazard related to the programme for Greece' and made a commitment that: 'Regarding the expected recapitalisation of banks, measures will be put in place to ensure that the principles of fair treatment, impartiality and independence from political influence are observed'. According to the balance sheets of New Democracy and PASOK, in 2012 the two parties increased their borrowing (their combined borrowing rose by almost EUR 30 million), despite the fact that since 2011 they had been over-indebted and it had been clear that they would not be repaying their debts. This increase in borrowing in an election year when they should have used State grants, subject to credit criteria, to service their loans is a violation of the very essence of the democratic process.

With their loans from the banks (which were totally dependent on the State and funding from European funds), the two parties enjoyed a financial advantage in the elections not only in terms of advertising but also in providing transport for their voters. They were thus able unfairly to influence the free expression of the will of the Greek people.

Essentially, the two parties were allowed to increase their borrowing, in breach of the legal credit criteria, despite the Commission's commitment that this would not occur, and despite the fact that at the end of 2011 their borrowing had already exceeded EUR 230 million and that in same year the credit growth of the private sector was in decline.

Does the Commission consider that it has honoured the commitment referred to above?

Does it consider that these developments affect the financial interests of the EU (through the borrowing of the political parties without being subject to credit criteria from banks which are dependent on the ECB and the European Stability Mechanism 'ESM')?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission

(18 April 2013)

Regarding the expected recapitalisation of banks, the European Commission has followed up on its commitment to put measures in place to ensure that the principles of fair treatment, impartiality and independence from political influence are observed.

This issue was discussed with Greek Authorities during the first review of the Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece, which finished in December 2012. The measures put in place in the context of the recapitalisation of core banks, according to the memorandum of understanding, Paragraph 3.4.2. (Safeguards to ensure stability and viability of the financial system), include the appointment of monitoring trustees in all banks under restructuring (the major part of Greek banking system).

The monitoring trustees started their activity on 16 January 2013 and they work within strictly defined terms of reference to closely monitor and follow bank operations. Even in the absence of an approved restructuring plan, the trustees are currently verifying proper governance and the use of commercial basis criteria in key policy decisions (including lending). This includes also monitoring lending transactions with political parties.

(Wersja polska)

Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej P-002641/13

do Komisji

Tomasz Piotr Poręba (ECR)

(6 marca 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Wstrzymanie unijnych dotacji na część projektów realizowanych w ramach RPO przez województwo podkarpackie

Dnia 26-ego lutego 2013 r. Komisja Europejska skierowała do marszałka województwa podkarpackiego Mirosława Karapyty pismo, w którym rekomendowała wstrzymanie unijnych dotacji na część projektów realizowanych w ramach Regionalnego Programu Operacyjnego (RPO) przez województwo podkarpackie. Sprawa wywołuje wiele kontrowersji i w związku z tym potrzeba jak najszybszego jej wyjaśnienia. W nawiązaniu do tej sprawy chciałem prosić Komisję Europejską o uściślenie następujących kwestii:

1. Jaka jest skala nieprawidłowości, którą podejrzewa Komisja w tym przypadku? Jaką dokładnie kwotę może stracić województwo podkarpackie z 5 mld PLN przyznanych mu w ramach RPO na lata 2007-2013?
2. Czy rekomendacja o wstrzymaniu wypłat ze środków unijnych na niektóre projekty realizowane w ramach RPO wydana przez Komisję oznacza *de facto* konieczność zablokowania tychże wypłat przez województwo podkarpackie?
3. Jakie dokładnie projekty w ramach RPO przez województwo podkarpackie są zagrożone utratą dofinansowania z funduszy unijnych?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Johannesha Hahna w imieniu Komisji

(10 kwietnia 2013 r.)

1. Komisja nie posiada informacji dotyczących szczegółów dochodzenia prowadzonego przez Centralne Biuro Antykorupcyjne ani na temat konkretnych projektów, w których potencjalnie mogą występować nieprawidłowości. Nie jest zatem możliwe podanie kwot, których to dotyczy. Komisja oczekuje, że organ zarządzający przekaze jej takie informacje, jeśli zostaną one udostępnione przez organy prowadzące dochodzenie.
2. Komisja zaleca wstrzymanie się od poświadczania wydatków powiązanych z projektami, w których potencjalnie mogą występować nadużycia lub nieprawidłowości. W związku z niedawną odmową przekazania przez prokuraturę szerszych szczegółów na temat prowadzonego dochodzenia organowi zarządzającemu instytucja certyfikująca podjęła decyzję o wycofaniu najnowszego wniosku o płatność. Instytucje odpowiedzialne za program powinny nawiązać kontakt z odpowiednimi organami krajowymi w celu uzyskania informacji koniecznych do określenia, których projektów to dotyczy. Przepisy UE przewidują, że instytucja certyfikująca odpowiedzialna jest za poświadczanie, że deklarowane wydatki są zgodne z obowiązującymi przepisami unijnymi i krajowymi. Dlatego też Komisja zmuszona jest przeprowadzić dodatkowe weryfikacje. Przed zakończeniem tych weryfikacji Komisja nie będzie rozpatrywać wniosków o płatności okresowe.
3. Komisja aktualnie nie posiada informacji na temat szczegółów dotyczących konkretnych projektów, w których potencjalnie mogą występować nieprawidłowości. Zgodnie z najnowszymi informacjami dostępnymi Komisji, organ prowadzący dochodzenie odmówił przekazania organowi zarządzającemu wszelkich szczegółów na temat tego dochodzenia. W niniejszych okolicznościach nie jest możliwe precyzyjne wskazanie, kiedy Komisja będzie miała dostęp do tych informacji.

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-002641/13
to the Commission**

Tomasz Piotr Poręba (ECR)

(6 March 2013)

Subject: Withholding of EU funding for a number of ROP projects in Podkarpackie province

On 26 February 2013, the Commission sent a letter to the leader of the Podkarpackie provincial executive, Mirosław Karapyta, recommending that EU funds be withheld for a number of projects being carried out by the Podkarpackie provincial executive as part of the Regional Operational Programme (ROP). The case has raised a storm of controversy, so it must be clarified as quickly as possible. In this connection, could the Commission please answer the following questions:

1. What scale of irregularities does the Commission suspect in this case? What precise sum does Podkarpackie province stand to lose of the PLN 5 billion allocated to it under the ROP for 2007-2013?
2. Does the Commission's recommendation to withhold payment of EU funds for a number of ROP projects represent a *de facto* obligation for the Podkarpackie province to block those payments?
3. What specific ROP projects are threatened with losing EU funding in Podkarpackie province?

Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission

(10 April 2013)

1. The Commission has no information on the details of the ongoing Central Anti-Corruption Bureau investigation or on the specific projects, which — potentially — may be affected by irregularities. It is therefore impossible to indicate in monetary terms any sums affected. The Commission expects to receive this information from the managing authority, if made available by the investigating authorities.
 2. The Commission recommends not certifying expenditure related to projects, which — potentially — may be affected by fraud or irregularities. Due to the recent refusal of the prosecutor to provide the managing authority with more details about the ongoing investigation, the certifying authority itself decided to withdraw the most recent payment claim. The programme authorities should liaise with the relevant national authorities to obtain the information necessary to identify the projects concerned. Under EU legislation, the certifying authority is responsible for certifying that expenditure declared complies with applicable EU and national rules. Therefore, the Commission has to carry out additional verifications. Until these verifications are completed, the Commission will not process future applications for interim payments.
 3. The Commission has at present no information on the details of the specific projects, which — potentially — may be affected by irregularities. According to the latest information available to the Commission, the investigating authorities refused to share any detailed information on the ongoing investigation with the managing authority. In these circumstances it is not possible to indicate precisely when such information will become available to the Commission.
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(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002642/13
a la Comisión
Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)
(6 de marzo de 2013)

Asunto: Fosfato bicálcico de Ercros en Flix, Tarragona

El fosfato bicálcico producido por la empresa Erkimia, del grupo Ercros en Flix, contiene elementos radiactivos, según consta en los análisis realizados en el producto de un saco de los que comercializa Ercros por los laboratorios CRII-RAD (Comisión Regional Independiente de Información francesa sobre la Radiactividad) de Valence, Francia, y por el IRSN (Instituto de Protección y de Seguridad Nuclear) de París ⁽¹⁾.

El plomo 210 y el polonio 210 son elementos de radiotoxicidad muy elevada, que se acumulan en el organismo y pueden suponer un riesgo para la salud de las personas que los ingieren. El fosfato bicálcico es un aditivo que se utiliza como reforzante del calcio, que entra en la cadena alimentaria porque se utiliza en la alimentación de animales que luego son de consumo humano.

Erkimia fabrica cada año 100 000 toneladas de fosfato bicálcico y Ercros, principal fabricante de fosfato bicálcico de España, titular de Erkimia, fabrica 100 000 toneladas más en Cartagena, a partir de la misma materia prima, las fosforitas procedentes de los yacimientos de fosfatos de Bou Cra, en el Sahara Occidental. Ercros ha anunciado recientemente un expediente de regulación de empleo que afectará al 75 % de su plantilla laboral. Sin embargo Ercros mantendrá en funcionamiento la planta de fosfato dicálcico para la alimentación animal en Flix.

La Directiva 96/29/Euratom, traspuesta por el Real Decreto 783/2001, establece en el Título IV, artículo 5, apartado 1: «Queda prohibida la adición de sustancias radiactivas en la producción de alimentos, juguetes, adornos personales y cosméticos y la importación, exportación o movimiento intracomunitario de dichos bienes cuando lleven incorporadas sustancias radiactivas». El Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear, el 19 de octubre de 2004, indicó que se debería requerir al titular de Erkimia que realice los estudios necesarios para determinar el impacto radiológico de los procesos de dicha instalación.

¿Conoce la Comisión la situación? ¿Pedirá a la Generalitat y al Estado español que inicien una investigación que permita eliminar cualquier riesgo para la salud de las personas por la adición del fosfato bicálcico fabricado por Erkimia en la cadena alimentaria?

¿Qué medidas tomará la Autoridad Europea de Seguridad Alimentaria (EFSA)? En caso en que se demostrase la existencia de productos radioactivos, ¿acusaría a Ercros de delito contra la salud pública y de incumplimiento de las normas vigentes?

Respuesta del Sr. Oettinger en nombre de la Comisión
(30 de abril de 2013)

1-2. La Comisión está al tanto de que el procesamiento del material básico específico identificado puede generar niveles significativos de radionucleidos en los efluentes, desechos, residuos y productos. Está al tanto asimismo de que el fosfato dicálcico que puede usarse como aditivo alimentario y en los piensos puede contener trazas de los radionucleidos presentes en la mena de fosfato original.

3-4. La correspondiente legislación de la UE exige que los alimentos y los piensos sean auténticos y seguros. La presencia de sustancias radiactivas en el fosfato de calcio, se utilice como aditivo alimentario o en piensos, nunca ha sido notificada a través del Sistema de Alerta Rápida para los Productos Alimenticios y los Alimentos para Animales (RASFF). No existe ninguna legislación específica sobre la presencia de radionucleidos naturales en los alimentos y los piensos.

La seguridad de los fosfatos en tanto que aditivos alimentarios fue evaluada por el Comité Científico de la Alimentación Humana, sin que se señalara ningún motivo concreto de preocupación. En caso de existir indicios de que el fosfato dicálcico utilizado en la alimentación animal puede suponer un riesgo para la salud animal o humana, la Comisión encargará a la Autoridad Europea de Seguridad Alimentaria la realización de una evaluación del riesgo ⁽²⁾.

⁽¹⁾ <https://www.ecologistasenaccion.org/article18233.html>

⁽²⁾ La Autoridad Europea de Seguridad Alimentaria volverá a evaluar los fosfatos dicálcicos en tanto que aditivos alimentarios a más tardar en 2018; en esta nueva evaluación se estudiarán todos los problemas potenciales para la seguridad, incluida la radiactividad.

La presencia de radionucleidos naturales en los alimentos o los piensos no se considera una «adición deliberada» con arreglo a la Directiva 96/29/Euratom, motivo por el cual no existe infracción de dicha Directiva. La Directiva exige que la autorización de los productos de consumo que contengan sustancias radiactivas sea objeto de una justificación previa y confía a los Estados miembros el control reglamentario. La Comisión publicó unas directrices que sirven de base para la armonización de los criterios y procedimientos entre los Estados miembros ⁽³⁾.

⁽³⁾ Guidelines for regulatory control of consumer products containing radioactive substances in the European Union, Radiation Protection Issue No.147, Luxemburgo, Oficina de Publicaciones Oficial de las Comunidades Europeas, 2007, ISBN 978.92-79-05651-2.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002642/13
to the Commission**

Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)

(6 March 2013)

Subject: Dicalcium phosphate manufactured by Ercros in Flix, Tarragona

Tests carried out on one sackful of the product by the Commission for Independent Research and Information on Radioactivity (CRIIRAD) laboratory in Valence, France, and the Paris-based French Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) have shown that the dicalcium phosphate manufactured in Flix, Tarragona, by the company Erkimia (part of the larger Ercros group, which markets the product) contains radioactive elements ⁽¹⁾.

Lead-210 and polonium-210 are highly radiotoxic elements which remain in the body and pose a health hazard if ingested. Dicalcium phosphate, an additive used as a calcium supplement, is present in the food chain because it is used to feed animals intended for human consumption.

Erkimia produces 100 000 tonnes of dicalcium phosphate annually and Ercros, its parent company and the main manufacturer of dicalcium phosphate in Spain, produces another 100 000 tonnes in Cartagena from the same raw material, i.e. phosphate sourced from the phosphate mines of Bou Craa in Western Sahara. Ercros recently announced plans to make up to 75% of its workforce redundant. Nevertheless, Ercros will continue to run the plant in Flix to produce dicalcium phosphate for animal feed.

Article 5(1) of Title II of Royal Decree 783/2001, which transposed Council Directive 96/29/Euratom into national law, states that: 'It is prohibited to add radioactive substances in the production of foodstuffs, toys, personal ornaments and cosmetics, and to import, export or transport such goods within the European Union'. On 19 October 2004 the Spanish Nuclear Safety Council said that the owner of Erkimia should be required to carry out testing into the radiological impact of the manufacturing processes carried out at the Erkimia plant.

Is the Commission aware of this situation? Is the Commission going to ask the Catalan Government and the Spanish Government to launch an investigation with a view to eliminating any potential risk to human health posed by allowing dicalcium phosphate manufactured by Erkimia to enter the food chain?

What measures will the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) take? If it is proven that the dicalcium phosphate contains radioactive elements, will the Commission charge Ercros with committing a crime against public health and failing to comply with the relevant legislation?

Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission

(30 April 2013)

1-2. The Commission is aware that the processing of identified, specific source material may result in significant levels of radio nuclides in effluents, residues, waste materials and products. The Commission is also aware that dicalcium phosphate which can be used as food additive and feed material may contain traces of the radio nuclides present in the original phosphate ore.

3-4. EU food law requires feed and food to be genuine and safe. The presence of radioactive substances in calcium phosphate, whether used as food additive or feed material, was never notified through the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF). There is no specific legislation on the presence of natural radionuclides in feed and food.

The safety of phosphates as food additive was assessed by the Scientific Committee on Food, resulting in no specific concern. If there is evidence that dicalcium phosphate used in animal feed might cause a risk to animal or human health, the Commission will mandate the European Food Safety Authority to undertake a risk assessment ⁽²⁾.

⁽¹⁾ <https://www.ecologistasenaccion.org/article18233.html>

⁽²⁾ The European Food Safety Authority will re-evaluate calcium phosphates as food additives by 2018; this re-evaluation will consider all potential safety issues including radioactivity.

The presence of naturally occurring radionuclides in food or feed is not regarded as a 'deliberate addition' in the sense of Directive 96/29/Euratom, hence there is no infringement of this directive. The directive requires that authorisation of consumer products containing radioactive substances is subject of prior justification and entrusted the regulatory control to Member States. The Commission published respective guidelines providing the basis for harmonisation of criteria and procedures among Member States ^(¹).

⁽¹⁾ Guidelines for regulatory control of consumer products containing radioactive substances in the European Union, Radiation Protection Issue No 147, Luxembourg, Office for Official publications of the European communities, 2007, ISBN 978-92-79-05651-2.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002643/13
a la Comisión**

Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)

(6 de marzo de 2013)

Asunto: ERE de la empresa Ercros en Flix, Tarragona

La empresa química Ercros anunció ⁽¹⁾ que despedirá a 198 trabajadores de diversas plantas productivas ubicadas en Flix, Tarragona, tras obtener pérdidas por importe de 12,13 millones de euros en 2012. La empresa también cerrará la fábrica de Cartagena (Murcia) y realizará otros ajustes.

Ercros ha presentado un expediente de regulación de empleo correspondiente e iniciará el proceso de negociación. La Federación de Industria de CC.OO. ha denunciado que el expediente de regulación de empleo (ERE) afecta al 75 % de la plantilla y pone en peligro un centenar de empleos indirectos, afectando gravemente a la comarca de la Ribera d'Ebre.

El grupo químico Ercros destinó el pasado año 690 000 euros a la remuneración de los miembros de su consejo de administración. El pasado año, los consejeros ejecutivos percibieron 525 000 euros, en tanto que los independientes recibieron 124 000 euros y otros externos 41 000 euros.

Ercros mantendrá en funcionamiento la planta de fosfato dicálcico para la alimentación animal en Flix, a pesar de que contiene elementos radiactivos, tal y como lo indicaron estudios de los laboratorios CRII-RAD (Comisión Regional Independiente de Información francesa sobre la Radiactividad) de Valence, Francia, y del IRSN (Instituto de Protección y de Seguridad Nuclear) de París, lo que ha contaminado el río y alrededores.

¿Conoce la Comisión este ERE? Dada la importancia de la empresa para la población de la Ribera d'Ebre y conociendo las últimas cifras de desempleo de España, ¿consideraría la posibilidad de otorgar financiación del Fondo Europeo de Adaptación a la Globalización (FEAG) o de otro fondo europeo a la empresa?

¿Cree la Comisión que cualquier ayuda de Europa, debe estar estrictamente ligada a la reconversión industrial de la empresa para que deje de contaminar el medioambiente y acabe con la producción de fosfato radiactivo?

¿Considera también la Comisión que dicha ayuda europea debería condicionar el nivel de retribución que se otorga a los consejeros ejecutivos?

Respuesta del Sr. Andor en nombre de la Comisión

(30 de abril de 2013)

La Comisión no tiene conocimiento de los despidos en las plantas de Ercros. Si bien la Comisión está profundamente preocupada por las consecuencias sociales y económicas de los mismos, no tiene competencia para interferir en las decisiones empresariales en relación con el cierre de plantas, por lo que insta a las empresas y a las partes interesadas a que se anticipen a las reestructuraciones en la medida de lo posible y las gestionen de forma socialmente responsable.

España tiene la posibilidad de solicitar ayudas del FEAG ⁽²⁾ siempre que los despidos puedan vincularse a la globalización. Su Señoría puede ponerse en contacto con el punto de contacto de FEAG España ⁽³⁾ para enterarse de si se está elaborando alguna solicitud al respecto.

En cuanto al FSE, el PO ⁽⁴⁾ para Cataluña ⁽⁵⁾ incluye actividades que promueven la empleabilidad, donde se concentran casi dos tercios de los fondos. Los trabajadores en paro pueden beneficiarse de estas acciones ejecutadas por el *Servei d'Ocupació de Catalunya*.

Por lo que se refiere al FEDER, en el marco del PO Cataluña 2007-2013 se han asignado 360 millones de euros a la economía del conocimiento y la innovación y al desarrollo del espíritu empresarial, incluido el objetivo de aumentar el apoyo a las PYME y a la innovación, la competitividad del espíritu empresarial y el acceso a la financiación. Siempre que cumpla los criterios de elegibilidad Ercros podrá beneficiarse de estas acciones, gestionadas por el organismo intermedio ⁽⁶⁾.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.lavanguardia.com/economia/20130220/54365572404/ercros-despedira-a-198-trabajadores-de-plantas-quimicas-de-flix.html>

⁽²⁾ Fondo Europeo de Adaptación a la Globalización.

⁽³⁾ Puede encontrarse información detallada pertinente en el sitio web del FEAG: <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=581&langId=es>

⁽⁴⁾ Programa operativo.

⁽⁵⁾ 2007-2013.

⁽⁶⁾ Generalitat de Catalunya, Suddirecció General de Programació.

La Comisión no está en posición de hacer declaraciones sobre la remuneración de los consejeros ejecutivos en casos individuales. No obstante, es importante contar con unos sistemas de gobernanza empresarial adecuados a fin de evitar los conflictos de interés y proteger los intereses de los accionistas y otras partes interesadas ⁽⁷⁾. La Comisión también considera que es importante moderar las retribuciones de los directivos cuando las empresas se enfrentan a condiciones económicas difíciles.

⁽⁷⁾ Véanse la Recomendación 2004/913/CE de la Comisión, de 14 de diciembre de 2004, relativa a la promoción de un régimen adecuado de remuneración de los consejeros de las empresas con cotización en bolsa y la Recomendación 2009/385/CE de la Comisión, de 30 de abril de 2009, que complementa las Recomendaciones 2004/913/CE y 2005/162/CE en lo que atañe al sistema de remuneración de los consejeros de las empresas que cotizan en bolsa.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002643/13
to the Commission**

Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)

(6 March 2013)

Subject: Ercros' labour force adjustment plan (ERE) in Flix, Tarragona

The chemical company Ercros has announced that it is going to make 198 employees redundant from a number of the plants that it operates in Flix, Tarragona, after making losses of EUR 12.13 million in 2012 ⁽¹⁾. The company is also going to close a plant in Cartagena, Murcia, and carry out further restructuring.

Ercros has issued a labour force adjustment plan and is due to begin negotiations. The trade union Federación de Industria affiliated to the CCOO claims that the redundancy plans will affect 75% of the company's workforce and jeopardise some 100 indirect jobs, thereby seriously affecting the whole Ribera d'Ebre region.

Last year Ercros spent a total of EUR 690 000 paying its board of directors, of which EUR 525 000 went to executive directors, EUR 124 000 to independent members and EUR 41 000 to external members.

Ercros is going to continue to run the plant in Flix that produces dicalcium phosphate for animal feed, despite the fact that tests carried out by the laboratories of the Commission for Independent Research and Information on Radioactivity (CRIIRAD) in Valence, France, and the French Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) in Paris have shown that the phosphate produced by Ercros contains radioactive elements, with the result that the nearby river and the surrounding area are now contaminated.

Is the Commission aware of Ercros' redundancy plans? Given that this company is important for people living in the Ribera d'Ebre region and in the light of the latest unemployment figures in Spain, will the Commission consider giving Ercros assistance through the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF) or another European fund?

Does the Commission believe that any EU funding should be strictly conditional on the industrial reconversion of the company in order to prevent further environmental pollution and ensure that the company stops manufacturing radioactive phosphate?

Does the Commission also think that any EU funding should be granted only on condition that pay scales for the company's executive directors are revised?

Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission

(30 April 2013)

The Commission is not aware of the redundancies in Ercros' plants. While the Commission is deeply concerned with their social and economic consequences, it has no powers to interfere in company decisions to close plants but it urges companies and stakeholders to anticipate restructuring as far as possible and to manage it in a socially responsible way.

Provided that the redundancies can be linked to globalisation, Spain has the possibility to apply for support from the EGF ⁽²⁾. The Honourable Member may wish to communicate with the EGF Spain ⁽³⁾ contact point in order to know whether any application is being prepared.

As for the ESF, the OP ⁽⁴⁾ for Cataluña ⁽⁵⁾ includes activities to promote of employability where almost two thirds of the funds are concentrated. Unemployed workers can benefit from these actions implemented by the *Sevei d'Ocupació de Catalunya*.

As regards ERDF, the OP Catalonia 2007-2013 has allocated EUR 360 million to knowledge economy and innovation and entrepreneurship development. This includes the objective to enhance the support to SME and innovation and entrepreneurship competitiveness and access to financing. Ercros may benefit from these actions managed by the intermediate body ⁽⁶⁾, if it fulfils the eligibility criteria.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.lavanguardia.com/economia/20130220/54365572404/ercros-despedira-a-198-trabajadores-de-plantas-quimicas-de-flix.html>

⁽²⁾ European Globalisation Fund

⁽³⁾ The relevant details can be found on the EGF website: <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=581&langId=es>

⁽⁴⁾ Operational Programme.

⁽⁵⁾ 2007-2013.

⁽⁶⁾ Generalitat de Catalunya, Suddirecció General de Programació.

The Commission is not in a position to comment on the remuneration of directors in individual cases. However, it is important that appropriate corporate governance systems are in place to prevent conflicts of interest and protect the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders ⁽⁷⁾. The Commission also considers that executive pay restraint is important when companies face challenging economic conditions.

⁽⁷⁾ Cf. Commission Recommendation 2004/913/EC of 14 December 2004 fostering an appropriate regime for the remuneration of directors of listed companies and Commission Recommendation 2009/385/EC of 30 April 2009 complementing Recommendations 2004/913/EC and 2005/162/EC as regards the regime for the remuneration of directors of listed companies.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002644/13
προς την Επιτροπή
Konstantinos Roupakis (PPE)
 (6 Μαρτίου 2013)

Θέμα: Αντιμετώπιση της φτώχειας και του κοινωνικού αποκλεισμού μέσα από προγράμματα κοινωνικής στέγασης στην Ευρώπη

Η κοινωνική στέγαση, ως εργαλείο αντιμετώπισης της φτώχειας και του κοινωνικού αποκλεισμού, περιλαμβάνει μια σειρά δράσεων που προσφέρουν ευκαιρίες πρόσβασης στη στέγαση σε συμπολίτες μας που δεν διαθέτουν επαρκή οικονομικά μέσα. Τέτοιου είδους δράσεις εφαρμόζονται στα περισσότερα κράτη μέλη της Ένωσης ως κοινωνικές επενδύσεις που συμβάλλουν παράλληλα στην προαγωγή της ανάπτυξης και την ενίσχυση της απασχόλησης. Σε αυτό το πλαίσιο και βάσει των έκτακτων κοινωνικών συνθηκών που αντιμετωπίζει η Ευρώπη, ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Ποιες θεωρεί ως τις βασικότερες και πιο ενδεδειγμένες δράσεις κοινωνικής στέγασης;
2. Ποια κράτη μέλη δεν διαθέτουν προγράμματα κοινωνικής στέγασης;
3. Στο πλαίσιο ανταλλαγής βέλτιστων πρακτικών, πώς κρίνει την υιοθέτηση τέτοιου είδους δράσεων σε κράτη μέλη που βρίσκονται σε καθυστέρηση δημοσιονομικής προσαρμογής και εμφανίζουν ανησυχητικούς κοινωνικούς δείκτες, όπως η Ελλάδα;
4. Πόσο συμβατές είναι οι περικοπές σε τομείς κοινωνικών επενδύσεων, όπως η κοινωνική στέγαση, με τους στόχους της στρατηγικής ΕΕ2020 για τη μείωση της φτώχειας και του κοινωνικού αποκλεισμού;
5. Υπάρχουν διαθέσιμα κονδύλια από τα Ευρωπαϊκά Διαρθρωτικά Ταμεία για την ενίσχυση της χρηματοδότησης σε δράσεις κοινωνικής στέγασης με δεδομένη τη ραγδαία αύξηση των νοικοκυριών που αδυνατούν να ανταποκριθούν με επάρκεια στις απαιτούμενες δαπάνες για την εξασφάλιση κατοικίας;

Απάντηση του κ. Andor εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
 (6 Μαΐου 2013)

Το μέγεθος των αποθεμάτων κοινωνικών κατοικιών διαφέρει από το ένα κράτος μέλος στο άλλο, ωστόσο όλα τα κράτη μέλη υποστηρίζουν προγράμματα στέγασης. Τα κράτη μέλη έχουν την κύρια αρμοδιότητα για την εφαρμογή στεγαστικής πολιτικής. Η Επιτροπή τα υποστηρίζει, αντιμετωπίζοντας τα προβλήματα στέγασης μέσω της γενικής της στρατηγικής για την κοινωνική ένταξη και παρακολουθεί την υλοποίηση των σχετικών δράσεων, καθώς και τις ανισορροπίες στην αγορά στέγης.

Η σύσταση που εξέδωσε η Επιτροπή το 2008 για την ενεργητική ένταξη⁽¹⁾ καλεί τα κράτη μέλη να προωθήσουν την κοινωνική ένταξη παρέχοντας βασικές υπηρεσίες, όπως υπηρεσίες στεγαστικής βοήθειας και εργατικών κατοικιών. Το πλαίσιο της ΕΕ για εθνικές στρατηγικές ένταξης των Ρομά⁽²⁾ αναγνωρίζει τη στέγαση ως βασικό τομέα παρέμβασης. Η δέσμη κοινωνικών επενδύσεων⁽³⁾ παρέχει καθοδήγηση σχετικά με τον καλύτερο τρόπο στόχευσης των κοινωνικών επενδύσεων με σκοπό την επίτευξη των στόχων της στρατηγικής ΕΕ2020 για την καταπολέμηση της κρίσης με τη χρήση κονδυλίων της ΕΕ. Η δέσμη διερευνά σειρά καλών πρακτικών που μπορούν να εφαρμόσουν τα κράτη μέλη ώστε να βελτιώσουν την πρόσβαση σε οικονομικά προσιτή στέγαση και να προλάβουν, κατ' αυτό τον τρόπο, το φαινόμενο των αστέγων.

Τα διαρθρωτικά ταμεία της ΕΕ μπορούν να χρηματοδοτήσουν επενδύσεις σε κοινωνικές κατοικίες για περιθωριοποιημένες πληθυσμιακές ομάδες, υπηρεσίες για τους αστέγους, προγράμματα αποϊδρυματοποίησης και επανένταξης. Στο επόμενο πολυετές δημοσιονομικό πλαίσιο⁽⁴⁾, προτείνεται να αφιερωθεί το 20% της χρηματοδότησης του ΕΚΤ⁽⁵⁾ στην κοινωνική ένταξη, μεταξύ άλλων στην πολιτική αντιμετώπισης του προβλήματος των αστέγων. Μία από τις προτεραιότητες που προτείνονται για χρηματοδότηση από το ΕΤΠΑ⁽⁶⁾ μετά το 2014 είναι η «προώθηση της κοινωνικής ένταξης και η καταπολέμηση της φτώχειας, η στήριξη για φυσική και οικονομική αναζωογόνηση υποβαθμισμένων αστικών και αγροτικών κοινοτήτων», επομένως συμπεριλαμβάνονται οι ολοκληρωμένες στεγαστικές επενδύσεις.

⁽¹⁾ Σύσταση της Επιτροπής 2008/867/ΕΚ σχετικά με την ενεργητική ένταξη των ατόμων που είναι αποκλεισμένα από την αγορά εργασίας.

⁽²⁾ Ανακοίνωση της Επιτροπής COM(2011)173 με τίτλο: Πλαίσιο της ΕΕ για εθνικές στρατηγικές ένταξης των Ρομά μέχρι το 2020.

⁽³⁾ Για περισσότερα στοιχεία σχετικά με τη δέσμη κοινωνικών επενδύσεων, επισκεφθείτε τη διεύθυνση <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1044&langId=en>

⁽⁴⁾ Μεταξύ 2014-2020.

⁽⁵⁾ Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινωνικό Ταμείο.

⁽⁶⁾ Ευρωπαϊκό Ταμείο Περιφερειακής Ανάπτυξης.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002644/13
to the Commission**

Konstantinos Poupakis (PPE)

(6 March 2013)

Subject: Tackling poverty and social exclusion through social housing schemes in Europe

Social housing, as a tool for tackling poverty and social exclusion, comprises a series of measures that offer access to housing for those of our fellow citizens who would not normally be able to afford any. Such schemes exist in most EU Member States as a social investment helping to boost growth and employment. In this context and in the light of the exceptional social conditions facing Europe, will the Commission say:

1. What are most basic and most appropriate social housing measures?
2. Which Member States do not have any social housing schemes?
3. As regards exchanges of best practices, how does it view the adoption of such schemes in Member States that are subject to a fiscal adjustment regime and report alarming social indicators, such as Greece?
4. How compatible are cuts in social investment sectors, such as social housing, with the objectives of the EU2020 strategy for reducing poverty and social exclusion?
5. Are any appropriations available from the European Structural Funds to boost funding for social housing schemes, given the rapid increase in the number of households that cannot afford housing?

Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission

(6 May 2013)

The size of social housing stocks is different in the Member States but they all have supported housing schemes. Member States have the primary competence for implementing housing policies. The Commission supports them addressing housing problems through its general social inclusion strategy and monitors the implementation of relevant actions as well as housing market imbalances.

The 2008 Recommendation on Active Inclusion ⁽¹⁾ called on Member States to foster social inclusion through providing essential services such as housing support and social housing. The EU Framework for national Roma integration strategies ⁽²⁾ recognises housing as a key area of intervention. The Social Investment Package ⁽³⁾ provides guidance on how best to target social investment to reach the EU2020 targets against the crisis with the use of EU funds. The Package explores a set of good practices how Member States may improve access to affordable housing and thus preventing homelessness.

The EU Funds can finance social housing investments for marginalised populations, homeless services, deinstitutionalisation and reintegration programmes. For the next multiannual financial framework ⁽⁴⁾, 20% of the ESF ⁽⁵⁾ is proposed to be devoted to social inclusion, including homelessness policies. A proposed priority for the ERDF ⁽⁶⁾ post-2014 is 'promoting social inclusion and combating poverty, support for physical and economic regeneration of deprived urban and rural communities', thus encompassing integrated housing investments.

⁽¹⁾ Commission Recommendation 2008/867/EC on the active inclusion of people excluded from the labour market.

⁽²⁾ Commission Communication COM(2011)173 on an EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies up to 2020.

⁽³⁾ For more information on the Social Investment Package, please visit <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1044&langId=en>.

⁽⁴⁾ Between 2014-2020.

⁽⁵⁾ European Social Fund.

⁽⁶⁾ European Regional Development Fund.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002645/13
to the Commission
Catherine Stihler (S&D)
(6 March 2013)**

Subject: Distance Selling Directive

Under the Distance Selling Directive 97/7/EC, information must be provided to the consumer by the seller. The seller must give consumers information about the goods or services that they are thinking of buying. This includes a description of the goods or service, the price of the goods or service, delivery and any cancellation rights, and information about the seller.

However, what is the situation when an online company such as Amazon acts as a service provider and not the seller, and the seller is outside the EU?

What obligations does the service provider have to consumers, who are not always made aware that they are buying goods or a service from a seller outside the EU?

Are there any obligations on companies that act as transactional intermediaries?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(6 May 2013)**

The Distance Selling Directive 97/7/EC (to be replaced by the Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83/EU as from 13 June 2014) provides a number of legal rights for consumers, including the right to comprehensive information before the purchase, which has to be provided in a clear and comprehensible manner (Article 4). The suppliers must comply with the information requirements provided in the Distance Selling Directive also where they use an intermediary for marketing their products to EU consumers. The identity of the supplier and its address are amongst the information requirements expressly provided in Article 4(1).

Member States have transposed the Distance Selling Directive into their national laws and are responsible for ensuring adequate and effective means for enforcement of the consumer rights under the directive.

Furthermore, the E-commerce Directive 2000/31/EC provides in Article 10(1) minimum information requirements that have to be presented clearly, comprehensibly and unambiguously prior to the placement of the order by the seller of a good or a service if established in the EU, even if the intermediary service provider is established outside the EU. Additionally, in case of EU-established seller contract terms and general conditions must be made available to the consumer who concludes contracts online in a manner that allows their storage and reproduction (Article 10(3)). These will normally provide for the identification of the supplier of a good or a service that is subject to the contract.

It should be noted that intermediary service provider, established inside or outside the EU, is not subject to these obligations.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002646/13
to the Commission**

Emma McClarkin (ECR)

(6 March 2013)

Subject: Commission response to the horsemeat scandal

Following the recent horsemeat scandal which has caused outrage across Europe, it is clearer than ever that consumers should have better information about the meat products they buy, including how the meat is produced.

1. Can the Commission comment on the recent horsemeat scandal?
2. Given that the Commission places great emphasis on animal welfare and the role of consumers, can the Commission state what actions it will be taking to ensure that full traceability information is available in meat production for the benefit of the consumer?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission

(9 April 2013)

1. To date, there is no indication on the subject which raises a safety issue, as horse meat can be destined for human consumption. However, the falsification of labels misleads the consumers as regards the content of foods and therefore constitutes fraud in food labelling. Indeed, under existing rules, ⁽¹⁾ the labelling of foods must not mislead the consumer as to their nature, origin and content and all ingredients must be labelled. Finally, the labelling of foods containing meat must also indicate the animal species concerned.

2. A comprehensive system of food safety rules is already in place at Union level, including traceability requirements for foods of animal origin; ⁽²⁾ it is because of this system that the origin and extent of the fraudulent actions in question were quickly identified.

Food business operators are primarily responsible for ensuring that the products placed on the market comply with Union food law requirements, while national competent authorities are responsible for enforcement by conducting appropriate controls and imposing dissuasive and effective penalties.

The Commission has been active both on political and technical levels in coordinating the pending investigations in the Member States concerned. To this end, the Commission adopted a recommendation ⁽³⁾ which calls for EU-wide controls at retail level in order to identify the scale of any misleading labelling practices as to the presence of beef as well as official controls to detect possible residues of phenylbutazone, a veterinary drug whose use is allowed only in non-food producing animals. A summary of all findings will be available by April 2013. Depending on the assessment of the findings, the Commission will decide on an appropriate course of action.

⁽¹⁾ Directive 2000/13/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 20 March 2000 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the labelling, presentation and advertising of foodstuffs, OJ L 109, 6.5.2000, p. 29.

⁽²⁾ Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 931/2011 on the traceability requirements set by Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council for food of animal origin, OJ L 242, 20.9.2011, p. 2.

⁽³⁾ Commission Recommendation of 19 February 2013 on a coordinated control plan with a view to establish the prevalence of fraudulent practices (2013/99/EU), OJ L 48, 21.2.2013, p. 28.

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002647/13
a la Comisión
Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Marije Cornelissen (Verts/ALE) y Karima Delli (Verts/ALE)
(6 de marzo de 2013)

Asunto: Suicidios como consecuencia de los desahucios en España

Algunos Estados miembros, como es el caso de España, hacen frente a la trágica situación derivada de los suicidios de personas tras haber sido desahuciadas de sus hogares.

El Gobierno español no ha adoptado ningún tipo de medida para abordar este asunto, y el Consejo tampoco ha remitido recomendación específica alguna para España al respecto.

El 16 de febrero de 2013, tuvieron lugar grandes manifestaciones en todo el territorio español organizadas por la «Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca», y el Congreso de los Diputados ha admitido a trámite una iniciativa ciudadana respaldada por 1 402 854 firmas.

A pesar de que las instituciones financieras que reciben fondos de rescate de la UE se han apropiado de viviendas vacías, ni los Estados miembros ni la troika están presionando para que estos inmuebles se oferten en el mercado de alquiler o en el de viviendas sociales. Aunque el verdadero problema del sector financiero es el nivel que ha alcanzado la deuda dentro del sector de la construcción, los Gobiernos de varios Estados miembros han dejado que sean los hogares los que paguen más por la crisis.

A pesar de la propuesta de directiva de la Comisión sobre los contratos de crédito para bienes inmuebles de uso residencial (COM(2011)0142) que se está negociando actualmente, numerosas familias que contrajeron hipotecas han sido víctimas de ejecuciones judiciales abusivas. Hasta que la directiva sea adoptada, convendría establecer un procedimiento excepcional que velase por los derechos a la vivienda de los propietarios de inmuebles en toda la UE.

1. ¿Anticipará la Comisión la adopción de la directiva propuesta y actuará urgentemente a fin de erradicar los desahucios y detener la creciente crisis social a través del rechazo a una legislación nacional que obligue a las víctimas de desalojos a seguir reembolsando sus préstamos hipotecarios incluso después de haber sido expulsados de sus antiguas propiedades?
2. ¿Recomendará la Comisión que los Estados miembros que reciben ayuda financiera de la UE (Grecia, Portugal, España e Irlanda) establezcan un plan de vivienda social, en coordinación con las instituciones financieras que reciben fondos de rescate de la UE, con objeto de adjudicar viviendas vacías a aquellas personas necesitadas?
3. ¿Incluirá la Comisión este aspecto en las recomendaciones específicas por país para el Semestre Europeo?

Respuesta del Sr. Rehn en nombre de la Comisión
(7 de mayo de 2013)

Si bien, en principio, los procedimientos de liquidación de deudas corresponden a la jurisdicción de las administraciones nacionales afectadas, no deben obstaculizar la aplicación de las reglas de la UE para la protección de los consumidores, como declaró recientemente el Tribunal de Justicia en una sentencia sobre el procedimiento español ⁽¹⁾.

La propuesta de directiva sobre los contratos de crédito para bienes inmuebles de uso residencial ⁽²⁾ cubre fundamentalmente la fase precontractual. Esta propuesta se está debatiendo actualmente en el Consejo y el Parlamento Europeo, y la Comisión tiene la intención de desempeñar un papel constructivo en este proceso.

⁽¹⁾ Sentencia del Tribunal de Justicia de 14 de marzo de 2013, Aziz (C-415/11).

⁽²⁾ COM(2011)142.

Uno de los aspectos que considera la Comisión en su análisis de los mercados inmobiliarios es la mejor utilización del parque de viviendas. El documento de trabajo que acompaña a la propuesta de directiva estudia medidas para impedir las ejecuciones hipotecarias ⁽³⁾. El «paquete de inversión social» ⁽⁴⁾ propone buenas prácticas a los Estados miembros a fin de evitar que aumente el número de personas sin hogar como consecuencia de los desahucios. Por ejemplo, las agencias de alquiler social pueden ser una manera innovadora de movilizar las viviendas de propiedad privada que no están alquiladas ⁽⁵⁾. En cualquier caso, la competencia principal en la formulación de las políticas de vivienda sigue recayendo en los Estados miembros. En 2012 se dirigieron recomendaciones específicas a varios Estados miembros (como los Países Bajos y el Reino Unido) sobre este asunto. En el caso de España, las recomendaciones específicas por país de 2012 también hacían referencia a la necesidad de reducir los incentivos fiscales que favorecen la propiedad frente al alquiler. En cuanto a los Estados miembros sometidos a un programa completo de ajuste macroeconómico, las recomendaciones específicas por país hacen referencia a las disposiciones de sus respectivos memorandos de acuerdo (véanse las recomendaciones de 2012 dirigidas a Grecia, Irlanda, Portugal y Rumanía). Por ejemplo, el Memorando de Acuerdo con Portugal establece el objetivo de «una mejor utilización del parque de viviendas». La Comisión continuará dando especial prominencia a los asuntos relacionados con la vivienda en sus recomendaciones.

⁽³⁾ Commission Staff Working Paper on national measures and practices to avoid foreclosure procedures for residential mortgages loans SEC(2011) 357. Véase http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finservices-retail/docs/credit/mortgage/sec_2011_357_en.pdf

⁽⁴⁾ Para más información sobre el paquete de inversión social:
<http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=es&catId=1044&newsId=1807&furtherNews=yes>

⁽⁵⁾ Paquete de inversión social — Commission Staff Working Document on Confronting Homelessness in the European Union. SWD(2013) 42 final. Véase <http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=9770&langId=en>

(Version française)

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-002647/13
à la Commission**

Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Marije Cornelissen (Verts/ALE) et Karima Delli (Verts/ALE)
(6 mars 2013)

Objet: Suicides provoqués par des expulsions en Espagne

Certains États membres, comme l'Espagne, se trouvent confrontés à la situation tragique de personnes qui se suicident après avoir été expulsées de leurs maisons.

Le gouvernement espagnol n'est pas intervenu sur cette question et le Conseil n'a envoyé aucune recommandation spécifique à l'Espagne à cet égard.

De grandes manifestations, organisées par l'association «Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca» (Mouvement en faveur des victimes de crédits hypothécaires), ont eu lieu dans toute l'Espagne le 16 février 2013 et une initiative citoyenne a été déposée auprès de la chambre basse du Parlement espagnol avec le soutien de 1 402 854 signatures.

Bien que les établissements financiers renfloués par des fonds de l'Union européenne soient propriétaires de maisons inhabitées, ni les États membres ni la troïka ne font en sorte que ces bâtiments soient mis sur le marché locatif ou viennent renforcer le parc de logements sociaux. Tandis que le véritable problème du secteur financier réside dans le niveau de la dette au sein du secteur de la construction, plusieurs gouvernements des États membres ont fait peser sur les ménages le plus lourd tribut de la crise.

En dépit de la proposition de directive de la Commission sur les contrats de crédit relatifs aux biens immobiliers à usage résidentiel (COM(2011)0142), actuellement en cours de négociation, de nombreuses familles détenant des prêts hypothécaires ont été victimes de saisies abusives. Il convient de mettre en place, jusqu'à l'adoption de la directive, une procédure exceptionnelle dans l'ensemble de l'Union pour garantir les droits au logement des personnes qui sont propriétaires de leur logement.

1. La Commission entend-elle anticiper l'adoption de la proposition de directive et agir de toute urgence de manière à limiter les expulsions et à endiguer une crise sociale, en évitant une législation nationale qui obligerait les personnes expulsées à poursuivre le remboursement de leur prêt hypothécaire, même après leur expulsion d'un logement qu'elles ne possèdent plus?
2. La Commission compte-t-elle recommander que les États membres bénéficiaires d'une aide financière de l'Union européenne (la Grèce, le Portugal, l'Espagne et l'Irlande) établissent un plan en matière de logement social en coordination avec les établissements financiers renfloués par des fonds de l'Union, de manière à rapprocher les logements vacants des personnes ayant besoin de logement?
3. La Commission intégrera-t-elle cet aspect dans sa recommandation spécifique par pays pour le semestre européen?

Réponse donnée par M. Rehn au nom de la Commission

(7 mai 2013)

Les procédures de règlement des dettes relèvent en principe de la compétence des autorités nationales concernées. Toutefois, elles ne devraient pas empêcher l'application des règles de l'UE en matière de protection des consommateurs, comme l'a récemment déclaré la Cour de justice dans un arrêt concernant la procédure espagnole ⁽¹⁾.

La proposition de directive sur les contrats de crédit relatifs aux biens immobiliers à usage résidentiel ⁽²⁾ couvre essentiellement la phase précontractuelle. Elle est actuellement examinée par le Conseil et le Parlement européen. et la Commission entend jouer un rôle constructif dans ce processus.

⁽¹⁾ Voir l'arrêt de la Cour de justice du 14 mars 2013 dans l'affaire C-415/11, Aziz.

⁽²⁾ COM(2011)142.

Dans son analyse des marchés du logement, la Commission attache de l'importance notamment à une meilleure utilisation du parc immobilier et dans un document de travail de ses services accompagnant la proposition de directive, elle étudie les mesures visant à éviter les saisies ⁽³⁾. Le train de mesures sur les investissements sociaux ⁽⁴⁾ propose de bonnes pratiques aux États membres afin d'éviter que les personnes ne se retrouvent sans-abri en raison d'une expulsion. Par exemple, les agences immobilières sociales peuvent constituer un moyen innovant pour exploiter des biens privés qui ne sont pas loués ⁽⁵⁾. L'élaboration des politiques de logement relève néanmoins principalement de la compétence des États membres. Plusieurs États membres (par ex. les Pays-Bas et le Royaume-Uni) ont reçu des recommandations spécifiques par pays en matière de logement en 2012. Pour l'Espagne, les recommandations spécifiques de 2012 portaient aussi sur la nécessité de réduire les avantages fiscaux liés à l'acquisition d'un logement, par opposition à la location. Pour les États membres disposant d'un programme complet d'ajustement macroéconomique, les recommandations faisaient référence aux dispositions des protocoles d'accord respectifs (voir les recommandations 2012 adressées à la Grèce, l'Irlande, le Portugal et la Roumanie). Par exemple, l'un des objectifs fixés dans le protocole d'accord avec le Portugal était de «mieux utiliser le parc immobilier». La Commission continuera d'accorder une attention particulière aux questions de logement dans ses recommandations.

⁽³⁾ Document de travail des services de la Commission sur les mesures et pratiques nationales destinées à éviter les procédures de saisie concernant les prêts hypothécaires au logement, SEC(2011)357. Voir: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finservices-retail/docs/credit/mortgage/sec_2011_357_en.pdf

⁽⁴⁾ Pour en savoir plus sur le train de mesures sur les investissements sociaux: <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=1044&newsId=1807&furtherNews=yes>

⁽⁵⁾ Train de mesures sur les investissements sociaux — Document de travail des services de la Commission intitulé «Confronting Homelessness in the European Union» (Lutter contre le problème des sans-abri dans l'Union européenne). SWD(2013) 42 final. Voir: <http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=9770&langId=en>

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002647/13

aan de Commissie

Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Marije Cornelissen (Verts/ALE) en Karima Delli (Verts/ALE)

(6 maart 2013)

Betreft: Zelfmoorden na huisuitzettingen in Spanje

In sommige lidstaten, waaronder Spanje, komt de tragische situatie voor dat mensen zelfmoord plegen nadat zij uit hun woning zijn gezet.

De Spaanse overheid neemt geen enkele maatregel tegen dit probleem, en de Raad heeft Spanje er geen specifieke aanbevelingen over gedaan.

Op 16 februari 2013 vonden er in heel Spanje grote demonstraties plaats, georganiseerd door de vereniging „Plataforma de afectados por la hipoteca” (platform voor hypotheekslachtoffers), en er is bij het Spaanse parlement een burgerinitiatief ingediend met 1 402 854 medeondertekenaars.

Terwijl financiële instellingen die steun ontvangen uit EU-noodfondsen eigenaar zijn van leegstaande woningen, oefenen de lidstaten noch de Trojka druk uit om deze gebouwen op de huurmarkt te plaatsen of als sociale woning aan te merken. En hoewel de schuldenlast van de bouwsector het echte probleem van de financiële sector vormt, hebben meerdere lidstaten de hoogste prijs van de crisis bij huisbewoners neergelegd.

Ondanks het Commissievoorstel voor een richtlijn over woningkredietovereenkomsten (COM(2011)0142), waarover momenteel wordt onderhandeld, zijn veel gezinnen met een hypotheek het slachtoffer geworden van oneerlijke gedwongen verkopen. In afwachting van de goedkeuring van de richtlijn zou een bijzondere procedure moeten worden ingevoerd om de woonrechten van woningeigenaren in de hele Unie te waarborgen.

1. Gaat de Commissie vooruitlopen op de goedkeuring van de voorgestelde richtlijn en snel maatregelen nemen om huisuitzettingen te verzachten en een groeiende maatschappelijke crisis een halt toe te roepen, onder meer door een einde te maken aan nationale regelgeving die op straat gezette mensen verplicht hun hypotheek door te betalen nadat zij uit hun woning zijn gezet?
2. Gaat de Commissie aanbevelen dat de lidstaten die financiële hulp ontvangen van de Unie (Griekenland, Portugal, Spanje en Ierland) in samenwerking met de financiële instellingen die steun uit noodfondsen ontvangen een sociaal woonplan opzetten om lege woningen te koppelen aan woningzoekenden?
3. Gaat de Commissie dit aspect opnemen in haar landenspecifieke aanbeveling voor het Europees semester?

Antwoord van de heer Rehn namens de Commissie

(7 mei 2013)

Schuldvereffeningsprocedures vallen in principe onder de bevoegdheid van de betrokken nationale autoriteiten. Zoals reeds is bepaald in een recent arrest van het Hof van Justitie over de Spaanse procedure ⁽¹⁾, mogen deze procedures de toepassing van de EU-voorschriften inzake consumentenbescherming echter niet belemmeren.

Het voorstel voor een richtlijn inzake woningkredietovereenkomsten ⁽²⁾ heeft voornamelijk betrekking op de precontractuele fase. Het voorstel wordt op dit moment besproken in de Raad en het Europees Parlement. De Commissie wil hierbij een constructieve rol spelen.

⁽¹⁾ Zie het arrest van het Hof van Justitie van 14 maart 2013 in zaak C-415/11, Aziz.

⁽²⁾ COM(2011) 142 definitief.

Het beter aanwenden van de woningvoorraad is een van de punten waar de Commissie rekening mee houdt wanneer zij huizenmarkten analyseert. In het werkdocument van de diensten van de Commissie bij het voorstel voor de richtlijn worden maatregelen onderzocht om gedwongen verkopen te voorkomen ⁽³⁾. In het pakket sociale-investeringsmaatregelen ⁽⁴⁾ worden goede praktijken voor lidstaten voorgesteld om te voorkomen dat mensen dakloos worden door huisuitzettingen. Zo kunnen sociale verhuurkantoren een innovatieve wijze zijn om onverhuurde privé-eigendommen aan te bieden ⁽⁵⁾. In eerste instantie blijven de lidstaten echter bevoegd voor het opstellen van een huisvestingsbeleid. Verschillende lidstaten (onder meer Nederland en het Verenigd Koninkrijk) hebben in 2012 landenspecifieke aanbevelingen over huisvesting gekregen. Voor Spanje is in deze aanbevelingen eveneens verwezen naar de behoefte om het woningbezit fiscaal minder voordelig te maken ten opzichte van huurformules. Voor lidstaten met een volwaardig macro-economisch aanpassingsprogramma is in de aanbevelingen verwezen naar de bepalingen/voorwaarden van het respectieve memorandum van overeenkomst (zie de aanbevelingen van 2012 voor Griekenland, Ierland, Portugal en Roemenië). Zo noemt het memorandum van overeenkomst met Portugal „een beter gebruik van de woningvoorraad” als doel. De Commissie blijft in haar aanbevelingen een bijzondere nadruk leggen op de huisvestingsproblematiek.

⁽³⁾ Werkdocument van de diensten van de Commissie betreffende nationale maatregelen en praktijken om executieprocedures voor hypotheekleningen voor woningen te voorkomen (SEC(2011) 357).

Zie http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finservices-retail/docs/credit/mortgage/sec_2011_357_en.pdf

⁽⁴⁾ Meer informatie over het pakket sociale-investeringsmaatregelen is beschikbaar op <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=1044&newsId=1807&furtherNews=yes>

⁽⁵⁾ Pakket sociale-investeringsmaatregelen — werkdocument van de diensten van de Commissie betreffende de bestrijding van dakloosheid in de Europese Unie. SWD(2013) 42 final. Zie <http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=9770&langId=en>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002647/13
to the Commission**

Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Marije Cornelissen (Verts/ALE) and Karima Delli (Verts/ALE)
(6 March 2013)

Subject: Suicides following evictions in Spain

Some Member States, such as Spain, face the tragic situation of people committing suicide after having been evicted from their homes.

The Spanish Government is not taking any form of action on this issue, and the Council has not sent any specific recommendation to Spain with regard to it.

Large demonstrations, organised by the organisation 'Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca' ('Platform for Mortgage Victims'), were held all over Spain on 16 February 2013, and a citizens' initiative has been introduced in the Spanish lower house of parliament with the support of 1 402 854 signatures.

While financial institutions that receive EU bailout funds own houses that are empty, neither the Member States nor the Troika are pushing to have these buildings put on the rental market or in the social housing stock. While the real problem for the financial sector is the level of debt within the construction sector, several Member State governments have let households pay the heaviest price of the crisis.

Notwithstanding the Commission proposal for a directive on credit agreements relating to residential property (COM(2011)0142), currently under negotiation, many families holding mortgages have been the victims of abusive foreclosures. Until the directive is adopted, an exceptional procedure should be introduced in order to guarantee the housing rights of homeowners throughout the EU.

1. Will the Commission anticipate the adoption of the proposed directive and act urgently to mitigate evictions and stem a mounting social crisis, avoiding national legislation that would force those evicted to continue making mortgage payments even after they have been ejected from their former property?
2. Will the Commission recommend that the Member States receiving financial help from the EU (Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland) establish a social housing plan in coordination with financial institutions receiving EU bailout funds, in order to match empty houses with people in need of housing?
3. Will the Commission include this aspect in its country-specific recommendation for the European Semester?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission

(7 May 2013)

Debt settlement procedures are in principle within the jurisdiction of the national authorities concerned. However, they should not hinder the application of EU consumer protection rules, as stated in a recent Court of Justice ruling concerning the Spanish procedure ⁽¹⁾.

The proposal for a directive on credit agreements relating to residential immovable property ⁽²⁾ mainly covers the pre-contractual phase. However, the proposal is currently under discussion in the Council and the European Parliament. The Commission intends to play a constructive role in this process.

⁽¹⁾ See Court of Justice judgment of 14 March 2013, in Case C-415/11, *Aziz*.

⁽²⁾ COM(2011)142.

Using the housing stock better is one of the considerations of the Commission when analysing housing markets. A Staff Working Document accompanying the directive proposal explores measures to prevent foreclosures ⁽³⁾. The Social Investment Package ⁽⁴⁾ proposes good practices for Member States to prevent homelessness due to evictions. For example social renting agencies can be an innovative way to mobilise privately owned unrented property ⁽⁵⁾. Still, the design of housing policies remains the primary competence of Member States. Several Member States (e.g., the Netherlands and the UK) received housing-related country-specific recommendations (CSR) in 2012. For Spain, the 2012 CSRs also referred to the need of reducing tax-induced bias towards home-ownership, as opposed to renting. For Member States with a full macroeconomic adjustment programme, the CSRs refer to the provisions of the respective Memorandum of Understanding (MoU; see the 2012 CSRs for Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Romania). For example, the MoU with Portugal sets the objective to 'make better use of the housing stock'. The Commission will continue giving a special prominence to housing issues in its recommendations.

⁽³⁾ Commission Staff Working Paper on national measures and practices to avoid foreclosure procedures for residential mortgages loans, SEC(2011) 357. See http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances-retail/docs/credit/mortgage/sec_2011_357_en.pdf

⁽⁴⁾ More information on the Social Investment Package can be found at <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=1044&newsId=1807&furtherNews=yes>

⁽⁵⁾ Social Investment Package, Commission Staff Working Document on Confronting Homelessness in the European Union. SWD(2013) 42 final. See <http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=9770&langId=en>

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002648/13
alla Commissione
Sergio Berlato (PPE)
(6 marzo 2013)**

Oggetto: Chiarimenti sulla normativa italiana in materia di OGM

Con riferimento alla risposta della Commissione all'interrogazione E-008252/2012 sul tema «Limiti e divieti alla coltivazione di OGM a livello nazionale», si interroga la Commissione per chiedere ulteriori chiarimenti circa la normativa italiana in materia di OGM.

Alcune notizie apparse sulla stampa italiana fanno riferimento a una richiesta ufficiale di informazioni della Commissione europea al Governo italiano e alla Regione Friuli Venezia Giulia in merito alle leggi nazionali e regionali sulla coltivazione di sementi geneticamente modificate.

In tale richiesta la Commissione europea sembrerebbe invitare le autorità italiane a fornire delle risposte sulla vigenza e applicabilità di alcune norme riguardanti, fra l'altro, l'autorizzazione nazionale alla coltivazione di OGM e il divieto regionale di coltivazione di OGM della Regione Friuli Venezia Giulia.

Potrebbe la Commissione fornire un aggiornamento sullo stato della procedura, precisando in particolare:

1. se abbia ricevuto risposta dalle autorità italiane; e
2. eventualmente sulla base delle risposte date, se ritenga opportuno procedere ulteriormente e in quale maniera?

**Risposta di Tonio Borg a nome della Commissione
(22 aprile 2013)**

1. La Commissione ha ricevuto una risposta dalle autorità italiane.
 2. La Commissione sta attualmente esaminando tale risposta. Se del caso si avvieranno i procedimenti appropriati.
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(English version)

Question for written answer E-002648/13
to the Commission
Sergio Berlato (PPE)
(6 March 2013)

Subject: Clarification regarding Italian legislation on GMOs

With reference to the Commission's answer to Question No E-008252/2012 on 'GMO crops: national restrictions and prohibition', the Commission is asked to provide further clarification regarding Italian legislation on GMOs.

Reports in the Italian press refer to a formal request for information from the European Commission to the Italian Government and the Region of Friuli Venezia Giulia regarding the national and regional laws on the cultivation of genetically-modified seeds.

In its request, the European Commission seems to be asking the Italian authorities to provide answers on the validity and applicability of certain rules concerning, among other things, national authorisation for the cultivation of GMOs and the regional ban on cultivation of GMOs in the Friuli Venezia Giulia Region.

Can the Commission provide an update on the status of the procedure, stating in particular:

1. Whether it has received a reply from the Italian authorities; and
2. If so, on the basis of the answers given, whether it deems it appropriate to proceed further and how?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission
(22 April 2013)

1. The Commission has received a reply from the Italian authorities.
 2. The Commission is currently assessing the reply. Appropriate proceedings will be initiated if and as necessary.
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(English version)

**Question for written answer P-002649/13
to the Commission**

Alyn Smith (Verts/ALE)

(6 March 2013)

Subject: Proposed Regional Aid Guidelines for 2014-2020

The proposed Regional Aid Guidelines for 2014-2020 appear to pay little heed to the fact that, since the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 174 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) has been in force, emphasising the need to pay special attention to territories beset by permanent and severe geographic and demographic handicaps, including island regions. The proposed guidelines also seem at odds with the recent Council conclusions on the Multiannual Financial Framework, which state: 'The special situation of island regions also needs to be taken into account' (Point 27 of the European Council's Conclusions, 7-8 February 2013).

An example of the absurdity of the situation that these proposed guidelines would create is the case of the Shetland Islands, a remote Scottish archipelago located in the North Sea and having a population of 23 000. Although its own population density at NUTS III level is slightly higher (15h/km²), this island region is part of the Highlands and Islands NUTS II area, which has a density below 12.5h/km². Under the current proposals and applying the proposed criteria for eligibility, Shetland would find most of its territory listed in the same 'non-assisted area' category as major economic centres such as London, Paris or Frankfurt. Only its very small outlying islands (with a population of under 5 000) would remain within the scope of Article 107.3(c).

Does the Commission not think that granting 'predefined' area status under Article 107.3(c) to islands, or at least to islands below a reasonable threshold of population (e.g. 100 000), would more adequately address the recognised needs of these territories without undermining the functioning of the internal market or expanding significantly the ceiling of EU population under assisted area status?

Furthermore, does the Commission not agree that applying such rules to sparsely populated areas has not led to any market disturbances so far, and that this would be unlikely to be the case if such rules were applied tomorrow to islands whose economy is characterised by isolation, a very small proximity market and obvious shortfalls in economies of scale?

Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission

(22 April 2013)

The Commission is aware of the Shetland Islands situation. In the draft guidelines on regional aid for 2014-2020, given the difficulties in defining general rules to cover all situations across the EU, the choice to designate islands on the basis of new population thresholds would in any case create disparities in the treatment of islands.

Criterion 3 in paragraph 153(d) of the draft guidelines is sufficient to allow Member States to designate as non-predefined 'c' areas islands that have either a GDP per capita below the EU-27 average, or an unemployment rate above 115% of the national average, or less than 5 000 inhabitants. This would cover all islands for which a derogation under Article 107(3)(c) TFEU is justified by commonly accepted socioeconomic indicators.

On the basis of 2007-2009 data, the GDP per capita of the Shetland Islands is 106.2% of the EU-27 average, and the unemployment rate 85% of the national average. Thus, they could not be designated as 'c' areas, but small islands with less than 5 000 inhabitants could.

The Commission cannot confirm that state aid in sparsely populated areas could not lead to market disturbances, but even if risks of distortion of competition could be ruled out, it is not in the common interest to predefine many regions as 'c' areas, as this would leave little flexibility to intervene in areas with higher needs.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002650/13
a la Comisión**

Dolores García-Hierro Caraballo (S&D)

(6 de marzo de 2013)

Asunto: Lucha contra la pesca ilegal

Interpol ha puesto en marcha el proyecto SCALE, una iniciativa mundial destinada a detectar, reprimir y combatir los delitos pesqueros que suponen un coste estimado anual de 17 620 millones de euros para la economía mundial y están relacionados con otras formas de delincuencia transnacional grave, como la corrupción, el blanqueo de capitales, la trata de personas y el narcotráfico.

Este proyecto está financiado por el Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores de Noruega, el organismo noruego para la cooperación al desarrollo (NORAD) y la ONG «The Pew Charitable Trusts». En el marco de esta iniciativa, además de concienciar sobre los delitos pesqueros, se coordinarán operaciones encaminadas a luchar contra este tipo de actividades delictivas, dismantelar las rutas de tráfico y armonizar los esfuerzos en materia de aplicación de la ley a escala nacional y regional.

Se estima que una quinta parte del pescado que sale del mar es ilegal, no declarado o no reglamentado, y el problema se está agravando porque las nuevas tecnologías permiten a los barcos de pesca estar en el mar más tiempo y realizar un arrastre cada vez más profundo.

¿Está participando la Comisión de algún modo en este proyecto tan interesante?

¿Qué medidas emplea la Comisión para poder detectar el fraude en el etiquetado del pescado y por ende contra la protección de los consumidores?

Respuesta de la Sra. Damanaki en nombre de la Comisión

(30 de abril de 2013)

El Reglamento de la UE sobre la pesca ilegal, no declarada y no reglamentada ⁽¹⁾ constituye la base para combatir las actividades pesqueras ilegales en aguas de la UE y de fuera de la UE.

Para afrontar mejor todos los aspectos del fenómeno, la Comisión ha reforzado la cooperación con otras organizaciones intergubernamentales como Interpol. Conforme a la resolución aprobada por el Parlamento Europeo en 2011 ⁽²⁾, Interpol ha creado un grupo permanente de trabajo sobre delitos pesqueros para combatir la pesca ilegal y todas las actividades delictivas ligadas a ella (como el fraude aduanero, la corrupción e infracciones de la legislación laboral). La Comisión participa en ese grupo de trabajo en calidad de observador.

El fraude en el etiquetado del pescado puede no estar ligado directamente a la pesca ilegal. Según diversos estudios e investigaciones realizados en la EU, ese fraude suele producirse en las etapas finales de la cadena de suministro y afecta a pescado barato que se etiqueta como especies populares más caras. Los productos de la pesca se caracterizan por una enorme variedad de especies. Los controles pueden mejorarse mediante requisitos de trazabilidad. Las pruebas de ADN son una posibilidad prometedora, especialmente para los productos que ya han sido transformados.

La Comisión ha incluido en su propuesta de nuevo Fondo Europeo Marítimo y de Pesca una línea de ayuda específica para reforzar los controles de la cadena de comercialización y de las obligaciones de etiquetado. Los controles corren a cargo de las administraciones nacionales competentes.

⁽¹⁾ Reglamento (CE) n° 1005/2008 del Consejo, por el que se establece un sistema comunitario para prevenir, desalentar y eliminar la pesca ilegal, no declarada y no reglamentada (DO L 286 de 29.10.2008, p. 1).

⁽²⁾ Resolución 2010/2210(INI): «La lucha contra la pesca ilegal a escala mundial — El papel de la UE».

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002650/13
to the Commission**

Dolores García-Hierro Carballo (S&D)

(6 March 2013)

Subject: Combating illegal fishing

Interpol has launched Project Scale, a global initiative to detect, suppress and combat fisheries crime, which is estimated to cost the global economy EUR 17 620 million each year and is linked to other forms of serious transnational crime, including corruption, money laundering, and human and drugs trafficking.

This project is funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) and the NGO the Pew Charitable Trusts. In addition to raising awareness of fisheries crime, Project Scale will coordinate operations to target this criminal activity, disrupt trafficking routes and harmonise national and regional law enforcement efforts.

One fifth of the fish that come out of the water is believed to be illegal, unreported or unregulated, and the problem is getting worse because new technologies allow fishing boats to stay at sea longer and trawl ever deeper.

Is the Commission taking part in this extremely interesting project?

What measures does the Commission deploy to detect fraudulent mislabelling of fish, which undermines consumer protection?

Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission

(30 April 2013)

The EU Regulation on illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU Regulation) ⁽¹⁾ provides the platform to combat illegal fishing activities in EU waters and in waters outside the EU.

In order to better tackle all the aspects of the phenomenon, the Commission has reinforced its cooperation with other intergovernmental organisations like Interpol. In line with the resolution adopted by the European Parliament in 2011 ⁽²⁾, Interpol has set up a permanent Fisheries Crime Working Group in order to address illegal fishing and all related criminal activities (e.g. customs fraud, corruption and breaches of labour law). The Commission participates as observer to the Working Group that promotes actions against illegal fishing and all related criminal activities.

On the other hand, fraud on fish labelling may not be directly linked to illegal fishing. According to studies and enquiries conducted in the EU it often takes place at the final stages of the supply chain and concerns cheap fish labelled as popular and more expensive ones. Fish products are characterised by a very large number of species. Traceability requirements can help to improve controls. DNA testing is a promising development in particular for products that have already been processed.

The Commission has included in its proposal for a new European Maritime and Fisheries Fund specific support to strengthen controls of the marketing chain and labelling obligations. Controls are conducted by relevant national administrations.

⁽¹⁾ Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, OJ L 286/1, 29.10.2008.

⁽²⁾ Resolution 2010/2210(INI) on 'Combating illegal fishing at the global level — the role of the EU'.

(Dansk udgave)

Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse E-002651/13
til Kommissionen
Christel Schaldemose (S&D)
(6. marts 2013)

Om: Indpakning af medicin

Som led i at involvere borgerne mere i EU — citizens-dialogen — har jeg modtaget et forslag fra en borger. Ideen er så god, at jeg straks skynder mig at stille spørgsmålet videre til Kommissionen.

Borgeren spørger, om der er nogle EU-regler i dag eller nogle på vej, der stiller krav til pakningerne af medicin. Medicinpakninger kan i dag være svære at håndtere for borgere med handicap. Fx svagtseende kan have svært ved at genkende pakningen og dosere mængden, andre handicappede kan have svært ved at åbne medicinpakningen.

Jeg er godt klar over, at der er mange hensyn at tage, når medicin pakkes. Hensynet til piratkopiering, hensynet til utilgængelighed for børn etc. Men det er en god ide at overveje fælles minimumsregler for indpakning af medicin. På den måde kan vi sikre alle handicappede borgere adgang til at kunne klare deres medicin selv.

Hvad er Kommissionens opfattelse af den ide? Er der standarder eller regler på vej på EU-plan? Er der vejledninger på vej?

Svar afgivet på Kommissionens vegne af Tonio Borg
(9. april 2013)

EU-lovgivningen om lægemidler ⁽¹⁾, som fastslår de oplysninger, der skal optræde på indlægssedlen til et lægemiddel, tager højde for handicappedes særlige behov. Lovgivningen fastsætter, at lægemidlets navn skal angives i blindeskrift på emballagen. Derudover sørger indehavere af markedsføringstilladelser for, at indlægssedlen på anmodning fra patientsammenslutninger gøres tilgængelig i formater, der egner sig for blinde og svagsynede.

Kommissionen skal forelægge en rapport for Europa-Parlamentet og Rådet om bl.a. indlægssedlen, og hvordan den kan forbedres yderligere for bedre at opfylde patienternes behov. Til dette formål har Kommissionen bestilt en undersøgelse om vurderingen af læsbarheden af indlægssedlen, som er i gang, og som skulle være tilgængelig i efteråret.

For yderligere oplysninger henviser Kommissionen det ærede medlem til sine tidligere svar på spørgsmål E-005012/11 og E-003968/2012 ⁽²⁾.

⁽¹⁾ Direktiv 2001/83/EF, EFT L 311 af 28.11.2001, s. 67.

⁽²⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/da/parliamentary-questions.html>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002651/13
to the Commission**

Christel Schaldemose (S&D)

(6 March 2013)

Subject: Packaging of medicinal products

As part of the initiative to involve citizens more in the EU — the citizens' dialogue — I received a suggestion from a citizen. The idea is such a good one that I am passing the question on to the Commission straight away.

The citizen asks whether there are any EU rules currently in existence or in the pipeline that lay down requirements concerning the packaging of medicinal products. Medicinal product packaging can at present be difficult for citizens with disabilities to cope with. For example, people with impaired vision can find it difficult to recognise the packaging and administer the dose, and people with other disabilities can find it difficult to open medicinal product packaging.

I appreciate that there are many things that need to be taken into consideration when medicinal products are packaged, such as counterfeiting, keeping the product out of the reach of children, etc. However, it is a good idea to consider common minimum rules for the packaging of medicinal products. This would enable us to ensure that all people with disabilities were able to cope with their medicines themselves.

What is the Commission's view of this idea? Are there any standards or rules in the pipeline at EU level? Are there any guidelines in preparation?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission

(9 April 2013)

The EU legislation on medicinal products ⁽¹⁾ which determines the information that should appear on the package leaflet of a medicinal product pays attention to the special needs of disabled patients. It provides that the name of the medicinal product must be expressed in Braille format on the packaging. In addition, marketing authorisation holders shall ensure that the package information leaflet is made available on request from patients' organisations in formats appropriate for the blind and partially-sighted.

The Commission has to present a report to the Parliament and the Council on, *inter alia*, the package leaflet and how it could be further improved in order to better meet the needs of patients. For that purpose, the Commission has commissioned a study on the assessment of the readability of the package leaflet which is ongoing and which should be available this autumn.

For further information, the Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its previous answers to questions E-005012/11 and E-003968/2012 ⁽²⁾.

⁽¹⁾ Directive 2001/83/EC, OJ L 311, of 28.11.2001, p. 67.

⁽²⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html>

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002652/13
προς την Επιτροπή
Nikolaos Salavrakos (EFD)
(6 Μαρτίου 2013)

Θέμα: Κοινοτικές χρηματοδοτήσεις προς την Αλβανία

Η Αλβανία συμπεριφέρεται με σκληρότητα στους 400 000 Έλληνες που ζουν στην Βόρεια Ήπειρο, καθώς και στους Ρομά, ενώ υιοθετεί και επιθετική τακτική κυρίως προς την Ελλάδα, κάτι που φάνηκε και με την απροθυμία της να συνεργαστεί στην οριστική επίλυση του ζητήματος του καθορισμού της Αποκλειστικής Οικονομικής Ζώνης μεταξύ των δύο χωρών.

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

Ποια είναι τα συνολικά κονδύλια που έλαβε από την ΕΕ η Αλβανία ως δωρεάν και δανειακή ενίσχυση από το 2000 ως σήμερα;

Απάντηση του κ. Füle εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(26 Απριλίου 2013)

Η χρηματοδοτική στήριξη της ΕΕ προς την Αλβανία δεν παρέχεται μέσω άτοκων δανείων.

Την περίοδο 2001-2006, χορηγήθηκε στην Αλβανία συνολικό πόσο ύψους 260 εκατ. ευρώ στο πλαίσιο του προγράμματος CARDS (πρόγραμμα κοινοτικής βοήθειας για την αναδιάρθρωση, την ανάπτυξη και τη σταθεροποίηση) με τη μορφή άμεσων επιχορηγήσεων.

Από το 2007 η Αλβανία λαμβάνει οικονομική στήριξη από τον Μηχανισμό Προενταξιακής Βοήθειας (ΜΠΒ). Κατά την περίοδο προγραμματισμού 2007-2013, το σύνολο των κονδυλίων που θα διατεθούν από τον ΜΠΒ στην Αλβανία ανέρχεται σε 589 εκατ. ευρώ περίπου.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002652/13
to the Commission**

Nikolaos Salavrakos (EFD)

(6 March 2013)

Subject: EU funding for Albania

Albania treats the 400 000 Greeks living in Northern Epirus and the Roma harshly, while adopting an aggressive stance particularly towards Greece: this can be seen in its unwillingness to cooperate in finally resolving the problem of determining the Exclusive Economic Zone between the two countries.

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

What is the overall amount of funding that Albania has received from the EU as aid in the form of interest-free loans since the year 2000?

Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission

(26 April 2013)

EU financial support to Albania is not provided via interest-free loans.

During the period 2001-2006 a total of EUR 260 million under the CARDS programme was allocated to Albania in the form of direct grants.

Since 2007 Albania benefits from the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). In the programming period 2007-2013, the total allocation to Albania under IPA amounts to approximately EUR 589 million.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002653/13
προς την Επιτροπή
Konstantinos Roupakis (PPE)
(6 Μαρτίου 2013)

Θέμα: Μείωση του Ειδικού Φόρου Κατανάλωσης στα καύσιμα

Τα περισσότερα ελληνικά νοικοκυριά αντιμετωπίζουν εξαιρετικά δύσκολη οικονομική κατάσταση αλλάζοντας άρδην τις καταναλωτικές τους συνήθειες, δεδομένου ότι η πλειοψηφία αυτών βρίσκονται σε οικονομικό αδιέξοδο και στα όρια της επιβίωσης. Χαρακτηριστικό παράδειγμα αποτελεί η πρωτοφανής και δραματική μείωση της κατανάλωσης στο πετρέλαιο θέρμανσης κατά 70% έως 80% σε όλη την Ελλάδα, σε σχέση με το προηγούμενο έτος. Ο εξαπλασιασμός του φόρου στο πετρέλαιο θέρμανσης και η εξίσωσή του με το πετρέλαιο κίνησης έκανε δυσβάσταχτο το κόστος της θέρμανσης για τους πολίτες και ώθησε τους περισσότερους καταναλωτές να στραφούν σε οικονομικότερους τρόπους για να ζεσταθούν, ενώ πολλοί ήταν εκείνοι που εξαιτίας της δύσκολης οικονομικής τους κατάστασης στερήθηκαν και αυτού του αγαθού.

Παρότι αυξήθηκε ο φόρος στο πετρέλαιο θέρμανσης, σύμφωνα με στοιχεία της Πανελλήνιας Ομοσπονδίας Πρατηριούχων Εμπόρων Καυσίμων, χρησιμοποιώντας τα επίσημα στοιχεία του υπουργείου Οικονομικών, παρατηρείται στον εν λόγω τομέα ότι τα φορολογικά έσοδα από ΕΦΚ (ειδικό φόρο κατανάλωσης) και ΦΠΑ του κράτους όχι μόνο δεν αυξήθηκαν, αλλά μειώθηκαν σημαντικά, λόγω της πρωτοφανούς μείωσης της κατανάλωσης. Σύμφωνα με τα παραπάνω ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Λαμβάνοντας υπόψη τις αρνητικές επιπτώσεις τέτοιων μέτρων για το κοινωνικό σύνολο σε μια περίοδο συρρίκνωσης των εισοδημάτων και έκρηξης της ανεργίας, τη ραγδαία μείωση της κατανάλωσης με τα ανάλογα αποτελέσματα στα έσοδα του κράτους καθώς και ότι οι έλεγχοι δείχνουν ότι περίπου το 20% των πρατηρίων διακινεί νοθευμένα καύσιμα στην αγορά, ως μέλος της τρόικας κρίνει ότι πρόκειται για ένα αποτελεσματικό μέτρο για την αύξηση των εσόδων του κράτους και για την πάταξη του λαθρεμπορίου;
2. Ως συμβουλευτικό μέλος για τη δημοσιονομική προσαρμογή της χώρας και δεδομένου ότι οποιοσδήποτε αλλαγές μπορούν να προκαλέσουν «χαλάρωση» των δημοσιονομικών στόχων, προτίθεται να προβεί σε μελέτη αντικτύπου σε συνεργασία με τις ελληνικές αρχές, διερευνώντας κατά πόσο μια επικείμενη μείωση στον εν λόγω φόρο για θα μπορούσε να αποδώσει δυνητικά περισσότερα έσοδα στα ταμεία του κράτους;
3. Αποκλείει το ενδεχόμενο η μείωση του φόρου στο πετρέλαιο θέρμανσης να μπορεί να αποτελέσει ισοδύναμο μέτρο, αυξάνοντας την κατανάλωση και τα έσοδα και παράλληλα μειώνοντας ένα σημαντικό βάρος στους οικογενειακούς προϋπολογισμούς;

Απάντηση του κ. Rehn εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(3 Ιουνίου 2013)

Από τον Οκτώβριο του 2011 ως τον Μάιο του 2012, ο ειδικός φόρος κατανάλωσης για το πετρέλαιο θέρμανσης ήταν 60 ευρώ ανά 1 000 λίτρα, ενώ ο ειδικός φόρος κατανάλωσης για το πετρέλαιο κίνησης 412 ευρώ ανά 1 000 λίτρα. Αυτή η διαφορά προκάλεσε περιπτώσεις απάτης με αντικείμενο τη χρήση πετρελαίου θέρμανσης στις μεταφορές. Συνεπώς, η ελληνική κυβέρνηση, μετά από διαβουλεύσεις με την Επιτροπή, την ΕΚΤ και το ΔΝΤ, αποφάσισε την εξομοίωση των δύο φόρων σε 330 ευρώ από τον Οκτώβριο του 2012.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002653/13
to the Commission**

Konstantinos Poupakis (PPE)

(6 March 2013)

Subject: Reduction in excise duties on fuel

Most Greek households are facing an extremely difficult economic situation. They are radically changing their consumption habits, since most are on a very tight budget and are barely able to survive. A telling example is the unprecedented and dramatic reduction in consumption of heating oil by between 70% and 80% in Greece as a whole, compared to the previous year. The six-fold increase of the tax on heating oil and the decision to price it on a par with diesel have put the cost of heating oil beyond people's means and prompted most consumers to switch to cheaper ways to keep warm. Many others have gone without heating altogether on account of the difficult economic situation.

Although the tax on heating oil has increased, the Panhellenic Federation of Fuel Service Station Dealers, drawing on official Ministry of Finance data, has noted in this connection that tax revenue from the State excise duty and VAT not only have failed to increase, but have decreased significantly due to the unprecedented decline in consumption. In view of the above, will the Commission say:

1. Bearing in mind the negative impact of such measures on society as a whole at a time of shrinking revenues and burgeoning unemployment and the sharp reduction in consumption and the effect this has had on State revenue and given that checks show that approximately 20% of filling stations are selling adulterated fuel, does it consider, as a member of the Troika, that this is an effective means of increasing State revenue and combating trafficking?
2. Given that any changes may cause a 'relaxation' of budgetary targets, does it intend, as an advisory member on the fiscal adjustment programme for Greece, to draw up an impact study, in cooperation with the Greek authorities, to investigate whether a reduction in this excise duty could potentially yield more revenue for the State coffers?
3. Does it rule out the possibility that a reduction in the tax on heating oil could have an equivalent effect, namely by increasing consumption and thereby revenue, while at the same time significantly reducing the burden on family budgets?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission

(3 June 2013)

Between October 2011 and May 2012, the excise duty rate on gas oil used for heating purposes was EUR 60 per 1000 litres, whereas the excise duty rate imposed on gas oil used for transportation purposes was EUR 412 per 1000 litres. This difference in excise duties provoked an incentive for fuel fraud for heating oil to be used for transportation purposes. The Greek Government, after conversation with the Commission, the ECB and the IMF, therefore decided to equalize the two rates at EUR 330 from October 2012.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002654/13
al Consiglio**

Pino Arlacchi (S&D)

(6 marzo 2013)

Oggetto: Le operazioni di extraordinary rendition della CIA (Central Intelligence Agency)

Un nuovo rapporto pubblicato questo mese dalla Open Society Justice Initiative denuncia l'ampiezza del ricorso da parte della CIA alle extraordinary renditions — la pratica di rapire sospetti terroristi e trasferirli in paesi in cui si reputa che si torturino i prigionieri durante gli interrogatori. Secondo il rapporto, 54 paesi hanno partecipato al programma statunitense di detenzione segreta. In molti di questi paesi, lo stato di diritto è debole o inesistente, come in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Egitto, Malesia e Somalia. Ma ancora più allarmante è la collusione di democrazie più che mature come il Belgio, la Finlandia e la Danimarca, che, secondo il rapporto, hanno consentito alla CIA di utilizzare i loro aeroporti e il loro spazio aereo per i voli connessi alle operazioni di extraordinary rendition. Inoltre, la relazione afferma che Gran Bretagna, Italia, Germania e Australia hanno contribuito a interrogare uno o più sospetti e hanno permesso o attivamente contribuito al loro trasferimento verso paesi noti per torturare i prigionieri. Il Parlamento ha più volte ribadito la sua condanna delle pratiche di extraordinary rendition, le prigioni segrete e le torture.

Da i fatti denunciati dalla relazione dell'Open Society Justice Initiative:

- può il Consiglio rilasciare una dichiarazione in cui conferma la partecipazione di Stati membri dell'UE al programma della CIA?
- Il Consiglio potrebbe organizzare audizioni con le pertinenti agenzie di sicurezza dell'UE, in particolare Europol, Eurojust e il coordinatore antiterrorismo dell'UE, per chiarire la loro conoscenza della partecipazione di Stati membri al programma della Cia, e la reazione dell'UE?
- Il Consiglio è disposto a proporre disposizioni di salvaguardia onde garantire il rispetto dei diritti umani nella condivisione delle attività di intelligence, e una precisa delimitazione dei ruoli tra attività di intelligence e di polizia in modo che i servizi segreti non siano autorizzati ad esercitare i poteri di arresto e detenzione?

Risposta

(17 giugno 2013)

Il Consiglio ha dichiarato a più riprese che la lotta al terrorismo deve essere condotta nel pieno rispetto del diritto internazionale, in particolare, del diritto internazionale dei diritti umani, del diritto internazionale umanitario e del diritto internazionale dei rifugiati, e che l'esistenza di centri di detenzione segreti in cui le persone detenute si trovano in una situazione di vuoto giuridico non è conforme al diritto internazionale. Esiste un dialogo regolare tra i consulenti giuridici UE e USA sugli aspetti della lotta al terrorismo relativi al diritto internazionale, nel cui ambito sono discusse questioni quali l'arresto, la detenzione, l'interrogatorio e il trasferimento di terroristi sospetti. Nel quadro di tale dialogo l'UE rileva l'importanza del rispetto del diritto internazionale e dei diritti umani, ma le specifiche attività dei servizi di intelligence non vi vengono trattate.

Nella «Dichiarazione congiunta dell'Unione europea e dei suoi Stati membri e degli Stati Uniti d'America sulla chiusura del centro di detenzione di Guantanamo Bay e sulla futura cooperazione in materia di lotta al terrorismo sulla base di valori condivisi, del diritto internazionale e del rispetto dello stato di diritto e dei diritti dell'uomo», del giugno 2009, si afferma che «gli sforzi per combattere il terrorismo dovrebbero essere realizzati in modo rispondente allo stato di diritto, nel rispetto dei nostri valori comuni e in ottemperanza ai nostri rispettivi obblighi nel quadro del diritto internazionale, in particolare, del diritto internazionale dei diritti umani, del diritto internazionale dei rifugiati e del diritto internazionale umanitario». Si afferma inoltre che l'UE e gli USA ritengono che gli sforzi per combattere il terrorismo realizzati con queste modalità ci mettano in condizioni di maggiore forza e sicurezza. Le due parti accolgono con favore la determinazione degli Stati Uniti d'America di chiudere il centro di detenzione assieme ad altre iniziative intraprese, fra cui l'approfondito riesame delle politiche USA in materia di detenzione, trasferimento, processi e interrogatori nella lotta al terrorismo ed una maggiore trasparenza sulle prassi applicate in passato relativamente a queste politiche, come pure l'eliminazione dei centri di detenzione segreti. L'UE ha fornito un contributo alle task force per il riesame delle politiche in materia di detenzione, interrogatori e trasferimento (una lettera a nome del Consiglio al segretario di Stato e al segretario della difesa, copresidenti, e un briefing del coordinatore antiterrorismo dell'UE) per garantire il rispetto dei suddetti principi nell'attuazione delle politiche USA.

Quanto alle garanzie volte ad assicurare il rispetto dei diritti fondamentali, le istituzioni, gli organi e gli organismi dell'UE sono tenuti a rispettare la Carta dei diritti fondamentali. Il medesimo obbligo si applica agli Stati membri quando attuano il diritto dell'Unione. Tuttavia, poiché, in base all'articolo 4, paragrafo 2 del trattato sull'Unione europea, l'UE non ha competenza riguardo alle attività dei servizi di intelligence nazionali che si occupano di questioni di sicurezza nazionale, il Consiglio non è in grado di adottare disposizioni giuridiche UE che vincolino gli Stati membri in relazione ai ruoli da assegnare a tali servizi.

Ciononostante, tutti gli Stati membri sono parti contraenti della Convenzione europea di salvaguardia dei diritti dell'uomo e delle libertà fondamentali. Tutti gli atti nazionali, inclusi quelli compiuti dai servizi di intelligence, sono soggetti alla giurisdizione della Corte europea dei diritti dell'uomo, che è competente a dichiarare se tali atti rispettano o no i diritti e le libertà fondamentali riconosciuti nella suddetta convenzione.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002654/13
to the Council
Pino Arlacchi (S&D)
(6 March 2013)

Subject: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) rendition operations

A new report published this month by the Open Society Justice Initiative denounces the extent of the CIA's use of extraordinary rendition — the practice of abducting suspected terrorists and transferring them to countries with reputations for torturing prisoners during interrogations. According to the report, 54 countries participated in the US secret detention program. In many of these countries, the rule of law is weak or nonexistent, such as in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Egypt, Malaysia and Somalia. But even more alarming is the collusion of full-fledged democracies such as Belgium, Finland and Denmark, which, according to the report, have allowed their airports and airspace to be used for flights associated with CIA rendition operations. Moreover, the report states that Britain, Italy, Germany and Australia have helped interrogate one or more suspects and either allowed or actively aided in their transfers to countries known for torturing prisoners. Parliament has on many occasions reiterated its condemnation of the practices of extraordinary rendition, secret prisons and torture.

Given the facts denounced by the Open Society Justice Initiative report:

Could the Council issue a declaration acknowledging EU Member States' involvement in the CIA programme?

Could the Council hold hearings with the relevant EU security agencies, in particular Europol, Eurojust and the EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator, to clarify their knowledge of Member States' involvement in the CIA programme, and the EU's response?

Is the Council willing to propose safeguards so as to guarantee respect for human rights in intelligence-sharing activities, and a strict delimitation of roles between intelligence and law-enforcement activities so that intelligence agencies are not permitted to assume powers of arrest and detention?

Reply
(17 June 2013)

The Council has stated on a number of occasions that the fight against terrorism has to take place in full respect of international law, including human rights law, international humanitarian law and refugee law, and that the existence of secret detention facilities where detained persons are kept in a legal vacuum is not in conformity with international law. There is a regular dialogue between EU and US legal advisers on the international law aspects of the fight against terrorism, where questions such as the arrest, detention, interrogation and transfer of terrorist suspects are discussed. In this dialogue, the EU stresses the importance of respect for international law and human rights, but the specific activities of intelligence services are not addressed.

In the 'Joint Statement of the European Union and its Member States and the United States of America on the Closure of the Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility and Future Counterterrorism Cooperation, based on Shared Values, International Law, and Respect for the Rule of Law and Human Rights' of June 2009, it was stated that 'efforts to combat terrorism should be conducted in a manner that comports with the rule of law, respects our common values, and complies with our respective obligations under international law, in particular international human rights law, refugee law, and humanitarian law'. It was also stated that the EU and US consider that efforts to combat terrorism conducted in this manner make us stronger and more secure. Both sides welcomed the determination of the United States of America to close the facility together with other steps taken, including the intensive review of its detention, transfer, trial and interrogation policies in the fight against terrorism and increased transparency about past practices in regard to these policies, as well as the elimination of secret detention facilities. The EU has provided a contribution to the Detention, Interrogation and Transfer Policy Review Task Forces (a letter on behalf of the Council to the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, co-chairs, and a briefing by the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator) to ensure respect for the above principles in the implementation of US policies.

As for safeguards aimed at guaranteeing respect for fundamental rights, EU institutions, offices and bodies are required to comply with the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The same obligation applies to the Member States when they implement Union law. However, given that in the light of Article 4(2) of the Treaty of the European Union the EU does not have competence regarding the activities of national intelligence services dealing with national security issues, the Council is not in a position to adopt EU legal provisions which would bind Member States in relation to the roles to be given to those services.

Nevertheless, all Member States are contracting parties to the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. All national acts, including those carried out by the intelligence services, are subject to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights, which is competent to declare whether such acts do or do not respect the fundamental rights and freedoms recognised in that Convention.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002655/13
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

Pino Arlacchi (S&D)

(6 marzo 2013)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Vendite di armi del Regno Unito allo Sri Lanka

Secondo dati raccolti dal database del governo britannico per il controllo delle esportazioni strategiche dal CAAT (Campagna contro il commercio di armi), il governo britannico sta vendendo armi di piccolo calibro e munizioni per milioni di sterline allo Sri Lanka, nonostante la disastrosa situazione dei diritti umani nel paese.

Infatti, le statistiche tratte dal database mostrano che l'anno scorso sono stati venduti al governo dello Sri Lanka articoli che vanno da fucili d'assalto e fucili a canna liscia a congegni di mira, fino a pistole e munizioni.

Tutto questo avviene nonostante che il Foreign Office britannico e del Commonwealth classifica ancora lo Sri Lanka come «paese a rischio» per le violazioni dei diritti umani. Il governo dello Sri Lanka è stato accusato della brutale repressione della minoranza tamil. Inoltre, in un aggiornamento di dicembre, il Foreign Office ha detto che la situazione dei diritti umani è stata caratterizzata da andamenti negativi.

1. La Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante è consapevole del fatto che il Regno Unito sta vendendo equipaggiamenti militari allo Sri Lanka?
2. La Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante è del parere che queste vendite di armi costituiscono una violazione del codice di condotta dell'Unione europea sulle esportazioni di armi?
3. Che genere di passi ha in programma di effettuare la Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante per porre termine a questa situazione e promuovere una più restrittiva applicazione dei criteri della posizione comune dell'Unione europea sulle esportazioni di armi da parte degli Stati membri?

Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione

(24 aprile 2013)

La posizione comune 2008/944/PESC del Consiglio sul controllo delle esportazioni di attrezzature militari (che ha sostituito il codice di condotta dell'Unione europea per le esportazioni di armi) prevede che le decisioni di autorizzare o vietare le esportazioni di armi siano di competenza nazionale. Tuttavia le licenze di esportazione di armi concesse dagli Stati membri devono essere valutate in base agli otto criteri fissati nella posizione comune ed è possibile che altri Stati membri esprimano parere contrario su operazioni analoghe.

Dato che non esiste alcun embargo dell'UE sulle vendite di armi allo Sri Lanka, ciascuno Stato membro decide se rilasciare le licenze di esportazione in base a una valutazione dei rischi guidata dai suddetti principi.

Gli Stati membri hanno l'obbligo di dichiarare le esportazioni di armi a livello dell'UE e le informazioni sono pubblicate in relazioni annuali ⁽¹⁾.

La posizione comune sul controllo delle esportazioni di attrezzature militari è attualmente in fase di riesame con le rispettive conclusioni del Consiglio adottate il 19 novembre 2012. Sono state sollevate alcune questioni, attualmente in discussione presso gli organi competenti del Consiglio, per migliorare ulteriormente l'attuazione della posizione comune.

⁽¹⁾ Le relazioni sono disponibili all'indirizzo:
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/non-proliferation-and-disarmament/arms-export-control/index_it.htm

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002655/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Pino Arlacchi (S&D)
(6 March 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — UK arms sales to Sri Lanka

According to figures collected from the British Government's database for strategic export controls by the Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT), the British Government is selling millions of pounds worth of small arms and ammunition to Sri Lanka despite the country's dire human rights record.

Indeed, statistics taken from this database show that items ranging from assault rifles and shotguns through to weapon sights, pistols and ammunition were sold last year to the Government of Sri Lanka.

All this occurs despite the fact that the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office still classifies Sri Lanka as a 'country of concern' for human rights abuses. The Government of Sri Lanka has been accused of the brutal repression of its Tamil minority. Moreover, in a December update, the Foreign Office said that the human rights situation there had been marked by negative developments.

1. Is the Vice-President/High Representative aware that the UK is selling military equipment to Sri Lanka?
2. Does the Vice-President/High Representative consider these arms sales to be an infringement of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports?
3. What kind of measures is the Vice-President/High Representative planning to take in order to put an end to this situation and promote a stricter implementation of the criteria of the EU Common Position on arms exports by Member States?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(24 April 2013)

Under the Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP on the control of export of military equipment (previously the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports), decisions on whether to authorise or deny arms exports remain a national responsibility of Member States. However, the arms export licences granted by the Member States have to be assessed against the eight criteria laid down in the Common Position and Member States have to take into account possible denials issued by other Member States for similar transactions.

Given that there is no EU embargo on arms sales to Sri Lanka, each Member State decides whether to issue arms export licences based on a risk assessment guided by the abovementioned principles.

Member States are under an obligation to report their arms exports at EU level, and the information is made public through annual reports⁽¹⁾.

The Common Position on the control of export of military equipment is currently under review with respective Council Conclusions adopted on 19 November 2012. A number of issues have been identified for further improving the implementation of the Common Position, and these are currently being discussed by the relevant Council bodies.

⁽¹⁾ All reports are accessible at:
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/non-proliferation-and-disarmament/arms-export-control/index_en.htm

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002656/13

**alla Commissione
Aldo Patriciello (PPE)**

(6 marzo 2013)

Oggetto: Politiche comunitarie per i disabili e gli ipovedenti

Nell'ambito dell'armonizzazione del diritto comunitario con la Convenzione delle Nazioni Unite sui diritti delle persone con disabilità e in occasione del terzo Parlamento europeo delle persone con disabilità, che si è riunito a Bruxelles il 5 dicembre 2012, il Consiglio dell'Unione europea ha stabilito che dovrebbe essere istituito un quadro per monitorare, proteggere e promuovere l'attuazione della Convenzione, che comprenderà la commissione per le petizioni del Parlamento europeo, il Mediatore europeo, così come l'Agenzia dell'Unione europea per i diritti fondamentali, la Commissione europea e il Forum europeo della disabilità.

Facendo riferimento alla circolare UICI n. 302/2012, si fa appello alle istituzioni europee e ai loro organismi consultivi nell'ambito delle rispettive attribuzioni e competenze, agli Stati membri dell'UE, alle parti sociali, alla società civile, alle ONG, alle Organizzazioni delle Persone Disabili (OPD) e alle altre parti interessate, affinché prendano disposizioni adeguate a garantire l'attuazione dei diritti delle persone con disabilità in Europa e in tutte le organizzazioni internazionali di cui le istituzioni europee ed i loro membri fanno parte, riconoscendo quanto segue:

- I. L'Europa si doterà di un nuovo piano per l'occupazione, la crescita e l'inclusione sociale per le persone con disabilità — nuove strategie per uscire dalla crisi.
- II. L'Europa garantirà che il sostegno finanziario sarà utilizzato in primo luogo per occuparsi dei più bisognosi dell'Unione europea e non creerà maggiore esclusione.
- III. L'Europa deve attuare pienamente i diritti umani delle persone con disabilità.
- IV. L'Europa deve completare i diritti di cittadinanza per le persone con disabilità.
- V. L'Europa garantisce il sostegno politico per l'attuazione della Convenzione delle Nazioni Unite sui diritti delle persone con disabilità.

Tutto ciò premesso, voglia la Commissione rispondere ai seguenti quesiti:

1. Quali sono i metodi attraverso i quali la Commissione intende promuovere l'attuazione dei suddetti obiettivi?
2. Nello specifico, quali sono le azioni che la Commissione intende avviare per migliorare le condizioni di vita delle persone con disabilità all'interno dell'Unione?

Risposta di Viviane Reding a nome della Commissione

(7 maggio 2013)

Nella Strategia europea sulla disabilità 2010-2020 ⁽¹⁾ la Commissione, agendo nell'ambito delle competenze conferite dai trattati, ha delineato i piani di attuazione della convenzione delle Nazioni Unite sui diritti delle persone con disabilità (UNCRPD) e le azioni per il periodo 2010-2015 ⁽²⁾. Per informazioni dettagliate, la Commissione invita l'onorevole parlamentare a consultare la risposta all'interrogazione scritta E-000118/2013.

Conformemente all'UNCRPD, l'UE assiste gli Stati membri nella promozione di condizioni di vita autonoma per le persone con disabilità. La Commissione invita gli Stati membri a utilizzare i fondi dell'UE per finanziare, ad esempio, la formazione e la riqualificazione nella transizione dai centri di assistenza residenziale ai servizi assistenziali di comunità e promuovere buone condizioni di lavoro, sviluppando meccanismi di finanziamento per l'assistenza personale, l'assistenza residenziale a livello delle comunità e misure di riabilitazione, e investendo in infrastrutture accessibili e capaci di favorire l'integrazione.

⁽¹⁾ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52010DC0636:en:NOT>.

⁽²⁾ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52010SC1324:EN:NOT>.

Il pacchetto normativo proposto dalla Commissione sui Fondi strutturali e d'investimento europei per il periodo 2014-2020 individua diversi settori di intervento per rispondere alle esigenze delle persone con disabilità. In determinate circostanze tematiche e generali ex-ante (quali l'attuazione e l'applicazione della convenzione delle Nazioni Unite sui diritti delle persone con disabilità ⁽³⁾), le priorità di investimento del Fondo sociale europeo (FSE) e del Fondo europeo di sviluppo regionale dovrebbero contribuire con investimenti mirati a migliorare la qualità di vita delle persone con disabilità. La Commissione ha proposto che almeno il 25 % del bilancio della politica di coesione sia destinato all'FSE e che il 20 % dei finanziamenti a titolo dell'FSE sia impiegato per l'obiettivo tematico dell'inclusione sociale.

⁽³⁾ Attualmente in corso di discussione nell'ambito della consultazione a tre.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002656/13
to the Commission
Aldo Patriciello (PPE)
(6 March 2013)

Subject: EU policies for the disabled and visually impaired

As part of the harmonisation of EC law with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and to mark the occasion of the third European Parliament of Persons with Disabilities, which met in Brussels on 5 December 2012, the Council of the European Union has determined that there should be a framework to monitor, protect and promote the implementation of the Convention, which will include the European Parliament's Committee on Petitions, the European Ombudsman, as well as the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, the European Commission and the European Disability Forum.

With reference to the Italian Union of the Blind and Partially Sighted's circular No 302/2012, we call upon the EU institutions and their advisory bodies within the limits of their respective powers and competences, upon EU Member States, social partners, civil society, NGOs, Organisations of Persons with Disabilities (OPDs) and other stakeholders, to take appropriate measures to ensure implementation of the rights of people with disabilities in Europe and in all international organisations to which the EU institutions and their Member States belong, acknowledging the following points:

- I. Europe shall introduce a new plan for employment, growth and the social inclusion of people with disabilities — new strategies for resolving the crisis.
- II. Europe shall ensure that financial support will be used primarily to take care of the most deprived citizens in the European Union and will not create greater social exclusion.
- III. Europe must fully implement the human rights of people with disabilities.
- IV. Europe must extend citizenship rights for people with disabilities.
- V. Europe shall guarantee political support for the implementation of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

In view of this, will the Commission answer the following questions:

1. What methods does the Commission intend to use to promote the implementation of the above objectives?
2. Specifically, what actions does the Commission intend to take to improve the living conditions of persons with disabilities in the EU?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(7 May 2013)

Acting within the limits of competences conferred to it by the Treaties, the Commission has laid out its plans for implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) in the European Disability Strategy 2010-2020 ⁽¹⁾ and its list of actions for 2010-2015 ⁽²⁾. For specific details, the Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answer to Written Question E-000118/2013.

In line with the UNCRPD, the EU supports the Member States in promoting independent living for persons with disabilities. The Commission encourages Member States to use the EU funds for instance to finance training and requalification of carers in the transition from institutional to community-based care and promoting sound working conditions, developing personal assistance funding schemes, community-based residential support and rehabilitation measures, and investing in accessible and inclusive infrastructure.

⁽¹⁾ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52010DC0636:en:NOT>.

⁽²⁾ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52010SC1324:EN:NOT>.

The regulatory package on European Structural and Investment Funds for 2014-2020, as proposed by the Commission, identifies several fields of intervention addressing the needs of disabled people. In particular thematic and general *ex-ante* conditionalities (like the implementation and application of the UN Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities ⁽¹⁾), European Social Fund (ESF) and European Regional Development Fund investment priorities should contribute by targeted investments to improving the quality of life of people with disabilities. The Commission proposed that at least 25% of cohesion policy budget be allocated to the ESF and that 20% of ESF funding targets the social inclusions thematic objective.

⁽¹⁾ Under discussion in the context of the trilogue.

(Nederlandse versie)

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002657/13
aan de Raad**

Lucas Hartong (NI) en Laurence J. A. J. Stassen (NI)

(6 maart 2013)

Betref: Vervolgfragen subsidieverlening aan Egypte

Zondag 13 januari jl. werd door de heer Van Rompuy aan de Egyptische president Morsi bekend gemaakt dat de Raad voornemens is 5 miljard euro ter beschikking te stellen aan Egypte in het kader van „het democratiseringsproces”. De Raad beantwoordde onze eerste set vragen op 27 februari (E-001277/2013). In dat kader de volgende vervolgvragen:

1. In zijn beantwoording geeft de Raad aan dat „de voorzitter van de Europese Raad verwees naar de totale financiële inspanning die onder voorwaarden ter beschikking wordt gesteld via verschillende financiële mechanismen waarover de Commissie en financiële instellingen (zoals de EIB en EBRD) beschikken”. Kan de Raad aangeven op welk moment de heer Van Rompuy toestemming heeft verkregen van de Commissie om uitspraken namens die Commissie en haar „financiële instellingen” te doen richting Egypte?
2. De Raad schrijft dat de heer van Rompuy „slechts de aangeboden steun heeft bevestigd die in beginsel reeds door de bevoegde instanties is goedgekeurd”. Kan de Raad aangeven wat er precies met „in beginsel” wordt bedoeld en op welke begrotingslijnen van de Commissie en „bevoegde instanties” de heer Van Rompuy doelde?
3. Kan de Raad aangeven voor welke precieze doeleinden deze 5 miljard is toegezegd? Wie zijn de begunstigden die dit geld gaan ontvangen?
4. Is de Raad van mening dat het een wijs besluit is geweest om zoveel geld ter beschikking te stellen aan het land Egypte nu het de laatste maanden steeds treuriger is gesteld met de rechtsstaat?

Antwoord

(15 mei 2013)

Het is niet aan de Raad om commentaar te leveren op antwoorden op parlementaire vragen die door de voorzitter van een andere instelling zijn gegeven.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002657/13
to the Council
Lucas Hartong (NI) and Laurence J.A.J. Stassen (NI)
(6 March 2013)**

Subject: Follow-up questions concerning subsidies granted to Egypt

On Sunday, 13 January 2013, Mr Van Rompuy informed President Morsi of Egypt that the Council intended to make EUR 5 billion available to Egypt to promote 'the democratisation process'. The Council replied to our first set of questions on 27 February (E-001277/2013). In that context, I would like to pose the following follow-up questions:

1. In its reply, the Council indicates that 'The President of the European Council was referring to the total financial effort ... being made available, subject to conditionality, through different financial mechanisms at the disposal of the Commission and financial institutions (such as the EIB and EBRD)'. Can the Council specify exactly when Mr Van Rompuy obtained authorisation from the Commission to make statements on behalf of the Commission and its 'financial institutions' in respect of Egypt?
2. The Council writes that Mr Van Rompuy was only 'repeating ... offers already approved in principle by the appropriate authorities'. Can the Council indicate what precisely it means by 'in principle' and to which budget lines of the Commission and the 'appropriate authorities' Mr Van Rompuy was referring?
3. Can the Council specify for which particular purposes these EUR 5 billion have been pledged? Who are the beneficiaries who will receive this money?
4. Does the Council believe that it was a wise decision to make so much money available to Egypt, given the fact that the situation in relation to the rule of law in that country has been increasingly dismal over recent months?

**Reply
(15 May 2013)**

It is not for the Council to comment on replies to parliamentary questions given by the President of another institution.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002658/13
aan de Commissie
Lucas Hartong (NI)
(6 maart 2013)

Betref: Software drama bij Europese Scholen

Uit het „Report on the annual accounts of the European Schools for the financial year 2011” ⁽¹⁾ blijkt dat in 2003 het project „Odyssee” werd gelanceerd: een school management systeem. Het had in 2008 operationeel moeten zijn, maar op 8 mei 2012 werd besloten het hele project te stoppen omdat er enorm veel fouten („bugs”) in zaten en de leverancier feitelijk niet in staat was het product fatsoenlijk en werkend af te leveren. Schade tot dan toe: 2 miljoen euro. Dezelfde leverancier blijkt nu bezig om een ander softwarepakket te leveren voor het financieel management van de scholen, genaamd „Cobee”. In dat kader de volgende vragen:

1. Kan de Commissie aangeven om welk exact schadebedrag het gaat inzake „Odyssee” en op welke begrotingslijn dit drukt?
2. Kan de Commissie aangeven welke leverancier voor dit financiële drama verantwoordelijk was/is en of zij voornemens is de geleden schade te verhalen op de betreffende leverancier? Zo nee, waarom niet?
3. Kan de Commissie aangeven wie verantwoordelijk was/is voor het onbegrijpelijke besluit om toch weer met dezelfde leverancier in zee te gaan, ditmaal voor „Cobee”?
4. Waarom heeft de Europese Rekenkamer dit weer moeten ontdekken en is er op geen enkele wijze eerder informatie hieromtrent naar buiten gekomen vanuit de Europese Scholen zelf of de Commissie? Is de Commissie het met de PVV eens dat zelfs het meest elementaire financiële toezicht ernstig heeft gefaald?
5. Is de Commissie voornemens het management en met name de Raad van Toezicht van de Europese Scholen hierop aan te spreken? Zo nee, waarom niet?

Antwoord van de heer Šefčovič namens de Commissie
(2 mei 2013)

De Europese Scholen (ES) worden beheerd door een intergouvernementele organisatie. In deze organisatie heeft de Commissie slechts 1 van de 28 stemmen. Aangezien de Commissie niet de ordonnateur van de ES is, gaat het secretariaat-generaal van de ES onafhankelijk contracten voor haar eigen IT-instrumenten aan. De volgende informatie kon worden verkregen:

1. Het „Odyssee”-contract is in 2005 afgesloten op basis van een openbare aanbesteding in 2003. De laatste tranche is in december 2010 uitbetaald, maar aanpassingen aan het nieuwe regelgevende kader die moesten worden opgenomen, zorgden voor extra kosten. In 2012 werd duidelijk dat verdere aanpassingen te veel zouden kosten en is besloten om het contract op te zeggen. Voor de reeds geleverde diensten is een bedrag van in totaal 2,1 miljoen euro uit begrotingslijn BC 60 70 01 van de begroting voor de ES betaald.
2. Aangezien was voldaan aan de taken in het contract, is er geen geld teruggevorderd.
3. Na een openbare aanbesteding in november 2008 hebben de ES de opdracht „New Cobee” aan dezelfde leverancier gegund. Op dat moment was er geen reden om aan te nemen dat „Odyssee” vier jaar later zou worden stopgezet. De opdracht voor „New Cobee” is gegund aan het bedrijf dat op dat moment het meest geschikt werd geacht om het werk uit te voeren. De regels voor het plaatsen van overheidsopdrachten ⁽²⁾ zijn hierbij strikt in acht genomen.
4. In maart 2012 heeft de Commissie in de begrotingscommissie (BC) van de ES vragen gesteld over de oplevering van „New Cobee”. In de begrotingscommissie van maart 2013 heeft zij geweigerd extra middelen te besteden aan „New Cobee”, dat nog steeds niet geheel naar behoren werkte. De laatste twee tranches zijn sinds 2010 ingehouden.

⁽¹⁾ <http://eca.europa.eu/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/18736747.PDF>.

⁽²⁾ Overeenkomstig de financiële voorschriften in het document 2011-07-D-17-en-4 van de Europese Scholen.

De ES zoeken juridisch advies om het contract te beëindigen voor onrechtmatige gebrekkige nakoming. In dit stadium is er nog geen definitief besluit genomen.

5. De Commissie zal de kwestie aan de orde stellen in de vergadering van de Raad van Bestuur van april 2013.
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(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002658/13
to the Commission
Lucas Hartong (NI)
(6 March 2013)**

Subject: Software drama in the European Schools

According to the 'Report on the annual accounts of the European Schools for the financial year 2011' ⁽¹⁾, the 'Odyssey project', a school management system, was launched in 2003. It was supposed to become operational in 2008, but it was decided on 8 May 2012 to stop the entire project because of enormous numbers of software errors ('bugs') and because the supplier was not actually able to deliver the product in proper and working condition. The loss incurred to date amounted to EUR 2 million. The same supplier now appears to be engaged in providing another software package, known as 'Cobee', for the financial management of the schools. In that context, I would like to pose the following questions:

1. Can the Commission indicate what the exact loss is with respect to 'Odyssey' and which budget line this is in?
2. Can the Commission indicate which supplier was/is responsible for this financial drama and whether it intends to recover the loss suffered from the relevant supplier? If not, why not?
3. Can the Commission indicate who was/is responsible for the incomprehensible decision to go into business yet again with the same supplier, this time for 'Cobee'?
4. Why did the European Court of Auditors have to discover this once again and did neither the European Schools nor the Commission provide any prior information about this in any way? Does the Commission agree with the Dutch Freedom Party (PVV) that there has been a serious failure of even the most basic financial supervision in this case?
5. Does the Commission intend to call the management, especially the Supervisory Board of the European Schools, to account on this matter? If not, why not?

**Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the Commission
(2 May 2013)**

The European Schools (ES) are managed by an intergovernmental organisation in which the Commission has only one vote out of 28. The Commission not being its Authorising Officer, the Secretariat-General of the ES concludes contracts for its own IT tools independently. But the following information could be obtained:

1. The 'Odyssey' contract was concluded in 2005 on the basis of a call for tender in 2003. The last instalment was paid in December 2010, but adaptations to the new regulatory framework needed to be integrated incurring an additional cost. In 2012, it became clear that further adaptations would be too costly and therefore the contract was terminated. A total amount of EUR 2.1 million has been paid from budget line BC 60 70 01 of the ES budget for the services already performed.
2. No recovery was requested as the tasks in the contract were fulfilled.
3. Following a call for tender in November 2008 the ES awarded a contract called 'New Cobee' coming from the same supplier. At that time, there was no reason to believe that 'Odyssey' would be abandoned four years later. The contract for 'New Cobee' was awarded to the company deemed the most suitable to perform the work at the time, in strict compliance with the rules for procurement. ⁽²⁾
4. The Commission raised questions regarding the delivery of the 'New Cobee' in the Budgetary Committee (BC) of the ES in March 2012 and refused a possible additional budget for the still not fully functional 'New Cobee' in the BC of March 2013. The last two instalments have been held back since 2010.

⁽¹⁾ <http://eca.europa.eu/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/18736747.PDF>

⁽²⁾ According to the Financial regulations of the ES document: 2011-07-D-17-en-4

The ES have been seeking legal advice to terminate the contract for wrongful improper performance. No final decision has been taken yet at this stage.

5. The Commission will raise the issue in the Board of Governors' meeting of April 2013.
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(Suomenkielinen versio)

Kirjallisesti vastattava kysymys E-002661/13

komissiolle

Satu Hassi (Verts/ALE)

(6. maaliskuuta 2013)

Aihe: Vertikaalinen monopoli juomapakkausten kierrätysjärjestelmässä

Suomessa juomapakkausten kierrätys perustui vuoteen 2005 asti pääosin uudelleentäytettäviin lasi- ja muovipulloihin. Vuonna 2008 uudelleenkäytettävät muovipullot korvattiin pehmeillä PET-pulloilla, joiden materiaali voidaan käyttää uudelleen. Sekä uudelleenkäytettävien että materiaalina hyödynnettävien juomapakkausten kierrätyksen hallinnoinnista vastaa Suomen Palautuspakkaus Oy (PALPA), josta puolet omistavat vähittäiskauppa- ja toisen puolen panimoteollisuuden yritykset. Panttijärjestelmän korkeat liittymiskustannukset (7 600 euroa) tekevät siitä eksklusiivisen.

PALPA:lla on voittoa tavoittelemattoman yrityksen asema, mutta tosiasiaa sille kertyy voittoa panteista, joita ei palauteta kuluttajille. Esimerkiksi Norjassa erotus maksetaan valtiolle, jos panteista ei palauteta vähintään 95 %. Pirkanmaan ympäristökeskuksen tilaston mukaan vuosien 2005–2011 panttinetto lienee yli 100 miljoonaa euroa. PALPA maksaa käsittely- ja kuljetuskorvauksia kaupalle ja panimoille, eli omistajilleen.

Siirtymää uudelleenkäytettävistä pulloista pulloihin ja metallitölkkeihin, joista vain materiaali käytetään uudelleen, ajoivat isot kauppa- ja kuljetuskorvaukset, sillä niiden käsittely kaupoissa on halvempaa.

Koska vähittäiskaupan yritykset omistavat merkittävän osan PALPA:sta, toiminta lähenee vertikaalista monopolia, jossa kierrätysjärjestelmän omistaja voi vaikuttaa eri pakkausmuotojen markkina-asemaan tavalla, joka ei ole ympäristön kannalta välttämättä paras, ja myös syrjiä pienempiä toimijoita.

Pitääkö komissio PALPA:n monopoliasemaa ja sen panteista keräämiä voittoja EU:n kilpailu- ja jätelainsäädännön mukaisena? Ellei, mihin toimiin komissio aikoo ryhtyä?

Janez Potočnikin komission puolesta antama vastaus

(14. toukokuuta 2013)

Pakkauksista ja pakkausjätteistä annetun direktiivin 94/62/EY⁽¹⁾ 7 artiklan 1 kohdassa veloitetaan jäsenvaltiot ottamaan käyttöön palautus-, keruu- ja hyödyntämisyjärjestelmiä. Kyseisen artiklan mukaan asianomaisten alojen talouden toimijoiden on voitava osallistua näihin järjestelmiin. Järjestelmiä on sovellettava syrjimättä tuontituotteisiin, myös järjestelmiin pääsyä koskevien yksityiskohtaisten sääntöjen ja pääsystä mahdollisesti perittävien maksujen osalta, ja järjestelmät on suunniteltava siten, että vältetään kaupan esteet ja kilpailun vääristyminen perustamissopimuksen mukaisesti.

Komission tiedonannossa juomapakkausista, panttijärjestelmistä ja tavaroiden vapaasta liikkuvuudesta⁽²⁾ selvennetään, että jäsenvaltiot voivat valita, ylläpitävätkö asianomaiset täyttäjät/toimiala näitä järjestelmiä vapaaehtoisuudelta vai perustetaanko niitä varten kansallinen lainsäädäntökehys. Tässä valinnassa on noudatettava direktiivin 94/62/EY 7 artiklaa ja perustamissopimuksen asiaankuuluvia määräyksiä, jotka koskevat tavaroiden vapaata liikkuvuutta ja kilpailun vääristymistä koskevaa kieltoa.

Suomi on ottanut käyttöön kansallisen lainsäädäntökehksen palautus- ja keruujärjestelmiä⁽³⁾ varten.

Jos määräävässä markkina-asemassa oleva yritys vastaa asianomaisesta järjestelmästä niin, että se johtaa syrjintään tai asettaa kohtuuttomia ehtoja, tilanteessa saatetaan rikkoa SEUT-sopimuksen 102 artiklaa, joka kieltää määräävän markkina-aseman väärinkäytökset. Komission käytettävissä olevien tietojen mukaan PALPAn tapaus ei viittaa tällaiseen väärinkäyttöön Suomessa. Komissio ryhtyy tarvittaessa epäröimättä toimiin, mikäli uusia todisteita väärinkäytöksistä ilmenee.

⁽¹⁾ EYVL L 365, 31.12.1994.

⁽²⁾ EUVL C 107, 9.5.2009.

⁽³⁾ Jätelaki/Avfallslag (646/2011); Suomen Säädoskokoelma 646/2011, 21.6.2011.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002661/13
to the Commission
Satu Hassi (Verts/ALE)
(6 March 2013)**

Subject: Vertical monopoly in the drinks packaging recycling system

Until 2005 the recycling of drinks packaging in Finland was based mainly on reusable glass and plastic bottles. In 2008 the reusable plastic bottles were replaced with soft PET bottles, the material of which can be recycled. The recycling of both the reusable bottles and the drinks packaging made from recyclable material is managed by the firm of Suomen Palautuspakkaus Oy (Palpa), half of which is owned by retail chains and the other half by breweries. The high cost of joining the drinks deposit system (EUR 7600) makes this an exclusive club.

Palpa's position is that of a not-for-profit undertaking, but in fact it makes a profit from the deposits, which are not returned to the consumer. In Norway, for example, if at least 95% of the deposits are not returned, the balance is paid to the state. Statistics from the Tampere Region environmental centre show that the net takings in deposits from 2005 to 2011 were some EUR 100 million. Palpa pays handling and transport compensation to the drinks trade and breweries, which are its owners.

The move from reusable bottles to bottles and cans of which only the material is recycled was driven by the big commercial chains, as it reduces handling costs in shops.

Because the retail firms own a significant share in Palpa, its activity is close to a vertical monopoly in which the owner of the recycling system can influence the market position of the various packaging forms in a way which is not necessarily better for the environment, and also discriminates against smaller operators.

Does the Commission consider that Palpa's monopoly and the profit it collects from deposits is in accordance with EU legislation on competition and waste? If not, what measures does the Commission propose to take?

**Answer given by Mr Potočník on behalf of the Commission
(14 May 2013)**

Article 7(1) of Directive 94/62/EC on packaging and packaging waste ⁽¹⁾ obliges Member States to set up return, collection and recovery systems. According to this Article these systems shall be open to the participation of the economic operators of the sectors concerned. They shall apply to imported products under non-discriminatory conditions, including the detailed arrangements and any tariffs imposed for access to the systems, and shall be designed so as to avoid barriers to trade or distortions of competition in conformity with the Treaty.

The communication from the Commission on beverage packaging, deposit systems and free movement of goods ⁽²⁾ clarified that Member States may choose to have such systems operated on a voluntary basis by the fillers/industry itself, or set up a national framework. Either choice has to comply with Article 7 of Directive 94/62/EC and with the relevant provisions of the Treaty regarding the free movement of goods and the prohibition of distortions of competition.

Finland has installed a national framework for return and collection systems ⁽³⁾.

Where the operation of such system by a dominant company leads to discrimination or to the imposition of unfair conditions, there may be a breach of Article 102 TFEU that prohibits abuses of dominant position. In the case of Palpa, the information available to the Commission does not indicate such an abuse in Finland. The Commission will not hesitate to take action should new evidence come into its possession indicating such abuse.

⁽¹⁾ OJ L 365, 31.12.1994.

⁽²⁾ OJ C 107, 9.5.2009.

⁽³⁾ Jätelaki/Avfallslag (646/2011); Suomen Saadoskokoelma 646/2011, 21/06/2011.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης P-002662/13
προς την Επιτροπή
Kyriacos Triantaphyllides (GUE/NGL)
(7 Μαρτίου 2013)

Θέμα: Διατροφικό σκάνδαλο με κατανάλωση κρέας αλόγου

Το διατροφικό σκάνδαλο με την κατανάλωση εκατοντάδων ή και χιλιάδων τόνων αλογίσου κρέατος, έχει συγκλονίσει την Ευρώπη. Πολλές εταιρείες που ασχολούνται με τον τομέα των τροφίμων απέσυραν προϊόντα τους και χιλιάδες καταναλωτές έχουν πέσει θύματά τους. Πιο ανησυχητικό είναι το ενδεχόμενο να καταναλώθηκαν ζώα που πέρασαν από θεραπεία φαινοβουλαζόνης.

Λαμβάνοντας υπόψη ότι σε χώρες όπου καταναλώνουν άλογο, το κρέας του θεωρείται ακριβό και η ύπαρξή του σε μπιφτέκια και προμαγειρεμένα φαγητά δημιουργεί εύλογες ανησυχίες για την ποιότητά του.

Τα ευρήματα τα καταδεικνύουν τελικά για την ποιότητά του; Χρησιμοποιήθηκαν υπολείμματα και όργανα; Μπροστά στο δίλημμα, απ' την μια των αυξημένων ελέγχων για την προστασία της υγείας των καταναλωτών και απ' την άλλη της εξάλειψης των περιττών εμποδίων, πού θεωρεί η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή ότι πρέπει να δοθεί μεγαλύτερο βάρος;

Απάντηση του κ. Borg εξ' ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(18 Απριλίου 2013)

Μετά τα πρώτα πορίσματα στην απάτη με κρέας αλόγου σε προϊόντα βοδινού κρέατος, χωρίς να αναγράφεται στη συσκευασία τους, ελήφθη άμεση δράση. Τα κράτη μέλη πραγματοποιούν δοκιμές DNA για κρέας αλόγου σε προϊόντα βοδινού κρέατος καθώς και δοκιμές για την απουσία καταλοίπων φαινοβουλαζόνης σε κρέας αλόγου, σύμφωνα με τον κανονισμό της Επιτροπής που εκδόθηκε στις 19 Φεβρουαρίου 2013⁽¹⁾.

Οι δοκιμές αυτές συνεχίστηκαν τον Μάρτιο. Τα θετικά αποτελέσματα κοινοποιούνται αμέσως και, μέχρι τις 15 Απριλίου 2013, αναμένεται η επισκόπηση των αποτελεσμάτων. Η Επιτροπή θα υποβάλει έκθεση.

Η κατάσταση δεν δείχνει ότι υπάρχει κρίση όσον αφορά τη δημόσια υγεία ή την ασφάλεια των τροφίμων. Το θέμα εξακολουθεί να αποτελεί ζήτημα παραπλανητικής επισήμανσης και όχι ασφάλειας. Τα προβλήματα έγκεινται στην εφαρμογή της νομοθεσίας και όχι στη νομοθεσία καθεαυτή, όμως, όπως και με κάθε υπόθεση που σχετίζεται με τα τρόφιμα, θα πρέπει να εξαχθούν συμπεράσματα και, αν χρειάζεται, να γίνουν οι απαραίτητες αλλαγές υπό το πρίσμα της αποκτηθείσας εμπειρίας.

Η Επιτροπή δεν διαπιστώνει κάποια αντίφαση ανάμεσα στην εφαρμογή των κανόνων της ΕΕ, τις αυστηρές υγειονομικές επιθεωρήσεις και την εξάλειψη περιττών εμποδίων. Συζητούνται με τα κράτη μέλη συγκεκριμένες δράσεις για την καταπολέμηση της απάτης με τρόφιμα, τη βελτίωση των προγραμμάτων δοκιμής ή την τροποποίηση των υφιστάμενων κανόνων, π.χ. σχετικά με διαβατήρια αλόγων.

⁽¹⁾ Σύσταση της Επιτροπής 2013/99/ΕΕ, της 19ης Φεβρουαρίου 2013, για την εφαρμογή συντονισμένου προγράμματος με σκοπό να διαγνωστεί η συχνότητα δόλων πρακτικών στην εμπορία ορισμένων τροφίμων (ΕΕ L 48 της 21.2.2013).

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-002662/13
to the Commission
Kyriacos Triantaphyllides (GUE/NGL)
(7 March 2013)**

Subject: Scandal of horsemeat in food for human consumption

Europe has been shaken by a recent scandal involving hundreds or even thousands of tonnes of horsemeat being used to produce food for human consumption. Many companies in the food sector have now withdrawn their products and thousands of consumers have been affected. The greatest concern has been caused by the possible consumption of horsemeat from animals treated with phenylbutazone.

In countries where it is regularly consumed, horsemeat is normally considered an expensive commodity and its presence in hamburgers and precooked foods hence gives rise to justifiable concerns as to the quality thereof.

In view of this:

What has been revealed by meat quality investigations? Was the food in question found to contain scraps and animal organs? Faced with the choice of more stringent health inspections for the protection of consumers on the one hand and the elimination of unnecessary obstacles on the other, to which does the Commission consider that greater importance should be attached?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission
(18 April 2013)**

Following the first findings of the fraud on unlabelled horsemeat in beef products immediate action has been taken. Member States are carrying out DNA testing for horsemeat in beef products and testing for the absence of phenylbutazone residues in horsemeat in accordance with the Commission Recommendation adopted on 19 February 2013 ⁽¹⁾.

These tests continued in March. Positive results are communicated immediately and an overview of the results is expected by 15 April 2013. The Commission will produce a report.

The situation does not point to a public health or food safety crisis. The issue remains one of fraudulent labelling not one of safety. Problems lie in the implementation of legislation and not in the legislation itself, but as with any food-related affair, lessons must be learnt and, if necessary, appropriate changes are to be made in the light of experience gained.

The Commission does not see any contradiction between enforcement of EU rules, strict health inspections and the elimination of unnecessary obstacles. Specific actions for fighting food fraud, improving testing programmes or modify the current rules for example about horse passports are being discussed with the Member States.

⁽¹⁾ Commission Recommendation 2013/99/EU of 19 February 2013 on a coordinated control plan with a view to establish the prevalence of fraudulent practices in the marketing of certain foods (OJ L 48, 21.2.2013).

(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej P-002663/13
do Komisji**

Michał Tomasz Kamiński (ECR)

(7 marca 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Stosunki handlowe UE-Tajwan

W odpowiedzi na pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-5942/09 Komisja stwierdziła: „strona europejska podkreśliła, że większość obaw UE związanych z handlem dwustronnym z Tajwanem to bariery pozataryfowe o charakterze regulacyjnym, które utrudniają dostęp do rynku tajwańskiego, i potrzebne są postępy w tej kwestii na istniejących forach dwustronnych”. Czy w opinii Komisji osiągnięto wystarczający postęp? Jeżeli nie, jakie kwestie pozostają do rozstrzygnięcia?

Czy Komisja podziela zdanie, że rozpoczęcie negocjacji w sprawie umowy o współpracy gospodarczej/umowy o wolnym handlu z Tajwanem ułatwiłoby osiągnięcie wzajemnie korzystnego rozwiązania w odniesieniu do wskazanych wyżej kwestii?

W odpowiedzi na pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-003047/2011 Komisja stwierdziła: „Komisja stale zachęca Tajwan do stosowania norm międzynarodowych i powstrzymywania się od przyjmowania odrębnych norm dla Tajwanu”. Czy w odniesieniu do norm, o których wspomniała Komisja, osiągnięto wystarczający postęp?

Jakie konkretnie „odrębne normy dla Tajwanu” miała Komisja na myśli?

W ostatnim sprawozdaniu Parlamentu Europejskiego w sprawie rocznego sprawozdania Rady dla Parlamentu Europejskiego na temat wspólnej polityki zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa (12562/2011-P7_TA(2012)0334) stwierdza się, że „bliższe związki gospodarcze z Tajwanem mogą ułatwić UE dostęp do chińskiego rynku”. Wzywa się także Komisję i Radę do „ułatwienia negocjacji w sprawie umowy o współpracy gospodarczej między UE a Tajwanem”.

W odpowiedzi na pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-003047/2011 Komisja stwierdziła: „Komisja uważa, że pytanie, czy [bliższe stosunki między UE a Tajwanem] mogą skutkować ułatwieniem dostępu do chińskiego rynku, zależy w dużym stopniu od wyników współpracy gospodarczej między stronami prowadzonej na podstawie ramowej umowy o współpracy gospodarczej i umów powiązanych”. Ponieważ zawarto ramową umowę o współpracy gospodarczej między Tajwanem i Chinami kontynentalnymi, czy Komisja jest zdania, że zawarcie przez UE umowy o współpracy gospodarczej/umowy o wolnym handlu z Tajwanem mogłoby usprawnić dostęp przedsiębiorstw europejskich do rynku chińskiego?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Karela De Guchta w imieniu Komisji

(5 kwietnia 2013 r.)

Kwestie barier pozataryfowych stanowią istotną część rozmów toczących się w ramach dobrze ugruntowanego dialogu handlowego pomiędzy Tajwanem a Unią Europejską. Specjalne grupy robocze spotykają się dwa razy w roku w celu omówienia przeszkód technicznych w handlu oraz problemów sanitarnych i fitosanitarnych, odnosząc pewne pozytywne rezultaty, jak na przykład w przypadku tajwańskiego rozporządzenia D 401 w sprawie produktów wysokiego napięcia, czy eksportu żywych ptaków z UE. Jednak w dalszym ciągu trwają prace w związku z wnioskiem pięciu państw członkowskich o pozwolenie na eksport wieprzowiny i mięsa drobiowego. W tym zakresie Komisja oczekuje konstruktywnych postępów do czasu następných dorocznych konsultacji.

Jeśli chodzi o szczegółowe normy, przykładowo UE zażądała od Tajwanu przestrzegania międzynarodowych standardów Europejskiej Komisji Gospodarczej Organizacji Narodów Zjednoczonych dotyczących części samochodowych. Rozmowy w tej kwestii w dalszym ciągu trwają.

Umowy o wolnym handlu są narzędziem mogącym ułatwić dostęp do rynku, należy jednak zauważyć, że umowa z Chinami – ramowa umowa o współpracy gospodarczej (Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement – ECFA) – jak na razie okazała się być względnym sukcesem. Zakres liberalizacji jest raczej ograniczony, a nawet w sektorach objętych liberalizacją przedsiębiorstwa UE zdają się nie wykorzystywać jeszcze ECFA bardzo aktywnie.

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-002663/13
to the Commission**

Michał Tomasz Kamiński (ECR)

(7 March 2013)

Subject: EU-Taiwan trade relations

In its answer to Written Question E-5942/09, the Commission stated: 'The European side underlined that most of the EU's bilateral trade concerns with Taiwan were non-tariff barriers of a regulatory nature, which made access to Taiwan's market difficult and that there is a need to make progress on this in the existing bilateral fora'. In the Commission's opinion, has sufficient progress been made? If not, what issues remain to be solved?

Does the Commission agree that launching negotiations for an ECA/FTA with Taiwan would facilitate reaching a mutually beneficial solution regarding the trade concern mentioned above?

In its answer to Written Question E-003047/2011, the Commission further stated that it 'has consistently encouraged Taiwan to apply international standards and to refrain from adopting standards specific to Taiwan'. Has enough progress been made regarding the standards referred to by the Commission?

What specific 'standards specific to Taiwan' did the Commission have in mind?

The recent report of Parliament on the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the CFSP (12562/2011-P7_TA(2012)0334) notes that 'closer economic ties with Taiwan could improve the EU's market access to China'. It also urges the Commission and Council to 'facilitate the negotiation of an EU-Taiwan Economic Cooperation Agreement'.

Finally, the Commission's answer to Written Question E-003047/2011 stated: 'The Commission considers that the question of whether this [closer economic ties between the EU and Taiwan] might result in improvements in access also to the Chinese market depends in large measure on the results of the ongoing economic cooperation being pursued between those parties under the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement and related agreements'. Since the ECFA between Taiwan and mainland China has been concluded, is the Commission of the opinion that concluding an ECA/FTA between the EU and Taiwan would improve access to the Chinese market for European businesses?

Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission

(5 April 2013)

Non-tariff issues constitute a significant part of the discussions taking place in the framework of the well-established trade dialogue between Taiwan and the European Union. Dedicated working groups meet twice a year on technical barriers to trade or sanitary and phytosanitary related concerns, with some positive results, for example, on the Taiwanese regulation D 401 on high voltage products or on the export of live birds from the EU. Work is, however, still ongoing regarding the application of five Member States to be authorised to export pork and poultry meat for which the Commission is expecting constructive developments by the next annual consultations.

As far as the specific standards are concerned, the EU has, for instance, requested Taiwan to follow international United Nations Economic Commission for Europe standards for car parts. Discussions on the matter continue to this date.

While Free Trade Agreements are a possible tool to facilitate market access, it should be noted that the agreement with China Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) seems to be only a qualified success so far. The liberalisation scope is rather limited and even in the liberalised sectors, EU companies seem not to utilise ECFA yet very actively.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002664/13
προς την Επιτροπή
Nikos Chrysogelos (Verts/ALE)
 (7 Μαρτίου 2013)

Θέμα: Νομιμότητα έργων αναδάσωσης που εντάσσονται στο «Αλέξανδρος Μπαλατατζής»

Σύμφωνα με την υπ' αριθμόν 168608/442/19-3-2012 απόφαση του Ειδικού Γραμματέα Δασών το έργο «Αναδασώσεις για την αποκατάσταση κατεστραμμένου φυσικού τοπίου στην περιφέρεια του ελατοδάσους Λαμπείας-Αστρά-Κρυόβρυσης-Τσίπιανα Δήμου Αρχαίας Ολυμπίας» εντάχθηκε στο Πρόγραμμα «Αγροτική Ανάπτυξη της Ελλάδας 2007-2013 — Αλέξανδρος Μπαλατατζής». Ο προϋπολογισμός είναι 4 013 113 ευρώ για αναδάσωση 2 130 στρεμμάτων, ενώ το έργο συγχρηματοδοτείται από την ΕΕ, με ποσοστό 79,37%, και ποσοστό εθνικής συμμετοχής 20,63%. Όπως, όμως, ισχυρίζονται κάτοικοι της περιοχής, η προς αναδάσωση περιοχή δεν έχει καεί ποτέ και δεν υπάρχουν κενά δασοκάλυψης που να δικαιολογούν το έργο. Την παραμονή των Χριστουγέννων του 2012, το Δασαρχείο του Πύργου υπέγραψε με ιδιώτη εργολάβο την υπ' αριθμ. πρωτ. 5.888 Σύμβαση Κατασκευής του Έργου συνολικού προϋπολογισμού 3 765 887,21 ευρώ, ενώ στις 14.1.2013, το Δασαρχείο Πύργου με την υπ' αριθμ. πρωτ. 94 απόφασή του ορίζει ως επιβλέποντα του έργου δασολόγο, ο οποίος με βάση, το πόρισμα των επιθεωρητών Δημόσιας Διοίκησης, που εστάλη πρόσφατα στον εισαγγελέα Πλημμελειοδικών Ηλείας, φέρεται, μαζί με ακόμη έναν δασικό υπάλληλο, να αποχαρακτηρίζουν υπέρ ιδιώτη δημόσιες δασικές εκτάσεις που κάηκαν από την καταστροφική και φονική πυρκαγιά το καλοκαίρι του 2007, στην Ηλεία. Ο εισαγγελέας πλημμελειοδικών Ηλείας διέταξε την Δευτέρα 4 Μαρτίου κατεπείγουσα προκαταρκτική εξέταση για το αδίκημα της απάτης σε βάρος του ελληνικού δημοσίου. Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Έχει ζητήσει ή πρόκειται να ζητήσει αναλυτική ενημέρωση από τις ελληνικές αρχές σχετικά με τη σκοπιμότητα του έργου και την νομιμότητα των διαδικασιών που ακολουθήθηκαν για την ανάθεσή του;
2. Προτίθεται να αναπτύξει μηχανισμό παρακολούθησης και αξιολόγησης των αποτελεσμάτων και των επιδόσεων προγραμμάτων αναδάσωσης σε διάφορες χώρες, τα οποία χρηματοδοτούνται από ευρωπαϊκά ταμεία, ώστε να αξιοποιούνται αποτελεσματικότερα οι πόροι που αφορούν στα δάση;

Απάντηση του κ. Ciolos εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
 (2 Μαΐου 2013)

1. Στο πλαίσιο της κοινής διαχείρισης (άρθρο 7 και τίτλος VI του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) 1698/2005⁽¹⁾ του Συμβουλίου), εναπόκειται σε κάθε κράτος μέλος να εφαρμόσει το οικείο πρόγραμμα αγροτικής ανάπτυξης (ΠΑΑ) με αποτελεσματικό, αποδοτικό και ορθό τρόπο και να εξασφαλίσει την αποτελεσματική προστασία των δημοσιονομικών συμφερόντων της Κοινότητας με i) διαχειριστική αρχή που θα ορίσει, ii) διαπιστευμένο οργανισμό πληρωμών και iii) οργανισμό πιστοποίησης. Η Επιτροπή δεν έχει πληροφορίες για τα συγκεκριμένα έργα αναδάσωσης που εκτελούνται με βάση το ελληνικό ΠΑΑ ή για τυχόν νομικές ενέργειες στις οποίες έχουν προβεί οι ελληνικές αρχές. Η Επιτροπή θα ζητήσει πάντως σχετικές πληροφορίες από το κράτος μέλος και, εάν χρειασθεί, θα λάβει κατάλληλα μέτρα για να εξασφαλίσει τη συμμόρφωση με τη χρηστή δημοσιονομική διαχείριση του Ευρωπαϊκού Γεωργικού Ταμείου Αγροτικής Ανάπτυξης (ΕΓΤΑΑ).

2. Η αξιολόγηση των αποτελεσμάτων και των επιδόσεων των μέτρων αναδάσωσης εμπίπτουν στην αρμοδιότητα του εκάστοτε κράτους μέλους. Ένα κοινό σύστημα παρακολούθησης και αξιολόγησης καθιστά δυνατή την παρακολούθηση και τη μέτρηση των επιδόσεων των παρεμβάσεων πολιτικής που χρηματοδοτούνται από το ΕΓΤΑΑ (μεταξύ των οποίων και τα μέτρα αναδάσωσης). Ωστόσο, η αξιολόγηση μεμονωμένων προγραμμάτων αγροτικής ανάπτυξης είναι και παραμένει ευθύνη των κρατών μελών.

⁽¹⁾ ΕΕ L 277 της 21.10.2005.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002664/13
to the Commission**

Nikos Chrysogelos (Verts/ALE)
(7 March 2013)

Subject: Legality of reforestation works under the 'Alexandros Baltatzis' programme

The project entitled 'Reforestation of afflicted areas of the pine forest in the region of Lampeia-Astra-Kryovrysi-Tsipiana in the Municipality of Archaia Olympia' was included in the 'Alexandros Baltatzis Programme for Rural Development in Greece 2007-2013' under decision No 168608/442 adopted on 19 March 2012 by the Special Secretary for Forests. It has a budget of EUR 4 013 113 for the reforestation of 2 130 decares and is being co-financed from an EU contribution of 79.37% and a national contribution of 20.63%. However, according to local residents, the area which is to be reforested has never been damaged by fire and there are no gaps in the tree cover which justify the project. On Christmas Eve in 2012, the Pyrgos Forestry Commission signed contract No 5.888 with a private contractor to complete the project at a total cost of EUR 3 765 887.21 and, on 14 January 2013, the Pyrgos Forestry Commission adopted decision No 94 appointing a forestry expert to oversee the project. According to a report by public inspectors which was recently sent to the prosecution service of the Ileia Lower Criminal Court, he and another Forestry Commission employee appear to have reclassified forest areas afflicted by the catastrophic and fatal fire in Ileia in the summer of 2007 for the benefit of a private individual. On Monday, 4 March, the prosecution service of the Ileia Lower Criminal Court ordered an urgent preliminary investigation into fraud against the Greek State. In view of the above, will the Commission say:

1. Has it requested or does it intend to request detailed information from the Greek authorities on the practical effects of the project and the legality of the procedures applied in order to award it?
2. Does it intend to introduce a mechanism for monitoring and evaluating the results and performance of reforestation programmes in various countries funded by European funds, so that funds ring-fenced for forests can be used more effectively?

Answer given by Mr Ciolos on behalf of the Commission

(2 May 2013)

1. In the context of shared management (Article 7, and Title VI of Council Regulation (EC) 1698/2005 ⁽¹⁾), it is the responsibility of each Member State to implement its rural development programme (RDP) in an efficient, effective and correct way and to ensure that the Community's financial interests are effectively protected through (i) a designated managing authority, (ii) an accredited paying agency and (iii) a certifying body. Therefore, the Commission does not have any information on the specific reforestation projects implemented under the Greek RDP or on any legal procedures undertaken by the Greek authorities. However, the Commission will request information from the Member State on this issue and if needed, it will take appropriate actions to ensure compliance with sound financial management of the European Agricultural Development Fund (EAFRD).

2. Evaluation of the results and performance of reforestation measures falls under the competence of each Member State. A common monitoring and evaluation system allows for an effective monitoring and measurement of the performance of the policy interventions funded by the EAFRD (including reforestation measures). However, the evaluation of individual Rural Development Programmes is and will remain the responsibility of the Member States.

(¹) OJ L 277, 21.10.2005.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002665/13
aan de Commissie
Marietje Schaake (ALDE)
 (7 maart 2013)

Betreft: EU-maatregelen ter vermindering van de uitvoer van ICT die vervolgens wordt misbruikt in het kader van schendingen van de mensenrechten

— Gezien eerdere vragen aan de Commissie over de uitvoer door de EU van ICT en het gebruik van deze ICT bij mensenrechtenschendingen, met name vragen E-007752/2012 ⁽¹⁾, E-006777/2012 ⁽²⁾ en E-010306/2011 ⁽³⁾, en de antwoorden van de Commissie hierop; gezien het verslag over een strategie voor digitale vrijheid in het buitenlands beleid van de EU (hierna „de strategie” genoemd) dat het Parlement op 11 december 2012 heeft goedgekeurd; gezien de wetgevingsresolutie van het Parlement van 23 oktober 2012 in het kader van procedure 2011/0310(COD) en de reactie van de Commissie op de goedgekeurde tekst;

— gezien het verslag over de openbare raadpleging die is uitgevoerd in het kader van het groenboek COM(2011)393 ⁽⁴⁾ („het verslag”);

— overwegende dat er op 20 november 2012 werd ⁽⁵⁾ gemeld dat het Zweedse telecommunicatiebedrijf Ericsson het grootste telecombedrijf van Iran momenteel helpt om zijn netwerk uit te breiden en tot 2021 ook een andere Iraanse operator zal ondersteunen;

— overwegende dat het Britse Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken in zijn verslag van 2012 over actie betreffende de mensenrechten ⁽⁶⁾ de aanbeveling deed dat de Britse regering een kader vastlegt voor het controleren van de levering door Britse onderdanen of door in het VK gevestigde bedrijven van telecommunicatievoorzieningen waarvan met redelijke zekerheid kan worden vermoed dat ze zullen worden gebruikt om de vrijheid van meningsuiting op het internet aan banden te leggen, en overwegende dat de Britse minister van Buitenlandse Zaken dit voorstel vervolgens heeft onderschreven ⁽⁷⁾:

1. Hoe en wanneer wil de Commissie de strategie in haar toekomstige beleidsmaatregelen en optreden opnemen en/of ten uitvoer leggen?
2. Hoe en wanneer wil de Commissie de in het verslag vermelde problemen met betrekking tot de mensenrechten aanpakken, onder meer door middel van een herziening van haar kader voor tweërlei gebruik en aan de hand van wetgevingsvoorstellen ter vergroting van de transparantie en verantwoordingsplicht van EU-bedrijven (zie alinea 28 van de strategie)?
3. Zijn de zakelijke activiteiten van Ericsson verenigbaar met de EU-sancties tegen Iran? Is de Commissie van plan een specifiek onderzoek te openen naar de huidige activiteiten van Ericsson in Iran en indien nodig een inbreukprocedure te starten tegen Zweden wegens de niet-uitvoering van EU-sancties?
4. Op welke manier werkt de Commissie samen met de lidstaten van de EU om ervoor te zorgen dat de sancties tegen Syrië en Iran ten volle worden uitgevoerd en nageleefd?

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2012-007752+0+DOC+XML+V0//NL&language=NL>.

⁽²⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2012-006777+0+DOC+XML+V0//NL&language=NL>.

⁽³⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2011-010306+0+DOC+XML+V0//NL&language=NL>.

⁽⁴⁾ http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/february/tradoc_150459.pdf

⁽⁵⁾ <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/20/us-iran-ericsson-idUSBRE8AJ1F420121120>.

⁽⁶⁾ <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cm201213/cmselect/cmfaff/116/11610.htm>

⁽⁷⁾ <https://www.privacyinternational.org/press-releases/british-government-welcomes-foreign-affairs-committee-recommendation-to-control>.

Antwoord van hoge vertegenwoordiger/vicevoorzitter Ashton namens de Commissie
(23 mei 2013)

1 en 2. De EU erkent het belang van de bevordering van mensenrechten en vrijheid van meningsuiting in verband met nieuwe communicatietechnologieën en stelt alles in het werk om te zorgen voor een duidelijk mensenrechtencomponent bij de ontwikkeling van beleidsmaatregelen en programma's voor cyberveiligheid, de bestrijding van cybercriminaliteit, internetbeheer en andere relevante beleidsgebieden. De Commissie heeft raadplegingen opgestart over de toepassing van de verordening inzake uitvoercontrole op sommige gevoelige technologieën die kunnen worden gebruikt op een wijze die in strijd is met de mensenrechten. Zij heeft eveneens het belang van uitvoercontroles op ICT ⁽⁸⁾ benadrukt in haar recente werkdocument van de diensten van de Commissie „Strategic export controls: ensuring security and competitiveness in a changing world — A report on the public consultation launched under the Green Paper COM(2011) 393” ⁽⁹⁾, waarin de antwoorden van verschillende belanghebbenden worden besproken. De Commissie zal de beleidsopties in dit verband beoordelen in het kader van de voorbereidingen voor een mededeling die is gepland voor 2013.

3 en 4. De beperkende maatregelen van de EU met betrekking tot de mensenrechtensituatie in Iran omvatten een verbod op de levering van apparatuur, technologie of software aan Iran die in de eerste plaats is bedoeld voor de monitoring en interceptie van communicatie via internet of telefoon, zoals is bepaald in bijlage IV bij Verordening (EU) nr. 359/2011 van de Raad ⁽¹⁰⁾. Soortgelijke maatregelen zijn van toepassing op Syrië overeenkomstig Verordening (EG) nr. 36/2012 van de Raad ⁽¹¹⁾. De sancties omvatten geen verbod op het leveren van andere goederen of diensten in de telecommunicatiesector. De handhaving van deze verordeningen is de primaire bevoegdheid van de lidstaten. Hierbij is het de taak van de Commissie om toezicht te houden op deze handhaving en, indien nodig, inbreukprocedures in te leiden overeenkomstig artikel 258 VWEU.

⁽⁸⁾ Informatie en communicatietechnologie.

⁽⁹⁾ SWD(2013) 7 final.

⁽¹⁰⁾ Verordening (EU) nr. 359/2011 van de Raad van 12 april 2011 betreffende beperkende maatregelen tegen bepaalde personen, entiteiten en lichamen in verband met de situatie in Iran, PB L 100 van 14.4.2011.

⁽¹¹⁾ Verordening (EU) nr. 36/2012 van de Raad van 18 januari 2012 betreffende beperkende maatregelen in het licht van de situatie in Syrië en tot intrekking van Verordening (EU) nr. 442/2011, PB L 16 van 19.1.2012.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002665/13
to the Commission
Marietje Schaake (ALDE)
(7 March 2013)

Subject: EU actions curbing the export and misuse of ICT in human rights violations

— Having regard to earlier questions and the Commission's answers regarding EU exports of ICT and its use in human rights violations, particularly E-007752/2012 ⁽¹⁾, E-006777/2012 ⁽²⁾ and E-010306/2011 ⁽³⁾; the report on 'A Digital Freedom Strategy in EU Foreign Policy' (hereinafter referred to as the 'Strategy') as adopted by Parliament on 11 December 2012; Parliament's legislative resolution of 23 October 2012 under procedure file 2011/0310(COD) and the Commission's response to the text adopted;

— having regard to the report on the public consultation carried out under Green Paper COM(2011)393 ⁽⁴⁾ (the 'Report');

— whereas on 20 November 2012 it was reported ⁽⁵⁾ that the Swedish telecommunications firm Ericsson is working with Iran's largest telecom operator to expand its network and will support another Iranian mobile operator until 2021;

— whereas the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in its 2012 report on human rights work ⁽⁶⁾ recommended that the British Government 'set out the scope for controlling the supply by UK nationals, or by companies based in the UK, of telecommunications equipment for which there is a reasonable expectation that it might be used to restrict freedom of expression on the Internet', a position subsequently endorsed ⁽⁷⁾ by the British Foreign Secretary:

1. How and when will the Commission include/implement the strategy in its future policies/actions?
2. How and when will the Commission address human rights concerns, as included in the report, through a revision of the Commission's dual-use framework, as well as through legislative proposals increasing transparency and accountability for EU companies (paragraph 28 of the strategy)?
3. Are Ericsson's business dealings compatible with EU sanctions against Iran? Will the Commission open a specific investigation into Ericsson's ongoing business in Iran and, if necessary, launch infringement proceedings against Sweden for failing to implement EU sanctions?
4. How does the Commission work with the EU Member States to ensure full implementation and enforcement of sanctions against Syria and Iran?

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2012-007752+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN>.

⁽²⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2012-006777+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN>.

⁽³⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2011-010306+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN>.

⁽⁴⁾ http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/february/tradoc_150459.pdf

⁽⁵⁾ <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/20/us-iran-ericsson-idUSBRE8A11F420121120>.

⁽⁶⁾ <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmfa/116/11610.htm>

⁽⁷⁾ <https://www.privacyinternational.org/press-releases/british-government-welcomes-foreign-affairs-committee-recommendation-to-control>.

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission*(23 May 2013)*

1-2. The EU recognises the importance of the promotion of human rights and freedom of expression in relation to new communication technologies and endeavours to ensure that a clear human rights perspective is present in the development of policies and programmes relating to cyber security, the fight against cyber crime, Internet governance and other related policies. The Commission has initiated consultations regarding the application of the Export Control Regulation to certain sensitive technologies that could be used in violation of human rights and has highlighted the issue of ICT ⁽⁸⁾ export controls in its recent Commission Staff Working Document 'Strategic export controls: ensuring security and competitiveness in a changing world — A report on the public consultation launched under the Green Paper COM(2011) 393' ⁽⁹⁾ which reviews responses received from various stakeholders. The Commission will assess policy options in this respect as part of preparations for a communication planned in 2013.

3-4. The EU's restrictive measures in view of the human rights situation in Iran include a prohibition on the supply to Iran of equipment, technology or software for use primarily for monitoring or interception of Internet or telephone communication as listed in Annex IV of Council Regulation (EU) No 359/2011 ⁽¹⁰⁾; similar measures apply vis-à-vis Syria under Council Regulation (EC) No 36/2012 ⁽¹¹⁾. The sanctions do not include a prohibition on the supply of other goods or services in the telecommunications sector. The primary responsibility for enforcement of these regulations rests with Member States. The Commission's role in this regard is to oversee such enforcement and to initiate infringement procedures in accordance with Article 258 TFEU as appropriate.

⁽⁸⁾ Information and Communication Technology.

⁽⁹⁾ SWD(2013) 7 final.

⁽¹⁰⁾ Council Regulation (EU) No 359/2011 of 12 April 2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Iran, OJ L 100, 14.4.2011.

⁽¹¹⁾ Council Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 of 18 January 2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria and repealing Regulation (EU) No 442/2011, OJ L 16, 19.1.2012.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002666/13
to the Commission
Jim Higgins (PPE)
(7 March 2013)**

Subject: Labelling of honey

The practical effect of the classification of pollen as a constituent of honey in the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2001/110/EC relating to honey will be that the presence of authorised genetically modified (GM) pollen in honey will not require labelling unless it exceeds 0.9% of the overall honey weight.

How does the Commission plan to protect the rights of consumers to transparent labelling?

How can consumers make an informed decision when the presence of GM pollen is not marked on the label of honey products?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission
(22 April 2013)**

The objective of the proposal by the Commission is not to prevent consumers from being informed of the presence of authorised GM pollen in honey, but to clarify that pollen is a constituent of honey, in line with international standards. This amendment will restore honey as a natural product made by bees and only composed of constituents. In this context, the GMO legislation ⁽¹⁾ adopted by the European Parliament and the Council sets out a labelling threshold of 0.9% under which presence of authorised GMOs in foodstuff does not have to be labelled when this presence is adventitious or technically unavoidable. The Commission considers that this labelling threshold applies equally to honey as to any other foodstuff and that there are no objective reasons to make a special treatment for honey.

The Commission considers that the development of 'GM free' labelling schemes by private operators or public authorities can permit consumers to select products avoiding any GM presence if they so wish. The Commission has launched a study to gain a better understanding of the scopes and specifications of these labels in the EU and to assess the need for a possible harmonisation of this field. The results of the study will be published in 2013.

⁽¹⁾ Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 on GM food and feed, OJ L 268, 18.10.2003.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita P-002667/13
a la Comisión**

Sergio Gutiérrez Prieto (S&D)

(7 de marzo de 2013)

Asunto: Plan de ayuda para Lorca con cargo al Fondo de Solidaridad de la Unión Europea (FSUE)

El 11 de mayo de 2011, la ciudad de Lorca (Murcia) se vio afectada por dos terremotos consecutivos de una magnitud de 5,2 en la escala de Richter, en los cuales fallecieron 9 personas y unas 300 resultaron heridas. La catástrofe causó daños generalizados en residencias (más de 100 000 personas fueron evacuadas), graves deterioros en empresas, infraestructuras básicas e instalaciones, así como importantes perturbaciones en las redes de carreteras locales. Los daños a los monumentos arquitectónicos de la ciudad también afectaron significativamente al sector turístico de la región lo que mermó aún más la dañada economía local. Un año después, el 22 de septiembre de 2012, las inundaciones acaecidas en el mismo municipio causaron más de 10 muertos e innumerables pérdidas personales y materiales que se sumaron a los destrozos provocados por los terremotos.

Ambas catástrofes naturales han conducido a la zona a una situación crítica que exige el mayor grado de solidaridad europea. Debido a ello en julio de 2011, las autoridades españolas presentaron una solicitud de ayuda del FSUE con el objetivo de cubrir gastos de emergencia en la reconstrucción del municipio. Dicha ayuda fue aprobada por la Comisión movilizando la cláusula relativa a «catástrofes regionales extraordinarias» del FSUE. El pasado mes de diciembre de 2012, el Comisario de Política Regional de la UE, Johannes Hahn, comprobó sobre el terreno los graves daños producidos por ambas catástrofes y anunció que a finales de junio de 2013 se entregaría a Lorca todo el dinero del FSUE que esté disponible para complementar las ayudas aprobadas en 2011.

En este sentido, ¿podría informarnos la Comisión del plan de ayuda que se ha diseñado para Lorca con cargo al FSUE desde 2011?

¿Qué grado de ejecución ha tenido hasta el momento?

¿Cuenta la Comisión con una jerarquía de prioridades de tal forma que el gran número de personas que han quedado sin vivienda pueda tener garantizada una vivienda digna con la mayor brevedad posible?

¿Podría darnos la Comisión una estimación de la cuantía del remanente del FSUE que ha anunciado que se entregará a Lorca en junio de 2013?

Respuesta del Sr. Hahn en nombre de la Comisión

(12 de abril de 2013)

A raíz del terremoto que sacudió Lorca, la Comisión concedió a España una ayuda financiera con cargo al Fondo de Solidaridad de la UE por un importe de 21,07 millones de euros. El convenio entre España y la Comisión establece que la subvención se utilice para:

- restablecer el buen funcionamiento de las infraestructuras relacionadas con las carreteras y los ferrocarriles, los servicios de salud pública y la educación, los sistemas de suministro de agua y de tratamiento de aguas residuales y la red pública de carreteras, y
- proveer alojamiento temporal, financiar servicios de socorro (incluidas tiendas de campaña), vivienda social y bienes y servicios de primera necesidad para los ciudadanos, así como proteger los bienes y a las personas.

Con arreglo a las normas que regulan el Fondo de Solidaridad, la utilización de la subvención es responsabilidad de las autoridades españolas. En febrero, los servicios de la Comisión se reunieron con las autoridades españolas en Lorca para supervisar el progreso que se había hecho en la ejecución del convenio de subvención, que finalizará no más tarde de julio de 2013.

En diciembre de 2012, España presentó una solicitud de ayuda en relación con las inundaciones en Andalucía, Murcia y Valencia. En la actualidad, la Comisión está terminando de evaluar si la solicitud cumple los requisitos necesarios para que se le conceda financiación del Fondo de Solidaridad. Si así fuera, la Comisión pedirá al Parlamento y al Consejo que pongan a disposición de España los créditos presupuestarios necesarios. El importe de la subvención del Fondo de Solidaridad se calcula en función de la cuantía de los daños.

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-002667/13
to the Commission**

Sergio Gutiérrez Prieto (S&D)

(7 March 2013)

Subject: Assistance for Lorca under the European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF)

On 11 May 2011, the town of Lorca (Murcia) was struck by two consecutive earthquakes measuring 5.2 on the Richter scale, killing nine people and injuring some 300 others. The disaster caused widespread damage to homes (more than 100 000 people had to be evacuated), businesses, basic infrastructure and facilities, as well as considerable disruption to local road networks. Damage to the town's historic architectural monuments also had a significant impact on tourism in the region, further harming the already weakened local economy. One year later, on 22 September 2012, Lorca was hit by floods that killed 10 people and inflicted personal and material loss on a large scale, compounding the damage caused by the earthquakes.

The two natural disasters have left the region in a critical state and in need of maximum European solidarity. Accordingly, in July 2011 the Spanish authorities submitted a request for EUSF assistance with the aim of covering the emergency costs of rebuilding the town. The Commission approved the aid request under the 'extraordinary regional disaster' clause of the EUSF. In December 2012, Johannes Hahn, Commissioner for Regional Policy, visited Lorca to see for himself the serious damage caused by the two natural disasters and announced that in late June 2013, Lorca would be given all the EUSF money available to top up the funding it received in 2011.

Can the Commission explain what sort of EUSF assistance plan for Lorca has been drawn up since 2011?

How much progress has been made so far on implementing the plan?

Does the Commission have a hierarchy of priorities in order to ensure that the large numbers of people made homeless by the natural disasters are guaranteed to be given decent housing as soon as possible?

Can the Commission provide an estimate of how much is left in the EUSF budget, money which the Commission has pledged to give Lorca in June 2013?

Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission

(12 April 2013)

Following the earthquake in Lorca the Commission granted EU Solidarity Fund financial aid to Spain amounting to EUR 21.07 million. The agreement concluded between Spain and the Commission foresees that the grant is used for:

- the restoration to working order of infrastructure related to roads and railways, public health services and education, water supply systems and waste water treatments, public road network; and
- the provision of temporary accommodation and funding rescue services (including tents), social housing, providing immediate goods and services to the population, protection of people and goods.

Under the rules governing the Solidarity Fund, the implementation of the grant is the responsibility of the Spanish authorities. In February, the Commission services met with the Spanish authorities in Lorca to monitor progress in implementation which has to be completed by July 2013.

In December 2012, Spain presented an application relating to floods in Andalusia, Murcia and Valencia. The Commission is currently completing its assessment of whether the application meets the criteria of the Solidarity Fund. If this is the case, the Commission will request the Parliament and the Council to make the necessary budget appropriations available. The amount of Solidarity Fund grant is calculated in relation to the amount of damage.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita P-002668/13

à Comissão

José Manuel Fernandes (PPE)

(7 de março de 2013)

Assunto: Aproveitamento dos excedentes agrícolas

Tendo em conta o objetivo da Estratégia UE 2020 de reduzir em, pelo menos, 20 milhões o número de pessoas em risco (ou em situação) de pobreza ou exclusão social e considerando que o aproveitamento dos excedentes agrícolas, em oposição ao seu desperdício, é uma opção inteligente, sensata e sustentável, que potencia o bem-estar dos cidadãos comunitários, pergunto à Comissão qual o destino que pretende dar aos excedentes agrícolas da União Europeia e qual a quantidade média anual de cada tipo de excedente agrícola na UE?

Resposta dada por Dacian Cioloș em nome da Comissão

(5 de abril de 2013)

O nível de excedentes agrícolas tem diminuído consideravelmente, após as reformas operadas na PAC desde 1992. As aquisições por intervenção pública são limitadas a certos cereais, arroz *paddy*, carne de bovino, manteiga e leite em pó desnatado, e a sua aplicação limita-se aos períodos de perturbação do mercado. No final da campanha de 2012, as existências resultantes das intervenções públicas foram absorvidas para todos os produtos elegíveis, com exceção de certas quantidades marginais de cevada e leite em pó desnatado, que foram atribuídas ao programa de 2012 para a distribuição de géneros alimentícios às pessoas mais necessitadas da UE.

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-002668/13
to the Commission**

José Manuel Fernandes (PPE)

(7 March 2013)

Subject: Making use of farm surpluses

Bearing in mind the EU 2020 strategy objective of reducing the number of people at risk of (or suffering from) poverty or social exclusion by at least 20 million, and given that making use of farm surpluses rather than wasting them is an intelligent, logical and sustainable option that will boost the well-being of Community citizens, can the Commission say what it intends to do with farm surpluses in the European Union? What is the average annual amount of each type of farm surplus in the EU?

Answer given by Mr Ciolos on behalf of the Commission

(5 April 2013)

The level of farm surpluses has declined considerably after subsequent CAP reforms since 1992. Public intervention purchases are limited to certain cereals, paddy rice, beef, veal, butter and skimmed milk powder and their application reduced to times of market disturbances. At the end of the 2012 marketing year public intervention stocks were depleted for all eligible products except for marginal quantities of barley and skimmed milk powder, allocated to the 2012 food distribution programme for the most deprived persons in the EU.

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002669/13
a la Comisión
Antolín Sánchez Presedo (S&D)
(7 de marzo de 2013)

Asunto: Reconocimiento por Noruega de los derechos de pensión a marineros que trabajaron en embarcaciones bajo pabellón noruego antes de 1994

En el año 2008 dirigí a la Comisión Europea y al Consejo las preguntas E-1587/2008 y E-1588/2008 sobre el reconocimiento por Noruega de los derechos sociales de marineros de la UE que trabajaron regularmente en embarcaciones bajo pabellón noruego y que fueron adquiridos antes del año 1994.

Esta misma cuestión fue objeto de las peticiones 475/2010 y 1326/2010, presentadas ante la Comisión de Peticiones del Parlamento Europeo, en cuyo debate participé, y, más recientemente, de la pregunta E-009577/2011 planteada por el diputado Alejandro Cercas, Portavoz de Empleo y Asuntos Sociales del Grupo de la Alianza Progresista de los Socialistas y Demócratas.

La Comisión se ha mostrado favorable a la celebración de acuerdos bilaterales para la solución de estos casos y su intervención, como mediador con las autoridades noruegas, ha sido solicitada expresamente por la Comisión de Peticiones del Parlamento.

Dadas la ausencia de progresos desde que la Comisión tiene constancia oficial del problema y la falta de protección de los afectados ya jubilados, ¿qué nueva información tiene la Comisión sobre este tema? ¿Qué nuevas iniciativas ha emprendido o tiene pensado adoptar para favorecer acuerdos bilaterales entre los Estados afectados, como defiende el Consejo, y dar cumplimiento a la posición expresada por la Comisión de Peticiones del Parlamento Europeo?

Respuesta del Sr. Andor en nombre de la Comisión
(7 de mayo de 2013)

Como se ha indicado en la respuesta a la pregunta escrita E-9577/2011, la Comisión no dispone de instrumentos para pedir a Noruega la afiliación retroactiva de los marineros españoles que trabajaron en embarcaciones noruegas antes de 1994.

Sin embargo, el Reglamento (CE) n° 883/2004 ofrece a las autoridades competentes de los Estados miembros la posibilidad de celebrar acuerdos bilaterales en beneficio de determinadas personas o categorías de personas (artículo 16). En aras de la justicia social, las autoridades competentes de España y Noruega podrían, por tanto, ponerse en contacto para celebrar un acuerdo bilateral de este tipo en interés de los trabajadores en cuestión. La Comisión anima a los Estados interesados en este sentido, pero no tiene competencias para pedirles que lleguen a un acuerdo.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002669/13
to the Commission**

Antolín Sánchez Presedo (S&D)

(7 March 2013)

Subject: Norwegian recognition of the pension rights of seamen who worked on ships flying the Norwegian flag before 1994

In 2008 I submitted Written Questions E-1588/2008 and E-1587/2008 to the Commission and to the Council on Norway's recognition of the social rights of EU seamen who regularly worked on ships flying the Norwegian flag and who were hired before 1994.

This same issue was the subject of Petitions 475/2010 and 1326/2010 submitted to the European Parliament's Committee on Petitions, the debate in which I took part, and more recently was the subject of Written Question E-009577/2011 raised by MEP Alejandro Cercas, the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats' Spokesperson for Employment and Social Affairs.

The Commission has supported bilateral agreements to settle these cases, and the Committee on Petitions has specifically requested that it act as mediator, along with the Norwegian authorities.

Given the lack of progress since the Commission took official note of the issue and given the lack of protection for affected retirees, what new information does the Commission have on this issue? What new initiatives has it launched or is it considering adopting to promote bilateral agreements between the states concerned, as advocated by the Council, and to implement the Committee on Petitions' request?

(Version française)

Réponse donnée par M. Andor au nom de la Commission

(7 mai 2013)

Ainsi qu'il a été signalé dans la réponse à la question écrite E-9577/2011, la Commission ne dispose pas d'instruments pour demander à la Norvège l'affiliation rétroactive de marins espagnols qui ont travaillé sur les bateaux norvégiens avant 1994.

Toutefois, le règlement 883/2004 donne la possibilité aux autorités compétentes des États membres de conclure des accords bilatéraux dans l'intérêt de certaines personnes ou catégories de personnes (article 16). Dans un souci de justice sociale, les autorités compétentes espagnoles et norvégiennes pourraient donc se mettre en contact en vue de conclure un tel accord bilatéral dans l'intérêt des travailleurs en question. La Commission encourage la conclusion d'un tel accord, mais elle n'a aucune compétence pour demander aux États impliqués d'arriver à un accord.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002670/13
a la Comisión**

Andreas Schwab (PPE), Pablo Arias Echeverría (PPE) y Pablo Zalba Bidegain (PPE)

(7 de marzo de 2013)

Asunto: El mercado único digital y las PYME

El mercado único digital debe representar una oportunidad para que toda empresa pueda desarrollar su actividad en todos los Estados miembros. Así pues, la compleción del mercado único digital es un factor determinante para un mercado único competitivo que aporte crecimiento y empleo y beneficie tanto a los consumidores como a las empresas en el comercio transfronterizo. Esto es especialmente cierto en el caso de las PYME, que suponen el 99 % de las empresas europeas y, en consecuencia, son la fuerza motriz de la economía europea.

No obstante y a pesar de diversas directivas y reglamentos, todavía perduran importantes obstáculos tras 20 años de mercado único. Algunas empresas todavía encuentran trabas cuando ofrecen bienes y servicios en otros Estados miembros. Un ejemplo concreto lo encarna un comerciante en línea de España que vende naranjas y mandarinas frescas, que los consumidores deberían poder recibir mediante envío ultrarrápido. Sin embargo, si desea ampliar su negocio a un Estado miembro vecino, más allá de la frontera española, se exige que esta empresa se establezca en el Estado miembro de destino, al que también debe pagar IVA.

En este contexto, deseamos formular a la Comisión las siguientes preguntas:

1. ¿Tras la evaluación de este caso concreto, puede la Comisión precisar si el trato que recibe esta empresa es coherente con la legislación europea vigente, es decir, con la Directiva sobre los derechos de los consumidores, la Directiva sobre comercio electrónico y otras disposiciones?
2. En general, ¿cómo está apoyando la Comisión a las PYME en lo que se refiere a la eliminación de los obstáculos al comercio en el mercado único y, en especial, en el contexto del fomento del comercio electrónico transfronterizo?
3. A raíz de la revisión de la iniciativa en favor de las pequeñas empresas (SBA) y el informe de iniciativa propia del Parlamento P7_TA(2012)0387 en 2012, ¿qué más medidas está adoptando la Comisión para posibilitar que las PYME actúen en todo el mercado único y para seguir aplicando las acciones expuestas en la SBA?
4. ¿Cuáles son los obstáculos que afrontan más comúnmente las empresas, como este comerciante de naranjas, a la hora de operar en el plano transfronterizo?

Respuesta del Sr. Barnier en nombre de la Comisión

(15 de mayo de 2013)

La Comisión está de acuerdo con Sus Señorías sobre la importancia de la plena realización del mercado único digital. Las PYME que desean beneficiarse de las ventajas del mercado único digital siguen enfrentándose a demasiados obstáculos. No obstante, la Comisión no está en condiciones de comentar este caso concreto, especialmente teniendo en cuenta el carácter general de la información facilitada.

La Comunicación sobre el comercio electrónico de 2012 ⁽¹⁾ señalaba los obstáculos más importantes que había que abordar de forma prioritaria. Entre ellos se hallan la falta de confianza en los pagos en línea y en los servicios de entrega, la ausencia de información adecuada en relación con las vías de recurso y la complejidad de los sistemas del IVA.

La Comisión ha propuesto un plan de acción coherente para eliminar los obstáculos detectados que forma parte de un mayor compromiso de la UE con el fomento de la sociedad de la información ⁽²⁾. El 23 de abril de 2013 se publicó un informe sobre su estado de ejecución ⁽³⁾.

La «Small Business Act» para Europa y su revisión también establecen varias acciones para mejorar el acceso de las PYME al Mercado Único.

⁽¹⁾ COM(2011) 942 final.

⁽²⁾ Comunicación de la Comisión «Una Agenda Digital para Europa», COM(2010) 245 final.

⁽³⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/docs/communications/130423_report-ecommerce-action-plan_en.pdf

Por último, la Comisión fomenta también la utilización de las redes existentes para proporcionar a los comerciantes en línea información sobre sus obligaciones y las oportunidades que ofrece la venta en los países de la UE. Además, el Plan de acción sobre emprendimiento 2020 recientemente adoptado supone un plan de acción global que comprende la inversión en educación en el espíritu empresarial, un mejor acceso a la financiación y más facilidad para la transmisión de empresas.

Tras el Consejo Europeo de primavera, la Comisión presentará un informe, antes de octubre, sobre los obstáculos que quedan por abordar a fin de garantizar la realización de un auténtico mercado único digital para 2015.

(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-002670/13
an die Kommission**

Andreas Schwab (PPE), Pablo Arias Echeverría (PPE) und Pablo Zalba Bidegain (PPE)

(7. März 2013)

Betrifft: Digitaler Binnenmarkt und KMU

Der europäische Binnenmarkt muss jedem Unternehmen die Möglichkeit bieten, seine Geschäftstätigkeit in allen Mitgliedstaaten auszuüben. Die Verwirklichung des digitalen Binnenmarkts ist daher ein ausschlaggebender Faktor für einen wettbewerbsfähigen Binnenmarkt, der für Wachstum und Beschäftigung sorgt und sowohl den Verbrauchern als auch den Unternehmen im grenzüberschreitenden Handel zugute kommt. Dies gilt insbesondere für KMU, die 99 % der europäischen Unternehmen ausmachen und somit die treibende Kraft der europäischen Wirtschaft darstellen.

Trotz verschiedener Richtlinien und Verordnungen bestehen nach 20 Jahren Binnenmarkt auch heute noch erhebliche Hemmnisse. Einige Firmen stoßen immer noch auf Hindernisse, wenn sie Güter und Dienstleistungen in anderen Mitgliedstaaten anbieten. Ein Beispiel ist ein spanischer Online-Händler, der frisch geerntete Orangen und Mandarinen verkauft, die den Kunden sehr schnell geliefert werden können sollten. Wenn die Firma jedoch ihr Geschäft über die Grenzen Spaniens hinaus auf einen angrenzenden Mitgliedstaat ausweiten möchte, ist sie gezwungen, sich auch im Bestimmungsland niederzulassen, wo sie dann ebenfalls umsatzsteuerpflichtig wird.

1. Kann die Kommission nach einer Bewertung dieses konkreten Falls darlegen, ob die Behandlung dieser Firma den geltenden europäischen Rechtsvorschriften, d. h. der Richtlinie über Verbraucherrechte, der Richtlinie über den elektronischen Geschäftsverkehr und anderen Vorschriften entspricht?
2. Wie unterstützt die Kommission KMU im Allgemeinen bei der Überwindung von Handelshemmnissen im Binnenmarkt und insbesondere im Rahmen der Förderung des grenzüberschreitenden elektronischen Geschäftsverkehrs?
3. Welche weiteren Maßnahmen ergreift die Kommission nach der Überarbeitung des „Small Business Act“ (SBA) und des Initiativberichts P7_TA(2012)0387 des Parlaments, um es den KMU zu ermöglichen, im gesamten Binnenmarkt zu agieren, und um die im SBA festgelegten Maßnahmen weiter umzusetzen?
4. Welches sind die häufigsten Hemmnisse, auf die Unternehmen wie dieser Orangenhändler stoßen, wenn sie grenzüberschreitend tätig sind?

Antwort von Herrn Barnier im Namen der Kommission

(15. Mai 2013)

Die Kommission stimmt den Herren Abgeordneten hinsichtlich der Bedeutung der Verwirklichung des digitalen Binnenmarkts zu. KMU, die die Vorteile des digitalen Binnenmarkts nutzen wollen, stoßen nach wie vor auf zu viele Hindernisse. Die Kommission ist jedoch insbesondere angesichts des allgemeinen Charakters der bereitgestellten Informationen nicht in der Lage, zu diesem spezifischen Fall Stellung zu nehmen.

In der Mitteilung über den elektronischen Handel ⁽¹⁾ von 2012 wurden die wichtigsten Hindernisse benannt, die vorrangig angegangen werden müssen. Dazu zählen unter anderem das mangelnde Vertrauen in elektronische Zahlungen und Zustelldienste, das Fehlen angemessener Informationen in Bezug auf Rechtsmittel und die Komplexität der Mehrwertsteuersysteme.

Die Kommission hat einen kohärenten Aktionsplan vorgeschlagen, um im Rahmen einer umfassenderen Verpflichtung der EU zur Förderung der Informationsgesellschaft die festgestellten Hindernisse zu beseitigen ⁽²⁾. Am 23. April 2013 wurde ein Bericht über den Stand der Umsetzung veröffentlicht ⁽³⁾.

Der „Small Business Act“ für Europa und seine Überarbeitung sahen ebenfalls mehrere Maßnahmen zur Verbesserung des Zugangs von KMU zum Binnenmarkt vor.

⁽¹⁾ KOM(2011)942 endg.

⁽²⁾ Mitteilung der Kommission „Eine digitale Agenda für Europa“, KOM(2010)245 endg.

⁽³⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/docs/communications/130423_report-ecommerce-action-plan_en.pdf

Die Kommission fördert auch die Nutzung bestehender Netze, um Online-Händler über ihre Pflichten und die Chancen von Verkäufen in andere EU-Länder zu informieren. Des Weiteren enthält der kürzlich angenommene Aktionsplan für unternehmerische Initiative 2020 einen detaillierteren Aktionsplan, der Investitionen in die Erziehung zu unternehmerischer Initiative, besseren Zugang zu Finanzmitteln und einfachere Unternehmensübertragungen umfasst.

Nach der Frühjahrstagung des Europäischen Rates wird die Kommission vor Oktober über die verbleibenden Hindernisse berichten, die in Angriff genommen werden müssen, um die Vollendung eines voll funktionsfähigen digitalen Binnenmarkts bis 2015 zu gewährleisten.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002670/13
to the Commission**

Andreas Schwab (PPE), Pablo Arias Echeverría (PPE) and Pablo Zalba Bidegain (PPE)

(7 March 2013)

Subject: Digital Single Market and SMEs

The European Single Market must represent an opportunity for every business to develop its activity in all the Member States. The completion of the Digital Single Market is thus a key factor for a competitive Single Market, providing for growth and employment and benefiting both consumers and businesses in crossborder trade. This especially applies to SMEs, which make up 99% of European businesses and are therefore the driving force in the European economy.

Nevertheless, and despite various directives and regulations, important barriers still remain after 20 years of the Single Market. Some companies still encounter obstacles when offering goods and services in other Member States. One particular example is an online trader from Spain selling freshly harvested oranges and mandarins which consumers should be able to receive by superfast delivery. However, if it wishes to expand its business beyond the Spanish borders to a neighbouring Member State, this company is required to establish itself in the destination Member State, to which it also has to pay VAT.

Against this background we would like to ask the Commission:

1. Can the Commission, after an assessment of this concrete case, state whether the treatment of this company is in line with current European legislation, i.e. the consumer rights directive, the e-commerce directive and other provisions?
2. How is the Commission supporting SMEs in general when tackling trade barriers in the Single Market, and in particular in the context of promoting crossborder e-commerce?
3. Following the revision of the Small Business Act (SBA) and Parliament's own-initiative report P7_TA(2012)0387 in 2012, what further measures is the Commission adopting to enable SMEs to act within the entire Single Market, and to further implement the actions laid down in the SBA?
4. What are the most common barriers that businesses such as this orange trader face when operating on a crossborder basis?

Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission

(15 May 2013)

The Commission agrees with the Honourable Members on the importance of the completion of the Digital Single Market. SMEs wishing to benefit from the Digital Single Market are still faced with too many obstacles. The Commission is however not in a position to comment on this specific case, notably in view of the general nature of the information provided.

The E-commerce Communication ⁽¹⁾ of 2012 identified the most important obstacles to be addressed as a matter of priority. These include, among others, the lack of trust in online payments and in delivery services, the absence of adequate information in relation to redress and the complexity of the VAT systems.

The Commission proposed a coherent action plan to remove the obstacles identified, as part of a wider EU commitment aimed at promoting the information society ⁽²⁾. A report on the state of implementation has been published on 23 April 2013 ⁽³⁾.

The 'Small Business Act' for Europe and its Review also provided for several actions to enhance SMEs access to the Single Market.

⁽¹⁾ COM(2011) 942 final.

⁽²⁾ Commission Communication 'A Digital Agenda for Europe', COM(2010) 245 final.

⁽³⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/docs/communications/130423_report-ecommerce-action-plan_en.pdf

Finally the Commission is also encouraging the use of existing networks to provide online dealers with information on their obligations and on the opportunities offered by sale in EU countries. Furthermore, the recently adopted Entrepreneurship 2020 Action Plan provides a comprehensive action plan which encompasses investing in entrepreneurship education, better access to finance and easier business transfers.

Following the Spring European Council, the Commission will report before October on the remaining obstacles to be tackled so as to ensure the completion of a fully functioning Digital Single Market by 2015.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002671/13
to the Commission
Vicky Ford (ECR)
(7 March 2013)**

Subject: Tree research

Could the Commission provide figures on how many research projects concerning tree and crop diseases have been funded under the Seventh Framework Programme for Research and how much money each of these projects was awarded?

Could the Commission outline how it proposes to address research into tree and crop diseases, in particular under Horizon 2020?

**Answer given by Ms Geoghegan-Quinn on behalf of the Commission
(22 April 2013)**

The Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development (FP7, 2007-2013) is currently supporting 3 projects ⁽¹⁾ and one ERA-NET ⁽²⁾ on tree pest and diseases control for a total EU contribution of EUR 12 million, and 8 projects ⁽³⁾ and one ERA-NET ⁽⁴⁾ on crop protection for a total EU contribution of EUR 31 million.

In addition, the present and last FP7 call for proposals of Theme 2 'Biotechnologies, Agriculture and Food' (KBBE), include the following topics addressing trees and crops health related issues, with a total allocation of EUR 17.5 million:

- KBBE.2013.1.2.04: Control of pests and pathogens in fruit tree crops, with a budget allocation of EUR 6 million
- KBBE.2013.1.2.05: Biological control agents in agriculture and forestry for effective pest and pathogens control, with a budget allocation of EUR 9 million
- KBBE.2013.1.2.06: Improved coordination and collaboration for EU plant health reference collection, with a budget allocation of EUR 0.5 million
- KBBE.2013.1.4.02: Integrated Pest Management — ERANET, with a budget allocation of EUR 2 million

Research activities addressing plant health and protection issues will be considered under Horizon 2020 ⁽⁵⁾, especially within the Societal Challenge 2 'Food Security, Sustainable Agriculture, Marine and Maritime Research and the Bioeconomy'.

⁽¹⁾ ISEFOR, NOVELTREE, REPHRAME, For more information, see FP7 Interim Catalogue: http://ec.europa.eu/research/bioeconomy/pdf/catalogue_of_projects_web_small.pdf

⁽²⁾ FORESTERRA ERA-NET: <http://193.146.122.109/fores/foresterra/>

⁽³⁾ QDETECT, PALM PROTECT, PRATIQUE, PURE, TESTA, QBOL, SHARCO, CO-FREE.

⁽⁴⁾ EUPHRESKO II ERA-NET: <http://www.euphresco.org/>

⁽⁵⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/research/horizon2020/index_en.cfm?pg=h2020-documents

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002672/13
aan de Commissie
Auke Zijlstra (NI)
(7 maart 2013)

Betref: Burgers teleurgesteld in de Europese Unie

Begin maart 2013 publiceerde de Commissie de eerste resultaten van de in november 2012 uitgevoerde Eurobarometer-enquête „De publieke opinie in de Europese Unie”, waarbij de aandacht vooral gericht was op de uitkomsten van de 27 lidstaten ⁽¹⁾.

1. Heeft de Commissie al conclusies getrokken op basis van de uitkomst van deze enquête?
2. Is de Commissie van mening dat haar programma om de crisis te bestrijden is mislukt, gezien het feit dat slechts 23 % van de geënquêteerden de EU beschouwt als de instantie die het best in staat is om effectief actie te ondernemen tegen de gevolgen van de economische en financiële crisis?
3. Welke conclusie trekt de Commissie uit het feit dat slechts 30 % van de geënquêteerden een positief beeld heeft van de EU? Met welke beleidswijzigingen denkt zij de Europese Unie aantrekkelijker te maken voor de burgers?
4. Is de Commissie het met mij eens dat deze uitkomsten duidelijk aantonen dat de burgers zich het best vertegenwoordigd voelen door hun nationale parlementen en dat de EU derhalve lijdt aan een democratisch deficit en een gebrek aan legitimiteit?
5. In hoeverre verwerkt de Commissie dergelijke resultaten die de mening van de burgers weergeven in haar beleidsmaatregelen? Is zij van mening dat dit een belangrijk instrument is voor het opstellen van voorstellen en uitvoeringsmaatregelen?

Antwoord van mevrouw Reding namens de Commissie
(2 mei 2013)

- 1) De eerste resultaten van de in november 2012 uitgevoerde standaard-Eurobarometerenquête 78 zijn op 20 december 2012 bekend gemaakt. Ter gelegenheid daarvan werd een persbericht uitgegeven.
- 2) Uit de resultaten van de enquête blijkt de burgers de EU als de meest doeltreffende actor zien om de gevolgen van de financiële en economische crisis effectief aan te pakken. Zowel de nationale regeringen als de G20 en het IMF zijn lager gerangschikt dan de EU.
- 3 & 4) Uit Eurobarometer 78 blijkt dat de burgers meer vertrouwen hebben in de EU dan in de nationale regeringen en parlementen. De Commissie is ervan overtuigd dat een succesvol sterk op de burger gericht beleid het vertrouwen nog zal doen toenemen. Die benadering behelst ook een doeltreffende communicatie en bewustmaking.

De Commissie erkent uiteraard de fundamentele rol die de nationale parlementen spelen in het democratisch leven van de lidstaten en het belang ervan voor de Europese burgers, overeenkomstig het Verdrag.

- 5) Op de vergaderingen van de Commissie wordt de informatie uit de Eurobarometer-enquêtes regelmatig geëvalueerd.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb78/eb78_en.htm

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002672/13
to the Commission
Auke Zijlstra (NI)
(7 March 2013)**

Subject: Citizens disappointed in the European Union

At the beginning of March 2013 the Commission published the first results of the Eurobarometer survey 'Public opinion in the European Union', carried out in November 2012, with the focus on the results obtained in the 27 Member States ⁽¹⁾.

1. Has the Commission already drawn conclusions from the results of this survey?
2. Does the Commission consider its crisis management programme to be a failure, in the light of the fact that only 23% of respondents see the EU as the agent best able to take effective action against the effects of the economic and financial crisis?
3. What does the Commission conclude from the fact that only 30% of respondents have a positive image of the EU? What policy changes is it planning to make the European Union more attractive to the citizens?
4. Does the Commission agree with me that these results clearly express the fact that citizens feel best represented by their national parliaments, and that the EU is therefore suffering from a democratic deficit and lack of legitimacy?
5. What use does the Commission make in its policymaking measures of such results reflecting the opinion of the citizens? Does it consider this to be an important tool when drawing up proposals and implementing measures?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(2 May 2013)**

1. The first results of the Standard Eurobarometer survey 78 carried out in November 2012 were made public on 20 December 2012. A press release was issued on that occasion.
 2. According to the survey results, the EU is considered by its citizens as being the most able actor to take effective action against the effects of the financial and economic crisis. National governments, the G20 and the IMF all come after the EU.
 - 3 and 4. Trust in the EU is higher than in national governments and Parliaments, as Eurobarometer 78 shows. The Commission is convinced that the success of a strong citizen- oriented policy will also lead to an increase in confidence. Strong communication and awareness raising is also part of their approach.
- The Commission of course acknowledges that the role of national parliaments is absolutely fundamental to the democratic life of Member States and also for European citizens, as foreseen in the Treaty.
5. The Commission regularly reviews the information produced by Eurobarometer surveys in its meetings.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb78/eb78_en.htm

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-002673/13

à la Commission

Gaston Franco (PPE)

(7 mars 2013)

Objet: Entrée en vigueur du règlement sur le bois de l'Union européenne

Au moins 20 % du bois et des produits forestiers qui pénètrent dans l'Union européenne sont d'origine illégale. Afin de lutter contre ce trafic, l'Union s'est dotée du règlement sur le bois (RBUE), entré en vigueur le 3 mars dernier.

Conformément à ce règlement, les opérateurs (importateurs et exploitants forestiers européens), les premiers à mettre les produits sur le marché, ont l'obligation de s'assurer de l'origine licite de leurs approvisionnements et de la justifier, via un système de diligence raisonnée.

— Comment la Commission compte-t-elle s'assurer de la mise en œuvre de ce règlement?

— Dispose-t-elle d'une analyse de l'état de préparation des opérateurs européens à l'application du système de la diligence raisonnée? Quels sont les dispositifs d'accompagnement qui pourraient être activés en cas de nécessité?

— Quel est le nombre d'États membres qui ont, à ce jour, désigné l'administration responsable des contrôles et établi le régime de sanctions liés à l'application du RBUE?

Réponse donnée par M. Potočník au nom de la Commission

(25 avril 2013)

Comme l'exige le règlement (UE) n° 995/2010¹ (le règlement «Bois»), la Commission a déjà adopté deux actes non législatifs en 2012². La Commission a également rédigé un document d'orientation portant sur le règlement «Bois» en étroite collaboration avec les États membres (EM).

La Commission collabore avec les autorités nationales compétentes, plus particulièrement dans le cadre du comité chargé de l'application des réglementations forestières, de la gouvernance et des échanges commerciaux, où sont discutées les questions relatives à l'application du règlement «Bois», y compris l'état de préparation des opérateurs à l'application du règlement.

La Commission collabore également avec des associations professionnelles et des fédérations de parties intéressées de l'Union européenne, notamment des opérateurs, pour fournir des explications aux membres de ces organisations et contribuer à leur préparation aux nouvelles obligations déterminées dans le règlement «Bois».

La Commission a mis sur pied une campagne de communication avec pour objectif d'aider les autorités nationales compétentes à sensibiliser les parties concernées, et de diffuser l'information concernant la nouvelle législation à toutes les parties intéressées au niveau national.

Tous les États membres ont désigné des autorités compétentes en vertu du règlement «Bois», et une liste à jour est disponible sur le site internet de la direction générale de l'environnement. La plupart des États membres préparent actuellement des sanctions, dont certaines découleront de la législation en vigueur.

⁽¹⁾ Relatif à l'exonération du droit à l'importation, pour certains produits du secteur céréalier, prévue par les accords entre la Communauté européenne et la République de Pologne, la République de Hongrie, la République Tchèque et la République Slovaque. JO L 196 du 19.8.1995.

⁽²⁾ Règlement délégué (UE) n° 363/2012 de la Commission du 23 février 2012 relatif aux règles de procédure concernant la reconnaissance et le retrait de la reconnaissance des organisations de contrôle conformément au règlement (UE) n° 995/2010 du Parlement européen et du Conseil établissant les obligations des opérateurs qui mettent du bois et des produits dérivés sur le marché.

Règlement d'exécution (UE) n° 607/2012 de la Commission du 6 juillet 2012 sur les modalités d'application relatives au système de diligence, ainsi qu'à la fréquence et à la nature des contrôles à effectuer auprès des organisations de contrôle conformément au règlement (UE) n° 995/2010 du Parlement européen et du Conseil établissant les obligations des opérateurs qui mettent du bois et des produits dérivés sur le marché.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002673/13
to the Commission
Gaston Franco (PPE)
(7 March 2013)

Subject: Entry into force of the EU Timber Regulation

At least 20% of the timber and forestry products which enter the European Union have been illegally harvested. The EU adopted the Timber Regulation (EUTR), which entered into force on 3 March 2013, in order to combat this trafficking.

The regulation obliges operators (importers and European forest owners) which place products on the market for the first time to ensure that their supplies are obtained from a legal source and to substantiate this using a due diligence system.

— How does the Commission intend to ensure that this regulation is implemented?

— Does it have access to any studies analysing the preparations made by European operators with a view to applying the due diligence system? Are there any supporting measures which could be put in place if necessary?

— To date, how many Member States have appointed an administrative body which will be responsible for carrying out checks and established a system of penalties for violations of the EUTR?

Answer given by Mr Potočník on behalf of the Commission
(25 April 2013)

As required by Regulation (EU) No 995/2010⁽¹⁾ (the EUTR), the Commission already adopted in 2012 two non-legislative acts⁽²⁾. The Commission also elaborated a Guidance document for the EUTR in close collaboration with Member States (MS).

The Commission is working with national competent authorities in particular within the setting of the Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade (FLEGT) committee where issues regarding the implementation and enforcement of the EUTR, including the readiness of operators to apply the regulation, are discussed.

The Commission also works with EU professional associations and federations of stakeholders, notably operators, to explain and help prepare their members for the new obligations laid down on the EUTR.

The Commission elaborated a communication campaign aimed at assisting the national competent authorities to raise awareness and disseminate information regarding the new legislation amongst national stakeholders.

All MS have designated competent authorities under the EUTR and an updated list is available on the website of the Directorate General for the Environment. The majority of MS are in a process of establishing penalties; some of which will derive from existing legislation.

⁽¹⁾ Relating to the exemption from the import duty for certain products in the cereals sector laid down in the Agreements between the European Community and the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Hungary, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. OJ L 196, 19.8.1995.

⁽²⁾ Commission delegated Regulation of 23.2.2012 on the procedural rules for the recognition and withdrawal of recognition of monitoring organisations as provided for in Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down the obligations of operators who place timber and timber products on the market.
Commission implementing Regulation (EU) No 607/2012 of 6 July 2012 on the detailed rules concerning the due diligence system and the frequency and nature of the checks on monitoring organisations as provided for in Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down the obligations of operators who place timber and timber products on the market.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002674/13
alla Commissione
Mario Borghezio (EFD)
(7 marzo 2013)**

Oggetto: L'UE intervenga a tutela del sapone di Marsiglia

Il 90 % del sapone di Marsiglia arriva in Francia, e in particolare in Provenza, dalla Cina, dalla Turchia, dalla Malaysia e anche dall'Italia: contiene grasso animale e profumazioni varie e, quindi, non rispetta il canone marsigliese che prevede che il sapone di Marsiglia tradizionale sia realizzato con il 72 % di oli vegetali e non contenga alcun grasso animale, né profumo né colorante e che sia, di conseguenza, biodegradabile e ipoallergenico.

Quello tradizionale, inoltre, richiede cinque fasi e 10 giorni di lavorazione, mentre quello taroccato ha il pregio di costare molto meno.

A Marsiglia ci sono solo due aziende che ancora producono il vero sapone, una delle quali, tra l'altro, sull'orlo del fallimento.

1. Alla Commissione è pervenuta dalla Francia la richiesta dell'istituzione dell'IGP per il sapone di Marsiglia, onde tutelarla dalla concorrenza sleale da parte dei Paesi sopra citati e proteggere le uniche due aziende francesi (e quindi i loro lavoratori) che ancora lo producono in modo tradizionale?
2. Qualora la Commissione abbia già ricevuto la richiesta per l'IGP, come intende procedere?
3. Secondo la Commissione, i prodotti utilizzati nel sapone contraffatto possono nuocere alla salute dei consumatori e all'ambiente?

**Risposta di Tonio Borg a nome della Commissione
(16 maggio 2013)**

1.-2. Attualmente a livello dell'Unione europea, non vi è un sistema specifico, uniformemente applicabile, di protezione dell'indicazione geografica (IG) per i prodotti non agricoli, come ad esempio il sapone di Marsiglia.

Pertanto, la Commissione non ha ricevuto dalla Francia una richiesta di protezione IG per il sapone di Marsiglia.

Per informazione, la Commissione ha fatto eseguire uno studio sulla protezione IG in relazione ai prodotti non agricoli sul mercato interno, studio che è stato pubblicato di recente ⁽¹⁾. Inoltre, il 22 aprile 2013 essa ha organizzato un'audizione pubblica ⁽²⁾ per discutere lo studio e sentire i punti di vista degli stakeholder. Alla luce dei risultati di queste consultazioni la Commissione deciderà i passi successivi da adottare.

3. La Commissione non dispone di informazioni su tutti gli ingredienti usati per la fabbricazione dei prodotti in questione e non può pertanto esprimere commenti sulla loro sicurezza. Tuttavia, tutti i prodotti cosmetici immessi sul mercato dell'UE devono rispettare le disposizioni della legislazione sui cosmetici ⁽³⁾, la quale prevede che i cosmetici devono essere sicuri per la salute umana. Spetta alle autorità nazionali competenti far rispettare la legislazione sui cosmetici, assicurando anche il controllo del mercato, e le stesse autorità devono assicurare che sul mercato dell'UE siano presenti soltanto prodotti a norma.

Si noti che la legislazione sui cosmetici non vieta in generale l'uso di sostanze o miscele di origine animale. Essa però vieta i materiali di categoria 1 e di categoria 2 quali definiti dal regolamento (CE) n. 1069/2009 sui sottoprodotti di origine animale ⁽⁴⁾.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/geo-indications/index_en.htm

⁽²⁾ Le parti interessate sono invitate a registrarsi all'indirizzo:

http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/docs/geo-indications/130422_geo-indications-public-hearing-agenda_en.pdf

⁽³⁾ La direttiva 76/768/CEE, del 27 luglio 1976, concernente il ravvicinamento delle legislazioni degli Stati membri relative ai prodotti cosmetici (GU L 262 del 27.9.1976, pag. 169) sarà sostituita l'11 luglio 2013 dal regolamento (CE) n. 1223/2009 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 30 novembre 2009, sui prodotti cosmetici (GU L 342 del 22.12.2009, pag. 59), che diverrà pienamente applicabile a decorrere da tale data.

⁽⁴⁾ GU L 300 del 14.11.2009, pag. 1.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002674/13
to the Commission**

Mario Borghezio (EFD)

(7 March 2013)

Subject: EU action to safeguard Marseille soap

Out of all Marseille soap, 90% comes to France, and Provence in particular, from China, Turkey, Malaysia, and, for that matter, Italy: it contains animal fat and various scents and therefore does not conform to the regulations on Marseille soap-making, which stipulate that traditional Marseille soap should contain 72% vegetable oils and no animal fat, scent, or colouring whatsoever and hence that it should be biodegradable and hypoallergenic.

The traditional soap, moreover, is made in five stages over 10 days, whereas the concocted variety has the merit of costing much less.

In Marseille, there are only two companies still producing the true soap, and one of them is on the verge of bankruptcy.

1. Has the Commission received any request from France to establish a PGI (protected geographical indication) for Marseille soap in order to protect it from unfair competition from the above countries and safeguard the last two French companies (and consequently their workers) still using the traditional production process?
2. If the Commission has already received a PGI request, how does it propose to deal with it?
3. Does the Commission think that the ingredients used in the fake soap could damage consumers' health and the environment?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission

(16 May 2013)

1 and 2. Currently, at European Union level, there is no specific, uniformly applicable system of geographical indication (GI) protection for non-agricultural products, such as for example Marseille soap.

The Commission has therefore not received a request from France to establish a PGI for Marseille soap.

For information, the Commission ordered a study on GI protection for non-agricultural products in the internal market, which was recently published ⁽¹⁾. In addition, it organised a public hearing on 22 April 2013 ⁽²⁾ to discuss the study and listen to stakeholders' views. In light of the outcome of these consultations, the Commission will decide on the appropriate way forward.

3. The Commission does not have information regarding all the ingredients used in the products in question, and therefore cannot comment on their safety. However, any cosmetic product placed on the EU market must comply with the requirements under the Cosmetics legislation ⁽³⁾, which foresees that cosmetics must be safe for human health. Enforcement of the Cosmetics legislation, including market surveillance, is the responsibility of the competent national authorities, which must ensure that only compliant products can be found on the EU market.

It should be noted that the Cosmetics legislation does not prevent the use of substances or mixtures of animal origin in general. Nevertheless, it bans Category C and Category C materials as defined in the animal by-products Regulation (EC) No 1069/2009 ⁽⁴⁾.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/geo-indications/index_en.htm

⁽²⁾ Interested stakeholders are invited to register under http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/docs/geo-indications/130422_geo-indications-public-hearing-agenda_en.pdf

⁽³⁾ Directive 76/768/EEC of 27 July 1976 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to cosmetic products (OJ L 262, 27.9.1976, p. 169) will be repealed on 11 July 2013 by Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on cosmetic products (OJ L 342, 22.12.2009, p. 59), which will become fully applicable as from that date.

⁽⁴⁾ OJ L 300, 14.11.2009, p. 1.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002675/13
alla Commissione
Mario Borghezio (EFD)
(7 marzo 2013)**

Oggetto: Adozioni in Turchia

Il premier turco Erdogan è nuovamente intervenuto reclamando indietro i bambini che, a suo dire, sono stati sottratti a famiglie «turche musulmane», per essere adottati da famiglie «europee cristiane».

Questi bimbi sarebbero circa 5.000 e, secondo Sefer Ustun, Presidente della Commissione diritti umani della Grande Assemblea turca, «avrebbero il sacrosanto diritto di crescere in una famiglia vicina alla loro cultura».

1. La Commissione non ritiene che questa ennesima esternazione sia una provocazione nei confronti dell'UE e che il premier Erdogan, conscio che l'opinione dei cittadini turchi relativa all'adesione della Turchia all'UE è in netto ribasso, tenti di strumentalizzare la questione delle adozioni a danno dei bambini stessi?
2. La Commissione come intende intervenire sulla questione?

**Risposta di Štefan Füle a nome della Commissione
(13 maggio 2013)**

La Commissione è a conoscenza della questione sollevata dall'onorevole deputato, che è invitato a consultare la risposta all'interrogazione scritta E-001846/2013 presentata dall'onorevole Stassen.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002675/13
to the Commission
Mario Borghezio (EFD)
(7 March 2013)**

Subject: Adoptions in Turkey

The Turkish Prime Minister, Mr Erdoğan, has again spoken out to reclaim children who, in his opinion, have been taken away from 'Turkish Muslim' families so that they may be adopted by 'European Christian' families.

Approximately 5 000 children are said to be involved, and according to Ayhan Sefer Üstün, Chair of the Committee for Human Rights of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, they have the sacrosanct right to grow up in a home environment that is similar to their culture.

1. Does the Commission not consider this latest pronouncement to be a provocation against the EU and that Prime Minister Erdoğan, aware that the Turkish citizens' opinion of Turkey's accession to the EU is in sharp decline, is trying to exploit the adoption issue to the detriment of the children?
2. What action does the Commission intend to take on this matter?

**Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission
(13 May 2013)**

The Commission is aware of the issue raised by the Honourable Member and would like to refer to its answer to previous Question E-001846/2013 by Ms Stassen.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002676/13
alla Commissione**

Mario Borghezio (EFD)

(7 marzo 2013)

Oggetto: Preventivi controlli UE al cofinanziamento UE per la ricostruzione della Città della Scienza di Napoli

La Commissione europea si è resa disponibile a valutare il cofinanziamento per la ricostruzione della Città della Scienza di Napoli, recentemente distrutta da un incendio di probabile origine criminale (camorra).

Tenendo conto, come si apprende da fonti di stampa, che sono già stati cofinanziati vari progetti legati alla Città della Scienza, si chiede:

la Commissione europea può specificare quando è stato erogato e che periodo copre il cofinanziamento «Corporea», progetto dal valore di 5,6 milioni?

«Campania Innovazione» beneficia del FESR (Fondo europeo di sviluppo regionale) per il periodo 2007-2013 per innovazione e ricerca: la Commissione europea può specificare l'ammontare di tale beneficio?

Qual è l'importo (o qual è la percentuale sul totale della spesa) che la Commissione intende erogare per la ricostruzione della Città della Scienza, come intende monitorare il corretto utilizzo di questi ulteriori cofinanziamenti e, in particolare, non ritiene necessario accertare preventivamente e che i finanziamenti pregressi non abbiano già dato luogo ad infiltrazioni da parte della camorra, e che le opere relative alla ricostruzione della Città della Scienza siano non solo regolarmente assoggettate a gare d'appalto europee, ma anche controllate, e in sede di progettazione, e in sede di realizzazione da una Commissione appositamente inviata in loco dall'UE?

Risposta di Johannes Hahn a nome della Commissione

(30 aprile 2013)

Il progetto «Corporea» è cofinanziato dal Fondo europeo di sviluppo regionale (FESR) nell'ambito dei programmi destinati alla Campania durante i periodi 2000-2006 e 2007-2013. Il finanziamento complessivo del progetto ammonta a 16 milioni di euro, di cui 2,8 milioni rientrano nel FESR. Il progetto, che secondo le informazioni disponibili non ha subito danni a seguito dell'incendio, dovrà essere portato a termine ed essere operativo entro i termini previsti.

Nell'ambito del progetto Campania 2007-2013 60 milioni di euro, di cui 32 milioni a carico del FESR, sono stati destinati al progetto «Campania innovazione». La Commissione finora ha pagato il contributo del FESR solo parzialmente, per un importo pari a 13,5 milioni di euro.

La Commissione intende cofinanziare la ricostruzione della «Città della Scienza» nell'ambito del progetto di bonifica del sito di Bagnoli. La Commissione sta collaborando con le autorità italiane per individuare il metodo di intervento più appropriato; al momento peraltro non è ancora possibile quantificare con precisione l'importo degli aiuti.

La Commissione non è a conoscenza di eventuali abusi o usi illegali dei fondi UE per quanto riguarda il progetto di cofinanziamento della «Città della Scienza». Qualora vi fossero elementi di prova tali da attestare tali abusi la Commissione prenderebbe tutti i provvedimenti del caso, ivi compresa la sospensione parziale o totale dei finanziamenti, in collaborazione con lo Stato membro interessato, così da garantire che i fondi UE siano impiegati nel rispetto delle prescrizioni giuridiche applicabili. Secondo il principio della gestione condivisa, che regola le politiche di coesione, spetta *in primis* agli Stati membri prevenire, individuare e rettificare frodi e irregolarità nonché recuperare le eventuali somme indebitamente versate. Gli Stati membri sono tenuti a informare la Commissione in merito alle irregolarità eventualmente riscontrate e all'iter delle procedure amministrative e giuridiche.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002676/13
to the Commission**

Mario Borghezio (EFD)

(7 March 2013)

Subject: Preventive EU controls of EU co-financing for the rebuilding of the City of Science in Naples

The Commission is willing to consider co-financing for the rebuilding of the City of Science in Naples which was recently destroyed by a fire, probably of criminal origin (the Camorra).

Bearing in mind, as reported in the press, that various City of Science projects have already been co-financed, can the Commission specify when the co-financing for the 'Corporea' project, worth EUR 5.6 million, was provided and what period it covers?

'Campania Innovazione' is funded by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) for the 2007-2013 period with regard to innovation and research: can the Commission specify the amount of this funding?

What amount (or what percentage of the total expenditure) does the Commission intend to provide to rebuild the City of Science and how does it intend to check that this additional co-financing is used properly? In particular, does it not consider it necessary to establish in advance that none of the previous funding has been misappropriated by the Camorra, and that the City of Science reconstruction works are not only duly offered under EU calls for tender, but are also monitored, both at the planning stage and at the construction stage, by a committee specially sent there by the EU?

Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission

(30 April 2013)

The 'Corporea' project was co-financed by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) under the Campania programmes in the 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 period. The total cost of the project is EUR 16 million, of which EUR 2.8 million from the ERDF. The project, which according to current information was not affected by the fire, will have to be completed and rendered operational within the current period.

The 'Campania innovazione' project was granted EUR 60 million under the 2007-2013 Campania programme, of which EUR 32 million from the ERDF. Up to now, the Commission has paid EUR 13.5 million out of the ERDF.

The Commission is willing to co-finance the reconstruction of the 'Città della Scienza' in the framework of the Bagnoli site rehabilitation. The Commission is working with the Italian authorities to identify the most appropriate course of action; at this moment it is too early to quantify the possible amounts.

The Commission is not aware of any improper or illegal use of EU funds linked to the co-financing of 'Città della Scienza'. Should evidence in this respect emerge, it will take all necessary measures in cooperation with the Member State, including suspension of part or all payments, to ensure that the EU funding is spent in accordance with all applicable legal requirements. In line with the shared management principle used for the implementation of cohesion policy, Member States are however in the first instance responsible for the prevention, detection and correction of fraud and irregularities as well as the recovery of amounts unduly paid. Member States have the duty to notify the Commission of all irregularities and keep it informed of the progress of administrative and legal proceedings.

(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002677/13
do Komisji**

Tomasz Piotr Poręba (ECR)

(7 marca 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Zakaz wydawania ogólnopolskiego tygodnika „W Sieci”

1 marca b.r. wydawca opiniotwórczego polskiego tygodnika „W Sieci” otrzymał decyzję Sądu Okręgowego z Warszawy wskazującą, iż tygodnik może naruszać interesy wydawnictwa Presspublika (obecnie Gremi Media), które dysponuje subdomeną internetową *W sieci opinii* (wsieci.rp.pl). Decyzja ta, o charakterze natychmiastowej wykonalności, stanowi w konsekwencji zakaz wydawania tygodnika pod obecną nazwą do zakończenia procesu. Działania sądu podjęte w tak szybkim czasie i w takim trybie sprawiają wrażenie rozstrzygnięcia sporu sądowego przed jego rozpatrzeniem i są wykonaniem wyroku przed jego wydaniem. Należy zauważyć, że zastosowana wobec tygodnika „W Sieci” metoda pozwala zablokować praktycznie każdą niewygodną dla władzy nową inicjatywę medialną.

Przedstawione powyżej fakty wskazują, iż decyzja w sprawie tygodnika „W Sieci” może mieć charakter polityczny. Po odmówieniu Telewizji Trwam miejsca na multipleksie cyfrowej telewizji naziemnej MUX-1 jest to już drugi w krótkim czasie rażący przypadek ograniczenia wolności mediów w Polsce.

Rolą Komisji Europejskiej jest stanie na straży wolności słowa i mediów w Unii Europejskiej. W związku z tym chciałbym zwrócić się z następującym pytaniem: Czy Komisja świadoma jest ww. kolejnego, jawnego przypadku naruszenia wolności mediów w Polsce?

Czy w związku z nasilającymi się przypadkami naruszenia wolności mediów m.in. w Polsce Komisja zamierza wdrażać zalecenia raportu opublikowanego w styczniu 2013 r. przez niezależną Grupę Wysokiego Szczebla w Sprawie Wolności i Pluralizmu Mediów?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarz Neelie Kroes w imieniu Komisji

(26 czerwca 2013 r.)

Zgodnie z art. 51 ust. 1 Karty jej postanowienia mają zastosowanie do państw członkowskich wyłącznie wówczas, gdy stosują one prawo UE. Ponadto art. 6 ust. 1 Traktatu o Unii Europejskiej stanowi, że „postanowienia Karty w żaden sposób nie rozszerzają kompetencji Unii określonych w Traktatach”.

W przypadku tygodnika „W Sieci” Komisja nie jest w stanie ustalić, czy Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie oparł swoje postanowienie na przepisach wdrażających prawo unijne, a zatem ocenić, w jaki sposób art. 11 ma zastosowanie, ponieważ dokładny tekst odnośnego postanowienia nie jest dostępny dla Komisji w momencie przygotowywania niniejszej odpowiedzi.

Ponadto wydaje się, iż z pytania Pana Posła wynika, że Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie jak dotąd podjął jedynie postanowienie w sprawie środków tymczasowych w odniesieniu do tygodnika „W Sieci”. Ponieważ ostateczna decyzja w sprawie własności domeny nie zapadła, wydawcy tygodnika „W Sieci” nadal dysponują możliwością obrony swojego stanowiska przed sądem.

Jeśli chodzi o niezależne sprawozdanie grupy wysokiego szczebla ds. wolności i pluralizmu mediów, Komisja zapoczątkowała niedawno dwukrotnie konsultacje społeczne – jedno w sprawie zaleceń grupy i drugie konkretnie na temat niezależności krajowych organów regulacyjnych sektora audiowizualnego. Przy podejmowaniu decyzji w sprawie możliwych dalszych działań, w tym ewentualnych działań legislacyjnych w dziedzinie niezależności organów sektora audiowizualnego, w granicach kompetencji Unii Europejskiej, pod uwagę zostaną wzięte wyniki tych konsultacji, jak również najnowsze sprawozdania Parlamentu Europejskiego, w szczególności sprawozdania Pań Posłanek Weber i Schaake.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002677/13
to the Commission**

Tomasz Piotr Poręba (ECR)

(7 March 2013)

Subject: Ban on the publication of the Polish weekly 'W Sieci'

On 1 March 2013, the publisher of the opinion-forming Polish weekly news magazine 'W Sieci' was informed of a decision taken by the Warsaw District Court stating that the weekly could damage the interests of the 'Presspublika' publishing house (currently Gremi Media), which owns the Internet subdomain 'W Sieci Opinii' (wsieci.rp.pl). This decision — to be implemented with immediate effect — effectively constitutes a ban on the publication of the weekly under its current name until such time as the trial is concluded. The Court's hasty actions and the manner in which they were taken create the impression that the Court has already reached a verdict on the case before it has been examined, and they constitute the execution of a judgment before judgment has been handed down. It is noteworthy that the methods used against 'W Sieci' could be used to block practically any new media initiative that inconveniences the Polish Government.

These facts show that the decision taken in the 'W Sieci' case may have had a political character. Following on from the refusal to grant 'Telewizja Trwam' broadcasting rights on the MUX-1 digital terrestrial television multiplex, this is the second blatant case in which the Polish media have had their freedom of expression restricted in a short period of time.

The Commission's role is to uphold freedom of expression and of the media in the European Union. I should therefore like to ask whether the Commission is aware of the above case, which is yet another clear violation of media freedom in Poland?

In connection with these increasingly frequent infringements of media freedom, *inter alia* in Poland, does the Commission intend to implement the recommendations set out in the report published in January 2013 by the independent High-Level Group on Media Freedom and Pluralism?

Answer given by Ms Kroes on behalf of the Commission

(26 June 2013)

According to its Article 51(1), the Charter applies to Member States only when they are implementing European Union law. Moreover, Article 6(1) of the Treaty of the European Union states that, 'the provisions of the Charter shall not extend in any way the competences of the Union as defined in the Treaties.'

In the case of the weekly news magazine 'W Sieci', the Commission is not in a position to establish if the Warsaw District Court based its decision on provisions implementing Union law and therefore assess how Article 11 is applicable, as the exact text of this decision is not accessible to the Commission at the time of writing.

Also, it appears from the question of the Honourable Member that the Warsaw District Court has so far taken only decision on provisional measures in the case of weekly news magazine 'W Sieci'. As the final decision on the ownership of the domain name has not been taken, the publishers of the weekly news magazine 'W Sieci' still have possibilities to defend their position before the Court.

As regards the independent report of the High Level Group on Media Freedom and Pluralism, the Commission has recently launched two public consultations, one on the recommendations of the group and one specifically on the independence of National Audiovisual Regulatory Authorities. The decision on any possible follow-up actions, including a possible legislative action in the field of independence of audiovisual authorities, within the limits of the competences of the European Union, will take account of the responses to those consultations, as well as the most recent reports by the European Parliament, especially the Weber and the Schaake reports.

(Svensk version)

**Frågor för skriftligt besvarande E-002678/13
till kommissionen
Åsa Westlund (S&D)
(7 mars 2013)**

Angående: Utvecklingen i Burma

Många positiva steg har tagits de senaste åren i Burma. Men repressiva lagar tillämpas fortfarande. Bara i november och december åtalades åtta aktivister för fredliga demonstrationer med hjälp av kapitel 505(b) i Burmas strafflag. Den nya demonstrationslagen når inte upp till internationella standarder; tal med "felaktigt" innehåll kan leda till fängelse och slagord måste godkännas på förhand. Nuvarande reformer i Burma har varit toppstyrda och civilsamhället begränsas fortfarande från att delta i politiken.

1. På vilka sätt arbetar kommissionen med att uppmana Burmas regering att inleda politiska dialoger med alla etniska grupper och civilsamhället?
2. Hur påverkar kommissionen Burma för att få landet att garantera mötesfrihet, organisationsfrihet och yttrandefrihet?

Den humanitära situationen i delstaten Rakhine och Kachin i Burma är akut. Våld mot civila har rapporterats och nödställda rohingyafamiljer som befinner sig utanför läger nås inte av hjälp och även i internflyktinglägren är situationen kritisk enligt Läkare utan gränser. Även Human Rights Watch har dokumenterat de grava MR-kränkningar som civila i konfliktområdet utsatts för av Burmas armé, såsom sexuellt våld och tortyr.

3. Vilka åtgärder har kommissionen vidtagit i sina relationer med landet för att förmå president Thein Sein att tillåta humanitär hjälp till alla delar av Rakhine- och Kachinstaten, verka för tolerans och ge rohingyafolket medborgerliga rättigheter?
4. Hur jobbar kommissionen med att kräva att kriget i Kachinstaten och dessa allvarliga brott mot mänskliga rättigheter i Burma upphör?

**Svar från Catherine Ashton på kommissionens vägnar
(23 april 2013)**

Europeiska unionen välkomnar de förbättringar i situationen i Burma när det gäller de mänskliga rättigheterna som uppnåtts tack vare reformerna under senare tid, men den är förstås också medveten om de utmaningar som landet står inför, särskilt de ihållande spänningarna mellan olika befolkningsgrupper i delstaten Rakhine och konflikten i delstaten Kachin.

EU tar löpande upp frågor som rör de mänskliga rättigheterna och situationen för minoriteter med Burmas statsförvaltning, även på högsta nivå, såsom under Burmas utrikesministers och landets presidents besök i Bryssel tidigare i år. EU-sidan manade vid dessa tillfällen åter till en öppen, inkluderande dialog med alla berörda parter i landet.

Unionen är också mycket aktiv i FN-organ. Den var en av initiativtagarna till den resolution om situationen i Burma när det gäller de mänskliga rättigheterna som antogs enhälligt den 21 mars vid tjugooandra sessionen i FN:s råd för de mänskliga rättigheterna. I resolutionen behandlas de kvarstående problemen i fråga om de mänskliga rättigheterna och behovet av att sörja för obehindrat tillträde för humanitärt bistånd till delstaten Kachin.

Unionen har hela tiden funnits med i främsta ledet bland dem som drivit på för att finna lösningar på rohingyaminoritets svåra situation. Kommissionens ordförande José Manuel Barroso manade vid Burmas president U Thein Seins besök till åtgärder för att trygga obehindrat tillträde för humanitärt bistånd. Han pekade också på behovet av att den burmesiska regeringen finner hållbara lösningar, bl.a. genom att ge rohingyaminoriteten medborgarskap och främja försoning mellan befolkningsgrupper.

Nationell försoning i Burma är en central komponent i landets omvandlingsprocess. EU strävar efter att bidra till fred och stabilitet genom kapacitetsuppbyggnad och utökad bistånd på områden såsom hälso- och sjukvård, utbildning och försörjningsmöjligheter.

Europeiska unionen kommer att fortsätta att ta upp de frågor som nämns ovan i sina löpande kontakter med den burmesiska statsförvaltningen och i internationella forum. Den kommer också att fortsätta att tillhandahålla direkt bistånd på fältet.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002678/13
to the Commission
Åsa Westlund (S&D)
(7 March 2013)

Subject: Developments in Burma

There have been many positive steps in recent years in Burma. However, repressive laws are still enforced. As recently as November and December, eight activists were charged under Chapter 505(b) of Burma's penal code because they took part in peaceful demonstrations. The new laws on demonstrations do not meet international standards; those who make statements with 'wrong' content can end up in prison and slogans must be approved beforehand. Present reforms in Burma have been led from the top and civil society is still subject to restrictions on taking part in politics.

1. In what ways is the Commission encouraging the Burmese Government to open political dialogue with all ethnic groups and civil society?
2. In what ways is the Commission encouraging Burma, to ensure that Burma guarantees freedom of assembly, freedom of association and freedom of expression?

The humanitarian situation in Rakhine and Kachin states in Burma is very serious. Violence against civilians has been reported, aid is not reaching distressed Rohingya families who are not in camps and the situation is also critical in the camps for internally displaced persons according to Médecins sans frontières. Human Rights Watch has also documented serious human rights violations, such as sexual violence and torture, which civilians in the conflict zone are being subjected to by the Burmese army.

3. What measures has the Commission taken in its relations with Burma to persuade President Thein Sein to allow humanitarian aid to get to all parts of Rakhine and Kachin states, to promote tolerance and to give the Rohingya people civil rights?
4. How is the Commission working to secure an end to the war in Kachin state and these serious human rights violations in Burma?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(23 April 2013)

The European Union welcomes improvements to the situation of human rights achieved through a series of recent reforms, but recognises the challenges ahead and in particular the persistence of inter-communal tensions in Rakhine state and the conflict in Kachin state.

Human rights concerns including the situation of minorities are constantly raised with the government, including at highest level as during the visits of the Foreign Minister and of President U Thein Sein earlier this year. At that occasion EU interlocutors again encouraged open and inclusive dialogue with all national stakeholders.

The EU is also very active in UN bodies: In the 22nd session of the UN Human Rights Council the EU was again in the lead of sponsors for the Resolution on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar adopted with unanimity on 21 March, which addresses remaining human rights concerns and needs to grant unhindered humanitarian access to Kachin state.

The EU has always been at the forefront of those urging for solutions to the plight of the Rohingya. During the visit of President U Thein Sein, President Barroso urged for measures to ensure unhindered access of humanitarian assistance. He also repeated calls for the government to find durable solutions, including by providing citizenship to the Rohingya minority, and promote reconciliation.

National reconciliation in Myanmar/Burma is a key element of its overall transition. The EU is seeking to contribute to peace and stability through capacity building and increased assistance in health, education and livelihoods.

The EU will continue to raise the above matters in its ongoing interaction with the government and in international fora, while providing direct assistance on the ground.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung P-002679/13

an die Kommission

Franziska Keller (Verts/ALE)

(7. März 2013)

Betrifft: „Alles außer Waffen“ (Everything but Arms — EBA) — Ermittlungen in Kambodscha

Es gibt umfassende Hinweise darauf, dass in Kambodscha schwerwiegende Menschenrechtsverletzungen im Zusammenhang mit Landverteilungsmaßnahmen stattgefunden haben. Der VN-Sonderberichterstatter für Menschenrechte in Kambodscha legte im September 2012 einen Bericht ⁽¹⁾ vor, in dem er auf hinreichend belegte schwerwiegende und weit verbreitete Menschenrechtsverletzungen im Zusammenhang mit Landverteilungsmaßnahmen hinwies. Außerdem empfahl das Parlament in seiner Entschließung vom 26. Oktober 2012 ⁽²⁾, die EBA-Präferenzen für Zucker und andere Agrarerzeugnisse aus Kambodscha wegen des offensichtlichen Zusammenhangs zwischen Zuckerausfuhren in die EU und Problemen mit Land-Konzessionen zeitweilig auszusetzen.

1. Plant die Kommission die Einleitung von EBA-Ermittlungen und falls ja, wann?
2. Falls nicht, welche Gründe gibt es dafür, keine Ermittlungen einzuleiten, angesichts des Berichts des VN-Sonderberichterstatters und anderer Gremien sowie in Kenntnis der Tatsache, dass die Maßnahmen, die die kambodschanische Regierung ergriffen hat — wie beispielsweise die Richtlinie vom 7. Mai 2012 — die Menschenrechtslage bisher nicht verbessert haben?

Antwort von Herrn De Gucht im Namen der Kommission

(12. April 2013)

Die EU ist besorgt über die Auswirkungen von Landkonzessionen wirtschaftlicher Natur in Kambodscha und hat in diesem Zusammenhang einige diplomatische Bemühungen unternommen. Deren letzte war das Treffen zwischen dem für Handel zuständigen Kommissar und dem kambodschanischen Handelsminister Cham Prasidh Anfang März 2013 am Rande der Ministertagung zwischen dem Verband Südostasiatischer Nationen (*Association of Southeast Asian Nations*, ASEAN) und der EU in Hanoi, bei dem der kambodschanische Ansprechpartner eine erkennbar größere Bereitschaft zeigte, etwas gegen das Problem zu unternehmen.

Was die Präferenzen im Rahmen des Abkommens „Alles außer Waffen“ betrifft, so prüft die Kommission fortwährend, ob die Bedingungen für die Einleitung von Rücknahmeverfahren erfüllt sind. Sie hat die Entwicklungen, die in den Berichten des Sonderberichterstatters Professor Subedi beschrieben werden, positiv vermerkt. Sie wird zudem die Schlussfolgerungen des Menschenrechtsrates sowie der Überwachungseinrichtungen der wesentlichen Menschenrechtsübereinkommen aufmerksam verfolgen, um festzustellen, ob ernsthafte und systematische Menschenrechtsverletzungen stattfinden. Die Kommission bleibt wachsam und ist bereit, geeignete Maßnahmen zu treffen, wenn die rechtlichen Voraussetzungen vorliegen.

⁽¹⁾ http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session21/A-HRC-21-63-Add1_en.pdf

⁽²⁾ http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/dase/dv/1129_13_epres_cambodia_10oct12_/1129_13_epres_cambodia_10oct12_de.pdf

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-002679/13
to the Commission**

Franziska Keller (Verts/ALE)

(7 March 2013)

Subject: Everything But Arms (EBA) investigation in Cambodia

There is extensive evidence that serious human rights violations connected to land concessions have occurred in Cambodia. The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Cambodia presented a report in September 2012 ⁽¹⁾, referring to 'well-documented serious and widespread human rights violations associated with land concessions'. Moreover, in its resolution of 26 October 2012 ⁽²⁾, Parliament recommended a temporary suspension of the EBA initiative on sugar and other agricultural products from Cambodia because of the obvious link between sugar exports to the EU and problems with land concessions.

1. Is the Commission considering launching an EBA investigation, and, if so, when?
2. If not, what are the reasons for not launching an investigation, given the report by the UN Special Rapporteur and other bodies, and knowing that the measures taken by the Cambodian Government — such as the directive of 7 May 2012 — have not improved the human rights situation so far?

Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission

(12 April 2013)

The EU is concerned about the impact of economic land concessions in Cambodia and has deployed a range of diplomatic efforts in this regard. The latest was the meeting early March 2013 between the Commissioner responsible for Trade and Cambodian Trade Minister Cham Prasidh on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-EU Ministerial in Hanoi, where the Cambodian counterpart demonstrated a visibly improved commitment to tackle the issue.

Regarding EBA preferences, the Commission continuously examines whether the conditions for the activation of withdrawal procedures are met. The Commission has taken good note of the developments described in the reports by the Special Rapporteur Professor Subedi and will follow closely the conclusions by the Human Rights Council and the monitoring bodies of the individual core human rights conventions, with a view to ascertain whether serious and systematic violations occur. The Commission remains vigilant and will be ready to take appropriate action if the legal requirements are met.

⁽¹⁾ http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session21/A-HRC-21-63-Add1_en.pdf

⁽²⁾ http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/dase/dv/1129_13_epres_cambodia_10oct12_/1129_13_epres_cambodia_10oct12_en.pdf

(Svensk version)

**Frågor för skriftligt besvarande E-002680/13
till kommissionen
Amelia Andersdotter (Verts/ALE)
(7 mars 2013)**

Angående: Ny översyn av direktivet om skydd av databaser

2006 drog kommissionen slutsatsen i sin utvärdering av *sui generis*-skyddet för databaser ⁽¹⁾ att den ekonomiska påverkan av *sui generis*-rätten för produktion av databaser inte går att styrka. Det nya instrumentet, som infördes för att främja produktionen av databaser i Europa, har inte haft någon styrkt påverkan på produktionen av databaser. [...] Är *sui generis*-skyddet därför nödvändigt för en blomstrande databasindustri? Utifrån empiriska belägg är det i detta skede oklart om behovet finns.

Nyligen, då stora datamängder har varit på allas läppar vad gäller flera intressanta affärsmöjligheter inom många sektorer, har frågan om skydd för databaser inom unionen återigen kommit på tal.

På vilket sätt arbetar kommissionen för att utvärdera påverkan av direktivet om skydd för databaser vad gäller målen och ambitionerna för den digitala agendan?

Planerar kommissionen att genomföra en ny översyn av direktivet?

**Svar från Michel Barnier på kommissionens vägnar
(15 maj 2013)**

Genom direktiv 96/9/EG ⁽²⁾ harmoniserades de olika nationella regelverken för skydd av databaser. Syftet var att skapa likvärdiga förutsättningar och en attraktiv miljö för investeringar på detta område. Samtidigt vill man genom direktivet skydda databasanvändarnas berättigade intressen.

I sitt meddelande av den 18 december 2012 ⁽³⁾ fastställer kommissionen en strategi för de kommande två åren för att säkerställa en effektiv digital inre marknad på upphovsrättens område. Tanken är att man 2014 ska besluta om huruvida lagförslag med nya bestämmelser ska läggas fram.

Även om direktiv 96/9/EG inte uttryckligen nämns i kommissionens meddelande av den 18 december 2012 utesluter inte kommissionen att detta direktiv kommer att tas med i översynen av EU:s upphovsrättsliga regelverk.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/databases/evaluation_report_en.pdf

⁽²⁾ Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 96/9/EG av den 11 mars 1996 om rättsligt skydd för databaser (EGT L 77, 27.3.1996, s. 20).

⁽³⁾ Meddelande från kommissionen om innehåll i den digitala inre marknaden (KOM(2012) 789 final).

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002680/13
to the Commission**

Amelia Andersdotter (Verts/ALE)

(7 March 2013)

Subject: New review of the database protection directive

In 2006, the Commission concluded in its evaluation of sui generis database protection ⁽¹⁾ that ‘the economic impact of the “sui generis” right on database production is unproven. Introduced to stimulate the production of databases in Europe, the new instrument has had no proven impact on the production of databases./.../ Is “sui generis” protection therefore necessary for a thriving database industry? The empirical evidence, at this stage, casts doubts on this necessity.’

Recently, with ‘Big Data’ becoming a buzzword for many interesting business opportunities in several sectors, the issue of database protection in the Union has come up again.

How is the Commission working to evaluate the impact of the database protection directive on the goals and ambitions of the Digital Agenda?

Is the Commission planning to conduct a new review of the directive?

Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission

(15 May 2013)

Directive 96/9/EC ⁽²⁾ harmonised the hitherto divergent national rules on the protection of databases in order to create a level playing field and an attractive environment for the investment in databases. At the same time, the directive aims at safeguarding the legitimate interests of users of databases.

In its communication of 18 December 2012 ⁽³⁾, the Commission has set out its strategy for the next two years in order to ensure an effective digital single market in the area of copyright with a view to a decision in 2014 whether to table legislative reform proposals.

Although Directive 96/9/EC is not specifically mentioned in the Commission’s Communication of 18 December 2012, the Commission does not exclude that this directive could be part of that review of the EU copyright legislative framework.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/databases/evaluation_report_en.pdf

⁽²⁾ Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of databases (OJ 1996 L 77, p. 20).

⁽³⁾ Communication from the Commission of 18 December 2012 on content in the Digital Single Market (COM(2012) 789 final).

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-002681/13
à la Commission
Hélène Flautre (Verts/ALE)
(7 mars 2013)

Objet: Passage de Mayotte au statut de RUP et acquis communautaire en matière de droits fondamentaux, d'immigration et d'asile

Après être devenu département français en mars 2011, le territoire de Mayotte obtiendra, le 1^{er} janvier 2014, le statut de région ultrapériphérique (RUP). La Commission prépare actuellement une proposition visant à définir les mesures transitoires et dérogatoires au droit communautaire dont bénéficiera le département de Mayotte. La loi française n° 012-1270 du 20 novembre 2012 relative à la régulation économique outre-mer et portant diverses dispositions relatives aux territoires d'outre-mer prévoit la possibilité pour le gouvernement de modifier l'ordonnance n° 2000-373 du 26 avril 2000 relative aux conditions d'entrée et de séjour des étrangers à Mayotte, afin notamment de la mettre en conformité avec le droit communautaire.

Les législations et des pratiques dérogatoires actuelles en matière d'immigration et d'asile conduisent à des violations claires de l'acquis communautaire sur le territoire de Mayotte. Absence de recours effectif, exercice marginal du contrôle juridictionnel, rétention massive des migrants, notamment de mineurs, sont autant d'exemples de violations des droits en matière de retour. D'ailleurs, la Cour européenne des Droits de l'homme réunie en grande chambre a affirmé le 13 décembre 2012 que les procédures d'exception appliquées dans certaines terres d'outre-mer (ici la Guyane, où le requérant avait été reconduit à la frontière avant une décision du tribunal administratif de la France violent le droit à un recours effectif garanti par l'article 13 de la Convention. En matière d'asile, de nombreux manquements quant à l'accueil et à la procédure régissant les demandes d'asile sont régulièrement constatés: expulsion au cours d'une demande d'asile, absence d'hébergement ou d'allocation compensatoire.

1. La Commission prévoit-elle d'inclure dans sa proposition des mesures transitoires ou dérogatoires à l'acquis en matière d'asile et de migration et à la charte européenne des droits fondamentaux, pour la RUP de Mayotte? Dans l'affirmative, quelles seraient-elles?
2. Quelles propositions la Commission pourrait-elle adopter afin d'assurer le respect de l'acquis communautaire en matière d'immigration, d'asile et de droits fondamentaux sur le territoire de Mayotte lors de son accession au statut de RUP?

Réponse donnée par M^{me} Malmström au nom de la Commission
(24 avril 2013)

La Commission, ayant analysé la demande des autorités françaises en faveur d'une dérogation à l'article 13, paragraphe 2, de la directive sur les retours ⁽¹⁾ et à l'article 13, paragraphe 5, de la directive sur les normes d'accueil ⁽²⁾, considère qu'il n'y a pas lieu d'accorder de mesures transitoires ou de dérogations à l'acquis de l'UE en la matière.

Cette analyse préliminaire ne remplace pas le contrôle a posteriori qui sera effectué, selon les procédures prévues à l'article 258 du TFUE, de la transposition et de l'application à Mayotte de l'acquis de l'UE dans le domaine de l'immigration et de l'asile. Aucune proposition n'est nécessaire pour assurer la conformité avec l'acquis de l'UE. La France, dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre de cet acquis sur le territoire de Mayotte, est tenue de respecter les dispositions de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l'UE.

⁽¹⁾ Directive 2008/115/CE du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 16 décembre 2008 relative aux normes et procédures communes applicables dans les États membres au retour des ressortissants de pays tiers en séjour irrégulier.

⁽²⁾ Directive 2003/9/CE du Conseil du 27 janvier 2003 relative à des normes minimales pour l'accueil des demandeurs d'asile dans les États membres.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002681/13
to the Commission**

Hélène Flautre (Verts/ALE)

(7 March 2013)

Subject: Granting Mayotte the status of an outermost region and implementing the *acquis communautaire* in the area of fundamental rights, immigration and asylum

After becoming a French department in March 2011, Mayotte will be granted the status of an outermost region on 1 January 2014. The Commission is currently drafting a proposal setting out the transitional measures and derogations from EC law which will be granted to the department of Mayotte. The French Act No 2012-1270 of 20 November 2012 on economic regulation in overseas territories and containing various provisions on overseas territories allows the government to amend Ordinance No 2000-373 of 26 April 2000 on the conditions for entry and residence of third-party nationals in Mayotte, with the particular aim of bringing the latter into line with EC law.

The legislation and derogations currently in force in the area of immigration and asylum result in clear violations of the *acquis communautaire* in Mayotte. The lack of an effective remedy, the infrequency of judicial reviews and the huge number of migrants who are detained, in particular minors, are just a few examples of ways in which rights of return are violated. On 13 December 2012, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights found that the exceptional procedures applied in certain overseas territories (in this case Guyana, where the petitioner had been returned to the border before a decision had been handed down by an administrative court) by France violated the right to an effective remedy guaranteed by Article 13 of the Convention. Shortcomings are regularly reported in respect of the reception of asylum-seekers and the procedure for handling asylum requests: these include expulsion during the asylum process and a lack of accommodation or compensation.

1. Is the Commission planning to propose that the outermost region of Mayotte should be granted transitional measures or derogations from the *acquis* in the area of asylum and migration and from the European Charter of Fundamental Rights? If so, which?
2. What proposals could the Commission adopt in order to guarantee that Mayotte complies with the *acquis communautaire* in the area of immigration, asylum and fundamental rights once it has gained the status of an outermost region?

Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission

(24 April 2013)

Following the analysis of the French request for derogations from Article 13 (2) of Return Directive ⁽¹⁾ and Article 13 (5) of Reception Conditions Directive ⁽²⁾, the Commission considers that there is no need to grant any transitional measures or derogations from the EU *acquis* in this area.

This preliminary analysis is without prejudice to the future monitoring of the transposition and application of the EU *acquis* in Mayotte in the area of asylum and migration, which will follow procedures provided under Article 258 TFEU. No proposals are needed to ensure compliance with the EU *acquis*. France shall be bound by the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union when the abovementioned *acquis* is implemented in Mayotte.

⁽¹⁾ Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals.

⁽²⁾ Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum-seekers.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002682/13
aan de Commissie
Wim van de Camp (PPE)
(7 maart 2013)

Betref: Invoerrechten door China en India op Europese producten

Uit een interview met Wim van de Leegte (CEO VDL) in het opinieblad Forum van VNO-NCW ⁽¹⁾, blijkt dat China en India nog steeds onevenredige invoerrechten heffen op producten uit de Europese Unie.

1. Heeft de Commissie kennisgenomen van het interview met Wim van der Leegte in het Blad Forum (Forum 4/28.02.2013)?
2. Kan de Commissie aangeven in hoeverre zij tevreden is over de handelsrelatie tussen de Europese Unie en China/India?
3. Kan de Commissie een overzicht geven over de voortgang in de onderhandelingen met China en India over de onevenredige invoerrechten die zij heffen op Europese producten?
4. Deelt de Commissie de mening dat de invoerrechten van China en India een gelijk speelveld in de wereld tegenhouden?

Antwoord van de heer De Gucht namens de Commissie
(18 april 2013)

Uit de bilaterale handelsbetrekkingen van de EU met India en China komen een aantal uitdagingen voort. Daarom werkt de Commissie aan verbetering van de situatie en aan vermindering van de bestaande problemen door voortgaande dialoog en samenwerking, maar ook, waar nodig, door het gebruik van geschillenbeslechting. De EU voert onderhandelingen met India over een vrijhandelsovereenkomst.

De door India en China geheven tarieven zijn in overeenstemming met hun respectieve verbintenissen bij de Wereldhandelsorganisatie (WTO). In het geval van China waren de tarieven het onderwerp van onderhandelingen voorafgaand aan China's toetreding tot de WTO in 2001. De tarieven vormen een belangrijk onderdeel van de onderhandelingen over een vrijhandelsovereenkomst met India.

India en China passen douanerechten toe binnen de beperkingen van hun WTO-verbintenissen, net als alle andere leden van de WTO met inbegrip van de EU. De EU is van mening dat vrijhandel bijdraagt aan wereldwijde economische groei en werkgelegenheid, en daarom bevordert zij een verstrekkende liberalisering van de handel met inbegrip van de afschaffing of vermindering van tarieven op multilateraal en bilateraal niveau.

⁽¹⁾ http://www.vno-ncw.nl/SiteCollectionDocuments/Forumartikelen/Forum_0413_vdLeegte_17967.pdf

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002682/13
to the Commission**

Wim van de Camp (PPE)

(7 March 2013)

Subject: Import duties imposed on European products by China and India

An interview with Wim van de Leegte (CEO VDL) in the Forum of the Confederation of Netherlands Industry and Employers (VNO-NCW) newspaper ⁽¹⁾ reveals that China and India are still imposing disproportionate import duties on products from the European Union.

1. Is the Commission aware of the interview with Wim van der Leegte in the Forum newspaper (Forum 4/28.2.2013)?
2. Can the Commission indicate to what extent it is satisfied with trade relations between the European Union and China/India?
3. Can the Commission give an assessment of progress in negotiations with China and India on the disproportionate import duties which they are imposing on European products?
4. Does the Commission share the view that the import duties imposed by China and India prevent a global level playing field?

Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission

(18 April 2013)

EU bilateral trade relationship with India and China present a number of challenges. For this reason, the Commission is working to improve the situation and to reduce the existing problems by ongoing dialogue and cooperation, but also by resorting to dispute settlement when necessary. With India, the EU is engaged in negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement (FTA).

The tariffs levied by India and China are subject to their respective commitments in the World Trade Organisation (WTO). For China, the tariffs were the subject of negotiation before China's accession to the WTO in 2001. For India, tariffs form an important part of the FTA negotiations.

India and China apply customs duties within the limits of their WTO commitments, as do all other WTO members including the EU. The EU believes that free trade contributes to global economic growth and job creation, and therefore promotes an ambitious trade liberalisation agenda including the elimination or reduction of tariffs at multilateral and bilateral level.

⁽¹⁾ http://www.vno-ncw.nl/SiteCollectionDocuments/Forumartikelen/Forum_0413_vdLeegte_17967.pdf

(Version française)

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite P-002683/13
à la Commission**

Véronique De Keyser (S&D)

(7 mars 2013)

Objet: Autobus israéliens et apartheid

Depuis ce 4 mars 2013, les autorités israéliennes ont autorisé deux compagnies de transport à mettre en place des autobus distincts, les uns réservés aux Israéliens, les autres aux Palestiniens.

L'objectif serait d'éviter que des Palestiniens empruntent des autobus où seraient montés des colons israéliens habitant dans les colonies illégales, comme le sont toutes les colonies, vis-à-vis du droit international.

Si cela se vérifie et se confirme, cette mesure incontestablement ségrégationniste (quelles que soient les motivations qui pourraient être avancées par les autorités israéliennes) rappelle fortement la situation qu'ont vécue, il y a quelques années, les populations africaines, en Afrique du Sud, avec l'apartheid et, il y a quelques décennies, aux États-Unis.

Cette situation est sans conteste contraire à la fois à la déclaration des Droits de l'homme, à la charte des droits fondamentaux et au droit européen.

Quelle va être la réaction de la Commission? Des sanctions sont-elles imaginables et envisagées?

Réponse donnée par M^{me} Ashton, Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante au nom de la Commission

(16 avril 2013)

La Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante a connaissance de cette décision. Il semble que le ministère des transports justifie l'ouverture de nouvelles lignes d'autobus par le fait qu'elles facilitent le transport d'un plus grand nombre de travailleurs palestiniens en Israël et qu'il n'ait pas émis d'instructions ou d'interdictions empêchant aux travailleurs palestiniens de prendre les autobus publics en Israël ou en Cisjordanie. Les délégations de l'Union européenne à Tel-Aviv et à Jérusalem-Est suivront attentivement l'évolution de cette situation, en particulier afin de vérifier si des Palestiniens titulaires de permis d'entrée sur le territoire d'Israël, qui ont, dès lors, le droit d'utiliser les transports publics, sont autorisés ou non à prendre les autobus publics de leur choix.

L'UE n'encourage pas le recours aux sanctions commerciales dans ses relations bilatérales avec Israël. Le commerce est perçu comme un facteur de croissance, ce pourquoi il convient de n'envisager d'adopter des restrictions commerciales que si tout autre instrument fait défaut, ce qui n'est pas le cas dans le cadre des relations bilatérales de l'UE avec Israël. L'UE ne prévoit pas non plus de recourir à l'interdiction d'importer des produits provenant des colonies, ni d'encourager la participation au boycottage de telles importations.

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-002683/13
to the Commission**

Véronique De Keyser (S&D)

(7 March 2013)

Subject: Israeli buses and apartheid

Since 4 March 2013, the Israeli authorities have been allowing two transport companies to run separate bus services for Israelis and Palestinians.

It appears that this measure is intended to ensure that Palestinians do not take the same buses as Israelis living in the illegal settlements (all Israeli settlements are considered illegal under international law).

If this turns out to be true, and whatever the justification put forward by the Israeli authorities, this undeniably segregationist measure is strongly reminiscent of the situation of black Africans a few years ago under apartheid in South Africa and a few decades ago in the USA.

There is no doubt that the current situation is at odds with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and EC law.

How is the Commission going to respond to the situation in Israel? Will it consider imposing sanctions?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(16 April 2013)

The HR/VP is aware of this decision. It is understood that the Ministry of Transport takes the position that the new bus lines were opened to facilitate the transportation of an increased number of Palestinian workers to Israel and that it has not issued any instruction or prohibition that prevents Palestinian workers from riding the public bus lines in Israel or in the West Bank. The EU Delegations in Tel Aviv and East Jerusalem will closely follow further developments on this issue, especially whether Palestinians who hold entrance permits to the State of Israel and who are therefore by law allowed to use public transportation, are prohibited or not from using the public bus lines of their choice.

The EU does not promote the use of trade sanctions in the context of bilateral EU-Israel relations. Trade is seen as an element of growth creation and therefore trade bans could only be considered when there is no other instrument at reach, which is not the case on bilateral EU-Israeli relations. Neither is resorting to banning the import of settlement products envisaged by the EU, nor the encouragement of participation in boycotts against such imports.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002684/13
a la Comisión**

Santiago Fisas Ayxela (PPE)

(7 de marzo de 2013)

Asunto: Apoyo al voluntariado

Desde el inicio de la crisis económica en España, los índices de pobreza no paran de aumentar. Esta pobreza se hace patente especialmente en los barrios más humildes de las ciudades, donde han surgido iniciativas como la apertura de nuevos comedores sociales y de lucha contra los desahucios.

Por desgracia, las autoridades municipales y la administración pública se ven desbordadas y debe ser el tercer sector y la sociedad civil quienes atiendan a los más desfavorecidos de forma voluntaria, a pesar de que en muchas ocasiones no les damos la importancia que merecen.

La Unión Europea reconoció esta labor con el año europeo del voluntariado. No solo por su labor contra la crisis, sino también por el importante papel del voluntariado en muchos otros ámbitos como el deporte o los movimientos escoltas.

Ante esta situación y en la línea de seguir apoyando el voluntariado:

¿Considera adecuado la Comisión establecer algún tipo de reconocimiento a todas las iniciativas y voluntarios que ayudan a los que más sufren esta crisis?

¿Está previsto elaborar un Estatuto del Voluntario?

¿Qué balance hace la Comisión del año europeo del voluntariado?

Respuesta de la Sra. Reding en nombre de la Comisión

(24 de abril de 2013)

Uno de los objetivos del año Europeo del Voluntariado 2011 era recompensar y reconocer las actividades de voluntariado a fin de ofrecer incentivos apropiados a las personas, las empresas y las organizaciones de desarrollo del voluntariado a nivel de la UE y de los Estados miembros.

En 2011, la Comisión organizó una serie de actividades para promover el reconocimiento del voluntariado. La primera conferencia temática del Año Europeo se dedicó al reconocimiento y la validación de las capacidades y competencias adquiridas a través del voluntariado. A nivel nacional, se celebraron en toda la UE gran número de actividades para reconocer y agradecer la labor de los voluntarios.

Los resultados y el impacto globales del Año Europeo fueron positivos ⁽¹⁾. El Año Europeo fomentó la creación de redes, aumentó la sensibilización sobre el voluntariado y contribuyó al desarrollo de estrategias y legislación sobre el voluntariado.

A partir de los resultados del Año Europeo, la Comisión seguirá promoviendo el voluntariado a través de sus programas de financiación ⁽²⁾.

La Recomendación del Consejo sobre la validación del aprendizaje no formal e informal, de 20 de diciembre de 2012, invita a los Estados miembros a establecer para 2018, a más tardar, disposiciones para su validación. Los representantes del sector del voluntariado deben participar como partes interesadas cuando se diseñen y apliquen dichas disposiciones. Este sector estará también representado en el Grupo Consultivo para el Marco Europeo de Cualificaciones, que realizará el seguimiento de la Recomendación.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/citizenship/pdf/eyv2011_final_report_es.pdf

⁽²⁾ El programa actual «Juventud en Acción», la propuesta de programa «Erasmus para todos» y los programas actuales y futuros «Europa con los Ciudadanos».

En esta fase, la Comisión no prevé proponer un Estatuto del Voluntario, pero remite a la «Carta Europea de Derechos y Responsabilidades de los Voluntarios», elaborada por el Foro Europeo de la Juventud, que es uno de los documentos desarrollados durante el Año Europeo como base para el seguimiento adecuado por las partes interesadas del voluntariado y las autoridades nacionales pertinentes.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002684/13
to the Commission**

Santiago Fisas Ayxela (PPE)

(7 March 2013)

Subject: Support for volunteering

Poverty rates in Spain have continued to rise since the start of the economic crisis. This poverty is particularly evident in the poorest neighbourhoods of cities where initiatives such as opening soup kitchens and fighting against evictions have been launched.

Unfortunately, local authorities and the civil service have been overwhelmed and it is the non-profit sector and civil society that have had to cater to those most in need voluntarily, even though they often do not receive the credit they deserve.

The European Union acknowledged this work with the European Year of Volunteering. This not only recognised volunteering's role in combating the crisis, but also its importance in many areas such as sport and related movements.

Given this situation and in order to continue supporting volunteering:

Does the Commission believe that it is appropriate to give some sort of recognition to all of the initiatives and volunteers helping those who are worst affected by the crisis?

Is it planning to draft a Volunteering Statute?

What is its assessment of the European Year of Volunteering?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission

(24 April 2013)

One of the objectives of the European Year (EY) of Volunteering 2011 was to reward and recognise voluntary activities to provide appropriate incentives for individuals, companies and volunteer development organisations at EU and Member State level.

In 2011, the Commission organised a series of activities to promote the recognition of volunteering. The first thematic conference of the EY was devoted to the recognition and validation of skills and competences acquired through volunteering. At national level, a large number of activities took place throughout the EU to recognise and thank volunteers.

The overall results and impact of the EY were positive ⁽¹⁾. The EY stimulated the development of networks, increased awareness of volunteering and contributed to the development of national strategies and legislation on volunteering.

Based on the results of the EY, the Commission will continue to promote volunteering through its funding programmes ⁽²⁾.

The Council Recommendation on the validation of non-formal and informal learning of 20/12/2012 invites Member States to set up arrangements for validation by 2018. Representatives of the voluntary sector should be involved as stakeholders when designing and implementing validation arrangements. The voluntary sector will also be represented in the EQF Advisory Group for the follow up to the recommendation.

At this stage, the Commission does not envisage proposing a volunteering Statute, but refers to the 'European Charter of the rights and responsibilities of volunteers', drawn up by the European Youth Forum, and which is among the documents development during the EY as a basis for appropriate follow-up by volunteering stakeholders and the relevant national authorities.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/citizenship/pdf/eyv2011_final_report_en.pdf

⁽²⁾ The current Youth in Action programme, the proposed Erasmus for All programme and the current and future Europe for Citizens programmes.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002686/13
a la Comisión**

Santiago Fisas Ayxela (PPE)

(7 de marzo de 2013)

Asunto: Homofobia en Bielorrusia

Aunque Bielorrusia despenalizó la homosexualidad en 1991, la homofobia sigue presente y en aumento. El último ejemplo de esta creciente homofobia lo tenemos en el rechazo al grupo de Derechos LGBT GayBelarus.

GayBelarus solicitó, a principios de este año, que su organización fuera oficialmente registrada como ONG, ya que sin el registro la organización no puede operar legalmente. En enero supieron que su solicitud había sido rechazada por el Ministerio de Justicia argumentando que «la organización no tiene en sus estatutos las cláusulas sobre el apoyo a la madurez social y el desarrollo integral de la juventud bielorrusa».

¿Cuál es la opinión de la Comisión ante este tipo de conductas homofóbicas en nuestro mismo continente?

¿Se plantea la Comisión algún tipo de apoyo o reconocimiento explícito a la organización GayBelarus?

¿No cree la Comisión que se deben tomar más medidas de apoyo a los jóvenes homosexuales especialmente en países donde no se ven reconocidos sus derechos?

Respuesta de la Alta Representante y Vicepresidenta Ashton en nombre de la Comisión

(29 de abril de 2013)

La Alta Representante y Vicepresidenta lamenta cualquier tipo de comportamientos y actitudes homófobas y apoya con firmeza los derechos de la Comunidad LGBT, ya sea en Europa o en cualquier otra parte del mundo.

La UE ha puesto en marcha diversas medidas en Bielorrusia con el fin de apoyar los derechos de los homosexuales y otros grupos vulnerables contra actos discriminatorios. La UE ha expresado también en repetidas ocasiones a las autoridades bielorrusas su preocupación sobre las dificultades a que se enfrentan las organizaciones de la sociedad civil para poder ser registradas y actuar sin limitaciones políticas ni administrativas.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002686/13
to the Commission**

Santiago Fisas Ayxela (PPE)

(7 March 2013)

Subject: Homophobia in Belarus

Although Belarus decriminalised homosexuality in 1991, homophobia still exists and is on the rise. The latest example of growing homophobia is the rejection of the LGBT rights group GayBelarus.

At the start of the year, GayBelarus requested that the organisation be officially registered as an NGO, as it cannot operate legally without this registration. In January it learned that its application had been rejected by the Ministry of Justice, which claimed that the organisation's statutes did not contain clauses supporting the social maturity and comprehensive development of Belarusian young people.

What is the Commission's view of this type of homophobic behaviour in our own continent?

Is it planning to provide any kind of support to or explicit recognition of GayBelarus?

Does it not believe that further measures should be taken to support young homosexuals, particularly in countries where their rights are not recognised?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(29 April 2013)

The High Representative/Vice-President deplores all kind of homophobic behaviour and attitudes against homosexuals and firmly support LGBT rights, be it in Europe or any other part of the world.

Different measures have been put in place by the EU in Belarus in order to support the rights of homosexuals and other vulnerable groups against discriminatory acts. The EU has also on repeated occasions expressed its concern to Belarusian authorities about the difficulties civil society organisations face in getting registered and being able to operate free of administrative and political constraints.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002687/13
a la Comisión**

Santiago Fisas Ayxela (PPE)
(7 de marzo de 2013)

Asunto: Colaboración contra la mafia del narcotráfico

El pasado 18 de febrero de 2013 los Mossos d'Esquadra (la policía regional de Cataluña) detuvieron en Barcelona a dos supuestos miembros de la N'drangheta, la mafia de la región italiana de Calabria, a los que acusa también de un delito de tráfico de drogas.

Atendiendo a la facilidad de movimiento y circulación en la Unión Europea, al Espacio Schengen, y al aumento de los delitos a nivel comunitario:

¿Cuáles son las medidas de la Comisión para luchar contra las mafias del narcotráfico que operan a nivel europeo?

¿Se plantean nuevas medidas para reforzar los controles fronterizos en las rutas a través de las cuales se consigue droga?

Respuesta de la Sra. Reding en nombre de la Comisión

(3 de mayo de 2013)

La Comisión no emprende medidas operativas de carácter coercitivo, pero respalda la cooperación de las autoridades de los Estados miembros en la lucha contra la delincuencia organizada y el tráfico de drogas, concretamente mediante su apoyo a las agencias de la UE competentes en la materia, como Europol, Eurojust o Frontex. El Informe sobre el mercado de drogas de la UE (*EU Drugs Market Report*⁽¹⁾) ofrece información más detallada sobre las actividades de tráfico de las distintas sustancias y las respuestas europea e internacional a esos delitos.

(¹) Para más información, véase: Observatorio Europeo de las Drogas y de las Toxicomanías, Europol, Informe sobre el mercado de drogas de la UE: análisis estratégico (*EU Drugs Market Report, A Strategic Analysis*), Luxemburgo, Oficina de Publicaciones de la Unión Europea, 2013.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002687/13
to the Commission**

Santiago Fisas Ayxela (PPE)

(7 March 2013)

Subject: Cooperation against drug-trafficking mafia

In Barcelona on 18 February 2013, the Mossos d'Esquadra (Catalonian regional police) arrested two suspected members of 'Ndrangheta, the Calabrian Mafia, for alleged drug trafficking.

Given the ease of movement and circulation within the EU, the Schengen Area and increased crime throughout the Union:

What measures is the Commission taking to combat drug-trafficking mafia operating in the EU?

Is it planning new measures to strengthen border controls on routes used to acquire drugs?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission

(3 May 2013)

The Commission does not undertake operational law enforcement measures. The Commission supports the cooperation of Member States' authorities in combating organised crime and drug trafficking, in particular, e.g., by supporting relevant EU agencies such as Europol, Eurojust or Frontex. The recently published EU Drugs Market Report ⁽¹⁾ provides more detailed information on trafficking activities as regards different substances and the responses at European and international level to these trafficking activities.

⁽¹⁾ See in more detail European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, Europol, EU Drugs Market Report, A Strategic Analysis, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2013.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-002688/13

an die Kommission

Franz Obermayr (NI)

(7. März 2013)

Betrifft: Feinstaub — Verstöße und Verbesserungsmöglichkeiten

In der Stadt Graz und dem österreichischen Bundesland Steiermark wurden systematisch die Bestimmungen der Feinstaubrichtlinie übertreten. Des Weiteren scheint derzeit im Zuge der Auswirkungen der Finanzkrise wenig Interesse an selbst gesetzten Verpflichtungen zu bestehen.

Auch ist der in der EU ab 2015 gesetzte Grenzwert von 20 Mikrogramm pro Kubikmeter Luft bei kleinsten Feinstaubpartikeln (PM_{2,5}) doppelt so hoch wie der von der WHO empfohlene.

Eine der wirksamsten Maßnahmen, um den Feinstaub zu binden, ist ferner die Begrünung von Fassaden und Dächern. Mehr Grünraum in der dritten Dimension wirkt sich überdies auf den Lebensraum von Pflanzen und Tieren sowie auf das Wohlbefinden von Menschen positiv aus.

1. Warum werden Verstöße gegen die Feinstaubrichtlinie durch die Republik Österreich seit einem halben Jahr nicht weiterverfolgt?
2. Welche Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Union sind bei der Feinstaubbekämpfung außer Österreich noch säumig?
3. Wie ist der diesbezügliche Verfahrensstand etwaiger Vertragsverletzungsverfahren?
4. Warum ist der ab 2015(!) festgesetzte Schwellenwert der EU bei kleinsten Feinstaubpartikeln, dem sogenannten Ultra-Feinstaub, doppelt so hoch wie der zurzeit von der WHO empfohlene?
5. Sieht die Kommission Möglichkeiten zur Anreizsetzung oder für verpflichtende rechtliche Maßnahmen in der Begrünung von Häuserfassaden und -dächern?
6. Falls es hier Überlegungen gibt, wie ist der Stand der Dinge?
7. Welche zwingenden Maßnahmen plant die EU in diesem Kalenderjahr 2013 zur Eindämmung des Feinstaubs und des Kohlendioxidausstoßes?

Antwort von Herrn Potočník im Namen der Kommission

(26. April 2013)

1./2. Es gab tatsächlich Untersuchungen zu Verstößen gegen die Richtlinie 2008/50/EG über Luftqualität und saubere Luft für Europa (⁽¹⁾), und Österreich ist einer von 17 Mitgliedstaaten, gegen die wegen Überschreitung der PM₁₀-Grenzwerte Vertragsverletzungsverfahren eingeleitet wurden. Hierzu verweisen wir den Herrn Abgeordneten auf die diesbezügliche Pressemitteilung vom 24. Januar 2013: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-47_de.htm

3. Was Österreich betrifft, so befindet sich das Vertragsverletzungsverfahren in der Phase des ergänzenden Aufforderungsschreibens, in das Graz und das österreichische Bundesland Steiermark einbezogen sind.

4. Die Menge an PM_{2,5} ist eine Teilmenge der PM₁₀, für die schon 1999 in den EU-Rechtsvorschriften Grenzwerte festgesetzt wurden. Zudem tritt der Grenzwert für PM_{2,5} zwar erst 2015 in Kraft, der Zielwert gilt jedoch schon seit dem 1. Januar 2010. Die neuesten WHO-Leitwerte für PM_{2,5} beruhen auf einem stufenweisen Ansatz (allmähliche Senkung auf 35, 25, 15 und 10 µg/m³). Der EU-Grenzwert beträgt 25 µg/m³ und ist bis 2015 zu erreichen, als nächste Stufe ist ein (Richt-)Grenzwert von 20 µg/m³ für das Jahr 2020 vorgesehen. Das Zwischenziel der WHO für die Stufe 2 beträgt 25 µg/m³ (ohne Fristen). Insofern steht das EU-Recht mit den Empfehlungen der WHO im Einklang. Aber es muss natürlich mehr getan werden, um die ehrgeizigsten, im spezifischen Leitwert von 10 µg/m³ festgesetzten Ziele der WHO-Empfehlungen zu verwirklichen.

(¹) Richtlinie 2008/50/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 21. Mai 2008 über Luftqualität und saubere Luft in Europa, ABl. L 152 vom 11.6.2008.

5./6. Die Begrünung von Dächern, eine von vielen Maßnahmen zur Verbesserung der Luftqualität und zur Anpassung an den Klimawandel in städtischen Gebieten, kommt bereits in mehreren Mitgliedstaaten für Fördermaßnahmen infrage.

7. Das Arbeitsprogramm der Kommission für 2013 umfasst bereits eine Überprüfung des EU-Regelungsrahmens zur Luftqualität, wobei auch etwaige andere Maßnahmen zum besseren Schutz gegen die Auswirkungen der Luftverschmutzung untersucht werden sollen.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002688/13
to the Commission
Franz Obermayr (NI)
(7 March 2013)

Subject: Particulate matter — violations and opportunities for improvement

The provisions of the directive on particulate matter have been systematically violated in the city of Graz and the Austrian federal state of Steiermark. There also appears to be little interest at present in meeting self-imposed commitments, due to the effects of the financial crisis.

The limit value of 20 mg/m³ for the smallest particulate matter (PM_{2.5}), which will apply in the EU from 2015, is twice as high as that recommended by the WHO.

One of the most effective ways of binding particulate matter is to 'green' the walls and roofs of buildings. Expanding three-dimensional green space also has a positive impact on plant and animal habitats and on the wellbeing of individuals.

1. Why have no attempts been made over the past six months to investigate violations of the directive on particulate matter by the Republic of Austria?
2. Which other Member States apart from Austria are also lagging behind in terms of reducing levels of particulate matter?
3. What is the current status of any infringement proceedings that have been initiated?
4. Why is the threshold value to be imposed by the EU from 2015(!) for the smallest particulate matter, known as ultra-fine particulate matter, twice as high as that currently recommended by the WHO?
5. Does the Commission believe that any opportunities exist to offer incentives or impose legal obligations to green the walls and roofs of houses?
6. What is the current status of any considerations in this direction?
7. What compulsory measures is the EU planning in the calendar year 2013 to restrict emissions of particulate matter and carbon dioxide?

Answer given by Mr Potočník on behalf of the Commission
(26 April 2013)

1 and 2. Failures to comply with the provisions of the Ambient Air Quality Directive (Directive 2008/50/EC⁽¹⁾) have been investigated indeed and Austria is one of the seventeen Member States for which infringement procedures are being pursued, with regard to the breach of PM₁₀ limit values. The Honourable Member may wish to refer to the press release of 24 January 2013: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-47_en.htm

3. As regards Austria, the infringement procedure is at the stage of additional letter of formal notice, which includes Graz and the Steiermark State.

4. PM_{2.5} are a fraction of PM₁₀, for which limit values have been laid down in EU legislation already in 1999. Moreover, while the limit value for PM_{2.5} will enter into force in 2015, the target value is already in force since 1 January 2010. The latest WHO guideline values for PM_{2.5} are based on a stage approach (successive levels of 35, 25, 15 and 10 µg/m³). The EU limit value is 25 µg/m³ to be met by 2015 and a stage 2 (indicative) limit value of 20 µg/m³ for year 2020. The WHO interim target for stage 2 is 25 µg/m³ (without deadlines). The EU legislation is therefore in line with the WHO recommendations. However, it is clear that more has to be done to reach the highest level of ambition recommended by the WHO as laid down in the specific guideline value of 10 µg/m³.

5 and 6. Green roofs, one of many possible measures to improve air quality and adaptation to climate change in urban areas, are already eligible for incentives in several Member States.

⁽¹⁾ Directive 2008/50/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe, OJ L 152, 11.6.2008.

7. The Commission work programme for 2013 includes a review of the EU air policy framework which will also look into possible further measures, as appropriate, to deliver enhanced protection from the impacts of air pollution.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-002689/13
an die Kommission
Franz Obermayr (NI)
(7. März 2013)

Betrifft: Recycling seltener Erdmetalle aus Elektronik-Schrott

Es ist wohlbekannt, dass im sogenannten Elektro-Schrott eine Vielzahl seltener Erdmetalle enthalten ist, wie z. B. Gold, Kupfer, Kobalt, Wolfram, Indium, Germanium, Tantal, Metalle der seltenen Erden, Platin-Gruppen-Metalle usw.

Diese sind für viele derzeitige High-Tech-Produkte, Zukunftstechnologien, Medizin und Forschung — um nur ein paar Bereiche zu nennen — unabdingbar. In Europa hat man im 20. Jahrhundert mehrfach die Erfahrung gemacht, wie sehr Industrie und Forschung durch den Mangel solch wichtiger Stoffe abgewürgt werden können. Derzeit werden große Mengen dieser wertvollen Rohstoffe durch gedankenlose Entsorgung insbesondere von Konsumprodukten wie z. B. Handys und PCs verschwendet. Gleichzeitig steigt der Bedarf kontinuierlich, was sich selbstverständlich durch steigende Preise bemerkbar macht.

Da die Entsorgungswirtschaft bei vielen dieser seltenen Stoffe bereits aufgrund der dadurch zu erzielenden Erlöse einen hohen Anreiz hat, diese Stoffe wiederzuverwerten, liegt der Schwerpunkt des Verbesserungspotenzials vornehmlich auf der Produktions- und Konsumentenseite. Daraus ergeben sich folgende Fragen:

1. Hat die Kommission bisher Vorschläge in der Hand, auf diese abzusehende Angebots-Nachfrage-Schere im Hinblick auf die Wiederverwertung der Stoffe zu reagieren?
2. Falls ja, wie gestalten sich diese Vorschläge? Sind eher weiter gehende gesetzliche Verordnungen, inklusive entsprechender Sanktionierung, zur Produktion und Entsorgung von Elektro-Schrott angedacht oder soll der Schwerpunkt auf belohnende Anreize gelegt werden?
3. Wäre im Hinblick auf die Konsumenten auch eine Mischung beider Aspekte vorstellbar, beispielsweise durch einen Preisaufschlag, samt Zertifikat zum Produkt (insbesondere für teure Produkte mit vielen wichtigen Rohstoffen), welcher bei fachgerechter Entsorgung wieder erstattet würde?
4. Gibt es Überlegungen der Entsorgungswirtschaft, weiter gehende Anreize zu bieten, um auch seltene Metalle, bei welchen sich eine Wiedergewinnung aufgrund des zu hohen Aufwands im Moment noch nicht rentiert, attraktiver für ein Recycling zu machen?

Antwort von Herrn Potočník im Namen der Kommission
(8. Mai 2013)

Die WEEE-Richtlinie ⁽¹⁾ enthält verbindliche allgemeine Ziele für Sammlung, Verwertung und Recycling von Elektro- und Elektronik-Altgeräten (WEEE — waste electrical and electronic equipment). Diese Ziele wurden in der neuen WEEE-Richtlinie ⁽²⁾ verschärft, ferner wurde eine Rücknahmeverpflichtung für sehr kleine WEEE (z. B. Handys) eingeführt, die zu einer wesentlich effizienteren Sammlung führen wird. In der Richtlinie sind auch die Verabschiedung von Maßnahmen zur Sensibilisierung der Verbraucher und eine angemessene Kennzeichnung der auf den Markt gebrachten Produkte vorgesehen.

Die Kommission erteilte den europäischen Normenorganisationen einen Auftrag zur Entwicklung von Normen für die Behandlung von WEEE.

Produktspezifische Anforderungen für seltene Erdmetalle können im Rahmen der Ökodesign-Richtlinie ⁽³⁾ festgelegt werden. Die Methodik für Ökodesign ⁽⁴⁾ wurde um einen Indikator für kritische Rohstoffe (CRM — Critical Raw Materials) erweitert, um mögliche Designoptionen zu erleichtern, bei denen CRM-Bauteile ersetzt werden oder eine Verwertung dieser Bauteile erleichtert wird.

⁽¹⁾ Richtlinie 2002/96/EG über Elektro- und Elektronik-Altgeräte (WEEE), ABl. L 37 vom 13.2.2003.

⁽²⁾ Richtlinie 2012/19/EU über Elektro- und Elektronik-Altgeräte (WEEE) (Neufassung), ABl. L 197 vom 24.7.2012.

⁽³⁾ Richtlinie 2009/125/EG, ABl. L 285 vom 31.10.2009.

⁽⁴⁾ MEErP: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sustainable-business/ecodesign/methodology/index_en.htm

Die Herausforderung der WEEE-Verfolgung ist Thema eines von der EU finanzierten Projekts mit Pilotinitiativen in der Tschechischen Republik und in Spanien (WEEE TRACE).

Derzeit werden Kriterien für das Ende der Abfalleigenschaft ⁽⁵⁾ entwickelt, um das Recycling zu erleichtern und die Nachfrage nach Sekundärrohstoffen durch verbindliche hohe Materialqualitäts-Standards zu stimulieren.

Weitere Maßnahmen zur Entwicklung und Einführung von Recyclingsystemen und -technologien sowie zur Verbesserung der Recyclingrate seltener Metalle in Europa werden im Rahmen der Europäischen Innovationspartnerschaft für Rohstoffe ⁽⁶⁾ erörtert.

Die Kommission arbeitet an einer Ex-Post-Bewertung des EU-Acquis im Abfallbereich, sie stützt sich dabei auf eine Studie von 2012, bei der der Nutzen wirtschaftlicher Instrumente für das Management spezifischer Abfallströme in verschiedenen Mitgliedstaaten untersucht wurde (Systeme der Herstellerverantwortung, verursacherbezogene Systeme (Pay-As-You-Throw) und Besteuerung von Deponien und Verbrennung).

⁽⁵⁾ In Einklang mit Artikel 6 der Abfallrahmenrichtlinie:
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/framework/end_of_waste.htm

⁽⁶⁾ Eine Mitteilung der Kommission zu diesem Thema soll noch vor Ende 2013 angenommen werden:
<http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/raw-materials/innovation-partnership/>

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002689/13
to the Commission
Franz Obermayr (NI)
(7 March 2013)

Subject: Recycling of rare earth metals from electronic waste

It is widely known that electronic waste contains many rare earth metals, such as gold, copper, cobalt, tungsten, indium, germanium, tantalum, rare earth metals, platinum group metals etc.

These are indispensable for many of the high-tech products currently manufactured, as well as for future technologies, medicine and research, to name but a few sectors. The history of Europe in the 20th century provides us with many examples of the extent to which industry and research can be stifled by a lack of such key substances. At present, large quantities of these valuable raw materials are wasted because they are disposed of carelessly, in particular those contained in consumer products such as mobile phones and PCs. At the same time, rising prices are of course evidence that demand is continuously on the up.

Since the waste management industry already has a major incentive to recycle many of these rare substances as a result of the potential revenues that can be generated, the potential for improvements lies mainly on the production and consumer side. This raises the following questions:

1. Has the Commission drafted with any proposals yet in response to this foreseeable mismatch between supply and demand for the recycling of these substances?
2. If so, what do these proposals look like? Do they feature harder-hitting legal regulations on the production and disposal of electronic waste, including the relevant sanctions, or do they focus on incentives instead?
3. As far as consumers are concerned, would it be feasible to implement a mixture of both approaches, for example price increases together with product certificates and refunds once an item has been disposed of correctly, in particular expensive products with many key raw materials?
4. Is the Commission considering offering further incentives to the waste management industry to make recycling a more attractive option for rare metals which cannot yet be reclaimed profitably due to the effort involved?

Answer given by Mr Potočník on behalf of the Commission
(8 May 2013)

The WEEE Directive ⁽¹⁾ contains binding overall targets for the collection, recovery and recycling of WEEE. These were raised in the new WEEE Directive ⁽²⁾ and a take-back obligation for very small WEEE (e.g. mobile phones) was introduced which should increase collection significantly. The directive also requires adoption of measures towards consumer awareness and appropriately marking of products placed on the market.

The Commission gave a mandate to the European standardisation organisations for the development of standards for the treatment of WEEE.

Product specific requirements on rare earth metals can be established under the Ecodesign Directive ⁽³⁾. A Critical Raw Materials (CRM) indicator was added to the Ecodesign methodology ⁽⁴⁾ to facilitate possible design options that substitute or make it easier to recover CRM components.

The challenge of tracking WEEE is being addressed in an EU-funded project with pilot initiatives in the Czech Republic and Spain (WEEE TRACE).

End-of-waste criteria ⁽⁵⁾ are being developed to facilitate recycling and stimulate demand for secondary raw materials by requiring high material quality standards.

⁽¹⁾ Directive 2002/96/EC on waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) (OJ L 37, 13.2.2003).

⁽²⁾ Directive 2012/19/EU on waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) (recast) (OJ L 197, 24.7.2012).

⁽³⁾ Directive 2009/125/EC (OJ L 285, 31.10.2009).

⁽⁴⁾ MEErP: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sustainable-business/ecodesign/methodology/index_en.htm

⁽⁵⁾ In accordance with Article 6 of the Waste Framework Directive: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/framework/end_of_waste.htm

Additional measures to develop and roll-out recycling systems and technologies and improve the rate of recycling of rare metals in Europe are being discussed in the framework of the European Innovation Partnership on Raw Materials ⁽⁶⁾.

The Commission is undertaking an *ex-post* evaluation of the EU waste *acquis*, taking into account a 2012 study that looked into the use of economic instruments to the management of specific waste stream directives in different Member States (producer responsibility schemes, pay-as-you-throw schemes and taxes for landfill and incineration).

⁽⁶⁾ A relevant Commission communication is planned for adoption before the end of 2013: <http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/raw-materials/innovation-partnership/>

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-002690/13

an die Kommission

Franz Obermayr (NI)

(7. März 2013)

Betrifft: Armutswanderung und Sozialleistungsmissbrauch in der EU

Die Kohäsionspolitik der EU ist eine offene Bestätigung zum Teil starker Unterschiede wirtschaftlicher Leistungskraft. Gleichzeitig soll Schengen den unkontrollierten Grenzübertritt im Mitgliedsraum ermöglichen. Da die Nivellierung wirtschaftlicher Leistungskraft, wenn überhaupt, langsam erfolgt, ist die logische Konsequenz eine starke Bevölkerungsmigration.

Die anstehende Schengenerweiterung um Rumänien und Bulgarien wurde nun vorerst vertagt. Die bisher erfolgte Armutswanderung ohne Schengen hat in den letzten 5 Jahren für eine Einwanderung von ca. 800 000 Menschen aus Rumänien und Bulgarien nach Deutschland gesorgt. Der überwiegende Teil ist leider unausgebildet — auch viele Analphabeten sind darunter. Die Befürchtung vieler europäischer Bürger ist ein massiver Missbrauch der Sozialleistungen der Mitgliedstaaten. So zeigt sich in Deutschland, dass dort ansässige Roma in rapide wachsenden, ghettolähnlichen Armutsbehausungen unter furchtbaren hygienischen Bedingungen wohnen. Viele halten sich durch Ein- bis Zwei-Eurojobs und sogar Prostitution, organisiert durch Verwandte oder auch Schlepper, über Wasser und leben von der Hand in den Mund. Ihr Zugang zu Sozialleistungen wird durch die Ausstellung eines Gewerbescheines erwirkt — alleine in Berlin-Neukölln gibt es einzelne Adressen an denen 200 Betriebe von Roma angemeldet sind. Trotzdem ziehen sie ein „Leben“ in Deutschland gegenüber dem in der alten Heimat vor. Aus diesen Umständen ergeben sich folgende Fragen:

1. Wie steht die Kommission zu dem grundsätzlichen Dilemma stark unterschiedlicher Wirtschaftskraft (Reichtum, Lohn, Kaufkraft, Sozialleistungen) einerseits und Schengen-Grenzen andererseits unter den EU-Mitgliedstaaten?
2. Wird die Armutswanderung von der Kommission zum Teil als vorteilhaft angesehen, da auf diese Weise die wirtschaftliche Anpassung beschleunigt wird, indem reichere Länder nun viel Geld zur Finanzierung der zugewanderten Bedürftigen detachieren müssen und so eine wirtschaftliche Nivellierung beschleunigt wird?
3. Welche Lösungen hat die Kommission um dieser fundamentalen Problematik zu begegnen?
4. Was würde die Kommission bei zwei Alternativen zur Bekämpfung dieses Problems des Missbrauchs von Sozialleistung präferieren: Die Übernahme der Sozialleistungen durch das jeweilige EU-Herkunftsland des zugezogenen EU-Bürgers oder die nachhaltige Ausweisung von EU-Bürgern, welche das Sozialsystem nachweislich missbrauchen?

Antwort von Herrn Andor im Namen der Kommission

(6. Mai 2013)

Die Freizügigkeit ist eine Grundfreiheit, die gemäß den EU-Verträgen allen Unions-Bürgerinnen und -Bürgern zusteht.

Die Mobilität der Arbeitskräfte wirkt sich positiv auf die Wirtschaft aus. Studien zeigen, dass Wanderarbeitnehmer aus anderen EU-Ländern das BIP des Aufnahmelandes erheblich steigern können.

Leistungen der sozialen Sicherheit und die diesbezüglichen Anspruchsvoraussetzungen sind in den nationalen Rechtsordnungen festgelegt. Die EU-Rechtsvorschriften sorgen für die Koordinierung der Systeme der sozialen Sicherheit der Mitgliedstaaten, nicht jedoch für eine Harmonisierung. Die Mitgliedstaaten verfügen über die erforderlichen rechtlichen und verwaltungstechnischen Möglichkeiten, um zu prüfen, ob Begünstigte tatsächlich einen Anspruch haben, ohne dabei jedoch zusätzliche Auflagen ausschließlich für Wanderarbeitnehmer festzulegen.

Statistiken (z. B. Eurobarometer zur Mobilität, EU-Arbeitskräfteerhebung) belegen, dass die Beschäftigungs- und Arbeitsmöglichkeiten die Hauptanreize für Bürgerinnen und Bürger sind, in einen anderen Mitgliedstaat zu ziehen.

Die Kommission unterstützt aktiv Maßnahmen zur Förderung der Integration von Wanderarbeitnehmern und zur Bekämpfung von Armut und sozialer Ausgrenzung, auch in den Herkunftsländern der Wanderarbeitnehmer. Dies steht im Einklang mit dem Ziel der Strategie Europa 2020, bis zum Jahr 2020 mindestens 20 Millionen Menschen aus Armut und sozialer Ausgrenzung herauszuführen und eine Beschäftigungsquote von 75 % zu erreichen.

Die Kommission weist den Herrn Abgeordneten insbesondere auf den EU-Rahmen für nationale Strategien zur Integration der Roma bis 2020 hin. Mit diesem Rahmen sollen die nationalen Politikmaßnahmen der Mitgliedstaaten (in den Bereichen Beschäftigung, Bildung, Gesundheit und Wohnraum) gestärkt und überwacht und EU-Mittel zur Unterstützung konkreter Projekte für Roma-Gemeinschaften mobilisiert werden, insbesondere aus dem ESF und dem EFRE.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002690/13
to the Commission**

Franz Obermayr (NI)

(7 March 2013)

Subject: The migration of poverty and the abuse of social welfare schemes in the EU

The EU's cohesion policy is clear confirmation of the sometimes major differences between its Member States in terms of economic performance. Yet at the same time the aim of Schengen is to allow uncontrolled border crossings within the EU. Since differences in economic performance are being eliminated slowly, if at all, the logical consequence is the large-scale migration of populations.

The forthcoming enlargement of the Schengen area to include Romania and Bulgaria has been delayed for the time being. Yet even without Schengen, poverty migration has so far resulted in the immigration of approximately 800 000 people from Romania and Bulgaria to Germany over the past five years. Unfortunately most of them are untrained, and many are illiterate. Many European citizens fear widespread abuse of the Member States' social welfare schemes. The Roma population in Germany, for example, lives in rapidly expanding ghetto-like slums in terrible sanitary conditions. Many of the people in these slums live from hand to mouth, keeping themselves afloat with low-paid community work or even prostitution, organised by relatives or people smugglers. They secure access to social welfare benefits on the basis of licences to trade, and in Berlin-Neukölln alone there are certain addresses which have been used to register 200 Roma-owned enterprises. Nevertheless, they prefer this 'life' in Germany to that in their former home country. These circumstances beg the following questions:

1. What is the Commission's position on the fundamental dilemma between the greatly varying economic performance (wealth, wages, purchasing power, social welfare benefits) of the EU Member States on the one hand, and Schengen borders on the other hand?
2. Does the Commission regard the migration of poverty as a benefit in some respects, given that it accelerates economic adjustment by forcing wealthier countries to spend a great deal of money on deprived immigrants, thus reducing economic differences more rapidly?
3. What solutions can the Commission suggest to overcome this fundamental problem?
4. Which of these two alternatives would the Commission prefer in order to combat the abuse of social welfare schemes: the payment of social welfare benefits for EU immigrants by the relevant Member State of origin, or the permanent expulsion of EU citizens who can be proven to have abused the social welfare system?

Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission

(6 May 2013)

Free movement of persons is a fundamental freedom enjoyed by all EU citizens under the terms of the EU Treaties.

Labour mobility is good for the economy. Studies show that migrant workers from other EU countries can boost the host country's GDP considerably.

Social security benefits and the conditions for entitlement to them are defined by national law. EC law provides for the coordination of the Member States' social security systems excluding any harmonisation. Member States have the necessary legal and administrative possibilities to carry out verifications on the beneficiaries to determine their entitlement but without imposing additional conditions only to the migrants.

According to statistical evidence (e.g. eurobarometers on mobility, EU labour force survey), the main incentives for citizens moving to another Member State are related to employment and work prospects.

The Commission is actively supporting measures to promote the integration of migrant workers and to fight poverty and social exclusion, including in the countries of origin of migrant workers. This is in line with the Europe 2020 objective to lift at least 20 million people from the risk of poverty and social exclusion by 2020 and reach an employment rate of 75% by that same year.

The Commission draws in particular the attention of the Honourable Member to the EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies up to 2020. This framework aims at enhancing and monitoring Member States' national policies (in employment, education, health and housing) and mobilising EU funds, in particular the ESF and the ERDF, to support concrete projects for Roma communities.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002691/13
to the Commission
Chris Davies (ALDE)
(7 March 2013)**

Subject: Re-use and recycling of printer cartridges

Is the Commission able to confirm that some 400 million inkjet cartridges and some 150 million printer toner cartridges are placed on the EU market each year?

Can the Commission confirm that more than 70% of used inkjet cartridges and some 30% of used toner cartridges still end up in landfill?

What specific EU legislation, if any, places a responsibility on producers to ensure that these products are disposed of in accordance with the waste hierarchy, with priority being attached to their re-use and recycling?

Does the Commission intend to put forward proposals for strengthening the responsibility of producers to ensure that these sophisticated products — which often contain rare earth metals — are not simply dumped in landfill at the end of their lives?

**Answer given by Mr Potočník on behalf of the Commission
(17 April 2013)**

The Commission is not in the position to confirm the specific data mentioned by the Honourable Member. The data that the Commission has are available on its web-page ⁽¹⁾ and are not linked specifically to ink cartridges.

Concerning the last two questions, the Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answer to Written Question E-004493/2012 ⁽²⁾.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/weee/index_en.htm

⁽²⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/QP-WEB/application?home.do?language=EN>.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002692/13

**alla Commissione
Aldo Patriciello (PPE)**

(7 marzo 2013)

Oggetto: Accesso ai libri per ipovedenti

L'Associazione europea dei ciechi (EBU) ha richiamato ripetutamente l'attenzione sull'importanza della conclusione da parte dell'Organizzazione mondiale per la proprietà intellettuale (WIPO), di un trattato internazionale vincolante che garantisca alle persone cieche, ipovedenti e con difficoltà di lettura di poter usufruire liberamente dei libri scritti in Braille, a grandi caratteri e in formato audio, prodotti in tutti i Paesi e protetti dal diritto d'autore. Attualmente, le statistiche dicono che solo il 5 % dei libri sul mercato sono accessibili ai ciechi e agli ipovedenti dei paesi sviluppati, e meno dell'1 % dei testi è disponibile per le persone con problemi di vista nei paesi in via di sviluppo.

La Commissione petizioni ha presentato nel gennaio 2012 un'interrogazione alla Commissione europea e al Consiglio europeo per chiedere chiarimenti circa la loro posizione nell'ambito dei negoziati WIPO.

Inoltre, la Commissione petizioni ha redatto una risoluzione che è stata approvata il 16 febbraio 2012 dalla plenaria del Parlamento europeo, nella quale si chiede al Consiglio e alla Commissione di promuovere un trattato WIPO giuridicamente vincolante sulla disciplina per il copyright per i libri e le stampe prodotti per i ciechi e ipovedenti.

L'Organizzazione Mondiale per la Proprietà intellettuale (WIPO) sta considerando l'adozione di tale trattato, ma fino a ora alcuni fra i membri europei di tale organizzazione si sono opposti a standard globali e stringenti che sanciscano un tale diritto. Per questo i testi disponibili in formato Braille, a caratteri ingranditi o in digitale, restano sempre troppo pochi e la situazione non è omogenea da Paese a Paese.

In occasione della discussione in Commissione petizioni del 12 luglio 2012, la Commissione europea si è detta pronta a riceverne mandato dal Consiglio europeo per negoziare un trattato WIPO vincolante che garantisca l'accesso ai libri per ciechi e ipovedenti, modificando nettamente la sua posizione precedentemente espressa a favore di un trattato facoltativo.

Tutto ciò premesso, voglia la Commissione rispondere ai seguenti quesiti:

- Ritene la Commissione che sia necessario verificare il livello di attuazione di tali policies a livello comunitario?
- Ritene la Commissione che la stipula di un trattato vincolante con la WIPO sia sufficiente a garantire la piena accessibilità ai libri da parte dei ciechi e degli ipovedenti?
- Quali eventuali ulteriori passi intende effettuare la Commissione a favore di questa categoria?

Risposta di Michel Barnier a nome della Commissione

(8 maggio 2013)

1. Nel mese di ottobre 2012 il Consiglio ha autorizzato la Commissione a negoziare un trattato vincolante con l'Organizzazione mondiale per la proprietà intellettuale (WIPO). Il Consiglio ha inoltre determinato le direttive di negoziato per le disposizioni sostanziali del trattato che la Commissione è invitata a seguire nel corso dei negoziati. Nel mese di dicembre 2012 l'Assemblea della WIPO ha deciso di organizzare una conferenza diplomatica a giugno 2013 a Marrakech per concludere i negoziati. Nel frattempo si sono svolte diverse tornate di negoziati preliminari per assicurare l'esito positivo della conferenza diplomatica.

2.-3. Secondo la Commissione, il futuro trattato può fornire un contributo significativo per migliorare l'accesso ai libri da parte di non vedenti e ipovedenti, soprattutto se contiene disposizioni che garantiscano la certezza giuridica per quanto riguarda lo scambio transfrontaliero di libri in formato accessibile. La Commissione favorisce inoltre la cooperazione volontaria fra editori e organizzazioni dei non vedenti per assicurare ai gruppi interessati un accesso ai libri quanto più ampio possibile.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002692/13
to the Commission
Aldo Patriciello (PPE)
(7 March 2013)

Subject: Access to books for the visually impaired

The European Blind Union (EBU) has repeatedly drawn attention to the importance of the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) concluding a binding international treaty to ensure that people who are blind, visually impaired or have reading difficulties are able to freely use books in braille, large print or audio format produced in all countries and protected by copyright. Currently, according to the statistics, only 5% of the books on the market are accessible to blind and partially sighted people in developed countries and less than 1% of books are available to visually impaired people in developing countries.

In January 2012 the Committee on Petitions submitted a question to the Commission and the Council to ask for clarification as to their position in the WIPO negotiations.

In addition, the Committee on Petitions drafted a resolution that was adopted on 16 February 2012 by the European Parliament in plenary session, in which the Council and the Commission were asked to promote a legally binding WIPO treaty on copyright rules for books and printed matter for the blind and visually impaired.

The World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) is considering the adoption of such a treaty but, hitherto, some of the European members of that organisation have expressed their opposition to stringent global standards that sanction such a right. That is why there are still too few texts available in braille, large print or digital format and the situation is very different from country to country.

During the debate in the Committee on Petitions meeting of 12 July 2012, the Commission said it was willing to accept a mandate from the Council to negotiate a binding WIPO treaty guaranteeing access to books for the blind and visually impaired, thereby significantly changing its previous position in favour of an optional treaty.

Can the Commission therefore answer the following questions:

- Does it consider it necessary to ascertain the level of implementation of these policies at EU level?
- Does it believe that the conclusion of a binding treaty with WIPO is sufficient to ensure that the blind and visually impaired have full access to books?
- What, if any, further steps will the Commission take to assist this category of person?

Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission
(8 May 2013)

1. In October 2012, the Council authorised the Commission to negotiate a binding treaty in WIPO. The Council also determined the negotiating directives for the substantive provisions of the treaty that the Commission is invited to follow during those negotiations. In December 2012, the General Assembly of WIPO decided to call a diplomatic conference to conclude the negotiations. It will take place in June 2013 in Marrakesh. In the meantime, several rounds of preliminary negotiations have taken place in order to ensure the positive outcome of the diplomatic conference.

2-3. In the Commission's view, the future treaty can make a significant contribution to improving access to books by print disabled persons, in particular if it will contain provisions that create legal certainty for the cross-border exchange for accessible format books. The Commission also fosters voluntary cooperation between publishers and organisations of the blind in order to ensure that print disabled persons have the broadest possible access to books.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002693/13

alla Commissione

Matteo Salvini (EFD)

(7 marzo 2013)

Oggetto: Conseguenze sull'industria tessile e calzaturiera e sulla salute dei consumatori, della soppressione dei dazi sulle importazioni dal Pakistan

Il Parlamento europeo approvava, in data 25 ottobre 2012, un regolamento contenente una serie di misure atte a favorire lo sviluppo economico e sociale del Pakistan incoraggiando l'esportazione dei prodotti locali.

Tali misure consistevano essenzialmente nell'esenzione dal pagamento dei dazi doganali sull'importazione di determinate categorie merceologiche (principalmente prodotti tessili e calzaturieri) dal Pakistan verso l'Unione europea, esenzione che resterà in vigore fino al 31 dicembre 2013; il regolamento subordinava peraltro il permanere di tale esenzione al rispetto ed alla tutela, da parte delle autorità pakistane, dei diritti umani in genere e, in particolare, dei diritti dei lavoratori.

Tuttavia, allo stato attuale non vi sono ragioni evidenti per ritenere che tale provvedimento abbia effettivamente contribuito a migliorare le condizioni di vita del popolo pakistano, con particolare riguardo agli strati sociali più deboli; inoltre la violazione dei diritti umani, dei diritti politici e dei diritti sindacali è tuttora un fenomeno diffuso in Pakistan e non si ravvisano sforzi significativi da parte delle autorità locali per mutare tale situazione.

È invece chiaro che detto accordo va a danneggiare la produzione interna dell'Unione, che vanta un notevole numero di eccellenze proprio in campo tessile e calzaturiero, le quali tuttavia non posso competere con prodotti provenienti da Paesi in via di sviluppo come il Pakistan, dove il costo del lavoro è infimo proprio a causa del mancato rispetto dei diritti dei lavoratori.

Infine, è opportuno sottolineare che i prodotti in questione, essendo realizzati con standard e metodologie non paragonabili a quelli europei, potrebbero nuocere gravemente alla salute, come dimostrato dalla recente individuazione di elevate quantità di cromo in prodotti calzaturieri, prodotti con materiale importato di origine incerta e commercializzati in Svizzera.

Chiediamo pertanto alla Commissione:

- Quali sono stati e quali saranno in futuro gli effetti della soppressione dei dazi sulle merci provenienti dal Pakistan, sull'industria tessile e calzaturiera europea ed italiana?
- Considerati gli effetti nefasti di tale provvedimento sulle suddette imprese italiane ed europee, nonché i possibili rischi per la salute dei consumatori, non sarebbe auspicabile rivedere i termini del regolamento di cui sopra?

Risposta di Karel De Gucht a nome della Commissione

(24 maggio 2013)

Le misure in questione sono state introdotte dal regolamento (UE) n. 1029/2012 ⁽¹⁾ in risposta alle alluvioni che hanno devastato parti del Pakistan nell'estate 2010 e arriveranno a scadenza alla fine del 2013. L'obiettivo è stimolare l'attività economica nei settori chiave dell'esportazione in Pakistan. Le preferenze sono tra l'altro condizionate al fatto che il Pakistan non si impegni in violazioni serie e sistematiche dei diritti umani, compresi i diritti basilari in tema di lavoro, dei principi fondamentali della democrazia e dello stato di diritto. Per il momento la Commissione non dispone di elementi che consentano di presumere un mancato rispetto di tali condizioni da parte del Pakistan.

Il regolamento prevede inoltre che entro i due anni successivi alla sua scadenza, la Commissione presenterà al Parlamento europeo e al Consiglio una relazione sugli effetti delle misure. Tale relazione dovrebbe comprendere un'analisi dettagliata degli effetti delle misure sull'economia del Pakistan e del loro impatto sugli scambi e sulle entrate tariffarie dell'Unione nonché sull'economia e l'occupazione nell'Unione. All'atto di elaborare tale relazione la Commissione dovrà tener conto in particolare degli effetti delle preferenze commerciali autonome in termini di creazione di posti di lavoro, eradicazione della povertà e sviluppo sostenibile della popolazione lavorativa e dei poveri in Pakistan.

⁽¹⁾ Regolamento (UE) n. 1029/2012 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 25 ottobre 2012, recante preferenze commerciali autonome d'urgenza per il Pakistan, GU L 316 del 14.11.2012.

È troppo presto per analizzare gli effetti del regolamento. Tuttavia, dai dati disponibili, le importazioni dal Pakistan nei settori in questione hanno registrato un lieve aumento a fine gennaio 2013 a petto di un calo relativo delle importazioni UE negli stessi settori da paesi terzi.

Quanto alla sicurezza dei prodotti, i prodotti in questione sono soggetti agli stessi standard e alle stesse disposizioni che si applicano a tutte le importazioni che arrivano nell'UE.

Considerate le circostanze la Commissione non ravvisa per ora la necessità di rivedere i termini del regolamento.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002693/13
to the Commission
Matteo Salvini (EFD)
(7 March 2013)

Subject: Impact of abolition of duties on imports from Pakistan on the textile and shoe industry and on consumer health

On 25 October 2012 the European Parliament adopted a regulation setting out a range of measures to promote the economic and social development of Pakistan by encouraging the export of local products.

Those measures consisted essentially of the exemption from import duties for certain categories of goods (mainly textiles and footwear) from Pakistan to the European Union; the exemption will remain in force until 31 December 2013. Moreover, under that regulation, such exemption was contingent upon compliance with and protection of human rights in general and the rights of workers in particular, by the Pakistani authorities.

However, at present there are no obvious reasons to believe that this measure has actually helped to improve the living conditions of the Pakistani people, particularly with regard to the weaker sections of society. Furthermore, the violation of human, political and trade union rights is still widespread in Pakistan and no significant efforts appear to have been made by the local authorities to change this situation.

It is, however, clear that this agreement is damaging the internal production of the EU, which lays claim to great excellence precisely in the textile and footwear fields. The EU cannot, however, compete with products from developing countries such as Pakistan, where the cost of labour is very low precisely because workers' rights are not respected.

Lastly, it should be stressed that since the products in question are made by using standards and methods that are not comparable to those used in Europe, they could cause serious harm to health, as demonstrated by the recent discovery of large quantities of chromium in footwear produced from imported material of uncertain origin and marketed in Switzerland.

Can the Commission therefore say:

- What has been, and what will be, the impact of the abolition of customs duties on goods from Pakistan on the European and Italian textile and shoe industry?
- Given the adverse effects of this measure on the Italian and European companies in question, as well as the possible risks to consumer health, would it not be preferable to revise the terms of the regulation mentioned above?

Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission
(24 May 2013)

The measures in question were introduced by Regulation (EU) No 1029/2012⁽¹⁾ in response to devastating flooding in parts of Pakistan in summer 2010 and are running to the end of 2013. The objective is to stimulate economic activity in Pakistan's core export sectors. The preferences are conditional, *inter alia*, on Pakistan not engaging in serious and systematic violations of human rights, including core labour rights, fundamental principles of democracy and the rule of law. At this stage, the Commission has not received evidence that Pakistan has not been fulfilling these conditions.

The regulation also provides that no later than two years after its expiry, the Commission will submit a report to Parliament and to the Council on the effects of the measures. That report should include a detailed analysis of the effects of the measures on the economy of Pakistan and their impact on trade and the Union's tariff income as well as on the Union economy and jobs. In reporting, the Commission should take into account in particular the effects of the autonomous trade preferences in terms of job creation, poverty eradication and the sustainable development of Pakistan's working population and poor.

⁽¹⁾ Regulation (EU) No 1029/2012 of Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 introducing emergency autonomous trade preferences for Pakistan, OJ L 316, 14.11.2012.

It is too soon to analyse the effects of the regulation at this point in time. However, from available data, imports from Pakistan in the sectors in question have shown a slight increase in end January 2013, against a relative decline in EU imports in the same sectors from third countries.

On the question of product safety, the products in question are subject to the same standards and requirements as all imports into the EU.

Under these circumstances, the Commission does not see the need to revise the terms of the regulation at this point in time.

(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-002694/13
an die Kommission**

Karl-Heinz Florenz (PPE), Sirpa Pietikäinen (PPE), Małgorzata Handzlik (PPE), Alojz Peterle (PPE) und Anne Delvaux (PPE)
(7. März 2013)

Betrifft: Moratorium für bzw. teilweises Verbot von Neonicotinoiden, verschobene Abstimmung

Die EFSA identifizierte Anfang 2013 von drei Neonicotinoid-Insektiziden (Clothianidin, Imidacloprid und Thiamethoxam) ausgehende Risiken für Bienen. Zwar konnte die EFSA die Risikobewertung aufgrund von mangelnden Informationen in einigen Fällen nicht abschließen, doch entschloss sich die Kommission daraufhin am 31.1. — wohl auch im Hinblick auf das Vorsorgeprinzip —, sich für ein auf zwei Jahre begrenztes teilweises Verbot der drei fraglichen Neonicotinoide einzusetzen, das für den Anbau von Mais, Sonnenblumen, Raps und Baumwolle gelten sollte. Für Wintergetreide und Pflanzen, die keine Bienen anziehen, sollten die Pestizide weiter erlaubt bleiben. Das Verbot sollte bereits im Sommer in Kraft treten. Nun wurde jedoch — nach Presseinformationen — die ursprünglich für Ende Februar angesetzte Abstimmung abgesagt. Die Kommission müsse weiter mit den Mitgliedstaaten verhandeln, heißt es. Verschiedene Umweltorganisationen nennen als Grund für die Verschiebung Einflussnahme der Chemieindustrie.

1. Aus welchen Gründen hat die Kommission die Abstimmung verschoben?
2. Welche Gesichtspunkte bzw. welche neuen Entwicklungen haben dazu geführt, dass die Kommission die Chance für ein Verbot nun anders bewertet als noch vor wenigen Wochen?
3. Hatte die Kommission vor der Erklärung, sie wolle ein Verbot durchsetzen, eine Bewertung eventueller Folgewirkungen bzw. Klagen eingeholt?
4. Welche weiteren Forschungen wird die Kommission in Auftrag geben (über die EFSA o. ä.), um die Risiken konkret(er) einschätzen zu können?

Antwort von Herrn Borg im Namen der Kommission
(22. April 2013)

1. Die Abstimmung wurde aus verfahrenstechnischen Gründen vom 25. Februar auf den 15. März 2013 verschoben.
2. Die Kommission hat ihren Standpunkt nicht geändert. Der Maßnahmenentwurf wurde erörtert und wird dem Ständigen Ausschuss für die Lebensmittelkette und Tiergesundheit am 14. und 15. März 2013 zur Abstimmung vorgelegt.
3. Zur Beantwortung dieser Frage verweist die Kommission die Abgeordneten auf ihre Antwort auf die Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-001323/2013 ⁽¹⁾.
4. Hierzu verweist die Kommission die Abgeordneten auf ihre Antwort auf die Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-001942/2013 ⁽²⁾. Darüber hinaus hat sich die Kommission verpflichtet, jegliche neuen wissenschaftlichen Informationen, die verfügbar gemacht werden, unverzüglich an die Europäische Behörde für Lebensmittelsicherheit weiterzuleiten.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/de/parliamentary-questions.html>

⁽²⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/de/parliamentary-questions.html>

(Version française)

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-002694/13
à la Commission**

**Karl-Heinz Florenz (PPE), Sirpa Pietikäinen (PPE), Małgorzata Handzlik (PPE), Alojz Peterle (PPE)
et Anne Delvaux (PPE)**
(7 mars 2013)

Objet: Moratoire sur les néonicotinoïdes ou interdiction partielle, vote reporté

L'Autorité européenne de sécurité des aliments (EFSA) a identifié début 2013 des risques pour les abeilles résultant de l'utilisation de trois insecticides néonicotinoïdes (la clothianidine, l'imidaclopride et le thiaméthoxame). L'EFSA n'a certes pas pu finaliser l'évaluation des risques dans tous les cas, en raison d'un manque d'informations, mais le 31 janvier, la Commission a décidé, également eu égard au principe de précaution, de se prononcer en faveur d'une interdiction partielle d'une durée de deux ans des trois néonicotinoïdes en question dans la culture du maïs, du tournesol, du colza et du coton. Pour les céréales d'hiver et les plantes qui n'attirent pas d'abeille, l'utilisation de ces pesticides reste autorisée. L'interdiction devait déjà entrer en vigueur cet été. Or, selon des informations publiées dans la presse, le vote à ce sujet, qui était à l'origine prévu pour le mois de février, a été annulé. Le communiqué indiquait que la Commission devait poursuivre ses négociations avec les États membres. Selon diverses organisations de défense de l'environnement, le report du vote serait dû à une intervention de l'industrie chimique.

1. Pour quelles raisons la Commission a-t-elle reporté le vote?
2. Quels sont les aspects ou les nouveaux développements qui ont conduit la Commission à évaluer la possibilité d'interdire ces pesticides d'une manière différente par rapport à il y a seulement quelques semaines?
3. Avant de déclarer qu'elle comptait imposer une interdiction, la Commission avait-elle demandé une évaluation des incidences ou recueilli des plaintes?
4. Quelles recherches supplémentaires la Commission va-t-elle commander (à l'EFSA ou autres) pour pouvoir évaluer les risques de façon plus précise?

Réponse donnée par M. Borg au nom de la Commission
(22 avril 2013)

1. Le vote a été reporté du 25 février au 15 mars 2013 pour des raisons de procédure.
2. La Commission n'a pas modifié sa position. La mesure proposée a été examinée et mise aux voix à la réunion que le Comité permanent de la chaîne alimentaire et de la santé animale a tenue les 14 et 15 mars 2013.
3. La Commission renvoie les auteurs de la question à sa réponse à la question écrite E-001323/2013 ⁽¹⁾.
4. Elle les renvoie également à sa réponse à la question écrite E-001942/2013 ⁽²⁾. De surcroît, elle entend soumettre sans retard à l'évaluation de l'Autorité européenne de sécurité des aliments toute nouvelle information d'ordre scientifique en la matière.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/fr/parliamentary-questions.html>

⁽²⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/fr/parliamentary-questions.html>

(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002694/13
do Komisji**

Karl-Heinz Florenz (PPE), Sirpa Pietikäinen (PPE), Małgorzata Handzlik (PPE), Alojz Peterle (PPE) oraz Anne Delvaux (PPE)
(7 marca 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Moratorium na stosowanie neonikotynoidów lub częściowy zakaz ich stosowania, odłożone głosowanie

Na początku 2013 r. EFSA określił ryzyko związane z działaniem trzech insektycydów zawierających neonikotynoidy (klotianidyna, imidachlopryd i tiametoksam) na pszczoły. Choć w kilku przypadkach EFSA nie mógł przeprowadzić oceny ryzyka z powodu braku informacji, to jednak Komisja postanowiła w dniu 31 stycznia br. – zapewne również ze względu na zasadę ostrożności – opowiedzieć się za wprowadzeniem częściowego, dwuletniego zakazu stosowania trzech ww. neonikotynoidów przy uprawie kukurydzy, słonecznika, rzepaku i bawełny. Stosowanie pestycydów byłoby nadal dozwolone dla zbóż ozimych i roślin, które nie wabią pszczoł. Zakaz miał wejść w życie już w lecie br. Jednak według doniesień prasowych głosowanie przewidziane początkowo na koniec lutego zostało anulowane. Podobno Komisja musi prowadzić dalsze negocjacje z państwami członkowskimi. Różne organizacje działające na rzecz ochrony środowiska wymieniają wpływ przemysłu chemicznego jako powód odłożenia głosowania.

1. Dlaczego Komisja odłożyła głosowanie?
2. Jakie czynniki lub jakie nowe wydarzenia sprawiły, że obecnie Komisja inaczej ocenia szansę na wprowadzenie zakazu niż jeszcze kilka tygodni temu?
3. Czy przed złożeniem oświadczenia o chęci wprowadzenia zakazu Komisja zasięgnęła opinii na temat jego ewentualnych skutków lub skarg?
4. Jakie dalsze badania zleci Komisja (EFSA lub innym podmiotom), aby móc konkretnie(j) oszacować ryzyko?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Tonio Borga w imieniu Komisji

(22 kwietnia 2013 r.)

1. Z przyczyn proceduralnych głosowanie przełożono z dnia 25 lutego 2013 r. na dzień 15 marca 2013 r.
2. Komisja nie zmieniła swego stanowiska. Projekt środka poddano dyskusji i przedłożono pod głosowanie w Stałym Komitecie ds. Łańcucha Żywnościowego i Zdrowia Zwierząt w dniach 14-15 marca 2013 r.
3. Komisja uprzejmie prosi Panie i Panów Posłów o zapoznanie się z odpowiedzią udzieloną na pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej nr E-001 323/2013 ⁽¹⁾.
4. Komisja uprzejmie prosi Panie i Panów Posłów o zapoznanie się także z odpowiedzią udzieloną na pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej nr E-001942/2013 ⁽²⁾. Komisja dokłada ponadto wszelkich starań, aby przedstawiać bez zbędnej zwłoki pod ocenę Europejskiego Urzędu ds. Bezpieczeństwa Żywności wszelkie nowe informacje naukowe, które zostaną jej udostępnione.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/pl/parliamentary-questions.html>

⁽²⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/pl/parliamentary-questions.html>

(Slovenska različica)

**Vprašanje za pisni odgovor E-002694/13
za Komisijo**

Karl-Heinz Florenz (PPE), Sirpa Pietikäinen (PPE), Małgorzata Handzlik (PPE), Alojz Peterle (PPE) in Anne Delvaux (PPE)
(7. marec 2013)

Zadeva: Moratorij na neonicotinoide oz. njihova delna prepoved, preloženo glasovanje

Evropska agencija za varnost hrane (EFSA) je v začetku leta 2013 odkrila, da so trije insekticidi na osnovi neonicotinoida (klotianidin, imidakloprid in tiametoksam) nevarni za čebele. EFSA v nekaterih primerih zaradi pomanjkanja informacij sicer ni mogla zaključiti ocene tveganja, kljub temu pa se je Komisija 31. januarja odločila – bržkone tudi na podlagi previdnostnega načela – za uvedbo dvoletne delne prepovedi uporabe treh spornih neonicotinoidov, ki velja za pridelavo koruze, sončnic, ogrščice in bombaža. Za zimska žita in rastline, ki ne privlačijo čebel, naj bi bila še naprej dovoljena uporaba teh pesticidov. Prepoved bi morala začeti veljati že poleti. Zdaj pa je bilo, sodeč po objavah v medijih, glasovanje, ki je bilo predvideno konec februarja, odpovedano. Po navedbah naj bi se morala Komisija še naprej pogajati z državami članicami. Različne okoljevarstvene organizacije kot razlog za preložitev navajajo vpliv kemične industrije.

1. Na podlagi katerih razlogov je Komisija preložila glasovanje?
2. Kateri vidiki oziroma katera nova spoznanja so privedla do tega, da Komisija zdaj drugače ocenjuje možnosti za prepoved kot pred zgolj nekaj tedni?
3. Ali je Komisija, preden je oznanila namero o uvedbi prepovedi, pridobila oceno morebitnih posledic oziroma pritožb?
4. Katere nadaljnje raziskave bo Komisija naročila (na primer prek Evropske agencije za varnost hrane), da bi lahko natančno oziroma natančneje ocenila tveganja?

Odgovor komisarja Tonija Borga v imenu Komisije
(22. april 2013)

1. Glasovanje je bilo iz proceduralnih razlogov prestavljeno s 25. februarja 2013 na 15. marec 2013.
2. Komisija ni spremenila svojega stališča. Osnutek ukrepa je bil obravnavan in predložen v glasovanje Stalnemu odboru za prehranjevalno verigo in zdravje živali v času od 14. do 15. marca 2013.
3. Komisija želi poslance opozoriti na svoj odgovor na pisno vprašanje E-001323/2013 ⁽¹⁾.
4. Komisija želi poslance opozoriti na svoj odgovor na pisno vprašanje E-001942/2013 ⁽²⁾. Pri tem se tudi zavezuje, da bo brez nepotrebne zamude Evropski agenciji za varnost hrane v oceno predložila vse razpoložljive nove znanstvene informacije.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/sl/parliamentary-questions.html>

⁽²⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/sl/parliamentary-questions.html>

(Suomenkielinen versio)

**Kirjallisesti vastattava kysymys E-002694/13
komissiolle**

**Karl-Heinz Florenz (PPE), Sirpa Pietikäinen (PPE), Małgorzata Handzlik (PPE), Alojz Peterle (PPE) ja
Anne Delvaux (PPE)**
(7. maaliskuuta 2013)

Aihe: Neonikotinoidien käytön keskeyttäminen tai niiden osittainen kieltäminen ja äänestyksen lykkääminen

Euroopan elintarviketurvallisuusviranomaisen EFSA totesi vuoden 2013 alussa, että kolmesta hyönteismyrkyissä käytettävästä neonikotinoidista (klotianidiinista, imidaklopridista ja tiametoksaamista) aiheutuu riskejä mehiläisille. EFSA ei puutteellisten tietojen vuoksi kyennyt erässä tapauksissa saattamaan riskien arviointia päätökseen, mutta komissio – oletettavasti osin ennalta varautumisen periaatteen takia – päätti 31. tammikuuta asettaa kyseiset kolme neonikotinoidia kahden vuoden ajaksi osittaiseen kieltoon. Kieltoa oli määrä soveltaa maissin, auringonkukkien, rapsin ja puuvillan viljelyssä. Torjunta-aineiden käyttö talvilajalajeille ja mehiläisiä houkuttelemattomille kasveille olisi ollut edelleen sallittua. Kiellon oli tarkoitus tulla voimaan jo kesällä. Lehtitietojen mukaan alun perin helmikuun loppuun kaavailtu äänestys on nyt peruttu. Syyksi on ilmoitettu, että komission on jatkettava neuvotteluja jäsenvaltioiden kanssa. Erilaisten ympäristöjärjestöjen mielestä lykkäämisen syynä on kemianteollisuuden vaikutusvalta.

1. Miksi komissio lykkäsi äänestystä?
2. Mitkä seikat tai millainen uusi kehitys on johtanut siihen, että komissio suhtautuu nyt mahdolliseen kieltoon toisin kuin vielä muutama viikko sitten?
3. Oliko komissio teettänyt arvioinnin mahdollisista seurauksista tai hankkeista ennen kuin se ilmoitti aikeestaan kieltää nämä aineet?
4. Mitä muita selvityksiä komissio aikoo teettää (EFSA:lla tai muulla sen tapaisella instanssilla) kyetäkseen arvioimaan riskejä konkreettisesti/konkreettisemmin?

Tonio Borgin komission puolesta antama vastaus
(22. huhtikuuta 2013)

1. Äänestystä lykättiin 25. päivästä helmikuuta 2013 15. päivään maaliskuuta 2013 menettelyllisistä syistä.
2. Komissio ei muuttanut kantaansa. Toimenpideluonnoksesta keskusteltiin, ja se siirrettiin äänestettäväksi elintarvikeketjua ja eläinten terveyttä käsittelevässä pysyvässä komiteassa 14.–15. maaliskuuta 2013.
3. Komissio pyytää arvoisia parlamentin jäseniä tutustumaan vastaukseen, jonka se on antanut kirjalliseen kysymykseen E-001323/2013 ⁽¹⁾.
4. Komissio pyytää arvoisia parlamentin jäseniä tutustumaan vastaukseen, jonka se on antanut kirjalliseen kysymykseen E-001942/2013 ⁽²⁾. Lisäksi komissio on sitoutunut toimittamaan kaikki mahdolliset saataville tulevat uudet tieteelliset tiedot ilman aiheetonta viivytystä Euroopan elintarviketurvallisuusviranomaiselle arviointia varten.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/fi/parliamentary-questions.html>

⁽²⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/fi/parliamentary-questions.html>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002694/13
to the Commission**

Karl-Heinz Florenz (PPE), Sirpa Pietikäinen (PPE), Małgorzata Handzlik (PPE), Alojz Peterle (PPE) and Anne Delvaux (PPE)
(7 March 2013)

Subject: Moratorium or partial ban on neonicotinoids, postponement of vote

At the start of 2013 the EFSA identified a number of risks posed to bees by three neonicotinoid insecticides (clothianidin, imidacloprid and thiamethoxam). Although the EFSA could not finalise the risk assessment due to shortcomings in the available data, on 31 January the Commission decided — presumably guided by the precautionary principle — to call for a partial two-year ban on the three neonicotinoids in question, which would have applied to the cultivation of maize, sunflowers, rape and cotton. The use of pesticides on winter cereals and plants which do not attract bees would still have been allowed. The ban would have entered into force in the summer. According to the press, however, the vote which was originally scheduled for the end of February has now been cancelled, apparently because the Commission needs to negotiate further with the Member States. Various environmental organisations have suggested that the vote has been postponed because of pressure from the chemical industry.

1. On what grounds has the Commission postponed the vote?
2. What factors or new developments have led to the Commission changing its position on the possibility of a ban it proposed a few weeks ago?
3. Before announcing its intention to impose a ban, did the Commission obtain an assessment of its potential impact or the claims to which it may give rise?
4. What other research will be commissioned by the Commission, via the EFSA or similar bodies, in order to allow the risks to be evaluated in (more) detail?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission
(22 April 2013)

1. The vote was postponed from 25 February 2013 to 15 March 2013 for procedural reasons.
2. The Commission did not change its position. The draft measure was discussed and put forward for a vote on the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health on 14-15 March 2013.
3. The Commission would refer the Honourable Members to its answer to Written Question E-001323/2013 ⁽¹⁾.
4. The Commission would refer the Honourable Members to its answer to Written Question E-001942/2013 ⁽²⁾. Furthermore, the Commission is committed to submit any new scientific information which will be made available without undue delay to the European Food Safety Authority for assessment.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html>

⁽²⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002695/13
to the Commission**

James Nicholson (ECR)

(7 March 2013)

Subject: Match funding for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)

In many European regions such as Northern Ireland, SMEs have particular difficulties accessing loan capital to match-fund the EU funding streams.

Does the Commission have a plan which will complement the Horizon 2020 programme and help SMEs access funding?

Answer given by Ms Geoghegan-Quinn on behalf of the Commission

(8 May 2013)

Horizon 2020 will, in addition to its targeted grant-based support for research- and innovation driven SMEs (the SME Instrument and the Eurostars Joint Programme), also provide financial instruments for innovative SMEs. These financial instruments will include equity finance focusing on companies in their early stage (seed and start-up) as well as a specific loan guarantee facility to encourage lending by banks and other financial institutions to SMEs investing in research and innovation. Further accompanying measures (mentoring and coaching) for new business and SMEs are foreseen to increase their investor-readiness and improve their access to finance.

The financial instruments of Horizon 2020 will be complemented by those of the Commission's COSME programme⁽¹⁾. COSME will support venture capital funds that provide equity to enterprises in their expansion and growth stage, and it will also have a loan guarantee facility providing (counter-)guarantees to financial intermediaries lending to SMEs. The focus will be on supporting access to finance for viable SMEs with a higher risk profile.

The Commission will implement the aforementioned SME-related financial instruments of Horizon 2020 and COSME in conjunction with each other.

In addition to Horizon 2020 and COSME, support to SMEs' access to finance might be provided through operational programmes co-financed by European Structural and Investment Funds (for the period 2014-2020) and implemented by the managing authorities in Member States. Such finance for SMEs could be made in various forms including equity, loan finance and loan guarantees.

⁽¹⁾ Programme for the Competitiveness of Enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises (2014 — 2020), COM(2011) 834 final, 30.11.2011 .

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002696/13
to the Commission
James Nicholson (ECR)
(7 March 2013)**

Subject: Implementation of Council Directive 1999/74/EC of 19 July 1999 laying down minimum standards for the protection of laying hens (Welfare of Laying Hens Directive)

Conventional cages for hens were due to be phased out by the Member States by 1 January 2012.

Will the Commission provide details of the Member States which remain non-compliant with the Welfare of Laying Hens Directive?

Further, will the Commission provide details of the level of compliance with the Welfare of Laying Hens Directive for each of the 27 Member States?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission
(24 April 2013)**

To date two Member States remain non-compliant not having managed to fully phase out unenriched cages for laying hens ⁽¹⁾. The number of hens still kept in unenriched cages represents roughly 4% of the total EU laying hen flock. The infringement case against these two Member States is still pending and more specific data can thus not be provided.

⁽¹⁾ Council Directive 1999/74/EC of 19 July 1999 laying down minimum standards for the protection of laying hens; OJ L 203, 3.8.1999, p. 53.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002697/13
to the Commission**

James Nicholson (ECR)

(7 March 2013)

Subject: Liberalisation of the EU labour market from January 2014

Unrestricted access to the EU labour market will be available to all EU citizens from 1 January 2014. The Commission will be aware of the many reports that suggest that upwards of 300 000 citizens could migrate to the United Kingdom within the first five years following this liberalisation.

Does the Commission have plans to help alleviate the pressure on Member States that are expected to receive an influx of migrants?

Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission

(7 May 2013)

The Commission does not consider it necessary to make any specific plans to meet what the Honorable Member refers to as an expected increased influx of migrants following the expiry of the transitional restrictions on Bulgarian and Romanian citizens on 1st January 2014. The freedom of movement of workers is one of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty and an essential component of the Single Market.

Previous experience of post-enlargement mobility point to an overall positive impact of mobility flows of workers on the economies and labour markets of receiving countries. The Commission has summarised its analysis in its 2008 and 2011 Reports on the functioning of the transitional arrangements ⁽¹⁾, which were based on detailed analysis published in the 2008 *Employment in Europe* report and 2011 *Employment and social developments in Europe* review.

Moreover, intra-EU labour mobility provides a much needed flexibility to EU labour markets since workers tend to move where jobs are, and may move back home if circumstances change, including on the labour market. This has been confirmed by the trends in mobility flows observed during the recession in 2009.

The Fund functions under shared management, meaning that the Operational Programmes laying down the priorities for funding are negotiated with the European Commission, but are implemented by the Member States at the appropriate territorial level, to respond properly to the needs 'on the ground'.

The European Social Fund is the main EU instrument to support employability and promote employment. It can be used for example to improve the skills of migrant workers.

⁽¹⁾ COM(2011)729 and SEC(2011)1343 and COM(2008) 765.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002698/13
to the Commission**

James Nicholson (ECR)

(7 March 2013)

Subject: European Union's activities in Haiti

Can the Commission provide an update on the European Union's activities in Haiti?

Does the Commission plan to continue with a programme of humanitarian aid in this country?

Has the European Union's focus in Haiti moved from humanitarian aid to development aid in order to assist with the ongoing infrastructure, social and economic problems throughout the region?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(6 May 2013)

As regards the humanitarian response to the earthquake that hit Haiti in Jan. 2010 and to other crises such as the cholera epidemic and tropical storms Isaac and Sandy, the EU has allocated between 2010 and 2012 EUR 195 million for assistance in the sectors of shelter, food, water and sanitation, health, protection and disaster risk reduction. In 2013, EUR 18.5 million are allocated to accelerate the exit of people still living in camps and the fight against cholera.

In addition to humanitarian aid, the EU has continued to provide cooperation assistance to Haiti aimed at supporting reconstruction, eradicating poverty and encouraging long-term socioeconomic development. Out of the EUR 522 million ⁽¹⁾ pledged by the EU as a response to the earthquake, EUR 434 million (86%) have been committed and EUR 189 million (36%) actually disbursed. Additional EUR 102 million were also earmarked under other EU programmes (Food Facility, Food Security Thematic Programme and the MDG initiative).

EU assistance to Haiti over the last three years has been implemented in a difficult context characterised by political tensions, lack of an effective government for several months and weakness of the Haitian State administration, further worsened by the human and material losses caused by the earthquake.

The programming of EU assistance under the 11th EDF, covering the period 2014-2020, is underway. Particular attention will be given to ensuring transition between emergency/humanitarian response and more structural development assistance, an approach already started under the 10th EDF, in particular in areas such as food security and housing/urban development.

⁽¹⁾ Includes EUR 460 million pledged at the March 2010 New York Donors conference + EUR 62 million of additional post-earthquake pledge.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002699/13
to the Commission**

James Nicholson (ECR)

(7 March 2013)

Subject: eTwinning network in Northern Ireland

The Commission has run a very successful 'eTwinning' network which has thus far encouraged 100 000 schools in 33 countries to talk to each other via the Internet, and I was pleased to see it recently extended to schools in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.

Does the Commission have any plans in place to encourage more schools to participate?

Answer given by Ms Vassiliou on behalf of the Commission

(11 April 2013)

Building on the success of eTwinning in European countries participating in the Lifelong Learning Programme, the European Commission extended it to five Eastern partnership countries on a pilot basis, under the label eTwinning Plus: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-183_en.htm

Following the Arab spring and its renewed Neighbourhood Policy, the European Commission is now planning to extend eTwinning Plus to Tunisia. Negotiations are well advanced and a selection of Tunisian schools will join the scheme during spring 2013. A similar offer was made to Egypt, but the European Commission has not yet received an answer from the Egyptian authorities.

Under the MFF 2014-2020, the Commission proposal for a new education and training programme, 'Erasmus for All', foresees an expanded role for eTwinning, with an upgraded platform, new services offered to schools and a much larger offer of online training opportunities for teachers. The European Commission runs communication campaigns at the beginning and at the end of every school year in order to encourage more schools to participate.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002700/13
to the Commission**

James Nicholson (ECR)

(7 March 2013)

Subject: A2 countries (Bulgaria and Romania) and the labour market

The 'A2 countries', Bulgaria and Romania, committed themselves to taking steps towards combating the spread of corruption and organised crime and properly policing their borders prior to the lifting of the restrictions on access to the EU labour market scheduled for 1 January 2014.

Can the Commission confirm that the A2 countries have fulfilled the commitments which were agreed with the EU?

Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission

(29 April 2013)

The lifting of the restrictions on access to the EU labour market for Bulgarian and Romanian citizens has never been conditional. All such restrictions on Bulgarian and Romanian citizens will end 7 years after accession, that is on 1 January 2014.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002701/13
to the Commission
Glenis Willmott (S&D)
(7 March 2013)

Subject: Impact of internal EU migration

Freedom of movement is a central principle of the EU. The movement of citizens between Member States can help boost local economies and allows European citizens to experience different cultures and ways of life. However, inward migration of citizens from other EU Member States can sometimes place added pressures on local services such as jobs, education, and health, while resources available to deal with these pressures have become scarcer due to cuts and other austerity measures in many Member States.

1. Has the Commission carried out an assessment of the impact on local communities of the arrival and settlement of citizens from other EU Member States?
2. In the light of increased austerity measures reducing the availability of previously used funding streams, would the Commission consider widening the scope of funding programmes such as the Asylum and Migration Fund and the Integration Fund to include EU migrants?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(3 May 2013)

The Commission recently commissioned a study on the evaluation of the impact of free movement of EU citizens at local level. For the purpose of this evaluation, six cities which have put in place policies and measures to facilitate the successful inclusion and participation of EU citizens moving there from other Member States have been selected as test cases. On this basis, the study should analyse the economic and social impacts of Directive 2004/38/EC on free movement on the local communities and deliver a catalogue of best practices. The study is expected to be finalised in the autumn.

As regards funding, the Commission would like to mention the European Social Fund, which supports actions in Member States under several priorities, including 'specific actions to increase the participation of migrants in employment and thereby strengthen their social integration'. These actions include guidance, language training and validation of competences and acquired skills. The ESF is not limited to third country-nationals and its financing can involve EU workers who have exercised intra-EU mobility.

On the other hand, the European Fund for the Integration of third-country nationals and the Asylum and Migration Fund are part of the EU's common immigration policy (Article 79 TFEU), which aims at ensuring efficient management of migration flows and fair treatment of third-country nationals residing legally in the EU. EU citizens do not belong to the target group and they cannot be subject to integration measures restricting their right of movement. The legal situation of both populations is different and the Commission cannot design a Fund structure ending the targeting on the basis of nationality, as different legal bases are applicable.

(Magyar változat)

Írásbeli választ igénylő kérdés E-002702/13
a Bizottság számára
Kovács Béla (NI)
(2013. március 7.)

Tárgy: A jogállamiság helyzete Moldovában

Orosz sajtóhírek arról számoltak be, hogy Moldova főügyésze, Valeriu Zubko lemondott, miután kiderült, hogy információkat titkolt el egy 2012. december 23-án Moldovában bekövetkezett vadászbalesettel kapcsolatosan. E sajtóértesülések szerint maga Valeriu Zubko, Dorin Recean belügyminiszter, továbbá bírák, a moldovai titkosszolgálat tagjai és más állami hivatalnokok vadászatot vettek részt, amelynek során egy üzletembert halálos lövés ért. A balesetről azonban csak két héttel később számoltak be egy informátor kezdeményezésére. Az eset a Moldovában uralkodó átláthatóságot és a jogállamiságot illető aggasztó állapotokat tükrözi.

Tudná-e a Bizottság az ügyre vonatkozó tényeket tisztázni és ismertetni, hogy milyen fellépéseket szándékozik tenni a tekintetben, hogy Moldovában javuljon a jogállamiság helyzete, biztosítva legyen a bűnüldöző szervek tisztviselőinek átláthatósága és a bírói testület megreformálása?

Štefan Füle válasza a Bizottság nevében
(2013. május 3.)

A szóban forgó ügyben a moldovai parlament ad hoc bizottság keretében vizsgálódott, amely 2013. február 15-én tette közzé jelentését. Ahogy az Ön számára is ismeretes, a moldovai fél lépéseket tett az ügyben, és Zubco főügyészt februárban leváltották.

Összességében elmondható, hogy az EU Moldovával kapcsolatos programjának legfőbb pontja a jogállam tiszteletben tartása. Miután a moldovai kormány előállt egy, a nemzetközi partnereivel folytatott konzultációk eredményeit megfelelően tükröző stratégiával, 2011-ben a Bizottság jelentős támogatást terjesztett ki az igazságszolgáltatás és a bűnüldözés terén végzett reformok elősegítésére.

A keleti partnerség integrációs és együttműködési programjával kiegészített támogatási csomag jelentős költségvetési támogatást tartalmaz, amely arra irányul, hogy Moldovát ambiciózus célok elérésére ösztönözze az alábbiakat illetően: az érintett területek intézményi és jogalkotási reformja (ideértve az állami pénzügyek elszámoltathatóságát), a bírói kar reformja, az előzetes eljárás keretében végzett vizsgálatok eljárási módjának a reformja, a bírósági ítéletek végrehajtása, a fiatalok számára vonatkozó igazságszolgáltatási rendszer reformja, a korrupció elleni küzdelem az érintett területeken, valamint az emberi jogok védelme az igazságszolgáltatási és bűnüldözési eljárások során (ideértve az ombudsman intézményének megerősítését).

A tervek szerint az EU emellett 10 millió EUR összegű technikai segítségnyújtással támogatja az igazságügyi reform előkészítését és koordinációs mechanizmusát. Ezzel egyidejűleg a belügyminisztérium reformját magas szintű tanácsadás révén segítik, ami arra irányul, hogy megtörténjen az intézmény demilitarizációja és szolgáltatásorientálttá alakítása. Végezetül, az EU a demokrácia és az emberi jogok európai eszköze keretében is biztosít segítségnyújtást.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002702/13
to the Commission
Béla Kovács (NI)
(7 March 2013)**

Subject: Rule of law in Moldova

It has been reported in the Russian press that the Attorney-General of Moldova, Valeriu Zubko, has resigned following allegations that he concealed information about a hunting accident that occurred in Moldova on 23 December 2012. According to these press reports, Mr Zubko himself, the Interior Minister Dorin Recean, judges, members of the Moldovan secret services and other state officials all took part in a hunting party during which a businessman was fatally shot. However, the incident was only made public two weeks later on the instigation of a whistleblower, and this circumstance sends out alarming signals regarding transparency and the rule of law in Moldova.

Can the Commission clarify the facts of this case and state what action it is taking with regard to improving the rule of law in Moldova, ensuring transparency on the part of Moldova's law enforcement officers and reforming its judiciary?

**Answer given by Commissioner Füle on behalf of the Commission
(3 May 2013)**

The facts of this case have been investigated by an ad-hoc commission of the Moldovan Parliament, which released its report on 15 February 2013. As you will know, the Moldovan side has taken action, and Prosecutor-General Zubco was dismissed in February.

On a more systemic note, ensuring respect for the rule of law is on the top of the EU-Moldova agenda. In 2011, the Commission extended massive support to help reform the justice and law enforcement areas, as the Moldovan Government came up with a strategy, which duly reflected consultations with its international partners.

The support package, which was further topped up with the Eastern Partnership Integration and Cooperation programme, includes a large budget support operation to help Moldova achieve ambitious benchmarks with respect to: institutional and legislative reform (including public finance accountability) in the relevant areas; reform of the judiciary; reform of the pre-judicial investigation process; enforcement of Court's decisions; reform of the juvenile justice system; fight against corruption in the relevant areas; and the protection of human rights in justice and law enforcement procedures (including the enhancement of the Ombudsman's institution).

EU support foresees also EUR 10 million of technical assistance to support the coordination mechanism and preparations of the justice reform. At the same time, reform of the Ministry of Interior is supported through high-level advice with a view to de-militarise the institution and turn it into a service-oriented one. Finally, assistance is provided through the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights.

(Svensk version)

Frågor för skriftligt besvarande E-002703/13
till kommissionen
Cecilia Wikström (ALDE)
(7 mars 2013)

Angående: Införandet av lagar om ärekränkning i Rom II

I maj 2012 antog parlamentet ett lagstiftningsbetänkande på eget initiativ om ändring av förordning (EG) nr 864/2007 om tillämplig lag för utomobligatoriska förpliktelser (Rom II).

I sitt betänkande uppmanade parlamentet kommissionen att "lägga fram ett förslag om tillägg till Rom II-förordningen i form av en bestämmelse som reglerar tillämplig lag på utomobligatoriska förpliktelser till följd av kränkning av privatlivet och rättigheter som rör personlighetsskyddet, även ärekränkning".

Europeiska medier är verksamma i en allt mer gränsöverskridande miljö och antalet gränsöverskridande rättstvister om påstådda kränkningar av privatlivet och personlighetsskyddet, inbegripet ärekränkning, kommer sannolikt att öka. Med beaktande av detta är det av största vikt att våra medier känner till vad de får och inte får publicera för att hålla sig till nationella bestämmelser om skydd av privatlivet. Medieföretag måste givetvis förväntas vara medvetna om vilka nationella lagar om privatlivet och ärekränkning som gäller i det land där det redaktionella ansvaret ligger och dit publiceringen eller sändningen i huvudsak riktas. Det är dock parlamentets tydliga ståndpunkt att medieföretag inte kan förväntas känna till alla nyanser av 27 olika nationella lagstiftningar om ärekränkning och rätten till privatliv.

Brist på tydlighet inom detta område kan utgöra ett hot mot tryckfriheten i Europa och leda till självensur eller till att det uppkommer hinder på den inre marknaden för att medieföretag tillämpar en begränsad spridning utanför sina huvudsakliga målländer av rädsla för att bryta mot någon annan medlemsstats lagstiftning om ärekränkning och rätten till privatliv.

Vilka åtgärder planerar kommissionen att vidta avseende det mycket tydliga budskap som en överväldigande majoritet ställde sig bakom i det lagstiftningsbetänkande på eget initiativ som antogs av parlamentet?

Svar från Viviane Reding på kommissionens vägnar
(6 maj 2013)

Kommissionen har tagit del av Europaparlamentets resolution av den 10 maj 2012 med rekommendationer om ändring av förordning (EG) nr 864/2007 om tillämplig lag för utomobligatoriska förpliktelser (Rom II).

Förordningens räckvidd har definierats efter intensiva förhandlingar mellan rådet och Europaparlamentet. Detta visar att frågan är mycket känslig, komplicerad och svår.

Efter det att förordningen antogs har kommissionen följt utvecklingen i medlemsstaterna och kommer i slutet av 2013 att utfärda en rapport om tillämpningen av förordningen. Härvid kommer Europaparlamentets synpunkter att beaktas.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002703/13
to the Commission
Cecilia Wikström (ALDE)
(7 March 2013)**

Subject: Inclusion of libel law under Rome II

In May 2012 Parliament adopted an own-initiative legislative report on amending Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II).

In its report, Parliament called on the Commission to submit a proposal designed to add to the Rome II Regulation a provision to govern the law applicable to non-contractual obligations arising out of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation.

Europe's media are operating in an ever more strongly crossborder environment, and there is likely to be a rise in crossborder litigation in cases of alleged violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation. In this context, it is crucial that our media know what they may or may not publish, in order to be in line with national provisions protecting privacy. A media outlet must obviously be expected to be aware of the national laws regarding privacy and defamation in place in the country where its editorial control is exercised and to which its publication or broadcasting service is principally directed. It is, however, the clear view of Parliament that media outlets cannot be expected to be aware of all the nuances of 27 different national legislations on defamation and rights of privacy.

A lack of clarity in this field could pose a threat to the freedom of the press in Europe and lead to self-censorship or to the creation of barriers in the internal market, with media outlets limiting circulation outside of their main target countries for fear of liability under other Member States' privacy and defamation legislation.

What measures does the Commission intend to take with respect to the very clear message, sent out by an overwhelming majority, that is contained in the legislative own-initiative report adopted by Parliament?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(6 May 2013)**

The Commission took carefully note of the European Parliament Resolution of 10 May 2012 with recommendations to the Commission on the amendment of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II).

The exclusion from the scope is the result of very intense negotiations between the Council and the Parliament. This shows that the matter is highly sensitive, complex and difficult.

Following the adoption of the regulation, the Commission has been also following closely the developments in Member States. The Commission will issue a report on the application of the regulation by the end of 2013. In this context the suggestions made by the European Parliament will be carefully considered.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002704/13
aan de Commissie
Bas Eickhout (Verts/ALE)
(7 maart 2013)

Betreeft: Implementatie van de Richtlijn hernieuwbare energie 2009/28/EG

1. Is de Commissie op de hoogte van de verschillende eisen en beperkingen die lidstaten stellen bij de implementatie van de dubbelstellingregeling (zoals caps op dubbeltellende biobrandstoffen, eisen met betrekking tot de herkomst van de grondstoffen voor dubbeltellende biobrandstoffen en zwaardere weging van eerste generatie biobrandstoffen van eigen bodem of geproduceerd in de EU)?
2. Is de Commissie het ermee eens dat de gefragmenteerde implementatie van de dubbelstellingregeling ertoe leidt dat er geen geharmoniseerde markt voor geavanceerde biobrandstoffen in Europa is?
3. Zijn de inbreukprocedures tegen lidstaten vanwege de onjuiste implementatie van Richtlijn 2009/28/EG afgerond? Wat is de reden voor de vertraging in het afdwingen van een tijdige omzetting van Richtlijn 2009/28/EG?
4. Op welke wijze zorgt het ILUC-voorstel van de Commissie van 17 oktober 2012 voor meer harmonisatie?
5. Is de incorrecte en vaak protectionistische wijze waarop de dubbelstellingregeling en andere onderdelen van de Richtlijn hernieuwbare energie zijn geïmplementeerd, zoals bijvoorbeeld de eis dat biobrandstoffen door een nationale instantie zijn gecertificeerd of de zwaardere weging van biobrandstoffen die in het eigen land zijn geproduceerd, in strijd met het handelsrecht, zoals de Europese bepalingen over het vrij verkeer? Indien ja, is de Commissie voornemens op deze grond procedures te starten?

Antwoord van de heer Oettinger namens de Commissie
(18 april 2013)

- 1) De uitvoering van Richtlijn 2009/28/EG inzake hernieuwbare energie (richtlijn hernieuwbare energie) is de verantwoordelijkheid van de lidstaten. Binnen het kader van de interne energiemarkt beschikken de lidstaten over een ruime mate van flexibiliteit bij het ontwerpen van steunregelingen die het gebruik van energie uit hernieuwbare bronnen bevorderen. De diensten van de Commissie hebben verschillende klachten over de uitvoering van de richtlijn hernieuwbare energie ontvangen die momenteel worden onderzocht om na te gaan of er gerechtelijke stappen moeten worden ondernomen.
- 2) In artikel 21, lid 2, van de richtlijn hernieuwbare energie is bepaald dat de bijdrage van biobrandstoffen op basis van afval, residuen, non-food cellulosemateriaal en lignocellulosisch materiaal dubbel zo groot moet zijn als die van andere biobrandstoffen. In de richtlijn wordt niet in detail bepaald welke grondstoffen onder deze bepaling vallen. De lidstaten beschikken dus over flexibiliteit bij de toepassing van de regels inzake dubbelstelling. Bijgevolg kan de nationale wetgeving in dit verband van lidstaat tot lidstaat verschillen.
- 3) Op dit moment lopen er 17 inbreukprocedures voor de niet-kennisgeving van omzettingsmaatregelen overeenkomstig Richtlijn 2009/28/EG. Aangezien de staten een groot aantal bepalingen blijven aanmelden, is het controleren van die aangemelde bepalingen een tijdrovend en ingewikkeld proces.
- 4) Het voorstel inzake indirecte veranderingen in het landgebruik van 17 oktober 2012 ⁽¹⁾ zorgt voor een betere harmonisatie in zoverre dat het twee lijsten met grondstoffen bevat die dubbel of vierdubbel moeten worden geteld voor de doelstelling van 10 % in de transportsector. Het voorstel omvat echter geen vereisten voor de wijze waarop lidstaten het gebruik van biobrandstoffen moeten aanmoedigen.
- 5) De diensten van de Commissie hebben verschillende klachten ontvangen over de uitvoering van de richtlijn hernieuwbare energie, met inbegrip van de regels inzake dubbelstelling. Deze klachten worden momenteel onderzocht.

⁽¹⁾ COM(2012) 595 final.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002704/13
to the Commission**

Bas Eickhout (Verts/ALE)

(7 March 2013)

Subject: Implementation of Directive 2009/28/EC on renewable energy

1. Is the Commission aware of the various requirements and constraints set by Member States when implementing the double counting scheme (such as caps on double counting biofuels, requirements concerning the origin of the raw materials for double counting biofuels and heavier weighting of home-grown first generation biofuels or those produced in the EU)?
2. Does the Commission agree that the piecemeal implementation of the double counting scheme is giving rise to a lack of harmonisation in the European market for advanced biofuels?
3. Have the infringement proceedings against Member States for improper implementation of Directive 2009/28/EC been completed? What is the reason for the delay in enforcing a timely transposition of Directive 2009/28/EC?
4. How does the Commission ILUC proposal of 17 October 2012 provide for greater harmonisation?
5. Is the incorrect and often protectionist way in which the double counting scheme and other elements of the Renewable Energy Directive have been implemented, such as for example the requirement for biofuels to be certified by a national authority or the heavier weighting of home-grown biofuels, contrary to commercial law, including the European provisions on freedom of movement? If so, does the Commission intend to start proceedings on this basis?

Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission

(18 April 2013)

1. The implementation of Directive 2009/28/EC (RED) on renewable energy is the responsibility of the Member States. Within the framework of the Internal Energy Market Member States have considerable flexibility in the design of the support schemes promoting the use of energy from renewable sources. The Commission services have received several complaints concerning the implementation of the RED which are currently scrutinised in order to establish whether legal action is necessary.
2. Article 21.2 of the RED lays down that the contribution made by biofuels produced from wastes, residues, non-food cellulosic material, and ligno-cellulosic material shall be considered to be twice that made by other biofuels. The RED does not define in detail which feedstock falls under this clause. Therefore, Member States have flexibility implementing the double counting rules. As a consequence national legislation differs among Member States in this respect
3. Presently, 17 infringement cases for non-communication of transposition measures under Directive 2009/28/EC are open. Checking the legislation notified by Member States is a lengthy and complex process as Member States continue to notify a large number of legal acts.
4. The proposal on Indirect Land Use Changes of 17 October 2012 ⁽¹⁾ provides for greater harmonisation in so far as it includes two lists of feedstock that would need to be counted double or quadruple towards the 10% target in the transport sector. The proposal does not, however, include any requirements how Member States should promote consumption of biofuels.
5. The Commission services have received several complaints concerning the implementation of the RED including the double counting rules which are currently being scrutinised.

⁽¹⁾ COM(2012) 595 final.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta P-002705/13
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)**

Marco Scurria (PPE)

(7 marzo 2013)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Eurodeputati dell'Intergruppo Sahrawi bloccati in Marocco

Nell'ambito delle attività e delle iniziative condotte nel contesto dell'Intergruppo per il Sahara occidentale, quattro deputati del Parlamento europeo hanno deciso di recarsi in visita nella zona per verificare le condizioni di vita della popolazione e il rispetto dei diritti umani.

Il 6 marzo 2013 gli onorevoli Ivo Vajgl, Vincent Ramòn Garcés, Isabella Lovin e Willy Meyer sono partiti alla volta di Laayoune, la principale città dei territori occupati.

Non appena arrivati all'aeroporto di Casablanca i quattro deputati sono stati fermati dalle autorità marocchine, gli è stato impedito di continuare il viaggio verso Laayoune e sono stati obbligati a fare immediato rientro a Madrid o Parigi, le città da cui provenivano.

1. Cosa intende fare laVicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante per tutelare il diritto dei deputati del Parlamento europeo di svolgere la loro attività politica?
2. Quali azioni saranno intraprese nei confronti del Marocco, che ha impedito la circolazione dei deputati europei sul suo territorio?
3. È giusto che un paese con cui l'Unione europea stipula accordi impedisca a dei deputati di circolare?

Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione

(24 aprile 2013)

L'AR/VP è al corrente delle circostanze in cui un gruppo di membri del Parlamento europeo che si dirigeva verso il territorio del Sahara occidentale è stato bloccato dalle autorità marocchine.

La questione sarà sollevata con le autorità marocchine. L'AR/VP è consapevole delle difficoltà legate alla questione del Sahara occidentale e ritiene che le parti debbano sforzarsi di adottare un approccio più costruttivo per poter condurre un dialogo e consentire agli osservatori internazionali di recarsi in buona fede nel Sahara occidentale.

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-002705/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

Marco Scurria (PPE)

(7 March 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Members of the Sahrawi intergroup refused entry to Morocco

On 6 March 2013, as part of the activities of the Western Sahara intergroup, four MEPs — Ivo Vajgl, Vicente Miguel Garcés Ramón, Isabella Lövin and Willy Meyer — left for Laayoune, the main town in the occupied territories, with the intention of looking into the living conditions of the local population and the human rights situation in the area.

As soon as they landed at Casablanca airport, the four MEPs were stopped by the Moroccan authorities, told that they could not travel on to Laayoune and obliged to take the next plane back to Madrid or Paris, from whence they had come.

1. How does the Vice-President/High Representative intend to ensure that MEPs are able to go about their parliamentary business without hindrance?
2. What steps will be taken vis-à-vis the Morocco authorities in response to their refusal to allow the MEPs to travel inside their country?
3. Is it acceptable for a country with which the Union has agreements in place to restrict the movement of MEPs in this way?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(24 April 2013)

The HR/VP is aware of the circumstances under which a group of Members of the European Parliament was turned back by Moroccan authorities en route to the territory of Western Sahara.

This issue will be raised with the Moroccan authorities. The HR/VP is aware of the difficulties of the Western Sahara issue and believes parties should make efforts to enable a more constructive approach through which dialogue is possible and visits to Western Sahara undertaken in good faith by international observers are allowed.

(Svensk version)

**Frågor för skriftligt besvarande P-002706/13
till kommissionen
Carl Schlyter (Verts/ALE)
(7 mars 2013)**

Angående: Nanosilver i kommissionens profilmaterial

Med tanke på strategin för minskad användning av antibiotika och antibakteriella medel är det med förvåning jag noterar att kommissionen producerat profilmaterial (pennor) som innehåller nanosilver. Med denna typ av produkt skapar man oro för bakterier och motverkar med kommissionens egna material strategin i fråga.

Pennorna påstås dessutom vara gröna och miljövänliga för att de inte innehåller DEHP, ftalater och decaBDE. Det är positivt att pennorna ifråga innehåller mindre farliga kemikalier men det är högst felaktigt att framhäva produkter med nanosilver som miljövänliga och upprörande att kommissionen använder sig av falska argument.

Att kommissionen framhäver av att pennorna är fria från decaBDE (flamskyddsmedel) kan också ifrågasättas. Brukar pennor på EU:s marknad innehålla flamskyddsmedlet decaBDE? Om så inte är fallet är omnämmandet minst sagt vilseledande.

1. Om pennor brukar innehålla decaBDE har kommissionen planerat att åtgärda detta?
2. Kommer kommissionen att dra tillbaka dessa pennor?
3. Kommer kommissionen i sin miljöpolicy för profilmaterial utveckla en strategi för att undvika att detta eller liknande sker igen?

**Svar från Viviane Reding på kommissionens vägnar
(11 april 2013)**

Kommissionen har ingen information om användningen av detta ämne i pennor eller om eventuella risker förknippade med detta.

Kommissionen försöker alltid att använda miljövänligt material i sitt arbete. Alla kommissionens upphandlingar utförs i enlighet med EU:s miljölagstiftning. Kriterier för miljöanpassad offentlig upphandling och en uppsättning verktyg finns på webbplatsen för generaldirektoratet för miljö.

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-002706/13
to the Commission**

Carl Schlyter (Verts/ALE)

(7 March 2013)

Subject: Nanosilver in the Commission's promotional products

In view of the strategy for reducing the use of antibiotics and antibacterial agents, I am surprised to see that the Commission has produced promotional items (pens) that contain nanosilver. Use of this type of product in the Commission's own promotional material runs counter to the Commission's strategy.

Moreover, the pens are said to be green and environmentally friendly because they do not contain DEHP, phthalates and decaBDE. It is positive that the pens in question contain fewer dangerous chemicals but it is highly misleading to advertise products containing nanosilver as environmentally friendly and shocking that the Commission makes use of false arguments.

It is also questionable for the Commission to emphasise that the pens do not contain decaBDE (flame retardant). Is it usual for pens on the EU market to contain the flame retardant decaBDE? If this is not the case, mentioning it is, to say the least, misleading.

1. If it is usual for pens to contain decaBDE, does the Commission intend to do something about this?
2. Will the Commission withdraw these pens?
3. Will the Commission develop a strategy for promotional products in its environment policy, to prevent this or a similar situation occurring again?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission

(11 April 2013)

The Commission would like to inform the Honourable Member that it has no information about the use of this substance in pens and of any potential related risk.

In addition, all Commission services give priority to the use of eco-friendly material in their work. Also, all Commission public procurement actions are carried out in conformity with the environmental legislation endorsed by the EU ('Green Public Procurement' criteria and toolkit available by Directorate General Environment).

(българска версия)

Въпрос с искане за писмен отговор E-002707/13

до Комисията
Ivailo Kalfin (S&D)
(7 март 2013 г.)

Относно: Нелоялни търговски практики в търговията на дребно

Големите вериги за хранителни стоки ограничават достъпа на малки и средни производители на пазара. Неотдавнашно проучване, направено в България, показва, че под 20 % от стоките, които се продават в големите вериги, са български. Като основна причина за този дисбаланс професионалното сдружение на работодателите — Съюз „Произведено в България“, което е автор на изследването, посочва нелоялните търговски практики. В частност търговските отстъпки, които се предлагат на вносителите на хранителни продукти, се различават съществено от тези за българските производители. Докато за първите те са 5—15%, за българските производители, които представляват почти изцяло микропредприятия, малки и средни предприятия, те са 20—60%. По този начин малките производители и доставчици биват лишени априори от повече от половината от своята печалба.

Тъй като големите вериги в огромното си мнозинство са собственост, регистрирана в други държави — членки на ЕС, и са значим участник в общия европейски пазар, бих искал да попитам:

Предвижда ли Европейската комисия мерки, чрез които да запази възможността за равен достъп до пазара на малки и средни производители, участващи във веригата на доставки на големите вериги?

Възнамерява ли Комисията да предложи обща регулация в тази област, тъй като проблемът обхваща повече от една страна членка? И каква е посоката, в която службите на ЕК работят в този смисъл?

Отговор, даден от г-н Barnier от името на Комисията

(26 април 2013 г.)

1. Европейската комисия е наясно с нелоялните търговски практики (НТП) във веригата за доставка на хранителни стоки и вредните въздействия, които това може да има върху икономически зависимите търговски партньори, много от които са малки предприятия.

Форумът за по-добре функционираща верига на предлагането на храни, създаден от Комисията през 2010 г., потвърди нуждата от насърчаване на по-добри взаимоотношения между предприятията. В този контекст основните заинтересовани страни предложиха доброволна рамка за прилагане на принципите на добрите практики в тази област.

Освен това борбата срещу НТП е едно от действията, заложили в Европейския план за действие в областта на търговията на дребно, приет от Комисията на 31 януари 2013 г. За да се съберат доказателства за проблема, последиците от него и възможните решения, Комисията прие Зелена книга относно НТП по веригата за доставки на хранителни и нехранителни стоки, която беше представена за обществена консултация. В този контекст службите на Комисията също започнаха работа за извършване на анализ на въздействието, с който да се оцени как въпросът за НТП най-удачно би могъл да бъде разгледан. Посочената оценка на въздействието ще разгледа внимателно последиците от тези практики върху по-малките участници на пазара.

2. В оценката на въздействието ще се анализират възможните последици от НТП върху единния пазар и ще се разгледат редица варианти за справяне с НТП, вариращи от механизми за саморегулация до законодателство. В тази връзка Комисията ще следи отблизо въвеждането на посочената по-горе доброволна инициатива и ще предприеме необходимите стъпки.

Освен това Комисията провежда тръжна процедура за извършване на проучване, чиято цел е, *inter alia*, да изясни дали концентрацията на продажбата на храни на дребно влияе върху избора и иновациите в хранителните продукти⁽¹⁾. Резултатите от това проучване ще бъдат включени в разискванията относно последиците от НТП и най-добрите начини за справяне с тях.

⁽¹⁾ За повече информация: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/calls/tenders_open.html

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002707/13
to the Commission
Ivailo Kalfin (S&D)
(7 March 2013)**

Subject: Unfair commercial practices in the retail sector

The big food chains are restricting small and medium-sized producers' access to the market. Recent research carried out in Bulgaria reveals that less than 20% of the products on sale in the big food chains are of Bulgarian origin. The 'Made in Bulgaria' Union, the employers' association that conducted the research, points to unfair commercial practices as a major cause of this imbalance. In particular, the commercial discounts applied for food importers are substantially different from those for Bulgarian producers: 5-15% for the former, as opposed to 20-60% for the Bulgarian producers, almost all of whom are micro-enterprises or SMEs. Small producers and suppliers are thus deprived up front of more than half their profit.

Since the great majority of the big chains are registered in other EU Member States and are major players in the European single market, I should like to know:

- whether the Commission plans to take steps to secure market access on equal terms for small and medium-sized producers who are part of the big groups' supply chain?
- whether the Commission intends to bring forward a proposal for a general regulation on this problem, as it concerns more than one Member State; and what is the thrust of the Commission's efforts to that end?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission
(26 April 2013)**

1. The European Commission is aware of unfair trading practices (UTPs) in the food supply chain and the harmful effects these may have on economically dependent trading partners, many of which are small businesses.

The Forum for a Better Functioning Food Supply Chain, set up by the Commission in 2010, acknowledged the need to promote better business-to-business relationships. In this context, major stakeholders put forward a voluntary framework to implement principles of good practice.

Moreover, tackling UTPs is one of the actions identified in the European Retail Action Plan, adopted by the Commission on 31 January 2013. In order to gather evidence on the problem, its effects and possible resolutions, the Commission has adopted a Green Paper on UTPs in the food and non-food supply chain. A public consultation has been launched on the basis of the Green Paper. In this context, Commission staff has also started to work on an impact analysis assessing how the question of UTPs could be best dealt with. This Impact Assessment will carefully consider the effects of such practices on smaller players.

2. The aforementioned Impact Assessment will analyse the possible effects of UTPs on the Single Market and consider a number of options addressing UTPs, ranging from self-regulatory mechanisms to legislation. In this context, the Commission will follow closely the uptake of the aforementioned voluntary initiative and will take the necessary steps.

In addition, the Commission is also tendering a study seeking to shed light, *inter alia*, on the evolution of choice and innovation in food products and its links with food retail's concentration ⁽¹⁾. The results of this study will feed into the debate on the effects of UTPs and the best ways to address them.

⁽¹⁾ More information is available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/calls/tenders_open.html

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002709/13
to the Commission
David Martin (S&D)
(7 March 2013)

Subject: Journey times in the case of combined road-sea transport of animals

Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 of 22 December 2004 stipulates that pigs can only be transported for a maximum period of 24 hours, after which they must be unloaded and rested for at least 24 hours before being transported onwards. However, the regulation contains derogations to this rule in certain cases of combined road-sea transport (point 1.7 of Chapter V, Annex 1).

Animal welfare organisations have recently exposed documented cases of pigs being transported by road and sea without being unloaded during the sea journey.

1. Does the Commission agree that substituting part of a road transport journey for transport by sea, without any unloaded rest time, is contrary to the scope of Regulation (EC) No 1/2005?
2. Does the Commission agree that Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 should be revised in order to remedy this unsatisfactory situation?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission
(22 April 2013)

1. Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 on the protection of animals during transport ⁽¹⁾ does not prevent the use of sea transport as a substitute for road transport. The Commission therefore does not see that this would be contrary to the scope of the regulation, as long as the requirements of Article 3(a) to minimise the length of the journey, as well as the journey and resting times for the species concerned, are met.

According to point 1.7(b), Chapter V of Annex I to Regulation 1/2005, after the sea leg of a journey, unless it can be included in the general maximum allowed journey time ⁽²⁾, animals must be unloaded in the vicinity of the port, and rest for at least 12 hours. How to calculate the journey and resting times when part or parts of a journey are undertaken via roll-on/roll-off ferries are explained in the ruling of the Court of Justice in Case C-277/06 ⁽³⁾.

2. The derogation from the maximum transport time as laid down in point 1.7(a) of Chapter V of Annex I to Regulation 1/2005, is in the view of the Commission necessary when animals are transported by sea. If this derogation was not in place, certain regions of the EU would not be able to transport animals to other regions, including mainland Europe, as animals cannot be unloaded during the sea leg of a journey.

The Commission therefore does not agree that sea journeys longer than the maximum allowed transport time should be banned, and does not plan any revision of Regulation (EC) No 1/2005.

⁽¹⁾ Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 on the protection of animals during transport and related operations; OJ L 3, 5.1.2005, p. 1.

⁽²⁾ As laid down in point 1.4 of Chapter V of Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 1/2005.

⁽³⁾ <http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.js?language=en&jur=C,T,F&num=277/06&td=ALL>.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002710/13

à Comissão

Diogo Feio (PPE)

(8 de março de 2013)

Assunto: Apostas na internet: risco de exclusão dos mais idosos

A senhora Vice-Presidente Neelie Kroes, responsável pela Agenda Digital, declarou recentemente que «todos os Europeus deveriam estar online» enfatizando a necessidade de desenvolver as capacidades dos cidadãos neste domínio e o reforço da segurança das comunicações e transações feitas por intermédio da internet.

Assim, pergunto à Comissão:

- Não considera que a ênfase colocada na internet arrisca alienar da vida ativa os cidadãos de mais idade?
- Não crê que, não obstante a necessária aposta nesta forma de comunicação tão importante, se devem acautelar os interesses daqueles que são menos aptos a usá-la e permitir que o acesso a serviços e a comunicação não lhes seja coartado na prática?
- Conhece ou estará disposta a avaliar os níveis de infoexclusão na União Europeia e o risco da alienação dos mais idosos da participação ativa no espaço público e na vida social por via daquela rede?

Resposta dada por Neelie Kroes em nome da Comissão

(18 de abril de 2013)

Os números sobre a infoinclusão indicam claramente a existência de um fosso entre gerações. Os adultos mais velhos participam significativamente menos nas comunicações e transações em linha do que as pessoas das gerações mais novas. No entanto, os dados disponíveis mostram que a utilização regular da Internet pelos utilizadores com idades compreendidas entre os 55 e os 74 anos progrediu, passando de 28 % em 2008 para 42 % em 2012, e convém não esquecer que os jovens utilizadores das TIC de hoje serão os utilizadores mais idosos de amanhã.

A Comissão está de facto particularmente atenta à inclusão no mundo digital dos mais idosos. Com a proposta de diretiva recentemente lançada relativa ao envelhecimento ativo e saudável, o acesso aos organismos públicos e a outros sítios e aplicações Web está a ser melhorado para todos e, por conseguinte, também para os mais idosos. Durante o ano de 2012, Ano Europeu do Envelhecimento Ativo, muitas atividades foram consagradas à inclusão digital e desde há vários anos que a Comissão cofinancia a investigação e a inovação neste domínio. Alguns recursos do 7.º Programa-Quadro e do futuro programa Horizonte 2020 destinam-se especialmente a estas atividades, bem como a projetos de investigação e inovação sobre soluções TIC que possam contribuir para responder ao desafio demográfico.

Os factos revelam que tais soluções encontram facilmente aceitação junto dos utilizadores, desde que sejam bem concebidas e se garanta o envolvimento e a formação dos utilizadores finais. Até agora, foram cerca de 100 as organizações de utilizadores finais que estiveram envolvidas em projetos de investigação e inovação financiados pela UE. Um exemplo é o projeto CommonWell, que envolve mais de quinhentos cidadãos séniores, bem como as pessoas que lhes prestam assistência. Os utilizadores dos serviços ficaram muito satisfeitos com os serviços integrados de cuidados de saúde que receberam, assentes nas novas tecnologias informáticas. As opiniões dão conta de uma maior sensação de segurança, menos tensão para os prestadores de cuidados e melhor apoio em situações críticas. Os resultados podem ser consultados em: <http://commonwell.eu/commonwell-home/>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002710/13
to the Commission
Diogo Feio (PPE)
(8 March 2013)**

Subject: Reliance on the Internet: risk of excluding the elderly

Vice-President Neelie Kroes, responsible for the Digital Agenda, recently said that all Europeans should be online, and stressed the need to develop citizens' skills in this area and to strengthen the security of online communication and transactions.

— Does the Commission not believe that the emphasis placed on the Internet may put older citizens at risk of missing out on an active life?

— Does it not agree that, notwithstanding the need to invest in this very important means of communication, the interests of those who are less able to use it should be considered and their access to services and communication should not be limited in practical terms?

— Is it aware of, or prepared to evaluate, the levels of information exclusion in the European Union and the risk of excluding the elderly from active participation in the public arena and from social interaction using this network?

**Answer given by Ms Kroes on behalf of the Commission
(18 April 2013)**

Figures on e-Inclusion clearly indicate a generation gap. Older adults take part significantly less in on line communication and transactions than people from younger generations. Yet, data show that the regular use of Internet by users aged 55-74 has progressed from 28% in 2008 up to 42% in 2012, and the ICT users of today will be the older ICT users of tomorrow.

The Commission does pay a lot of attention to the e-Inclusion of older adults. With the recently launched proposal for a directive on Active and Healthy Ageing the access of public bodies and other websites and applications is being improved for all, so also for older adults. During the 2012 European Year of Active Ageing many activities were devoted to Digital Inclusion, and for several years the Commission has been co-financing research and innovation in this field. Certain resources from the 7th Framework programme and the forthcoming Horizon 2020 programme are especially allocated to these activities and also to research and innovation projects on ICT-based solutions that can help to address the demographic challenge.

The facts show that such solutions do find easily user acceptance, provided good design and close involvement and training of end-users is ensured. Up to now one hundred end user organisations have been involved in EU funded research and innovation projects. An example is the CommonWell project involving over five hundred older citizens as well as their carers. Service users were very happy with the integrated eCare services they received. An improved sense of security and safety, reduced stress for carers and better support in critical situations were reported. The results can be found at <http://commonwell.eu/commonwell-home/>

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002711/13

à Comissão

Diogo Feio (PPE)

(8 de março de 2013)

Assunto: Futebol — apoios públicos ilegítimos

Notícias recentes dão conta que a Comissão estará a investigar clubes de futebol holandeses — PSV, NEC e Willem II — bem como as autarquias em que aqueles se encontram sedeados — Eindhoven, Nijmegen e Tilburg — devido a eventuais apoios públicos ilegítimamente recebidos por aqueles.

Assim, pergunto à Comissão:

- Tem conhecimento de casos idênticos?
- Não considera natural que as autarquias procurem apoiar os clubes desportivos que com elas se identificam e que constituem uma mais-valia para as respetivas economias locais?
- Em que medida os apoios concedidos são ilegítimos?
- Dispõe de dados acerca da capacidade de atração de receitas e de investimentos para determinadas localidades motivada pela notoriedade e atividade de clubes desportivos?
- De um modo mais global, está em condições de avaliar a importância da «economia do desporto» no quadro europeu?

Resposta dada por Joaquín Almunia em nome da Comissão

(17 de abril de 2013)

Em 6 de março de 2013, a Comissão deu início a uma investigação aprofundada para saber se as medidas levadas a cabo por cinco municípios dos Países Baixos a favor dos clubes locais de futebol profissional cumprem as regras relativas aos auxílios estatais da UE. A Comissão está a analisar os procedimentos noutros Estados-Membros que foram levados ao seu conhecimento.

Para esse efeito, em outubro de 2012, a Comissão enviou um pedido de informação a todos os Estados-Membros no que diz respeito à organização do futebol profissional nos seus respetivos países.

A Comissão reconhece a importância que os municípios atribuem aos seus clubes de futebol. No entanto, como o Vice-Presidente Almunia e o Presidente da UEFA Platini declararam num comunicado conjunto, a 21 de março de 2012, os clubes de futebol profissional devem subsistir pelos seus próprios meios. Os clubes de futebol profissional estão ativos em muitos mercados: participam em competições; compram, vendem e alugam jogadores; celebram acordos de patrocínio; ocupam-se da comercialização de produtos; radiodifusão; acordos de publicidade. O apoio público financeiro a este tipo de clubes é por conseguinte, suscetível de distorcer a concorrência e de afetar o comércio entre os Estados-Membros. Esse tipo de apoio deve ser notificado à Comissão para aprovação prévia, o que, neste caso, as autoridades neerlandesas não fizeram.

Segundo os resultados de um estudo recente da UE¹, a percentagem do desporto na economia da UE, expressa em valor acrescentado bruto (VAB), é de 1,76 %, enquanto a contribuição dos postos de trabalho relacionados com o desporto para o emprego total é de 2,12 %.

A Comissão não dispõe de dados sobre receitas e investimentos a nível local que pudessem ser atribuídos à fama e às atividades dos clubes desportivos.

(¹) http://ec.europa.eu/sport/news/20121119-study-contrib-sport-economic-growth_en.htm

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002711/13
to the Commission
Diogo Feio (PPE)
(8 March 2013)**

Subject: Football — illegitimate state aid

Recent reports reveal that the Commission will investigate several Dutch football clubs (PSV, NEC and Willem II) and the municipalities in which they are based (Eindhoven, Nijmegen and Tilburg) due to the possibility that they have received illegitimate state aid.

— Is the Commission aware of any other cases like this?

— Does it not think it natural for the municipalities to support the sports clubs with which they identify themselves and which generate revenue for their local economies?

— In what way is this aid illegitimate?

— Does it have data on certain locations' ability to attract revenue and investment due to the fame and activities of sports clubs?

— Is it able to make a general assessment of the importance of the 'sports economy' to the EU?

**Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission
(17 April 2013)**

On 6 March 2013, the Commission opened an in-depth investigation into whether measures by five municipalities in the Netherlands in favour of local professional football clubs comply with EU State aid rules. The Commission is also looking at measures in other Member States which were brought to its attention.

To this end, in October 2012, the Commission sent a request for information to all Member States concerning professional football arrangements in their respective countries.

The Commission acknowledges the importance municipalities attach to their football clubs. However, as Vice-President Almunia and President Platini of UEFA declared in a joint statement on 21 March 2012, professional football clubs should live within their means. Professional football clubs are active in many markets: participating in competitions; buying, selling and leasing players; sponsorship deals; merchandising; broadcasting; publicity agreements. Public financial support to such clubs is therefore likely to distort competition and affect trade between Member States. Such aid must be notified to the Commission for prior approval, which the Dutch authorities in this case have failed to do.

According to the results of a recent EU study⁽¹⁾, the share of sport in the EU economy, expressed in Gross Value Added (GVA), is 1.76%, while the contribution of sport-related employment to total employment amounts to 2.12%.

The Commission does not have data on revenue and investment at local level which could be attributed to the fame and activities of sport clubs.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/sport/news/20121119-study-contrib-sport-economic-growth_en.htm

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002712/13

à Comissão

Diogo Feio (PPE)

(8 de março de 2013)

Assunto: Europol — manipulação de resultados desportivos

A Europol anunciou recentemente que 425 jogadores, árbitros, dirigentes e outros funcionários eram suspeitos de envolvimento num processo de manipulação de resultados de cerca de 380 jogos de futebol nos Países Baixos, Alemanha, Turquia, Áustria, Suíça, Hungria e Eslovénia.

Esta descoberta coloca em causa a verdade desportiva e lança as maiores dúvidas sobre o modo como operam as empresas e sociedades que controlam clubes desportivos e aos meios a que recorrem para assegurar os melhores resultados.

Assim, pergunto à Comissão:

- Tem conhecimento de casos idênticos?
- Tratando-se de um modo particular de violação da concorrência e sabendo-se a importância que o desporto hoje ocupa nas sociedades europeias, não considera que, juntamente com os Estados-Membros, devem ser tomadas medidas que previnam, reprimam e combatam situações como as relatadas e assegurem o fair-play e o respeito pela verdade desportiva?

Resposta dada por Androulla Vassiliou em nome da Comissão

(16 de abril de 2013)

A Comissão está a par dos episódios de manipulação dos resultados graças à sua cooperação com os Estados-Membros, nomeadamente no quadro do Grupo de Peritos sobre a Boa Governação no Desporto, criado com base no Plano de Trabalho da UE para o Desporto 2011. A Comissão gostaria de remeter o Senhor Deputado para as suas respostas às perguntas escritas E-010132/2012, E-000964/2013 e E-001039/2013 ⁽¹⁾, para uma panorâmica das medidas planeadas para proteger a integridade do desporto a nível da UE.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002712/13
to the Commission
Diogo Feio (PPE)
(8 March 2013)**

Subject: Europol — match-fixing

Europol recently announced that 425 players, match officials, managers and other club officials are suspected of involvement in the match-fixing of approximately 380 football games in the Netherlands, Germany, Turkey, Austria, Switzerland, Hungary and Slovenia.

This discovery calls into question the integrity of sporting events and raises serious doubts about the way in which companies and associations that control sports clubs operate and the lengths they go to in pursuit of the best results.

— Is the Commission aware of any other cases like this?

— Since match-fixing undermines competition and given the importance that sport holds today in European society, does the Commission agree that it, together with the Member States, should take measures to prevent, dismantle and combat schemes such as this and ensure fair play and respect for sporting integrity?

**Answer given by Ms Vassiliou on behalf of the Commission
(16 April 2013)**

The Commission is aware of episodes of match-fixing thanks to its cooperation with Member States, notably in the framework of the Expert Group on Good Governance in Sport created on the basis of the 2011 EU Work Plan for Sport. The Commission would like to refer the Honourable Member to its answers to written questions E-010132/2012, E-000964/2013 and E-001039/2013 ⁽¹⁾ for an overview of planned measures to protect the integrity of sport at EU level.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html>

(Versão portuguesa)

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002713/13
à Comissão (Vice-Presidente/Alta Representante)**

Diogo Feio (PPE)
(8 de março de 2013)

Assunto: VP/HR — Coreia do Norte — reforço das sanções internacionais

Notícias recentes dão nota que as Nações Unidas reforçaram as sanções contra a Coreia do Norte como resposta ao terceiro ensaio nuclear realizado por este país. Do lado norte-coreano sucedem-se ameaças diversas, em particular contra a Coreia do Sul, e multiplicam-se os exercícios militares em larga escala. A Austrália objetou à reabertura da embaixada da Coreia do Norte no seu território.

Assim, pergunto à Vice-Presidente/Alta Representante:

- Atendendo a que a situação da Coreia do Norte aparenta agravar-se a grande velocidade, considera expectável uma maior firmeza internacional contra as autoridades deste país?
- Dispõe de informações acerca do estado em que se encontra a sua população?
- Qual deve ser o papel da União Europeia e dos Estados-Membros na busca de uma solução duradoura para esta questão?

Resposta dada pela Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente Catherine Ashton em nome da Comissão
(15 de maio de 2013)

A série de violações das suas obrigações jurídicas internacionais por parte da Coreia do Norte, através do ensaio de mísseis em dezembro último, o ensaio de um engenho nuclear no passado mês de fevereiro e a ameaça anunciada em 2 de abril de reativar as instalações nucleares de Yongbyon deram origem a uma reação de condenação firme por parte da comunidade internacional, como demonstrado pelas recentes resoluções do Conselho de Segurança da ONU sobre a RPDC. Uma prioridade para a diplomacia da UE consiste em ajudar a manter essa firmeza e em persuadir a Coreia do Norte a alterar o seu comportamento. A UE está em estreito contacto com outros parceiros-chave.

No que diz respeito à situação do povo coreano do Norte, não dispomos de informações exaustivas ou pormenorizadas, mas temos informação suficiente saber que a situação em termos de segurança alimentar é frágil, que existe uma grave escassez de energia e que não existem mudanças positivas relativas aos direitos humanos. A UE já mantém um pequeno programa de assistência humanitária para grupos especialmente vulneráveis.

A UE continuará a trabalhar em estreito apoio ao Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas, transpondo as suas medidas restritivas sobre a RPDC para o direito da UE. A UE insta ainda a que o processo de Conversações a Seis seja restabelecido o mais rapidamente possível. A UE exortou inúmeras vezes a que a Coreia do Norte adote um caminho construtivo e dialogue com os seus vizinhos e a comunidade internacional de forma a alcançar o bem-estar do seu povo.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002713/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

Diogo Feio (PPE)

(8 March 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — North Korea: strengthening of international sanctions

Recent reports state that the United Nations has strengthened sanctions against North Korea in response to the country conducting its third nuclear test. North Korea has made various threats, particularly against South Korea, and large scale military exercises are on the increase. Australia has objected to the North Korean embassy being reopened in its territory.

— Given that the North Korean situation seems to be deteriorating rapidly, does the Vice-President/High Representative believe that greater international resolve against Pyongyang is to be expected?

— Does she have information on the situation of the North Korean people?

— What role should the European Union and the Member States play in seeking a lasting solution to this problem?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(15 May 2013)

North Korea's serial violations of its international legal obligations through the missile test last December, the test of a nuclear device last February and the threat announced on 2 April to restart the disabled plutonium reactor at the Yongbyon site have drawn a unified reaction of condemnation from the international community as witnessed by the recent UNSC Resolutions on the DPRK. A priority now for EU diplomacy is to help maintain that unity and to persuade North Korea to change its behaviour with that objective. The EU is in close contact with other key partners.

As regards the situation of the North Korean people, we have no detailed or comprehensive information, but, we have enough information to know that the food security situation is fragile, there are severe energy shortages and there is no positive change in the human rights situation. The EU already maintains a small programme of humanitarian assistance for especially vulnerable groups.

The EU will continue to work in close support of the UNSC, including through transposing its restrictive measures on the DPRK into EC law. The EU also presses for the Six Party Talks process to be revived as soon as possible. The EU called repeatedly on North Korea to take a constructive path and, re-engaged with neighbours and international community to work for the well-being of its people.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002714/13

à Comissão

Diogo Feio (PPE)

(8 de março de 2013)

Assunto: Pesca artesanal: aumento da participação europeia

A senhora Comissária Maria Damanaki revelou que a participação europeia de projetos relacionados com a pesca artesanal irá aumentar de 50 para 70 %, beneficiando desta forma regiões cujas frotas sejam maioritariamente constituídas por embarcações dedicadas à pesca daquele tipo.

Assim, pergunto à Comissão:

- Prevê um aumento significativo de projetos apresentados para participação?
- Sabendo-se que os pescadores de mais idade nem sempre têm a informação e instrução bastantes para que lhes seja possível apresentar pedidos de apoio comunitário, através de que formas pretende dar a conhecer este aumento da participação e torná-lo operacionalizável pelos que dele efetivamente necessitam?
- O maior foco que pretende dar ao apoio às comunidades costeiras passa ou poderá passar por uma maior divulgação dos meios comunitários à disposição das mesmas? Em que termos poderia processar-se esta divulgação?

Resposta dada por Maria Damanaki em nome da Comissão

(30 de abril de 2013)

Na sua proposta relativa a um novo Fundo Europeu dos Assuntos Marítimos e das Pescas (FEAMP), a Comissão recomenda que se reforce o apoio à implementação da política comum das pescas (PCP) reformada. Uma vez que esta inclui medidas de particular interesse para as frotas de pequena pesca e que a intensidade do auxílio prestado a estas frotas será maior, a Comissão prevê uma percentagem mais elevada de procura por parte do setor da pequena pesca.

Em conformidade com o princípio da gestão partilhada em que assenta o FEAMP, os Estados-Membros são responsáveis pela promoção dos fundos. A Comissão assegurará que os Estados-Membros tirem pleno partido destas possibilidades nos respetivos programas operacionais FEAMP, bem como na execução dos mesmos.

A nível local, cabe aos grupos de ação local da pesca (GAL-Pesca) assegurar a divulgação do financiamento disponível ao abrigo do FEAMP. Dado que disporão de um orçamento específico para «custos operacionais e de animação» que pode representar até 25 % dos fundos disponíveis, estes grupos deverão estar em condições de atingir um público vasto.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002714/13
to the Commission
Diogo Feio (PPE)
(8 March 2013)**

Subject: Small-scale fishing: increase in EU co-financing

Commissioner Maria Damanaki has revealed that EU co-financing for projects related to small-scale fishing will increase from 50% to 70%, thereby benefiting regions whose fleets mainly consist of vessels dedicated to this type of fishing.

— Does the Commission expect a significant increase in the number of projects applying for co-financing?

— Given that older fishermen do not always have sufficient information and training to be able to apply for Community support, how will the Commission publicise this increase in co-financing and make it available to those who genuinely need it?

— Is the aim to provide more aid to coastal communities being achieved, or could it be achieved, through greater awareness of the EU funds available to these communities? How can such awareness be raised?

**Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission
(30 April 2013)**

In its proposal for a new European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF), the Commission recommends to provide greater support to the implementation of the reformed Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). As the latter involves measures of particular interest for small-scale fishing fleets, and as a higher aid intensity will be offered to these fleets, the Commission expects a higher proportion of demands from the small-scale sector.

In line with the principle of shared management upon which the EMFF is based, the Member States are responsible for promoting the funds. The Commission will ensure that they do take full advantage of such possibilities in their EMFF Operational Programmes and in their implementation.

At local level, it is the role of the Fisheries Local Action Groups (FLAGs) to communicate on the EMFF funding available locally. Given that they will have access to a specific budget for 'running costs and animation' which can represent up to 25% of available funds FLAGs they should be able to reach out for a wide public.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002715/13

à Comissão

Diogo Feio (PPE)

(8 de março de 2013)

Assunto: Agravamento da recessão europeia

Segundo o mais recente relatório do Eurostat, a recessão europeia agravou-se no último trimestre de 2012.

Assim, pergunto à Comissão:

- Que avaliação faz desta situação? E que avaliação faz do impacto que ela tem na vida das pessoas e das empresas? Dispõe de dados a este respeito?
- Em que medida as economias europeias, em particular as da zona euro, estarão aptas a inverter este estado de coisas? Através de que meios e instrumentos?
- Quais poderão ser os principais motores da tão desejada retoma da economia europeia?

Resposta dada por Olli Rehn em nome da Comissão

(11 de abril de 2013)

A Comissão avalia a situação económica da UE nas suas Previsões Económicas Europeias, sendo as últimas as Previsões de inverno de 22 de fevereiro de 2013 ⁽¹⁾. Estas revelaram, entre outros elementos, que embora as condições dos mercados financeiros na UE tenham melhorado substancialmente desde o último verão, a atividade económica foi dececionante no segundo semestre de 2012. Contudo, os principais indicadores sugerem que o PIB da UE já atingiu o seu ponto mais baixo e espera-se que a atividade económica registe uma aceleração progressiva. A retoma do crescimento será inicialmente impulsionada pelo aumento da procura externa. Prevê-se que os investimentos e o consumo internos recuperem mais tarde ao longo do ano e, até 2014, prevê-se igualmente que a procura interna assuma o papel de principal motor do crescimento do PIB. Contudo, o mercado de trabalho continua a suscitar graves preocupações. Prevê-se que em alguns trimestres o emprego registe uma nova contração e o desemprego permaneça inaceitavelmente elevado o que acarreta graves consequências sociais.

A avaliação da situação efetuada pela Comissão e a sua posição relativamente às medidas apropriadas que se devem tomar para estimular o crescimento e a criação de emprego constam da sua Análise Anual do Crescimento (AAC) de 2013 ⁽²⁾. A AAC apela a que se prossiga uma consolidação orçamental diferenciada e favorável ao crescimento, restabelecendo as condições normais de concessão de crédito à economia, incentivando o crescimento bem como a competitividade, combatendo o desemprego e as consequências sociais da crise e modernizando a administração pública. O alívio sentido nos mercados financeiros e a potencial recuperação têm de ser utilizados para impulsionar com determinação a agenda política de modo a assegurar a sustentabilidade das finanças públicas, ultrapassar a fragmentação financeira, implementar reformas estruturais de apoio ao crescimento, aumentar o emprego e reforçar a arquitetura da UEM.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu/forecasts/2013_winter_forecast_en.htm

⁽²⁾ A Comissão enunciou as suas prioridades para 2013 na Análise Anual de Crescimento publicada a 28 de novembro de 2012. http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/ags2013_pt.pdf

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002715/13
to the Commission**

Diogo Feio (PPE)

(8 March 2013)

Subject: Worsening of the EU recession

According to the latest Eurostat report, the EU recession worsened in the last quarter of 2012.

— What is the Commission's assessment of this situation? What is its assessment of the impact that the recession is having on companies and on people's lives? Does it have any data in this regard?

— To what extent are the EU economies, particularly those in the euro area, capable of reversing this state of affairs? What means and instruments can they use?

— What might be the main engines to drive the long-awaited EU economic recovery?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission

(11 April 2013)

The Commission assesses the economic situation in the EU in its European Economic Forecasts, the latest being the Winter Forecast of 22 February 2013 ⁽¹⁾. It showed among other things that while financial market conditions in the EU have improved substantially since last summer, economic activity was disappointing in the second half of 2012. However, leading indicators suggest that GDP in the EU is now bottoming out and we expect economic activity to gradually accelerate. The pick-up in growth will initially be driven by increasing external demand. Domestic investment and consumption are projected to recover later in the year, and by 2014 domestic demand is expected to take over as the main driver of strengthening GDP growth. The labour market, however, remains a serious concern. Employment is forecast to shrink further for some quarters and unemployment remains unacceptably high with grave social consequences.

The Commission's assessment of the situation and views on the appropriate actions to stimulate growth and job creation are set out in its Annual Growth Survey (AGS) 2013 ⁽²⁾. The AGS calls for pursuing differentiated, growth-friendly fiscal consolidation, restoring normal lending to the economy, promoting growth and competitiveness, tackling unemployment and the social consequences of the crisis and modernising public administration. The relief in financial markets and the prospective recovery have to be used to press ahead relentlessly with the policy agenda to ensure the sustainability of public finances, overcome financial fragmentation, implement growth-supporting structural reforms, lift employment and strengthen the architecture of EMU.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu/forecasts/2013_winter_forecast_en.htm

⁽²⁾ The Commission has set out its priorities for 2013 in the Annual Growth Survey, published on 28 November 2012, http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/ags2013_en.pdf

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002716/13

à Comissão

Diogo Feio (PPE)

(8 de março de 2013)

Assunto: Agricultura: cooperação Portugal/Moçambique

Os ministros da Agricultura de Portugal e de Moçambique defenderam recentemente, em Maputo, que a investigação e a formação de recursos humanos são áreas com potencial para a cooperação bilateral no setor. «A investigação será área de consolidação e expansão» na cooperação entre os dois países, afirmou o ministro moçambicano da Agricultura, José Pacheco, após um encontro com a sua homóloga portuguesa, Assunção Cristas. A formação de recursos humanos, «para aumentar a produtividade», e a irrigação, «onde a experiência portuguesa pode ser muito útil», foram outras áreas destacadas pelo ministro.

Assim, pergunto à Comissão:

- Que apoio dá a Moçambique nas áreas da investigação agrária e da formação de recursos humanos no setor?
- A verificar-se uma intensificação da cooperação entre Portugal e Moçambique naqueles domínios e se tal lhe for solicitado pelas partes, admite dar também o seu contributo para criar ainda maiores sinergias e potenciar o desenvolvimento rural de Moçambique?

Resposta dada por Andris Piebalgs em nome da Comissão

(30 de abril de 2013)

A Comissão assinou recentemente uma convenção de financiamento no âmbito da iniciativa relativa aos Objetivos de Desenvolvimento do Milénio (ODM) em Moçambique, que pretende acelerar a concretização do ODM 1c (redução da fome). Moçambique foi o maior beneficiário desta iniciativa, tendo-lhe sido atribuído um montante de 67 milhões de euros.

As atividades, que incluem uma vertente substancial de investigação orientada para o setor das sementes com o objetivo de aumentar a utilização de sementes melhoradas, contribuirão para lançar variedades de sementes melhoradas, bem como para produzir sementes para variedades de sementes melhoradas. O quadro institucional e político, bem como o serviço nacional de sementes, serão apoiados ativamente (1 milhão de euros).

Estão previstas várias atividades de desenvolvimento de competências (recursos humanos), que beneficiarão de um financiamento superior a 13,5 milhões de euros e contemplarão, nomeadamente, as escolas para agricultores, os formadores para estas escolas, os sistemas de senhas para a distribuição de fatores de produção, o comércio de fatores de produção e de produtos, as organizações de agricultores, o pessoal do Ministério das Pescas, os sistemas de informação sobre os mercados e a pesca comercial.

A UE é atualmente um grande parceiro de cooperação no setor da agricultura e procura assegurar que seja envidado um esforço coletivo para apoiar o CAADP ⁽¹⁾ em Moçambique. Por conseguinte, a UE já está empenhada em apoiar uma maior sinergia neste setor e em fomentar o desenvolvimento rural no país; a iniciativa ODM mencionada supra prevê também o apoio ao programa do Governo Pronea ⁽²⁾, destinado a reforçar os serviços de extensão prestados aos agricultores. Será importante melhorar a ligação entre as atividades de investigação e de extensão. Neste contexto, o reforço da cooperação com Portugal seria acolhido favoravelmente.

⁽¹⁾ Programa Integrado para o Desenvolvimento da Agricultura em África.

⁽²⁾ Programa nacional de extensão agrícola.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002716/13
to the Commission
Diogo Feio (PPE)
(8 March 2013)**

Subject: Agriculture: cooperation between Portugal and Mozambique

In a recent visit to Maputo, Portugal and Mozambique's Ministers for Agriculture said that research and the training of human resources were areas in which there was potential for bilateral cooperation in the agricultural sector. Following a meeting with his Portuguese counterpart — Assunção Cristas — Mozambique's Minister for Agriculture, José Pacheco, said that research was an area in which to consolidate and expand cooperation between the two countries. He also made reference to the training of human resources, to increase productivity, and irrigation, where Portuguese experience could prove very useful.

— What support does the Commission currently give to Mozambique for agricultural research and for the training of human resources in the sector?

— In view of the increased cooperation between Portugal and Mozambique in these areas, and if requested by the parties, will it also help to create greater synergies and to promote rural development in Mozambique?

**Answer given by Mr Piebalgs on behalf of the Commission
(30 April 2013)**

The Commission has recently signed a Financing Agreement for the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) initiative in Mozambique, which seeks to accelerate the achievement of MDG 1c (reduction in hunger). Mozambique was the largest beneficiary of this initiative, receiving an allocation of EUR 67 million.

The activities include a substantial research element focused upon the seeds sector, with the aim of increasing the usage of improved seeds. Activities will help the release of improved seed varieties, as well as the production of seed for improved seed varieties. There will be active support to the institutional and policy framework and the national seed service (EUR 1 million).

A range of capacity building activities (human resources) with funding of over EUR 13.5 million are planned; these include Farmer Field Schools, trainers for these schools, voucher schemes for input distribution, input-output trading and farmers organisations, staff in the fisheries ministry, market information systems and commercial fishing.

The EU is currently acting as lead cooperating partner in the agriculture sector, seeking to ensure a collective effort is engaged in support to the CAADP ⁽¹⁾ process in Mozambique. Thus the EU is already engaged in supporting greater synergy in this sector and in fostering rural development in Mozambique; the abovementioned MDG initiative programme also provides support to the Government's PRONEA programme ⁽²⁾ to strengthen the extension service provided to farmers. It will be important to improve the linkages between research and extension activities. Increased cooperation with Portugal would be welcome in this context.

⁽¹⁾ Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Program.

⁽²⁾ National Agricultural Extension Programme.

(Versão portuguesa)

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002717/13
à Comissão (Vice-Presidente/Alta Representante)**

Diogo Feio (PPE)

(8 de março de 2013)

Assunto: VP/HR — Síria — rapto de observadores das Nações Unidas

Vinte e um observadores das Nações Unidas de nacionalidade filipina foram raptados por rebeldes sírios nas imediações dos montes Golã.

Neste contexto, pergunto à Vice-Presidente/Alta Representante:

- Tem conhecimento desta situação?
- Considera que esta situação poderá pôr em causa a credibilidade externa e a imagem de unidade que vem sendo veiculada pelas forças que lutam contra o regime de Assad?
- Em que medida o rapto destes observadores põe em causa a estabilidade da fronteira entre a Síria e Israel?
- A VP/HR contactou a resistência síria a este respeito? E Israel? Que respostas obteve?
- Qual deve ser o papel da União Europeia e dos «países amigos da Síria» neste particular?

Resposta dada pela Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente Catherine Ashton em nome da Comissão

(29 de maio de 2013)

Em 7 de março de 2013, o porta-voz da AR/VP emitiu uma declaração dando conta da sua preocupação com a detenção de mais de 20 observadores das Nações Unidas de nacionalidade filipina, membros da Força das Nações Unidas de Observação da Separação (UNDOF) nos montes Golã. Catherine Ashton exortou à boa e célere cooperação das partes para resolver a situação o mais rapidamente possível, a todas as partes envolvidas para que se abstenham de quaisquer ações que possam ter efeitos negativos na estabilidade regional e ao respeito das resoluções do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas (CSNU) e do estatuto da Força das Nações Unidas de Observação da Separação (UNDOF).

A UE condena as detenções e ações arbitrárias, como a tomada de reféns, dado que constituem graves violações do direito internacional. A UE considera inaceitável qualquer ataque às Nações Unidas e ao seu pessoal e exigiu a libertação imediata e incondicional dos observadores.

A UE está profundamente empenhada na segurança de Israel e aborda frequentemente as ameaças potenciais enfrentados por Israel, que valoriza o trabalho das missões da UNDOF.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002717/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

Diogo Feio (PPE)

(8 March 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Syria: kidnapping of UN observers

Twenty-one Filipino UN observers have been kidnapped by Syrian rebels near the Golan Heights.

— Is the Vice-President/High Representative aware of this situation?

— Does she believe that this situation may jeopardise the external credibility and the image of unity being conveyed by forces fighting against the Assad regime?

— To what extent does this kidnapping jeopardise the stability of the Syria-Israel border?

— Has she contacted the Syrian resistance on this matter? Has she contacted Israel? What answers has she received?

— What role should the EU and the 'Friends of Syria' play in this situation?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(29 May 2013)

On 7 March 2013, the spokesperson of the HR/VP issued a statement stating that she was alarmed by the detention of more than 20 peacekeepers from the Philippines, members of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) on the Golan. She called for good and swift cooperation of the parties to resolve the situation as soon as possible and to all the parties involved to refrain from any actions that may have negative effects on regional stability and to respect UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and the status of the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF).

The EU condemns arbitrary detentions and actions such as hostage-taking as they are serious breaches of international law. The EU considers any attacks on the UN and its personnel unacceptable and demanded at the time the immediate and unconditional release of the peacekeepers.

The EU is fundamentally committed to the security of Israel and the EU frequently discusses potential threats faced by Israel, which values the work of the UNDOF mission.

(Versão portuguesa)

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002718/13
à Comissão (Vice-Presidente/Alta Representante)**

Diogo Feio (PPE)
(8 de março de 2013)

Assunto: VP/HR — Síria — apelo ao armamento dos rebeldes

O general Salim Idris, líder do Exército Livre da Síria — Free Syrian Army — esteve recentemente em Bruxelas e, numa conferência de imprensa conjunta com o deputado Guy Verhofstadt, apelou à União Europeia para que ajudasse a armar as forças rebeldes.

Assim, pergunto à Vice-Presidente/Alta Representante:

- Tem conhecimento deste apelo?
- Que comentário lhe merece?
- Sabendo-se que vinte e um observadores das Nações Unidas de nacionalidade filipina foram raptados por rebeldes sírios nas imediações dos montes Golã, em que medida esta circunstância poderia pôr em causa o objetivo do general Salim Idris?
- Qual deve ser o papel da União Europeia e dos «países amigos da Síria» neste tocante?

Resposta dada pela Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente Catherine Ashton em nome da Comissão
(1 de julho de 2013)

A AR/VP encontrou-se com o general Idriss durante a visita deste a Bruxelas.

Na sequência da reunião de 18 de fevereiro do Conselho dos Negócios Estrangeiros, foi tomada, em 1 de março, a decisão de prorrogar as medidas restritivas contra a Síria por um período de três meses e de as alterar «por forma a prestar um maior apoio não letal e assistência técnica para a proteção dos civis». As disposições relativas ao embargo de armas foram alteradas para permitir a exportação de equipamento não mortífero e a prestação de assistência técnica à coligação na proteção dos civis. A assistência técnica será canalizada através da SOC. A essa decisão seguiu-se a tomada pelo Conselho dos Negócios Estrangeiros em 27 de maio, sobre as medidas relativas ao armamento. Os Estados-Membros comprometeram-se a proceder, no âmbito das suas políticas nacionais, em conformidade com os princípios estabelecidos pela Declaração do Conselho, adotada em 27 de maio. Neste contexto, salienta-se igualmente que, nesta fase, os Estados-Membros não avançarão para a entrega de equipamento militar e que o Conselho reverá a sua posição antes de 1 de agosto de 2013, com base num relatório da AR/VP, após consulta ao Secretário-Geral da ONU, sobre a evolução da iniciativa EUA-Rússia e sobre o empenho das partes sírias.

A UE prosseguirá os trabalhos em curso, de avaliação e revisão das sanções, de acordo com a evolução no terreno, a fim de apoiar e ajudar a oposição.

A AR/VP emitiu uma declaração sobre a retenção de tropas de manutenção da paz em que solicitava a sua libertação, o que veio a ocorrer pouco depois.

A UE continua a trabalhar no âmbito do Grupo dos Amigos da Síria e com outras partes interessadas, principalmente com Lakhdar Brahimi, representante especial conjunto da Liga dos Estados Árabes e das Nações Unidas, no sentido de encontrar uma solução pacífica para o conflito.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002718/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

Diogo Feio (PPE)
(8 March 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Syria: call to arm the rebels

General Salim Idris, leader of the Free Syrian Army, was recently in Brussels and, at a joint press conference with Guy Verhofstadt MEP, called on the European Union to help arm the rebel forces.

— Is the Vice-President/High Representative aware of this call?

— What is her opinion of it?

— To what extent is General Salim Idris' request undermined by the fact that 21 Filipino United Nations observers have been kidnapped by Syrian rebels near the Golan Heights?

— What role should the EU and the 'Friends of Syria' play in this regard?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(1 July 2013)

HR/VP met General Idris during his visit in Brussels.

Following the 18 February FAC, the decision was made on 1 March to renew the restrictive measures against Syria for a further three months and to amend them 'to provide greater non-lethal support and technical assistance for the protection of civilians'. The arms embargo provisions were amended to be able to export non-lethal equipment and provide technical assistance to the Coalition for the protection of civilians. The technical assistance will be channelled through the SOC. This decision was followed by the one taken at the 27 May FAC with regard to the measures on arms. Member States committed to proceed in their national policies in accordance with the principles set out in the Council Declaration adopted on 27 May. In this context, it is also underlined that Member States will not proceed at this stage with the delivery of military equipment and that the Council will review its position before 1 August 2013 on the basis of a report by the HR/VP, after having consulted the UN Secretary General, on the developments related to the US-Russia initiative and on the engagement of the Syrian parties.

The EU will continue the work underway to assess and review the sanctions, in line with developments on the ground, in order to support and help the opposition.

The HR/VP has issued a statement regarding the detention of the peacekeepers calling for their release, which happened soon after.

The EU continues to work within the Friends of Syria group and with other stakeholders, most importantly the Joint Special Representative of the League of Arab States and the UN, Mr L. Brahimi to bring about a peaceful solution to the conflict.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002719/13

à Comissão

Diogo Feio (PPE)

(8 de março de 2013)

Assunto: Mares dos Açores: proteção das zonas biogeograficamente sensíveis

A senhora Comissária Maria Damanaki foi questionada, durante a sua visita ao arquipélago dos Açores, sobre se a Comissão defenderia junto do Conselho, no quadro das negociações sobre a Política Comum de Pescas, a proteção das zonas biogeograficamente sensíveis dos mares dos Açores.

A comunicação social dá nota que a resposta da senhora Comissária terá sido: «penso que isso é algo que teremos de fazer. Eu admiro os pescadores locais, porque usam bons métodos, amigos do ambiente — eles respeitam o stock, respeitam o peixe — e, por isso, gostaríamos de respeitar o seu esforço, protegendo as áreas, os stocks de peixe. É o mínimo que podemos fazer».

Assim, pergunto à Comissão:

- De que formas procurará sensibilizar o Conselho para esta questão?
- Face à admiração que, pela voz da senhora Comissária, justamente manifesta pelos pescadores açorianos, através de que medidas e de que meios concretizará o apoio que merecem e a proteção que reclamam?

Resposta dada por Maria Damanaki em nome da Comissão

(26 de abril de 2013)

A Comissão assegurou-se de que o Conselho tem plena consciência da importância biológica da zona em torno dos Açores e da necessidade de proteger os habitats de profundidade. O Conselho procedeu a um debate aprofundado sobre esta questão, em especial aquando da adoção do Regulamento (CE) n.º 1568/2005 ⁽¹⁾ que altera o Regulamento (CE) n.º 850/98 respeitante à proteção dos recifes de coral de profundidade dos efeitos da pesca em determinadas zonas do oceano Atlântico.

A Comissão dedica especial atenção à pequena pesca nas águas dos Açores e noutras regiões ultraperiféricas e remete o Senhor Deputado para a resposta dada à pergunta escrita E-002596/2013.

⁽¹⁾ JO L 252 de 28.9.2005.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002719/13
to the Commission**

Diogo Feio (PPE)

(8 March 2013)

Subject: Azorean waters: protection of biogeographically sensitive areas

During her visit to the Azores, Commissioner Maria Damanaki was asked whether the Commission and the Council would call for the protection of biogeographically sensitive areas in Azorean waters, during negotiations on the common fisheries policy.

According to the media, the Commissioner replied that this was something that needed to be done. She added that she admired local fishermen for using good, eco-friendly methods and for respecting both stock and fish, which is why the Commission wanted to respect their efforts by protecting these areas and their fish stocks. She stated that this was the least the Commission could do.

— How will the Commission try and make the Council aware of this issue?

— Given the Commissioner's obvious admiration for Azorean fishermen, what action and measures will it take to provide them with the support they deserve and the protection they are seeking?

Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission

(26 April 2013)

The Commission has ensured that the Council is well aware of the biological importance of the area around the Azores and of the need to protect its deep-water habitats. The Council undertook detailed discussions on this issue in particular during the adoption of Regulation (EC) No 1568/2005 ⁽¹⁾ amending Regulation (EC) No 850/98 as regards the protection of deep-water coral reefs from the effects of fishing in certain areas of the Atlantic Ocean.

The Commission is giving a special consideration to small-scale fisheries around Azores and other outermost regions. The Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answer to Written Question E-002596/2013 ⁽²⁾.

⁽¹⁾ OJ L 252, 28.9.2005.

⁽²⁾ In course.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita P-002720/13
a la Comisión**

Esther Herranz García (PPE)

(8 de marzo de 2013)

Asunto: Promoción de la carne de vacuno

En los últimos días estamos asistiendo a una escalada mediática sobre la inclusión de carne de caballo en los preparados cárnicos elaborados con vacuno.

Evidentemente, estas noticias están generando una disminución de la confianza del consumidor en todos los preparados cárnicos y, especialmente, los elaborados con vacuno, con la consiguiente reducción del consumo de carne de vacuno, cuya tendencia lamentablemente viene disminuyendo en los últimos años sin que se realice acción correctora alguna por parte de la Comisión.

Dado que el sector de la carne de vacuno es una víctima colateral de esta situación, ¿qué medidas piensa adoptar la Comisión para normalizar el consumo de carne de vacuno?

¿Tiene pensado la Comisión realizar algún tipo de acción o campaña que contrarreste la actual presión mediática y que frene la caída de consumo de carne de vacuno?

Respuesta del Sr. Ciolos en nombre de la Comisión

(18 de abril de 2013)

Hasta el momento, no hay indicios de se haya producido una caída del consumo de carne de vacuno como consecuencia del llamado escándalo de la carne de caballo. Es más, algunas fuentes indican un cambio positivo en la actitud de los consumidores hacia la carne de vacuno producida al amparo de regímenes de certificación de la calidad.

En cualquier caso, la UE dispone cada año de fondos para cofinanciar medidas de información y promoción de productos [Reglamento (CE) n° 3/2008 del Consejo ⁽¹⁾], incluida la carne de vacuno producida con arreglo a un régimen comunitario o nacional de certificación de la calidad.

Además, para tranquilizar a los consumidores, la Comisión adoptó inmediatamente después de que comenzara la crisis una recomendación sobre un plan coordinado de control, cofinanciado por la Unión, que aboga por efectuar en toda la UE controles de los alimentos que contengan carne de vacuno, para detectar los casos de fraude en el etiquetado, y de la carne de caballo destinada al consumo humano.

⁽¹⁾ DO L 3 de 5.1.2008.

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-002720/13
to the Commission**

Esther Herranz García (PPE)

(8 March 2013)

Subject: Promotion of beef

In recent days there has been widespread media outrage over horsemeat found in prepared meat products labelled as beef.

The news has clearly damaged consumer confidence in all prepared meat products, especially those made with beef, and has resulted in a drop in beef consumption, which has unfortunately been declining for some years without prompting the Commission to take any remedial action.

Given that this scandal has caused significant collateral damage to the beef sector, what action does the Commission intend to take to restore normal beef consumption levels?

Does the Commission plan to take any action or launch a campaign to counter the effects of the current adverse media publicity and to curb the fall in beef consumption?

Answer given by Mr Ciolos on behalf of the Commission

(18 April 2013)

There is so far no evidence of a drop in beef consumption as a result of the so-called horsemeat scandal and even certain sources indicate a positive change in consumer's behaviour regarding beef meat that is produced under certified quality schemes.

In any case, every year EU promotion funds are made available for the co-financing of information and promotion measures (Council Regulation (EC) 3/2008 ⁽¹⁾) including promotion measures for beef meat — produced in accordance with a Community or a national quality scheme.

Furthermore, with the view to reassure consumers, the Commission has responded in the immediate aftermath of the crisis by adopting a recommendation on a coordinated control plan, which is co-financed by the Union, calling for EU-wide controls on food containing beef meat to detect fraudulent labelling as well as on horse meat destined for human consumption.

⁽¹⁾ OJ L 3, 5.1.2008.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002722/13
a la Comisión**

Vicente Miguel Garcés Ramón (S&D)

(8 de marzo de 2013)

Asunto: Solicitud de documentación sobre el cumplimiento dado por España al Reglamento (UE) n° 1219/2012

El día 22 de febrero de 2013 solicité a la Comisión Europea que me enviara copia de la documentación remitida por el Gobierno de España en cumplimiento de la normativa fijada por el Reglamento (UE) n° 1219/2012. El día 26 de febrero recibí una comunicación escrita donde se me indicaba que no tenían autorización para que me fuera enviada la documentación solicitada.

Como miembro titular de la Comisión de Mercado Interior y Protección del Consumidor, sigo teniendo un gran interés en conocer la información remitida por el Gobierno de España a la Comisión en cumplimiento del Reglamento (UE) n° 1219/2012. Ante esta negativa, me gustaría conocer cuál es el fundamento jurídico sobre el que se sustenta la no transmisión de dicha información a un diputado europeo que tiene interés en conocerla.

Respuesta del Sr. De Gucht en nombre de la Comisión

(3 de mayo de 2013)

El Reglamento (CE) n° 1219/2012 establece la posibilidad de que los Estados miembros puedan solicitar a la Comisión autorización para mantener en vigor, negociar o firmar acuerdos bilaterales de inversión con terceros países. Concretamente, establece dicho Reglamento la obligación de que la Comisión remita al Parlamento la siguiente información:

1. La Comisión dispone hasta el 8 de mayo de 2013 para publicar en el *Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea* la lista de los acuerdos firmados antes del 1 de diciembre de 2009 que le hayan sido notificados por los Estados miembros; también compete a la Comisión publicar cada doce meses una lista completa con todos los acuerdos que le hayan sido notificados.
2. La Comisión ha de informar al Parlamento Europeo de su decisión de autorizar a los Estados miembros a iniciar negociaciones, firmar o permitir la entrada en vigor de acuerdos bilaterales de inversión.
3. El Comité para los Acuerdos de Inversión, que asiste a la Comisión en la aplicación del mencionado Reglamento, está sujeto al procedimiento consultivo del artículo 4 del Reglamento (CE) n° 182/2011. Por consiguiente, también se aplica en este caso el artículo 10 de este último Reglamento, por el que se regula la información sobre las deliberaciones de los comités.
4. Antes del 10 de enero de 2020 la Comisión ha de presentar al Parlamento Europeo y al Consejo un informe sobre la aplicación del Reglamento (CE) n° 1219/2012.

La Comisión lamenta que se haya producido un malentendido acerca de la petición que le ha sido dirigida. Si bien es cierto que el Reglamento (CE) n° 1219/2012 impide que la Comisión pueda revelar toda notificación de las autoridades españolas que equivalga a confirmar la celebración de unas negociaciones que podrían estar todavía en curso, con sumo gusto compartirá la Comisión cualquier información sobre tratados bilaterales de inversión ya celebrados y que sean de dominio público.

En el enlace que figura en la nota a pie de página hallará Su Señoría todos los datos sobre los 69 tratados bilaterales de inversión celebrados por España ⁽¹⁾.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.comercio.gob.es/es-ES/inversiones-exteriores/acuerdos-internacionales/acuerdos-promocion-proteccion-reciproca-inversiones-appris/Paginas/lista-appri-vigor.aspx>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002722/13
to the Commission**

Vicente Miguel Garcés Ramón (S&D)

(8 March 2013)

Subject: Request for documentation on Spain's compliance with Regulation (EU) No 1219/2012

On 22 February 2013, I asked the Commission to send me a copy of the documentation submitted by the Spanish Government in compliance with the rules established by Regulation (EU) No 1219/2012. On 26 February, I received a written communication stating that they were not authorised to send me the requested documentation.

As a full member of the Committee on the internal market and Consumer Protection (IMCO), I am still very interested in finding out about the information submitted by the Spanish Government to the Commission in compliance with Regulation (EU) No 1219/2012. In the light of this refusal, I would like to know what the legal basis is for not transmitting this information to a Member of the European Parliament who is interested in finding out about it.

Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission

(3 May 2013)

Regulation (EC) No 1219/2012 provides for the possibility for Member States to request authorisation from the Commission to maintain in force, negotiate or sign, bilateral investment agreements with third countries. It provides specifically for the information of Parliament as follows:

1. The Commission shall publish in the *Official Journal* by 8 May 2013, the list of agreements signed before 1 December 2009 and notified by Member States and shall also publish annually the list of notified agreements.
2. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament of its decisions to authorise Member States to enter into negotiations, sign or allow the entry into force of bilateral investment agreements.
3. The Committee for Investment Agreements, which assists the Commission in implementing the regulation, is subject to the advisory procedure of Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 182/2011. Therefore, Article 10 of that regulation, on the information of committee proceedings, applies as well.
4. The Commission shall present to Parliament and to Council a report on the application of Regulation (EC) No 1219/2012 by 10 January 2020.

The Commission regrets that there seems to be a misunderstanding on the request which was put to it. While the Commission cannot disclose the Spanish notification under Regulation (EC) No 1219/2012 as such because it does entail confirmation on ongoing negotiations, the Commission is more than happy to share information on already concluded Spanish BITs which are in the public domain.

Details on the 69 BITs of Spain can be found at the following link ⁽¹⁾.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.comercio.gob.es/es-ES/inversiones-exteriores/acuerdos-internacionales/acuerdos-promocion-proteccion-reciproca-inversiones-appri/Paginas/lista-appri-vigor.aspx>

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-002723/13
an die Kommission
Renate Sommer (PPE)
(8. März 2013)

Betrifft: Kennzeichnung von Fructose für Verbraucher mit einer Unverträglichkeit

In der EU leiden zahlreiche Menschen an einer Fructosemalabsorption. Allein in Deutschland sind schätzungsweise 2 von 3 Kindern und jeder 3. Erwachsene von einer solchen Lebensmittelunverträglichkeit betroffen (Quelle: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Ernährung).

Die Unverträglichkeit von Fructose, welche vor allem in Früchten, Honig und auch immer mehr Obstsaften und Erfrischungsgetränken vorkommt, führt zu Magen- und Darmbeschwerden und kann langfristig sogar zu einer Vergrößerung der Leber führen. Betroffenen Verbrauchern wird daher geraten, die Aufnahme von Fructose einzuschränken oder Fruchtzucker gänzlich zu vermeiden.

Normalerweise können Verbraucher mit Allergien oder Unverträglichkeiten mögliche allergene Stoffe durch den Blick auf das Zutatenverzeichnis identifizieren. Da Fructose gemäß dem aktuellen Lebensmittelrecht allerdings unter die allgemeine Definition von Zucker fällt, sind Hersteller nicht dazu verpflichtet, Fructose als solche zu kennzeichnen, sondern erfüllen mit der Angabe „Zucker“ im Zutatenverzeichnis die Angabepflicht. Folglich können Verbraucher, die unter einer Fructosemalabsorption leiden, nicht immer eindeutig erkennen, ob Lebensmittel Fructose enthalten.

1. Ist sich die Kommission der Problematik des zunehmenden Einsatzes von Fructose insbesondere in Erfrischungsgetränken bewusst?
2. Plant die Kommission, die Definition von Zucker zu spezifizieren und die Verpflichtung zur Kennzeichnung von Fructose einzuführen?

Antwort von Herrn Borg im Namen der Kommission
(7. Mai 2013)

Gemäß den EU-Rechtsvorschriften über die Kennzeichnung von Lebensmitteln ⁽¹⁾ müssen Lebensmittelzutaten auf dem Etikett mit ihrem spezifischen Namen, wie er in den EU-Rechtsvorschriften oder nationalen Bestimmungen vorgesehen ist, bezeichnet werden.

Diesbezüglich enthält die Richtlinie 2001/111/EG über bestimmte Zuckerarten für die menschliche Ernährung ⁽²⁾ die Bestimmung des Begriffs „Fruktose“ und beschränkt die Verwendung dieser Bezeichnung auf Erzeugnisse, die bestimmte Merkmale aufweisen. Fruktose fällt nicht unter die allgemeine Definition von Zucker und ist daher in der Zutatenliste mit der spezifischen offiziellen Bezeichnung „Fruktose“ anzugeben.

Was Aspekte im Zusammenhang mit Allergien und Unverträglichkeiten aufgrund von Fruktose anbelangt, möchte die Kommission die Frau Abgeordnete auf die Antwort auf die schriftliche Anfrage E-002310/2012 ⁽³⁾ verweisen. In diesem Zusammenhang ist zu betonen, dass das in dieser Antwort genannte wissenschaftliche Gutachten der Europäischen Behörde für Lebensmittelsicherheit aufgrund der Komplexität der Arbeiten und der Tatsache, dass manche der diesbezüglichen Projekte noch nicht abgeschlossen sind, erst in der ersten Jahreshälfte 2014 erwartet wird.

⁽¹⁾ Richtlinie 2000/13/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 20. März 2000 zur Angleichung der Rechtsvorschriften der Mitgliedstaaten über die Etikettierung und Aufmachung von Lebensmitteln sowie die Werbung hierfür, ABL K 109 vom 6.5.2000, S. 29.

⁽²⁾ Richtlinie 2001/111/EG des Rates vom 20. Dezember 2001 über bestimmte Zuckerarten für die menschliche Ernährung, ABL L 10 vom 12.1.2002, S. 53.

⁽³⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/de/parliamentary-questions.html>

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002723/13
to the Commission
Renate Sommer (PPE)
(8 March 2013)

Subject: Labelling of fructose for consumers with an intolerance

Numerous people in the EU suffer from fructose malabsorption. In Germany alone, it is estimated that two out of three children and one in three adults are affected by this type of food intolerance (source: German Nutrition Society (DGE)).

An intolerance of fructose, which is found, in particular, in fruit, honey and an increasing number of fruit juices and soft drinks, results in gastro-intestinal ailments, and in the long term can even lead to enlargement of the liver. The consumers affected by this are therefore advised to limit their intake of fructose or to avoid it completely.

Consumers with allergies and intolerances can normally identify possible allergenic substances by looking at the list of ingredients. However, as fructose falls within the general definition of sugar under current food legislation, manufacturers are not obliged to label fructose as such, but meet their information obligation by indicating 'sugar' in the ingredients list. Consequently, consumers suffering from fructose malabsorption are not able to ascertain for certain whether foods contain fructose.

1. Is the Commission aware of the problem of the increasing use of fructose, in particular in soft drinks?
2. Does it plan to make the definition of sugar more specific and introduce a labelling obligation for fructose?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission
(7 May 2013)

According to the EU legislation on food labelling ⁽¹⁾, food ingredients shall be designated on the label by their specific name as provided in the EU legislation or national provisions.

In this regard, Directive 2001/111/EC relating to certain sugars intended for human consumption ⁽²⁾ establishes the definition of 'fructose' and allows the use of this designation only to products containing specific characteristics. As such, fructose does not fall under the general definition of sugar and therefore, must be mentioned in the list of ingredients by its specific legal name — 'fructose'.

For aspects related to the allergies and intolerances caused by fructose, the Commission would like to refer the Honourable Member to the answer given to the Written Question E-002310/2012 ⁽³⁾. In this regard, it should be highlighted that due to the complexity of the work and the fact that certain projects on the matter are still ongoing; the scientific opinion of the European Food Safety Authority referred to in the answer is only expected in the first half of 2014.

⁽¹⁾ Directive 2000/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the labelling, presentation and advertising of foodstuffs, OJ L 109, 6.5.2000, p. 29.

⁽²⁾ Council Directive 2001/111/EC of 20 December 2001 relating to certain sugars intended for human consumption, OJ L 10, 12.1.2002, p. 53.

⁽³⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html>

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002725/13

alla Commissione

Andrea Zanoni (ALDE)

(8 marzo 2013)

Oggetto: Trattamento di rifiuti a Zero Branco (TV) in possibile violazione delle direttive «VIA» 2011/92/UE e «Rifiuti» 2008/98/CE

La Mestrinaro S.p.A., sita a Zero Branco (TV), dedita, tra l'altro, all'attività di riutilizzo di inerti e sottoprodotti industriali, nel 2004 presentava un progetto finalizzato a ottenere l'aumento delle quantità e qualità di rifiuti speciali (pericolosi e non pericolosi) trattabili; l'azienda, che ha sede nel mezzo di una zona residenziale e agricola, famosa per la produzione di Radicchio Rosso di Treviso IGP, veniva autorizzata dalla Giunta regionale del Veneto a iniziare i lavori, grazie alla delibera n. 882 del 7 aprile 2009 di approvazione del progetto, in seguito al favorevole parere obbligatorio della Commissione VIA (Valutazione di Impatto Ambientale) regionale. Tale atto veniva annullato con ordinanza del Consiglio di Stato del 29 settembre 2009, n. 4962⁽¹⁾ per irregolarità nella valutazione della compatibilità territoriale e ambientale del progetto medesimo e a causa della sussistenza di una condanna definitiva per il reato di traffico illecito di rifiuti a carico del legale rappresentante dell'azienda stessa.

La Mestrinaro S.p.A. chiedeva quindi alla Giunta regionale del Veneto un riesame del progetto, ottenendo una seconda approvazione dello stesso (previo secondo parere favorevole della Commissione regionale VIA) grazie alla delibera n. 100 del 26 gennaio 2010; anche tale atto, tuttavia, veniva annullato dal Consiglio di Stato con sentenza del 28 dicembre 2011, n. 6917⁽²⁾. In forza di ciò, il comune di Zero Branco (TV) decideva di emanare un'apposita ordinanza⁽³⁾ (poi sospesa dal TAR del Veneto⁽⁴⁾) volta a intimare la demolizione dei fabbricati nel frattempo costruiti dall'azienda, e la Provincia di Treviso chiedeva l'allontanamento dei rifiuti non conformi già ricevuti. L'azienda provvedeva solo parzialmente all'allontanamento⁽⁵⁾, lamentando difficoltà concernenti i rifiuti solidi aventi codice CER 19 13 02⁽⁶⁾, a causa, a suo giudizio, dell'eccessivo costo dell'operazione⁽⁷⁾; la Provincia, quindi, decideva di venire incontro alle esigenze economiche dell'azienda autorizzando il trattamento di tali rifiuti non conformi⁽⁸⁾. A questo punto, la Mestrinaro S.p.A. ripresentava per la terza volta il progetto ottenendo il terzo parere positivo della Commissione regionale VIA, preludio della probabile imminente emanazione di una terza delibera autorizzativa da parte della Giunta regionale del Veneto.

La Commissione è a conoscenza di quanto esposto? Quali iniziative intende intraprendere per controllare il rispetto della normativa comunitaria applicabile a tale controversa vicenda?

Risposta di Janez Potočnik a nome della Commissione

(16 aprile 2013)

In base agli elementi forniti dall'onorevole deputato, la Commissione non individua, in questa fase, alcuna violazione della direttiva 2008/98/CE⁽⁹⁾ relativa ai rifiuti. Inoltre, quanto alle presunte violazioni della direttiva 2011/92/UE⁽¹⁰⁾ concernente la valutazione dell'impatto ambientale, non rientra tra i ruoli istituzionali della Commissione commentare procedimenti giudiziari nazionali in corso di competenza di uno Stato membro.

⁽¹⁾ Ordinanza di accoglimento dell'appello del comune di Zero Branco contro l'ordinanza del TAR (Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale) del Veneto 15.07.2009, n. 723.

⁽²⁾ Sentenza di accoglimento dell'appello del comune di Zero Branco contro la sentenza del TAR del Veneto 5.11.2010, n. 5981.

⁽³⁾ Ordinanza del Comune di Zero Branco n. 1 del 28.2.2012.

⁽⁴⁾ In seguito all'accoglimento del ricorso dell'azienda da parte del TAR del Veneto con ordinanza 7.6.2012, n. 352.

⁽⁵⁾ Conferendo i rifiuti presso la Discarica CO.VE.RI. S.c.a.r.l. di Silea (TV).

⁽⁶⁾ In base alle categorie di cui alla decisione della Commissione europea 2000/5320/CE.

⁽⁷⁾ Come risulta da una comunicazione della Mestrinaro S.p.A. inviata alla Provincia di Treviso il 22.06.2012.

⁽⁸⁾ Decreto della Provincia di Treviso n. 684 del 19.11.2012.

⁽⁹⁾ G.U. L. 312 del 22.11.2008.

⁽¹⁰⁾ G.U. L. 26 del 28.1.2012.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002725/13
to the Commission
Andrea Zanoni (ALDE)
 (8 March 2013)

Subject: Waste treatment in Zero Branco (Treviso), possibly in breach of the EIA Directive 2011/92/EU and the Waste Directive 2008/98/EC

In 2004, Mestrinaro S.p.A., in Zero Branco (Treviso), a company which, among other things, re-uses inert waste and industrial by-products, submitted a project seeking to obtain an increase in the quantity and quality of special waste (both hazardous and non-hazardous) it could treat. The company, which is based in the middle of a residential and agricultural area that is famous for the production of *Radicchio Rosso di Treviso* IGP, received authorisation from the Regional Council of Veneto to start the work in question, further to Resolution No 882 of 7 April 2009 approving the project, in the wake of the compulsory favourable opinion of the regional EIA (Environmental Impact Assessment) Committee. This act was subsequently cancelled by Order No 4962 ⁽¹⁾ of the Council of State of 29 September 2009, due to irregularities in the assessment of the spatial and environmental compatibility of the project and because the legal representative of the company had been convicted of the crime of illegal waste trafficking.

Mestrinaro S.p.A. then asked the Regional Council of Veneto to review the project, obtaining a second approval of the same project (after a second favourable opinion by the regional EIA Committee), through Resolution No 100 of 26 January 2010. This act, too, however, was cancelled by the Council of State in its judgment No 6917 of 28 December 2011 ⁽²⁾. Because of this, the municipality of Zero Branco decided to issue a special order ⁽³⁾ (later suspended by the Regional Administrative Court of Veneto ⁽⁴⁾) for the demolition of the buildings which had, in the meantime, been built by the company; the Province of Treviso also called for the removal of the non-compliant waste which had already been received.

The company removed the waste only partially ⁽⁵⁾, claiming it was having difficulties with the solid waste bearing the code 19 13 02 ⁽⁶⁾, because, in its opinion, the operation was too costly ⁽⁷⁾. The Province, therefore, decided to meet the company half way and authorised the treatment of such non-compliant waste ⁽⁸⁾. At that point, Mestrinaro S.p.A. submitted its project for the third time, obtaining a third positive opinion from the regional EIA Committee, which is likely to lead to the imminent issuance of a third resolution by the Regional Council of Veneto approving the project.

Is the Commission aware of this? What steps will it take to monitor compliance with the Community rules applicable to this controversial matter?

Answer given by Mr Potočník on behalf of the Commission
 (16 April 2013)

Based on the elements provided by the Honourable Member, the Commission cannot detect at this stage any violation of Directive 2008/98/EC ⁽⁹⁾ on waste. Furthermore, regarding the alleged breaches of Directive 2011/92/EU ⁽¹⁰⁾ on Environmental Impact Assessment, it is not the institutional role of the Commission to comment on ongoing national legal proceedings pertaining to a Member State.

⁽¹⁾ An order upholding the appeal by the municipality of Zero Branco against Order No 723 of the Regional Administrative Court (TAR) of Veneto of 15.7.2009.

⁽²⁾ A judgment upholding the appeal by the municipality of Zero Branco against Order No 5981 of the Regional Administrative Court (TAR) of Veneto of 5.11.2010.

⁽³⁾ Order No 1 of the Municipality of Zero Branco of 28.2.2012.

⁽⁴⁾ Further to the upholding of the company's appeal by the Veneto TAR, through Order No 352 of 7.6.2012.

⁽⁵⁾ Sending the waste to the CO.VE.RI. S.c.a.r.l. landfill of Silea (Treviso).

⁽⁶⁾ In accordance with the categories under Commission Decision 2000/5320/EC.

⁽⁷⁾ See letter sent by Mestrinaro S.p.A. to the Province of Treviso on 22.6.2012.

⁽⁸⁾ Decree No 684 of the Province of Treviso of 19.11.2012.

⁽⁹⁾ OJ L 312, 22.11.2008.

⁽¹⁰⁾ OJ L 26, 28.1.2012.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002726/13

alla Commissione

Claudio Morganti (EFD)

(8 marzo 2013)

Oggetto: Problematiche degli aeroporti toscani

Nei giorni scorsi è stata presentata dalla Giunta Regionale Toscana una Variante al PIT (Piano di Indirizzo Territoriale) che prevede anche la costruzione di una nuova pista dell'Aeroporto di Firenze, convergente e parallela all'Autostrada A11.

Da più parti vi sono timori che questa nuova opera possa arrecare notevoli disagi e danni ambientali, come del resto segnalato da un rapporto ambientale dell'Arpat (Agenzia regionale per la protezione ambientale della Toscana): il passaggio di numerosi aerei sopra un'area fortemente urbanizzata come quella di Prato (terza città dell'Italia centrale per numero di abitanti) causerebbe infatti un notevole incremento del livello di inquinamento acustico in diverse zone della città e nei Comuni limitrofi.

Il Parlamento europeo si è recentemente espresso per una maggiore tutela della popolazione rispetto all'inquinamento acustico aeroportuale, seguendo nei fatti le linee già delineate dalla Commissione europea nella sua comunicazione 828 del 2011.

1. La Commissione è a conoscenza di questo progetto? Come intervengono nella questione le direttive VAS (2001/42/CE) e VIA (2011/92/UE)? Sono state correttamente applicate?
2. Non ritiene auspicabile, nell'ottica di una migliore integrazione e per sviluppare a pieno le potenzialità della Regione, puntare su un unico aeroporto, che per molti aspetti non può che essere Pisa, e sviluppare al meglio i collegamenti di questo scalo con il resto delle destinazioni regionali?
3. Non ritiene inoltre che lo scalo di Pisa possa rientrare a pieno titolo tra i core network aeroportuali della rete TEN-T europea, come invece escluso dal recente Piano Nazionale per lo Sviluppo Aeroportuale del Governo italiano?

Risposta di Siim Kallas a nome della Commissione

(30 aprile 2013)

1. La Regione Toscana ha comunicato alla Commissione che il piano di indirizzo territoriale è attualmente oggetto di una valutazione ai sensi della direttiva 2001/42/CE ⁽¹⁾ sulla valutazione ambientale strategica (VAS) e che, inoltre, sarà svolta una valutazione conformemente alla direttiva 2011/92/UE ⁽²⁾ sulla valutazione di impatto ambientale (VIA) riguardante la nuova pista dell'aeroporto di Firenze nella fase di definizione del progetto. La Regione Toscana ha altresì confermato alla Commissione che la valutazione di impatto ambientale terrà conto della valutazione ambientale strategica.
2. La Commissione sta valutando un progetto di infrastruttura riguardante la costruzione di una ferrovia leggera fra l'aeroporto di Pisa e la stazione centrale della città, presentato per ottenere un cofinanziamento a titolo del Fondo europeo di sviluppo regionale nell'ambito del programma operativo regionale 2007-2013.
3. Sulla base della metodologia di pianificazione della rete TEN-T ⁽³⁾, non è possibile includere l'aeroporto di Pisa nella rete centrale TEN-T in quanto non soddisfa i criteri corrispondenti: Pisa non è un aeroporto di un nodo urbano centrale (capitale di uno Stato membro, area MEGA secondo l'atlante ESPON del 2006, conurbazione con oltre 1 milione di abitanti); inoltre, con i suoi 4,5 milioni di passeggeri all'anno, l'aeroporto di Pisa non raggiunge la soglia di volume di circa 7,8 milioni di passeggeri. Anche il volume del traffico merci dell'aeroporto si attesta al di sotto della soglia richiesta.

⁽¹⁾ GUL 197 del 21.7.2001.

⁽²⁾ GUL 26 del 28.1.2012.

⁽³⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/infrastructure/doc/web_methodology.pdf

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002726/13
to the Commission**

Claudio Morganti (EFD)

(8 March 2013)

Subject: Issues relating to Tuscany's airports

In recent days, an amendment to the Territorial Policy Plan has been submitted to the Regional Council of Tuscany, providing for the construction of a new runway at Florence airport, convergent and parallel with respect to the A11 motorway.

Various parties are voicing fears that this new project could cause serious environmental disturbances and damage, as highlighted in an environmental report produced by ARPAT (Regional Agency for Environmental Protection in Tuscany): countless aeroplanes flying over a densely built-up area such as Prato (the third largest city of central Italy in terms of inhabitants) would significantly increase the noise pollution level in various parts of the city and in neighbouring towns.

Recently, the European Parliament came out in favour of affording greater protection to the population from noise pollution from airports, following, in practice, the guidelines already laid down by the Commission in its communication No 828 of 2011.

1. Is the Commission aware of this project? What part do the SEA (Strategic Environmental Assessment) (2001/42/EC) and EIA (Environmental Impact Assessment) (2011/92/EU) Directives play in this matter? Have they been applied correctly?
2. With a view to better integration and to fully develop the potential of the region, does the Commission not consider it desirable to focus on a single airport, which in many ways can only be Pisa, and maximise development of the links from this airport to the other regional destinations?
3. Furthermore, does it not believe that Pisa airport could be a fully fledged part of the core airport networks of the trans-European transport network (TEN-T), whereas it was excluded from the recent National Airport Development Plan prepared by the Italian Government?

Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission

(30 April 2013)

1. The Tuscany Region has informed the Commission that an assessment according to Directive 2001/42/EC ⁽¹⁾ (on Strategic Environment Assessment or SEA) is currently ongoing on the Territorial Policy Plan (*Piano di Indirizzo Territoriale*) and that, furthermore, an assessment according to 2011/92/EU ⁽²⁾ (on Environmental Impact Assessment or EIA) will be carried out on the new runway at Florence Airport in the project definition phase. The Tuscany Region also confirmed to the Commission that the EIA procedure will take into account the results of the SEA procedure.
2. The Commission is currently assessing an infrastructure project relating to the construction of a light railway line between the Pisa airport and the Pisa main train station submitted for co-financing by the European Regional Development Fund in the framework of the 2007-2013 Regional Operational Programme.
3. Based on the TEN-T planning methodology ⁽³⁾, it is not possible to include Pisa airport in the TEN-T core network, as it does not fulfil any of the corresponding criteria: Pisa is not an airport of an urban core node (MS capital, MEGA city according to ESPON atlas 2006, conurbation of more than 1 million inhabitants); nor does it, with about 4.5 million passengers per year, reach the volume threshold of about 7.8 million passengers. The airport's throughput of air cargo also falls below the required threshold.

⁽¹⁾ OJ L 197, 21.7.2001.

⁽²⁾ OJ L 26, 28.1.2012.

⁽³⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/infrastructure/doc/web_methodology.pdf

(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002727/13
do Komisji**

Jacek Włosowicz (EFD)

(8 marca 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Wsparcie dla organizacji broniących praw ofiar przestępstw

Komisja Europejska w wielu swoich programach wspiera organizacje pozarządowe. Do naszego biura wpłynęło pytanie od organizacji świadczącej pomoc ofiarom przestępstw oraz walczącej z korupcją dotyczące wsparcia finansowego dla takich organizacji ze środków unijnych.

1. Czy Komisja wspiera takie inicjatywy z budżetu UE?
2. Z jakich funduszy udzielane jest to wsparcie i jak o nie aplikować?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarz Viviane Reding w imieniu Komisji

(22 kwietnia 2013 r.)

Komisja może udzielić wsparcia organizacji pozarządowej świadczącej pomoc ofiarom przestępstw i zwalczającym korupcję w ramach programów szczegółowych „Wymiar sprawiedliwości w sprawach karnych” (JPEN, zarządzanego przez DG ds. Sprawiedliwości) oraz „Zapobieganie i walka z przestępczością” (ISEC, zarządzanego przez DG do Spraw Wewnętrznych).

Informacje na temat celów tych programów, możliwości finansowania oraz procedur aplikacyjnych odnaleźć można na stronie Internetowej Komisji:

JPEN: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/grants/programmes/criminal/index_en.htm

ISEC: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/financing/fundings/security-and-safeguarding-liberties/prevention-of-and-fight-against-crime/index_en.htm

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002727/13
to the Commission**

Jacek Włosowicz (EFD)

(8 March 2013)

Subject: Support for organisations defending the rights of crime victims

The Commission provides non-governmental organisations with support through many of its programmes. An organisation that helps the victims of crime and combats corruption recently contacted our office with a query concerning EU funding for such organisations.

1. Does the Commission provide support for such initiatives from the EU budget?
2. From what funds is this support allocated, and what is the application procedure?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission

(22 April 2013)

The Commission can fund a non-governmental organisation that supports victims of crime and combats corruption under the Criminal Justice Support Programme ('JPEN', managed by DG Justice) and the Prevention of and Fight against Crime ('ISEC', managed by DG HOME).

Information about the objectives, funding possibilities and procedures under these programmes is found on the Commission's website:

JPEN: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/grants/programmes/criminal/index_en.htm

ISEC: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/financing/fundings/security-and-safeguarding-liberties/prevention-of-and-fight-against-crime/index_en.htm

(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002728/13
do Komisji**

Marek Henryk Migalski (ECR)

(8 marca 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Białoruska lista prewencyjna

Władze białoruskie wprowadziły kolejne prawo wymierzone przeciwko działalności niezależnych organizacji pozarządowych. Opiera się ono na rejestracji prewencyjnej, która w założeniach jest formą zapobiegania przestępstwom, gdyż mają się na niej znajdować osoby, które zagrażają bezpieczeństwu, jednak w praktyce zasady wpisywania na ową listę są zupełnie subiektywne i niejasne. Policja oraz inne organy państwowe mogą wpisać do rejestru prewencyjnego te osoby, które ich zdaniem przyczyniły się do szkody państwa lub są zagrożeniem dla bezpieczeństwa.

Zgodnie z ustawą organy państwowe nie mają obowiązku informowania obywateli o tym, że zostali wpisani na listę rejestracji prewencyjnej. Zapis ten jest trudny dla organizacji pozarządowych, których członkowie znaleźli się na takiej liście. Jeśli bowiem przewodniczący NGO wpisany do rejestru nie podejmie żadnych niezbędnych kroków w ciągu 2 miesięcy od daty wpisania na listę, jego organizacja jest likwidowana. Wydaje się, iż prawo to będzie stosowane jako mechanizm represji i pozbywania się organizacji niewygodnych dla reżimu.

W związku z powyższym pragnę zapytać Komisję, czy ma zamiar interweniować poprzez swoją delegaturę w Mińsku w kwestii subiektywności nowego białoruskiego prawa.

Czy Komisja, w ramach promowania europejskich wartości i praworządności, ma zamiar pomóc organizacjom pozarządowym, którym z powodu nowych zapisów grozi lub będzie grozić zamknięcie?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Štefana Fülego w imieniu Komisji

(17 kwietnia 2013 r.)

Unia Europejska, w szczególności poprzez swoją delegację w Mińsku, uważnie monitoruje sytuację w dziedzinie praw człowieka na Białorusi i znany jest jej nowy prezydencki dekret w jeszcze większym stopniu komplikujący życie organizacjom pozarządowym i prywatnym przedsiębiorstwom. UE wykorzystuje każdą okazję, aby przypomnieć władzom Białorusi o potrzebie poprawy sytuacji w dziedzinie praw człowieka, wspierania demokracji i praworządności. UE zaproponuje również na sesji Rady Praw Człowieka w czerwcu 2013 r. odnowienie mandatu specjalnego sprawozdawcy ds. sytuacji w zakresie praw człowieka na Białorusi.

Pomoc UE dla Białorusi skupia się bezpośrednio i pośrednio na wsparciu związanym z potrzebami obywateli i z demokratyzacją. Unia Europejska nadal udziela wsparcia organizacjom społeczeństwa obywatelskiego i niezależnym mediom na Białorusi w rozwijaniu ich możliwości instytucjonalnych w przedłużającej się sytuacji stosowania przez władze środków represyjnych.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002728/13
to the Commission**

Marek Henryk Migalski (ECR)

(8 March 2013)

Subject: Belarusian preventive watch list

The Belarusian authorities have introduced yet another law targeting the activities of independent non-governmental organisations. The law is based on preventive registration, which is seen as a means of preventing crime by including the names of people who pose a security threat. However, the rules relating to inclusion on this list are, in practice, utterly subjective and unclear. The police and other state bodies may include people on the list if, in their opinion, they have contributed to harming the state or if they pose a security threat.

Under the new law, state bodies are not obliged to notify citizens if they are included on the preventive watch list. This clause makes it difficult for NGOs whose members are on the list, since NGO directors who are on the list and who do not take the necessary steps within two months from the date of their inclusion will have their organisations closed down. It appears that this law will be used as a means to persecute and get rid of organisations that are inconvenient to the regime.

Does the Commission intend to make representations through its delegation in Minsk with regard to the subjective character of the new Belarusian law?

Does the Commission intend, as part of efforts to promote European values and the rule of law, to provide assistance to NGOs which are threatened — or will be threatened — with closure by the new law?

Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission

(17 April 2013)

The EU, in particular through its Delegation in Minsk, is monitoring closely the situation of human rights in Belarus and is aware of a new presidential decree which further complicates the life of NGOs and private companies. The EU takes every opportunity to remind the Belarusian authorities of the need to improve the human rights situation, to promote democracy and the rule of law. The EU will also propose a renewal of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on human rights situation in Belarus at the June 2013 session of the Human Rights Council.

EU assistance to Belarus focuses directly and indirectly on supporting the needs of the population and democratisation. The EU continues to support civil society organisations and the independent media in Belarus to develop their institutional capacity in a prolonged situation of repressive measures.

(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002729/13
do Komisji (Wiceprzewodniczącej/Wysokiej Przedstawiciel)
Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD) oraz Jacek Włosowicz (EFD)
(8 marca 2013 r.)**

Przedmiot: Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel – Terrorystyczne ugrupowania islamskie w Syrii

Wielu analityków zajmujących się konfliktem w Syrii wskazuje na rosnący wpływ grup islamskich w szeregach rebeliantów. Wśród nich znaczącą rolę odgrywają Al Nusra Front oraz Syryjski Front Islamski. Oskarża się je o koneksje z Al Kaidą oraz rekrutowanie mudżahedinów z Afganistanu, Bośni, Kosowa i Albanii. Gen Salim Idriss, szef Syryjskiej Wolnej Armii, podczas swojej wizyty w Parlamencie Europejskim potwierdził stawiane obu ugrupowaniom zarzuty. Podczas dwóch lat trwania konfliktu opisywane organizacje wzięły na siebie odpowiedzialność za przygotowanie i przeprowadzanie wielu ataków bombowych. Wskazuje się również na ich zbrodnie przeciw ludzkości popełniane na zajętych terenach, w tym masowe mordowanie oraz wypędzanie chrześcijan i Alawitów. Przywódcy Al Nusry nie kryją swoich ideologicznych zapędów kontynuowania dżihadu przy pomocy zdobytych w Syrii środków finansowych i militarnych.

1. Jak Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel ocenia ewentualne zagrożenie dla Europy oraz Bliskiego Wschodu ze strony wspomnianych ugrupowań Al Nusra Front oraz Syryjskiego Frontu Islamskiego?
2. Czy Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel zgadza się z twierdzeniem, iż oba ugrupowania stosując akty terroru wobec ludności cywilnej, w tym masowo mordując chrześcijan i Alawitów, popełniają zbrodnie przeciw ludzkości?
3. Unia Europejska na liście organizacji terrorystycznych umieściła Al Kaidę oraz Partię Walczących Kurdystanu. Oba ugrupowania mają szerokie powiązania z organizacją Al Nusra, dostarczając jej materiałów szkoleniowych, broni oraz ludzi. Czy wobec tego Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel rozważa uznanie przez Unię Europejską organizacji Al Nusra Front z Syrii za organizację terrorystyczną?
4. Które ugrupowania walczące w Syrii są beneficjentami unijnej pomocy?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez Wysoką Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodniczącą Catherine Ashton w imieniu
Komisji
(6 maja 2013 r.)**

UE współpracuje z Narodową Koalicją Syryjskich Sił Rewolucyjnych i Opozycyjnych oraz jej przewodniczącym Mu'azem al-Khatibem w celu pokojowego rozwiązania konfliktu. UE zachęca Koalicję między innymi do podtrzymania zobowiązania do przestrzegania zasad praw człowieka i demokracji, dlatego też nie wspiera żadnych ugrupowań, które sprzeciwiają się tym wartościom.

UE przyjęła z zadowoleniem pracę Niezależnej Międzynarodowej Komisji Dochodzeniowej w Sprawie Syrii. W ostatnim sprawozdaniu Komisja wyszczególnia nadużycia popełnione w Syrii, w tym zbrodnie przeciwko ludzkości. Sprawozdanie uwzględnia bezprawne morderstwa chrześcijan, bombardowania okolic zamieszkiwanych przez chrześcijan i druzów w Damaszku oraz masakry i egzekucje alawickich żołnierzy i ludności cywilnej bez należytego procesu. UE angażuje się w doprowadzenie do rozliczenia osób odpowiedzialnych za owe zbrodnie. Warto odnotować, iż niektórzy, jak na przykład przewodniczący Koalicji, Mu'az al-Khatib, uważają, że podłoże tego konfliktu nie jest religijne.

Państwa członkowskie nie dyskutowały na temat kwestii wpisania Frontu Al-Nusra na listę organizacji terrorystycznych. UE nie udziela pomocy ugrupowaniom zbrojnym.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002729/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD) and Jacek Włosowicz (EFD)
(8 March 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Islamist terror groups in Syria

Many analysts of the conflict in Syria point out the growing influence of Islamist groups in the ranks of the rebels. Among these groups, the al-Nusra Front and the Syrian Islamic Front play a major role. They are accused of having links with al-Qaida and of recruiting mujahideen from Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo and Albania. During his visit to the European Parliament, General Salim Idriss, the Chief of Staff of the Free Syrian Army, confirmed the accusations levelled at the two groups. In the two years since the conflict began, these groups have been responsible for preparing and carrying out numerous bombings. There are also indications that they have committed crimes against humanity in areas which they occupy, including mass killings and the expulsion of Christians and Alawites. The leaders of the al-Nusra Front do not hide their ideological drive to use the financial and military aid that they receive in Syria to continue to wage jihad.

1. How does the Vice-President/High Representative assess the potential threat to Europe and the Middle East posed by the al-Nusra Front and the Syrian Islamic Front?
2. Does the VP/HR agree that the acts of terrorism carried out against the civilian population by the two groups, including massacres of Christians and Alawites, constitute crimes against humanity?
3. The EU has included al-Qaida and the Kurdistan Workers' Party on its list of terrorist organisations. Both groups have broad ties to the al-Nusra Front, providing it with training equipment, weapons and people. In this connection, is the VP/HR considering having the EU declare the al-Nusra Front a terrorist organisation?
4. Which groups engaged in fighting in Syria are recipients of EU assistance?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(6 May 2013)

The EU has been working with the Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC) and its leader Muaz al-Khatib towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The EU encourages the SOC to remain committed to the respect of the principles of human rights and democracy, among other things, and thus does not support any groups that go against these values.

The EU has welcomed the work of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry. Its recent report details abuses, among them crimes against humanity, committed in Syria. It lists instances of unlawful killings of Christians, bombing of Christian and Druze neighbourhoods in Damascus as well as massacres and executions of Alawite soldiers and civilians without due process. The EU is committed to ensuring accountability for such crimes. It is important to note that some, like the leader of the SOC, Moaz al-Khatib, believe that the lines of conflict are not sectarian.

There have been no discussions about putting the al-Nusra Front on the list of terrorist organisations among the Member States. The EU is not providing assistance to armed groups.

(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002730/13
do Komisji (Wiceprzewodniczącej/Wysokiej Przedstawiciel)**

Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD)

(8 marca 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel – Ochrona wolności do wyznania podejmowana przez Europejską Służbę Działań Zewnętrznych

W styczniu 2011 r. Parlament Europejski przyjął rezolucję „sytuacja chrześcijan w kontekście wolności wyznania”. Rezolucja nie tylko zwracała uwagę na przypadki łamania praw chrześcijan i potępiała je, lecz wskazywała i zobowiązywała Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoką Przedstawiciel do konkretnych działań.

1. W punkcie 13 rezolucja zobowiązywała do pilnego przedstawienia strategii UE na rzecz egzekwowania prawa człowieka do wolności wyznania, w tym listy sankcji przeciwko państwom, które świadomie unikają chronienia wyznań. Jak Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel zrealizowała ten postulat? Proszę o przesłanie strategii oraz wyników jej realizacji w roku 2012.
2. Jakie działania podejmuje Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel, aby wzmocnić kwestie poszanowania wolności religijnej i wolności wyznania? Szczególnie w państwach, wskazanych np. przez coroczne raporty organizacji Open Doors, w których wolność ta stanowi niedostępne dla wielu dobro. Jakie instrumenty można zastosować, aby zapewnić zagrożonym wspólnotom chrześcijańskim bezpieczeństwo i ochronę, bez względu na to, gdzie się w świecie znajdują?
3. Jak Europejska Służba Działań Zewnętrznych zrealizowała punkt 104 „rezolucji Parlamentu Europejskiego w sprawie rocznego sprawozdania dotyczącego praw człowieka na świecie oraz polityki Unii Europejskiej w tym zakresie, w tym wpływu na strategiczną politykę UE w dziedzinie praw człowieka” z 30 marca 2012 r.?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez Wysoką Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodniczącą Catherine Ashton w imieniu Komisji

(23 maja 2013 r.)

W konkluzjach „w sprawie nietolerancji, dyskryminacji i przemocy ze względu na wyznanie lub przekonania”, przyjętych w lutym 2011 r. na wniosek Wysokiej Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodniczącej, Rada potwierdziła silne zaangażowanie UE w promocję i ochronę wolności religii lub przekonań, w sposób wolny od wszelkiej dyskryminacji. ESDZ, pod kierownictwem Wysokiej Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodniczącej, wykorzystuje pełen zakres możliwości w celu zaangażowania się w sprawę wolności religii lub przekonań na poziomie dwustronnym i wielostronnym, za pośrednictwem dialogów dotyczących praw człowieka, oświadczeń, działań dyplomatycznych, szczególnie odnośnie do sytuacji krajów, w których promocja i obrona wolności religii lub przekonań stanowią jedną z ważniejszych kwestii. UE podjęła starania w celu zdobycia silnego międzyregionalnego poparcia, zwłaszcza na forum ONZ, w walce przeciwko nietolerancji religijnej oraz wsparła inicjatywy w dziedzinie dialogu międzykulturowego i międzyreligijnego dążące do złagodzenia wszelkich pojawiających się napięć.

W celu dalszej intensyfikacji i uwidocznienia działań UE do planu działania przyjętego przez Radę w czerwcu 2012 r. włączono opracowanie publicznych wytycznych UE w sprawie wolności religii lub przekonań, wraz ze strategicznymi ramami UE dotyczącymi praw człowieka i demokracji. Wytyczne zapewnią urzędnikom UE szczegółowe i konkretne mechanizmy działania. Przede wszystkim przypomną one, że państwa mają nadrzędny obowiązek ochrony podlegających ich jurysdykcji wyznawców wszystkich religii, a także osób o przekonaniach nieistotnych i ateistycznych.

Odnośnie do pkt 104 sprawozdania R. Howitta, ESDZ pracuje nad zwiększeniem swoich możliwości w zakresie rozpowszechniania kwestii wolności religii lub przekonań we wszystkich dystryktach, zwłaszcza poprzez specjalne szkolenia na ten temat. Ponadto roczne sprawozdanie na temat praw człowieka i demokracji na świecie zawiera obecnie specjalny rozdział, w którym szczegółowo omawia się działania ESDZ w dziedzinie wolności religii lub przekonań.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002730/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD)
(8 March 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — the European External Action Service's protection of freedom of religious belief

In January 2011, Parliament adopted a resolution on the situation of Christians in the context of freedom of religion. This resolution not only drew attention to and condemned instances in which Christians' rights were violated, it also proposed specific actions and called for the Vice-President/High Representative to implement them.

1. Point 13 of the resolution calls for an EU strategy on enforcing the human right to freedom of religion, including a list of measures against states who knowingly fail to protect religious denominations, to be presented as a matter of urgency. How has the Vice-President/High Representative translated this demand into reality? I should be grateful if you would provide me with the strategy and the results of its implementation in 2012.
2. What steps is the VP/HR taking to place greater emphasis on the issue of respect for freedom of religion and freedom of belief, particularly in countries identified in the Open Doors organisation's annual reports as places where this freedom is denied to many? What instruments can be used to ensure the safety of threatened Christian communities, regardless of where they are in the world?
3. How has the EEAS implemented point 104 of Parliament's resolution of 30 March 2012 on the Annual Report on Human Rights in the World and the European Union's policy on the matter, including implications for the EU's strategic human rights policy?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(23 May 2013)

In the conclusions 'on intolerance, discrimination and violence on the basis of religion or belief' adopted in February 2011 on the HR/VP's proposal, the Council reaffirmed the strong commitment of the EU to the promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief (FoRB) without any discrimination. Under the guidance of the HR/VP, the EEAS has been using the full range of possibilities to engage on FoRB at bilateral and multilateral levels, through human rights dialogues, statements, demarches, especially on the situation of countries where the promotion and defense of FoRB is a major issue. The EU endeavoured to rally strong cross-regional support, notably at the UN, in the fight against religious intolerance and supported initiatives in the field of intercultural and inter-religious dialogue with a view to defuse tensions wherever they appear.

In order to further enhance EU action and make it more visible, the development of EU public guidelines on FoRB has been included in the action plan adopted by the Council in June 2012, alongside with the EU Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy. The guidelines will provide EU officials with specific and concrete action mechanisms. They will notably recall that States have a primary duty to protect believers of all faiths living under their jurisdiction, as well as people holding non-theistic or atheistic beliefs.

As regards point 104 of the Howitt report, the EEAS is working on reinforcing its capacity to mainstream FoRB across directorates, notably through specific trainings on the issue. Furthermore, the annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World now contains a specific chapter addressing in depth the activities of the EEAS in the field of FoRB.

(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002731/13
do Komisji (Wiceprzewodniczącej/Wysokiej Przedstawiciel)**

Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD)

(8 marca 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel – Konflikt między Chinami a Japonią o wyspy Senkaku

Od dłuższego czasu trwa starcie Chin z Japonią o sporne wyspy Senkaku. Oba państwa wysuwają sprzeczne żądania do tego bogatego w zasoby terytorium. Wsparte oczekiwaniami społeczeństwa decydują się również na częste pokazy siły. W ostatnim czasie okręty chińskie wielokrotnie, zdaniem Tokio, symulowały atak na wyspę oraz naruszały wody terytorialne Japonii. Ze względu na kontekst historyczny oba państwa wydają się posiadać mandat do sprawowania władzy nad wyspami.

1. Jaką strategię przyjmuje Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel względem konfliktu między Japonią, a Chinami?
2. Kto według Wiceprzewodniczącej/Wysokiej Przedstawiciel ma prawo do posiadania wysp Senkaku?
3. Jakie działania podejmuje Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel, aby złagodzić konflikt między obiema stronami?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez Wysoką Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodniczącą Catherine Ashton w imieniu
Komisji**

(7 maja 2013 r.)

Z uwagi na znaczące interesy UE w tym regionie Wysoka Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodnicząca z niepokojem śledzi rozwój wydarzeń na obszarach morskich Azji Wschodniej. W oświadczeniu wydanym dnia 25 września 2012 r. Wysoka Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodnicząca wezwała wszystkie zaangażowane strony do poszukiwania pokojowych i opartych na współpracy rozwiązań, zgodnych z prawem międzynarodowym.

UE nie przyjmuje stanowiska wobec zasadności/legalności odnośnych roszczeń stron dotyczących wysp Diaoyu/Senkaku, jednak wyraża poważne obawy, że błędna ocena lub wypadek mogą doprowadzić do niebezpiecznej eskalacji napięcia. Dalsze zaostrzenie sytuacji może mieć poważny wpływ na bezpieczeństwo w tym regionie i światową gospodarkę. Może to również wpłynąć na sprawy UE, która posiada w tym regionie znaczące interesy handlowe, gospodarcze oraz polityczne i która zaangażowana jest w strategiczne partnerstwa z obydwoma stronami.

Dlatego też UE wykorzystuje wszystkie dostępne środki, by nakłonić obydwa kraje do unikania wszelkich działań prowokacyjnych i zachęca je do podejmowania wysiłków mających na celu zmniejszenie napięcia. UE wspiera pogląd, że długotrwałe rozwiązanie sporu pomiędzy tymi dwoma państwami powinno odbyć się na zasadzie konstruktywnego dialogu i negocjacji oraz zgodnie z prawem międzynarodowym, w szczególności Konwencją Narodów Zjednoczonych o prawie morza. Wysoka Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodnicząca będzie w dalszym ciągu angażować się po chińskiej i japońskiej stronie tego sporu oraz zachęcać oba państwa do zapanowania nad sytuacją w sposób prowadzący do stabilności, przewidywalności i dobrobytu w tym regionie.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002731/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD)
(8 March 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku Islands

Tensions between China and Japan have been high for some time over the disputed Senkaku Islands. Both nations assert conflicting claims to this resource-rich territory. Buoyed by public expectations, they also carry out frequent shows of strength. According to Tokyo, Chinese vessels have recently conducted numerous simulated attacks on the islands and made incursions into Japanese territorial waters. Given the historical background, it seems that both countries have a claim to govern the islands.

1. What is the Vice-President/High Representative's strategy for dealing with this dispute between Japan and China?
2. In the VP/HR's view, which country's claim to govern the Senkaku Islands is legitimate?
3. What steps is the VP/HR taking to de-escalate tensions between the two countries?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(7 May 2013)

With its significant interests in the region, the HR/VP is following with concern developments in East Asia's maritime areas. In a statement issued 25th September 2012, the High Representative/Vice-President urged all parties concerned to seek peaceful and cooperative solutions in accordance with international law.

The EU takes no view regarding the legitimacy/legality of the respective claims over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, but is deeply concerned that a miscalculation or an accident could lead to a dangerous escalation of tensions. Further exacerbation risks severe impact on the regional security and the global economy. This would also affect EU's interests, which has high commercial, economic and political stakes in the region, and which is engaged in strategic partnerships with both sides.

The EU therefore uses all available means to urge both countries to avoid any provocative action and encourages them to make every effort to de-escalate tension. The EU promotes the view that a long-term resolution of the differences between the two countries should be sought through constructive dialogue and negotiation and based on international law, in particular on the Unclos. The HR/VP will continue to engage with both the Chinese and Japanese sides on this issue, and encourage them to manage the situation in a way which is conducive to stability, predictability and prosperity in the region.

(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002732/13
do Komisji**

Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD)

(8 marca 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Skutki szczelinowania hydraulicznego dla środowiska

W listopadzie 2011 r. Państwowy Instytut Geologiczny opublikował raport pt. „Ocena oddziaływania na środowisko procesu szczelinowania hydraulicznego wykonanego w otworze Łebień LE-2H”. Aktualnie jest to jedyne badanie wykonane w terenie i w oparciu o uwarunkowania geologiczne UE. W listopadzie 2012 r. Komisja zapowiedziała rozpoczęcie w 2013 r. inicjatywy, która ma zbadać skutki szczelinowania hydraulicznego dla środowiska.

1. Czy w swoich badaniach, ocenach i analizach dotyczących szczelinowania Komisja uwzględni raport przedstawiony przez Państwowy Instytut Geologiczny?
2. Z jakich innych materiałów ma zamiar korzystać? Jakim ośrodkom zlecono przygotowanie oraz przeprowadzenie badań dotyczących szczelinowania w Europie?
3. Polska ma aktualnie największe doświadczenia w procesie poszukiwania gazu łupkowego w Unii Europejskiej – czy Komisja zamierza prowadzić w czasie przygotowywania swojego raportu konsultacje z Polską?
4. Kiedy Komisja planuje zakończyć przygotowywanie raportu dotyczące szczelinowania hydraulicznego?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Janeza Potočnika w imieniu Komisji

(17 kwietnia 2013 r.)

1+2. Ocena skutków inicjatywy Komisji „Ramy oceny dotyczące środowiska, klimatu i energii, umożliwiające bezpieczne niekonwencjonalne wydobywanie węgłowodórów” odbywa się na podstawie obecnie dostępnych informacji. Przy dokonywaniu oceny uwzględniane są doświadczenia z Ameryki Północnej, gdzie wydobywanie gazu łupkowego odbywa się na skalę handlową, a także, w stosownych przypadkach, doświadczenia zdobyte podczas poszukiwań w Europie.

3. Komisja prowadzi regularne konsultacje z państwami członkowskimi, w tym Polską, w ramach technicznej grupy roboczej ds. aspektów środowiskowych niekonwencjonalnych paliw kopalnych, w szczególności gazu łupkowego.
4. Komisja planuje zakończenie swoich prac w zakresie wyżej wspomnianej inicjatywy przed końcem 2013 r.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002732/13
to the Commission**

Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD)

(8 March 2013)

Subject: Environmental impact of hydraulic fracturing

In November 2011, the Polish Geological Institute published a report assessing the environmental impact of the hydraulic fracturing process carried out at the Łebień LE-2H well. It is currently the only study to have been carried out *in situ* and on the basis of EU geological criteria. In November 2012, the Commission announced the launch of an initiative in 2013 that would study the environmental impact of hydraulic fracturing.

1. Will the Commission take the Polish Geological Institute's report into consideration in its studies, analyses and evaluations of hydraulic fracturing?
2. What other materials does the Commission intend to draw upon? What institutes have been charged with preparing and conducting the research into hydraulic fracturing in Europe?
3. Given that Poland is currently the EU Member State with the greatest experience of shale gas exploration, does the Commission intend to carry out consultations with Poland when preparing the report?
4. When does the Commission plan to complete preparations for the report on hydraulic fracturing?

Answer given by Mr Potočník on behalf of the Commission

(17 April 2013)

1+2. The Impact Assessment for the Commission initiative for an 'Environmental, climate and energy assessment framework to enable safe and secure unconventional hydrocarbon extraction' is carried out on the basis of currently available information. The assessment takes into consideration experience from North America, where shale gas extraction is taking place at a commercial scale, as well as experience gained with explorations in Europe, where relevant.

3. The Commission is regularly consulting Member States, including Poland, in the context of the Technical Working Group on environmental aspects of unconventional fossil fuels, in particular shale gas.
 4. The Commission plans to finalise its work on the abovementioned initiative by the end of 2013.
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(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002733/13
do Komisji (Wiceprzewodniczącej/Wysokiej Przedstawiciel)**

Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD)

(8 marca 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel – Zatrzymanie chrześcijan w libijskim Bengazi

W libijskim mieście Bengazi zatrzymano ponad 40 chrześcijańskich kupców. Oskarżono ich o posiadanie Biblii, dewocjonalistów oraz wizerunków Jezusa Chrystusa. Podejrzewano ich o szerzenie chrześcijaństwa. Organizacja Open Doors od dłuższego czasu zwraca uwagę na pogarszającą się sytuację chrześcijan mieszkających w Libii. W ostatnim raporcie sklasyfikowała ona Libię na 17. miejscu spośród krajów, które prześladują wyznawców Chrystusa.

1. Jak Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel ocenia ograniczenia wolności wiary w Libii? Jakie działania podejmuje w imieniu UE, aby zagwarantować możliwość zrzeszania się oraz wolności praktyk w Libii?
2. Czy rozważa się powiązanie unijnej pomocy finansowej na odbudowę Libii z wprowadzeniem przez Trypolis praw zapewniających wolność wyznania i zrzeszania się?
3. Jak Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel ocenia wpływ „arabskich wiosen” na sytuację chrześcijan w Afryce Północnej?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez Wysoką Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodniczącą Catherine Ashton w imieniu
Komisji**

(24 kwietnia 2013 r.)

1. UE jest zaniepokojona niedawnymi doniesieniami o atakach na mniejszość chrześcijańską w Libii, ponieważ wolność religii i przekonań należy do kanonu powszechnie obowiązujących praw człowieka, które należy chronić.

Dnia 13 marca 2013 r. delegatura UE wydała oświadczenie, w którym w imieniu szefów misji UE wyraziła swoje głębokie zaniepokojenie traktowaniem osób zatrzymanych na podstawie zarzutów o rzekomy prozelityzm w Libii i ich długotrwałym przetrzymywaniem w areszcie. Ponadto UE zwróciła się do władz Libii o zagwarantowanie odpowiedniego traktowania wszystkich zatrzymanych i zapewnienie im odpowiednich warunków zgodnie z międzynarodowymi standardami oraz międzynarodowymi zobowiązaniami Libii. Delegatura UE podkreśliła, że wolność religii i przekonań należy do kanonu powszechnych praw człowieka, które powinny być chronione wszędzie i przysługiwać każdemu człowiekowi.

2. Obecnie stosunki dwustronne między UE a Libią nie opierają się na żadnym kompleksowym i prawnie wiążącym porozumieniu. UE pragnie rozpocząć negocjacje prowadzące do zawarcia wspomnianego kompleksowego porozumienia tak szybko, jak to możliwe, a kwestia ta jest obecnie przedmiotem rozmów z władzami libijskimi. UE będzie domagać się umieszczenia w tekście przyszłego porozumienia odniesienia do praw człowieka.

3. UE nadal wyraża poważne obawy w związku z coraz bardziej napiętą sytuacją między grupami religijnymi w regionie Maghrebu oraz ogólnymi ograniczeniami prawa do wolności wyznania i przekonań. W ramach dialogu z liderami i ogółem społeczeństwa UE stale podkreśla, iż broni zasady wolności religii i przekonań jako fundamentalnego prawa, które powinno przysługiwać zarówno osobom mieszkającym w UE, jak i poza nią.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002733/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD)
(8 March 2013)**

Subject: VP/HR — Arrest of Christians in the Libyan city of Benghazi

More than 40 Christian merchants have been arrested in the Libyan city of Benghazi. They are charged with being in possession of Bibles, devotional items and images of Jesus Christ. The merchants are suspected of spreading Christianity. The Open Doors organisation has long been drawing attention to the worsening situation of Christians living in Libya. In its latest report, the organisation places Libya in 17th place among countries that persecute Christians.

1. What is the Vice-President/High Representative's assessment of the restrictions on freedom of religion in Libya? What action is the VP/HR undertaking to guarantee freedom of association and worship in Libya?
2. Is consideration being given to making EU financial assistance for Libya's reconstruction contingent upon Tripoli introducing laws to ensure freedom of religion and of association?
3. What is the VP/HR's assessment of the Arab Spring's impact on the situation of Christians in North Africa?

**ENE-002733/2013 Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the
Commission
(24 April 2013)**

1. The EU is concerned about recent reports of attacks against the small Christian minority in Libya as freedom of religion or belief is a universal human right which needs to be protected.

The EU Delegation issued a statement on 13 March 2013 expressing on behalf of all EU Heads of Mission its deep concerns about the continued detention and the treatment of persons held on alleged charges of proselytism in Libya. Furthermore, the EU requested the Libyan authorities to ensure adequate conditions and treatment of all detainees in accordance with international standards and Libya's international obligations. The EU Delegation underlined that freedom of religion or belief is a universal human right which needs to be protected everywhere and for everyone.

2. Currently, bilateral relations between the EU and Libya are not based on a comprehensive, legally binding, agreement. The EU is keen to start the negotiations of such a comprehensive agreement as soon as possible and this matter is currently under discussion with the Libyan authorities. The EU will demand to include in the text of a future agreement a reference to human rights.
 3. The EU remains concerned about increased tensions among religious groups in the Maghreb region as well as restrictions imposed on freedom of religion and belief in general. In its dialogue with leaders and the societies at large, the EU stresses that the EU defends the principle that freedom of religion and belief is a fundamental right to which everyone is entitled, outside and within the EU.
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(Suomenkielinen versio)

Kirjallisesti vastattava kysymys E-002734/13

komissiolle

Hannu Takkula (ALDE)

(8. maaliskuuta 2013)

Aihe: Hizbollah-järjestö terroristilistalle

Hizbollah on aseellista toimintaa harjoittava järjestö, jonka on todettu syyllistyneen kansainväliseen terrorismiin. Hizbollahin terroritoiminta on ulottunut jopa Euroopan unionin alueelle, kun viime kesänä itsemurhapommittaja iski bussiin Bulgariassa.

Tämän johdosta haluankin kysyä, milloin komissio toteaa Hizbollah-järjestön terroristijärjestöksi ja kohtelee sitä sen mukaisella tavalla?

Korkean edustajan, varapuheenjohtaja Ashtonin komission puolesta antama vastaus

(4. kesäkuuta 2013)

Burgasin iskua tutkitaan parhaillaan, ja tarkoituksena on selvittää sekä tekijät että kaikki olosuhteet. Bulgarian viranomaiset ovat ilmoittaneet tekevänsä asiassa yhteistyötä libanonilaiskollegojensa kanssa.

Kysymys Hizbollahin mahdollisesta luokittelusta terroristijärjestöksi ei kuulu komission toimivaltaan, sillä terroristijärjestöjä koskevan EU:n luettelon muuttaminen edellyttää EU:n jäsenvaltioiden yksimielistä päätöstä. Hizbollahista on tässä yhteydessä keskusteltu monesti, mutta jäsenvaltiot eivät ole koskaan päässeet yksimielisyyteen. Yksityiskohtaisia tietoja järjestön liittämisestä EU:n luetteloon on annettu komission vastauksessa kirjalliseen kysymykseen E-001611/2013 ⁽¹⁾.

Jos käynnissä olevissa tutkinta- ja oikeusmenettelyissä käy ilmi Hizbollahin osallisuus iskuun, EU harkitsee erilaisia reagointivaihtoehtoja, joihin saattaa kuulua ryhtyminen toimiin EU-tason tutkinnallisen ja oikeudellisen yhteistyön puitteissa sekä mahdollisten muutosten tekeminen tiettyjen järjestöjen, yhteisöjen ja henkilöiden luetteloihin. EU ja sen jäsenvaltiot keskustelevat asianmukaisesta reagoitavasta, kunhan kaikki tutkinnassa selviävät seikat ovat tiedossa.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/fi/parliamentary-questions.html?tabType=wq>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002734/13
to the Commission**

Hannu Takkula (ALDE)

(8 March 2013)

Subject: Inclusion of Hezbollah on list of terrorist organisations

Hezbollah is an armed organisation which has been shown to be guilty of international terrorism. Its terrorist activity even spread to the territory of the European Union when a suicide bomber attacked a bus in Bulgaria last summer.

I should therefore like to ask when will the Commission declare Hezbollah a terrorist organisation and treat it accordingly?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(4 June 2013)

The Burgas attack is subject to ongoing investigations, which aim at identifying the perpetrators and all circumstances. The Bulgarian authorities informed of their cooperation with their Lebanese counterparts in this regard.

Regarding the possibility of designating Hizbullah as a terrorist organisation, amendments to the EU list of terrorist organisations are not in the remit of the Commission; they require a unanimous decision by EU Member States. Hizbullah was, in this context, discussed on several occasions in the past, but there has never been consensus among Member States. Details on the procedure for the designation of an organisation in the EU list has been provided in the Commission's answer to Written Question E-001611/2013 ⁽¹⁾.

Should the ongoing investigative and judicial processes bear implications for Hizbullah, the EU will consider a range of options to respond, which could include steps in the framework of investigative and judicial cooperation at EU level; as well as possibilities of amendments to the lists of designated organisations, entities and persons. The EU and Member States will discuss the appropriate response based on all elements identified by the investigators.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html?tabType=wq#sidesForm>.

(Suomenkielinen versio)

Kirjallisesti vastattava kysymys E-002735/13

komissiolle

Hannu Takkula (ALDE)

(8. maaliskuuta 2013)

Aihe: Egyptin demokratisoituskehitys

Demokratisoitumisen odotettiin pääsevän liikkeelle Egyptissä ns. arabikevään tapahtumien seurauksena ja vallan vaihtumisen myötä. Näin ei kuitenkaan näytä tapahtuneen. Tällä hetkellä ihmisoikeustilanne Egyptissä on huonompi kuin edellisen hallinnon aikana. Nuorten laaja tyytymättömyys ilmenee muiden muassa monenlaisena väkivaltana ja levottomuutena kaduilla. Yksi syy tähän on siinä, että yliopistojärjestelmä toimii edelleen vanhakantaisen mallin mukaan. Egyptissä olisikin toteutettava kiireellisesti kattava koulutusjärjestelmän uudistus.

Demokratian vahvistaminen on yksi EU:n tavoitteista Egyptissä, samoin kuin koko Lähi-idän alueella. Tämän tavoitteen saavuttamiseksi EU on käyttänyt suuria summia erilaisiin kehityshankkeisiin ja myönteistä kehitystä tukeviin projekteihin. Koulujen ja yliopistojen uudistamisen ja kehittämisen kautta pitkän tähtäimen tavoitteet voisivat toteutua tehokkaasti. Koulutusvientiin panostamalla ja yliopistokoulutusta kehittämällä voidaan demokratian juurtumista Egyptissä vauhdittaa nykyistä tehokkaammin.

Aikooko komissio siirtää Egyptiin tähdätyn tukensa painopistettä koulutusviennin ja koulutusjärjestelmän uudistamisen suuntaan?

Štefan Fülen komission puolesta antama vastaus

(13. toukokuuta 2013)

Komissio on samaa mieltä arvoisan parlamentin jäsenen kanssa siitä, että Egyptin koulutusjärjestelmän perusteellinen uudistaminen on keskeinen tavoite. Komissio toteaa kuitenkin, että ennen kuin EU:n tukea opetuslalle lisätään, tarvitaan lisätietoja, jotta nykyistä poliittista ympäristöä ja uuden opetusministerin poliittisia painopisteitä voitaisiin arvioida riittävän hyvin. Virallisesti ilmoitettuihin uusiin painopisteisiin kuuluvat teknisten alojen koulutus, mahdollisuus laadukkaaseen peruskoulutukseen, keskittyminen tieteseen ja teknologiaan sekä luku- ja kirjoitustaitoon uudelleen panostaminen.

On myös muistettava, että EU tukee jo opetuslää 140 miljoonan euron alakohtaisella tukiohjelmalla, joka saadaan päätökseen toukokuussa 2013. Ohjelmassa tehdään muutoksia koulutusjärjestelmään, jotta kaikille lapsille voitaisiin tarjota laadukasta opetusta tasapuolisin, kustannustehokkain ja taloudellisesti kestävin ehdoin. Teknisten alojen ammattikoulutuksen tukemista jatketaan viisivuotisella ohjelmalla, joka alkaa vuonna 2013 (50 miljoonaa euroa).

Korkeakoulutuksen saralla Egypti on viimeisten kymmenen vuoden ajan hyötynyt merkittävästi TEMPUS-ohjelmasta: Egypti on mukana 33 hankkeessa eli 30 prosentissa kaikista hyväksytyistä hankkeista EU:n eteläisellä naapurialueella. Egypti osallistuu myös Erasmus Mundus -ohjelmaan, josta rahoitetaan eurooppalaisten ja eteläisen Välimeren yliopistojen välisiä kumppanuussuhteita, jotka mahdollistavat opiskelijoiden ja henkilökunnan liikkuvuuden: 860 henkilökunnan jäsentä, opiskelijaa ja tutkijaa on saanut apurahoja vuodesta 2007 lähtien.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002735/13
to the Commission**

Hannu Takkula (ALDE)

(8 March 2013)

Subject: Democratisation in Egypt

Democratisation was expected to get under way in Egypt as a consequence of the 'Arab Spring' and the change of regime. However, this does not seem to have happened. At the moment, the human rights situation in Egypt is worse than under the previous government. High youth unemployment is reflected, *inter alia*, in many forms of violence and unrest on the streets. One reason is that the university system is still operating according to a primitive model. There is an urgent need for a comprehensive reform of the education system in Egypt.

Fostering democracy is one of the EU's objectives in Egypt, as it is in the Middle East as a whole. In order to attain this objective, the EU has spent large sums on various types of development project and on projects in support of positive development. By reforming and developing schools and universities, long-term objectives could be attained effectively. Investing in exports of educational expertise and developing university education will enable democracy to take root in Egypt, accelerating this process more effectively than at present.

Will the Commission adjust the focus of its aid for Egypt so as to assign higher priority to exporting educational expertise and to reform of the education system?

Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission

(13 May 2013)

The Commission agrees with the Honourable Member that a comprehensive reform of the education system in Egypt is a key priority. The Commission notes, however, that more information is needed to adequately assess the present policy environment and the political priorities of the new Minister of Education before stepping up EU support to the sector. Formally declared new priorities include technical education, access to quality basic education, a focus on science and technology and a renewed emphasis on literacy.

In this context, it should be recalled that the EU is already supporting the education sector through a EUR 140 million Sector Support Programme that will be completed in May 2013. The programme introduces changes in the education system so as to provide quality education to all children under equitable, cost-effective and financially sustainable terms. Technical Vocational Education and Training will continue to be supported through a five-year Programme starting in 2013 (EUR 50 million).

In the field of higher education, Egypt has for the past 10 years benefited considerably from the TEMPUS programme. Egypt is involved in 33 projects or 30% of all accepted projects in the Southern Neighbourhood. Egypt is also participating in Erasmus Mundus, which funds partnerships between European and South Mediterranean universities leading to student and staff mobility (860 staff, students and researchers have benefited from scholarships/fellowships since 2007).

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002736/13
a la Comisión (Vicepresidenta/Alta Representante)**

José Ignacio Salafrañca Sánchez-Neyra (PPE)

(8 de marzo de 2013)

Asunto: VP/HR — Relaciones UE-Armenia

En relación con el excelente nivel de relaciones alcanzado entre la Unión Europea y Armenia, que pronto se materializarán con la firma del Acuerdo de Asociación entre ambas partes, me gustaría, en primer lugar, subrayar el enorme progreso realizado en estos dos últimos años.

Por otra parte, el Parlamento Europeo ha puesto de manifiesto en varias resoluciones su apoyo a la excelente iniciativa de desplegar en ese país el *EU Advisory Group* (grupo consultivo de la UE), que ha desempeñado un papel determinante en dicho progreso.

Sin embargo, desde comienzos de 2012, las constantes interferencias de la Delegación de la Unión Europea en Armenia, así como la deliberada marginación de las instituciones nacionales en la toma de decisiones, absolutamente contraria a la filosofía y la base legal del proyecto, están seriamente restando efectividad a este excelente formato de cooperación.

Asimismo, esta inaceptable actitud, no representativa del excelente nivel de entendimiento alcanzado con ese país, está generando un profundo malestar en el Jefe del Gobierno así como en el Parlamento del citado país que podría llegar a afectar al conjunto de nuestras relaciones.

¿Qué medidas piensa tomar el Servicio Europeo de Acción Exterior para atajar esta situación y recuperar la confianza de las Instituciones armenias?

¿Cómo se piensa instruir a la Delegación de la Unión Europea en Armenia para evitar semejantes acciones absolutamente contrarias al espíritu de nuestras relaciones?

¿Qué acciones propone la Comisión para restablecer la legítima implicación de las Autoridades armenias en la toma de decisiones del *EU Advisory Group* (grupo consultivo de la UE) y cómo se podría reforzar esta efectiva herramienta de cooperación?

Respuesta de la Alta Representante/Vicepresidenta Ashton en nombre de la Comisión

(7 de mayo de 2013)

La Alta Representante y Vicepresidenta comparte plenamente la opinión de que el grupo consultivo de la UE (EUAG) ha sido un excelente instrumento de cooperación en las relaciones de la UE con Armenia.

Asimismo desea asegurarle que no ha habido intención de suprimir ni restringir el apoyo consultivo. El mandato de la Delegación de la UE para gestionar y supervisar el proyecto está claramente definido, al igual que el papel del PNUD como socio de ejecución. En caso de que persistieran los problemas percibidos actualmente, mencionados en la pregunta de Su Señoría, la Alta Representante y Vicepresidenta le agradecería que volviese a llamarle la atención al respecto.

Quisiera también asegurarle que, con miras a la próxima nueva fase de las relaciones entre la UE y Armenia regidas por el Acuerdo de Asociación, la UE tiene previsto incrementar su apoyo consultivo a la parte armenia en el marco del proyecto. Por mencionar un ejemplo, se ha publicado un puesto adicional de asesor ante la Asamblea Nacional para ayudar al Parlamento armenio a ampliar sus capacidades institucionales a fin de hacer frente a la labor de aproximación de la legislación armenia a la de la UE.

Por lo que respecta a la legítima y adecuada participación de las autoridades armenias en la gestión del proyecto, dicha participación está garantizada en el marco del comité consultivo del EUAG, el órgano del proyecto que implica directamente a los beneficiarios en la toma de decisiones. El comité se reúne trimestralmente y sus decisiones se consideran obligatorias. Dentro de este marco, los beneficiarios han sido sistemáticamente consultados en lo que respecta a los informes y los planes de trabajo, y también han participado en los comités de selección de asesores.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002736/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
José Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra (PPE)**

(8 March 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — EU-Armenia relations

With regard to the excellent level of relations established between the European Union and Armenia, which will soon be consolidated with the signing of the Association Agreement between the two parties, I should like, first of all, to highlight the enormous progress that has been achieved in the last two years.

Furthermore, Parliament has displayed, in various resolutions, its support for the superb initiative to deploy in this country the EU Advisory Group, which has played a defining role in this progress.

However, since the beginning of 2012, the constant interference from the European Union Delegation in Armenia, and the deliberate marginalisation of national institutions from decision making, in complete contradiction to the philosophy and legal basis of the project, are seriously undermining the effectiveness of this excellent cooperation format.

In addition, this unacceptable attitude, which is not representative of the admirable level of understanding reached with this country, is generating a profound sense of unease in the Head of Government, as well as in the Armenian Parliament, which could affect all of our relations.

What measures does the European External Action Service (EEAS) intend to take in order to contain this situation and regain the trust of the Armenian institutions?

How does it intend to instruct the European Union Delegation in Armenia so as to avoid similar actions which completely contradict the spirit of our relations?

What actions is the Commission proposing in order to re-establish the legitimate involvement of the Armenian authorities in the decision making of the EU Advisory Group, and how could this effective cooperation tool be strengthened?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(7 May 2013)

The HR/VP fully shares the view that EUAG has been an excellent cooperation instrument in the EU relations with Armenia.

The HR/VP would like to assure you that there has been no intended suppression or restriction of advisory support. The mandate of the EU Delegation in the management and oversight of the project is clearly defined, as is the role of UNDP as the implementing partner. In case currently perceived problems, mentioned in the honourable member's question, would persist, the HR/VP would be grateful for these being brought again to her attention.

The HR/VP would also like to re-assure you that in view of forthcoming new stage of relations between EU and Armenia, governed by the Association Agreement, the EU plans to further increase its advisory support to the Armenian side in the framework of the project. As an example, an additional seconded post of advisor to the National Assembly has been published in order to assist the Armenian parliament in increasing its institutional capacities to tackle the task of approximation with EU legislation.

Regarding the legitimate and appropriate involvement of the Armenian authorities in the management of the project, it is assured in the framework of the Advisory Board of the EU Advisory Group. It is the project body when involves the beneficiaries directly in the decision making. The board meets on a quarterly basis and its decisions are considered mandatory. Within its framework, the beneficiaries have been consistently consulted on reports, work plans and have also participated in the selection committees of advisors.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002737/13
προς την Επιτροπή
Sylvana Rapti (S&D) και Spyros Danellis (S&D)
(8 Μαρτίου 2013)

Θέμα: Διακριτική μεταχείριση των μηχανοκίνητων οχημάτων ΔΧ που φέρουν ελληνικές πινακίδες από τις τουρκικές αρχές

Η τουρκική κυβέρνηση με την απόφασή 2010/945, που δημοσιεύτηκε στην Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Κυβέρνησης (T.C. Resmî Gazete) στις 14 Οκτωβρίου 2010 με αριθμό 27729, περιόρισε την απαλλαγή από τους ειδικούς φόρους κατανάλωσης στα 200 λίτρα καυσίμων ως μέγιστη ποσότητα μόνο για τα εμπορικά οχήματα και τα ιδιωτικά κοντέινερ που φέρουν ελληνικές πινακίδες. Στην εν λόγω απόφαση, η τουρκική κυβέρνηση επικαλείται την αρχή της αμοιβαιότητας στον περιορισμό που εφαρμόζεται στην ποσότητα αυτοτελών καυσίμων που μπορούν να έχουν στις κανονικές αποθήκες τους τα εμπορικά οχήματα με τουρκικές πινακίδες κατά την είσοδό τους στην Ελλάδα.

Ωστόσο, η αρχή της αμοιβαιότητας δεν μπορεί να εφαρμοστεί στη συγκεκριμένη περίπτωση. Η ελληνική κυβέρνηση με σχετική Υπουργική απόφαση Δ18Α5017560/2010 που δημοσιεύτηκε στην Εφημερίδα της Κυβέρνησης στις 10 Μαΐου 2010, Τεύχος Β, αριθμός 610, δεν εφαρμόζει τον περιορισμό αυτόν στα μηχανοκίνητα οχήματα δημοσίας χρήσης μεταφοράς εμπορευμάτων που φέρουν τουρκικές πινακίδες, αλλά, όπως διακρίνεται από τον τίτλο της απόφασης και από το περιεχόμενό της, ο περιορισμός αυτός απευθύνεται σε όλα τα οχήματα που εισέρχονται οδικώς στην Ελλάδα από τρίτες χώρες προς την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση (στην προκειμένη περίπτωση Αλβανία, π.Γ.Δ.Μ. και Τουρκία) χωρίς να γίνεται κάποια αναφορά στην εθνικότητα των οχημάτων.

Όπως είναι προφανές, η ανωτέρω πρακτική της τουρκικής κυβέρνησης αποτελεί διακριτική μεταχείριση των μηχανοκίνητων οχημάτων δημοσίας χρήσης που φέρουν ελληνικές πινακίδες.

Έχοντας υπόψη το καθεστώς της Τουρκίας ως υποψήφιας για προσχώρηση χώρας στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση, καθώς και τη Συμφωνία Σύνδεσης του 1963, γνωστή ως «Συμφωνία της Άγκυρας», συγκεκριμένα δε το άρθρο 9 με το οποίο εισάγεται η αρχή της μη διάκρισης στις σχέσεις Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης (τότε ΕΟΚ) και Τουρκίας, ερωτάται η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή:

- Αυτή η πρακτική άμεσης διάκρισης των τουρκικών αρχών να επιβάλλουν τέτοιου είδους περιορισμό αποκλειστικά στα μηχανοκίνητα οχήματα δημοσίας χρήσης που φέρουν ελληνικές πινακίδες παραβιάζει το δικαίωμα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης;
- Αν η πρακτική αυτή πράγματι αποτελεί παραβίαση του δικαίου της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, σε τι ενέργειες προτίθεται να προβεί (ή έχει προβεί) η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή για την αντιμετώπιση της παράνομης αυτής πρακτικής;

Απάντηση του κ. Füle εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(26 Απριλίου 2013)

Η Επιτροπή έχει επίγνωση των προβλημάτων που προέκυψαν με την τουρκική απόφαση 2010/945, που δημοσιεύτηκε στην Επίσημη Εφημερίδα της Κυβέρνησης της Τουρκίας στις 14 Οκτωβρίου 2010 με αριθμό 27729, με την οποία η τουρκική κυβέρνηση περιόρισε την απαλλαγή από τους ειδικούς φόρους κατανάλωσης το πολύ σε 200 λίτρα καυσίμων μόνο για τα εμπορικά οχήματα και τα ιδιωτικά εμπορευματοκιβώτια που φέρουν ελληνικές πινακίδες.

Εκ πρώτης όψεως, η εν λόγω απόφαση θα μπορούσε να θεωρηθεί ως παράβαση των σχετικών διατάξεων της συμφωνίας σύνδεσης ΕΕ-Τουρκίας του 1963, ιδίως του άρθρου 9, και του πρόσθετου πρωτοκόλλου του 1970.

Η Επιτροπή θα θέσει το ζήτημα στις τουρκικές αρχές στο κατάλληλο επίπεδο.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002737/13
to the Commission
Sylvana Rapti (S&D) and Spyros Danellis (S&D)
(8 March 2013)**

Subject: Discriminatory treatment of Greek-registered commercial motor vehicles by the Turkish authorities

By its Decision 2010/945, published in the Official Government Gazette of the Republic of Turkey on 14 October 2010 under number 27729, the Turkish government limited the exemption from excise duty to a maximum of 200 litres of fuel solely in respect of commercial vehicles and private containers bearing Greek registration plates. In that decision, the Turkish government invokes the principle of reciprocity as regards the reduction applied to the amount of duty-free fuel that commercial vehicles fitted with Turkish plates may carry in their normal tanks when entering Greece.

However, the principle of reciprocity does not apply in the present case. The Greek Government in the Ministerial Decision in question, namely D18A5017560/2010, published in the Government Gazette of 10 May 2010, Volume II, No 610, does not apply such a restriction only to commercial motor vehicles transporting goods bearing Turkish number plates, but, as the title of the decision and its contents indicate, to all vehicles entering Greece by road from third countries to the European Union (i.e. Albania, FYROM and Turkey). It makes no reference to the country in which the vehicles are registered.

This action by the Turkish government clearly constitutes discriminatory treatment of commercial motor vehicles bearing Greek registration plates.

Given the status of Turkey as a candidate country for accession to the European Union and the Association Agreement of 1963, known as the 'Ankara Agreement', and in particular Article 9 which introduces the principle of non-discrimination in relations between the European Union (the then EEC) and Turkey, will the Commission say:

- Does this act of direct discrimination by the Turkish authorities in imposing such a restriction solely to commercial motor vehicles bearing Greek number plates violate EC law?
- If this act is indeed a violation of EC law, what does it intend to do (or has it done) to address this violation?

**Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission
(26 April 2013)**

The Commission is aware of the problems created by the Turkish Decision 2010/945, published in the Official Government Gazette of Turkey on 14 October 2010 under number 27729, with which the Turkish Government limited the exemption from excise duty to a maximum of 200 litres of fuel solely for commercial vehicles and private containers bearing Greek registration plates.

At first sight, the said decision could be considered as contravening the relevant provisions of the EU-Turkey Association Agreement of 1963, in particular its Article 9, and of the Additional Protocols of 1970.

The Commission will raise the issue with the Turkish authorities at the appropriate level.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002738/13

προς την Επιτροπή

Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)

(8 Μαρτίου 2013)

Θέμα: Απόφαση του ΔΕΚ σε βάρος της «Ελληνικά Ναυπηγεία ΑΕ»

Παρά τις συνεχείς επαφές με κυβερνητικούς παράγοντες και τις ελπίδες που καλλιεργήθηκαν ότι θα επιτραπεί στην εταιρία «Ελληνικά Ναυπηγεία ΑΕ» να αναλαμβάνουν παραγγελίες εμπορικών πλοίων, προκειμένου να αντιμετωπισθεί το τεράστιο πρόβλημα της ανεργίας των ελλήνων, και ιδιαίτερα της ναυπηγοεπισκευαστικής ζώνης, το Δικαστήριο Ευρωπαϊκών Κοινοτήτων (υπόθεση C 246/12 P) επιδικάσε στην εταιρία πρόστιμο, συνολικού ύψους περίπου 310 εκατομμυρίων ευρώ. Το γεγονός αυτό θα σημάνει το οριστικό κλείσιμο των ναυπηγείων, αφού είναι βέβαιο ότι η σημερινή ιδιοκτησία της «Ελληνικά Ναυπηγεία ΑΕ» δεν προτίθεται να πληρώσει το ποσό αυτό, που άλλωστε προέρχεται από χρέη που υποτίθεται ότι υπήρχαν πριν τη μεταβίβαση της εν λόγω επιχείρησης σε αυτήν.

Με δεδομένα τα ανωτέρω, αλλά και τις τεράστιες ευθύνες που έχει η Επιτροπή για το κατάντημα των ναυπηγείων στην Ελλάδα, όπου σήμερα οι εργαζόμενοι έχουν φτάσει να εργάζονται μία ημέρα την εβδομάδα, να τους οφείλονται δεδουλευμένα πολλών μηνών, αλλά επιπλέον να απειλούνται και με απόλυση από πιθανό κλείσιμο των ναυπηγείων, ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

- Με την ανωτέρω απόφαση του ΔΕΚ, τι προβλέπουν οι σχετικοί κανονισμοί για την «ανάκτηση ενισχύσεων»; Τι προβλέπεται για την περίπτωση αδυναμίας ή άρνησης απόδοσης του «προστίμου» από την ελεγχόμενη εταιρία;
- Τι μέτρα προτίθεται να πάρει προκειμένου τα ναυπηγεία να ανασυγκροτηθούν συνεχίζοντας τη λειτουργία τους, με πλήρη απασχόληση των εργαζομένων σε αυτά, με όλες τους τις δραστηριότητες, συμπεριλαμβανομένων των εμπορικών πλοίων αλλά και της δυνατότητας εξαγωγών σε τρίτες χώρες;

Απάντηση του κ. Almunia εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής

(8 Μαΐου 2013)

Σύμφωνα με την απόφαση της Επιτροπής του 2008, η Ελλάδα πρέπει να ανακτήσει από τα Ελληνικά Ναυπηγεία (ΕΝΑΕ) την παράνομη ενίσχυση που είχε προηγουμένως χορηγηθεί. Ως εκ τούτου, δεν τίθεται θέμα επιβολής προστίμου στην ΕΝΑΕ. Το 2010, η Επιτροπή (με βάση το άρθρο 346 της ΣΛΕΕ) είχε αποδεχθεί μια περιορισμένη ανάκτηση, με αντάλλαγμα μια σειρά δεσμεύσεων, που προσφέρθηκαν από την Ελλάδα (και ιδίως την απαγόρευση των μη στρατιωτικών δραστηριοτήτων για 15 χρόνια, την πώληση των μη στρατιωτικών περιουσιακών στοιχείων του ναυπηγείου, που δεν έχει ακόμη πραγματοποιηθεί, και την επιστροφή στο Δημόσιο των εκτάσεων που της είχαν παραχωρηθεί).

Η αλλαγή ιδιοκτησίας δεν θίγει τις υποχρεώσεις που έχουν αναληφθεί από την εταιρεία.

Προτεραιότητα για την Ελλάδα και την ΕΝΑΕ είναι η τήρηση των υποχρεώσεων που αναλήφθηκαν το 2010.

Η εναλλακτική λύση είναι η πλήρης εφαρμογή της απόφασης ανάκτησης, η οποία θα ελευθερώσει το ναυπηγείο από την απαγόρευση των μη στρατιωτικών δραστηριοτήτων. Αν η ΕΝΑΕ δεν είναι σε θέση να επιστρέψει τις ενισχύσεις, θα πρέπει να προβλεφθεί η εκκαθάρισή της. Πράγματι, η παύση των δραστηριοτήτων της εταιρείας και η πώληση των περιουσιακών της στοιχείων θα επέτρεπε σε άλλους δυνητικά ενδιαφερόμενους επενδυτές να αποκτήσουν αυτά τα περιουσιακά στοιχεία, και, χωρίς τα βάρη του παρελθόντος, να κάνουν την καλύτερη δυνατή χρήση τους.

Η Επιτροπή υπογραμμίζει το γεγονός ότι η υποχρέωση να διασφαλιστεί η εφαρμογή της απόφασης ανάκτησης βαρύνει την Ελλάδα.

Στις 28 Ιουνίου 2012 (υπόθεση C-485/10, Επιτροπή κατά Ελλάδας), το Δικαστήριο απεφάνθη ότι η Ελλάδα παρέβη τις υποχρεώσεις που υπέχει βάσει της Συνθήκης με την μη εφαρμογή της απόφασης ανάκτησης της 2ας Ιουλίου 2008.

Σύμφωνα με τη νομοθεσία της ΕΕ, εάν η Επιτροπή κρίνει ότι ένα κράτος μέλος δεν έχει συμμορφωθεί με απόφαση του Δικαστηρίου των Ευρωπαϊκών Κοινοτήτων, η Επιτροπή μπορεί να λάβει μέτρα σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 260 της ΣΛΕΕ.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002738/13
to the Commission**

Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)

(8 March 2013)

Subject: ECJ judgment against Ellinika Nafpigeia AE ('Greek Shipyards Ltd')

Despite constant contacts between 'Greek Shipyards Ltd' and government officials and the hopes that had been encouraged that this undertaking would be permitted to take orders for commercial vessels, thereby partly addressing the huge problem of unemployment among Greeks, especially in the shipbuilding sector, the Court of Justice of the European Communities (Case C 246/12 P) has imposed a fine on the undertaking totalling approximately EUR 310 million. This will mean the definitive closure of the shipyards, since it is certain that the current ownership of 'Greek Shipyards Ltd' does not intend to pay this amount, which is, incidentally, due to debts that supposedly pre-existed the transfer to it of that undertaking.

In view of the above, and also the Commission's overwhelming responsibility for the plight of the shipyards in Greece, where employees, who already work a one-day week and are due many months' pay, are now also threatened with dismissal due to the possible closure of the shipyards, will the Commission say:

- In the context of the above ECJ judgment, what provision do the relevant laws make regarding the 'recovery of aid'? What provisions exist regarding a situation in which the undertaking in question fails or refuses to pay the 'fine'?
- What steps will it take so that the shipyards restructure and continue to operate, providing full employment for shipyard workers in all areas of activity, including the construction of commercial vessels and the possibility of exporting to third countries?

Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission

(8 May 2013)

Under the 2008 Commission decision, Greece must recover from Hellenic Shipyards (HSY) illegal aid previously granted to it. Therefore, there can be no question of a fine imposed on HSY. In 2010, the Commission (based on Article 346 TFEU) accepted a limited recovery, in exchange for a number of commitments, offered by Greece (in particular the ban on civil activities for 15 years, the sale of the yard's civil assets, which has not taken place yet, and the return to the State of the concessionary land).

The change of ownership does not affect the commitments entered into by the company.

The priority for Greece and HSY should be to honour the commitments entered into in 2010.

The alternative is full implementation of the recovery decision, which would free the yard from the ban on civil activities. If HSY is not in a position to pay back the aid, its liquidation could be envisaged. Indeed, the termination of the company and the sale of its assets would allow other potentially interested investors to acquire these assets, and, free of the burden of the past, to make the best possible use of them.

The Commission emphasises the fact that the obligation to ensure implementation of the recovery decision lies with Greece.

On 28 June 2012 (Case C-485/10, Commission against Greece), the Court of Justice ruled that Greece had failed to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty by not implementing the recovery decision of 2 July 2008.

According to EU rules, if the Commission considers that a Member State has not complied with a judgment of the Court of Justice, the Commission may pursue the matter in accordance with Article 260 TFEU.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002739/13
προς την Επιτροπή
Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)
(8 Μαρτίου 2013)

Θέμα: Βιωσιμότητα και αξιοποίηση των Ανανεώσιμων Πηγών Ενέργειας στην Ελλάδα

Το Υπουργείο Ενέργειας και Κλιματικής Αλλαγής (ΥΠΕΚΑ), ανακοίνωσε πρόσφατα ότι συνυπέγραψε με το Γερμανικό Υπουργείο Περιβάλλοντος, Προστασίας της Φύσης και Πυρηνικής Ασφάλειας (BMU) και την Ομάδα Δράσης (Task Force) για την Ελλάδα, Κοινή Δήλωση Προθέσεως για συνεργασία στην αναμόρφωση του κλάδου των Ανανεώσιμων Πηγών Ενέργειας στην Ελλάδα.

Σύμφωνα με την ανακοίνωση, στόχος της συνεργασίας είναι η «προετοιμασία ενός Οδικού Χάρτη, και η κατάρτιση της στρατηγικής για την εφαρμογή των απαιτούμενων μεταρρυθμίσεων που θα εξασφαλίσουν τη βιωσιμότητα του κλάδου των Ανανεώσιμων Πηγών Ενέργειας στην Ελλάδα, και παράλληλα η δημιουργία ενός υγιούς επενδυτικού περιβάλλοντος για τη βέλτιστη δυνατή αξιοποίηση του ενεργειακού δυναμικού της χώρας».

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

- Πιστεύει ότι υπάρχουν προβλήματα με τη βιωσιμότητα του κλάδου των Ανανεώσιμων Πηγών Ενέργειας στην Ελλάδα; Ποια είναι αυτά; Τι στοιχεία μπορεί να δώσει σχετικά;
- Θεωρεί ότι δεν είναι υγιές το επενδυτικό περιβάλλον που υπάρχει για τη βέλτιστη αξιοποίηση του ενεργειακού δυναμικού της χώρας; Τι μέτρα προτίθεται να λάβει;

Απάντηση του κ. Oettinger εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(24 Απριλίου 2013)

1. Στο πλαίσιο στήριξης για εγκαταστάσεις που παράγουν ηλεκτρική ενέργεια στην Ελλάδα από ανανεώσιμες πηγές ενέργειας, έχει συσσωρευτεί στο παρελθόν σημαντικό ποσό χρέους κυρίως λόγω των υπερβολικά υψηλών τιμολογίων τροφοδότησης ορισμένων τεχνολογιών, ιδίως των φωτοβολταϊκών, και της ανεπαρκούς χρηματοδότησης για την κάλυψη των αντίστοιχων δαπανών. Η εξέλιξη αυτή επιδεινώθηκε από άλλες διαρθρωτικές ελλείψεις στην αγορά ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας, καθώς και από αναποτελεσματικές διοικητικές διαδικασίες. Το τελευταίο αυτό πρόβλημα είχε ως αποτέλεσμα τη συσσώρευση αδειών παραγωγής που καθιστά ολοένα και πιο δύσκολο τον σχεδιασμό της εξέλιξης του κόστους του καθεστώτος στήριξης, καθώς και τις αναγκαίες ενισχύσεις του δικτύου σύμφωνα με την πραγματική ανάπτυξη. Λεπτομερείς και επικαιροποιημένες πληροφορίες διατίθενται στην ιστοσελίδα του ελληνικού φορέα λειτουργίας της αγοράς (¹).

2. Η Επιτροπή συνεργάζεται με τις ελληνικές αρχές και άλλους ενδιαφερόμενους φορείς για να στηρίξει την ολοκληρωμένη μεταρρύθμιση του ρυθμιστικού και νομοθετικού πλαισίου για τις ανανεώσιμες πηγές ενέργειας στην Ελλάδα με στόχο τη μεγιστοποίηση της οικονομικής απόδοσης, την εξασφάλιση της εμπιστοσύνης των επενδυτών και τη μακροπρόθεσμη βιωσιμότητα των μηχανισμών στήριξης. Οι ελληνικές αρχές έχουν ήδη λάβει μέτρα για την αντιμετώπιση των θεμάτων που επισημάνθηκαν και περαιτέρω μέτρα θα ληφθούν στο εγγύς μέλλον. Επιπλέον, όπως αναφέρει το Αξιότιμο Μέλος, υπεγράφη πρόσφατα δήλωση προθέσεων μεταξύ της ελληνικής κυβέρνησης, της γερμανικής κυβέρνησης και της Επιτροπής, η οποία προβλέπει τεχνική βοήθεια για τον σκοπό αυτό.

(¹) Πιο πρόσφατη (Φεβρουάριος 2013) επικαιροποίηση σχετικά με την ανάπτυξη και όσον αφορά τον ειδικό λογαριασμό ΑΠΕ είναι διαθέσιμη στον δικτυακό τόπο: http://www.lagie.gr/fileadmin/groups/EDSHE/MiniaiaDeltiaEL/2013_02_Miniaio_Deltio_EL_APE_SITHYA.pdf

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002739/13
to the Commission**

Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)

(8 March 2013)

Subject: Sustainability and Use of Renewable Energy Sources in Greece

The Greek Ministry for the Environment, Energy and Climate Change recently announced that it had signed, with the German Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) and the Task Force for Greece, a Joint Declaration of Intent on cooperation in reforming the Renewable Energy Sources sector in Greece.

According to the announcement, the aim of this cooperation is to prepare a roadmap and formulate a strategy for implementing the necessary reforms to ensure the sustainability of the Renewable Energy Sources sector in Greece, while creating a healthy investment environment for the optimal use of the country's energy potential.

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

- Does it believe there are problems with the sustainability of the Renewable Energy Sources sector in Greece? If so, what are they? What evidence can it provide for this?
- Does it take the view that Greece lacks the healthy investment environment needed for the optimal use of its energy potential? If so, what steps will it take to remedy this?

Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission

(24 April 2013)

1. The support framework for renewable energy installations generating electricity in Greece has in the past been accumulating a substantial amount of debt mainly due to excessively high feed-in tariffs for some technologies, in particular photovoltaics, and insufficient funding to cover the corresponding expenditures. This development was exacerbated by other structural deficiencies in the electricity market as well as inefficient administrative procedures. The latter problem led to a backlog of production licenses rendering it increasingly difficult to plan the evolution of the cost of the support scheme, as well as the necessary grid reinforcements according to actual deployment. Detailed and up to date information can be found on the website of the Greek market operator ⁽¹⁾.

2. The Commission cooperates with the Greek authorities and other stakeholders to support a comprehensive reform of the regulatory and legislative framework for renewable energy in Greece to maximise cost-efficiency, secure investor confidence and provide long-term sustainability to support schemes. The Greek authorities have already taken measures to address the issues identified and further steps will be taken in the near future. Furthermore, as mentioned by the Honourable Member, a Declaration of Intent was recently signed between the Greek Government, the German Government and the Commission, which provides for technical assistance to that effect.

⁽¹⁾ Most recent (February 2013) update on the development of deployment and as regards the RES special account can be found under: http://www.lagie.gr/fileadmin/groups/EDSHE/MiniaiaDeltiaEL/2013_02_Miniaio_Deltio_EL_APE_SITHYA.pdf

(Svensk version)

**Frågor för skriftligt besvarande E-002741/13
till kommissionen
Amelia Andersdotter (Verts/ALE)
(8 mars 2013)**

Angående: Särskild grund för förverkligandet av en helt automatiserad bildrapportering?

I sitt svar på den skriftliga frågan E-011539/2012 angav kommissionen att för att kunna uppfylla den globala alliansens mål skulle "företagen [...] använda ett helt automatiskt system, specifikt inriktat på att hitta och rapportera endast kända och kontrollerade barnpornografiska bilder och skulle inte granska eller avslöja några andra uppgifter".

Den globala alliansen är en uttryckligen icke-rättslig ansträngning. På exakt vilken grund avser kommissionen eller alliansen att se till att "företagen [använder] ett helt automatiskt system, specifikt inriktat på att hitta och rapportera endast kända och kontrollerade barnpornografiska bilder och skulle inte granska eller avslöja några andra uppgifter"?

Har kommissionen eller alliansen en strategi för att se till att just denna förväntning uppfylls i praktiken, ja eller nej?

**Svar från Cecilia Malmström på kommissionens vägnar
(24 april 2013)**

Såsom förklaras i svaret på den skriftliga frågan E-011539/12 som parlamentsledamoten hänvisar till, är syftet med det operativa mål som anges i förklaringen vid upprättandet av den globala alliansen för sexuella övergrepp mot barn på internet att uppmuntra leverantörer av elektroniska tjänster och internetjänster att *frivilligt* använda målinriktade åtgärder för att hitta bilder på sexuella övergrepp mot barn i deras system. Såsom parlamentsledamoten mycket riktigt påpekar är den globala alliansen för sexuella övergrepp mot barn på internet en icke-rättslig ansträngning. Den bygger på att de deltagande staterna åtar sig att ställa upp vissa gemensamma politiska mål. Det operativa mål som anges ovan är ett sätt att bidra till att förverkliga dessa politiska mål för ett visst land, men det kommer an på varje enskilt deltagande land att utifrån sin specifika situation besluta vilka lagstiftningsåtgärder eller andra åtgärder som det vidtar för att uppnå målen.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002741/13
to the Commission**

Amelia Andersdotter (Verts/ALE)

(8 March 2013)

Subject: What specific basis exists for the realisation of fully automated image reporting?

In its response to Written Question E-011539/12, the Commission indicated that in order to fulfil the goals of the Global Alliance, '[c]ompanies would use a fully automated system to specifically target, find and report only known or vetted child pornography images, without examining or revealing any other data'.

The Global Alliance is an explicitly non-legislative endeavour. On what specific basis does the Commission or the Alliance plan to ensure that '[c]ompanies would use a fully automated system to specifically target, find and report only known or vetted child pornography images, without examining or revealing any other data'?

Specifically — yes or no — does the Commission or the Alliance have a strategy to ensure that the aforementioned expectation is realised in practice?

Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission

(24 April 2013)

As explained in the answer to Written Question E-011539/12 which the Honourable Member refers to, the objective of the operational goal provided for in the Declaration on the Launch of the Global Alliance against Child Sexual Abuse Online is to encourage electronic/Internet service providers to *voluntarily* employ targeted measures to find child sexual abuse images on their systems. As the Honourable Member rightly points out, the Global Alliance against Child Sexual Abuse Online is a non-legislative endeavour. It relies on the commitment of the participating states to a set of shared policy targets. The operational goal identified above is one possible way to contribute to realising these policy targets for a given state, but it is up to each participating state to decide, in accordance with its specific situation, which legislative or non-legislative actions it will undertake to reach the targets.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002742/13

à Comissão

Carlos Coelho (PPE) e Mário David (PPE)

(8 de março de 2013)

Assunto: Vistos Schengen — recusa de entrada

Têm sido apresentadas inúmeras queixas por parte de nacionais de países terceiros relativamente ao facto de lhes ser recusada entrada no espaço Schengen, apesar de possuírem um visto válido para esse efeito.

Apesar de estarem em posse de um visto uniforme (visto válido para a totalidade do território dos Estados-Membros), o qual foi emitido pelo Estado-Membro de destino principal da visita (após ter sido verificado que o requerente cumpre todas as condições de entrada ao abrigo do Código das Fronteiras Schengen, se não representa um risco em termos de imigração clandestina ou uma ameaça à segurança do Estado-Membro e se tenciona deixar o território antes do fim de validade do visto), esses nacionais de países terceiros têm sido alvo de uma recusa de entrada numa fronteira externa de outro Estado-Membro que não o responsável pela emissão do visto.

Gostaríamos de saber se, para a Comissão, estamos perante uma violação das regras de Schengen, ou, caso considere que assim não é, se pode explicar as regras jurídicas que servem de base à possibilidade de um Estado-Membro poder recusar a entrada de um nacional de um país terceiro detentor de um visto uniforme válido para uma estada de curta duração (emitido de acordo com as regras previstas no Código de Vistos).

Caso exista uma base jurídica que permita este tipo de recusas de entrada, gostaríamos de saber sobre quem é que recai esse poder de decisão.

Resposta dada por Cecilia Malmström em nome da Comissão

(14 de maio de 2013)

Nos termos do artigo 30.º do Código de Vistos ⁽¹⁾, «a mera posse de um visto uniforme (...) não confere um direito de entrada automático». Quando se apresentam nas fronteiras externas, os titulares de vistos devem poder provar que preenchem as condições de entrada (artigo 5.º, n.º 1, do Código das Fronteiras Schengen) ⁽²⁾. As autoridades dos Estados-Membros são obrigadas a comunicar esta informação às pessoas a quem emitem vistos.

A Comissão tem conhecimento de casos em que um Estado-Membro recusa a entrada e anula um visto válido emitido por outro Estado-Membro, apesar do princípio de reconhecimento mútuo de vistos emitidos por outros Estados-Membros para efeitos de entrada e permanência no espaço Schengen. Se uma pessoa for titular de um visto de entrada única ou de um visto de entradas múltiplas é porque o Estado-Membro emissor competente considerou que estão preenchidas as condições atrás referidas. Este deve ser o elemento principal da avaliação efetuada quando essa pessoa pretende entrar num Estado-Membro diferente do que emitiu o visto. Nessas circunstâncias, a recusa «automática» de entrada ou a anulação «automática» do visto emitido por outro Estado-Membro é incompatível com o princípio do reconhecimento mútuo dos vistos Schengen. Não obstante, um Estado-Membro pode recusar a entrada quando o titular do visto não puder provar que preenche as condições de entrada. Se se afigurar que o visto foi obtido de forma fraudulenta, por exemplo com base em informações falsas, o visto também pode ser anulado.

⁽¹⁾ Regulamento (CE) n.º 810/2009, JO L 243 de 15.9.2009, p. 1.

⁽²⁾ Regulamento (CE) n.º 562/2006, JO L 105 de 13.4.2006, p. 1.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002742/13
to the Commission
Carlos Coelho (PPE) and Mário David (PPE)
(8 March 2013)**

Subject: Schengen Visas — refusal of entry

There have been numerous complaints made by third-country nationals who have been refused entry to the Schengen area, despite holding a visa valid for this purpose.

Despite holding a uniform visa (a visa valid for the entire Schengen area), issued by the Member State whose territory constitutes the main destination of the visit (after it has been confirmed that the applicant meets all of the entry requirements set out in the Schengen Borders Code and does not represent a risk of clandestine immigration or a threat to the security of the Member State and intends to leave the territory before the visa expires), these third-country nationals have been refused entry at an external border of a Member State other than that which issued the visa.

In the Commission's view, does this constitute a violation of the Schengen rules or is this not the case? Can it explain the legal rules used as the basis for a Member State refusing entry to a third-country national holding a uniform visa valid for a short-term stay (issued in accordance with the rules set out in the Visa Code)?

Should there be a legal basis for refusing entry in this way? Who holds the power of decision?

**Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission
(14 May 2013)**

According to the Visa Code ⁽¹⁾ Article 30 the 'mere possession of a uniform visa... shall not confer an automatic right of entry'. Visa holders must, when presenting themselves at the external borders, be in a position to prove that they fulfil the entry conditions (Article 5(1) of the Schengen Borders Code) ⁽²⁾. Member States' authorities are obliged to inform a person to whom a visa has been issued of the above.

The Commission is aware of cases where a Member State has refused entry and annulled a valid visa issued by another Member State despite the principle of mutual recognition of visas issued by other Member States for the purpose of entry into and stay in the Schengen area. If a person holds a single entry visa or a multiple entry visa, it means that the competent, issuing Member State has assessed that the person concerned fulfils the above criteria. That should be the prevailing element in the assessment when such persons wish to enter a Member State different from the one that issued the visa. In such circumstances an 'automatic' refusal of entry and the 'automatic' annulment of the visa issued by another Member State would be incompatible with the principle of mutual recognition of Schengen visas. Nevertheless, a Member State is entitled to refuse entry when a visa holder is unable to prove that he/she fulfils the entry conditions. Where it appears that the visa was obtained fraudulently, for instance on the basis of false information, the visa may also be annulled.

⁽¹⁾ Regulation (EC) 810/2009, OJ L 243, 15.9.2009, p. 1.

⁽²⁾ Regulation (EC) No 562/2006, OJ L 105, 13.4.2006, p. 1.

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-002743/13
to the Commission
Sajjad Karim (ECR)
(8 March 2013)**

Subject: Investigation into DuPont and Honeywell regarding 1234yf and the directive on mobile air-conditioning systems (MAC Directive)

With the refrigerant 1234yf being adopted to comply with the MAC Directive, there is uncertainty surrounding the implementation of this directive. Deep concerns have been raised regarding the safety and supply issues of 1234yf.

The Directorate General for Competition has announced that it is investigating DuPont and Honeywell regarding 1234yf production in 2011.

1. What is the current stage of the Directorate General for Competition's investigation into the agreements between DuPont and Honeywell?
2. Does the Directorate General for Competition realise that its investigation into DuPont and Honeywell is having a strong effect on the industry, particularly as many companies have been unable to make investment decisions in time to meet the requirements of the directive?
3. Furthermore, does the Directorate General for Competition realise that all delays benefit the only two players that can supply 1234yf as a direct result of the very agreements that are currently the subject of the antitrust investigation?

**Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission
(12 April 2013)**

The Commission is currently pursuing an investigation involving Honeywell and DuPont following complaints alleging breaches of both Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty in the field of automotive refrigerants.

The Commission is aware of the importance of the refrigerants issue for both the car industry and chemical suppliers. However, competition investigations involving complex factual and legal issues inevitably take some time to resolve.

This is a highly commercially sensitive issue from the point of view of the complainants, the target companies, and the sectors involved as a whole. For these reasons, and in line with general practice, the Commission cannot disclose precise details of the investigative steps that it is taking.

The Commission's Directorate-General for Competition is carrying out a thorough investigation taking also into account, as appropriate, the market developments.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord P-002744/13
aan de Commissie
Toine Manders (ALDE)
(8 maart 2013)

Betreeft: Europese geluidsnormen voor treinverkeer

Tijdens de plenaire vergadering in Straatsburg heeft het Europees Parlement de nieuwe geluidsnormen voor motorvoertuigen vastgesteld. In veel lidstaten hebben veel Europese burgers ook last van geluidsoverlast door treinen, in het bijzonder hogesnelheidstreinen. Om eerlijke concurrentie te garanderen zouden alle treinen aan dezelfde maximale geluidsnorm moeten voldoen om op de interne markt te mogen worden gebracht.

1. Is de Commissie voornemens om ook voor treinen geluidsnormen vast te stellen op Europees niveau?
2. Zo ja, wanneer is er een Commissievoorstel te verwachten? Zo nee, hoe gaat de Europese Commissie dan burgers beschermen tegen geluidsoverlast van treinen?

Antwoord van de heer Kallas namens de Commissie
(10 april 2013)

1. De Commissie heeft op Europees niveau reeds geluidsnormen voor treinen vastgesteld: het besluit van de Commissie betreffende technische specificaties inzake interoperabiliteit — geluidsemissies (TSI geluidsemissies) ⁽¹⁾ heeft betrekking op het geluid van conventionele treinen, en de beschikking van de Commissie betreffende technische specificaties inzake interoperabiliteit — rollend hogesnelheidsmaterieel ⁽²⁾, heeft betrekking op onder meer de geluidsemissies van hogesnelheidstreinen.
2. Aangezien bovengenoemde besluiten betrekking hebben op vergunningen voor nieuw rollend materieel, heft de Commissie maatregelen getroffen om ook het bestaande rollend materieel stiller te laten rijden:
 - a. De richtlijn tot instelling van één Europese spoorwegruimte (Richtlijn 2012/34/EU ⁽³⁾) voorziet in de mogelijkheid om de infrastructuurheffingen die spoorwegaansluitingen moeten betalen, te differentiëren op basis van het geluidsniveau van de goederenwagons;
 - b. de financieringsfaciliteit voor Europese verbindingen (COM(2011)665/3) voorziet in de mogelijkheid tot medefinanciering door de EU van de uitrusting van bestaande goederenwagons met stille remblokken zodat ze minder geluidshinder veroorzaken.

Ten slotte kan de Richtlijn 2002/49/EG (richtlijn omgevingslawaai ⁽⁴⁾) de problemen verlichten op plaatsen waar de blootstelling aan lawaai het grootst is. Krachtens deze richtlijn zijn de lidstaten verplicht om geluidsbelastingkaarten op te maken van alle voornaamste infrastructures, met inbegrip van de spoorweginfrastructuur, en op basis daarvan actieplannen op te stellen om de blootstelling aan lawaai in de buurt van de hotspots die tijdens het in kaart brengen zijn geïdentificeerd, te verminderen.

⁽¹⁾ Besluit van de Commissie van 4 april 2011 betreffende de technische specificaties inzake interoperabiliteit van het subsysteem „rollend materieel — geluidsemissies” van het conventionele trans-Europese spoorwegsysteem (2011/229/EU).

⁽²⁾ Beschikking van de Commissie van 21 februari 2008 betreffende de technische specificatie inzake interoperabiliteit van het subsysteem „rollend materieel” van het trans-Europese hogesnelheidsspoorwegsysteem (2008/232/EG).

⁽³⁾ Richtlijn 2012/34/EU van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van 21 november 2012 tot instelling van één Europese spoorwegruimte, PB L 343 van 14.12.2012.

⁽⁴⁾ Richtlijn 2002/49/EG van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van 25 juni 2002 inzake de evaluatie en de beheersing van omgevingslawaai — Verklaring van de Commissie in het Bemiddelingscomité over de richtlijn inzake de evaluatie en de beheersing van omgevingslawaai, PB L 189 van 18.7.2002.

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-002744/13
to the Commission**

Toine Manders (ALDE)

(8 March 2013)

Subject: European noise standards for rail transport

At the part-session in Strasbourg, the European Parliament adopted the new noise standards for motor vehicles. In many Member States, numerous members of the public are also disturbed by rail noise, particularly from high-speed trains. In order to ensure fair competition, all trains ought to be required to comply with the same noise standard in order to be placed on the internal market.

1. Will the Commission also adopt noise standards for trains at European level?
2. If so, when can a Commission proposal be expected? If not, how will the Commission protect the public against noise nuisance from trains?

Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission

(10 April 2013)

1. The Commission already adopted noise standards for trains at the European level: Commission Decision on Technical Specifications for Interoperability — Noise (TSI Noise) ⁽¹⁾ deals with noise of conventional trains and Commission Decision on Technical Specifications for Interoperability — High-speed rolling stock ⁽²⁾ deals with high-speed trains, also in relation to noise.
2. As the abovementioned decisions concern authorisations of new rolling stock, the Commission adopted measures that would enable rendering also existing rolling stock more silent:
 - a. Directive establishing a single European railway area (Directive 2012/34/EU ⁽³⁾) provides for a possibility to differentiate infrastructure charges paid by train operators in respect of the noise levels of the wagons;
 - b. The Connecting Europe Facility (COM(2011)665/3) provides for a possibility for the EU to co-fund the retrofitting of existing freight wagons with silent brake blocks, in order to make them less noisy.

Finally, Directive 2002/49/EC (Environmental Noise Directive ⁽⁴⁾) can help to alleviate problems where noise exposure is high. It requires Member States to elaborate noise maps concerning major infrastructures including rail and, on that basis, draw up action plans in order to reduce noise exposure near to hot spots identified in the mapping.

⁽¹⁾ Commission decision of 4 April 2011 concerning the technical specifications of interoperability relating to the subsystem 'rolling stock — noise' of the trans-European conventional rail system (2011/229/EU).

⁽²⁾ Commission decision of 21 February 2008 concerning a technical specification for interoperability relating to the 'rolling stock' sub-system of the trans-European high-speed rail system (2008/232/EC).

⁽³⁾ Directive 2012/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 establishing a single European railway area, OJ L 343, 14.12.2012.

⁽⁴⁾ Directive 2002/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 June 2002 relating to the assessment and management of environmental noise — Declaration by the Commission in the Conciliation Committee on the directive relating to the assessment and management of environmental noise, OJ L 189, 18.7.2002.

(българска версия)

Въпрос с искане за писмен отговор E-002745/13
до Комисията
Monika Panayotova (PPE)
(8 март 2013 г.)

Относно: Гаранция за младежта

Имайки предвид високите нива на безработица сред младите и стремежа за устойчив, приобщаващ и интелигентен растеж, с какво новата финансова рамка 2014—2020 г. ще допринесе за развитието на младите и учащите се европейски граждани и как тя ще се превърне от финансов ресурс в устойчива инвестиционна рамка за отделните държави членки?

Според проучване на Световната организация на труда за въвеждането на Гаранцията за младежта само за държавите от еврозоната ще са необходими 21 млрд. евро. В тази връзка считате ли, че определените 6 милиарда евро за инициативата „Младежка заетост“ са достатъчен ресурс за реално подпомагане и предпоставка за постоянна работа на младите хора от слаборазвитите региони в 27-те държави членки?

В ЕС едва 15—20% от учениците, които по време на средното си образование са участвали в програма за създаване на малко предприятие, впоследствие започват собствена стопанска дейност. Техният брой е от три до пет пъти по-голям в сравнение с броя на предприемачите като процент от общото население. Вземайки предвид и факта, че според проучване на Евробарометър 58% от европейските граждани предпочитат да бъдат служители, а едва 37 % предпочитат да бъдат самостоятелно заети:

- какви конкретни мерки ще бъдат предприети за прилагането на Плана за действие в областта на предприемачеството до 2020 г.?
- какви други стъпки предвижда Европейската комисия за въвеждане на обучение по предприемачество в образователните системи на държавите членки и за стимулиране по този начин на предприемаческия дух сред младите хора в ЕС?

Отговор, даден от г-н Андор от името на Комисията
(3 май 2013 г.)

В Предложението за регламент относно Европейския социален фонд (ЕСФ) за периода 2014 — 2020 г. е определен специален инвестиционен приоритет за устойчивото интегриране на пазара на труда на младите хора, неангажирани с трудова дейност, образование или обучение. В изпратени на държавите членки ⁽¹⁾ през 2012 г. документи за изразяване на позиция са очертани приоритетите по отношение на подкрепата по линия на европейските структурни и инвестиционни фондове в периода 2014 — 2020 г. От ДЧ, към които в рамките на европейския семестър през 2012 г. са отправени специфични за всяка държава препоръки по отношение на младежта, се очаква да предвидят достатъчно средства в тази област.

Чрез ИМЗ ⁽²⁾, средствата по която възлизат на 6 млрд. евро, ще бъде предоставена подкрепа специално за младите хора в региони с младежка безработица над 25 % по линия на ЕСФ, както и допълнителна финансова подкрепа. ИМЗ следва да подсили, а не да замени подкрепата по линия на ЕСФ за мерките с насоченост към младежта. Определеният дял от ЕСФ в размер на 3 млрд. евро представлява само минимално изискване.

В Плана за действие „Предприемачество 2020 г.“ ⁽³⁾ се призовава за предприемане на съвместни действия на всички равнища в три области на действие, първата от които е образованието по предприемачество. В допълнение към инициативите на ЕК, в плана ДЧ се приканват да гарантират, че основното умение „предприемачество“ ще бъде застъпено в учебните програми за всички нива на образование преди края на 2015 г., и да осигурят поне една възможност за придобиване на практически опит в областта на предприемачеството преди напускане на системата на задължителното образование.

⁽¹⁾ ДЧ.

⁽²⁾ Инициатива за младежка заетост COM (2013)144, 145, 146 от 12 март 2013 г.

⁽³⁾ <http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/promoting-entrepreneurship>.

В Съобщението на Комисията „Преосмисляне на образованието“ ⁽⁴⁾ също се призовава за придобиване на практически опит в реални условия в периода на училищното образование. ЕК в сътрудничество с ОИСР е в процес на разработване на рамка за университетите в областта на предприемачеството. Подобна рамка ще бъде разработена за училищата и институциите за професионално образование и обучение (ПОО). Допълнителни насоки за политиката се очаква да бъдат публикувани през есента на 2013 г.

В съвместен документ на ЕК-ОИСР относно политиката в областта на младежкото предприемачество ⁽⁵⁾ са дадени примери за различни практики на включване в училищните учебни програми на обучение по предприемачество.

⁽⁴⁾ COM(2012) 669 final, 20 ноември 2012 г.

⁽⁵⁾ <http://www.oecd.org/regional/leed/Youth%20Policy%20Brief.pdf>, 2012 г.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002745/13
to the Commission**

Monika Panayotova (PPE)

(8 March 2013)

Subject: Youth Guarantee

Having regard to the high levels of youth unemployment and the pursuit of sustainable, inclusive, smart growth, what contribution will the 2014-2020 multiannual financial framework make to the career development of young people and those in education, and how will that contribution translate from a financial resource into a sustainable investment framework in the various Member States?

According to International Labour Organisation research, it will cost EUR 21 billion to introduce the Youth Guarantee in the eurozone countries alone. Does the Commission consider that the EUR 6 billion earmarked for the 'Youth employment' initiative represents a sufficient resource from which to provide real support and create the conditions necessary for getting young people from under-developed regions in the 27 Member States into permanent employment?

Between 15% and 20% of students in the EU who participate in a mini-company programme in secondary school will later start their own company, a figure that is about three to five times that for the general population. Bearing in mind too that, according to research by Eurobarometer, being an employee is the preferred career option for 58% of Europeans, while just 37% would rather be self-employed:

- what practical measures are to be taken to implement the Entrepreneurship 2020 Action Plan, and
- what other steps does the Commission intend to take to introduce entrepreneurship training into the Member States' education systems and thus encourage a spirit of entrepreneurship among young people in the Union?

Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission

(3 May 2013)

The proposal for the 2014-2020 ESF regulation identifies a dedicated investment priority for the sustainable labour-market integration of young people not in employment, education or training. Position Papers sent to each Member State ⁽¹⁾ in 2012 outline priorities for European Structural and Investment Funds support in 2014-2020. MS with a country specific recommendation on youth in the 2012 European Semester are expected to allocate adequate resources to youth.

The YEI ⁽²⁾, amounted to EUR 6 billion, will provide specific support to young people in regions with youth unemployment rates above 25%, through ESF funding and a top-up allocation. The YEI should enhance and not replace ESF support to youth measures. The earmarked ESF share of EUR 3 billion represents only a minimum requirement.

The Entrepreneurship 2020 Action Plan ⁽³⁾ calls for joint action at all levels in three action pillars, the first being entrepreneurship education. In addition to EC initiatives, the Plan invites MS to ensure that the key competence 'entrepreneurship' is embedded into curricula across all levels of education before the end of 2015 and to offer the possibility of at least one practical entrepreneurial experience before leaving compulsory education.

The EC Communication 'Rethinking Education' ⁽⁴⁾ also calls for a practical entrepreneurial exercise during school life. The EC has, in collaboration with OECD, been developing a framework for entrepreneurial universities. A similar framework will be prepared for schools and VET institutions. Further policy guidance is to be published in autumn 2013.

A joint EC-OECD policy brief on youth entrepreneurship ⁽⁵⁾ provides examples of various practices of entrepreneurship training's inclusion into school curricula.

⁽¹⁾ MS.

⁽²⁾ Youth Opportunity Initiative COM(2013)144, 145, 146 of 12 March 2013.

⁽³⁾ <http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/promoting-entrepreneurship>.

⁽⁴⁾ COM(2012) 669 final, 20 November 2012.

⁽⁵⁾ <http://www.oecd.org/regional/leed/Youth%20Policy%20Brief.pdf>, 2012.

(българска версия)

Въпрос с искане за писмен отговор E-002746/13

до Комисията

Monika Panayotova (PPE)

(8 март 2013 г.)

Относно: Стратегия за освобождаване от Механизма за сътрудничество и проверка — Присъединяване на България към Шенген

1. Вземайки под внимание, че в обсега на Механизма за сътрудничество и проверка се осъществява наблюдение и оценка в областта на борбата с корупцията, не считате ли, че след въвеждането от 2013 г. на практиката за изготвяне на редовни европейски антикорупционни доклади за всички държави членки (вкл. и тези по Механизма за сътрудничество и проверка), възниква риск от припокриване на дейностите в тази сфера? Още повече, че ЕК потвърди в мониторинговите си доклади за България и Румъния от юли 2012 г., че необходимата законодателна и институционална рамка в сферата на правосъдието и вътрешните работи е вече налична и следва да се оцени нейното ефективно прилагане. В тази връзка не считате ли, че е необходимо изготвянето на стратегия за освобождаване от Механизма за сътрудничество и проверка (т.нар. CVM Exit Strategy) и превръщането на инициативата за подготовка на антикорупционни доклади в инструмент за бъдещо сътрудничество и координация с компетентните национални органи в държавите членки?

2. Все по-често в предизборната реторика в някои от държавите членки присъединяването към Шенген се обвързва с Механизма за сътрудничество и проверка. В тази връзка считате ли, че присъединяването на България към Шенген следва да се възприема като самостоятелен процес, включващ обективна оценка на постигнатото — без прилагане на двойни стандарти, и обвързването му с Механизма за сътрудничество и проверка?

Отговор, даден от г-н Барозу от името на Комисията

(25 април 2013 г.)

1. Няма официална връзка между механизма за сътрудничество и проверка и доклада на ЕС за борбата с корупцията. Механизмът за сътрудничество и проверка беше създаден през декември 2006 г. като средство след присъединяването за мониторинг за конкретни области, предизвикващи загриженост, и той включва ясни показатели, обхващащи не само борбата с корупцията, но също така и съдебната реформа, а в случая на България — и борбата с организираната престъпност. Според решението за създаване на механизма той ще се прилага, докато показателите бъдат „задоволително изпълнени“. Следователно прекратяването на механизма за сътрудничество и проверка е изцяло в ръцете на двете държави членки. Бъдещият механизъм на ЕС за докладване относно борбата с корупцията има за цел да събира данни от различни източници, което да позволи на Комисията да очертае точна картина на усилията за борба с корупцията във всички държави — членки на ЕС. Неговият обхват е различен от механизма за сътрудничество и проверка. Посланията за борбата с корупцията в рамките на тези два различни инструмента трябва да бъдат съгласувани, тъй като действително е налице тематично прекриване.

2. Няма правна връзка между механизма за сътрудничество и проверка и присъединяването към Шенгенското пространство. Именно инструментите, налични в рамките на Шенген, както и тези, които се обсъждат понастоящем в подобрен механизъм за оценка и наблюдение на Шенген, са правилните инструменти за справяне с възможните недостатъци при граничния контрол, а не механизмът за сътрудничество и проверка, който има различен обхват. Комисията няма да подкрепи каквато и да била официална връзка между тези два процеса. Това не би било в съответствие с шенгенските критерии за оценка. От своя страна Комисията многократно е изразявала ясно своята пълна подкрепа за присъединяването на Румъния и България към Шенгенското пространство, както и усилията на председателствата в тази посока.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002746/13
to the Commission**

Monika Panayotova (PPE)

(8 March 2013)

Subject: A Cooperation and Verification Mechanism exit strategy and Bulgaria's accession to Schengen

1. Bearing in mind that the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) includes monitoring and assessment of measures to combat corruption, does the Commission not consider that, following the introduction from 2013 of the practice of preparing regular EU anti-corruption reports for each Member State (including those subject to the CVM), there will be a risk of overlap here? The question is particularly pertinent as the Commission stated in its July 2012 monitoring reports on Bulgaria and Romania that the necessary legal and institutional framework for justice and home affairs was already in place and that what was now needed was to assess the effectiveness of its application. Therefore, does the Commission not think that a 'CVM exit strategy' needs to be prepared and that the anti-corruption reports initiative needs to be turned into a tool for future cooperation and coordination with the relevant national authorities in the Member States?
2. Increasingly, in pre-election rhetoric in some Member States, the question of accession to Schengen is being linked to the CVM. Does the Commission consider that Bulgaria's accession to Schengen ought to be seen as an independent process which includes objective assessments of progress, without applying double standards and linking it to the CVM?

Answer given by Mr Barroso on behalf of the Commission

(25 April 2013)

1. There is no formal connection between the CVM and the EU Anti-Corruption Report. The CVM was established in December 2006, as a post-accession monitoring tool for specific areas of concern, and it comprises clear benchmarks covering not only fight against corruption, but also justice reforms and, in the case of Bulgaria, fight against organised crime. According to the decision establishing the CVM, the mechanism will stay in place until the benchmarks are 'satisfactorily fulfilled'. The exit from the CVM is thus entirely in the hands of the two Member States. The future EU anti-corruption reporting mechanism aims at gathering data from various sources, which would then enable the Commission to draw an accurate picture of the anti-corruption efforts in all EU Member States. This is a different scope than the CVM. The messages passed on the fight against corruption in these two different instruments will have to be coherent, as there is indeed a topical overlap.
2. There is no legal link between the CVM and the accession to the Schengen zone. The tools already available under Schengen, as well as those currently being discussed under an improved Schengen evaluation and monitoring mechanism, are the right tools to address any possible shortcoming in border controls, not the CVM, which has a different scope. The Commission will not support any formal link being made between these two processes. This would not be in line with the Schengen evaluation criteria. For its part, the Commission has made clear repeatedly that it fully supports Romania and Bulgaria's accession to Schengen as well as the Presidencies' efforts in this direction.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002747/13
a la Comisión**

Andrés Perelló Rodríguez (S&D)

(8 de marzo de 2013)

Asunto: Ayudas públicas a clubes de fútbol de la Comunidad Valenciana

En julio de 2011, el Gobierno de la Generalitat Valenciana decidió avalar préstamos por valor de 118 millones de euros a los clubes de fútbol Valencia C.F., Elche C.F., y Hércules C.F., todos ellos sociedades anónimas deportivas de titularidad privada.

Ante el impago de estas tres sociedades, la Generalitat Valenciana tiene que hacer frente actualmente al pago de unas deudas por valor de 118 millones de euros. El Gobierno Valenciano ya ha pagado 4,9 millones de euros por los intereses de la deuda de 86 millones de euros contraída por el Valencia C.F. con la entidad bancaria Bankia.

Sin menoscabo del sentimiento que simbolizan los distintos clubes de fútbol para los aficionados, la ciudad y la región que representan, tenemos que distinguir lo que es el deporte, los sentimientos, la afectividad y la buena gestión de los fondos públicos.

En el contexto socioeconómico actual, en el que se están produciendo recortes y privatizaciones de los servicios públicos que ponen en riesgo servicios públicos básicos para los ciudadanos como la salud y la educación, resulta censurable que, al mismo tiempo, se esté avalando con fondos públicos, cuando no nacionalizando, clubes de fútbol de titularidad privada con el fin de salvarlos de quiebras económicas provocadas por la mala gestión de sus responsables.

1. ¿Está investigando la Comisión las ayudas públicas que han recibido los distintos clubes de fútbol de la Comunidad Valenciana por parte del Gobierno regional valenciano?
2. ¿Son estas ayudas públicas compatibles con el artículo 107 del TFUE y con las líneas directrices de la UE sobre ayudas de Estado de salvamento y de reestructuración de empresas en crisis?
3. ¿Qué medidas piensa adoptar la Comisión en relación con este asunto y qué clubes de fútbol están siendo investigados?

Respuesta del Sr. Almunia en nombre de la Comisión

(17 de abril de 2013)

La Comisión está al corriente de las noticias sobre préstamos y avales del Estado a tres clubes de fútbol de la Comunidad Valenciana. La Comisión ha recabado del Gobierno español información acerca de los tres clubes, por lo que todavía no está en condiciones de evaluar la compatibilidad de esas medidas con el artículo 107 del Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002747/13
to the Commission**

Andrés Perelló Rodríguez (S&D)

(8 March 2013)

Subject: State aid for football clubs in Valencia

In July 2011, the Government of the Autonomous Community of Valencia decided to grant loans in the amount of EUR 118 million to the football clubs Valencia C.F., Elche C.F. and Hércules C.F., all of which are privately owned limited sports companies.

As these three companies have defaulted on the loans, the Valencian Government is now having to pay debts of EUR 118 million. The Valencian Government has already paid EUR 4.9 million in interest on the EUR 86 million debt owed by Valencia C.F. to the bank Bankia.

Without playing down what the various football clubs mean to the fans, the town and the region they represent, a distinction needs to be drawn between sport, feelings, emotion and the sound management of public funds.

In the current socioeconomic climate, in which public services are being cut and privatised, jeopardising basic public services such as healthcare and education, it is reprehensible that public funds are being used at the same time to bail out privately owned football clubs, when they are not being nationalised, to save them from bankruptcy as a result of mismanagement on the part those running them.

1. Is the Commission investigating the state aid that several football clubs in Valencia have received from the Valencian Regional Government?
2. Is this state aid compatible with Article 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and with the EU guidelines on state aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty?
3. What action does the Commission intend to take on this matter and which football clubs are being investigated?

Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission

(17 April 2013)

The Commission is aware of reports about loans and State guarantees for three football clubs in Valencia. The Commission has asked the Spanish Government for information regarding the three clubs, so is not yet in a position to assess the compatibility of these measures with Article 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-002748/13
an die Kommission
Jutta Steinruck (S&D)
(8. März 2013)

Betrifft: Europaweite Arbeitsvermittlung

Zwischen Deutschland und Frankreich wurde in Kehl das erste Büro für grenzüberschreitende Arbeitsvermittlung eröffnet. Trotz der Freizügigkeit in der EU ist es für Arbeitssuchende und Arbeitgeber noch immer nicht selbstverständlich, eine Arbeitsstelle im Nachbarland anzunehmen, beziehungsweise dort einen Bewerber zu suchen.

Um der Arbeitslosigkeit in der Europäischen Union zu begegnen, ist es wichtig, den europäischen Arbeitsmarkt durch den Ausbau der Vernetzung der Arbeitsagenturen zu stärken. Insbesondere in Grenzregionen, in denen es kaum Sprachbarrieren gibt, ist die Arbeitsannahme interessant, da sie nicht mit einem Umzug des Suchenden verbunden ist.

1. Strebt die Kommission die Errichtung weiterer Einrichtungen dieser Art an, und sollen diese ausschließlich in Grenzregionen liegen?
2. Sieht die Kommission eine anteilige Finanzierung durch die entsprechenden Länder vor oder durch die Europäische Union?
3. Sieht die Kommission bei der Ausgestaltung der Arbeitsvermittlung auch eine individuelle Beratung der Arbeitnehmer und Arbeitgeber vor?

Antwort von Herrn Andor im Namen der Kommission
(6. Mai 2013)

1. Der Rechtsrahmen der EU zur Förderung der Freizügigkeit der Arbeitnehmerinnen und Arbeitnehmer innerhalb der Union, d. h. die Verordnung (EU) Nr. 492/2011, überlässt den Mitgliedstaaten die Entscheidung über die Gestaltung der Arbeitsverwaltungen und damit auch die Gestaltung der grenzübergreifenden Arbeitsvermittlung. Gemäß dieser Verordnung sorgt EURES, das Netz der europäischen öffentlichen Arbeitsverwaltungen und der Kommission, dafür, dass die Arbeitsverwaltungen aller Mitgliedstaaten sowie Norwegens, Islands, Liechtensteins und der Schweiz Stellenangebote und Stellengesuche in der Union austarieren und Arbeitnehmer in Beschäftigungsverhältnisse vermitteln. Hierunter fallen auch Dienstleistungen für Grenzregionen. So können die Mitgliedstaaten Strukturen für eine Zusammenarbeit und die Erbringung von Dienstleistungen speziell für Grenzregionen einrichten.

2. Die Kommission stellt Finanzhilfen für Dienstleistungen bereit, die die Mitgliedstaaten im Rahmen von EURES erbringen. Hierunter fallen Informationstätigkeiten, der Abgleich von Stellenangebot und -nachfrage und die Vermittlung in Grenzregionen sowie in ein anderes Land. Für den Zeitraum ab 2014 basiert die finanzielle Unterstützung auf den Ergebnissen der Beratungen über das Programm für sozialen Wandel und soziale Innovation und den Europäischen Sozialfonds.

3. Die Arbeitsverwaltungen und weitere Partner (wie die Sozialpartner) bieten im Rahmen von EURES auch eine individuelle Beratung für Arbeitssuchende an, die eine Anstellung in einem anderen Mitgliedstaat suchen, wie auch für Arbeitgeber, die Arbeitskräfte aus anderen EU-Ländern anwerben möchten.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002748/13
to the Commission**

Jutta Steinruck (S&D)

(8 March 2013)

Subject: Europe-wide job placement services

The first office for cross-border job placement between Germany and France has been opened in Kehl. Despite free movement in the EU, accepting a job in a neighbouring country or seeking an applicant from there is still not self-evident for job seekers and employers.

In order to tackle unemployment in the European Union it is important to strengthen the European labour market by expanding the network of employment agencies. In border regions in particular, where there are unlikely to be any language barriers, job acceptance is interesting, as the job seeker does not need to move location.

1. Is the Commission aiming to establish more agencies like this one, and is it the intention for these to be located exclusively in border regions?
2. Does it intend the financing to be shared by the relevant Member States or by the European Union?
3. With regard to the structuring of the job placement service, is it also planning to provide individual advice to workers and employers?

Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission

(6 May 2013)

1. The EU framework to facilitate the freedom of movement for workers within the Union, i.e. Regulation No 492/2011, leaves to the Member States to decide on the organisation of the employment services, including as regards cross border placements. Pursuant to this regulation, EURES, the network of European employment services and the Commission, ensures the intra-EU clearing of vacancies and applications for employment and the resultant placing of workers in employment by employment services in all Member States, Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland. This includes services for border regions. Member States may decide to set up specific cooperation and service structures for border regions.

2. The Commission provides grants for services offered in the Member States in the framework of EURES. This includes information, matching and placement services for cross-border and cross-country mobility. Funding as of 2014 is dependent on the outcome of the negotiations on the Programme on Social Change and Innovation and the European Social Fund.

3. In the framework of EURES employment services and other partners such as social partners provide individual advice for both, jobseekers that are interested in working in other European countries and employers searching to recruit from other European countries.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-002749/13

an die Kommission

Jörg Leichtfried (S&D)

(8. März 2013)

Betrifft: E-Book-Reader Kindle — Löschen von erworbenen E-Books bei Kündigung von Amazon-Account

Das Online-Versandhaus „Amazon“ bietet seinen Kunden mit dem E-Book-Reader „Kindle“ ein digitales Gerät zum Lesen von online erworbenen Büchern an. Diese „E-Books“ können in einer virtuellen Bibliothek über einen Amazon-Account erworben und nach Erwerb uneingeschränkt gelesen werden.

Anscheinend soll jedoch bei einer Kündigung dieses Amazon-Accounts auch die gesamte erworbene Online-Büchersammlung gelöscht werden.

1. Ist der Kommission dieser Umstand bekannt?
2. Ist diese Sachlage rechtlich mit dem Konsumentenschutz vereinbar?
3. Muss der Kunde in solch einem Fall nicht bei Eröffnung eines Accounts über diese Bedingungen informiert werden?
4. Plant die Kommission behördliche Untersuchungen in diese Richtung?

Antwort von Frau Reding im Namen der Kommission

(2. Mai 2013)

Die Verbraucherschutzvorschriften der EU gelten auch für den Verkauf digitaler Produkte an EU-Verbraucher. Sie stellen sicher, dass den Verbrauchern alle erforderlichen Informationen zur Verfügung stehen, damit sie eine fundierte Kaufentscheidung treffen können.

Nach der Richtlinie 97/7/EG über den Verbraucherschutz bei Vertragsabschlüssen im Fernabsatz und nach der Richtlinie 2005/29/EG über unlautere Geschäftspraktiken im binnenmarktinternen Geschäftsverkehr zwischen Unternehmen und Verbrauchern sind die Händler verpflichtet, Informationen über die wesentlichen Merkmale der von ihnen angebotenen Waren und Dienstleistungen zur Verfügung zu stellen. In der Richtlinie 2011/83/EU über die Rechte der Verbraucher, die in Kürze an die Stelle der Richtlinie über den Fernabsatz treten wird, ist ferner festgelegt, dass die Händler die Verbraucher über Funktionsweise und Interoperabilität der von ihnen angebotenen digitalen Inhalte informieren müssen.

Jede allgemeine Vertragsklausel, die die Verfügbarkeit käuflich erworbener Inhalte an die Laufzeit eines Kundenkontos bindet, muss ebenfalls nach der Richtlinie 93/13/EWG über missbräuchliche Klauseln in Verbraucherverträgen geprüft werden. Dieser Richtlinie zufolge sind Vertragsklauseln untersagt, die ein erhebliches und ungerechtfertigtes Missverhältnis der vertraglichen Rechte und Pflichten der Vertragspartner zum Nachteil des Verbrauchers verursachen.

Es liegt vorrangig in der Zuständigkeit der mitgliedstaatlichen Behörden und Gerichte, für eine ordnungsgemäße Umsetzung dieser Richtlinien zu sorgen. In Fällen, in denen mehrere EU-Mitgliedstaaten von unlauteren Geschäftspraktiken von Händlern betroffen sind, arbeitet die Kommission jedoch unter Berücksichtigung aller maßgeblichen Umstände mit den mitgliedstaatlichen Durchsetzungsbehörden zusammen, um eine wirksamere Zusammenarbeit zu erzielen. Ihre besondere Aufmerksamkeit gilt dem digitalen Markt, der in der im Mai 2012 verabschiedeten Europäischen Verbraucheragenda als ein Schlüsselbereich ausgewiesen ist.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002749/13
to the Commission**

Jörg Leichtfried (S&D)

(8 March 2013)

Subject: Kindle e-book reader — deletion of purchased e-books on closure of an Amazon account

With the 'Kindle' e-book reader, the online retailer Amazon offers its customers a digital device for reading books purchased online. These e-books can be obtained from a virtual library via an Amazon account and, after purchase, can be read without restriction.

On closure of this Amazon account, however, it appears that the entire online collection of books purchased is deleted.

1. Is the Commission aware of this situation?
2. Is this situation compatible with consumer protection law?
3. In a case like this, should a customer not be informed of these conditions when opening an account?
4. Is the Commission planning any official investigations in this regard?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission

(2 May 2013)

EC law on consumer protection applies to the sale of digital products to EU consumers, and ensures that they receive all necessary information in order to make an informed decision.

The Distance Selling Directive 97/7/EC and the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29/EC require traders to provide information on the main characteristics of the goods or services they put on offer. The Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83/EU, which will soon replace the Distance Selling Directive, specifically requires traders to provide consumers with information about the functionality and interoperability of the digital content they put on offer.

Any standard contractual term limiting the availability of purchased content to the account duration also has to be assessed in light of Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts. This directive prohibits the use by companies of standard contractual terms, which cause a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations to the detriment of consumer.

Whilst it is the primary competence of national authorities and courts to ensure the correct enforcement of these Directives, in light of all relevant circumstances, the Commission is working with national enforcement authorities to ensure more effective cooperation in cases where several EU Member States are affected by unfair practices of a trader. In particular, it is giving specific attention to the digital market in line with the priorities identified in the European Consumer Agenda adopted in May 2012.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002751/13
alla Commissione**

Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)

(8 marzo 2013)

Oggetto: Presenza di fitofarmaci nell'olio di oliva esportato negli USA

Da diversi anni oramai gli esportatori italiani di olio extravergine di oliva nazionale ravvisano notevoli difficoltà nella commercializzazione verso gli Stati Uniti (quale paese importatore) a causa della presenza nel prodotto di residui di Clorpirifos Etile, un pesticida il cui utilizzo è autorizzato in Italia e in Europa sulla coltura olivicola (regolamento (CE) n. 149/2008). Negli Stati Uniti l'impiego del fitofarmaco menzionato, adoperato per contrastare gli attacchi della «mosca olearia», benché ammesso e autorizzato su diverse colture, in forza del Code of Federal Regulation non può essere utilizzato nelle produzioni olivicole. Sicché l'olio UE importato dagli USA viene sottoposto a procedure di verifica da parte del FDA preordinate ad accertare l'assenza del fitofarmaco in questione nel prodotto: nella ipotesi in cui tale accertamento abbia esito negativo, sono avviate procedure di allerta in tutto il territorio nazionale.

Attualmente più dell'80 % degli olii extravergine prodotti in Italia e venduti negli Stati Uniti d'America sono bloccati nei container presso i porti di New York e Seattle per un totale di 98 container.

È questo il risultato di un recente controllo che la dogana americana ha predisposto su campioni nei vari container, dove si sono riscontrati valori pari allo 0.015-0.020 ppm, su olio extravergine di oliva, che significa una presenza minima di questo principio attivo, mentre ai produttori americani è consentito una presenza massima di Clorpirifos Etile di 0.100 ppm.

Tutto ciò premesso e considerato che l'Unione consente la presenza di questo insetticida pari a 0.250 ppm su tutte le colture agricole, può la Commissione far sapere:

1. per quale motivo fino ad oggi non si è trovato un accordo bilaterale con gli Stati Uniti per tale sostanza, e se intende aprire al più presto un negoziato con la FDA americana, eventualmente attraverso un'apposita istanza da sottoporre all'EPA (Registration Division) che ha il potere di decidere di modificare il Code of Federal Regulation (in particolare il cap. 40 che concerne la protezione ambientale) con riferimento al Clorpirifos in agricoltura e nei cibi;
2. quali ulteriori iniziative intende assumere al fine di garantire un libero scambio tra le due parti ed evitare che misure sanitarie e fitosanitarie come quelle descritte possano trasformarsi in vere e proprie barriere internazionali all'esportazione di prodotti UE (ad esempio, tramite il riconoscimento dell'equivalenza di determinate norme in regola con gli standard internazionali come previsto dal Codex Alimentarius nell'ambito del WTO e dell'accordo Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Agreement sottoscritto nel 2008)?

Risposta di Karel De Gucht a nome della Commissione

(22 maggio 2013)

La Commissione è stata informata di recente del problema in cui si imbattono gli esportatori italiani di olio d'oliva extravergine verso gli Stati Uniti nel caso in cui l'olio contenga residui del pesticida clorpirifos etile. Sebbene tale sostanza sia ampiamente utilizzata negli USA e sebbene si sia stabilito un limite massimo di residui per altri prodotti, l'uso di clorpirifos etile negli alimenti attualmente non è autorizzato dalle autorità statunitensi e pertanto non è stato definito nessun limite massimo di residui per l'olio di oliva.

Di conseguenza, qualsiasi traccia della sostanza nell'olio di oliva importato negli USA porta al rifiuto della partita. La Commissione è a stretto contatto con le autorità competenti italiane e sosterrà un'eventuale richiesta di approvazione della sostanza nell'olio di oliva o un'eventuale petizione alle autorità statunitensi per la definizione di una tolleranza all'importazione.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002751/13
to the Commission**

Sergio Paolo Francesco Silvestris (PPE)

(8 March 2013)

Subject: Presence of pesticide residues in olive oil exported to the USA

For several years now, Italian exporters of national extra virgin olive oil have been having considerable difficulty in selling their product to the United States (as the importing country) due to the presence of residues of Chlorpyrifos-ethyl, a pesticide whose use is authorised in Italy and Europe in olive cultivation (Regulation (EC) No 149/2008).

This pesticide, which is used to counter the attacks of the olive fly, is accepted and authorised in the United States for use on various crops, but under the Code of Federal Regulation it cannot be used for olive oil production. Accordingly, all EU oil imported by the US is subject to prior checks by the FDA to ascertain that there are no traces of the pesticide in question in the product; where the results of the tests are negative, alert procedures are activated throughout the United States.

At present, over 80% of the extra virgin olive oil produced in Italy and sold in the United States remains blocked in 98 containers at the ports of New York and Seattle.

This is the result of recent checks that the US customs carried out on samples in different containers, where values equal to 0.015-0.020 ppm were found in extra virgin olive oil; this means that the presence of this active substance was minimal, when US producers are allowed a maximum Chlorpyrifos-ethyl level of 0.100 ppm.

Given the above, and since the EU allows this insecticide to be present in amounts equal to 0.250 ppm in all agricultural crops, can the Commission answer the following questions:

1. Why has a bilateral agreement with the United States in relation to that substance not yet been reached? Will the Commission start negotiations with the FDA as soon as possible, if necessary through a special application to be submitted to the EPA (Registration Division), which has the power to decide whether to amend the Code of Federal Regulation (in particular Chapter 40 concerning environmental protection) with reference to Chlorpyrifos in agriculture and food?
2. What further action does it intend to take in order to ensure free trade between the two parties and prevent sanitary and phytosanitary measures, such as those described, from becoming real international barriers to the export of EU products (for example, through recognition of the equivalence of certain standards that comply with international standards, as required by the WTO's Codex Alimentarius and the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement signed in 2008)?

Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission

(22 May 2013)

The Commission has been recently informed of the problem faced by Italian exporters of extra virgin olive oil to the United States (US) in cases where the oil contains residues of the pesticide chlorpyrifos-ethyl. Although this substance is widely used in the US and a maximum residue limit has been established for other products, the use of chlorpyrifos-ethyl in olive cultivation is currently not authorised by the US authorities and therefore no maximum residue limit has been established for olive oil.

As a result, any trace of the substance in olive oil being imported into the US leads to the refusal of the shipment. The Commission is in close contact with the Italian competent authorities and will support any submission for the approval of the substance in olive oil or any petition for the establishment of an import tolerance to the US authorities.

(Magyar változat)

Írásbeli választ igénylő kérdés E-002752/13
a Bizottság számára
Gáll-Pelcz Ildikó (PPE) és Járóka Lívia (PPE)
 (2013. március 8.)

Tárgy: A nemek közötti bérkülönbségekről

Az Európai Unióról szóló szerződés 157. cikke kimondja: minden tagállamnak biztosítani kell annak az elvnek az alkalmazását, hogy a férfiak és a nők egyenlő vagy egyenlő értékű munkáért egyenlő díjazást kapjanak. Az Európai Unióban a nők azonban átlagosan 17 százalékkal keresnek kevesebbet a férfiaknál – derül ki a Workania kutatásából. Az előző évekhez hasonlóan a legnagyobb differencia a 35–44 éves munkavállalóknál van, valamint a diplomások és a magasabb pozíciók esetében. A 45–54 éveseknél 25 százalék, a 35–44 évesek között pedig 26 százalék a differencia a két nem fizetése között. A legkisebb, 11 százalékos lemaradás a 24 év alatti, jórészt pályakezdő nőknél van, 34 éves kor alatt pedig átlagosan 18 százalék a különbség. A diploma sem feltétlenül garancia az egyenlőségre: főiskolai végzettséggel ugyanis a gyengébbik nem képviselői 25 százalékkal, egyetemi diplomával pedig átlagosan 23 százalékkal alacsonyabb fizetésre számíthatnak.

Nagyobbak az eltérések a pozíciószintek szerinti összehasonlításnál: míg a felső vezető nők átlagosan negyedével kevesebbet kapnak, mint a férfiak, addig a segédmunkásoknál csupán 5 százalék a különbség. A középvezetők esetében és a szolgáltatási szférán belül 16 százalék, az irodai dolgozóknál 10 százalék a különbség.

1. Nem gondolja-e azt a Bizottság, hogy a negatív trendek megfordításához szükség lenne egy átfogó uniós szabályozásra a béreket illetően?
2. Milyen módszereket javasolna a Bizottság a nemek közti bérolló megszüntetésére uniós szinten?

Viviane Reding válasza a Bizottság nevében
 (2013. május 16.)

1. Az EUMSZ és a 2006/54/EK irányelv⁽¹⁾ rögzíti az egyenlő díjazás elvét. A Bizottság a következő évekre szóló egyik célkitűzése keretében figyelemmel kíséri a fenti irányelv egyenlő díjazásra vonatkozó rendelkezéseinek megfelelő alkalmazását és érvényre juttatását, valamint támogatni fogja a tagállamokat és más érdekelt feleket a meglévő szabályok helyes alkalmazásában és érvényesítésében.

2. A nők és férfiak közötti egyenlőségről szóló stratégia (2010–2015) prioritásai közé tartozik a nemek közötti bérszakadék leküzdése. A figyelemfelkeltő tevékenységek nagyon fontosak a kérdés napirenden tartásában. 2013. február 28-án a Bizottság harmadik alkalommal megrendezte az egyenlő díjazás európai napját⁽²⁾ és kiadott egy új brosúrát⁽³⁾. A Bizottság nemek közötti egyenlőséggel foglalkozó honlapja⁽⁴⁾ információkkal és példákkal szemlélteti a nemek közötti bérszakadék leküzdésére irányuló nemzeti szintű fellépéseket.

2012-ben a Bizottság útjára indította az „egyenlőség kifizetődő” elnevezésű kezdeményezést, amely célja, hogy segítse felhívni a vállalatok figyelmét a nemek közötti bérszakadékokra. A kezdeményezés keretében rendezett képzési tevékenységek és kidolgozott eszközök révén kívánják felhívni a vállalatok figyelmét a nemek közötti egyenlőség és az egyenlő fizetés gazdasági előnyeire. Ezen túlmenően 2013. március 21-én Brüsszelben tapasztalatcserére lehetőséget nyújtó platformként üzleti fórumot⁽⁵⁾ tartottak a vállalkozások számára.

A nemek közötti egyenlőség egyben az Európa 2020 stratégia egyik fontos prioritása. A Bizottság az európai szemeszter során országspecifikus ajánlásokat⁽⁶⁾ intéz a tagállamokhoz a nemek közötti bérszakadékot kiváltó okokhoz⁽⁷⁾ kapcsolódóan.

⁽¹⁾ Az Európai Parlament és a Tanács 2006. július 5-i 2006/54/EK irányelve a férfiak és nők közötti esélyegyenlőség és egyenlő bánásmód elvének a foglalkoztatás és munkavégzés területén történő megvalósításáról (átdolgozott szöveg), HL L 204., 2006.7.26., 23–36. o.

⁽²⁾ http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-165_hu.htm

⁽³⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/gender_pay_gap/gpg_brochure_2013_final_en.pdf

⁽⁴⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/gender-pay-gap/index_hu.htm

⁽⁵⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/equality-pays-off/index_en.htm

⁽⁶⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/making-it-happen/country-specific-recommendations/index_hu.htm

⁽⁷⁾ Többek között a hozzáférhető és megfizethető gyermekgondozási lehetőségek hiánya, illetve az adókedvezmény-rendszereknek a második kereső munkavállalása ellen ható hiányosságai.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002752/13
to the Commission
Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE) and Livia Járóka (PPE)
(8 March 2013)**

Subject: Pay discrepancies between men and women

Article 157 of the Treaty on European Union states that each Member State shall ensure that the principle of equal pay for male and female workers for equal work or work of equal value is applied. However, a study by Workania shows that in the EU, women earn on average 17% less than men. As in previous years, the biggest differences are among employees aged between 35 and 44 and among graduates and holders of higher positions. The difference is 25% for the 45-54 age group and 26% for the 35-44 age group. The smallest discrepancy — 11% — can be found among women under 24, most of whom are at the beginning of their careers. In the case of women under 34 the difference is 18%. Nor does a higher education qualification guarantee equal pay: members of the weaker sex who have finished college can expect to be paid 25% less, whilst the figure for those with a university degree is 23%.

The differences are greater among holders of higher positions: whilst women in top managerial posts are paid on average 25% less than their male counterparts, this figure drops to 5% in the case of unskilled workers. In the case of middle managers and in the service sector it is 16% and for office workers 10%.

1. Does the Commission not think that comprehensive EU legislation on pay is needed in order to reverse these negative trends?
2. What methods would the Commission propose to eliminate the gender pay gap at EU level?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(16 May 2013)**

1. The principle of equal pay is enshrined in the TFEU and is incorporated in Directive 2006/54/EC⁽¹⁾. One of the Commission's priorities for the coming years will be to monitor the correct application and enforcement of the equal pay provisions of this directive and to support Member States and other stakeholders with the proper enforcement and application of the existing rules.

2. Tackling the gender pay gap is one of the priorities in the strategy for equality between women and men 2010-2015. Awareness-raising activities are very important to keep the issue high in the agenda. On 28 February 2013 the Commission held the third European Equal Pay Day⁽²⁾ and presented a new brochure⁽³⁾. The Commission's gender equality website⁽⁴⁾ provides information and examples of actions at national level to tackle the gender pay gap.

In 2012, the Commission started an initiative to help raising awareness in companies about the gender pay gap, 'Equality Pays Off'. It is doing so through the organisation of training activities and preparation of tools for companies to raise awareness on the 'business case'. Moreover, a business forum, a platform of knowledge exchange for companies, was organised in Brussels on 21 March⁽⁵⁾.

Gender equality is an important priority in the Europe 2020 strategy. During the course of the European Semester the Commission is addressing country specific recommendations⁽⁶⁾ to Member States on issues relating to some of the root causes associated with the gender pay gap⁽⁷⁾.

⁽¹⁾ Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast); OJ L 204, 26.7.2006, p. 23-36.

⁽²⁾ http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-165_en.htm

⁽³⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/gender_pay_gap/gpg_brochure_2013_final_en.pdf

⁽⁴⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/gender-pay-gap/index_en.htm

⁽⁵⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/equality-pays-off/index_en.htm

⁽⁶⁾ <http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/making-it-happen/country-specific-recommendations/>

⁽⁷⁾ Such as lack of available and affordable childcare or disincentives for second earners stemming from inefficiently designed tax-benefit systems.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002753/13
aan de Commissie
Toine Manders (ALDE)
(8 maart 2013)

Betref: Verstoring van de interne markt

In sommige EU-landen zoals Nederland worden vormen van schonere autotechnieken fiscaal gunstiger behandeld dan andere nieuwe technieken die ook leiden tot minder CO₂ uitstoot. Dat komt omdat Nederland in haar fiscale beleid alleen kijkt naar de CO₂ uitstoot bij het verbruik.

Het gevolg in Nederland is dat vooral hybride en semi-elektrische auto's met een 0 % bijtelling worden gestimuleerd en andere schone, nieuwe technieken als groengas worden verdrongen. Feitelijk worden bepaalde technieken gestimuleerd en ontstaat er te weinig marktwerking voor het terugdringen van de CO₂ uitstoot. De Nederlandse vorm van stimulering past ook niet binnen de kaders van de duurzame energierichtlijn (2009/28/EG).

1. Deelt de Commissie bovenstaande analyse?
2. Kan de Commissie een inventarisatie maken van alle verschillende fiscale stimuleringsregelingen van autotechnieken en brandstoffen in de verschillende lidstaten maken om te bezien hoe groot dit probleem is?
3. Is Commissie voornemens om deze vorm van marktverstoring aan te pakken? Zo nee, waarom niet?

Antwoord van de heer Tajani namens de Commissie
(30 april 2013)

Het onlangs gepubliceerde werkdocument van de diensten van de Commissie „Guidelines on financial incentives for clean and energy efficient vehicles”⁽¹⁾ bevat aanbevelingen voor door de lidstaten uit te voeren maatregelen aan de vraagzijde. Zo wordt een evenredigheid van de stimuleringsmaatregelen aanbevolen, waarbij de lidstaten ertoe worden aangemoedigd hun drempelwaarden zodanig te definiëren dat geen al te verschillende financiële ondersteuning wordt gegeven voor voertuigen met soortgelijke milieuprestaties.

De bij de typegoedkeuringstest gemeten CO₂-emissies vormen een geschikte en aanbevolen referentie om de drempelwaarden voor financiële stimuleringsmaatregelen vast te stellen.

Bovendien wordt aanbevolen om financiële stimuleringsmaatregelen technisch neutraal te houden zodat zij verschillende aandrijftechnologieën en een grote diversiteit aan alternatieve brandstoffen bestrijken.

Er bestaat geen algemene verplichting dat de lidstaten de Commissie op de hoogte brengen van al hun verschillende fiscale stimuleringsregelingen voor autotechnologieën en -brandstoffen. Daarom is de Commissie niet in staat een inventaris van die maatregelen op te stellen.

Met de publicatie van de richtsnoeren beoogt de Commissie de lidstaten een referentiekader te bieden voor de uitvoering van nationale maatregelen aan de vraagzijde. Daartoe worden in het document de beste praktijken vastgesteld en worden de lidstaten aangemoedigd om hun activiteiten te coördineren zodat onnodige verstoringen van de interne markt worden vermeden.

Voorts stelde de Commissie een herziening van de energiebelastingrichtlijn⁽²⁾ voor om ervoor te zorgen dat alle als motorbrandstof gebruikte energieproducten eerlijk fiscaal belast worden door het belastingniveau afhankelijk te maken van hun energie-inhoud en CO₂-gehalte.

⁽¹⁾ SWD(2013) 27 final.

⁽²⁾ COM(2011) 169 definitief.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002753/13
to the Commission**

Toine Manders (ALDE)

(8 March 2013)

Subject: Distortion of the internal market

In some EU countries like the Netherlands forms of cleaner automotive technology receive more favourable fiscal treatment than other new technologies which also produce lower CO₂ emissions. This is because Dutch fiscal policy only considers consumption-based CO₂ emissions.

In the Netherlands this results in mainly hybrid and semi-electric cars with 0% aggregation being promoted while other clean, new technologies like green gas are sidelined. The fact is that certain technologies are promoted and market forces are too ineffective in pushing back CO₂ emissions. What is more, the Dutch form of promotion does not fall within the framework of the Renewable Energy Directive (2009/28/EC).

1. Does the Commission share the aforementioned analysis?
2. Can the Commission make an inventory of all the different fiscal incentive schemes for automotive technologies and fuels in the different Member States in order to see the extent of this problem?
3. Does the Commission intend to tackle this form of market distortion? If not, why not?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission

(30 April 2013)

The recently published Staff Working Document 'Guidelines on financial incentives for clean and energy efficient vehicles' ⁽¹⁾ lays down recommendations for demand-side measures implemented by Member States. One of the recommendations refers to proportionality of the incentives, thus encouraging Member States to apply thresholds in such a way that the difference in terms of financial support between vehicles with a similar environmental performance is not excessive.

The CO₂ value measured during the type-approval test is a valid and recommended reference for establishing thresholds for financial incentives.

In addition, it is recommended for financial incentives to be technically neutral, thus covering a range of powertrain technologies and a wide portfolio of alternative fuels.

As there is no general obligation for Member States to inform the Commission about all their different fiscal incentive schemes for automotive technologies and fuels, the Commission is not in a position to make an inventory of these measures.

With the publication of the Guidelines the Commission intends to provide a reference for Member States when implementing national demand-side measures. To this end, the document identifies best practices and encourages Member States to coordinate their activities in order to avoid unnecessary distortions of the internal market.

Furthermore the Commission proposed a revision of the Energy Taxation Directive ⁽²⁾ which aims at providing a fair tax treatment to all energy products used as motor fuel by setting taxation levels on the basis of their energy and CO₂ content.

⁽¹⁾ SWD(2013) 27 final.

⁽²⁾ COM(2011) 169 final.

(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002754/13
do Komisji**

Adam Bielan (ECR)

(8 marca 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Stawka podatku VAT na e-booki

W lutym Komisja Europejska zapowiedziała skierowanie do Trybunału Sprawiedliwości spraw przeciwko Francji i Luksemburgowi za zastosowanie obniżonych stawek VAT na książki elektroniczne (e-booki). Komisja poinformowała jednocześnie, że kwestia opodatkowania e-booków będzie rozwiązywana w ramach prac nad zmianami obowiązujących obecnie stawek VAT.

Kwestia tego podatku jest szeroko komentowana i problematyczna także dla innych państw członkowskich, w tym Polski.

Zwracam się zatem do Komisji z prośbą o informację, na jakim etapie aktualnie znajdują się prace nad zapowiedzianą rewizją przepisów podatkowych?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Algirdasa Šemetę w imieniu Komisji

(18 kwietnia 2013 r.)

8 października 2012 r. Komisja rozpoczęła publiczną konsultację w sprawie przeglądu istniejących przepisów dotyczących obniżonych stawek podatku VAT⁽¹⁾. Celem tej konsultacji było zebranie uwag odpowiednich zainteresowanych stron na temat trzech głównych zasad przeglądu określonych w komunikacie w sprawie przyszłości podatku VAT⁽²⁾. Zasada równego traktowania towarów i usług tego samego rodzaju jest szczególnie istotna w rozwiązywaniu problemu konwergencji środowiska internetowego i fizycznego.

Wspomniana konsultacja jest częścią ogólnego procesu oceny zainicjowanego w 2012 r. i trwającego w dalszym ciągu. Będzie ona uwzględniona podczas przygotowywania nowego wniosku w sprawie stawek podatku VAT. Jednak Komisja nie podjęła jeszcze żadnych decyzji w sprawie polityki dotyczącej przyszłego zakresu stosowania obniżonych stawek VAT.

Do tego czasu należy stosować obowiązujące przepisy dotyczące podatku VAT. Komisja postanowiła wnieść skargę przeciwko Francji i Luksemburgowi do Trybunału Sprawiedliwości Unii Europejskiej w związku ze stosowaniem obniżonych stawek VAT na książki elektroniczne (e-booki), gdyż jest to niezgodne z obowiązującym prawem UE.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/common/consultations/tax/article_4209_en.htm

⁽²⁾ COM(2011) 851 final z 6.12.2011 – Komunikat Komisji w sprawie przyszłości podatku VAT – W stronę prostszego, solidniejszego i wydajniejszego systemu podatku VAT dostosowanego do jednolitego rynku.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002754/13
to the Commission
Adam Bielan (ECR)
(8 March 2013)**

Subject: VAT rate on e-books

In February 2013, the Commission announced that cases against France and Luxembourg regarding the application of reduced VAT rates for e-books would be referred to the European Court of Justice. The Commission also pointed out that the issue of the taxation of e-books would be addressed as part of the revision of current VAT rates.

This controversial tax has also been the cause of much debate in other Member States, including Poland.

In this connection, can the Commission say what stage has been reached in work on the announced revision of tax provisions?

**Answer given by Mr Šemeta on behalf of the Commission
(18 April 2013)**

On 8 October 2012 the Commission launched a public consultation on the review of existing legislation on reduced VAT rates ⁽¹⁾. The aim was to gather feedback from relevant stakeholders as regards the three guiding principles for the review which are set out in the communication on the future of VAT ⁽²⁾. The principle of equal treatment of similar goods and services is particularly relevant in addressing the challenge of convergence between the online and physical environment.

This consultation is part of the overall assessment process launched in 2012 which is still ongoing. It will feed into the preparation of a new proposal on VAT rates. The Commission has however not yet taken any policy decisions on the future scope of the reduced VAT rates.

Meanwhile, the current VAT legislation needs to be respected. The application of VAT reduced rates on e-books is not in line with existing EC law, therefore the Commission has decided to refer France and Luxembourg to the Court of Justice of the European Union for applying a reduced rate of VAT to e-books.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/common/consultations/tax/2012_vat_rates_en.htm

⁽²⁾ COM(2011) 851 final of 6.12.2011 — Communication on the future of VAT Towards a simpler, more robust and efficient VAT system tailored to the single market.

(българска версия)

Въпрос с искане за писмен отговор E-002755/13

до Комисията

Monika Panayotova (PPE)

(8 март 2013 г.)

Относно: Гъвкавост и сигурност на пазара на труда (flexicurity)

Като се има предвид, че концепцията „flexicurity“ е ключов елемент в Европейската стратегия за заетост и че интегрираната политика на баланс между гъвкавост и сигурност съответно е ключов фактор за модернизацията на трудовите пазари и за постигане на целите по заетостта, предвидени в стратегията „Европа 2020“, считате ли, че:

1. Въвеждането на почасова заетост в държавите членки дава своите резултати в условията на икономическа криза и спомага за намаляване нивата на безработица, най-вече сред младите хора в ЕС?
2. „Flexicurity“ ще се превърне в инструмент за устойчив, приобщаващ и интелигентен растеж в контекста на „Европа 2020“?
3. Разполагате ли с добри примери в тази насока и ако да, бихте ли ги посочили във Вашия отговор?

Отговор, даден от г-н Андор от името на Комисията

(3 май 2013 г.)

В пакет за заетостта, разработен от Комисията, тя изразява становището, че осигуряването на плавен преход между различни работни места е ключов аспект на балансираните и ефективни реформи на пазара на труда ⁽¹⁾. Както е предвидено в стратегията „Европа 2020“, комбинацията от гъвкавост и подходящи мерки за сигурност ще допринесе за това европейските пазари на труда да станат по-динамични и устойчиви по отношение на процесите на икономическо адаптиране.

Заетостта при непълно работно време допринася в значителна степен за създаването на работни места в периода на криза, когато местата на пълно работно време намаляват ⁽²⁾. Този вид заетост улеснява участието на пазара на труда, особено за жените и младите хора. При все това чрез добра правна уредба следва да се гарантира, че работниците приемат работата на непълно работно време доброволно и че им се предоставя подходяща степен на социална закрила.

В по-общ план разработването на гъвкави режими на работа представлява ключова стъпка в посока на модернизиране на пазара на труда ⁽³⁾. Сумираното изчисляване на работното време и режимите на работа при непълно работно време в Германия или договорите с механизъм за солидарност в Италия представляват изключителни примери за това как европейските предприятия се справят с кризата, като същевременно подобряват устойчивостта на пазара на труда ⁽⁴⁾. Постигането на договореност между социалните партньори даде възможност за съчетаване на предимствата на по-голямата вътрешна гъвкавост за предприятията със запазването на работните места. Комисията насърчава по-нататъшните усилия за прилагане на подобни стратегии за уредба на работното време.

⁽¹⁾ Европейска комисия (2012 г.), „Към възстановяване и създаване на работни места“, COM (2012) 173 final.

⁽²⁾ Европейска комисия (2012 г.), „Съвместен доклад за заетостта за 2012 г.“, COM(2012) 750 final.

⁽³⁾ Европейска комисия (2012 г.), „Годишен обзор на растежа 2013 г.“, COM (2012) 750 final.

⁽⁴⁾ Работен документ на службите на Комисията (2012 г.), „Отворени, динамични и приобщаващи пазари на труда“, SWD(2012) 97 final.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002755/13
to the Commission
Monika Panayotova (PPE)
(8 March 2013)**

Subject: Labour market flexibility and security (flexicurity)

Given that the concept of flexicurity is a key element in the European employment strategy and that the integrated policy of balancing flexibility with security is thus a crucial factor in labour market modernisation and the achievement of the Europe 2020 employment targets:

1. Does the Commission consider that the development of part-time employment in the Member States is proving useful against the background of economic crisis and that it will help to reduce levels of unemployment, particularly among young people in the Union; and
2. Does it believe that flexicurity will become a tool for sustainable, integrated and smart growth in the context of the Europe 2020 strategy?
3. Are there good examples of developments along these lines and, if so, could the Commission please refer to them in its answer?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission
(3 May 2013)**

In its Employment Package, the Commission considers that securing labour market transitions is a key aspect of balanced and effective labour market reforms ⁽¹⁾. In the perspective of the EU2020 strategy, the combination of flexibility with appropriate security arrangements will contribute to making European labour markets more dynamic and resilient to the processes of economic adjustment.

Part-time employment has accounted for a significant share of the job growth during the crisis facing the contraction of full-time positions ⁽²⁾. It favours labour market participation, notably of women and young people. However, good regulation should ensure the voluntarily take-up of part-time work and adequate level of social protection for workers.

Overall, developing flexible working arrangements constitutes a key step for labour market modernisation ⁽³⁾. Working time accounts and short-time work arrangements in Germany or solidarity contracts in Italy represent outstanding examples of how European companies have weathered the crisis while at the same time improving the resilience of the labour market ⁽⁴⁾. Social partners' agreement allowed to combining the advantages of more internal flexibility for firms with the protection of workers' jobs. The Commission encourages the further pursuit of such strategies of work time management.

⁽¹⁾ European Commission (2012) 'Towards a Job rich Recovery', COM(2012) 173 final.

⁽²⁾ European Commission (2012) 'Joint Employment Report 2012', COM(2012) 750 final.

⁽³⁾ European Commission (2012), 'Annual Growth Survey 2013', COM(2012) 750 final.

⁽⁴⁾ Commission Staff Working Document (2012), 'Open, dynamic and inclusive labour markets', SWD(2012) 97 final.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002756/13
προς την Επιτροπή
Sophocles Sophocleous (S&D)
(8 Μαρτίου 2013)

Θέμα: Διατροφικό σκάνδαλο

Μετά την αποκάλυψη του πρόσφατου σκανδάλου του εντοπισμού αλογίσιου κρέατος σε συσκευασμένα προϊόντα, έρχεται στην επιφάνεια νέο σκάνδαλο για ύπαρξη βακτηρίων σε τάρτες σοκολάτας που πωλούνταν από γνωστό σουηδικό όμιλο.

Με βάση την δήλωση εκπροσώπου του ομίλου, το επίπεδο συγκέντρωσης αυτών των βακτηρίων δεν δημιουργεί σοβαρό πρόβλημα για τη δημόσια υγεία. Ωστόσο, κάτι τέτοιο δεν δικαιολογεί τέτοια περιστατικά και αναδεικνύει το πρόβλημα περιορισμένου ή ελλιπειατικού έλεγχου από τις υγειονομικές υπηρεσίες κάποιων κρατών μελών καθώς επίσης και το γεγονός ότι υπάρχει πρόβλημα στην αλυσίδα εφοδιασμού τροφίμων.

Ερωτάται λοιπόν η Επιτροπή:

Ποια η έκβαση της έρευνας μέχρι τώρα;

Ποια μέτρα προτίθεται να πάρει;

Προτίθεται να διασφαλίσει τον αποτελεσματικότερο έλεγχο από τις υγειονομικές υπηρεσίες των κρατών μελών, και κατά πόσον πρόκειται να επιβληθούν κυρώσεις για παραλείψεις των απαραίτητων ελέγχων στα τρόφιμα;

Απάντηση του κ. Borg εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(9 Απριλίου 2013)

Την ευθύνη για την επιβολή της νομοθεσίας περί τροφικής αλυσίδας φέρουν τα κράτη μέλη ⁽¹⁾, τα οποία υποχρεούνται να καθιερώσουν σύστημα επίσημων ελέγχων, ώστε να εξακριβώνουν τη συμμόρφωση των εταιρειών με τα προβλεπόμενα και να επιβάλλουν κυρώσεις σε περιπτώσεις μη συμμόρφωσης. Όσον αφορά τις κυρώσεις, η νομοθεσία περί τροφικής αλυσίδας απαιτεί να είναι αποτελεσματικές, ανάλογες της παράβασης και αποτρεπτικές, όμως το είδος και το ύψος τους επαφίεται στη διακριτική ευχέρεια των κρατών μελών.

Η Επιτροπή παρακολουθεί τακτικά τη συνέπεια των κρατών μελών ως προς τη διενέργεια ελέγχων, πραγματοποιώντας μεταξύ άλλων και επιτόπιους ελέγχους. Ως θεματοφύλακας των συνθηκών, η Επιτροπή θα λάβει τα κατάλληλα μέτρα όταν αντιληφθεί ότι κάποιο κράτος μέλος συστηματικά αποτυγχάνει να επιβάλλει τις διατάξεις της ΕΕ, συμπεριλαμβανομένων διαδικασιών επί παραβάσει, σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 121 ΣΛΕΕ.

Μέχρι στιγμής, δεν συντρέχει λόγος να αμφισβητείται η αποτελεσματικότητα των ελέγχων που έχουν καθιερώσει τα κράτη μέλη. Ωστόσο, η επικείμενη πρόταση περί επίσημων ελέγχων θα έχει ως στόχο την περαιτέρω ενίσχυση του υφιστάμενου συστήματος, συμπεριλαμβανομένων των κυρώσεων.

⁽¹⁾ Κανονισμός (ΕΚ) αριθ. 882/2004 του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου, της 29ης Απριλίου 2004, για τη διενέργεια επίσημων ελέγχων της συμμόρφωσης προς τη νομοθεσία περί ζωοτροφών και τροφίμων και προς τους κανόνες για την υγεία και την καλή διαβίωση των ζώων, ΕΕ L 165 της 30.4.2004, σ. 1.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002756/13
to the Commission**

Sophocles Sophocleous (S&D)

(8 March 2013)

Subject: Food scandal

The scandal of horsemeat in prepared meals which broke recently has now been succeeded by news of another scandal involving bacteria in chocolate cakes sold by a well-known Swedish group.

According to a statement given by the group's spokesman, the level of concentration of the bacteria does not represent a serious problem to public health. However, that is no excuse for such occurrences and it highlights the problem of limited or unsatisfactory controls by public health services in certain Member States and the fact that there is a problem in the food supply chain.

Will the Commission therefore say:

What is the outcome of the investigation so far?

What measures does it intend to take?

Does it intend to take measures to ensure that public health services in the Member States carry out more effective controls and does it intend to impose sanctions when the necessary food controls fall short?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission

(9 April 2013)

The responsibility for enforcing food chain legislation lies with Member States ⁽¹⁾, which are required to establish a system of official controls to verify compliance by operators with requirements deriving therefrom and sanction non-compliances. As regards sanctions, food chain legislation requires that they should be effective, proportionate and dissuasive but leaves Member States discretion as to their type and level.

The Commission regularly monitors delivery by the Member States of their control duties, including through on-the-spot audits. As the guardian of the Treaties, the Commission will take appropriate measures when it becomes aware of a failure by a Member State to systematically enforce EU provisions, including the launching of infringement procedures in accordance with Article 258 TFEU.

So far, there is no reason to believe that the official controls systems established in Member States are ineffective. Notwithstanding this, the forthcoming proposal on official controls will aim at further strengthening the existing system, including as regards sanctions.

⁽¹⁾ Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on official controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules, OJ L 165, 30.4.2004, p. 1.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002757/13
προς την Επιτροπή
Sophocles Sophocleous (S&D)
(8 Μαρτίου 2013)

Θέμα: Πιθανότητα κουρέματος των καταθέσεων και αύξηση εταιρικού φόρου στην Κύπρο

Δηλώσεις, που είδαν το φως της δημοσιότητας μετά την συνάντηση του Eurogroup, άφησαν ανοικτό το θέμα του κουρέματος των καταθέσεων στις κυπριακές τράπεζες αλλά και της αύξησης του εταιρικού φόρου, ενδεχόμενα που, μόνο με την αναφορά τους, ταράζουν την οικονομική σταθερότητα της Κύπρου.

Για ποιο λόγο πιστεύει η Επιτροπή πως δεν έχουν συζητηθεί παρόμοια ενδεχόμενα σε χώρες που έγιναν δέκτες βοήθειας από τον Ευρωπαϊκό Μηχανισμό Στήριξης όπως για παράδειγμα την Ιρλανδία, η οποία όπως και η Κύπρος έχει χαμηλό εταιρικό φόρο και το χρέος της ήταν επίσης τραπεζικό;

Η περίπτωση κουρέματος καταθέσεων δεν έχει συζητηθεί για κανένα άλλο κράτος μέλος. Αντιλαμβάνεται η Επιτροπή πως σε μια τέτοια περίπτωση θα προκαλούσε χρηματοπιστωτικό πανικό, όχι μόνο στην Κύπρο αλλά και σε άλλες χώρες της Ευρωζώνης;

Πού πιστεύει η Επιτροπή πως στηρίζεται αυτή η διαφορετική αντιμετώπιση;

Πώς σχολιάζει η Επιτροπή την εκροή δισεκατομμυρίων ευρώ από τις καταθέσεις των κυπριακών τραπεζών από την αρχή του 2013 λόγω της συζήτησης περί κουρέματος των καταθέσεων;

Τι μέτρα προτίθεται να πάρει για να προστατευτεί το χρηματοοικονομικό σύστημα της Κύπρου αλλά και της Ευρωζώνης;

Απάντηση του κ. Rehn εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(7 Μαΐου 2013)

Η Κύπρος αποτελεί ειδική περίπτωση λόγω του μεγέθους του τραπεζικού της τομέα (7 έως 8 φορές το ΑΕΠ), σε συνδυασμό με τη δομή του, το επίπεδο των αναλαμβανόμενων κινδύνων και την ανεπαρκή εποπτεία. Τα μέτρα είναι προσαρμοσμένα στην πολύ ιδιαίτερη περίπτωση της Κύπρου και έχουν ως στόχο την αποκατάσταση της βιωσιμότητας ενός μικρότερου τραπεζικού τομέα εξασφαλίζοντας συγχρόνως την προστασία όλων των καταθέσεων κάτω των 100 000 ευρώ σύμφωνα με τους κανόνες της ΕΕ.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002757/13
to the Commission**

Sophocles Sophocleous (S&D)

(8 March 2013)

Subject: Possible haircut on deposits and increase in corporation tax in Cyprus

Statements published in the wake of the Eurogroup meeting left open the question of a haircut on deposits in Cypriot banks and an increase in corporation tax, the mere mention of which has undermined financial stability in Cyprus.

Why, in the Commission's view, were similar moves not discussed in countries in receipt of assistance from the European Stability Mechanism, such as Ireland which, like Cyprus, has low corporation tax and also had a banking debt?

The possibility of a haircut on deposits was not discussed for any other Member State. Does the Commission realise that this would cause financial panic, not only in Cyprus, but also in other countries in the euro area?

What, in the Commission's view, is the cause of this differentiated approach?

What comments does the Commission have to make on the flight of billions of euros from deposits in Cypriot banks since early 2013, as a result of the debate about a haircut on deposits?

What measures does it intend to take in order to protect the financial system in both Cyprus and the euro area?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission

(7 May 2013)

Cyprus is a unique case because of the size of its banking sector (7 to 8 times GDP), combined with its structure, level of risk-taking and suboptimal supervision. So measures are tailor-made to the very exceptional situation in Cyprus in order to restore the viability of a smaller banking sector while, at the same time, protecting all deposits below EUR 100 000 in accordance with EU rules.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002758/13

alla Commissione

Oreste Rossi (EFD)

(8 marzo 2013)

Oggetto: Compatibilità tra ETS e WTO: nuove evidenze per valutare la perdita di competitività del settore

Già nel 2011 in seno alla Commissione si evidenziava una forte divergenza di posizioni in merito alla proposta sulla direttiva sull'efficienza energetica. In particolare, sin da allora si rilevava come il rischio maggiore fosse un «drammatico declino nei prezzi della CO₂». Come a dire che invece di investire in efficienza energetica è meglio avere un prezzo della CO₂ molto alto per finanziare gli onerosissimi investimenti in nuova produzione energetica, rinnovabili e non solo. Basti pensare che ora si sta anche valutando di finanziare scorte di riserva poiché le rinnovabili non possono garantire una produzione costante 24h/24.

Da sempre l'entusiasmo per i dazi sulle emissioni solleva dubbi sulla legittimità nell'ambito delle regole del commercio internazionale. Il principio del libero scambio sancisce che i paesi dovrebbero produrre beni e servizi sulla base dei loro vantaggi comparati. Imporre aggravii sulle emissioni per svalutare le industrie, i prodotti e i servizi ad alta intensità di carbonio è un anatema a questo principio, perché distrugge ogni vantaggio comparato. In coerenza con i principi del libero scambio, Pascal Lamy, Direttore generale del WTO, aveva infatti fatto notare che «il WTO consente ai membri una certa flessibilità nell'adottare politiche frontaliere di aggiustamento per livellare i costi connessi ai controlli sulle emissioni di carbonio, fin tanto che non distorcono o impediscono il commercio; ma come strumento di policy le tariffe doganali sulle emissioni di carbonio sono progettate deliberatamente per distorcere gli scambi». Imporre dazi sulle emissioni aumenta, di fatto, la tensione tra il «carbon pricing» e la capacità di ogni paese di sfruttare il proprio vantaggio comparato, costringendo a svalutare industrie, prodotti e servizi ad alta intensità di emissioni.

Tali misure violerebbero il GATT, in particolare gli articoli I e III, nonché la clausola di nazione più favorita, richiedendo ai paesi di offrire ai membri del WTO lo stesso trattamento riservato alla nazione con le condizioni migliori. È evidente che la violazione di tale principio, in quanto si impone una barriera commerciale ad alcuni paesi membri del WTO, ma non ad altri. Anche a voler ricorrere all'escamotage dell'esenzione secondo l'art. XX(g) del GATT, rimarrebbe la necessità di soddisfare i test prescritti nella conclusione, ovvero che «non venga applicato in modo tale da costituire uno strumento di discriminazione arbitraria o ingiustificabile tra paesi dove prevalgono le stesse condizioni, o una restrizione camuffata del commercio internazionale».

Ritiene la Commissione di dover fornire nuove evidenze di certezza dell'attuale sistema ETS rispetto alla conformità dei principi WTO e rispetto alla perdita di competitività dell'industria del settore?

Risposta di Connie Hedegaard a nome della Commissione

(30 aprile 2013)

Il pacchetto dell'UE su clima ed energia del 2008 ⁽¹⁾ comprende la riduzione delle emissioni di gas serra, la quota di energia rinnovabile e gli obiettivi di efficienza energetica. Le direttive collegate, presentate successivamente o modificate dopo l'adozione del pacchetto, includono anche la riduzione di emissioni ai sensi della decisione di condivisione degli sforzi ⁽²⁾, nell'ambito della quale rientrano molte delle misure di efficienza energetica. Il sistema EU ETS copre il 45 % circa delle emissioni dell'UE. Se gli Stati membri intendono conseguire gli obiettivi in materia di energia rinnovabile, dovranno effettuare ingenti investimenti per ammodernare le reti, costruire stazioni di trasferimento e potenziare le capacità di stoccaggio.

La Commissione ha valutato le possibilità offerte dalle misure di adeguamento alle frontiere per il carbonio, che restano uno strumento utilizzabile, ma ritiene che attualmente non vadano attuate in via unilaterale. La Commissione ha scelto l'assegnazione gratuita, integrata dalle norme in materia di rilocizzazione delle emissioni di carbonio, che stabilisce una quota più elevata di assegnazione gratuita ⁽³⁾ ai settori ritenuti esposti a un grave rischio di rilocizzazioni delle emissioni di carbonio. Esistono inoltre quote notevoli di crediti internazionali che possono essere utilizzati a fini di restituzione. La Commissione ritiene pertanto che le misure di salvaguardia in vigore proteggano adeguatamente la competitività dell'industria europea.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/st17215.en08.pdf>

⁽²⁾ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:140:0136:0148:EN:PDF>.

⁽³⁾ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:140:0063:0087:EN:PDF>.

La compatibilità delle misure di adeguamento alle frontiere per il carbonio con l'Organizzazione mondiale del commercio (OMC) è al centro di un dibattito di lunga data. L'opinione prevalente è che la valutazione finale dovrebbe dipendere dalla struttura giuridica dettagliata delle misure di adeguamento per il carbonio. La complessità della discussione accademica sulla frammentazione della legislazione internazionale, come per esempio le differenze fra i regimi dell'OMC e della convenzione quadro delle Nazioni Unite sui cambiamenti climatici (UNFCCC), illustra la possibilità di interpretazioni diverse del quadro giuridico. L'attuale sistema ETS è pienamente conforme ai principi dell'OMC.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002758/13
to the Commission
Oreste Rossi (EFD)
(8 March 2013)

Subject: Compatibility between the EU ETS and WTO: new evidence for assessing loss of sectoral competitiveness

There was already a clear divergence in 2011 among the positions prevailing within the Commission regarding the proposal for a directive on energy efficiency. Since then, it has been claimed that the greatest risk is a 'sharp fall in the price of CO₂.' In other words, instead of investing in energy efficiency, it would be better to have a very high CO₂ price so as to provide funding for the huge investments in new energy production, renewable and otherwise. The fact that discussions are ongoing to fund stockpiling, given that renewables cannot guarantee constant round-the-clock production, springs to mind.

Despite enthusiasm for carbon tariffs, doubts remain about their legitimacy under the rules of international trade. The principle of free trade states that countries should produce goods and services on the basis of their comparative advantages. Placing tariffs on emissions to devalue carbon-intensive industries, products and services is an anathema to this principle, because it destroys any comparative advantage. Consistent with the principles of free trade, WTO Director-General, Pascal Lamy, has in fact pointed out that 'the WTO allows members certain flexibilities to adopt border adjustment policies to equalize costs related to carbon controls, as long as they do not distort or disrupt trade, but as policy instruments carbon tariffs are deliberately designed to distort trade.' Imposing carbon tariffs further exacerbates the tension between carbon pricing and each country's capacity to exploit their comparative advantage by forcing the devaluation of their carbon-intensive industries, goods and services.

Such measures would violate the GATT, particularly Articles I and III, as well as the most-favoured-nation clause, requiring countries to provide WTO members with the same treatment as the nation with the most favourable treatment. It is clear that this principle is violated, given that it would impose a trade barrier on some WTO members, but not on others. Even if one were to use sleight of hand, by invoking exemption under GATT Article XX(g), there would still be a need to meet the requirements set out in the conclusion, namely that 'such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade'.

Does the Commission consider that it should come up with new clear-cut evidence that the current ETS system is compliant with WTO principles as well as on the loss of sectoral competitiveness?

Answer given by Ms Hedegaard on behalf of the Commission
(30 April 2013)

The 2008 EU Climate and Energy Package ⁽¹⁾ includes GHG emission reductions, share of renewable energy and targets for energy efficiency. Related Directives subsequently introduced or amended after its adoption include also emission reductions under the Effort Sharing Decision ⁽²⁾, under which many of the energy efficiency measures fall. The EU ETS covers about 45% of the EU emissions. For the Member States to meet their renewable energy targets, considerable investments will be necessary to upgrade grids, build transfer stations and storage capacities.

The Commission has investigated possibilities of the border carbon adjustments (BCA), which remain as a possible tool, but considers that currently they should not be unilaterally implemented. The Commission has opted for free allocation that is complemented by the rules on carbon leakage, which provide a higher share of free allocation ⁽³⁾ to those sectors deemed exposed to significant risk of carbon leakage. Also there are considerable amounts of international credits that can be used for surrendering purposes. The Commission therefore believes that the safeguarding measures put in place adequately protect competitiveness of the European industry.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/st17215.en08.pdf>

⁽²⁾ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:140:0136:0148:EN:PDF>.

⁽³⁾ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:140:0063:0087:EN:PDF>.

The compatibility of border carbon adjustments with WTO law is subject to a long-standing debate and the prevailing view is that the final assessment would depend on the detailed legal design of the scheme imposing BCAs. The complexity of academic discussion about fragmentation of international law such as differences of the WTO and UNFCCC regimes well illustrates potential different interpretations of the legal frameworks. The current ETS system is fully compliant under the WTO regime.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002759/13

alla Commissione

Oreste Rossi (EFD)

(8 marzo 2013)

Oggetto: Alimenti senza glutine: quali passi avanti

Attualmente le disposizioni sull'uso delle menzioni «senza glutine» e «con contenuto di glutine molto basso» sono contenute nel regolamento (CE) n. 41/2009 relativo alla composizione e all'etichettatura dei prodotti alimentari adatti alle persone intolleranti al glutine. Tuttavia la questione in diritto viene tralata dal menzionato regolamento al regolamento (UE) n. 1169/2011 attraverso un atto delegato e un atto di esecuzione.

Nella stesura degli atti di cui al regolamento (UE) n. 1169/2011 si prevede che: «nella preparazione ed elaborazione degli atti delegati, la Commissione dovrebbe provvedere alla contestuale, tempestiva e appropriata trasmissione dei documenti pertinenti al Parlamento europeo e al Consiglio». Alla luce delle disposizioni di cui alla Comunicazione [COM(2009)0673 del 9.12.2009] e della risoluzione del Parlamento europeo del 5.5.2010 sul potere di delega legislativa, può la Commissione far sapere se:

- ritiene, a tale ultimo fine, di dover provvedere alla consultazione di esperti per la predisposizione di atti delegati e di esecuzione;
- può riferire se intende consultare esperti nazionali, la società civile, rappresentanti di gruppi d'interesse, imprese, parti sociali, accademici o persino deputati o organi del Parlamento europeo?

Risposta di Tonio Borg a nome della Commissione

(22 aprile 2013)

Durante i recenti negoziati sulla proposta della Commissione in merito a un regolamento volto a rivedere il quadro giuridico applicabile agli alimenti destinati a particolari usi nutrizionali ⁽¹⁾, si è concordato che le regole per l'uso delle indicazioni «senza glutine» e «con contenuto di glutine molto basso» andrebbero trasferite al regolamento (UE) n. 1169/2011 ⁽²⁾. A tal fine la Commissione dovrà modificare l'articolo 36, paragrafo 3, del regolamento (UE) n. 1169/2011 mediante un atto delegato, costituendo così la base legale necessaria per l'adozione di regole armonizzate sulle indicazioni in questione e, quindi, un atto di esecuzione che definirà le regole in merito all'uso di tali indicazioni.

Come indicato al considerando 58 del regolamento (UE) n. 1169/2011, durante i lavori preparatori degli atti delegati la Commissione intende svolgere adeguate consultazioni, anche a livello di esperti. Il Parlamento europeo ed il Consiglio verranno informati delle riunioni di gruppi di esperti e riceveranno in maniera contestuale, tempestiva e appropriata tutti i documenti pertinenti.

Una volta adottato l'atto delegato di cui sopra, la preparazione e l'adozione del pertinente atto di esecuzione saranno soggette alla procedura di esame prevista all'articolo 48, paragrafo 2, dello stesso regolamento. Il Parlamento europeo verrà informato per il tramite del Registro comitatologia delle riunioni del comitato pertinente composto di rappresentanti degli Stati membri, e dei documenti pertinenti.

⁽¹⁾ Proposta di regolamento del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio relativo agli alimenti destinati ai lattanti e ai bambini e agli alimenti destinati a fini medici speciali, COM(2011)353 def., 2011/0156(COD).

⁽²⁾ Regolamento (UE) n. 1169/2011 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 25 ottobre 2011, relativo alla fornitura di informazioni sugli alimenti ai consumatori, che modifica i regolamenti (CE) n. 1924/2006 e (CE) n. 1925/2006 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio e abroga la direttiva 87/250/CEE della Commissione, la direttiva 90/496/CEE del Consiglio, la direttiva 1999/10/CE della Commissione, la direttiva 2000/13/CE del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, le direttive 2002/67/CE e 2008/5/CE della Commissione e il regolamento (CE) n. 608/2004 della Commissione, GUL 304 del 22.11.2011, pag. 18.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002759/13
to the Commission
Oreste Rossi (EFD)
(8 March 2013)

Subject: Gluten-free foods: what progress is being made?

Currently, provisions governing use of the terms 'gluten-free' or 'very low gluten' are included in Regulation (EC) No 41/2009 concerning the composition and labelling of foodstuffs suitable for people intolerant to gluten. However, in law, the issue is being passed from the aforementioned Regulation to Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 by means of a delegated act and an implementing act.

With regard to drafting the acts referred to in Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011, the following is laid down: 'the Commission, when preparing and drawing up delegated acts, should ensure simultaneous, timely and appropriate transmission of relevant documents to the European Parliament and to the Council'. Given the provisions of Communication COM(2009)0673 of 9 December 2009 and of the European Parliament resolution of 5 May 2010 on the power of legislative delegation, can the Commission state:

- whether, with the latter aim in mind, it believes that it should consult experts when preparing delegated and implementing acts;
- whether it intends to consult national experts, civil society, representatives of interest groups, businesses, social partners, academics or even European Parliament Members or bodies?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission
(22 April 2013)

During recent negotiations on the Commission's proposal for a regulation to revise the legislative framework applicable to foods for particular nutritional uses ⁽¹⁾, it was agreed that the rules on the use of the statements 'gluten-free' and 'very low gluten' should be transferred under Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 ⁽²⁾. To this purpose, the Commission will have to amend Article 36(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 by way of a delegated act, thus providing the necessary legal basis for the adoption of harmonised rules on the statements at issue and, subsequently, an implementing act that will set out the rules on the use of these statements.

As indicated in recital (58) of Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011, the Commission intends to carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work on delegated acts, including at expert level. The European Parliament and the Council will be informed of any expert group meetings and will receive all relevant documents in a simultaneous, timely and appropriate manner.

Once the delegated act mentioned above is adopted, the preparation and adoption of the relevant implementing act will be subject to the examination procedure foreseen in Article 48(2) of the same Regulation. The European Parliament will be informed through the Comitology Register of any meetings of the relevant committee, composed of representatives of Member States, and relevant documents.

⁽¹⁾ Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on food intended for infants and young children and on food for special medical purposes, COM(2011) 353 final, 2011/0156 (COD).

⁽²⁾ Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on the provision of food information to consumers, amending Regulations (EC) No 1924/2006 and (EC) No 1925/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Commission Directive 87/250/EEC, Council Directive 90/496/EEC, Commission Directive 1999/10/EC, Directive 2000/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, Commission Directives 2002/67/EC and 2008/5/EC and Commission Regulation (EC) No 608/2004, OJ L 304, 22.11.2011, p. 18.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002760/13

alla Commissione

Oreste Rossi (EFD)

(8 marzo 2013)

Oggetto: Mercato nero di corpi umani: quali controlli sulla certificazione di parti del corpo umano provenienti da Paesi terzi?

In tutto il mondo è diffusa un'ampia rete internazionale di prodotti medici e dentistici che quotidianamente vengono impiantati nei corpi di migliaia di persone. Resta alta la preoccupazione, nella comunità medica, per quelli che possono essere i rischi d'infezione, e contagi di epatite e Hiv, nei casi in cui al momento dell'espianto non siano seguite le procedure e le prassi sancite da norme europee, come la direttiva 2010/53/UE.

Una recente inchiesta giornalistica condotta, in undici Paesi, da un gruppo di giornalisti afferenti all'International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (Icij), ha rilevato che non ci sono controlli sufficienti per verificare che le parti del corpo umano siano raccolte in modo etico e legale. In particolare, negli ultimi anni, si è diffuso il commercio di tessuti umani, poiché la pratica del trapianto di pelle è ormai consolidata e di semplice esecuzione. È stato riscontrato che in Paesi come l'Ucraina, prossima all'entrata nell'Unione europea, esiste un sistema commerciale che tratta ed espianta parti di corpo umano dai cadaveri, senza previo consenso delle famiglie direttamente coinvolte. Anche in Slovacchia si esportano parti di cadaveri umani verso la Germania, sede di multinazionali che certificano ed esportano tali parti umane verso altri Paesi, soprattutto in America.

Considerato che: — la direttiva 2005/36/CE stabilisce che il reperimento di un organo (previa sua caratterizzazione) vada effettuato presso centri specializzati e sotto la supervisione di un medico e che debba essere un atto volontario e non remunerato, sono a chiedere alla Commissione se:

- sia consapevole della presenza di questa rete di commercio attiva sul territorio europeo;
- sia a conoscenza che la pratica dell'espianto avviene in Paesi non ancora membri dell'UE, senza il consenso dei familiari, tanto che la stessa polizia locale sta indagando sulla legittimità di questa pratica, e che la seguente certificazione avviene in uno Stato membro;
- intenda intraprendere un'indagine specifica per verificare che le aziende seguano meticolosamente le direttive europee, poiché si sta parlando pur sempre della vita delle persone che riceveranno un trapianto, nonché della sofferenza di coloro che affrontano la perdita di un loro caro e non sono a conoscenza dell'espianto già effettuato.

Risposta di Tonio Borg a nome della Commissione

(22 aprile 2013)

La Commissione condivide le preoccupazioni dell'onorevole parlamentare sulle notizie diffuse recentemente dalla stampa che hanno portato alla luce casi che danno adito a sospetti di attività illegali e fraudolente connesse al commercio di cellule e tessuti umani. La Commissione è a conoscenza del fatto che nel settore in esame sono attivi anche alcuni operatori commerciali o privati oltre alle banche pubbliche dei tessuti che operano in molti Stati membri. La Commissione è altresì a conoscenza degli elementi che lasciano supporre che le disposizioni riguardo al consenso alla donazione non sono state rispettate per alcuni tessuti e cellule prelevati nei paesi terzi e successivamente importati nell'UE.

Le disposizioni di base riguardo alla qualità e alla sicurezza dei tessuti e delle cellule destinati all'applicazione sull'uomo, comprese quelle attinenti al consenso alla donazione, sono contenute nella direttiva 2004/23/CE⁽¹⁾ e nella relativa normativa di attuazione, ossia nelle direttive 2006/17/CE⁽²⁾ e 2006/86/CE⁽³⁾. Queste disposizioni si applicano alle banche dei tessuti pubbliche, private e commerciali. L'articolo 9, paragrafo 1, della direttiva 2004/23/CE dispone che i tessuti e le cellule importati nell'Unione europea da paesi terzi devono essere conformi alle norme di qualità e sicurezza secondo quanto stabilito nella suddetta direttiva.

⁽¹⁾ GUL 102 del 7.4.2004, pag. 48.

⁽²⁾ GUL 38 del 9.2.2006, pag. 40.

⁽³⁾ GUL 294 del 25.10.06, pag. 32.

All'interno di ciascuno Stato membro le autorità nazionali o regionali competenti in tema di tessuti e cellule sono responsabili dell'autorizzazione e del controllo di tutti gli istituti dei tessuti compresi quelli che importano tessuti e cellule da paesi terzi. A seguito dei sospetti sollevati nei recenti comunicati stampa la Commissione è stata informata in merito ad alcune ispezioni effettuate nel quadro di un'indagine sulle pratiche oggetto della denuncia. Da quanto risulta alla Commissione l'inchiesta è tuttora in corso e le conclusioni non sono ancora state rese note.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002760/13
to the Commission
Oreste Rossi (EFD)
(8 March 2013)

Subject: Black market in human bodies: what controls are there on the certification of human body parts coming from third countries?

Across the world, there is a vast international network of medical and dental products that are implanted into the bodies of thousands of people every day. There is still great concern among the medical community about the possible risks of infection and the spread of hepatitis and HIV in cases where — at the time of removal of the body part concerned — the procedures and practices sanctioned by European legislation, such as Directive 2010/53/EU, are not followed.

A recent press investigation, carried out in eleven countries by a group of journalists belonging to the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ), revealed that there are insufficient controls for verifying that body parts have been collected legally and ethically. In particular, the trade in human tissue has grown over the last few years, since skin grafts are now commonplace and easy to perform. It was found that in countries such as Ukraine, which will shortly be joining the EU, there is a commercial network that handles and removes body parts from corpses, without the prior consent of the families directly affected. In Slovakia too, human body parts are exported to Germany, where multinational companies certify those parts and export them to other countries, especially America.

Directive 2005/36/EC stipulates that the procurement of an organ (after characterisation) must be carried out in specialised centres and under the supervision of a doctor, and that the donation must be voluntary and unpaid.

Can the Commission answer the following:

- Is it aware of the existence of this commercial network operating in Europe?
- Is it aware that the body parts are being removed in countries that are not yet members of the EU, without the consent of relatives, to such an extent that local police forces are investigating the legality of this practice, and that the subsequent certification is taking place in a Member State?
- Does it intend to carry out a specific investigation to check that the companies involved are complying scrupulously with the European directives? What is at stake here is quite simply the lives of transplant recipients, as well as the suffering of those who have to face the loss of a loved one and are unaware that a body part has already been removed.

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission
(22 April 2013)

The Commission shares the Honourable Member's concern on the recent press reports which brought to light suspected cases of illegal and fraudulent activities related to the tissues and cells sector. The Commission is aware that in the tissue and cells sector, in addition to the public tissue banks that operate in many Member States, commercial or private operators are also active in the sector. The Commission is also aware of the allegations that have been made suggesting that the requirements for donor consent were not met for certain tissues and cells procured in third countries and subsequently imported into the EU.

The minimum requirements for quality and safety of tissue and cells intended for human application, including requirements related to donor consent, are set out in Directive 2004/23/EC⁽¹⁾ and its implementing legislation, Directives 2006/17/EC⁽²⁾ and 2006/86/EC⁽³⁾. These requirements apply on public as well as on private or commercial tissue banks. Article 9(1) of Directive 2004/23/EC states that tissue and cells imported into the EU from third countries shall meet standards of quality and safety equivalent to the ones laid down in this directive.

⁽¹⁾ OJ L 102/48, 7.4.2004.

⁽²⁾ OJ L 38/40, 9.2.2006.

⁽³⁾ OJ L 294/32, 25.10.2006.

Within each Member State the tissue and cells national or regional competent authorities are responsible for the authorisation and inspection of all tissue establishments including those importing tissues and cells from third countries. Following the suspicions raised in the recent press reports, the Commission has been made aware of inspections that have taken place in the framework of an investigation into these alleged practices. As far as the Commission is aware this investigation is ongoing and its findings have not yet been finalised.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002761/13
alla Commissione
Oreste Rossi (EFD)
(8 marzo 2013)

Oggetto: Nuovi possibili standard e modelli di gestione per i musei europei

Con il decreto legge 22 giugno 2012, n. 83 il governo italiano ha deciso di rinnovare la forma giuridica della pinacoteca di Brera. In occasione dell'ampliamento degli spazi e del riordino della sede espositiva, ha colto l'occasione per dare un nuovo assetto al museo, trasformandolo in una fondazione di partecipazione. Tale modello non rappresenta una novità, essendo già stato applicato in altre situazioni. La sua prima adozione risale al 2004, quando la veste giuridica del museo delle antichità egizie è cambiata da museo statale a fondazione pubblico-privata. La gestione dei musei italiani avviene sia in forma diretta, attraverso le strutture interne alla pubblica amministrazione, sia in forma indiretta, mediante un soggetto «terzo». A livello locale vi è stata maggiore innovazione, con il ricorso a strumenti come l'istituzione, l'azienda speciale, le associazioni, le fondazioni o le società di capitali. A livello statale si sono avute le esperienze dei poli museali e delle fondazioni di partecipazione. Nell'affidamento della gestione tuttavia vi sono criticità nei rapporti tra i soggetti interessati ameno sotto quattro aspetti: il rapporto fra il proprietario del bene e l'ente gestore; il rapporto fra il soggetto preposto alla tutela e l'ente gestore; le fonti di finanziamento; la gestione del personale.

In particolare è evidente come una gestione diretta dei siti statali sia gravata da numerosi disincentivi verso un management virtuoso. Paradossale appare soprattutto l'assenza di autonomia finanziaria: se i ricavi dei biglietti non rimangono all'istituzione, che incentivi si avranno ad aumentare il numero di visitatori? La mancata autonomia è disincentivante anche nella ricerca di contributi propri attraverso le attività di fund raising o di affitto di sale per eventi.

Considerato che: i musei sono una delle grandi risorse culturali dell'Europa; nel rispetto del principio di sussidiarietà il settore è oggetto di una cooperazione tra Stati membri e Commissione;

chiedo alla Commissione:

- è possibile elaborare linee guida davvero innovative per la gestione del patrimonio culturale volte alla realizzazione di sistemi integrati di gestione?
- quali nuovi spunti stanno emergendo a livello europeo dalla progressiva armonizzazione delle politiche gestionali dei musei?

Risposta di Androulla Vassiliou a nome della Commissione
(30 aprile 2013)

Conformemente all'articolo 167 del trattato sul funzionamento dell'Unione europea gli interventi dell'Unione nel campo della cultura si limitano a incoraggiare la cooperazione tra gli Stati membri e, se necessario, ad appoggiare e ad integrare le azioni di questi ultimi, tra l'altro per quanto concerne la conservazione e salvaguardia del patrimonio culturale di importanza europea.

La cooperazione con gli Stati membri nel campo della cultura si configura nel «metodo di coordinamento aperto» (MCA). Essa è volontaria e mira a migliorare il processo decisionale grazie allo scambio delle migliori pratiche.

Le materie per le attività del MCA sono definite nel «Piano di lavoro per la cultura» 2011-2014 ⁽¹⁾ che è stato adottato dagli Stati membri. Nell'elenco delle materie da trattare è compreso il patrimonio culturale, ma non vi rientrano tematiche specifiche d'ordine gestionale. Qualsiasi tentativo di armonizzare i sistemi di gestione dei musei costituirebbe in ogni caso una violazione del trattato e del principio di sussidiarietà.

⁽¹⁾ GUC 325 del 2.12.2010.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002761/13
to the Commission
Oreste Rossi (EFD)
(8 March 2013)

Subject: Possible new governance standards and models for European museums

With Decree-Law No 83 of 22 June 2012, the Italian Government decided to update the legal status of the Pinacoteca di Brera art gallery. The government took advantage of the extension of the site and the reorganisation of the exhibition area to give the museum a new structure, transforming it into a participatory foundation. This model is not new, insofar as it has already been applied in other situations. Its first adoption dates back to 2004, when the legal status of the Museum of Egyptian Antiquities was changed from a public museum to a public/private foundation. Italian museums are governed both directly, through internal public administration structures, and indirectly, through third parties. At local level there has been greater innovation, with the use of models such as institutions, special agencies, associations, foundations or joint-stock companies. At national level there have been experiments with '*poli museali*' (groups of museums) and participatory foundations. When deciding on the form of governance, however, there are some problematic issues in terms of the relations between the interested parties with regard to at least four aspects: the relationship between the owner of the asset and the governing body; the relationship between the person appointed to safeguard the asset and the governing body; the sources of funding; and the management of staff.

In particular, it is clear that direct governance of state-owned sites is affected by many disincentives to good management. Above all, the lack of financial autonomy seems irrational: if the income from ticket sales is not kept by the institution, what incentives are there to increase the number of visitors? This lack of autonomy is also a disincentive to seeking contributions through fund-raising activities or the letting of spaces for events.

Museums are one of Europe's great cultural resources. In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, the sector is now the subject of cooperation between Member States and the Commission.

Can the Commission answer the following:

- Is it possible to draw up truly innovative guidelines for the governance of our cultural heritage that are geared towards the creation of integrated governance systems?
- What new ideas are emerging at European level from the progressive harmonisation of museum governance policies?

Answer given by Ms Vassiliou on behalf of the Commission
(30 April 2013)

According to Article 167 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, actions by the Union in the field of culture are limited to encouraging cooperation among Member States and, if necessary, supporting and implementing their actions, *inter alia*, in view of the conservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage of European significance.

The cooperation with Member States in the field of Culture takes the form of 'the Open Method of Coordination' (OMC). It is voluntary and aims at improving policy-making by exchanging best practices.

Topics for OMC work are defined by the 'Work Plan for Culture' 2011-2014 ⁽¹⁾ which was adopted by the Member States. While cultural heritage is included in the list of topics, the specific issue of governance is not. Any attempt to harmonise museum governance systems would in any case be in breach of the of the Treaty and subsidiarity principle.

⁽¹⁾ OJ C 325, 2.12.2010.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002763/13
alla Commissione**

Mario Borghezio (EFD)

(8 marzo 2013)

Oggetto: Tracce radioattive nella carne di alcuni cinghiali

Premesso che nella carne di alcuni cinghiali catturati in Valsesia (Italia-Piemonte) è stata accertata la presenza di consistenti tracce di «Cesio 137», pericolosissime in caso di consumo della carne da parte dell'uomo,

la Commissione non intende accertare se tale situazione sia da collegarsi ancora agli eventi di Chernobyl o, piuttosto, da mettersi in collegamento con l'eventuale fuoriuscita di fumi radioattivi delle centrali atomiche transalpine consideratane la vicinanza geografica con il Piemonte?

Risposta di Günther Oettinger a nome della Commissione

(26 aprile 2013)

Il 21 marzo 2013 una comunicazione (*news notification* 13-693) è stata distribuita mediante il sistema di allarme rapido per gli alimenti e i mangimi (RASFF) relativa al rilevamento di un livello di radioattività troppo elevato nei cinghiali provenienti dall'Italia. I controlli sono stati effettuati su campioni prelevati nell'ambito di un'indagine sulla trichinellosi, una malattia parassitaria che colpisce prevalentemente suini e cinghiali. Nella comunicazione si segnala inoltre che all'inizio del marzo 2013 il ministro italiano della Sanità ha organizzato un incontro di coordinamento urgente con tutte le autorità competenti al fine di discutere il problema.

La Commissione è del parere che tali conclusioni non siano collegate a perdite di effluenti radioattivi provenienti da centrali nucleari transalpine.

Tuttavia, alla luce dell'esperienza acquisita dopo l'incidente di Chernobyl, la Commissione è consapevole del fatto che, in alcune regioni degli Stati membri che sono state colpite da livelli elevati di ricadute radioattive a seguito dell'incidente di Chernobyl, non è da attendersi una diminuzione significativa nella contaminazione da cesio radioattivo in alcuni prodotti selvatici provenienti da ambienti naturali e seminaturali nel corso dei prossimi decenni. In effetti è noto che, per questi prodotti, la contaminazione da cesio radioattivo dipende principalmente dal periodo fisico di semitrasformazione di questo radionuclide, pari a circa 30 anni. Secondo l'atlante relativo ai livelli di cesio in Europa dopo l'incidente di Chernobyl ⁽¹⁾, il Piemonte settentrionale (Italia) fa parte delle regioni interessate e pertanto un elevato livello di cesio 137 potrebbe, ad esempio, essere trovato nelle carni di cinghiale.

Al fine di sensibilizzare la popolazione di queste regioni in merito alla persistente contaminazione di alcuni prodotti selvatici, la Commissione ha adottato, il 14 aprile 2003, una raccomandazione agli Stati membri sulla protezione e l'informazione del pubblico ⁽²⁾.

⁽¹⁾ Atlas of caesium deposition on Europe after the Chernobyl Accident, ISBN 92-828-3140-X, Ufficio delle pubblicazioni ufficiali delle Comunità europee 1998.

⁽²⁾ Raccomandazione 2003/274/Euratom della Commissione, del 14 aprile 2003, sulla protezione e l'informazione del pubblico per quanto riguarda l'esposizione risultante dalla continua contaminazione radioattiva da cesio di taluni prodotti di raccolta spontanei a seguito dell'incidente verificatosi nella centrale nucleare di Chernobyl (GU L 99 del 17.04.2003, pag. 55). In base a tale raccomandazione, tutti gli Stati membri interessati devono prendere le disposizioni idonee per garantire che i livelli massimi in termini di cesio-134 e cesio-137 di cui all'articolo 3 del regolamento (CEE) n. 737/90 (attualmente il regolamento (CE) n. 733/2008) siano rispettati nell'Unione in particolare per l'immissione sul mercato della selvaggina. Inoltre, gli Stati membri devono informare la popolazione dei rischi sanitari connessi, nelle regioni in cui esiste un rischio potenziale che tali prodotti superino i livelli massimi consentiti e devono anche informare la Commissione e informarsi reciprocamente circa i casi registrati dei prodotti in questione immessi sul mercato dell'Unione che eccedano i livelli massimi mediante il sistema unionale di allarme rapido di cui al regolamento (CE) n. 178/2002, e i provvedimenti presi in risposta alla suddetta raccomandazione.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002763/13
to the Commission**

Mario Borghezio (EFD)

(8 March 2013)

Subject: Radioactive traces in the meat of some wild boar

Given that high levels of caesium-137 have been found in the meat of some wild boar caught in Valsesia (Piedmont, Italy), levels which would be extremely dangerous in the event that this meat was eaten by humans,

does the Commission intend to establish whether this situation can still be linked to the Chernobyl incident or rather, whether it can be linked to the possible emission of radioactive fumes from transalpine nuclear power plants, given their proximity to Piedmont?

Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission

(26 April 2013)

On 21 March 2013, a news notification 13-693 was distributed in the Rapid Alert System for Feed and Food (RASFF) regarding the findings of too high level of radioactivity in wild boar from Italy. The controls were done on samples taken as part of a trichinellosis survey, a parasitic disease predominantly affecting pigs and wild boars. The message further mentions that the Italian Minister for Health has called for an urgent coordination meeting in early March 2013 with all competent authorities to address the problem.

The Commission is of the opinion that these findings are not linked to releases of radioactive effluents from transalpine nuclear power plants.

However, in the light of the experience gained since the Chernobyl accident, the Commission is aware that, in some regions of the Member States that were affected by high levels of fallout following the Chernobyl accident, no significant decrease in contamination by radioactive caesium of certain wild products coming from natural and semi natural environments is to be expected over the next few decades. Indeed, it is recognised that for these products, the radioactive caesium contamination depends mainly on the physical half-life of this radionuclide which is approximately 30 years. According to the Atlas of Caesium deposition on Europe after the Chernobyl accident ⁽¹⁾, the north Piedmont (Italy) is part of the regions concerned and therefore high level of caesium 137 could, for example, be found in meat of wild boar.

With a view to raising awareness amongst the population of these regions regarding the persistent contamination of certain wild products, the Commission adopted, on 14 April 2003, a recommendation to the Member States on the protection and information of the public ⁽²⁾.

⁽¹⁾ Atlas of caesium deposition on Europe after the Chernobyl accident, ISBN 92-828-3140-X, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1998.

⁽²⁾ Commission Recommendation No 2003/274/Euratom on the protection and information of the public with regard to exposure resulting from the continued radioactive caesium contamination of certain wild food products as a consequence of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station (OJ L 99, 17.4.2003, p. 55). According to this recommendation, all Member States concerned should take appropriate steps to ensure that the maximum permitted levels in terms of caesium-134 and caesium-137 referred to in Article 3 of Regulation (EEC) No 737/90 (now Regulation (EEC) No 733/2008) are respected in the Community for the placing on the market of wild game in particular. In addition, Member States should inform the population, in regions where there is a potential for such products to exceed the maximum permitted levels, of the health risk involved. They should also inform the Commission and each other of recorded cases of such products placed on the Community market exceeding the maximum permitted levels through the Community Rapid Alert System laid down in Regulation (EC) 178/2002, and the action taken in response to this recommendation.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002764/13
alla Commissione**

Francesco De Angelis (S&D)

(8 marzo 2013)

Oggetto: Costo dei servizi mobili nazionali rispetto all'Eurotariffa per i servizi in roaming

Considerato che il Regolamento (UE) n. 531/2012 pubblicato sulla Gazzetta Ufficiale dell'Unione europea il 30 giugno 2012 ha fissato dei cap (retail e wholesale) alle tariffe delle comunicazioni voce, SMS e dati in roaming all'interno dell'UE.

Tenuto conto che il costo della sola terminazione in alcuni Paesi europei, tra i quali l'Italia, ha un valore medio di circa 4 cent, e dunque pari al doppio del valore massimo stabilito dalla Commissione per il totale dei costi di gestione, rendendo paradossalmente l'SMS wholesale più economico in un ambito di roaming rispetto ad un ambito nazionale.

Constatato che in Italia, nonostante numerosi MVNO abbiano chiesto alla NRA di intervenire sul mercato della terminazione SMS in modo da favorire la concorrenza e garantire agli operatori virtuali di poter competere con le offerte flat o bundle degli operatori di rete, la NRA italiana ha deciso di non intervenire lasciando che il mercato si autoregoli. Tuttavia questa autoregolamentazione sta avvenendo a discapito dei consumatori e degli operatori virtuali.

Come intende procedere la Commissione onde garantire il rispetto dei criteri di libera concorrenza, a vantaggio dei consumatori e dei MVNO?

Risposta di Neelie Kroes a nome della Commissione

(16 aprile 2013)

Come giustamente osservato dall'onorevole parlamentare, i mercati (nazionali) dei servizi di terminazione SMS in Italia non sono soggetti a regolamentazione nell'ambito del quadro normativo dell'UE. I prezzi della fornitura dei rispettivi servizi sono stabiliti dagli operatori di telecomunicazioni in funzione della pressione concorrenziale incontrata. A causa delle caratteristiche economiche dei servizi SMS (come l'esistenza di aggregatori all'ingrosso/operatori di transito e la pressione concorrenziale da parte di altri servizi quali, ad esempio, la messaggistica istantanea), la Commissione, nella sua raccomandazione sui mercati rilevanti del 2007 (2007/879/CE) ha considerato che i mercati degli SMS solitamente non sono suscettibili di una regolamentazione ex ante. Nel caso in cui circostanze nazionali giustifichino un intervento normativo, la piena competenza e responsabilità di imporre una regolamentazione ex ante nei mercati di terminazione degli SMS spetta alle autorità nazionali di regolamentazione (ANR), come l'AGCOM in Italia (Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni). È interessante notare che, fino a poco tempo fa, soltanto le ANR di Francia, Danimarca e Polonia avevano imposto una regolamentazione ex ante nei mercati di terminazione SMS. Inoltre, in caso di abuso di posizione dominante, ad esempio in caso di fissazione di prezzi eccessivi, le autorità garanti della concorrenza (in Italia l'Autorità garante della concorrenza e del mercato, AGCM) possono intervenire ai sensi della legislazione sulla concorrenza. Per dare un quadro completo si segnala che la raccomandazione sui mercati rilevanti del 2007 summenzionata è attualmente in corso di revisione e che l'adozione di una raccomandazione rivista è prevista per il secondo trimestre del 2014. A tal riguardo, la Commissione sta esaminando attentamente il mercato di terminazione degli SMS.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002764/13
to the Commission**

Francesco De Angelis (S&D)

(8 March 2013)

Subject: Cost of national mobile services compared with the Eurotariff for roaming services

Regulation (EU) No 531/2012, published in the *Official Journal of the European Union* on 30 June 2012, set retail and wholesale caps on tariffs for voice calls, SMS and data roaming within the EU.

The termination charge alone in some EU countries — including Italy — averages around EUR 0.04, which is double the maximum established by the Commission for total management costs. Paradoxically, this makes wholesale SMS roaming charges cheaper than national charges.

In Italy, despite the fact that numerous mobile virtual network operators (MVNO) have asked the national regulatory authority (NRA) to take action on the SMS termination market to promote competition and ensure that virtual operators can compete with network operators' flat rates or bundle offers, the Italian NRA has decided not to step in, leaving the market to regulate itself. However, this self-regulation is working to the detriment of consumers and virtual operators.

What action does the Commission intend to take to ensure compliance with the principles of free competition, for the benefit of consumers and MVNOs?

Answer given by Ms Kroes on behalf of the Commission

(16 April 2013)

As the Honourable Member rightly points out the (national) markets for SMS termination services in Italy are not subject to regulation under the EU Regulatory Framework. The prices for the provision of the respective services are set by the telecommunication operators, subject to the prevailing competition constraints. Due to the economic characteristics of SMS services (such as the existence of wholesale aggregators/transit operators and competitive pressure stemming from other services like for example instant messaging) the Commission in its 2007 Recommendation on relevant markets (2007/87/EC) considered that the SMS markets are usually not susceptible to *ex ante* regulation. The National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs), including AGCOM in Italy, retain, however, the full competence and responsibility to impose *ex ante* regulation on SMS termination markets, in case national circumstances would justify regulatory intervention. It is worth noting that until recently only the NRAs in France, Denmark and Poland imposed *ex ante* regulation in SMS termination markets. Moreover, in case of an abuse of a dominant position, for example by way of excessive pricing, the competition authorities (in Italy the Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, AGCM) could intervene on the basis of competition law. By way of background, the abovementioned 2007 Recommendation on relevant markets is currently under review, and a revised Recommendation is scheduled to be adopted by the second quarter of 2014. The market for SMS termination is being duly considered by the Commission in this respect.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002775/13

à Comissão

Nuno Teixeira (PPE)

(8 de março de 2013)

Assunto: Orçamento Europeu — Capping

Tendo em conta que:

- A 8 e 9 de fevereiro realizou-se o Conselho Europeu, tendo sido aprovada uma nova proposta apresentada por Herman Van Rompuy, Presidente do Conselho, intitulada «Projeto de Conclusões».
- No período de 2007-2013, o valor da Política de Coesão foi de 347,9 mil milhões de euros, verificando-se uma redução global de 22,7 mil milhões de euros, equivalente a uma redução de 6,53 %.
- Comparando com a proposta da Comissão Europeia, verifica-se uma redução de 14,1 mil milhões de euros, ou seja, aproximadamente 4,15 %. A redução de 14,1 mil milhões de euros verificada na globalidade da Política de Coesão foi aceite pelos Estados-Membros devido ao facto de terem sido aprovadas disposições especiais de afetação de fundos no valor de 9,9 mil milhões de euros.
- O limite máximo que cada Estado-Membro poderá receber da Política de Coesão é reduzido de 2,5 % para 2,35 % do PIB. Para os Estados-Membros que entraram antes de 2013 e cujo PIB per capita médio entre 2008 e 2010 foi inferior a -1 %, o nível máximo de transferência de verbas deve subir 10 %, atingindo os 2,59 %.

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Qual a percentagem de verbas europeias face ao PIB que Portugal recebeu em 2007-2013?
2. Segundo as projeções elaboradas pela Comissão, será Portugal afetado por este limite máximo de dotação financeira?
3. Qual o PIB per capita de Portugal entre 2008 e 2010?

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002776/13

à Comissão

Nuno Teixeira (PPE)

(8 de março de 2013)

Assunto: Orçamento Europeu — Clarificação de verbas que Portugal receberá

Tendo em conta que:

- A 8 e 9 de fevereiro realizou-se o Conselho Europeu, tendo sido aprovada uma nova proposta apresentada por Herman Van Rompuy, Presidente do Conselho, intitulada «Projeto de Conclusões»;
- Para ter uma real impressão da redução do orçamento europeu acordada pelos Estados-Membros na reunião do Conselho de 8 e 9 de fevereiro, é necessário somar a redução verificada nas rubricas que se encontram dentro do QFP (73 248 milhões de euros) com as que se encontram fora do QFP (21 523 milhões de euros), perfazendo assim uma redução global de aproximadamente 95 mil milhões de euros, cerca de 8,5 % a menos do que inicialmente proposto pela Comissão Europeia;
- Analisando o quadro global de fundos que Portugal deverá receber, é possível constatar que o país sai beneficiado das negociações do Conselho Europeu de 8 e 9 de fevereiro último, devido ao facto das duas Políticas Europeias (Política de Coesão e Política Agrícola Comum) terem sofrido uma redução orçamental de 10,05 % e Portugal apenas perder cerca de 9,5 % da globalidade das verbas europeias;
- Portugal deverá receber assim 27,7 mil milhões de euros, sendo que 19,6 mil milhões de euros serão para a Política de Coesão e 8,1 mil milhões de euros para a Política Agrícola Comum, e que 4,5 mil milhões de euros são do Pilar I (Ajudas diretas aos agricultores) e 3,6 mil milhões de euros para o Pilar II (Desenvolvimento Rural);

- O país sai ainda beneficiado por ter conseguido negociar dois envelopes específicos de apoio, um de mil milhões de euros na Política de Coesão e outro de 500 milhões de euros no Desenvolvimento Rural, sendo que este último não necessita de taxa de cofinanciamento até 2016, constituindo um apoio direto concedido ao Estado-Membro.

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Pode confirmar que Portugal irá realmente receber 27,7 mil milhões de euros?
2. Como se distribuem os 27,7 mil milhões de euros pelos vários fundos europeus de apoio (e.g.: FEDER, FSE, Fundo de Coesão, Cooperação Territorial Europeia)?

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002777/13

à Comissão

Nuno Teixeira (PPE)

(8 de março de 2013)

Assunto: Orçamento Europeu — Clarificação de verbas da Política de Coesão

Tendo em conta que:

- A 8 e 9 de fevereiro realizou-se o Conselho Europeu, tendo sido aprovada uma nova proposta apresentada por Herman Van Rompuy, Presidente do Conselho, intitulada «Projeto de Conclusões»;
- Para ter uma real impressão da redução do orçamento europeu acordada pelos Estados-Membros na reunião do Conselho de 8 e 9 de fevereiro, é necessário somar a redução verificada nas rubricas que se encontram dentro do QFP (73 248 milhões de euros) com as que se encontram fora do QFP (21 523 milhões de euros), perfazendo assim uma redução global de aproximadamente 95 mil milhões de euros, cerca de 8,5 % a menos do que inicialmente proposto pela Comissão Europeia;
- Analisando o quadro global de fundos que Portugal deverá receber, é possível constatar que o país sai beneficiado das negociações do Conselho Europeu de 8 e 9 de fevereiro último, devido ao facto das duas Políticas Europeias (Política de Coesão e Política Agrícola Comum) terem sofrido uma redução orçamental de 10,05 % e Portugal apenas perder cerca de 9,5 % da globalidade das verbas europeias;
- Portugal deverá receber assim 27,7 mil milhões de euros, sendo que 19,6 mil milhões de euros serão para a Política de Coesão e 8,1 mil milhões de euros para a Política Agrícola Comum, e que 4,5 mil milhões de euros são do Pilar I (Ajudas diretas aos agricultores) e 3,6 mil milhões de euros para o Pilar II (Desenvolvimento Rural);
- O país sai ainda beneficiado por ter conseguido negociar dois envelopes específicos de apoio, um de mil milhões de euros na Política de Coesão e outro de 500 milhões de euros no Desenvolvimento Rural, sendo que este último não necessita de taxa de cofinanciamento até 2016, constituindo um apoio direto concedido ao Estado-Membro.

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Como se distribuem os 19,6 mil milhões de euros entre financiamento atribuído ao Estado-Membro e às Regiões Portuguesas?
2. Qual o montante que será destinado a cada uma das Regiões Portuguesas, nomeadamente ao Norte, Centro, Lisboa e Vale do Tejo, Alentejo, Algarve, Madeira e Açores?

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002778/13

à Comissão

Nuno Teixeira (PPE)

(8 de março de 2013)

Assunto: Orçamento Europeu — Cláusula de revisão

Tendo em conta que:

- A 8 e 9 de fevereiro realizou-se o Conselho Europeu, tendo sido aprovada uma nova proposta apresentada por Herman Van Rompuy, Presidente do Conselho, intitulada «Projeto de Conclusões».

- No período de 2007-2013, o valor da Política de Coesão foi de 347,9 mil milhões de euros, verificando-se uma redução global de 22,7 mil milhões de euros, equivalente a uma redução de 6,53 %.
- Comparando com a proposta da Comissão Europeia, verifica-se uma redução de 14,1 mil milhões de euros, ou seja, aproximadamente 4,15 %. A redução de 14,1 mil milhões de euros verificada na globalidade da Política de Coesão foi aceite pelos Estados-Membros devido ao facto de terem sido aprovadas disposições especiais de afetação de fundos no valor de 9,9 mil milhões de euros;
- Em 2016 serão revistos os valores da Política de Coesão para o período de 2017 a 2020. Serão utilizados os valores do PIB per capita regional de 2014 e 2015 e o valor do PIB per capita a nível nacional de 2012. Só serão realizados ajustamentos caso exista uma divergência de verbas superior ou inferior a 5 % e estes não poderão ser superiores a 4 mil milhões de euros;

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Não considera que esta cláusula de revisão, a realizar em 2016, poderá afetar os investimentos já planeados e calendarizados pela globalidade das regiões europeias e dos Estados-Membros?
2. No caso de uma região perder verbas da Política de Coesão, mas já ter projetos cabimentados a médio / longo prazo, como poderá financiar os investimentos em causa?
3. Está ciente das implicações que esta cláusula de revisão poderá gerar, nomeadamente ao nível da retração de investimentos estratégicos importantes para a União Europeia?

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002779/13

à Comissão

Nuno Teixeira (PPE)

(8 de março de 2013)

Assunto: Orçamento Europeu — Estimular o crescimento económico e geração de emprego

Tendo em conta que:

- A 8 e 9 de fevereiro realizou-se o Conselho Europeu, tendo sido aprovada uma nova proposta apresentada por Herman Van Rompuy, Presidente do Conselho, intitulada «Projeto de Conclusões».
- O documento reforça o que já tinha sido definido na anterior reunião de 22 e 23 de novembro, dado assumir que o orçamento «deve atuar como catalisador do crescimento e do emprego em toda a Europa, servindo nomeadamente como alavanca para os investimentos produtivos e os investimentos em capital humano. No futuro, no âmbito do QFP 2014-2020, a despesa deverá ser mobilizada a favor do crescimento, do emprego, da competitividade e da convergência, em estreita consonância com a Estratégia Europa 2020»;
- O Conselho salienta ainda que: «Só haverá uma retoma do crescimento sustentável e do emprego se for seguida uma abordagem coerente e assente numa base alargada, conjugando uma consolidação orçamental inteligente que preserve o investimento no crescimento futuro com políticas macroeconómicas sólidas e uma estratégia ativa em prol do emprego que preserve a coesão social».

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Na globalidade do orçamento definido no último Conselho Europeu, entende que existe a preocupação manifestada pelos Estados-Membros de estimular o crescimento económico e a geração de emprego?
2. Quais as políticas europeias que considera prioritárias para alcançar esse desiderato estratégico?

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002780/13
à Comissão

Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(8 de março de 2013)

Assunto: Orçamento Europeu — Cooperação Territorial Europeia

Tendo em conta que:

- A 8 e 9 de fevereiro realizou-se o Conselho Europeu, tendo sido aprovada uma nova proposta apresentada por Herman Van Rompuy, Presidente do Conselho, intitulada «Projeto de Conclusões».
- No período de 2007-2013, o valor da Política de Coesão foi de 347,9 mil milhões de euros, verificando-se uma redução global de 22,7 mil milhões de euros, equivalente a uma redução de 6,53 %.
- Comparando com a proposta da Comissão Europeia, verifica-se uma redução de 14,1 mil milhões de euros, ou seja, aproximadamente 4,15 %;
- O orçamento da Política de Coesão para 2014-2020 é assim de 325,2 mil milhões de euros, sendo que 8,9 mil milhões de euros são destinados à Cooperação Territorial Europeia. Verifica-se uma redução de -24,7 % face à proposta inicialmente apresentada pela Comissão Europeia;
- À semelhança dos restantes projetos europeus, nomeadamente de investigação e inovação ou Mecanismo Interligar a Europa, também a criação de redes territoriais foi drasticamente afetada;

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Quais os motivos subjacentes que levaram à redução drástica de 25 % nos projetos de Cooperação Territorial Europeia?
2. Entende que a nova disposição orçamental irá colocar em causa os objetivos definidos pela Comissão Europeia de estimular uma crescente cooperação entre regiões e países europeus?

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002781/13
à Comissão

Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(8 de março de 2013)

Assunto: Orçamento Europeu — Emprego Jovem 1

Tendo em conta que:

- A 8 e 9 de fevereiro realizou-se o Conselho Europeu, tendo sido aprovada uma nova proposta apresentada por Herman Van Rompuy, Presidente do Conselho, intitulada «Projeto de Conclusões».
- No sentido de combater o grave flagelo social verificado nas camadas mais jovens da população resultante do elevado valor do desemprego jovem, o Presidente do Conselho, Herman Van Rompuy, propôs que fosse criada uma Iniciativa de Emprego Jovem, com as seguintes características:
- Estão orçamentados 6 mil milhões de euros, sendo a origem do financiamento como segue:
 - 3 mil milhões de euros não é mais dinheiro atribuído aos Estados-Membros, mas sim uma pré-afetação do Fundo Social Europeu que cada Estado-Membro já iria receber. Na globalidade da UE, a verba é calculada de acordo com o número global de desempregados nestas regiões europeias;
 - 3 mil milhões de euros são uma nova rubrica financeira que ficará no âmbito do subcapítulo da Política de Coesão (1b). Este valor será atribuído aos Estados-Membros e acrescentado ao valor do Fundo Social Europeu.
- O orçamento destina-se a apoiar os seguintes programas europeus de juventude:
 - Garantia Jovem; Metodologia para Formação; Aliança para a Aprendizagem; Rede EURES;

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. A verba a afetar por cada Estado-Membro ao emprego jovem no âmbito do Fundo Social Europeu será semelhante à verba atribuída pela Comissão Europeia na nova rubrica orçamental que foi agora definida?
2. Estas verbas serão atribuídas aos Estados-Membros e geridas por eles próprios ou irão permanecer no orçamento europeu e serão geridas pela Comissão Europeia?
3. No caso de serem geridas pelos Estados-Membros, como sabe que irão implementar os programas que pretende colocar em prática?

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002782/13

à Comissão

Nuno Teixeira (PPE)

(8 de março de 2013)

Assunto: Orçamento Europeu — Emprego Jovem 2

Tendo em conta que:

- A 8 e 9 de fevereiro realizou-se o Conselho Europeu, tendo sido aprovada uma nova proposta apresentada por Herman Van Rompuy, Presidente do Conselho, intitulada «Projeto de Conclusões».
- No sentido de combater o grave flagelo social verificado nas camadas mais jovens da população resultante do elevado valor do desemprego jovem, o Presidente do Conselho, Herman Van Rompuy, propôs que fosse criada uma Iniciativa de Emprego Jovem, com as seguintes características:
- Estão orçamentados 6 mil milhões de euros, sendo a origem do financiamento como segue:
 - 3 mil milhões de euros não é mais dinheiro atribuído aos Estados-Membros, mas sim uma pré-afetação do Fundo Social Europeu que cada Estado-Membro já iria receber. Na globalidade da UE, a verba é calculada de acordo com o número global de desempregados nestas regiões europeias;
 - 3 mil milhões de euros são uma nova rubrica financeira que ficará no âmbito do subcapítulo da Política de Coesão (1b). Este valor será atribuído aos Estados-Membros e acrescentado ao valor do Fundo Social Europeu.
- Serão elegíveis as Regiões europeias (NUTS 2) com nível de desemprego jovem superior a 25 %. As Regiões elegíveis e o número de jovens desempregados serão obtidos com base nos valores estatísticos do Eurostat de final de 2012, que deverão ser publicados brevemente.

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Tem conhecimento do número de regiões europeias em que a taxa de desemprego jovem é superior a 25 %? Quantas são e em que países estão localizadas?
2. Como se irão distribuir os 6 mil milhões de euros entre todas as regiões europeias com mais de 25 % de desemprego jovem?
3. Será elaborado algum rácio que tenha em conta as regiões com menor taxa de desemprego jovem, conforme sucede em Espanha ou na Grécia, ou apenas será tido em conta a globalidade das regiões afetadas?

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002783/13

à Comissão

Nuno Teixeira (PPE)

(8 de março de 2013)

Assunto: Orçamento Europeu — Envelopes financeiros

Tendo em conta que:

- A 8 e 9 de fevereiro realizou-se o Conselho Europeu, tendo sido aprovada uma nova proposta apresentada por Herman Van Rompuy, Presidente do Conselho, intitulada «Projeto de Conclusões».

- No período de 2007-2013, o valor da Política de Coesão foi de 347,9 mil milhões de euros, verificando-se uma redução global de 22,7 mil milhões de euros, equivalente a uma redução de 6,53 %.
- Comparando com a proposta da Comissão Europeia, verifica-se uma redução de 14,1 mil milhões de euros, ou seja, aproximadamente 4,15 %. A redução de 14,1 mil milhões de euros verificada na globalidade da Política de Coesão foi aceite pelos Estados-Membros devido ao facto de terem sido aprovadas disposições especiais de afetação de fundos no valor de 9,9 mil milhões de euros que são repartidos da seguinte forma entre vários Estados-Membros: Espanha: 1 824 milhões de euros, Hungria: 1 560 milhões de euros Grécia: 1 375 milhões de euros, Itália: 1 500 milhões de euros, Portugal: 1 000 milhões de euros, República Checa: 900 milhões de euros, Alemanha: 710 milhões de euros, França: 200 milhões de euros, Malta: 200 milhões de euros, Chipre: 150 milhões de euros, Bélgica: 133 milhões de euros, Irlanda: 100 milhões de euros, Eslovénia: 75 milhões de euros, Ceuta e Melilla: 50 milhões de euros e Programa PEACE: 150 milhões de euros.

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Considera que a atribuição direta de envelopes financeiros aos Estados-Membros em detrimento de políticas que beneficiem as regiões menos desenvolvidas irá prejudicar os objetivos definidos na Política de Coesão?
2. Quais os critérios que levaram a que alguns Estados-Membros recebessem envelopes financeiros superiores aos vizinhos europeus?
3. Qual o destino estratégico que será dado a estes envelopes específicos adicionais, nomeadamente se visam alcançar objetivos do FEDER, do FSE ou do Fundo de Coesão?

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002784/13

à Comissão

Nuno Teixeira (PPE)

(8 de março de 2013)

Assunto: Orçamento Europeu — Equilíbrio na redução orçamental

Tendo em conta que:

- A 8 e 9 de fevereiro realizou-se o Conselho Europeu, tendo sido aprovada uma nova proposta apresentada por Herman Van Rompuy, Presidente do Conselho, intitulada «Projeto de Conclusões».
- Ao nível das rubricas orçamentais que se encontram dentro do QFP, verifica-se uma drástica redução do orçamento destinado a promover um crescimento europeu que seja inteligente e inclusivo (-44 milhões de euros), com especial destaque para a diminuição de verbas nas políticas e programas que visam impulsionar a competitividade europeia, onde se constata uma redução de aproximadamente 30 milhões de euros, cerca de -20 % face à proposta inicial da Comissão Europeia.
- À redução de 73 248 milhões de euros verificada nas rubricas orçamentais que estão consagradas dentro do QFP, é necessário acrescentar a transferência de políticas de fora do QFP para dentro do QFP (e.g.: ITER, GMES, Reserva para crises no setor agrícola) que levaram um corte de 9 293 milhões de euros. Devido ao facto de agora estarem incluídas no QFP, quer dizer que os restantes projetos dos referidos capítulos (e.g.: subcapítulo 1a) — Competitividade para o crescimento e o emprego ou capítulo 2 — Crescimento Sustentável) terão uma maior redução orçamental.
- Ou seja, para ter uma real impressão da redução do orçamento europeu acordada pelos Estados-Membros na reunião do Conselho de 8 e 9 de fevereiro, é necessário somar a redução verificada nas rubricas que se encontram dentro do QFP (73 248 milhões de euros) com as que se encontram fora do QFP (21 523 milhões de euros), perfazendo assim uma redução global de aproximadamente 95 mil milhões de euros, cerca de 8,5 % a menos do que inicialmente proposto pela Comissão Europeia.

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Considera que existiu um equilíbrio entre as reduções orçamentais verificadas a nível interno e externo do Quadro Financeiro Plurianual?
2. Quais os motivos que levaram a que 3 das políticas europeias tenham transitado para dentro do QFP, nomeadamente os projetos ITER, GMES e Reserva Agrícola e outras não?

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002785/13
à Comissão

Nuno Teixeira (PPE)

(8 de março de 2013)

Assunto: Orçamento Europeu — Fundo Europeu de Ajustamento à Globalização

Tendo em conta que:

- A 8 e 9 de fevereiro realizou-se o Conselho Europeu, tendo sido aprovada uma nova proposta apresentada por Herman Van Rompuy, Presidente do Conselho, intitulada «Projeto de Conclusões».
- Em termos das rubricas orçamentais que constam fora do QFP, é importante ressaltar que 3 das políticas europeias transitaram para dentro do QFP, nomeadamente os projetos ITER e GMES e a Reserva para crises no setor agrícola, estando já contabilizadas estas perdas nos valores do próprio QFP.
- Num momento em que muitas das empresas europeias estão a deslocalizar internamente a sua atividade industrial ou a transferir os seus processos produtivos para países fora da UE, onde o custo de mão-de-obra é mais baixo, era importante que a União Europeia apoiasse todos os trabalhadores que fossem despedidos devido às consequências derivadas da globalização.
- Sucede-se que o Fundo Europeu de Ajustamento à Globalização, que começará também a apoiar as atividades agrícolas, além das industriais, vê a sua dotação orçamental fortemente reduzida em 65 %, passando de um valor inicial de 3 000 milhões de euros para 1 848 milhões de euros, dificultando assim a receção de fundos europeus por parte dos trabalhadores que poderiam ter formação para se adequarem às novas necessidades do mercado de trabalho.

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Entende que o orçamento apresentado irá ser suficiente para acudir aos trabalhadores de centenas de empresas que têm deslocalizado a sua atividade industrial?
2. Sendo o orçamento do Fundo Europeu de Ajustamento à Globalização drasticamente inferior ao apresentado inicialmente pela Comissão Europeia, considera ponderar a elegibilidade dos agricultores nesta política europeia?
3. Como se poderá apoiar a entrada no mercado de trabalho de tantos trabalhadores que ficam desempregados devido à globalização, quando o orçamento em causa para os próximos 7 anos é tão reduzido?

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002786/13
à Comissão

Nuno Teixeira (PPE)

(8 de março de 2013)

Assunto: Orçamento Europeu — Cooperação Territorial Europeia — 150 km

Tendo em conta que:

- A 8 e 9 de fevereiro se realizou o Conselho Europeu, tendo sido aprovada uma nova proposta apresentada por Herman Van Rompuy, Presidente do Conselho, intitulada «Projeto de Conclusões»;
- No período de 2007-2013, o valor da Política de Coesão foi de 347,9 mil milhões de euros, verificando-se uma redução global de 22,7 mil milhões de euros, equivalente a uma redução de 6,53 %; comparando com a proposta da Comissão Europeia, verifica-se uma redução de 14,1 mil milhões de euros, ou seja, aproximadamente 4,15 %;
- O orçamento da Política de Coesão para 2014-2020 é, assim, de 325,2 mil milhões de euros, sendo 8,9 mil milhões de euros destinados à cooperação territorial europeia; verifica-se uma redução de 24,7 % face à proposta inicialmente apresentada pela Comissão Europeia;

- As regiões a apoiar serão as regiões NUTS 3 situadas ao longo de todas as fronteiras terrestres internas e externas, bem como todas as regiões de nível NUTS 3 da União situadas ao longo das fronteiras marítimas, separadas por uma distância máxima de 150 quilómetros, sem prejuízo dos eventuais ajustamentos necessários para assegurar a coerência e a continuidade das zonas abrangidas pelos programas de cooperação no período de programação de 2007-2013; este facto consta inclusivamente das notas de conclusões, ao contrário do que se tem verificado nas anteriores versões que têm circulado entre Estados-Membros e instituições;
- Em janeiro deste ano, em conjunto com os colegas eurodeputados provenientes das Regiões Ultraperiféricas, enderecei uma carta ao Presidente do Conselho a alertar para esta injustiça territorial;

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Tem conhecimento dos motivos que levaram a que o Conselho não considerasse as especificidades das Regiões Ultraperiféricas no programa de Cooperação Territorial Europeia?
2. Quais as ações que entende desenvolver para repor alguma justiça na atribuição de verbas a estas regiões europeias, face a outros países europeus que irão receber financiamento, mas que não pertencem à União Europeia, como é o caso de Andorra, Suíça ou Noruega?

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002787/13
à Comissão
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(8 de março de 2013)

Assunto: Orçamento Europeu — Política Agrícola Comum

Tendo em conta que:

- A 8 e 9 de fevereiro se realizou o Conselho Europeu, tendo sido aprovada uma nova proposta apresentada por Herman Van Rompuy, Presidente do Conselho, intitulada «Projeto de Conclusões»;
- Ao nível das rubricas orçamentais que se encontram dentro do QFP, verifica-se uma drástica redução do orçamento destinado a promover um crescimento europeu que seja inteligente e inclusivo (-44 milhões de euros), com especial destaque para a diminuição de verbas nas políticas e programas que visam impulsionar a competitividade europeia, onde se constata uma redução de aproximadamente 30 milhões de euros, cerca de -20 % face à proposta inicial da Comissão Europeia;
- O Eixo 2, denominado de Crescimento Sustentável, é reduzido em 13 293 milhões de euros, observando-se uma redução orçamental de 3,44 % face à proposta inicialmente apresentada pela Comissão Europeia;
- Sucede que este Eixo passa a incluir o financiamento de 2 800 milhões de euros (reserva para crise no setor agrícola) que anteriormente estava consagrada fora do QFP;
- No entanto, não se compreende em que sub-eixo do Eixo 2 este financiamento adicional será inscrito, não se podendo, assim, entender a real diminuição orçamental de todos os sub-eixos em causa;

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Considera apropriados os novos valores orçamentais da Política Agrícola Comum? Como se justifica que ela continue a ser a principal política europeia, em detrimento de uma aposta crescente na investigação e inovação ou na competitividade das PME?
2. Em qual dos sub-eixos do eixo 2 (Crescimento Sustentável) serão cabimentados os 2 800 milhões de euros referentes à reserva agrícola?

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002788/13
à Comissão

Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(8 de março de 2013)

Assunto: Orçamento Europeu — Horizonte 2020

Tendo em conta que:

- A 8 e 9 de fevereiro realizou-se o Conselho Europeu, tendo sido aprovada uma nova proposta apresentada por Herman Van Rompuy, Presidente do Conselho, intitulada «Projeto de Conclusões».
- Considera-se que existe uma forte redução de orçamento das políticas de investigação e inovação (Horizonte 2020), educação, formação, juventude e desporto (Erasmus para Todos) e redes europeias de transportes, energia e telecomunicações (Mecanismo Interligar a Europa).
- A Política de Investigação e Inovação da UE (Horizonte 2020) é reduzida de 80 mil milhões de euros para 70 mil milhões de euros, uma redução de 12,5 %;
- Ao inverso, os Estados Unidos da América e países em desenvolvimento, nomeadamente os BRIC, continuam a investir elevados montantes nas áreas da investigação, desenvolvimento e inovação, entendendo que só assim se podem tornar mais competitivos à escala global;
- São aprofundadas as sinergias a criar entre o Horizonte 2020 e os fundos estruturais, por forma às regiões com menor desempenho e menos desenvolvidas criarem polos de excelência.

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Quais as áreas da Política de Investigação e Inovação do Horizonte 2020 que serão mais afetadas com a redução orçamental definida pelo Conselho Europeu?
2. Considera que o orçamento acordado para esta área é suficiente para fazer face aos grandes desafios que a Europa tem pela frente à escala global?
3. Quais as prioridades estratégicas e políticas para os próximos anos, tendo em vista que sem um orçamento adequado é difícil apoiar de forma enfática as PME, Universidades, Centros Tecnológicos, Parques Industriais ou Investigadores?

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002789/13
à Comissão

Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(8 de março de 2013)

Assunto: Orçamento Europeu — Negociações com o Parlamento Europeu

Tendo em conta que:

- A 8 e 9 de fevereiro realizou-se o Conselho Europeu, tendo sido aprovada uma nova proposta apresentada por Herman Van Rompuy, Presidente do Conselho, intitulada «Projeto de Conclusões».
- Para ter uma real impressão da redução do orçamento europeu acordada pelos Estados-Membros na reunião do Conselho de 8 e 9 de fevereiro, é necessário somar a redução verificada nas rubricas que se encontram dentro do QFP (73 248 milhões de euros) com as que se encontram fora do QFP (21 523 milhões de euros), perfazendo assim uma redução global de aproximadamente 95 mil milhões de euros, cerca de 8,5 % a menos do que inicialmente proposto pela Comissão Europeia;
- No sentido de se chegar a um acordo entre as instituições europeias e não atrasar a entrada em execução do orçamento, assim como os diversos regulamentos e políticas que ainda deverão ser redigidos, entende-se que deverá existir um processo negocial que conduza à aprovação de um orçamento europeu para o período 2014-2020;
- No entanto, entende-se que é necessário implementar algumas medidas que melhorem o orçamento europeu e que não prejudiquem as pessoas e as empresas;

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Está disponível para apoiar o Parlamento Europeu a implementar uma maior flexibilidade entre todos os capítulos do orçamento e anualmente, por forma a que possa existir uma real transferência de verbas entre políticas europeias e assim uma execução total dos pagamentos?
2. Está disponível para apoiar o Parlamento Europeu ao nível da revisão do orçamento europeu no final de 2016, por forma a que não exista um orçamento de austeridade durante 7 anos?
3. Está disponível para apoiar o Parlamento Europeu com vista a aumentar os recursos próprios do orçamento europeu, diminuindo assim as transferências dos Estados-Membros, podendo estes investir o mesmo montante em outras políticas nacionais que criem emprego e riqueza?
4. Está disponível para apoiar o Parlamento Europeu no intuito de reforçar os poderes do Parlamento na adoção do próximo QFP 2021-2027, nomeadamente ao nível do processo legislativo.

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002790/13

à Comissão

Nuno Teixeira (PPE)

(8 de março de 2013)

Assunto: Orçamento Europeu — Orçamento atribuído a cada Estado-Membro

Tendo em conta que:

- A 8 e 9 de fevereiro realizou-se o Conselho Europeu, tendo sido aprovada uma nova proposta apresentada por Herman Van Rompuy, Presidente do Conselho, intitulada «Projeto de Conclusões».
- Para ter uma real impressão da redução do orçamento europeu acordada pelos Estados-Membros na reunião do Conselho de 8 e 9 de fevereiro, é necessário somar a redução verificada nas rubricas que se encontram dentro do QFP (73 248 milhões de euros) com as que se encontram fora do QFP (21 523 milhões de euros), perfazendo assim uma redução global de aproximadamente 95 mil milhões de euros, cerca de 8,5 % a menos do que inicialmente proposto pela Comissão Europeia.
- Analisando o quadro global de fundos que Portugal deverá receber, é possível constatar que o país sai beneficiado das negociações do Conselho Europeu de 8 e 9 de fevereiro último, devido ao facto das duas Políticas Europeias (Política de Coesão e Política Agrícola Comum) terem sofrido uma redução orçamental de 10,05 % e Portugal apenas perder cerca de 9,5 % da globalidade das verbas europeias.
- Tendo em linha de conta a informação disponibilizada pela comunicação social, a globalidade dos Estados-Membros perde 13,1 % entre ambos os quadros financeiros, um valor superior em 3,6 pontos percentuais face ao que Portugal irá perder.

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Qual o orçamento atribuído a cada Estado-Membro nas áreas da Política Agrícola Comum e da Política de Coesão no período 2007-2013?
2. Quanto é que cada Estado-Membro irá receber nas áreas da Política Agrícola Comum e da Política de Coesão no período 2014-2020?

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002791/13

à Comissão

Nuno Teixeira (PPE)

(8 de março de 2013)

Assunto: Orçamento Europeu — Preconizar o crescimento

Tendo em conta que:

- A 8 e 9 de fevereiro realizou-se o Conselho Europeu, tendo sido aprovada uma nova proposta apresentada por Herman Van Rompuy, Presidente do Conselho, intitulada «Projeto de Conclusões».

- A UE não pode ter um orçamento de austeridade devido ao facto de ser o único motor de crescimento e criação de emprego que irá existir na UE;
- Os orçamentos de austeridade impostos aos Estados-Membros pela Troika, onde se inclui a Comissão Europeia e o Banco Central Europeu, são apenas para os próximos 3 anos e não para 7 anos como é a duração do orçamento da UE;
- A UE não pode ter um orçamento restritivo para um período de 7 anos, dado que será impossível cumprir com os objetivos e metas delineados na Estratégia «Europa 2020»;
- No final das medidas de austeridade que os Estados-Membros estão a implementar, é necessário investir para criar crescimento e emprego e nada melhor do que o orçamento europeu para contribuir para a geração de riqueza;
- Cerca de 94 % do orçamento europeu é destinado a projetos de investimento e criação de emprego e apenas 6 % são para financiar a máquina burocrática da UE;
- A contribuição dos Estados-Membros para o orçamento europeu acaba por lhes ser devolvida sob a forma de novos projetos de investimento que irão criar emprego e riqueza nas regiões europeias;

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Considera viável que a Comissão tenha um orçamento de austeridade durante um período tão longo e com objetivos definidos para a próxima década?
2. Como pretende alavancar o crescimento económico que tem vindo a preconizar nas várias intervenções públicas dos Comissários Europeus por essa Europa fora?

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002792/13
à Comissão
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(8 de março de 2013)

Assunto: Orçamento Europeu — Redução orçamental do Mecanismo Interligar a Europa

Tendo em conta que:

- A 8 e 9 de fevereiro realizou-se o Conselho Europeu, tendo sido aprovada uma nova proposta apresentada por Herman Van Rompuy, Presidente do Conselho, intitulada «Projeto de Conclusões».
- Considera-se que existe uma forte redução de orçamento das políticas de investigação e inovação (Horizonte 2020), educação, formação, juventude e desporto (Erasmus para Todos) e redes europeias de transportes, energia e telecomunicações (Mecanismo Interligar a Europa).
- CEF: Orçamento global reduz de 50 mil milhões para 29,3 mil milhões de euros — a transferência do Fundo de Coesão é mantida em 10 mil milhões de euros;
- Transportes: reduz de 31,7 mil milhões de euros para 23,2 mil milhões de euros (já inclui transferência do Fundo de Coesão no valor de 10 mil milhões de euros);
- TIC: reduz de 9,2 mil milhões para mil milhões de euros;
- Energia: reduz de 9,1 mil milhões para 5,1 mil milhões de euros;
- A transferência do montante do Fundo de Coesão para o CEF já está definida. Cada Estado-Membro tem direito a receber, na exata proporção em que contribuiu para o Fundo de Coesão, verbas para investir nos 3 setores estratégicos. Os fundos não utilizados até 31 de dezembro de 2016 poderão ser reafetados a novos projetos mediante novos convites à apresentação de propostas de carácter concorrencial.

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Considera os montantes acordados suficientes para implementar as redes europeias ambicionadas, sobretudo nas áreas dos Transportes, TIC e Energia?

2. Com apenas mil milhões de euros, não considera que estão em causa todos os projetos de banda larga e tecnologia digital que a Comissão ambicionava desenvolver e que foram apresentados na iniciativa emblemática da Estratégia Europa 2020 «Agenda Digital»?
3. Com uma redução de aproximadamente 50 % considera possível continuar a desenvolver um mercado único de energia que contribua para diminuir os custos energéticos das empresas europeias?

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002793/13

à Comissão

Nuno Teixeira (PPE)

(8 de março de 2013)

Assunto: Orçamento Europeu — Redução orçamental políticas transeuropeias

Tendo em conta que:

- A 8 e 9 de fevereiro realizou-se o Conselho Europeu, tendo sido aprovada uma nova proposta apresentada por Herman Van Rompuy, Presidente do Conselho, intitulada «Projeto de Conclusões».
- Ao nível das rubricas orçamentais que se encontram dentro do QFP, verifica-se uma drástica redução do orçamento destinado a promover um crescimento europeu que seja inteligente e inclusivo (-44 milhões de euros), com especial destaque para a diminuição de verbas nas políticas e programas que visam impulsionar a competitividade europeia, onde se constata uma redução de aproximadamente 30 milhões de euros, cerca de -20 % face à proposta inicial da Comissão Europeia.
- Neste caso, considera-se que existe uma forte redução de orçamento das políticas de investigação e inovação (Horizonte 2020), educação, formação, juventude e desporto (Erasmus para Todos) e redes europeias de transportes, energia e telecomunicações (Mecanismo Interligar a Europa).
- Importa ainda destacar que a redução orçamental também afeta as áreas da Segurança e Cidadania e da Europa Global, verificando-se assim um equilíbrio nos cortes das políticas internas com outras políticas externas da UE.
- Por fim, ressalva-se que as duas maiores políticas europeias, nomeadamente a Política Agrícola Comum e a Política de Coesão sofreram ligeiras reduções, mas que no contexto global acabaram por reforçar a sua posição no orçamento europeu.

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Quais os motivos que levaram os Estados-Membros a diminuir de forma mais drástica as verbas orçamentais que são geridas pela Comissão Europeia em detrimento das que são geridas pelos 27 países europeus?
2. Entende que a redução orçamental das políticas transeuropeias afetará a boa execução das mesmas?

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002794/13

à Comissão

Nuno Teixeira (PPE)

(8 de março de 2013)

Assunto: Orçamento Europeu — Regiões Ultraperiféricas

Tendo em conta que:

- A 8 e 9 de fevereiro realizou-se o Conselho Europeu, tendo sido aprovada uma nova proposta apresentada por Herman Van Rompuy, Presidente do Conselho, intitulada «Projeto de Conclusões»;
- Segundo a nova proposta do Conselho, as críticas de que as Regiões mais desenvolvidas tinham tido um corte inferior ao das Regiões Ultraperiféricas acabaram por ser atendidas pelos restantes Estados-Membros;
- Neste sentido, as Regiões Ultraperiféricas e as Regiões escassamente povoadas têm assim um financiamento de 30 euros / por habitante, subindo para 1,4 mil milhões de euros em detrimento dos 926 milhões de euros apresentados inicialmente pela Comissão Europeia;
- Comparando com o anterior período de programação em que receberam um apoio de 1,738 mil milhões de euros, verifica-se uma redução de 351 milhões de euros, equivalente a 20,2 % (antes o corte chegava aos 47 %);

- Chama-se ainda à atenção para o facto do «Projeto de Conclusões» apresentado pelo Conselho referir explicitamente que será ainda necessário ter em atenção a situação especial das regiões insulares, sem no entanto definir financiamento nem qualquer outro critério de apoio;
- Importa salvaguardar o facto das Regiões Ultraperiféricas também serem consideradas regiões insulares.

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Na União Europeia, quantas regiões insulares existem e quais são?
2. Sabendo que o financiamento às RUP e Regiões escassamente povoadas é de 30 euros / habitante e estando definido o orçamento global desta rubrica, como é que a Comissão Europeia irá ter «em atenção a situação especial das regiões insulares»?

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002795/13
à Comissão
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(8 de março de 2013)

Assunto: Orçamento Europeu — Tratado de Lisboa

Tendo em conta que:

- A 8 e 9 de fevereiro realizou-se o Conselho Europeu, tendo sido aprovada uma nova proposta apresentada por Herman Van Rompuy, Presidente do Conselho, intitulada «Projeto de Conclusões».
- O orçamento europeu é de apenas 1 % do PIB da globalidade dos Estados-Membros, ao contrário do verificado nos EUA em que o orçamento, em 2012, representou 22,8 % do PIB nacional (na média, entre 1971 e 2008 o orçamento dos EUA foi de 20,6 % da riqueza nacional);
- O orçamento da UE é 33 vezes mais pequeno que o dos EUA e 44 vezes mais pequeno que a soma da globalidade dos orçamentos dos 27 Estados-Membros;
- Este orçamento demonstra uma falta de ambição europeia para competir à escala global;
- O Conselho aprovou um orçamento em que existe um gap entre dotações de compromisso e dotações de pagamento na ordem dos 40 mil milhões de euros, quando o Tratado de Lisboa proíbe linearmente a existência de défices europeus;
- Em 2012, já existiu um problema de pagamentos de compromissos assumidos e autorizados pelos Estados-Membros, tendo sido adotado um orçamento anual revisto;
- Os compromissos são para um período de 10 anos, enquanto os pagamentos são apenas para um período de 7 anos, de que resulta a diferença orçamental de 40 mil milhões de euros;
- Os 22 mil milhões de euros da reserva de eficiência da Política de Coesão apenas irão ser pagos em 2020, 2021 e 2022, pelo que já irão transitar para o próximo QFP, diminuindo assim o suposto défice que dizem existir;

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Qual a análise que faz deste crescente fosso orçamental entre dotações de autorização e dotações de pagamento?
2. Considera que este diferencial coloca em causa o estipulado no Tratado de Lisboa, nomeadamente o facto do orçamento europeu não poder ter um défice orçamental?
3. Quando é que acredita que a União Europeia poderá ter realmente um orçamento adequado para fazer face às suas necessidades de crescimento?

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002796/13
à Comissão
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(8 de março de 2013)

Assunto: Orçamento Europeu — Estratégia «Europa 2020»

Tendo em conta que:

- A 8 e 9 de fevereiro realizou-se o Conselho Europeu, tendo sido aprovada uma nova proposta apresentada por Herman Van Rompuy, Presidente do Conselho, intitulada «Projeto de Conclusões».
- Para ter uma real impressão da redução do orçamento europeu acordada pelos Estados-Membros na reunião do Conselho de 8 e 9 de fevereiro, é necessário somar a redução verificada nas rubricas que se encontram dentro do QFP (73 248 milhões de euros) com as que se encontram fora do QFP (21 523 milhões de euros), perfazendo assim uma redução global de aproximadamente 95 mil milhões de euros, cerca de 8,5 % a menos do que inicialmente proposto pela Comissão Europeia.
- O Conselho salienta ainda que: «Só haverá uma retoma do crescimento sustentável e do emprego se for seguida uma abordagem coerente e assente numa base alargada, conjugando uma consolidação orçamental inteligente que preserve o investimento no crescimento futuro com políticas macroeconómicas sólidas e uma estratégia ativa em prol do emprego que preserve a coesão social».
- A Comissão Europeia definiu a sua estratégia «Europa 2020», tendo sido elencadas 7 iniciativas emblemáticas e vários objetivos para serem concretizados na presente década;
- A UE não pode ter um orçamento restritivo para um período de 7 anos, dado que será impossível cumprir com os objetivos e metas delineados na Estratégia «Europa 2020»;

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Considera que o orçamento aprovado pelo Conselho Europeu coloca em causa os objetivos e metas da Estratégia «Europa 2020»?
2. Com menos 95 mil milhões de euros, ou seja, menos 8,5 % do orçamento europeu que o apresentado pela Comissão Europeia, quais serão as iniciativas emblemáticas que mais serão afetadas com esta redução orçamental?
3. Como explica à população em geral que a União Europeia vai ter um orçamento restritivo para os próximos 7 anos mas que, em contrapartida, estabeleceu metas ambiciosas para crescer e se desenvolver?

Resposta conjunta dada por Janusz Lewandowski em nome da Comissão
(24 de abril de 2013)

A Comissão entende que as conclusões do Conselho Europeu sobre o Quadro Financeiro Plurianual (QFP) constituem a base da posição do Conselho nas próximas negociações com o Parlamento Europeu (PE), que deverá dar a sua aprovação relativamente ao Regulamento QFP. O PE, na resolução de 13 de março de 2013, definiu a sua posição sobre as referidas conclusões e conferiu um mandato claro à sua equipa de negociação para que conduza as negociações sobre um pacote global. Por conseguinte, a Comissão convida o Senhor Deputado a apresentar diretamente ao Conselho Europeu todas as questões relativas a dados pormenorizados sobre as conclusões do Conselho Europeu e ao motivo pelo qual os Chefes de Estado e de Governo assumiram determinadas posições.

A Comissão teria preferido que do Conselho Europeu tivessem resultado reduções menos significativas em termos de pagamentos e de autorizações em comparação com as suas propostas. Os níveis aprovados pelos Chefes de Estado e de Governo estão aquém do nível de ambição que a Comissão considera desejável face ao desafio de promover o crescimento e o emprego na UE nos próximos anos. Simultaneamente, a Comissão considera que ainda podem ser aprovadas melhorias significativas nas negociações entre o PE e o Conselho. Sem antecipar de forma alguma o alcance e o teor dessas negociações, é evidente que uma maior flexibilidade deveria ser uma componente fundamental do acordo relativo ao QFP.

A Comissão está empenhada em envidar todos os esforços ao seu alcance para facilitar um acordo entre o PE e o Conselho o mais rapidamente possível no intuito de garantir o início atempado da próxima geração de programas plurianuais.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002775/13
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(8 March 2013)

Subject: EU budget — Capping

— The European Council of 8 and 9 February adopted a new proposal entitled ‘Conclusions’ tabled by President Van Rompuy.

— The Cohesion Policy allocation for the period 2007-2013 was EUR 347.9 billion, which is an overall reduction of EUR 22.7 billion, or 6.53%.

— Compared with the Commission’s proposal, this was a reduction of EUR 14.1 billion, which is approximately 4.15%. Cuts of EUR 14.1 billion to the Cohesion Policy’s overall budget were accepted by the Member States, as they approved special allocation provisions for funds worth EUR 9.9 billion.

— The cap on Cohesion Policy funding for each Member State has been reduced from 2.5% to 2.35% of GDP. For Member States that joined before 2013 and whose average GDP per capita between 2008 and 2010 was less than 1%, the maximum amount of funds transferred should increase by 10% to 2.59%.

1. What percentage of EU funds, in relation to GDP, did Portugal receive in 2007-2013?
2. According to the Commission’s forecasts, will Portugal be affected by this funding cap?
3. What was Portugal’s GDP per capita between 2008 and 2010?

Question for written answer E-002776/13
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(8 March 2013)

Subject: EU budget — Clarification of funds allocated to Portugal

— The European Council of 8 and 9 February adopted a new proposal entitled ‘Conclusions’ tabled by President Van Rompuy.

— To gain a real sense of the EU budget cut agreed by the Member States at the Council meeting of 8 and 9 February, we must add together cuts to budget lines financed under the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) (EUR 73.248 billion) and outside the MFF (EUR 21.523 billion), totalling some EUR 95 billion, around 8.5% less than the amount originally proposed by the Commission.

— Analysis of the funds allocated to Portugal shows that the country has done well out of the Council’s negotiations, as two EU policy areas (Cohesion Policy and the common agricultural policy) have suffered budget cuts of 10.05%, while Portugal has only lost around 9.5% of its total EU funding.

— Portugal is therefore set to receive EUR 27.7 billion, EUR 19.6 billion of which will be allocated under the Cohesion Policy and EUR 8.1 billion under the common agricultural policy: EUR 4.5 billion under Pillar I (direct aid to farmers) and EUR 3.6 billion under Pillar II (rural development).

— The country has also benefited from negotiations on two specific financial support envelopes, receiving EUR 1 billion under the Cohesion Policy and a further EUR 500 million for rural development; the latter requires no co-financing until 2016, and thereby constitutes direct support to the Member State.

1. Can the Commission confirm that Portugal will receive EUR 27.7 billion?
2. How will the EUR 27.7 billion be distributed among the various EU support funds (for example, the ERDF, ESF, Cohesion Fund and European Grouping for Territorial Cooperation)?

Question for written answer E-002777/13
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(8 March 2013)

Subject: EU budget — Clarification of Cohesion Policy funds

— The European Council of 8 and 9 February adopted a new proposal entitled 'Conclusions' tabled by President Van Rompuy.

— To gain a real sense of the EU budget cut agreed by the Member States at the Council meeting of 8 and 9 February, we must add together cuts to budget lines financed under the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) (EUR 73.248 billion) and outside the MFF (EUR 21.523 billion), totalling some EUR 95 billion, around 8.5% less than the amount originally proposed by the Commission.

— Analysis of the funds allocated to Portugal shows that the country has done well out of the Council's negotiations, as two EU policy areas (Cohesion Policy and the common agricultural policy) have suffered budget cuts of 10.05%, while Portugal has only lost around 9.5% its total EU funding.

— Portugal is therefore set to receive EUR 27.7 billion, EUR 19.6 billion of which will be allocated under the Cohesion Policy and EUR 8.1 billion under the common agricultural policy: EUR 4.5 billion under Pillar I (direct aid to farmers) and EUR 3.6 billion under Pillar II (rural development).

— The country has also benefited from negotiations on two specific financial support envelopes, receiving EUR 1 billion under the Cohesion Policy and a further EUR 500 million for rural development; the latter requires no co-financing until 2016, and thereby constitutes direct support to the Member State.

1. How will the EUR 19.6 billion be distributed among funding allocated to the Member State and that allocated to the Portuguese regions?
2. How much will be allocated to each of the Portuguese regions: the North, the Centre, Lisbon and the Tagus Valley, the Alentejo, the Algarve, the Azores and Madeira?

Question for written answer E-002778/13
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(8 March 2013)

Subject: EU budget — Review clause

— The European Council of 8 and 9 February adopted a new proposal entitled 'Conclusions' tabled by President Van Rompuy.

— The Cohesion Policy allocation for the period 2007-2013 was EUR 347.9 billion, which is an overall reduction of EUR 22.7 billion, or 6.53%.

— Compared with the Commission's proposal, this was a reduction of EUR 14.1 billion, which is approximately 4.15%. Cuts of EUR 14.1 billion to the Cohesion Policy's overall budget were accepted by the Member States, as they approved special allocation provisions for funds worth EUR 9.9 billion.

— In 2016 Cohesion Policy allocations will be revised for the period 2017-2020 using the cumulated regional GDP observed for the years 2014-2015 and the cumulated national GDP for 2012. Adjustments to these allocations will only be made if there is a cumulative divergence of more than +/-5%. The total net effect of these adjustments may not exceed EUR 4 billion.

1. Does the Commission not think that the 2016 review clause may affect investments that have already been planned and scheduled within the European regions and the Member States?
2. If a region loses its Cohesion Policy allocations, but has already scheduled medium- to long-term projects, how will it then finance these?
3. Is it aware of the implications of the review clause, particularly regarding the withdrawal of key EU strategic investments?

**Question for written answer E-002779/13
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(8 March 2013)**

Subject: EU budget — Stimulating economic growth and job creation

— The European Council of 8 and 9 February adopted a new proposal entitled ‘Conclusions’ tabled by President Van Rompuy.

— This document supports what was set out at the previous meeting of 22 and 23 November: that the EU budget ‘must be a catalyst for growth and jobs across Europe, notably by leveraging productive and human capital investments. Within the future Multiannual Financial Framework [2014-2020] spending should be mobilised to support growth, employment, competitiveness and convergence, in line with the Europe 2020 strategy.’

— The Council also maintains that: ‘Sustainable growth and employment will only resume if a consistent and broad-based approach is pursued, combining smart fiscal consolidation that preserves investment in future growth, sound macroeconomic policies and an active employment strategy that preserves social cohesion.’

1. In the light of the budget set at the last European Council, does the Commission believe that Member States are focused on increasing economic growth and job creation?
2. Which European policies does it believe are essential to achieving this strategy?

**Question for written answer E-002780/13
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(8 March 2013)**

Subject: EU budget — European Territorial Cooperation

— The European Council of 8 and 9 February adopted a new proposal entitled ‘Conclusions’ tabled by President Van Rompuy.

— The Cohesion Policy allocation for the period 2007-2013 was EUR 347.9 billion, which is an overall reduction of EUR 22.7 billion, or 6.53%.

— Compared with the Commission’s proposal, this was a reduction of EUR 14.1 billion, which is approximately 4.15%.

— The Cohesion Policy budget for 2014-2020 is EUR 325.2 billion, EUR 8.9 billion of which is earmarked for European Territorial Cooperation. This is a reduction of 24.7% compared with the Commission’s initial proposal.

— Just as with other European projects, particularly those concerning research and innovation and the Connecting Europe Facility, the creation of territorial networks has also been severely affected.

1. What are the underlying reasons for the drastic 25% reduction in allocations for European Territorial Cooperation projects?
2. Does the Commission believe that the new budget allocation will jeopardise the Commission’s objective to stimulate further cooperation between European regions and countries?

**Question for written answer E-002781/13
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(8 March 2013)**

Subject: EU budget — Youth Employment 1

The European Council of 8 and 9 February adopted a new proposal entitled ‘Conclusions’ tabled by President Van Rompuy.

With the aim of tackling the serious social challenges suffered by the youngest members of society due to high youth unemployment levels, President Van Rompuy proposed the creation of a Youth Employment Initiative with the following features:

— A budget of EUR 6 billion, funded as follows:

EUR 3 billion will no longer be allocated to the Member States but instead will be pre-allocated to the European Social Fund that each Member State would already receive. Throughout the EU, this sum is calculated according to the total level of unemployment in each European region.

EUR 3 billion will be assigned to a new budget heading under sub-heading 1b on Cohesion Policy. This sum will be allocated to the Member States and added to the sum from the European Social Fund.

— The budget is aimed at supporting the following European youth schemes: the Youth Guarantee scheme; the Youth in Action Programme; the European Alliance for Apprenticeships; the EURES network.

1. Will the amount allocated to each Member State for youth employment under the European Social Fund be similar to that allocated by the Commission under this new budget heading?
2. Will these funds be allocated to and managed by the Member States, or will they remain part of the EU budget and be managed by the Commission?
3. If they are to be managed by the Member States, how will the Commission ensure that they are used to fund the proposed schemes?

Question for written answer E-002782/13
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(8 March 2013)

Subject: EU budget — Youth Employment 2

The European Council of 8 and 9 February adopted a new proposal entitled 'Conclusions' tabled by President Van Rompuy.

With the aim of tackling the serious social challenges suffered by the youngest members of society due to high youth unemployment levels, President Van Rompuy proposed the creation of a Youth Employment Initiative with the following features:

A budget of EUR 6 billion, funded as follows:

- EUR 3 billion will no longer be allocated to the Member States but instead will be pre-allocated to the European Social Fund that each Member State would already receive. Throughout the EU, this sum is calculated according to the total level of unemployment in each European region.
 - EUR 3 billion will be assigned to a new budget heading under sub-heading 1b on Cohesion Policy. This sum will be allocated to the Member States and added to the sum from the European Social Fund.
 - The European (NUTS 2) Regions with youth unemployment levels over 25% will be eligible. The eligible regions and levels of youth unemployment will be based on Eurostat statistics from the end of 2012, which will be published shortly.
1. Is the Commission aware of the number of European regions which have over 25% youth unemployment? How many are there, and in which countries are they?
 2. How will the EUR 6 billion be shared between the European regions which have over 25% youth unemployment?
 3. Will the Commission set a ratio that takes account of regions with lower youth unemployment rates, such as those in Spain and Greece, or will it only take account of the affected regions as a whole?

Question for written answer E-002783/13
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(8 March 2013)

Subject: EU budget — Financial envelopes

— The European Council of 8 and 9 February adopted a new proposal entitled 'Conclusions' tabled by President Van Rompuy.

— The Cohesion Policy allocation for the period 2007-2013 was EUR 347.9 billion, which is an overall reduction of EUR 22.7 billion, or 6.53%.

— Compared with the Commission's proposal, this was a reduction of EUR 14.1 billion, which is approximately 4.15%. Cuts of EUR 14.1 billion to the Cohesion Policy's overall budget were accepted by the Member States, as they approved special allocation provisions for funds worth EUR 9.9 billion, to be divided as follows: Spain: EUR 1.824 billion, Hungary: EUR 1.56 billion, Greece: EUR 1.375 billion, Italy: EUR 1.5 billion, Portugal: EUR 1 billion, Czech Republic: EUR 900 million, Germany: EUR 710 million, France: EUR 200 million, Malta: EUR 200 million, Cyprus: EUR 150 million, Belgium: EUR 133 million, Ireland: EUR 100 million, Slovenia: EUR 75 million, Ceuta and Melilla: EUR 50 million, PEACE Programme: EUR 150 million

1. Does the Commission believe that the direct allocation of financial envelopes to the Member States at the expense of policies that benefit less developed regions will jeopardise the Cohesion Policy's objectives?
2. What were the criteria that led to some Member States receiving more substantial financial envelopes than their European neighbours?
3. What is the strategic goal of these additional specific financial envelopes, particularly in the context of achieving ERDF, ESF and Cohesion Fund objectives?

Question for written answer E-002784/13
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(8 March 2013)

Subject: EU budget — Balance in the budget cut

— The European Council of 8 and 9 February adopted a new proposal entitled 'Conclusions' tabled by President Herman Van Rompuy.

— With regard to budget headings within the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), there has been a drastic cut to the budget for promoting smart and inclusive growth in the EU (EUR 44 million); in particular, the amount set aside for policies and programmes that aim to foster European competitiveness has been reduced by some EUR 30 million, which is around 20% less than the Commission's initial proposal.

— As well as cuts of EUR 73.248 billion to budget lines financed under the MFF, various policies — including ITER, GMES and the Reserve for crises in the agricultural sector — previously outside the MFF, have been transferred into the framework, leading to EUR 9.293 billion in cuts. Remaining projects under these chapters (for example: sub-heading 1a — Competitiveness for growth and jobs and heading 2 — Sustainable growth) will see further budget cuts, since they are now covered by the MFF.

— To gain a real sense of the EU budget cut agreed by the Member States at the Council meeting of 8 and 9 February, we must add together cuts to budget lines financed under the MFF (EUR 73.248 billion) and outside the MFF (EUR 21.523 billion), totalling some EUR 95 billion, around 8.5% less than the amount originally proposed by the Commission.

1. Does the Commission believe that a balance has been struck between cuts made to budget lines both within and outside the MFF?
2. Why have three EU policies — ITER, GMES and the Reserve for crises in the agricultural sector — been transferred into the MFF when others have not?

Question for written answer E-002785/13
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(8 March 2013)

Subject: EU budget — European Globalisation Adjustment Fund

— The European Council of 8 and 9 February adopted a new proposal entitled ‘Conclusions’ tabled by President Herman Van Rompuy.

— With regard to budget headings outside the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), three EU policies — ITER, GMES, and the Reserve for crises in the agricultural sector — were transferred into the MFF, with these losses already accounted for in the MFF values.

— At a time when many European companies are internally relocating their industrial activity or are transferring their production processes to countries with lower labour costs outside the EU, it is important that the EU support all workers who have been laid off as a result of globalisation.

— The European Globalisation Adjustment Fund, which will also begin to support agricultural as well as industrial activities, has seen its budget drastically cut by 65%, from an initial EUR 3 billion to EUR 1.848 billion. This makes it difficult for workers, who could be trained to suit the changing needs of the labour market, to access EU funds.

1. Does the Commission believe that the new budget will be enough to support the workers of hundreds of companies that have relocated their industrial activity?
2. As the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund's budget is drastically lower than the Commission's initial proposal, will it reconsider farmers' eligibility under this EU policy?
3. How can we help the numerous workers, laid off due to globalisation, re-enter the labour market, when the corresponding budget for the next seven years is so small?

Question for written answer E-002786/13
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(8 March 2013)

Subject: EU budget — European Territorial Cooperation: 150 km

— The European Council of 8 and 9 February adopted a new proposal entitled ‘Conclusions’ tabled by President Van Rompuy.

— The Cohesion Policy allocation for the period 2007-2013 was EUR 347.9 billion, which is an overall reduction of EUR 22.7 billion, or 6.53%. Compared with the Commission's proposal, this was a reduction of EUR 14.1 billion, which is approximately 4.15%.

— The Cohesion Policy budget for 2014-2020 is EUR 325.2 billion, EUR 8.9 billion of which is earmarked for European Territorial Cooperation. This is a reduction of 24.7% compared with the Commission's initial proposal.

— The supported regions will be NUTS 3 regions located along all internal and external land borders as well as NUTS 3 regions located along maritime borders, separated by a maximum distance of 150 kilometres, notwithstanding any possible adjustments required to ensure the coherence and continuity of the areas covered by the cooperation programmes for the 2007-2013 programming period. This fact is stated in the notes of the conclusions but did not appear in previous versions distributed to the Member States and to institutions.

— In January of this year, together with fellow MEPS from the outermost regions, I addressed a letter to the President of the Council to alert him to this territorial injustice.

1. Does the Commission know why the Council did not consider the specific characteristics of the outermost regions in the European Territorial Cooperation programme?
2. What actions will it take to ensure that these European regions receive a more just allocation of resources in relation to European countries such as Andorra, Switzerland and Norway that will receive funding despite not belonging to the EU?

Question for written answer E-002787/13
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(8 March 2013)

Subject: EU budget — Common Agricultural Policy

— The European Council of 8 and 9 February adopted a new proposal entitled 'Conclusions' tabled by President Van Rompuy.

— With regard to budget headings within the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), there has been a drastic cut to the budget for promoting smart and inclusive growth in the EU (EUR 44 million); in particular, the amount set aside for policies and programmes that aim to foster European competitiveness has been reduced by some EUR 30 million, which is around 20% less than the Commission's initial proposal.

— The budget for Axis 2, known as Sustainable Growth, has been cut by EUR 13.293 billion, which is a reduction of 3.44% compared with the Commission's initial proposal.

— This Axis includes funding of EUR 2.8 billion (the Reserve for crises in the agricultural sector) which was previously not included within the MFF.

— However, it is not clear to which sub-axis of Axis 2 this additional funding will be assigned; consequently, the real budget cut for all relevant sub-axes cannot be discerned.

1. Does the Commission believe that the new budgetary figures for the common agricultural policy are appropriate? How is it possible to justify its continuing status as a main European policy at the expense of increasing commitment to research and innovation or to the competitiveness of small and medium-sized enterprises?

2. To which of the sub-axes of Axis 2 (sustainable growth) will the EUR 2.8 billion intended for the agricultural reserve be assigned?

Question for written answer E-002788/13
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(8 March 2013)

Subject: EU budget — Horizon 2020

— The European Council of 8 and 9 February adopted a new proposal entitled 'Conclusions' tabled by President Van Rompuy.

— There have been major budget cuts to policies for research and innovation (Horizon 2020), education, training, youth and sport (Erasmus for All), and European transport, energy and telecommunications networks (Connecting Europe Facility).

— The EU's Research and Innovation Policy (Horizon 2020) budget has been cut from EUR 80 billion to EUR 70 billion, a reduction of 12.5%.

— By contrast, the United States and developing countries, specifically the BRIC nations, continue to invest significant sums in research, development and innovation on the understanding that only by doing so can they become more competitive on a global scale.

— Deeper synergies between Horizon 2020 and the Structural Funds will allow poorer performing and less-developed regions to create centres of excellence.

1. Which areas of the Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Policy will be most affected by the budget cuts outlined by the Council?

2. Does the Commission believe that the budget agreed in this area is sufficient to meet the great challenges facing Europe on a global scale?

3. What are the strategic and political priorities for the next few years, bearing in mind that without an adequate budget it is difficult to provide solid support to SMEs, universities, technology centres, industrial parks and researchers?

Question for written answer E-002789/13
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(8 March 2013)

Subject: EU budget — Negotiations with the European Parliament

— The European Council of 8 and 9 February adopted a new proposal entitled ‘Conclusions’ tabled by President Van Rompuy.

— To gain a real sense of the EU budget cut agreed by the Member States at the Council meeting of 8 and 9 February, we must add together cuts to budget lines financed under the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) (EUR 73.248 billion) and outside the MFF (EUR 21.523 billion), totalling some EUR 95 billion, around 8.5% less than the amount originally proposed by the Commission.

— To enable the European institutions to reach an agreement and to prevent any delay in the implementation of the budget and the various regulations and policies that must be drawn up, it is clear that negotiations must take place that lead to the approval of an EU budget for the period 2014-2020.

— However, some measures must be introduced to improve the EU budget without being detrimental to either citizens or companies.

1. Is the Commission prepared to support Parliament in introducing greater flexibility between all of the budget chapters each year in order to create a real carry-over of appropriations between European policies, thereby ensuring that payments are fully implemented?
2. Is it prepared to support Parliament in reviewing the EU budget at the end of 2016 to prevent the possibility of an austerity budget lasting seven years?
3. Is it prepared to support Parliament in increasing the resources of the EU budget, thereby decreasing transfers from Member States, which can invest the same sum in other national policies creating jobs and wealth?
4. Is it prepared to support Parliament in strengthening its powers related to the passing of the next MFF (2021-2027), specifically in terms of the legislative procedure?

Question for written answer E-002790/13
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(8 March 2013)

Subject: EU budget — Budget allocation for each Member State

— The European Council of 8 and 9 February adopted a new proposal entitled ‘Conclusions’ tabled by President Van Rompuy.

— To gain a real sense of the EU budget cut agreed by the Member States at the Council meeting of 8 and 9 February, we must add together cuts to budget lines financed under the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) (EUR 73.248 billion) and outside the MFF (EUR 21.523 billion), totalling some EUR 95 billion, around 8.5% less than the amount originally proposed by the Commission.

— Analysis of the funds allocated to Portugal shows that the country has done well out of the Council’s negotiations, as two EU policy areas (Cohesion Policy and the common agricultural policy) have suffered budget cuts of 10.05%, while Portugal has only lost around 9.5% of its total EU funding.

— Media reports suggest that the Member States as a whole will lose 13.1% compared with the last MFF, which is over 3.6 percentage points more than Portugal will lose.

1. What was the budget allocation for each Member State under the common agricultural policy and the Cohesion Policy for the period 2007-2013?
2. How much will each Member State receive under the common agricultural policy and the Cohesion Policy for the period 2014-2020?

Question for written answer E-002791/13
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(8 March 2013)

Subject: EU budget — advocating growth

— The European Council of 8 and 9 February adopted a new proposal entitled 'Conclusions' tabled by President Van Rompuy.

— The EU cannot implement an austerity budget, since the budget is the only engine for growth and job creation at its disposal.

— The austerity budgets imposed by the Troika — which includes the Commission and the European Central Bank — correspond to the next three years, not to seven years like the EU budget.

— The EU cannot implement a restricted budget for seven years, as it will be impossible to achieve the Europe 2020 strategy's goals and targets.

— Following the austerity measures being implemented by the Member States, investment is needed to create growth and jobs; the EU budget is the best way to foster wealth creation.

— Around 94% of the EU budget goes towards investment and job creation projects while only 6% is used to fund the EU's administrative machine.

— The Member States' contributions to the EU budget are ultimately returned to them in the form of new investment projects, which will create wealth and jobs in the European regions.

1. Does the Commission believe that such a long-term austerity budget, including goals set for the next decade, is viable?
2. How does it intend to foster the economic growth that various Commissioners have been advocating in their speeches all over Europe?

Question for written answer E-002792/13
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(8 March 2013)

Subject: European budget — Less funding for the Connecting Europe Facility

The European Council of 7 and 8 February 2013 endorsed the new draft conclusions proposed by the Council President, Herman Van Rompuy.

Swingeing cuts are to be made in the budgets for research and innovation policies (Horizon 2020), education, training, youth and sport (Erasmus for All), and European transport, energy, and telecommunications networks (Connecting Europe Facility).

CEF: the overall budget has been reduced from EUR 50 000 million to EUR 29 300 million; there has been no change regarding the EUR 10 000 million to be transferred from the Cohesion Fund.

Transport: the budget has been reduced from EUR 31 700 million to EUR 23 200 million (allowing for the EUR 10 000 million to be transferred from the Cohesion Fund).

ICT: the budget has been reduced from EUR 9 200 million to EUR 1 000 million.

Energy: the budget has been reduced from EUR 9 100 million to EUR 5 100 million.

The transfer from the Cohesion Fund to the CEF has been finally agreed. The amounts that the individual Member States will be entitled to receive, exactly in proportion to their contributions to the Cohesion Fund, are intended to finance investment in the three key sectors. Funds which have not been used by 31 December 2016 may be reallocated to new projects on the basis of new competitive calls for proposals.

1. Does the Commission consider that the amounts granted will be sufficient to complete the projected European networks, especially in the fields of transport, ICT, and energy?
2. Does it not believe that the meagre funding, only EUR 1 000 million, will jeopardise all the broadband and digital technology projects which it was aiming to pursue under the Digital Agenda, a flagship initiative of the Europe 2020 strategy?
3. Given that the funding has been cut by roughly 50%, does it see any prospect of further progress on a single energy market to lower the energy bills for European industry?

Question for written answer E-002793/13
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(8 March 2013)

Subject: EU budget — Budget cuts for trans-European policies

— The European Council of 8 and 9 February adopted a new proposal entitled ‘Conclusions’ tabled by President Van Rompuy.

— With regard to budget headings within the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), there has been a drastic cut to the budget for promoting smart and inclusive growth in the EU (EUR 44 million); in particular, the amount set aside for policies and programmes that aim to foster European competitiveness has been reduced by some EUR 30 million, which is around 20% less than the Commission’s initial proposal.

— There have been major budget cuts to policies for research and innovation (Horizon 2020), education, training, youth and sport (Erasmus for All), and European transport, energy and telecommunications networks (Connecting Europe Facility).

— Notably, the budget cut also affects the areas of Security and European Citizenship and Global Europe, to strike a balance between cuts to both internal and external EU policies.

— Finally, there will be slight cuts to the two largest EU policy areas — the common agricultural policy and the Cohesion Policy — however, their overall share of the EU budget will ultimately increase.

1. What were the Member States’ motives for making the most drastic cuts to the budget lines managed by the Commission rather than those managed by the 27 Member States?
2. Does the Commission believe that budget cuts to trans-European policy areas will prevent them from being well implemented?

Question for written answer E-002794/13
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(8 March 2013)

Subject: EU budget — Outermost regions

— The European Council of 8 and 9 February adopted a new proposal entitled ‘Conclusions’ tabled by President Van Rompuy.

— Under the new Council proposal, Member States accepted criticism that cuts to the more developed regions had been smaller than those to the outermost regions.

— Consequently, the outermost regions and the sparsely populated regions will receive funding of EUR 30 per inhabitant, with the Commission’s initial proposal of EUR 926 billion rising to EUR 1.4 billion.

— This is a reduction of EUR 351 million compared with the last programming period, when these regions received EUR 1.738 billion. This equates to a 20.2% cut (the previous cut was 47%).

— Moreover, the Council’s ‘Conclusions’ explicitly mention the continued need to take account of the special situation of island regions, but do not set out funding or any other form of support.

— It is important to safeguard the outermost regions’ status as island regions.

1. How many island regions are there in the EU and what are they?
2. Given that funding for the outermost regions and the sparsely populated regions is EUR 30 per inhabitant, and since the overall budget for this heading has been set, how will the Commission take account of 'the special situation of island regions'?

**Question for written answer E-002795/13
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(8 March 2013)**

Subject: EU budget — Treaty of Lisbon

— The European Council of 8 and 9 February adopted a new proposal entitled 'Conclusions' tabled by President Van Rompuy.

— The EU budget represents just 1% of Member States' total GDP, compared with the 2012 US budget which amounted to 22.8% of national GDP (on average US budgets between 1971 and 2008 have equated to 20.6% of national wealth).

— The EU budget is 33 times smaller than that of the US and 44 times smaller than the budgets of all 27 Member States put together.

— This budget demonstrates the EU's lack of ambition to compete at a global level.

— The Council has adopted a budget with a EUR 40 billion shortfall between commitment appropriations and payment appropriations; the Treaty of Lisbon explicitly prohibits EU budget deficits.

— In 2012 there have already been problems regarding Member States accepting and authorising commitment appropriations, with a revised annual budget having been adopted.

— Commitment appropriations are valid for a 10-year period, while payment appropriations are only valid for a seven-year period, resulting in the EUR 40 billion budget gap.

— The EUR 22 billion Cohesion Policy performance reserve will be paid in 2020, 2021 and 2022 and will therefore carry over to the next MFF, thereby reducing the supposed deficit that is said to exist.

1. What is the Commission's view of the growing budget gap between commitment appropriations and payment appropriations?
2. Does this gap comply with the requirements of the Treaty of Lisbon, specifically in view of the fact that EU budget deficits are prohibited?
3. When does it realistically believe that the EU will have a budget that adequately meets its growth needs?

**Question for written answer E-002796/13
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(8 March 2013)**

Subject: EU budget — Europe 2020 strategy

— The European Council of 8 and 9 February adopted a new proposal entitled 'Conclusions' tabled by President Van Rompuy.

— To gain a real sense of the EU budget cut agreed by the Member States at the Council meeting of 8 and 9 February, we must add together cuts to budget lines financed under the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) (EUR 73.248 billion) and outside the MFF (EUR 21.523 billion), totalling some EUR 95 billion, around 8.5% less than the amount originally proposed by the Commission.

— The Council also maintains that: 'Sustainable growth and employment will only resume if a consistent and broad-based approach is pursued, combining smart fiscal consolidation that preserves investment in future growth, sound macroeconomic policies and an active employment strategy that preserves social cohesion.'

— The Commission has set out its Europe 2020 strategy, listing seven flagship initiatives and several goals to be achieved this decade.

— The EU cannot implement a restricted budget for seven years, as this would make it impossible to achieve the Europe 2020 strategy's goals and targets.

1. Does the Commission believe that the budget adopted by the Council jeopardises the Europe 2020 strategy's goals and targets?
2. With cuts of EUR 95 billion to the EU budget, an 8.5% reduction on the Commission's proposal, which of these flagship initiatives will be hardest hit?
3. How will it explain to the general public that the EU will implement a restricted budget for the next seven years despite having set ambitious growth and development targets?

Joint answer given by Mr Lewandowski on behalf of the Commission

(24 April 2013)

The Commission understands that the European Council conclusions on the Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF) represent the basis for the Council's position in the upcoming negotiations with the European Parliament (EP), which needs to give its consent to the MFF Regulation. The EP has defined its position on these European Council conclusions in its resolution of 13 March 2013 and has given a strong mandate to its negotiating team to conduct the negotiations on an overall package. The Commission would invite you therefore to address directly to the European Council all questions related to the details of the European Council conclusions and why Heads of State and Government have taken certain positions.

The Commission would have preferred an outcome from the European Council that made less significant reductions in payments and commitments compared to its proposals. The levels agreed by Heads of State and Government are below the level of ambition that the Commission considers desirable given the challenge of promoting growth and jobs across the EU in the coming years. At the same time, the Commission considers that substantial improvements to the European Council conclusions may still be agreed in the negotiations between the EP and the Council. Without prejudging in any way the scope and content of these negotiations, it is clear that increased flexibility should be a crucial component of the MFF agreement.

The Commission is committed to do everything in its power to facilitate an agreement between the EP and the Council at the earliest opportunity to ensure the timely start of the next generation of multi-annual programmes.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002797/13
a la Comisión**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(8 de marzo de 2013)

Asunto: Ayudas de Estado a Bankia

La prensa se ha echo eco de que la Comisión Europea considera ayudas de Estado la diferencia de 12 000 millones entre el precio pagado por Sareb por los activos de Bankia y su precio de mercado. Según la información, la Comisión considera que Sareb es una entidad pública, pues su deuda es mucho mayor que su capital ⁽¹⁾.

A la luz de lo anterior:

1. ¿Confirma la Comisión que considera a Sareb como una entidad pública?
2. ¿Considera la Comisión que esta diferencia de 12 000 millones debe ser sumada al total de deuda pública del Estado?

Respuesta del Sr. Almunia en nombre de la Comisión

(18 de abril de 2013)

Con arreglo a las normas sobre ayudas estatales de la UE, una medida es constitutiva de ayuda estatal si se cumplen determinados criterios jurídicos, conforme a lo dispuesto en el Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea y de acuerdo con una jurisprudencia reiterada. Una medida es ayuda pública si implica la utilización de recursos estatales (incluidos los de organismos privados creados por el Estado), entraña ventajas para una empresa o actividad, es selectiva, falsea la competencia y tiene repercusiones en los intercambios comerciales dentro de la UE. El concepto de ayuda estatal se interpreta en un sentido amplio.

En cambio, el concepto de hacienda pública se refiere a la carga presupuestaria del Estado.

Estos conceptos diferentes pueden tener consecuencias muy diversas. Por ejemplo, con arreglo a la normativa comunitaria sobre las ayudas estatales, una medida puede ser constitutiva de ayuda estatal, aunque no tenga incidencia en la hacienda pública. Al contrario, una medida puede tener repercusiones en las cuentas públicas y no ser considerada ayuda estatal.

En la Decisión de 28 de noviembre de 2012, la Comisión consideró que el traspaso de activos de promociones inmobiliarias de Bankia/BFA a Sareb era constitutivo de ayuda, ya que se cumplían todos los criterios pertinentes. La Comisión (Eurostat) no considera Sareb una entidad pública a efectos de la hacienda pública. Es de titularidad mayoritariamente privada, su único objeto es hacer frente a la crisis financiera, se ha creado por un período determinado y prevé pérdidas pequeñas si se comparan con el tamaño total del pasivo. De esto se desprende que el importe de 12 000 millones EUR no debe sumarse al déficit y la deuda de las administraciones públicas en las cuentas nacionales.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.elconfidencial.com/economia/2013/03/07/bruselas-considera-ayudas-de-estado-12000-millones-que-bankia-recibio-de-sareb-116355/>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002797/13
to the Commission**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(8 March 2013)

Subject: State aid for Bankia

Accounts in the press report that the Commission is considering state aid with a difference of EUR 12 000 million between the price paid for Bankia's assets by Sareb and its market price. According to the information provided, the Commission considers Sareb to be a public entity, and hence its debt is much greater than its capital ⁽¹⁾.

In light of this:

1. Can the Commission confirm that it considers Sareb to be a public entity?
2. Is the Commission of the opinion that this difference of EUR 12 000 million should be added to the State's total public debt?

Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission

(18 April 2013)

Under EU State aid rules, a measure constitutes state aid if certain legal criteria are fulfilled, as set out in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and in line with a comprehensive body of case law. A measure is public aid if it involves State resources (including from private bodies established by the State), constituting an advantage for an undertaking or activity, is selective, distorts competition and has an impact on trade within the EU. The concept of state aid is given a broad interpretation.

In contrast, the concept of public finance tries to capture the fiscal burden for the State.

Those different concepts can lead to very different outcomes. For instance, under EU State aid rules, a measure can constitute state aid but have no public finance implications. Conversely, a measure can have public finance implications without being considered as state aid.

In the decision of 28 November 2012, the Commission considered that the transfer of Real Estate Development assets from BFA/Bankia to SAREB constituted aid, as all the relevant criteria were fulfilled. The Commission (Eurostat) does not consider SAREB to be a public entity for the purpose of public finance. It is majority privately owned, has a purpose solely to address the financial crisis, is established with a temporary duration, and has expected losses that are small in comparison with the total size of the liabilities. It follows that the amount of EUR 12 000 million is not to be added to the deficit and debt of general government in the national accounts.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.elconfidencial.com/economia/2013/03/07/bruselas-considera-ayudas-de-estado-12000-millones-que-bankia-recibio-de-sareb-116355/>

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002798/13
a la Comisión**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(11 de marzo de 2013)

Asunto: «Efecto lunes» — Pregunta complementaria a la pregunta E-000207/13

En fechas anteriores presenté una pregunta parlamentaria basada en un trabajo académico ⁽¹⁾ en la que planteaba la sospecha de que las empresas petroleras manipulaban los precios de los carburantes según el día de la semana ⁽²⁾. La Comisión Nacional de Energía (CNE) del Estado español ha abierto un expediente informativo a las petroleras por el llamado «efecto lunes», que consiste en que los operadores bajan los precios ese día de la semana —cuando la Comisión Europea recoge datos para las estadísticas— y vuelven a subirlos a partir del martes.

En su respuesta a dicha pregunta, la Comisión afirma: «No obstante, la Comisión no dudará en actuar, por sí misma o en coordinación con la autoridad de competencia española, si recibe suficiente información que indique una conducta colusoria o un comportamiento abusivo de las distintas empresas del mercado del combustible, sea por propia iniciativa, sea por presiones del Gobierno». También dice que «conoce las asimetrías en el ritmo con que los precios al por menor, antes de impuestos, se ajustan a las variaciones de los precios internacionales de los carburantes, pero que nunca ha tenido indicios, directamente o a resultas de las investigaciones nacionales llevadas a cabo hasta el momento».

A la luz de lo anterior, ¿piensa la Comisión investigar ahora la existencia del «efecto lunes» en el precio del petróleo?

En caso de que se confirme su existencia, ¿piensa proponer medidas de sanción para las empresas petroleras involucradas?

Respuesta del Sr. Almunia en nombre de la Comisión

(3 de mayo de 2013)

En su respuesta a la pregunta E-000207/13 planteada previamente, la Comisión indicó que las asimetrías en la velocidad a la que los precios al por menor, antes de impuestos, se adaptan a las variaciones de los precios del combustible internacional (el fenómeno llamado en inglés *rockets and feathers*, o «cohetes y plumas») han sido examinadas a nivel nacional, más recientemente, por parte de la UK Office of Fair Trading. Además, la Comisión Nacional de la Competencia analizó detenidamente este fenómeno en 2012, al igual que el Bundeskartellamt alemán en su investigación sobre el sector de los combustibles de 2011. En esta última investigación, la autoridad nacional de la competencia alemana llevó a cabo un análisis pormenorizado de los precios de las estaciones de servicio en cuatro áreas metropolitanas durante el período comprendido entre enero de 2007 y junio de 2010, gracias al cual concluyó que los precios de los combustibles llegaban a su punto álgido los viernes y a su punto más bajo los domingos y los lunes. A pesar de algunas teorías económicas que justificarían estos resultados empíricos, la autoridad nacional de la competencia alemana no excluyó que las asimetrías observadas fueran el resultado de conductas contrarias a la competencia, pero fue incapaz de proporcionar argumentos concluyentes de que lo fueran. Tampoco ninguna otra autoridad nacional de la competencia que haya examinado el fenómeno *rockets and feathers* o «efecto lunes» ha podido demostrar que sea resultado de prácticas anticompetitivas.

Aunque la Comisión, a falta de indicios claros de que las empresas petroleras ejerzan prácticas contrarias a la competencia, no tiene por ahora intención de investigar este fenómeno, no dudará en actuar si se presentan nuevas pruebas concluyentes.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.fedeablogs.net/economia/?p=27073>

⁽²⁾ <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2013/03/07/economia/1362683839.html>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002798/13
to the Commission**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(11 March 2013)

Subject: The 'Monday effect' — Supplementary question to Question E-000207/13

On a previous occasion, I presented a parliamentary question based on an academic piece of work ⁽¹⁾ in which the suspicion was raised that oil companies were manipulating fuel prices according to the day of the week ⁽²⁾. Spain's National Energy Commission has opened an inquiry into the oil companies concerning the so-called 'Monday effect', which involves operators lowering prices on this particular day of the week, when the Commission collects its statistical data, and then raising them again from Tuesday.

In its answer to this question, the Commission states: 'However, the Commission will not hesitate to act, alone or in conjunction with the Spanish competition authority, if it receives sufficient information to suggest collusive or unfair behaviour from the various companies in the fuel market, whether on their own initiative or as a result of government pressure'. It also says that it is 'aware of the imbalances in the rate with which retail prices vary, before taxes, with the fluctuations in international fuel prices, but that it has never had evidence of this, either directly or as a result of national inquiries carried out thus far'.

In light of the above, is the Commission now considering investigating the existence of the 'Monday effect' in petrol pricing?

Should the Commission confirm its existence, is it planning to propose sanctions on the oil companies involved?

Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission

(3 May 2013)

In its answer to previous Question E-000207/13, the Commission indicated that the asymmetries in the speed at which pre-tax retail prices adjust to variations in international fuel prices — the so-called 'rockets and feathers' phenomenon — has been examined at national level, most recently by the UK Office of Fair Trading. Also, the Comisión Nacional de la Competencia has carefully analysed this phenomenon in 2012, as has the German Bundeskartellamt in its Fuel Sector Inquiry of 2011. In the latter inquiry, the German national competition authority (NCA) carried out a detailed analysis of petrol stations' prices in four metropolitan areas over the period January 2007 — June 2010, finding that fuel prices were the highest on Fridays and the lowest on Sundays and Mondays. Despite some economic theories that would justify these empirical findings, the German NCA did not exclude that the asymmetries observed were the result of anticompetitive conducts, but was unable to provide conclusive arguments that they were. No other NCA that has examined the 'rockets and feathers' or 'Monday effect' phenomenon has been able to show that it is the result of anticompetitive practices either.

While the Commission, in the absence of clear indications of anticompetitive practices by oil companies, does not currently intend to investigate this phenomenon, it will not hesitate to act if presented with new, compelling evidence.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.fedeablogs.net/economia/?p=27073>.

⁽²⁾ <http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2013/03/07/economia/1362683839.html>

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002799/13
a la Comisión**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(11 de marzo de 2013)

Asunto: Retraso sistemático en las devoluciones impositivas a empresas

En los últimos dos meses de 2012, la Agencia Tributaria ha recortado hasta un 91 % las devoluciones de impuestos como el de Sociedades y un 50 % los de IVA o IRPF para disminuir el dato de déficit público. Según el Informe de Recaudación Tributaria de diciembre, Hacienda ha devuelto a los contribuyentes 3 791 millones de euros menos que en 2011, con lo que el déficit disminuye en casi 4 décimas. Sin ese colchón, el dato de déficit público habría sido del 7,1 % ⁽¹⁾.

Respecto al Impuesto sobre Sociedades, Hacienda apenas ha devuelto 79 millones de euros frente a los 934 millones que devolvió en el mismo mes del año pasado. En el caso del Impuesto sobre la Renta de las Personas Físicas (IRPF), las devoluciones a los contribuyentes se han reducido a la mitad: Hacienda apenas ha devuelto 248 millones frente a los 538 que retornó el pasado año. De igual modo, en el caso de las devoluciones por IVA, el Estado las ha recortado a la mitad y ha pagado 1 499 millones frente a los 3 472 millones que entregó el año pasado.

1. ¿Conoce la Comisión estos datos?
2. ¿Cree la Comisión que el retraso en las devoluciones a las empresas distorsiona el dato de déficit público para 2012?

Respuesta del Sr. Šemeta en nombre de la Comisión

(14 de junio de 2013)

Los datos publicados por la Agencia Tributaria española se registran de acuerdo con la contabilidad de caja, mientras que los datos que deben transmitirse a Eurostat a efectos de las cuentas nacionales y del procedimiento de déficit excesivo deben generarse según el principio de devengo. En el pasado, las autoridades estadísticas españolas se basaron en los datos de la contabilidad de caja en relación con las devoluciones de impuestos, también en las cuentas nacionales, debido a la regularidad que caracterizaba a las devoluciones de impuestos. Sin embargo, los datos de 2012 facilitados a Eurostat el 1 de abril de 2013 han sido corregidos por las autoridades estadísticas españolas. En la comunicación de datos a Eurostat de abril de 2013 relativa al procedimiento de déficit excesivo se han trasladado ya al año 2012 la parte de las devoluciones abonadas en 2013 pero correspondientes a 2012.

1. La Comisión está al corriente de las cifras publicadas por la Agencia Tributaria de España.
2. Se han corregido los datos facilitados a Eurostat en abril de 2013 y los datos de devoluciones relativas a 2012 que se abonaron en 2013 se han consignado en el año 2012 de conformidad con el principio de devengo.

⁽¹⁾ <http://vozpopuli.com/economia/22440-hacienda-retiene-3-800-millones-de-euros-en-devoluciones-para-cuadrar-el-dato-de-deficit>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002799/13
to the Commission**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(11 March 2013)

Subject: Systematic delay in tax rebates to companies

In the last two months of 2012, the Spanish Tax Office cut corporation tax rebates by up to 91% and VAT or personal income tax (IRPF) rebates by up to 50% to reduce the public deficit figure. According to a tax revenue report from December, the Spanish Treasury has granted taxpayer rebates of EUR 3 791 million less than in 2011, in which time the deficit has fallen by almost four tenths. Without this buffer, the public deficit would have been 7.1% ⁽¹⁾.

With regard to corporation tax, the Ministry of Finance has only paid out EUR 79 million in rebates compared with the EUR 934 million in the same month of the previous year. In the case of personal income tax (IRPF), taxpayer rebates have been halved, the Ministry only paying out EUR 248 million compared with the EUR 538 million last year. Similarly, VAT rebates have been halved by the State, which has paid EUR 1 499 million, compared with the EUR 3 472 million last year.

In view of the above, can the Commission state:

whether it is aware of these figures;

whether it believes that the delay in providing rebates to companies has distorted the public deficit figure for 2012?

Answer given by Mr Šemeta on behalf of the Commission

(14 June 2013)

Data published by the Spanish Tax Agency are recorded on a cash basis while data for the purposes of the national accounts and EDP reporting to Eurostat should be based on accrual data. In the past, the Spanish statistical authorities used cash data for tax reimbursements (rebates) also in national accounts, due to the regularity shown in the pattern of tax refunds. The 2012 data reported to Eurostat on 1 April 2013 has however been corrected by the Spanish statistical authorities. The part of the reimbursements paid in 2013, relating to 2012, has been moved back to the year 2012 when reporting data to Eurostat in the April 2013 EDP notification.

1. The Commission is aware of the figures published by the Spanish Tax Authority.
2. The data reported to Eurostat in April 2013 has been corrected and the data referring to 2012, paid in 2013, has been moved back to year 2012 in line with the accrual principle.

⁽¹⁾ <http://vozpopuli.com/economia/22440> 'Ministry of Finance withholds EUR 3 800 million in tax rebates to help deficit statistics'.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002800/13
προς την Επιτροπή (Αντιπρόεδρος/Υπατη Εκπρόσωπος)
Charalampos Angourakis (GUE/NGL)
(11 Μαρτίου 2013)

Θέμα: VP/HR — Να εγγυηθεί η Κολομβία τα δικαιώματα του κοινωνικού και πολιτικού κινήματος

Στην Κολομβία συνεχίζεται με αμείωτη ένταση το όργιο δολοφονιών, απαγωγών, καταναγκαστικού εκτοπισμού και φυλάκισης εναντίον μελών και στελεχών του λαϊκού κινήματος, τόσο από την Κολομβιανή κυβέρνηση, όσο και από τις παραστρατιωτικές οργανώσεις που υποστηρίζονται από τους κρατικούς μηχανισμούς. Τα τελευταία 20 χρόνια πάνω από 2 900 συνδικαλιστές και περισσότερα από 4 500 στελέχη της Union Patriótica και άλλων οργανώσεων του λαϊκού κινήματος έχουν δολοφονηθεί.

Η Διεθνής Ομοσπονδία Ανθρωπίνων Δικαιωμάτων έχει καταγράψει περισσότερους από 3 000 δολοφονημένους αθώους επιστρατευμένους νεαρής ηλικίας που εκτελέστηκαν εξωδικαστικά από τον στρατό της Κολομβίας. Υπάρχουν ακόμα 9 500 πολιτικοί κρατούμενοι και 5 500 000 εκτοπισμένοι ως αποτέλεσμα των επιχειρήσεων των παραστρατιωτικών οργανώσεων.

Οργανώσεις του λαϊκού κινήματος της Κολομβίας, μεταξύ των οποίων και το Κοινωνικό και Πολιτικό Κίνημα «Marcha Patriótica», απαιτούν από την Κυβέρνηση να σεβαστεί να παρέχει πολιτικές εγγυήσεις για τη ζωή και τη φυσική ακεραιότητα των μελών τους.

Το Κίνημα της «Marcha Patriótica» αντιπροσωπεύει μεγάλο αριθμό συνδικαλιστικών ενώσεων και οργανώσεων, οργανώσεις φοιτητών και νεολαίας, οργανώσεις αγροτών εκπαιδευτικών και διανοούμενων της χώρας. Τάσσεται υπέρ των διαδικασιών ειρήνευσης στην Κολομβία με κοινωνική δικαιοσύνη και με μέτρα υπέρ των φτωχών αγροτών και των εργαζομένων της χώρας.

Πώς τοποθετείται η Υπατη Εκπρόσωπος της ΕΕ στο δίκαιο αίτημα της Marcha Patriótica στην κυβέρνηση της Κολομβίας να παρέχει εγγυήσεις για την ελεύθερη δράση, τη ζωή και τη σωματική ακεραιότητα των μελών της, καθώς και στην απαίτηση για την απελευθέρωση των 9 500 πολιτικών κρατούμενων;

Απάντηση της Υπατης Εκπροσώπου/Αντιπρόεδρου Ashton εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(24 Απριλίου 2013)

Η Υπατη Εκπρόσωπος/Αντιπρόεδρος (ΥΕ/ΑΠ) δηλώνει εκ νέου ότι η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση καταδικάζει σθεναρά τη χρήση βίας. Η ΕΕ έχει ζητήσει επανειλημμένα από την κυβέρνηση να λάβει αποτελεσματικά μέτρα για να κατοχυρώσει την ασφάλεια ευάλωτων τμημάτων του πληθυσμού και απειλούμενων προσώπων, συμπεριλαμβανομένων πολιτικών και κοινωνικών ακτιβιστών και υπερασπιστών των δικαιωμάτων του ανθρώπου, μεταξύ των οποίων περιλαμβάνεται και η περίπτωση της Marcha Patriótica. Η ΕΕ είναι ενήμερη για επιθέσεις, εξαφανίσεις και απειλές κατά ορισμένων μελών της οργάνωσης, και παρακολουθεί εκ του σύνεγγυς τις εν λόγω υποθέσεις.

Η ΥΕ/ΑΠ συγχαίρει τη Marcha Patriótica για τη δέσμευσή της υπέρ της ειρήνης, όπως και όλων των άλλων παραγόντων που συμβάλλουν στην αναζήτηση ειρηνικής επίλυσης της εσωτερικής σύγκρουσης στην Κολομβία. Επισημαίνει ότι η Marcha Patriótica και η ομάδα «Κολομβιανοί για την ειρήνη» διοργάνωσαν διαδήλωση στη Μπογκοτά στις 9 Απριλίου με σκοπό να εκφράσουν την υποστήριξή τους στις διεξαγόμενες ειρηνευτικές συνομιλίες με τους αντάρτες των FARC, στην οποία ο Πρόεδρος Santos και άλλοι πολιτικοί ανακοίνωσαν ότι θα συμμετάσχουν.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002800/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Charalampos Angourakis (GUE/NGL)
(11 March 2013)**

Subject: VP/HR — Guaranteed rights for social and political movement in Colombia

The wave of murders, kidnappings, forced displacement and imprisonment of members and cadres of the popular movement, both by the Colombian government and by paramilitary organisations supported by the State continues in Colombia unabated. Over the last 20 years, more than 2 900 trade unionists and more than 4 500 cadres of the *Union Patriótica* and other popular movements have been murdered.

The International Federation for Human Rights has identified more than 3 000 innocent young conscripts who have fallen victim to extrajudicial killings by the Colombian army. There are still 9 500 political prisoners and 5 500 000 persons have been displaced as a result of operations by paramilitary organisations.

Organisations of the popular movement in Colombia, including the *Marcha Patriótica*, are calling on the government to provide political guarantees for the life and physical integrity of their members.

The *Marcha Patriótica* represents a large number of trade union associations and organisations, student and youth organisations and organisations of farmers, teachers and intellectuals in the country. It supports the peace process in Colombia, calling for social justice and measures for the benefit of poor farmers and workers in the country.

What is the EU High Representative's opinion on the just demand made by *Marcha Patriótica* to the government of Colombia to guarantee the freedom of action, life and physical integrity of its members and its demand that 9 500 political prisoners be released?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(24 April 2013)**

The HR/VP reiterates the EU's firm condemnation of the use of violence. The EU has consistently called on the government to take effective measures to ensure the safety of vulnerable parts of the population and of persons under threat, including political and social activists, and human rights defenders. This includes the case of the *Marcha Patriótica*. The EU is aware of attacks and threats against and disappearances of some of the organisation's members, and are following these cases closely.

The HR/VP commends the *Marcha's* commitment to peace, as she does that of all other actors contributing to the search for a peaceful solution to Colombia's internal conflict. She notes that the *Marcha* and the group *Colombians for Peace* are organising a demonstration in Bogota on 9 April to express support for the ongoing peace talks with the FARC guerrilla, which President Santos and other politicians in office have said they will join.

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-002801/13
à la Commission
Philippe Boulland (PPE)
(11 mars 2013)

Objet: Compétences renforcées pour l'EFSA

Le scandale de la viande de cheval qui a éclaté en Europe a révélé des failles dans le système des contrôles sanitaires effectués par les États membres.

L'Autorité européenne de sécurité des aliments (EFSA) fournit aux États membres, qui sont chargés d'effectuer les contrôles nécessaires pour assurer la sécurité alimentaire, des conseils scientifiques sur les risques existants ou émergents. L'EFSA ne se limite pour le moment qu'à un rôle consultatif et informatif.

Alors que le contrôle des aliments relève de la compétence des États membres, la France a vu son nombre d'experts vétérinaires diminuer de 20 % en 7 ans (4 600 en 2013). La baisse du nombre d'experts n'est-elle pas liée à la hausse du nombre de scandales et de fraudes consécutive à la baisse du nombre de contrôles?

Il semble y avoir un parallèle entre la baisse du nombre d'experts et la hausse du nombre de scandales et de fraudes consécutive à la baisse du nombre de contrôles.

La Commission envisagerait-elle de renforcer les pouvoirs de l'EFSA, qui pourrait imposer une obligation de moyens aux États membres (par la mise en place d'un nombre de contrôles obligatoires dans les pays européens) et non une simple obligation de résultat en matière de sécurité alimentaire dans le marché intérieur?

Réponse donnée par M. Borg au nom de la Commission
(30 avril 2013)

Le domaine de compétence de l'Autorité européenne de sécurité des aliments (EFSA) se limite à l'évaluation des risques, sur la base du principe de séparation entre l'évaluation des risques et la gestion des risques.

Cette séparation vise à garantir l'indépendance du conseil scientifique ⁽¹⁾. L'EFSA est une agence autonome, et son comité scientifique et ses groupes scientifiques qui fournissent les avis scientifiques sont constitués d'experts indépendants.

Les institutions de l'UE sont responsables de la gestion des risques (politique, législation et contrôles).

La responsabilité du respect de la législation alimentaire incombe aux États membres ⁽²⁾, qui sont priés d'instaurer un système de contrôles officiels pour s'assurer du respect, par les opérateurs, des exigences légales et de sanctionner les infractions. Dans le cas évoqué par l'Honorable Parlementaire, les systèmes de contrôles officiels ont bien fonctionné et permis de détecter des violations des règles applicables. De plus, la Commission a adopté le 19 février 2013 un plan de contrôle coordonné demandant aux États membres de réaliser: a) des tests ADN permettant de détecter la présence de viande de cheval et b) des contrôles permettant de détecter la présence de phénylbutazone dans la viande de cheval. La Commission a pris en charge une partie du coût de ces tests.

La Commission estime que la séparation des responsabilités en matière d'évaluation et de gestion des risques est essentielle et n'a pas l'intention de modifier le domaine de compétence de l'EFSA.

⁽¹⁾ Règlement (CE) n° 178/2002 du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 28 janvier 2002 établissant les principes généraux et les prescriptions générales de la législation alimentaire, instituant l'Autorité européenne de sécurité des aliments et fixant des procédures relatives à la sécurité des denrées alimentaires, JO L 31 du 1.2.2002, p. 1. Règlement modifié en dernier lieu par le règlement (CE) n° 1642/2003 (JO L 245 du 29.9.2003, p. 4).

⁽²⁾ Règlement (CE) n° 882/2004 du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 29 avril 2004 relatif aux contrôles officiels effectués pour s'assurer de la conformité avec la législation sur les aliments pour animaux et les denrées alimentaires et avec les dispositions relatives à la santé animale et au bien-être des animaux, JO L 165 du 30.4.2004, p. 1.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002801/13
to the Commission
Philippe Boulland (PPE)
(11 March 2013)

Subject: Enhanced competences for EFSA

The horsemeat scandal that broke out in Europe has revealed flaws in the system of health checks carried out by Member States.

The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) provides Member States, which are responsible for carrying out the necessary checks to ensure food safety, with scientific advice on existing or emerging risks. At present, EFSA only has an advisory and informative role.

Whereas food control is a matter for Member States, France has seen the number of its veterinary experts drop by 20% in 7 years (4 600 in 2013). Is the drop in the number of experts not linked to the rise in the number of scandals and frauds following the fall in the number of checks?

There seems to be a link between the drop in the number of experts and the rise in the number of scandals and frauds following the fall in the number of checks.

Does the Commission plan to increase EFSA's remit, enabling it to impose a best endeavours obligation on Member States (by setting up various compulsory checks in European countries) and not simply an obligation to achieve a result in terms of food safety within the internal market?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission
(30 April 2013)

The European Food Safety Authority's (EFSA) remit is limited to risk assessment on the basis of the principle of separation of risk assessment and risk management.

This separation was made in order to ensure the independence of scientific advice ⁽¹⁾. EFSA is an autonomous agency and its Scientific Committee and Panels providing the scientific opinions are composed of independent experts.

The EU institutions are responsible for risk management (policy, legislation and controls).

The responsibility for enforcing food legislation lies with Member States ⁽²⁾ which are required to establish a system of official controls to verify compliance by operators with legal requirements and to sanction non-compliance. In the case referred to by the Honourable Member, the national official controls systems have worked well and have allowed the identification of violations of applicable rules. In addition, on 19 February 2013, the Commission adopted a coordinated control plan asking Member States to perform: a) DNA testing for horsemeat and b) controls for the detection of Phenylbutazone in horsemeat. The Commission paid part of the costs of the testing.

The Commission considers that the separation of the responsibilities of risk assessment and risk management is essential and does not intend to change EFSA's remit.

⁽¹⁾ Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority, and laying down procedures in matters of food safety, OJ L 31, 1.2.2002, p. 1. Regulation as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1642/2003, (OJ L 245, 29.9.2003, p. 4).

⁽²⁾ Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on official controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules, OJ L 165, 30.4.2004, p. 1.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002802/13
aan de Commissie
Corien Wortmann-Kool (PPE)
(11 maart 2013)

Betreft: NAIADES-programma

In mei 2013 lanceert de Europese Commissie het langverwachte Naiades II-actieplan voor de periode 2014-2020.

Dit ambitieuze vervolprogramma voorziet in het versterken van het aandeel van de binnenvaart en het versterken van zijn milieubonus tegen 2020. De binnenvaart levert maar liefst een CO₂-besparing tussen 43 % en 63 % in vergelijking met het wegvervoer en levert dus een belangrijke bijdrage aan de resource efficiency en CO₂-uitstootvermindering van ons transportsysteem.

De binnenvaart is een onmisbare schakel in het oplossen van de oplopende files en capaciteitstekorten op de weg. Het fileprobleem brengt veel kosten met zich mee en tast het concurrentievermogen van onze bedrijven aan. In landen als Nederland is een substantiële verhoging van het modale aandeel van de binnenvaart onontbeerlijk om een verdere verkeerstoename in goede banen te leiden.

Ondertussen leidt het MFF-akkoord (2014-2020) binnen de Raad tot een vermindering van het transportbudget van het Connecting Europe Facility-programma.

1. Hoe ziet de Commissie de voortgang van het Naiades II-programma met een verminderd budget, wetende dat bij de mid-term review van het eerste Naiades-programma (SEC(2011)0453 final) al aan het licht kwam dat de implementatie door onvoldoende middelen tekort is geschoten?
2. Welke maatregelen beschouwt de Commissie als belangrijk voor het versterken van het modale aandeel van de binnenvaart en het versterken van zijn milieubonus?
3. Welk minimumbudget acht de Commissie noodzakelijk om deze maatregelen daadwerkelijk en efficiënt te implementeren?

Antwoord van de heer Kallas namens de Commissie
(30 april 2013)

De Commissie is van mening dat de binnenvaart als rendabele, energie-efficiënte en veilige wijze van vervoer een belangrijke rol moet spelen in het vervoerssysteem van de EU. Om het aandeel van de binnenvaart te versterken en de milieuprestaties ervan te verbeteren, is de Commissie voornemens om het NAIADES-actieplan ⁽¹⁾ te herzien voor de periode 2013-2020. Het actieplan spitst zich toe op de kwaliteitsaspecten van deze wijze van vervoer, met inbegrip van een verbetering van het infrastructuurnetwerk voor de binnenvaart, innovatie, emissiereductie, banen en vaardigheden, en de integratie van de binnenvaart in de multimodale logistieke keten.

Op EU-niveau is de financiering van het plan afkomstig uit de financieringsfaciliteit voor Europese verbindingen (*Connecting Europe Facility* — CEF) ⁽²⁾ voor investeringen in infrastructuur en voor het milieuvriendelijker maken van de vloot, en uit Horizon 2020, het kaderprogramma voor innovatie, onderzoek en ontwikkeling. De specifieke maatregelen van het plan en de financiering ervan worden uitgewerkt wanneer de details van de CEF en van het Horizon 2020-kaderprogramma bekend zijn. Deze worden momenteel besproken in de Raad en in het Parlement.

⁽¹⁾ COM(2006) 6 definitief.

⁽²⁾ COM(2011) 665.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002802/13
to the Commission**

Corien Wortmann-Kool (PPE)

(11 March 2013)

Subject: Naiades programme

In May 2013 the Commission will be launching the long-awaited Naiades II action plan for the 2014-2020 period.

This ambitious follow-up programme aims to produce an increase in the share of traffic carried by inland waterways and boost its environmental subsidy until 2020. Transport by inland waterways delivers a sizeable CO₂ saving of between 43 and 63% in comparison to road transport and thus delivers an important contribution to resource efficiency and CO₂ emissions reduction for our transport system.

Transport by inland waterways has a vital part to play in solving the problems of ever-increasing traffic jams and capacity shortfalls on our roads. The issue of traffic jams gives rise to major costs and affects the competitiveness of our businesses. In countries like the Netherlands, a substantial increase in the modal share of inland waterways transport is indispensable in order to manage further increases in traffic volume.

Meanwhile, the agreement on the Multiannual Financial Framework (2014-2020) in the Council will result in a reduction of the budget for the Connecting Europe Facility.

1. How does the Commission see the way forward for the Naiades II programme with a smaller budget, given that we have already seen from the mid-term review of the first Naiades programme (SEC(2011)0453 final) that there were shortcomings in implementation as a result of insufficient funds?
2. What measures does the Commission view as important in order to increase inland waterways transport's modal share and to boost its environmental subsidy?
3. What minimum budget does the Commission view as necessary for the proper and efficient implementation of these measures?

Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission

(30 April 2013)

The Commission considers that inland waterway should play an important role as an economic, energy-efficient and safe mode of transport for the EU transport system. In order to help inland waterway transport to increase its modal share and to improve its environmental performance, the Commission is planning the renewal of the NAIADES action programme ⁽¹⁾ for the period 2013-2020. The programme will focus on the quality aspects of this transport mode including improvement of the inland waterway infrastructure network, innovation, emission reduction, jobs and skills and the integration of inland waterway transport into the multimodal logistic chain.

At EU level, the financing of the programme will come from the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) ⁽²⁾ for infrastructure investments and for the greening of the fleet as well as from Horizon 2020 for innovation and research and development. The details of the specific actions of the programme and their financing will be worked out when the details of the CEF and Horizon 2020 instruments which are currently under discussion in the Council and Parliament are known.

⁽¹⁾ COM(2006) 6 final.

⁽²⁾ COM(2011) 665.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002804/13
to the Commission**

David Campbell Bannerman (ECR)

(11 March 2013)

Subject: Members of the Commission and Working Time Directive rules

Have any current members of the Commission worked in excess of the hours allowed under the rules of the Working Time Directive?

Answer given by Mr Barroso on behalf of the Commission

(22 May 2013)

The directive concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time No 2003/88/EC ⁽¹⁾ allows in its Article 17§1 point a) for derogations from certain provisions of the directive, including the limit to working time, in the case of managing executives, and persons in similar positions, who can decide autonomously on the duration of their own working time. The Members of the Commission are not subject to this directive.

(1) OJ L 299, 18.11.2003, p. 9.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002805/13
to the Commission**

David Campbell Bannerman (ECR)

(11 March 2013)

Subject: Fish discards in waters covered by the CFP

What is the Commission's current estimate of fisheries discards — by species — in waters covered by the common fisheries policy?

Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission

(17 May 2013)

The most recent assessment on discarding was carried out by the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) in 2005 who estimated global discards at around 7 million tonnes from a global catch of around 80 million tonnes. The total level of discards within waters covered by the common fisheries policy (CFP) was estimated around 1.4 million tonnes with discards highest in the North Atlantic including the North Sea (13% of total catches). In other areas covered by the CFP, for example in the Mediterranean and Black Seas, the FAO put discards at 4.9% of catches, while in the Baltic, the rate was only 1.4% on average.

As part of the impact assessment to support the CFP reform ⁽¹⁾, an assessment of the extent of discarding across EU fisheries was carried out. Discard rates by fishery were classified as high (greater than 40% of total catches), medium (between 15-39%) or low (less than 15%) based on the best available data. Examples of fisheries identified in this study with high discard rates (up to 70%) included mixed demersal trawl fisheries widespread in the North Atlantic and in Mediterranean as well as flatfish beam trawl fisheries in the North Sea and dredge fisheries in the Mediterranean. Pelagic fisheries in the North Atlantic along with cod fisheries in the Baltic have low discarding rates.

In the framework of the Reform of the CFP the Commission has proposed to gradually phase out discarding. The European Parliament in its position emerging from Plenary on 6 February 2013 and the Council in its General Approach of 26 February 2013 supported this.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/documentation/studies/discards/index_en.htm

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002806/13
to the Commission
David Campbell Bannerman (ECR)
(11 March 2013)**

Subject: Fraud involving EU grants

How many cases of fraud involving EU grants have led to (i) a criminal prosecution and (ii) a prison sentence over the last five years?

**Answer given by Mr Šemeta on behalf of the Commission
(30 April 2013)**

The Commission doesn't have separate statistics on cases of fraud involving EU grants which have led to a criminal prosecution and a prison sentence. However, the Commission would refer the Honourable Member to the most recent annual report of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF ⁽¹⁾), in which he will find in Section 3.4 'Monitoring phase', in the Table 6 'Overview of progress on judicial actions in actions created between 2006-2011' on page 22 information concerning the judicial follow-up of all files transmitted by OLAF to the Member States authorities.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/documents/reports-olaf/2011/olaf_report_2011_en.pdf

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002807/13
to the Commission**

David Campbell Bannerman (ECR)

(11 March 2013)

Subject: Functions hosted in Brussels for the benefit of EU diplomats

Can the Commission list all functions hosted in Brussels over the last two years for the benefit of diplomats accredited to the EU?

Answer given by Mr Barroso on behalf of the Commission

(9 April 2013)

The European Commission confirms that the President, Vice-Presidents and Members of the College offer a New Year reception for the diplomatic corps accredited to the EU, once a year, normally in January.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002808/13
to the Commission**

David Campbell Bannerman (ECR)

(11 March 2013)

Subject: International organisations to which the EU sends delegates

Would the Commission list the international organisations to which the EU sends delegates, indicating the role of the EU in relation to that body (observer, voting member, etc)?

**Question for written answer E-002822/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

David Campbell Bannerman (ECR)

(11 March 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — International entities to which the European External Action Service is accredited

Can the Vice-President/High Representative list all international entities to which the European External Action Service is accredited?

Joint answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(6 May 2013)

The EU participates in numerous international organisations and follows their deliberations closely and on a regular basis. The activities of these organisations are covered either by staff of the relevant EU Delegations and/or by Brussels-based officials.

In most international organisations/fora, the EU has observer status and no voting rights. Exceptions to this rule apply include FAO, WTO and the Codex Alimentarius Commission where the EU participates as a member with equivalent rights.

A table indicating the status of the EU in the main international organisations and UN bodies is attached to this answer.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002809/13
to the Commission**

David Campbell Bannerman (ECR)

(11 March 2013)

Subject: Military staff working for the EU

How many military staff, by nationality and by rank, work for the EU?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(28 May 2013)

In accordance with the High Representative's decision of 23 March 2011 establishing the rules applicable to national experts seconded to the European External Action Service (EEAS), there are 176 military staff in the EU Military Staff in the EEAS. The ranks and nationalities are presented in the table in annex, sent directly to the Honourable Member and to Parliament's Secretariat. The Honourable Member is also invited to consult the reply to previous Written Question E-002810/2013. Furthermore, there are 32 military experts working in the EEAS crisis structures (CMPD, CPCC and INTCEN). Such expertise also exists in some of the EU agencies such as the European Defense Agency.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002810/13
to the Commission**

David Campbell Bannerman (ECR)

(11 March 2013)

Subject: EU military staff posted to non-EU headquarters

Can the Commission say how many EU military staff are posted to non-EU headquarters, and where?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(14 May 2013)

The EU Military Staff has a Liaison Officer to the UN in New York, USA, and a Liaison Cell of four military in NATO HQ SHAPE in Mons, Belgium.

In addition there is a temporary Liaison Officer to Ecowas HQ in Abuja, Nigeria, related to the logistic support of the EU to Ecowas AFISMA in Mali.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002811/13
to the Commission**

David Campbell Bannerman (ECR)

(11 March 2013)

Subject: EU battlegroups: declared capabilities and key assets

Can the Commission provide a list of EU battlegroups, with associated declared capabilities and key assets?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(3 May 2013)

All provided Battlegroups (BG) as shown in the BG roster comply with the requirements stated in the EU Battlegroup-Concept.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002812/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
David Campbell Bannerman (ECR)**

(11 March 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Register of national military units and assets available to the common foreign and security policy

Can the Vice-President/High Representative please indicate the extent of the current register of national military units and assets designated as being available to the common foreign and security policy?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(6 May 2013)

The Capability Development Mechanism (CDM), developed in 2003, defined the EU's autonomy in decision-making and the voluntary nature of the commitments made. It introduced three classified catalogues to be used in the development of EU military capabilities:

- (1) Requirements Catalogue (RC), identifying the agreed military capabilities required to pursue the EU military level of ambition set in the Headline Goal (HLG) 2010;
- (2) Force Catalogue (FC), compiling the voluntary Member States' contributions in terms of capabilities;
- (3) Progress Catalogue (PC), presenting the prioritised capability shortfalls and the related operational risks.

The FC presents the military capabilities, which Member States could make available to EU CSDP operations against the required capabilities as defined in the RC. Thus, the FC forms a detailed basis for determining the deficits possibly leading to capability shortfalls.

Since, as stated in the CDM, the FC is not based on firm Member States commitments but on their voluntary and preliminary pledges, the EEAS has only a snapshot of the potential availability of military capabilities for CSDP needs for a designated target year. For that reason, Member States contributions to the FC are periodically collected. The next FC will be developed in the autumn of 2013. At no stage are Member States obliged to contribute to operations or missions. Absolute provision will be subject to a case by case basis for specific operations/missions based on consensus among the 27 EU Member States.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002813/13
to the Commission**

David Campbell Bannerman (ECR)

(11 March 2013)

Subject: EU decision-making under qualified majority voting

Can the Commission say what proportion of EU decision-making is currently assessed as falling under qualified majority voting? Please provide a breakdown by subject area.

Answer given by Mr Barroso on behalf of the Commission

(6 May 2013)

The decision-making procedures that involve qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council of the EU are clearly set out in the Treaties. As regards legislative procedures, approximately four fifths of the legal bases for the adoption of legislative acts provide for QMV. Parliament made an in-depth analysis of legislative and non-legislative procedures in its 'Resolution of 20 February 2008 on the Treaty of Lisbon' (2007/2286(INI)) ⁽¹⁾. It is not for the Commission to make assessments about actual proportions of decision-making involving QMV in the Council.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P6-TA-2008-55>.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002814/13
to the Commission**

David Campbell Bannerman (ECR)

(11 March 2013)

Subject: Accidents and injuries — EU Agency for Safety and Health at Work

Can the Commission provide a list of all accidents and injuries over the past five years (for which figures are available) that have been declared as occurring: (i) in the EU Agency for Safety and Health at Work, EU-OSHA; (ii) in the health and safety unit of the responsible DG?

Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission

(14 May 2013)

1. Following the Eurostat methodological definition of the ESAW data collection, which defines an 'accident at work' as 'a discrete occurrence in the course of work which leads to physical or mental harm', one accident at work occurred at the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work from 2010 to 2013;
 2. Following the same Eurostat definition, no accidents at work occurred in the Health, Safety and Hygiene at Work Unit of the Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion from 2007 to April 2013
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(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002815/13
to the Commission**

David Campbell Bannerman (ECR)

(11 March 2013)

Subject: EU employees claiming diplomatic immunity

Can the Commission indicate the number of cases since 2000 in which EU employees have claimed diplomatic immunity?

Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the Commission

(26 April 2013)

The Commission would point out that it receives the occasional request from national judicial authorities for a waiver of the immunity its staff members enjoy, whether under the Vienna Convention of 18 April 1961 on diplomatic relations when they are posted outside the territory of the Union, or under Protocol No 7 on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Union.

According to the data held by the Commission, we are able to inform the Honourable Member that, since January 2010, the Commission has received six requests for a waiver of immunity from legal proceedings for a member of its staff, to which the Commission responded favourably.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002816/13
to the Commission
David Campbell Bannerman (ECR)
(11 March 2013)**

Subject: EU staff arrests

Can the Commission state the number of occasions on which EU staff have been arrested for each year since 2000, indicating the country of arrest and the charges brought?

**Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the Commission
(3 May 2013)**

The Commission does not have centralised data regarding EU staff on this issue.

The Commission would point out that the definition of arrest varies from one Member State to another.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002817/13
to the Commission**

David Campbell Bannerman (ECR)

(11 March 2013)

Subject: Investigation and Disciplinary Office of the Commission

Can the Commission provide copies of the findings of its Investigation and Disciplinary Office (IDOC) for each year from 2009 onwards?

Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the Commission

(29 April 2013)

The Commission will send directly to the Honourable Member and to the Parliament's Secretariat copies of the annual reports of its Investigation and Disciplinary Office (IDOC) for the years 2009, 2010 and 2011, which lists the sanctions per category and gives a brief summary of the relevant facts. The report for 2012 is currently under preparation and is therefore not yet available.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002818/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
David Campbell Bannerman (ECR)**

(11 March 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — European External Action Service — total workforce

Can the Vice-President/High Representative indicate the total workforce of the European External Action Service, including locally employed staff, and give comparative figures for the diplomatic services of each Member State?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(6 May 2013)

The European External Action Service (EEAS) currently employs 3 392 staff altogether, 1 450 in Brussels and 1 942 in EU Delegations (of which 11 34 EEAS local agents).

The EEAS does not have official figures for the staffing of EU national foreign ministries. Furthermore, it is difficult to compare these services on a reliable basis as national practices can vary considerably, in particular when it comes to aid management or consular matters. Finally, the EEAS is not represented in EU Member States whereas this is generally an important component of national diplomatic services.

There are however a series of studies undertaken by academic institutions that provide some indications of orders of magnitude of the different services.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002819/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
David Campbell Bannerman (ECR)**

(11 March 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — European External Action Service — employment of EU nationals and local staff

Can the Vice-President/High Representative say how many (i) EU nationals and (ii) locally employed staff are currently employed by the European External Action Service, by location?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(6 May 2013)

The European External Action Service (EEAS) currently employs 3392 staff altogether, 1450 in Brussels and 1942 in EU Delegations. In the EU Delegations, the EEAS has 808 EU expatriate staff (EU civil servants, seconded national experts, EU contract agents and Young Professionals) and 1134 EEAS local agents.

Detailed chart by location can be found in annex, which is sent directly to the Honourable Member and to Parliament's Secretariat.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002820/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
David Campbell Bannerman (ECR)**

(11 March 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — European External Action Service — vehicle fleet

Can the Vice-President/High Representative state the size of the vehicle fleet of the European External Action Service (EEAS)? What is the average price of an EEAS vehicle? What is the most common vehicle used by the EEAS?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(3 May 2013)

In Brussels, there is no EEAS vehicle fleet. Through a Service Level Agreement, the Commission (Office des Infrastructures de Bruxelles) makes vehicles available to senior EEAS staff on a limited basis.

In the 141 Delegations, the size of the vehicle fleet is about 650 cars (including the armoured cars) which are used by EEAS and COM staff. Cars are used for service purpose only, including diplomatic activities and visits to development projects inside the countries. The number of cars in each Delegation depends on their size, the local security environment and transport systems. Cars are usually bought locally if possible and EU public procurement rules are followed when purchasing. With the exception of the armoured cars, the average price is EUR 25 000. Delegations use a range of vehicles for different purposes (official cars for Heads of Delegations, general service cars and 4X4 vehicles for field visits).

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002821/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
David Campbell Bannerman (ECR)**

(11 March 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Art commissioned by the European External Action Service

Can the Vice-President/High Representative list the works of art commissioned by the European External Action Services, along with their cost, since it was established? What is the process for deciding upon new art for EU embassies/missions?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(7 May 2013)

The EEAS has not commissioned any art works to decorate its delegation since 1 January 2011 and the tight EEAS budget does not leave any margin for any spending on art. Occasionally, the EEAS, and EU Delegations, have benefited from protocol gifts of works of art from international partners.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002823/13
a la Comisión**

Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Spyros Danellis (S&D), Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE), Dominique Vlasto (PPE), Luis de Grandes Pascual (PPE), Carlo Fidanza (PPE), Jim Higgins (PPE) y Giommaria Uggias (ALDE)
(11 de marzo de 2013)

Asunto: Grupo de crisis de la UE para la gestión turística

La industria del turismo en la UE genera alrededor del 5 % del PIB de la Unión y emplea a cerca del 5,2 % de la población activa total. Es más, si se toman también en consideración los servicios relacionados con el turismo, las cifras ascienden al 10 % del PIB y al 12 % de la población activa total.

En algunas regiones de la Unión, el turismo es la actividad económica principal. Por ello, los efectos de una catástrofe natural o de otro tipo de desastre pueden resultar insostenibles tanto para las economías locales como para los Estados miembros implicados, no solo debido a los esfuerzos de reconstrucción y rehabilitación, sino también por la disminución de los ingresos por turismo. Esto ocurre porque los medios de comunicación tienden de forma inevitable a distorsionar la situación real, lo cual trae consigo graves consecuencias para la imagen del destino turístico.

La crisis económica y monetaria está provocando un estancamiento e incluso una recesión en el sector turístico de algunas regiones de la UE.

El Tratado de Lisboa confiere nuevas competencias compartidas a la Unión, incluida la promoción de acciones o de instrumentos capaces de crear un valor añadido europeo mediante el desarrollo de estrategias transnacionales, consistentes en el intercambio de buenas prácticas, la accesibilidad a los datos y el análisis de estos.

Entre los beneficiarios del programa COSME (Programa para la Competitividad de las Empresas y para las Pequeñas y Medianas Empresas) se incluyen las PYME del sector turístico, al que se destinan 131 millones de euros de los 2 500 millones que conforman el presupuesto total.

1. A la vista de las competencias compartidas que confiere el Tratado de Lisboa, ¿está considerando la Comisión establecer un pequeño grupo o un organismo para gestionar las situaciones de crisis y proporcionar asistencia en materia de turismo a los medios de comunicación y a los operadores, con el objetivo de disminuir las consecuencias negativas de la transmisión de información engañosa que puede dañar la imagen turística de un lugar?
2. En caso afirmativo, ¿sobre qué base se desarrollaría este pequeño grupo u organismo?

Respuesta del Sr. Tajani en nombre de la Comisión
(16 de mayo de 2013)

La Comisión reconoce que las catástrofes naturales y otras situaciones de peligro pueden tener efectos importantes en la industria del turismo y, en general, en las economías locales de las regiones y los Estados miembros afectados. Estos y aquellas son los principales responsables de gestionar las emergencias en sus territorios respectivos y de decidir si necesitan ayuda exterior.

A nivel europeo, la Comisión puede facilitar apoyo a través del Mecanismo de Protección Civil de la Unión ⁽¹⁾, que facilita la cooperación en las intervenciones de protección civil en caso de emergencias graves. Sin embargo, con arreglo al principio de subsidiariedad, solo ofrece su apoyo a petición del país afectado. Esto puede ocurrir cuando la preparación de este país ante una catástrofe no es suficiente para darle una respuesta adecuada con los recursos disponibles ⁽²⁾.

En cuanto a las crisis posteriores a las catástrofes a las que se refiere Su Señoría, la Comisión ya ha tomado medidas en relación con la información engañosa en este contexto sobre la situación de varios destinos dentro de la Unión Europea. Por el momento, la Comisión no ha recibido ninguna solicitud de creación de un organismo específico para prestar asistencia en temas turísticos a los medios de comunicación y a los operadores, pero está dispuesta a seguir estudiando con los Estados miembros y la industria turística si conviene crear tal grupo u organismo, y cuáles han de ser sus competencias.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/disaster_response/mechanism_en.htm

⁽²⁾ Un ejemplo reciente en este sentido es la intervención del Mecanismo de Protección Civil de la Unión para apoyar la lucha contra los incendios forestales ocurridos en Portugal en septiembre de 2012.

Además, la Red de Respuesta ante Emergencias Turísticas ⁽³⁾, bajo la responsabilidad de la Organización Mundial del Turismo, ayuda a mejorar el bienestar de los pasajeros y a limitar el efecto de las catástrofes naturales y de origen humano sobre el turismo.

(3) <http://rcm.unwto.org/en/content/about-tourism-emergency-response-network-tern-0>.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002823/13

προς την Επιτροπή

Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Spyros Danellis (S&D), Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE), Dominique Vlasto (PPE), Luis de Grandes Pascual (PPE), Carlo Fidanza (PPE), Jim Higgins (PPE) και Giommara Uggias (ALDE)

(11 Μαρτίου 2013)

Θέμα: Ομάδα αντιμετώπισης κρίσης στη διαχείριση του ενωσιακού τουρισμού

Η τουριστική βιομηχανία της ΕΕ αποδίδει περίπου το 5% του συνολικού ΑΕγχΠ της Ένωσης, αντιστοιχώντας περίπου στο 5,2% του συνολικού εργατικού δυναμικού· αν ληφθούν υπόψη και οι υπηρεσίες που συνδέονται με τον τουρισμό, τα αντίστοιχα ποσοστά ξεπερνούν το 10% του ΑΕγχΠ και 12% του εργατικού δυναμικού.

Σε μερικές ευρωπαϊκές περιφέρειες ο τουρισμός είναι η βασική οικονομική δραστηριότητα, οι δε επιπτώσεις από μια φυσική καταστροφή ή άλλο κίνδυνο μπορεί να αποδειχθούν αβάσταχτες για τις τοπικές οικονομίες και το πληγέν κράτος μέλος, όχι μόνο από την άποψη των προσπαθειών ανοικοδόμησης και αποκατάστασης αλλά και εξαιτίας της πτώσης των εσόδων από τον τουρισμό, δεδομένου ότι τα ΜΜΕ τείνουν πάντα να διαστρεβλώνουν την πραγματικότητα, πράγμα που επιφέρει αρνητικότερες επιπτώσεις στην τουριστική εικόνα του τόπου.

Η οικονομική και νομισματική κρίση προκαλεί στασιμότητα και σε ορισμένες περιπτώσεις ύφεση στην τουριστική δραστηριότητα ορισμένων περιφερειών της ΕΕ.

Η Συνθήκη της Λισαβόνας έχει δώσει νέες συντρέχουσες αρμοδιότητες στην Ένωση, όπως η προώθηση μέτρων ή μέσων που μπορούν να δημιουργήσουν ευρωπαϊκή προστιθέμενη αξία μέσω της αναπτύξεως διακρατικών στρατηγικών, χάρη στην ανταλλαγή βέλτιστων πρακτικών και τη διαθεσιμότητα και ανάλυση δεδομένων.

Στους δικαιούχους του προγράμματος COSME (Ανταγωνιστικότητα των Επιχειρήσεων και των ΜΜΕ) περιλαμβάνονται ΜΜΕ του τουριστικού τομέα, ενώ 131 εκατ. ευρώ από το συνολικό του προϋπολογισμό 2,5 δισ. ευρώ για την περίοδο 2014-2020 διατίθενται στον τουρισμό.

1. Με δεδομένες τις συντρέχουσες αρμοδιότητες που προβλέπει η Συνθήκη της Λισαβόνας, εξετάζει η Επιτροπή το ενδεχόμενο να συγκροτήσει μία μικρή ομάδα ή/και φορέα για τη διαχείριση κρίσεων μετά από καταστροφές και την προσφορά υπηρεσιών σχετικών με τον τουρισμό στα μέσα ενημέρωσης και στους πράκτορες, με σκοπό να αμβλύνονται οι αρνητικές επιπτώσεις από τη διάδοση παραπλανητικών πληροφοριών που μπορεί να καταστρέψουν την εικόνα ενός τουριστικού προορισμού;

2. Αν ναι, σε ποια βάση μπορεί να αναπτυχθεί μια τέτοια μικρή ομάδα ή/και φορέας;

Απάντηση του κ. Tajani εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής

(16 Μαΐου 2013)

Η Επιτροπή αναγνωρίζει ότι οι φυσικές και άλλες καταστροφές μπορεί να επιφέρουν σημαντικά πλήγματα στην τουριστική βιομηχανία και γενικώς στις τοπικές οικονομίες των περιφερειών και των κρατών μελών. Τα κράτη μέλη και οι περιφέρειές τους φέρουν την κύρια ευθύνη για τη διαχείριση των καταστάσεων έκτακτης ανάγκης στην επικράτειά τους, καθώς και για τη λήψη απόφασης ως προς το κατά πόσον χρειάζονται εξωτερική βοήθεια.

Σε ευρωπαϊκό επίπεδο, η Επιτροπή μπορεί να παράσχει υποστήριξη μέσω του μηχανισμού πολιτικής προστασίας της ΕΕ⁽¹⁾, ο οποίος διευκολύνει την συνεργασία στις επεμβάσεις παροχής βοήθειας πολιτικής προστασίας, σε περιπτώσεις έκτακτης ανάγκης. Ωστόσο, σύμφωνα με την αρχή της επικουρικότητας, η εν λόγω υποστήριξη παρέχεται μόνο κατόπιν αιτήματος της πληγείσας χώρας. Αυτό μπορεί να συμβεί αν η πληγείσα χώρα δεν είναι επαρκώς προετοιμασμένη, όσον αφορά τους διαθέσιμους πόρους⁽²⁾, για την αντιμετώπιση της καταστροφής.

Σχετικά με την ερώτηση του αξιότιμου βουλευτή ως προς τη διαχείριση καταστάσεων κρίσης μετά από καταστροφές, η Επιτροπή έχει ήδη λάβει μέτρα όσον αφορά τις παραπλανητικές πληροφορίες σχετικά με την κατάσταση μετά από καταστροφές σε διάφορους προορισμούς εντός της ΕΕ. Προς το παρόν, η Επιτροπή δεν έχει λάβει καμία αίτηση σύστασης ειδικού φορέα για την παροχή βοήθειας στο πλαίσιο της προώθησης του τουρισμού στα μέσα μαζικής ενημέρωσης και στους τουριστικούς πράκτορες, αλλά είναι πρόθυμη να εξετάσει περαιτέρω από κοινού με τα κράτη μέλη και τη βιομηχανία τουρισμού κατά πόσον θα πρέπει να συσταθεί μια τέτοια ομάδα ή φορέας και ποιες θα πρέπει να είναι η αρμοδιότητές τους.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/disaster_response/mechanism_en.htm

⁽²⁾ Ένα πρόσφατο παράδειγμα υπό αυτή την έννοια είναι η παρέμβαση του μηχανισμού πολιτικής προστασίας της ΕΕ στο πλαίσιο της στήριξης της Πορτογαλίας για την καταπολέμηση των δασικών πυρκαγιών τον Σεπτέμβριο του 2012.

Επιπλέον, το δίκτυο Tourism Emergency Response Network ⁽³⁾ (TERN) για την αντιμετώπιση καταστάσεων έκτακτης ανάγκης, υπό την αιγίδα του Παγκόσμιου Οργανισμού Τουρισμού (UNWTO), συμβάλλει στη βελτίωση της ευημερίας των ταξιδιωτών και στην άμβλυση των επιπτώσεων των φυσικών και των ανθρωπογενών καταστροφών στον τομέα του τουρισμού.

(3) <http://rcm.unwto.org/en/content/about-tourism-emergency-response-network-tern-0>

(Version française)

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-002823/13
à la Commission**

**Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Spyros Danellis (S&D), Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE), Dominique Vlasto (PPE),
Luis de Grandes Pascual (PPE), Carlo Fidanza (PPE), Jim Higgins (PPE) et Giommara Uggias (ALDE)**
(11 mars 2013)

Objet: Groupe de crise sur la gestion du tourisme dans l'Union

L'industrie du tourisme génère quelque 5 % du PIB total de l'Union et emploie environ 5,2 % de la main d'œuvre totale; lorsqu'on y ajoute les services liés au tourisme, les chiffres s'élèvent à plus de 10 % du PIB et 12 % de la main d'œuvre.

Dans certaines régions d'Europe, le tourisme est la principale activité économique. Les répercussions d'une catastrophe naturelle ou d'un autre type de risque peuvent s'avérer impossibles à assumer pour les économies locales et l'État membre concerné, non seulement en raison des efforts nécessaires à la reconstruction et à la remise en état, mais aussi à cause de la baisse des recettes touristiques résultant de l'image faussée que les médias ont inévitablement tendance à présenter et qui a des conséquences désastreuses sur la réputation de la destination.

La crise économique et monétaire provoque une stagnation, voire une récession, de l'activité touristique dans certaines régions de l'Union.

Le traité de Lisbonne a conféré de nouvelles compétences partagées à l'Union, telles que la promotion d'actions ou d'instruments capables de créer une valeur ajoutée européenne par le développement de stratégies transnationales, au moyen de l'échange de bonnes pratiques, ainsi que de la mise à disposition et de l'analyse de données.

Le programme pour la compétitivité des entreprises et des PME (COSME) compte des PME du secteur du tourisme parmi ses bénéficiaires. Sur son budget total de 2,5 milliards d'euros pour la période 2014-2020, 131 millions d'euros sont alloués au tourisme.

1. Au vu des compétences partagées prévues par le traité de Lisbonne, la Commission envisage-t-elle de créer un petit groupe et/ou un organe qui serait chargé de gérer les situations de crise survenant à la suite d'une catastrophe et de fournir une assistance en matière de tourisme aux médias et aux opérateurs, afin de réduire les répercussions négatives que peut avoir la diffusion d'informations trompeuses susceptibles d'anéantir la réputation d'une destination?
2. Dans l'affirmative, sur quelle base un tel petit groupe et/ou organe pourrait-il être créé?

Réponse donnée par M. Tajani au nom de la Commission
(16 mai 2013)

La Commission est consciente que les catastrophes naturelles et les autres risques majeurs peuvent avoir de graves conséquences sur l'activité touristique et, en général, sur les économies locales des régions et des États membres concernés. C'est aux États membres et à leurs régions qu'appartient la responsabilité primaire de gérer les urgences se déclarant sur leur territoire et de décider s'ils ont besoin d'une assistance extérieure.

Au niveau européen, la Commission peut fournir une aide par l'intermédiaire du mécanisme de protection civile de l'UE ⁽¹⁾, qui facilite la coopération en ce qui concerne les interventions de secours relevant de la protection civile en cas d'urgence majeure. Cependant, conformément au principe de subsidiarité, le mécanisme n'est activé que si le pays touché le demande, ce qui peut se produire lorsque les ressources du pays en question ne lui permettent pas de réagir efficacement à une catastrophe naturelle ⁽²⁾.

Pour ce qui est de la question de l'Honorable Parlementaire relative à la gestion des situations de crise postérieures aux catastrophes, la Commission a déjà pris des mesures concernant les informations trompeuses circulant sur ce type de situation dans différentes destinations touristiques au sein de l'UE. Pour le moment, la Commission n'a pas reçu de demande de création d'un organe spécifique susceptible de fournir une assistance «Tourisme» aux médias et aux opérateurs, mais elle est disposée à examiner avec les États membres et les professionnels du tourisme si un tel groupe ou organe devrait être créé et quel devrait être son mandat.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/disaster_response/mechanism_fr.htm

⁽²⁾ Parmi les exemples récents, on peut citer l'intervention du mécanisme de protection civile de l'UE pour soutenir le Portugal dans la lutte contre les feux de forêt qui ont ravagé le pays en septembre 2012.

En outre, le Tourism Emergency Response Network ⁽³⁾ (réseau d'intervention d'urgence dans le domaine du tourisme, TERN), placé sous la responsabilité de l'Organisation mondiale du tourisme (OMT), contribue à améliorer le bien-être des voyageurs et à réduire l'impact des catastrophes naturelles et d'origine humaine sur le tourisme.

(3) <http://rcm.unwto.org/en/content/about-tourism-emergency-response-network-tern-0>

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002823/13
alla Commissione**

Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Spyros Danellis (S&D), Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE), Dominique Vlasto (PPE), Luis de Grandes Pascual (PPE), Carlo Fidanza (PPE), Jim Higgins (PPE) e Giommaria Uggias (ALDE)

(11 marzo 2013)

Oggetto: Gruppo UE di gestione delle crisi nel settore del Turismo

L'industria del turismo dell'UE crea circa il 5 % del PIL dell'Unione e rappresenta circa il 5,2 % della forza lavoro totale; se si considerano anche i servizi connessi il dato sale oltre il 10 % del PIL e il 12 % della forza lavoro complessiva.

Per talune regioni d'Europa il turismo è la principale attività economica e gli effetti negativi a seguito di una calamità naturale o altri rischi possono diventare insopportabili per le economie locali e per gli Stati membri, non solo per gli sforzi di ricostruzione e riabilitazione, ma anche a causa di una diminuzione delle entrate da turismo, dato che i media inevitabilmente tendono a distorcere la realtà, con conseguenze enormi per l'immagine della destinazione colpita.

Le crisi economiche e monetarie creano stagnazione e, in alcuni casi, recessione dell'attività turistica in alcune regioni dell'Unione europea.

Il Trattato di Lisbona offre nuove competenze condivise all'Unione quali la promozione di azioni o di strumenti in grado di creare un valore aggiunto europeo attraverso lo sviluppo di strategie transnazionali, attraverso lo scambio di buone prassi e della disponibilità e analisi dei dati.

Il programma COSME (Programma per la competitività delle imprese e delle PMI) comprende le PMI del turismo con 131 milioni per il turismo su una proposta di bilancio di 2,5 miliardi di euro per il 2014-2020.

1. Alla luce delle competenze condivise contemplate nel Trattato di Lisbona, la Commissione considererà la creazione di un piccolo gruppo e/o di un organismo per la gestione della crisi conseguente a un disastro, che assista, in una prospettiva turistica, i media e gli operatori con lo scopo di ridurre gli effetti negativi di una pubblicità errata che può distruggere l'immagine di una destinazione?
2. In caso affermativo, su quali basi si potrebbe sviluppare siffatto piccolo gruppo e/o organismo?

Risposta di Antonio Tajani a nome della Commissione

(16 maggio 2013)

La Commissione riconosce che le catastrofi naturali o pericoli critici di altra natura possano avere gravi ripercussioni sul settore del turismo e, in generale, sulle economie locali delle regioni e degli Stati membri interessati. La responsabilità primaria per la gestione delle emergenze sul proprio territorio e per un'eventuale richiesta di assistenza esterna spetta agli Stati membri e alle loro regioni.

A livello europeo la Commissione può fornire sostegno mediante il meccanismo di protezione civile dell'UE ⁽¹⁾ che, in caso di gravi emergenze, facilita la cooperazione nel corso degli interventi di soccorso della protezione civile. Essa tuttavia rende disponibile tale sostegno solamente su richiesta dello stato colpito in ottemperanza al principio di sussidiarietà. Ciò può verificarsi se il livello di preparazione alle catastrofi di un determinato paese si dimostra in un caso specifico insufficiente a fornire una risposta adeguata in termini di risorse disponibili ⁽²⁾.

Per quanto riguarda la domanda dell'onorevole parlamentare in tema di gestione delle situazioni di crisi in seguito a una catastrofe, la Commissione ha già preso provvedimenti in merito ad informazioni fuorvianti sulla situazione esistente in destinazioni turistiche differenti dell'Unione in seguito alla catastrofe. Per il momento la Commissione non ha ricevuto richieste relative all'istituzione di un organismo specifico per l'assistenza ai media e agli operatori in tema di turismo. Ciononostante è sua intenzione svolgere ulteriori indagini in collaborazione con gli Stati membri e il settore turistico al fine di verificare l'effettiva necessità di istituire tale organismo e, al caso, stabilirne i compiti.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/disaster_response/mechanism_en.htm

⁽²⁾ A questo proposito un esempio recente è costituito dall'intervento del meccanismo di protezione civile dell'UE a sostegno del Portogallo nella lotta agli incendi boschivi del mese di settembre 2012.

Sotto la responsabilità dell'Organizzazione Mondiale del Turismo (OMT) il Tourism Emergency Response Network ⁽³⁾ (TERN) contribuisce inoltre a migliorare il benessere dei viaggiatori e ad alleviare gli effetti sul turismo delle catastrofi naturali nonché di quelle causate dall'uomo.

⁽³⁾ <http://rcm.unwto.org/en/content/about-tourism-emergency-response-network-tern-0>.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002823/13
à Comissão

Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Spyros Danellis (S&D), Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE), Dominique Vlasto (PPE), Luis de Grandes Pascual (PPE), Carlo Fidanza (PPE), Jim Higgins (PPE) e Giommaria Uggias (ALDE)

(11 de março de 2013)

Assunto: Grupo de gestão da crise do turismo na UE

O setor do turismo gera cerca de 5 % da totalidade do PIB da União, representando aproximadamente 5,2 % do total da força de trabalho. Se os serviços relacionados com o turismo também forem tidos em conta, os números ascenderão a mais de 10 % do PIB e a 12 % da mão de obra, respetivamente.

Em algumas regiões da Europa, o turismo é a principal atividade económica e as consequências de um desastre natural ou de qualquer outra catástrofe poderão não ser suportáveis para as economias locais ou para o Estado-Membro em causa, tendo em conta, não só os esforços de reconstrução e reabilitação, mas também a queda das receitas no setor, na medida em que os meios de comunicação social, numa circunstância dessas, tenderão inevitavelmente a distorcer a situação real, com consequências imprevisíveis para a reputação de um determinado destino turístico.

A crise económica e monetária está a gerar situações de estagnação e, em alguns casos, de recessão na atividade turística em algumas das regiões da União Europeia.

O Tratado de Lisboa atribuiu novas competências partilhadas à União, como é o caso do fomento de ações ou instrumentos capazes de criar valor acrescentado europeu através do desenvolvimento de estratégias transnacionais, por via do intercâmbio de práticas de excelência e da disponibilização e análise de dados.

Os beneficiários do Programa COSME (Competitividade das Empresas e das Pequenas e Médias Empresas) incluem as PME do setor do turismo, estando 131 milhões de euros de um orçamento total que ascende a 2,5 mil milhões de euros para o período 2014-2020 reservados para a atividade turística.

1. À luz das competências partilhadas conferidas pelo Tratado de Lisboa, estará a Comissão a ponderar a criação de um pequeno grupo e/ou organismo para gerir as situações de crise após a ocorrência de desastres e para prestar um tipo de assistência vocacionada para o turismo, tanto aos meios de comunicação social, como aos operadores, com o propósito de minorar os efeitos negativos da transmissão de informação enganosa e passível de destruir a reputação de um destino?
2. Em caso de resposta afirmativa, em que bases poderá alicerçar-se um grupo e/ou organismo de tão pequenas dimensões?

Resposta dada por Antonio Tajani em nome da Comissão

(16 de maio de 2013)

A Comissão reconhece que as catástrofes naturais ou outras calamidades podem ter um impacto importante na indústria do turismo e, de um modo geral, nas economias locais das regiões e dos Estados-Membros em causa. Os Estados-Membros e as respetivas regiões são os primeiros responsáveis por gerir as situações de emergência no seu território e decidir da necessidade de ajuda externa.

A nível europeu, a Comissão pode prestar apoio através do mecanismo de proteção civil da UE ⁽¹⁾, que facilita a cooperação em intervenções de socorro da proteção civil em caso de situações de emergência grave. No entanto, em conformidade com o princípio da subsidiariedade, este mecanismo apenas disponibiliza apoios a pedido do país afetado. Tal pode acontecer se, em caso de catástrofe, o país em causa não estiver suficientemente preparado para dar uma resposta adequada em termos dos recursos que tem disponíveis ⁽²⁾.

Relativamente à pergunta dos Senhores Deputados sobre a gestão de situações de crise após a ocorrência de catástrofes, a Comissão já interveio no que respeita à transmissão de informações enganosas sobre a situação pós-catástrofe em diferentes destinos da UE. De momento, a Comissão não recebeu qualquer pedido de criação de um organismo específico para prestar assistência na área do turismo aos meios de comunicação social e aos operadores, mas está disposta a analisar de forma mais aprofundada, em cooperação com os Estados-Membros e o setor do turismo, a pertinência da criação de um grupo ou organismo desse tipo e o eventual mandato.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/disaster_response/mechanism_en.htm

⁽²⁾ Um exemplo recente é a intervenção do mecanismo de proteção civil da UE em apoio do combate aos incêndios florestais de Portugal, em setembro de 2012.

Além disso, a rede de resposta a situações de emergência no turismo ⁽³⁾, sob a responsabilidade da Organização Mundial do Turismo (OMT), contribui para melhorar o bem-estar dos viajantes e atenuar o impacto no setor do turismo de catástrofes naturais e provocadas pelo homem.

(3) <http://rcm.unwto.org/en/content/about-tourism-emergency-response-network-tern-0>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002823/13
to the Commission**

Nuno Teixeira (PPE), Spyros Danellis (S&D), Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE), Dominique Vlasto (PPE), Luis de Grandes Pascual (PPE), Carlo Fidanza (PPE), Jim Higgins (PPE) and Giommaria Uggias (ALDE)
(11 March 2013)

Subject: EU tourism management crisis group

The EU's tourism industry generates around 5% of the Union's total GDP, accounting for some 5.2% of the total labour force; if tourism-related services are also taken into account, the figures become more than 10% of GDP and 12% of the workforce, respectively.

In some European regions, tourism is the main economic activity, and the fallout from a natural disaster or other hazard can prove impossible for the local economies and the Member State concerned to bear, not only in view of the reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts but also because of the fall in income from tourism, given that the media inevitably tend to distort the real situation, with huge consequences for the destination's image.

The economic and monetary crisis is creating stagnation and in some cases recession in tourist activity in some regions in the EU.

The Treaty of Lisbon has conferred new shared competences on the Union, such as the promotion of actions or instruments capable of creating European added value through the development of transnational strategies, by means of the exchange of best practice and the availability and analysis of data.

The beneficiaries of the COSME (Competitiveness of Enterprises and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises) programme include SMEs in the tourism sector, with EUR 1 31 million out of its total budget of EUR 2.5 billion for the period 2014-2020 being allocated to tourism.

1. In view of the shared competences conferred by the Treaty of Lisbon, is the Commission considering setting up a small group and/or body to manage post-disaster crisis situations and provide tourism-related assistance to the media and to operators, with the aim of diminishing the negative effects of the relaying of misleading information which can destroy a destination's image?
2. If so, on what basis might such a small group and/or body be developed?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission
(16 May 2013)

The Commission acknowledges that natural disasters or other critical hazards can have major impacts on the tourism industry and, generally, on the local economies of the regions and Member States concerned. It is the Member States and their regions that bear the primary responsibility for managing emergencies on their territories and for deciding whether they need external assistance.

At European level, the Commission can provide support through the EU Civil Protection Mechanism ⁽¹⁾ which facilitates cooperation in civil protection assistance interventions in the event of major emergencies. However, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, it only makes support available on request of the affected country. This may arise if the affected country's preparedness for a disaster is not sufficient to provide an adequate response in terms of available resources ⁽²⁾.

On the Honourable Member's question related to managing post-disaster crisis situations, the Commission has already taken action with regard to misleading information on the post-disaster situation in different EU destinations. For the moment, the Commission has not received any request to set up a dedicated body to provide tourism-related assistance to the media and to operators but it is willing to further investigate with the Member States and the tourism industry whether such a group or body should be set up and what its remit should be.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/echo/policies/disaster_response/mechanism_en.htm

⁽²⁾ A recent example in this sense is the intervention of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism in support of Portugal's fight against forest fire in September 2012.

Furthermore, the Tourism Emergency Response Network ⁽³⁾ (TERN) under the responsibility of the World Tourism Organisation (UNWTO) helps improve the well-being of travellers and to mitigate the impacts of natural and man-made disasters on tourism.

⁽³⁾ <http://rcm.unwto.org/en/content/about-tourism-emergency-response-network-tern-0>.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002824/13
προς την Επιτροπή
Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE)
(11 Μαρτίου 2013)

Θέμα: Πρωτοβουλίες για τη στήριξη της λογοθεραπείας

Με αφορμή την Ευρωπαϊκή Ημέρα Λογοθεραπείας (6 Μαρτίου) ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

- Διαθέτει στοιχεία σχετικά με το ποσοστό των παιδιών που εκτιμάται πως αντιμετωπίζει διαταραχές στην ανάπτυξη, στην κατανόηση και στην έκφραση του λόγου στην ΕΕ;
- Καθώς η καθιέρωση της ευρωπαϊκής ημέρας συνιστά και πρωτοβουλίες προς την κατεύθυνση της έγκαιρης διάγνωσης των διαταραχών αυτών, είναι σε θέση να με ενημερώσει η Επιτροπή για τις πρόσφατες δράσεις της στον συγκεκριμένο τομέα;

Απάντηση της κ. Βασιλείου εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(14 Μαΐου 2013)

Η Επιτροπή δεν διαθέτει συγκριτικά στοιχεία για την ΕΕ.

Η ομάδα εμπειρογνομόνων υψηλού επιπέδου για τον αλφαριθμητισμό, την οποία έχει καταρτίσει η Επιτροπή, υπογράμμισε τη σημασία της έγκαιρης διάγνωσης των γλωσσικών προβλημάτων. Η τελική της έκθεση⁽¹⁾ (η οποία δημοσιεύθηκε τον Σεπτέμβριο του 2012) ανέφερε ότι η έγκαιρη αντιμετώπιση των γλωσσικών προβλημάτων μπορεί να αποτρέψει την εξέλιξη τους σε μεγαλύτερα εκπαιδευτικά εμπόδια στο μέλλον. Η γλωσσική αξιολόγηση θα πρέπει να ακολουθήσει το παράδειγμα των επιτυχών προγραμμάτων για την υγεία, τα οποία ελέγχουν την ακοή, την όραση και την ομιλία των μικρών παιδιών και παρέχουν αξιόπιστη πρόσβαση στην επαγγελματική υποστήριξη που χρειάζονται προκειμένου να αντιμετωπίσουν σχετικά προβλήματα.

(1) http://ec.europa.eu/education/literacy/what-eu/high-level-group/documents/literacy-final-report_en.pdf

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002824/13
to the Commission**

Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE)

(11 March 2013)

Subject: Initiatives to support speech and language therapy

Following the European Day of Speech and Language Therapy on 6 March, will the Commission say:

- Does it have statistics on the estimated percentage of children with speech development, comprehension and expression difficulties in the EU?
- As the European Day was adopted in order to promote initiatives to foster the early diagnosis of such difficulties, is the Commission able to report any recent action in this particular sector?

Answer given by Ms Vassiliou on behalf of the Commission

(14 May 2013)

The Commission does not have comparable data for the EU.

The High Level Group of experts in the field of Literacy that was established by the Commission stressed the importance of early diagnosis of language problems. Its final report ⁽¹⁾ (published in September 2012) stated that, if language problems are addressed early, they can be prevented from growing into much bigger educational obstacles later. Language assessment should follow the example of successful health programmes which screen young children for hearing, eyesight and speech and provide reliable access to the professional support they need to overcome difficulties.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/education/literacy/what-eu/high-level-group/documents/literacy-final-report_en.pdf

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002825/13
προς την Επιτροπή
Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE)
(11 Μαρτίου 2013)

Θέμα: Αποτελεσματικότητα του Προγράμματος Αμέσων Νομισματικών Συναλλαγών (OMT)

Το Πρόγραμμα Αμέσων Νομισματικών Συναλλαγών (OMT), που ανακοινώθηκε στις αρχές Σεπτεμβρίου 2012 από την ΕΚΤ, αποσκοπούσε μεταξύ άλλων στην αντιμετώπιση του προβλήματος δανεισμού των μικρομεσαίων επιχειρήσεων στην ΕΕ. Μισό χρόνο αργότερα, προκύπτει ότι επιχειρήσεις σε κράτη μέλη που βρίσκονται σε ύφεση καταβάλλουν ολοένα και υψηλότερους τόκους δανεισμού. Για παράδειγμα, τον Ιανουάριο 2013, το σχετικό επιτόκιο ανήλθε στο 5,8% στην Ιταλία και στο 6% στην Ισπανία, από 5,55% και 5,65% αντίστοιχα πριν λίγους μήνες, εγείροντας εκ των πραγμάτων ερωτηματικά για την αποδοτικότητα του μέτρου.

- Ποίοι κατά την Επιτροπή, οι λόγοι της πολύ περιορισμένης επιτυχίας του συγκεκριμένου μέτρου;
- Εκτιμά ότι ο συγκεκριμένος μηχανισμός χρειάζεται είτε να ενισχυθεί είτε να αναμορφωθεί;

Απάντηση του κ. Rehn εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(7 Μαΐου 2013)

Καταρχάς, η Επιτροπή υπενθυμίζει ότι η νομισματική πολιτική αποτελεί αποκλειστική αρμοδιότητα της ΕΚΤ, η οποία δρα με πλήρη ανεξαρτησία σύμφωνα με την εντολή της που ορίζεται από τη Συνθήκη.

Δεύτερον, οι Άμεσες Νομισματικές Συναλλαγές θα ληφθούν υπόψη για μελλοντικές υποθέσεις σχετικά με προγράμματα μακροοικονομικής προσαρμογής ή προληπτικά προγράμματα του ΕΤΧΣ/ΕΜΣ. Μπορούν επίσης να ληφθούν υπόψη για κράτη μέλη, τα οποία επί του παρόντος υπόκεινται σε προγράμματα μακροοικονομικής προσαρμογής, όταν αποκτήσουν εκ νέου πρόσβαση στις αγορές ομολόγων⁽¹⁾. Οι ΟΝΣ δεν έχουν χρησιμοποιηθεί ακόμη.

⁽¹⁾ http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002825/13
to the Commission**

Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE)

(11 March 2013)

Subject: Success of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme

One of the aims of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme announced by the ECB in early September 2012 was to address the problem of borrowing by small and medium-sized enterprises in the EU. Six months later, it would appear that enterprises in the Member States in recession are paying increasingly higher borrowing rates. For example, in January 2013, the interest rate was 5.8% in Italy and 6% in Spain, compared with 5.55% and 5.65% a few months ago, thereby begging questions as to the success of the measure.

- What, in the Commission's view, are the reasons for the very limited success of this particular measure?
- Does it consider that this particular mechanism needs to be strengthened or revised?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission

(7 May 2013)

First of all, the Commission recalls that monetary policy is the exclusive competence of the ECB, which acts in full independence in line with its mandate set out by the Treaty.

Secondly, Outright Monetary Transactions will be considered for future cases of EFSF/ESM macroeconomic adjustment programmes or precautionary programmes. They may also be considered for Member States currently under a macroeconomic adjustment programme when they will be regaining bond market access⁽¹⁾. The OMT has not been yet used.

⁽¹⁾ http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002826/13
προς την Επιτροπή
Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE)
(11 Μαρτίου 2013)

Θέμα: Γραφειοκρατία στις εξαγωγές

Παρόλο που το κόστος της γραφειοκρατίας είναι δύσκολο να εκτιμηθεί σε όρους ΑΕΠ, είναι σε θέση να με ενημερώσει η Επιτροπή για τον χρόνο που απαιτείται κατά μέσο όρο για την εξαγωγή προϊόντων από την Ελλάδα; Ποιος είναι ο ευρωπαϊκός μέσος όρος και σε ποια κράτη μέλη παρατηρείται ο μικρότερος χρόνος;

Απάντηση του κ. Šemeta εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(7 Μαΐου 2013)

Η Επιτροπή γνωρίζει τα στοιχεία που ζητήθηκαν, τα οποία παρέχονται από την Εθνική Στρατηγική και Οδικό Χάρτη της Ελλάδας για τη Διευκόλυνση του Εμπορίου ⁽¹⁾. Στο έγγραφο αυτό (στις σελίδες 15 και 16), γίνεται αναφορά στην έκθεση της Παγκόσμιας Τράπεζας «Doing Business — Trading Across Border» ⁽²⁾. Σύμφωνα με την έκθεση αυτή, απαιτούνται 19 ημέρες για την εξαγωγή προϊόντων από την Ελλάδα, ενώ ο μέσος όρος όλων των κρατών μελών της ΕΕ είναι 11 ημέρες. Ο βραχύτερος χρόνος για εξαγωγή προϊόντων στην ΕΕ είναι 5 ημέρες στη Δανία και την Εσθονία, ενώ τη δεύτερη θέση κατέχουν οι Κάτω Χώρες με 6 ημέρες. Αυτά τα αριθμητικά στοιχεία αντιπροσωπεύουν τον συνολικό αριθμό ημερών που απαιτούνται για την εξαγωγή ενός προϊόντος, συμπεριλαμβανομένης της έκδοσης των απαραίτητων εγγράφων (πιστοποιητικών, αδειών), της εσωτερικής μεταφοράς, των τελωνειακών διαδικασιών και της διακίνησης σε λιμένες/τερματικούς σταθμούς.

⁽¹⁾ http://www.mindev.gov.gr/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Greece_Trade_Facilitation_Strategy_Roadmap_Oct-2012.pdf

⁽²⁾ <http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/trading-across-borders>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002826/13
to the Commission**

Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE)

(11 March 2013)

Subject: Red tape in exports

Although the cost of red tape is hard to estimate in terms of GDP, is the Commission able to tell me how long it takes on average to export products from Greece? What is the European average and which Member States have the shortest time?

Answer given by Mr Šemeta on behalf of the Commission

(7 May 2013)

The Commission is aware of the requested figures, which are provided by the National Trade Facilitation Strategy and Roadmap for Greece ⁽¹⁾. In this document (on page 15 and 16), reference is made to the 'World Bank Doing Business — Trading Across Border' Report ⁽²⁾. According to this report, it takes 19 days to export goods from Greece, whereas the average of all EU Member States is 11 days and the shortest export time in the EU is 5 days in Denmark and Estonia, followed by 6 days in the Netherlands. These figures represent the overall number of days needed to export a product, including the issuance of the necessary documents (certificates, licences), the inland transport, the customs procedures and the port/terminal handlings.

⁽¹⁾ http://www.mindev.gov.gr/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Greece_Trade_Facilitation_Strategy_Roadmap_Oct-2012.pdf

⁽²⁾ <http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/trading-across-borders>

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002827/13
προς την Επιτροπή
Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE)
(11 Μαρτίου 2013)

Θέμα: Οριστική κατανομή κονδυλίων προς την Ελλάδα του γενικού προγράμματος «Αλληλεγγύη και διαχείριση μεταναστευτικών ροών» για το 2013

Είναι σε θέση να με ενημερώσει η Επιτροπή για την οριστική κατανομή των κονδυλίων προς την Ελλάδα, βάσει των τεσσάρων Ταμείων του γενικού προγράμματος «Αλληλεγγύη και διαχείριση μεταναστευτικών ροών», για το έτος 2013;

Απάντηση της κ. Malmström εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(2 Μαΐου 2013)

Η κατανομή των κονδυλίων για την Ελλάδα από τα τέσσερα Ταμεία του γενικού προγράμματος «Αλληλεγγύη και διαχείριση των μεταναστευτικών ροών» για το 2013 έχει ως εξής:

Ταμείο Εξωτερικών Συνόρων
2013: 44 033 646 ευρώ

Ευρωπαϊκό Ταμείο Επιστροφής
2013: 35 544 340 ευρώ

Ευρωπαϊκό Ταμείο για τους Πρόσφυγες
2013: 3 163 323 ευρώ

Ταμείο ένταξης των υπηκόων τρίτων χωρών
2013: 4 178 416 ευρώ

Όσον αφορά το Ταμείο Εξωτερικών Συνόρων, η Επιτροπή υπενθυμίζει ότι το 20% της αντίστοιχης γραμμής του προϋπολογισμού τέθηκε σε αποθεματικό από την αρμόδια για τον προϋπολογισμό αρχή. Εάν δεν αποδεσμευθεί το αποθεματικό, ενδέχεται μείωση 20% των κονδυλίων από το Ταμείο Εξωτερικών Συνόρων για όλα τα κράτη μέλη για το 2013.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002827/13
to the Commission**

Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE)

(11 March 2013)

Subject: Final allocation of funds to Greece under the 2013 general programme entitled Solidarity and management of migration flows (Solid)

Is the Commission in a position to advise me of the final allocation of funds to Greece based on the four funds of the 2013 Solid general programme?

Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission

(2 May 2013)

The breakdown of the allocations for Greece under the four Funds of the General Programme 'Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows' for 2013 is indicated below.

External Borders Fund — 2013: EUR 44 033 646

European Return Fund — 2013: EUR 35 544 340

European Refugee Fund — 2013: EUR 3 163 323

European Fund for the Integration of third-country nationals — 2013: EUR 4 178 416

As regards the External Borders Fund, the Commission recalls that 20% of the respective budget line was put into reserve by the budgetary authority. If the reserve is not released, there could be a 20% reduction of 2013 allocations under the External Borders Fund for all the Member States.

(Version française)

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-002828/13
à la Commission (Vice-Présidente/Haute Représentante)**

Louis Michel (ALDE)

(11 mars 2013)

Objet: VP/HR — Camp Liberty

Suite à l'attaque du 9 février 2013, perpétrée contre les réfugiés iraniens du camp Liberty, qui avait fait six morts et plus de soixante blessés, le sort de ces 3 400 personnes occupe à nouveau l'actualité internationale et nécessite plus que jamais une solution.

Cette attaque survient près d'un an après le début du transfert des 3 400 réfugiés iraniens du camp d'Ashraf (au nord de Bagdad), contrôlé par le Conseil national de la résistance iranienne, traqué par l'Iran. Les conditions de vie et de sécurité du camp Liberty ont déjà été le sujet de vives critiques par le passé. Or, ce transfert n'a fait qu'accroître les conditions de vie précaires de ces réfugiés. Pourtant, le 30 janvier 2012, le HCR considérait que le camp Liberty était en mesure d'accueillir des résidents. Le représentant du Secrétaire général de l'ONU en Irak, Martin Kobler, avait d'ailleurs affirmé, dans un communiqué publié le 31 janvier 2012, que «les structures et installations du camp Liberty sont conformes aux normes humanitaires internationales». Le gouvernement irakien actuel, proche de l'Iran, paraît peu soucieux du sort de ces réfugiés iraniens et les considère plutôt comme un fardeau. Il est évident que la sécurité des résidents du camp n'est actuellement plus assurée de façon conforme aux termes de la convention IV de Genève.

Quelles sont les mesures que la Vice-Présidente/Haute Représentante de la Commission a l'intention de prendre pour assurer la sécurité de ces réfugiés?

Réponse donnée par M^{me} Ashton, Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante au nom de la Commission

(13 mai 2013)

L'Union européenne s'intéresse de très près à la question de la réinstallation des anciens résidents du camp d'Ashraf et souscrit aux initiatives visant à trouver une solution pacifique et harmonieuse à ce véritable problème de Droits de l'homme.

À maintes reprises, M^{me} Ashton a souligné qu'elle soutenait pleinement le processus actuel, mené sous les auspices des Nations unies, ainsi que M. Martin Kobler, le représentant spécial du secrétaire général. Le Haut commissariat des Nations unies pour les réfugiés (HCR) conduit actuellement, comme prévu, les procédures de vérification et de «détermination du statut de réfugié» des résidents hébergés au lieu de transit temporaire que constitue le camp de Hurriya.

La réinstallation dans des pays tiers est la seule solution pacifique et durable. Il est à présent crucial, ainsi que M^{me} Ashton l'a souligné dans sa déclaration du 20 mars, que les résidents recommencent à coopérer pleinement avec les Nations unies et acceptent les propositions de réinstallation offertes par des pays tiers, de sorte que ce processus essentiel puisse se dérouler sans retard. La Commission appuie ce processus par son projet «soutien à la résolution du problème des camps d'Ashraf et de Hurriya» doté d'un budget de 12 millions d'euros. L'objectif général est de promouvoir une solution pacifique et durable pour les résidents du camp. Les premières actions sont actuellement mises en œuvre par le bureau des Nations unies pour les services d'appui aux projets (UNOPS) et par le HCR.

Les attaques du 9 février contre le camp de Hurriya ont été publiquement condamnées par l'Union. Elles ont été revendiquées par Jaish al-Mukhtar, une aile militante du Hezbollah en Irak. Le gouvernement irakien a réagi rapidement par l'envoi d'équipes en vue de sécuriser la zone autour du camp et de prêter assistance en fournissant le transport médical. Le premier ministre a constitué un comité chargé d'enquêter sur cet incident. Ces attaques appellent l'urgence d'accélérer le processus de réinstallation mené sous les auspices des Nations unies avec à la fois la coopération des résidents et celle des pays tiers qui sont prêts à les accueillir.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002828/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

Louis Michel (ALDE)

(11 March 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Camp Liberty

Following the attack of 9 February 2013 against the Iranian refugees at Camp Liberty, which killed six and injured over sixty, the fate of these 3 400 people is once again at the forefront of international news and requires more than ever a solution.

This attack occurred roughly one year after the 3 400 Iranian refugees started to be transferred from the Ashraf camp (north of Baghdad), controlled by the National Council of Resistance of Iran and hunted down by Iran. Living conditions and security at Camp Liberty have already been heavily criticised in the past. This transfer has only worsened the poor living conditions for these refugees. Yet, on 30 January 2012, the HCR considered that Camp Liberty was fit for receiving residents. Martin Kobler, representative of the UN Secretary-General in Iraq, had even confirmed in a press release dated 31 January 2012 that the 'buildings and facilities at Camp Liberty comply with international humanitarian standards'. The current Iraqi government, close to Iran, appears uninterested in these refugees' fate, considering them a burden instead. It is plain to see that the safety of the Camp residents is no longer assured as required under the Geneva Convention IV.

What measures does the High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission intend to take to ensure these refugees' safety?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(13 May 2013)

The EU follows the issue of resettlement of the former residents of Camp Ashraf very closely and supports efforts to find a peaceful and orderly solution to what is a human rights issue.

The HR/VP has repeatedly stressed her full support to the ongoing process facilitated by the UN and to Martin Kobler, the Special Representative of the Secretary General. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees is proceeding as foreseen with the verification and 'refugee status determination' of the residents who are staying at the temporary transit location, Camp Hurriya.

Resettlement to third countries is the only peaceful and durable solution. It is crucial now, as the HR/VP stressed in her statement of 20 March, that the residents resume their full cooperation with the UN and accept the resettlement offers made by third countries, so that this crucial process can proceed without delays. The Commission supports this process through its 12 Million EUR project 'Support to resolving the situation of Camp Ashraf / Camp Hurriya'. The overall objective is to promote a peaceful and sustainable solution for the Camp residents. First actions are currently being implemented through UNOPS and UNHCR.

The attacks of 9 February on Camp Hurriya were condemned publicly by the EU. Jaish al-Mukhtar, a militant wing of Hizbullah in Iraq, claimed responsibility for these attacks. The Iraqi Government responded rapidly by dispatching teams to secure the area around the camp and assisting with medical transportation. The Prime Minister formed a committee to investigate the incident. The attacks remind us of the urgency to accelerate the UN-facilitated resettlement process, with the cooperation of both the residents and third countries that are ready to receive them.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002830/13
aan de Commissie
Judith A. Merkies (S&D)
(11 maart 2013)

Betreeft: Dierentransport boven de 35°C

Verordening nr. 1/2005 bepaalt dat veevoertuigen tijdens transporten van meer dan acht uur, uitgerust moeten zijn met een ventilatiesysteem die de temperatuur binnen de 5 °C en 30 °C houdt, met een marge van 5 °C.

De reden hiervoor is dat het welzijn van dieren wordt aangetast bij zeer hoge of lage temperaturen, vooral tijdens langdurige ritten.

Toch liggen, vooral in Zuid-Europese landen en tijdens de zomer, temperaturen vaak veel hoger.

- 1) Welke maatregelen vindt de commissie dat lidstaten moeten nemen om dierenwelzijn te waarborgen wanneer ontdekt wordt dat de temperatuur in veevervoerscompartimenten de 35 °C overschrijdt? Is het in een dergelijke noodsituatie mogelijk om dieren over te plaatsen?
- 2) Heeft de Commissie informatie over het aantal boetes en het aantal noodmaatregelen die de lidstaten in 2011 hebben genomen voor inbreuk op de verordening rondom temperatuur van langdurige transporten?
- 3) Is de Commissie de mening toegedaan dat een terugdringing van vervoertijd naar maximaal acht uur, zoals 1,1 miljoen Europese burgers verzocht hebben in een petitie, een aanzienlijke bijdrage levert aan de bescherming van dierenwelzijn?

Antwoord van de heer Borg namens de Commissie
(30 april 2013)

1. Artikel 23, lid 1, van Verordening (EG) nr. 1/2005 inzake de bescherming van dieren tijdens het vervoer ⁽¹⁾ luidt als volgt: „Indien een bevoegde autoriteit constateert dat een bepaling van deze verordening niet wordt [...] nageleefd, neemt zij de nodige maatregelen om het welzijn van de dieren te beschermen of gelast zij de persoon die voor de dieren verantwoordelijk is, zulks te doen.” De genomen maatregelen mogen geen onnodig of extra dierenleed veroorzaken en moeten in verhouding staan tot de ernst van de risico's in kwestie.

In artikel 23, lid 2, van die verordening worden mogelijke maatregelen vermeld die de bevoegde autoriteiten mogen eisen, waaronder uitladen van de dieren in geschikte huisvesting totdat het probleem is opgelost.

2. Verordening (EG) nr. 1/2005 bepaalt niet dat de lidstaten bij de Commissie verslag moeten uitbrengen over het aantal boetes of het aantal noodmaatregelen voor inbreuken met betrekking tot de temperatuur. De Commissie beschikt dan ook niet over deze informatie.

3. De Commissie verwijst naar haar antwoord op E-007313/2012 ⁽²⁾.

⁽¹⁾ Verordening (EG) nr. 1/2005 van de Raad van 22 december 2004 inzake de bescherming van dieren tijdens het vervoer en daarmee samenhangende activiteiten; PB L 3 van 5.1.2005, blz. 1.

⁽²⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002830/13
to the Commission**

Judith A. Merkies (S&D)

(11 March 2013)

Subject: Transport of animals above 35 °C

Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 lays down that vehicles for animal transport must, for journeys exceeding eight hours, be fitted with a ventilation system that keeps temperatures between 5 and 30 °C, with a margin of 5 °C.

The reason for this is that the wellbeing of animals is affected by very high or low temperatures, especially during long journeys.

Temperatures are often much higher than this, however, especially in the countries of southern Europe.

1. What measures does the Commission believe that Member States need to take in order to ensure animal welfare when it is discovered that the temperature in animal transport compartments exceeds the 35 °C limit? Is it possible to relocate the animals in an emergency of this kind?
2. Does the Commission have any information on the number of fines imposed and emergency measures taken by the Member States in 2011 in relation to violations of the regulation in respect of the temperature during long journeys?
3. Does the Commission consider that a reduction in journey times to a maximum of eight hours, as 1.1 million European citizens have requested via a petition, would make a considerable contribution to the protection of animal welfare?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission

(30 April 2013)

1. According to Article 23 (1) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 on the protection of animals during transport ⁽¹⁾, 'Where a competent authority finds that any provision of this regulation is not being complied with [...] it shall take, or require the person responsible for the animals to take, any necessary action required to safeguard the welfare of the animals.' The action taken shall not cause unnecessary or additional suffering to the animals and shall be proportionate to the seriousness of the risks involved.

Article 23 (2) of that regulation establishes a list of possible actions that the competent authorities may require including unloading the animals in a suitable accommodation until the problem is solved.

2. Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 does not require the Member States to inform the Commission on the number of fines imposed, or of emergency measures taken in respect of violations in respect of temperature. The Commission therefore does not have this information.
3. The Commission would refer to its reply to E-007313/2012 ⁽²⁾.

⁽¹⁾ Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 of 22 December 2004 on the protection of animals during transport and related operations; OJ L 3, 5.1.2005, p. 1.

⁽²⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html>

(Nederlandse versie)

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002831/13
aan de Commissie
Mark Demesmaeker (Verts/ALE)
(11 maart 2013)**

Betreft: Reactie EU na uitspraken Erdogan over zionisme

Eind februari deed premier Erdogan van Turkije een boude uitspraak. Tijdens een forum van de Verenigde Naties (VN) over de „Alliance of Civilizations” in Wenen zette Erdogan het zionisme, de staatsideologie van Israël, op gelijke hoogte met „fascisme, antisemitisme en islamofobie” als een misdaad tegen de menselijkheid.

Het beleid van de staat Israël, — hoe vatbaar voor kritiek ook —, over één kam scheren met de misdaden van de nazi's komt in de internationale gemeenschap over als een banalisering van het antisemitisme dat in de Holocaust uitgemond is. Verontwaardigde reacties bleven dan ook niet uit (Israëls premier Netanyahu, de Amerikaanse minister van buitenlandse zaken Kerry, Ban Ki Moon, de secretaris-generaal van de VN, de Duitse minister van Buitenlandse Zaken Guido Westerwelle).

De Commissie heeft bij mijn weten niet gereageerd. Waarom heeft zij, als instantie die met Turkije onderhandelt over zijn eventuele toetreding tot de Europese Unie, niet gereageerd op de uitspraken van de Turkse premier?

Passen de uitspraken van Erdogan binnen de Europese waarden waarvan de EU vindt dat die moeten worden gerespecteerd door kandidaat-lidstaten?

Welke gevolgen hebben Erdogans uitspraken voor de toetredingsonderhandelingen van Turkije met de EU?

**Antwoord van de heer Füle namens de Commissie
(15 mei 2013)**

De Commissie sluit zich aan bij de opmerkingen van de secretaris-generaal van de Verenigde Naties, Ban Ki-Moon, die in zijn verklaring stelt dat als de opmerking van premier Erdogan over het zionisme op de juiste manier is geïnterpreteerd, zijn opmerking niet enkel fout was, maar ook indruist tegen de beginselen waar de Alliantie van beschavingen op steunt.

Wat de toetredingsonderhandelingen met Turkije betreft, verwijst de Commissie het geachte Parlementslid naar het onderhandelingskader dat in 2005 unaniem is aangenomen door de EU en waarin de doelstellingen, regels en procedures voor deze onderhandelingen, alsook de voorwaarden voor vooruitgang zijn bepaald.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002831/13
to the Commission**

Mark Demesmaeker (Verts/ALE)

(11 March 2013)

Subject: EU reaction to Prime Minister Erdoğan's comments on Zionism

At the end of February, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan made an outspoken statement. During a United Nations forum about the 'Alliance of civilisations' in Vienna, Mr Erdoğan equated Zionism, the State ideology of Israel, with 'fascism, anti-Semitism and Islamophobia' as a crime against humanity.

Putting the policy of the State of Israel — however much scope there may be to criticise it — on a par with the crimes of the Nazis is something that the international community will view as a trivialisation of the anti-Semitism that found its expression in the Holocaust. There was no lack of indignant reactions (amongst others from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, US Secretary of State John Kerry, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle).

To my knowledge, the Commission has not reacted. Why has it, the institution that is negotiating with Turkey about the latter's potential accession to the European Union, not reacted to these comments by Turkey's Prime Minister?

Do Mr Erdoğan's comments fit in with the European values that the EU believes must be respected by candidate States?

What consequences will Mr Erdoğan's comments have for Turkey's accession negotiations with the EU?

Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission

(15 May 2013)

The Commission shares the remarks made by the United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, who has issued a statement saying that if Mr Erdoğan's comment about Zionism was interpreted correctly, it was not only wrong but also contradicts the very principles on which the Alliance of Civilisations is based.

As for the accession negotiations with Turkey, the Commission invites the Honourable Member to refer to the Negotiating Framework, unanimously adopted by the EU in 2005, which sets the objectives, rules and procedures of these negotiations, as well as the conditions for progress.

(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002832/13
do Komisji
Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD) oraz Jacek Olgierd Kurski (EFD)
(11 marca 2013 r.)**

Przedmiot: Stan przemysłu stoczniowego w Unii Europejskiej

1. Jak Komisja ocenia stan przemysłu stoczniowego w poszczególnych państwach członkowskich?
2. W których państwach członkowskich kryzys najmocniej dotknął przemysł stoczniowy?
3. Jakie działania podejmuje Komisja w celu pomocy dla firm sektora stoczniowego?

**Odpowiedź udzielona przez Wiceprzewodniczącego Antonia Tajaniego w imieniu Komisji
(23 kwietnia 2013 r.)**

Po okresie bardzo dobrej koniunktury, której szczyt przypadł na rok 2007, branża stoczniowa w Europie i na świecie znalazła się w głębokim kryzysie. Świadczy o tym spadek produkcji w tej branży w UE o ponad połowę – z 4,5 mln CGT⁽¹⁾ w 2007 r. do 2 mln CGT w roku 2012.

Według statystyk CESA i SEA Europe⁽²⁾ największy spadek produkcji odnotowano w Danii, Finlandii, Niemczech, Włoszech, Niderlandach i Hiszpanii. Bardziej istotne niż różnice między państwami członkowskimi są jednak różnice między poszczególnymi segmentami rynku. Podczas gdy produkcja standardowych statków towarowych, takich jak kontenerowce, niemal całkowicie zanikła, w niektórych segmentach produkcji wyspecjalizowanej (np. statki obsługujące instalacje morskie) koniunktura jest bardzo dobra, a segmenty statków wycieczkowych i megajachtów wykazują stosunkową odporność.

W ramach inicjatywy Europa 2020 Komisja opracowała niedawno – we współpracy z branżą i wszystkimi innymi głównymi zainteresowanymi stronami – strategię „LeaderSHIP 2020”⁽³⁾. W sprawozdaniu poświęconym tej strategii podkreślono, że konieczne jest zwiększenie ekologiczności i efektywności energetycznej transportu morskiego oraz dywersyfikacja przemysłu stoczniowego w kierunku nowych obszarów działalności gospodarczej, takich jak wytwarzana na morzu energia wiatrowa i energia morska.

Sprawozdanie to zawiera szereg zaleceń w czterech kluczowych obszarach (kwalifikacje i zatrudnienie, dostęp do rynku i uczciwe warunki rynkowe, dostęp do finansowania oraz badania, rozwój i innowacje) do uwzględnienia w perspektywie krótko- i średniookresowej celem utrzymania wzrostu oraz wymagających wysokich kwalifikacji miejsc pracy w europejskiej branży stoczniowej.

⁽¹⁾ CGT (compensated gross ton) = skompensowana tona brutto.

⁽²⁾ Dostępnych w sprawozdaniach tych zrzeszeń europejskiego przemysłu stoczniowego: CESA (Community of European Shipyards' Associations), Annual report 2007/08; SEA Europe (European Ships and Maritime Equipment Association), Market Monitoring Report, marzec 2013 r.

⁽³⁾ Odpowiednie sprawozdanie dostępne jest pod następującym adresem:
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/maritime/files/shipbuilding/leadership2020-final-report_en.pdf

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002832/13
to the Commission
Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD) and Jacek Olgierd Kurski (EFD)
(11 March 2013)**

Subject: State of the shipbuilding industry in the EU

1. What is the Commission's assessment of the state of the shipbuilding industry in the individual Member States?
2. In which Member States has the crisis had the greatest impact on the shipbuilding industry?
3. What steps is the Commission taking to assist shipbuilding companies?

**Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission
(23 April 2013)**

After a strong boom, which reached its peak in 2007, the European and global shipbuilding markets entered into a deep crisis. As a result EU shipbuilding production decreased by more than half from 4.5 million cgt ⁽¹⁾ in 2007 to 2.0 cgt in 2012.

According to statistics from CESA and SEA Europe ⁽²⁾, production decreased strongest in Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain. More important than differences between Member States are, however, differences between market segments. While the production of standard cargo vessels such as container vessels almost disappeared, some specialised market segments such as off-shore support vessels are booming while cruise vessels and mega-yachts show some resilience.

In the framework of the Europe 2020 initiative, the Commission, in cooperation with the industry and all other relevant stakeholders, recently elaborated the LeaderShip 2020 strategy ⁽³⁾. The report stresses the need for the greening of shipping, energy efficiency and the diversification into new maritime markets, such as off-shore wind power and marine energy.

The report provides a series of recommendations in four key areas (employment and skills, market access and fair market conditions, access to finance, research, development and innovation) for the short and medium term to safeguard growth and high-value employment in the European maritime industry.

⁽¹⁾ Cgt= compensated gross tons.

⁽²⁾ CESA = Community of European Shipyards' Associations, Annual report 2007/08
SEA Europe = European Ships and Maritime Equipment Association, Market Monitoring Report, March 2013.

⁽³⁾ The LeaderShip 2020 report is available on:
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/maritime/files/shipbuilding/leadership2020-final-report_en.pdf

(Wersja polska)

Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002833/13
do Komisji
Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD) oraz Jacek Olgierd Kurski (EFD)
(11 marca 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Korytarz transportowy Północ-Południe

Od dłuższego czasu eksperci zajmujący się rynkiem transportowym w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej wskazują na konieczność szybkiego rozwoju połączeń transportowych pomiędzy południem oraz północną regionu. Zwiększenie przepustowości umożliwi wzmocnienie współpracy handlowej oraz otwarcie gospodarek Węgier, Słowacji i Czech na nowe rynki zbytu. Poprawi również sytuację na rynku pracy w portowych miastach przeładunkowych w Polsce, takich jak np. Szczecin, Gdynia i Gdańsk.

1. Czy Komisja Europejska zdecydowała już, jaki wariant korytarza transportowego Północ-Południe jest najbardziej efektywny i ekonomicznie opłacalny dla Europy?
2. Jakie środki i z jakich programów Komisja zamierza przeznaczyć w najbliższych latach na realizację programów transportowych łączących północ i południe Europy Środkowej?
3. Czy trasa S7 stanowiąca wariant jednego z korytarzy transportowych biegnących przez Polskę została uwzględniona w unijnym planie budowy transeuropejskich sieci transportowych?
4. Jakie środki Komisja zamierza przeznaczyć na rozbudowę portów na Bałtyku. Jakie ośrodki otrzymają dofinansowanie?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Siima Kallasa w imieniu Komisji
(6 maja 2013 r.)

W 2011 r. Komisja przedstawiła projekt zmian w wytycznych dotyczących rozwoju transeuropejskiej sieci transportowej ⁽¹⁾ (TEN-T) oraz nowy instrument finansowania „Łącząc Europę” ⁽²⁾ (CEF). Obie propozycje przechodzą właśnie procedurę ustawodawczą.

Sieć bazowa TEN-T połączy stolice, największe aglomeracje i główne porty przy pomocy tras kolejowych i drogowych oraz śródlądowych dróg wodnych (w stosownych przypadkach). Aby wdrożyć sieć bazową, Komisja zaproponowała korytarze multimodalne przewidujące zwiększoną integrację poszczególnych rodzajów transportu, ich interoperacyjność oraz koordynację inwestycji, robót budowlanych i zarządzania infrastrukturą. Jednym z 10 zaproponowanych korytarzy sieci bazowej jest korytarz „Bałtyk-Adriatyk”, który przebiega przez Polskę od granicy z Litwą i portów w basenie Morza Bałtyckiego do granic z Republiką Czeską i Słowacją. Ponieważ korytarz ten jest z definicji multimodalny, obejmuje on szereg równoległych tras drogowych, takich jak S7 w Polsce.

Instrument „Łącząc Europę” będzie finansować projekty dotyczące sieci bazowej i priorytetów horyzontalnych. Zgodnie z pierwotną propozycją Komisji, środki przydzielone na ten instrument wyniosły 31,7 mld EUR, z czego 10 mld EUR – przeniesione z Funduszu Spójności – zarezerwowano dla kwalifikujących się państw członkowskich. 80-85 % tych środków zostanie wykorzystane w ramach wieloletnich programów prac na projekty wymienione w załączniku do CEF. Projekty drogowe kwalifikują się do korzystania z wymienionej kwoty 10 mld EUR tylko wtedy, gdy mają charakter transgraniczny. Projekty drogowe dotyczące sieci TEN-T mogą kwalifikować się także do finansowania z Funduszu Spójności i Europejskiego Funduszu Rozwoju Regionalnego (EFRR). Rada obniżyła jednak pulę środków dla instrumentu „Łącząc Europę” (CEF) oraz wysokość kwoty przeznaczonej na transport.

Do korzystania ze środków CEF kwalifikują się także porty sieci bazowej, w tym połączenia między portami i rozwój platform multimodalnych, jak również innowacyjne projekty w portach sieci bazowej, takich jak Gdynia, Gdańsk, Szczecin i Świnoujście.

⁽¹⁾ COM(2011) 650.

⁽²⁾ COM(2011) 665.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002833/13
to the Commission
Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD) and Jacek Olgierd Kurski (EFD)
(11 March 2013)**

Subject: North-South Transport Corridor

For some time now, experts in central and eastern Europe's transport market have been pointing out the need to rapidly develop transport links between the North and the South of the region. Increasing capacity would make it possible to strengthen trade links and open up the economies of Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic as new export markets. It would also improve the situation on the labour market in Polish cities with cargo ports, such as Szczecin, Gdynia and Gdańsk.

1. Has the Commission already decided which North-South Transport Corridor route would be most effective and economically beneficial for Europe?
2. What funds — drawn from what programmes — does the Commission intend to earmark in the coming years for the execution of transport programmes to link northern and southern Central Europe?
3. Has the S7 route — one of the possible routes for a transport corridor running through Poland — been considered in the EU's plans for the construction of trans-European transport networks?
4. What funds does the Commission intend to allocate for the reconstruction of Baltic ports? What facilities will receive financing?

**Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission
(6 May 2013)**

In 2011 the Commission proposed revised Guidelines for the Trans-European Transport Network ⁽¹⁾ (TEN-T) and a new funding instrument, the 'Connecting Europe Facility' ⁽²⁾ (CEF). Both are now in the legislative procedure.

The TEN-T core network will connect capitals, major agglomerations and main ports by rail, road and inland waterways (where relevant). To implement the core network the Commission proposed multi-modal corridors providing for greater modal integration, interoperability and coordination of investments, works and management of the infrastructure. Among the 10 core network corridors proposed, the 'Baltic Adriatic Corridor' goes through Poland from the border with Lithuania and ports in the Baltic Sea to the borders with the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Being multi-modal by definition it includes parallel high-quality roads like the S7 in Poland.

The CEF will finance projects on the Core Network and horizontal priorities. As originally proposed by the Commission, it had an allocation of EUR 31.7 billion, including EUR 10 billion transferred from the Cohesion Fund reserved for eligible Member States. 80 to 85% of the money will be spent through multiannual work programmes for projects listed in the CEF Annex. Road projects are eligible under the EUR 10 billion only when they are cross-border. Road projects on the TEN-T network can also be eligible for funding under the Cohesion Fund and the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). The Council has however reduced the CEF envelope and the amount for transport.

Ports of the Core network are also eligible to the CEF, including port interconnections and the development of multimodal platforms but also innovative projects in Core Network Ports like Gdynia, Gdansk, Szczecin and Świnoujście.

⁽¹⁾ COM(2011) 650.

⁽²⁾ COM(2011) 665.

(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002834/13
do Komisji**

Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD) oraz Jacek Olgierd Kurski (EFD)
(11 marca 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Broń chemiczna zatopiona w Bałtyku

Jak oceniają historycy po II wojnie światowej ukryto w Bałtyku ok. 60 tys. ton amunicji chemicznej, w tym od 12 000 do 13 000 ton bojowych środków trujących. Obecnie znane są trzy rejonry zatapiania: Głębia Bornholmska – na wschód od Bornholmu, Mały Bełt i południowo-zachodnia część Głębi Gotlandzkiej. Akwenty te są oznakowane na mapach nawigacyjnych.

Zdaniem ekologów zatopiona amunicja chemiczna to tykająca bomba ekologiczna, mogąca wybuchnąć w każdym momencie. Stanowi zagrożenie zarówno dla wrażliwego i kruchego ekosystemu Bałtyku, jak również dla zdrowia i życia mieszkańców wybrzeży. Szacuje się, iż w przypadku uwolnienia się ze zbiorników jednej szóstej zatopionych substancji chemicznych, życie w Morzu Bałtyckim i przy jego brzegach mogłoby ulec zniszczeniu na ponad 100 lat.

1. Czy Komisja Europejska posiada informacje dotyczące broni chemicznej składowanej na dnie Bałtyku?
2. Jak wysokie, zdaniem Komisji, jest zagrożenie związane ze składowiskami? Czy Komisja podziela zdanie ekspertów mówiące o ewentualnym zagrożeniu zniszczenia ekosystemu Bałtyku w przypadku uszkodzenia pojemników z bronią chemiczną?
3. Jakie środki zostały podjęte przez Komisję w celu zabezpieczenia i usunięcia szkodliwych materiałów?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Janeza Potočnika w imieniu Komisji

(17 maja 2013 r.)

UE wspiera realizowany na Morzu Bałtyckim projekt „CHEMSEA – poszukiwanie amunicji chemicznej i ocena”, aby zlikwidować istniejące braki w wiedzy na temat amunicji chemicznej dzięki opracowaniu map i charakterystyki składowisk tej amunicji, opracować wytyczne w celu ograniczenia potencjalnych zagrożeń dla środowiska i rybaków oraz aby przygotować regionalny plan awaryjny na wypadek wycieku.

Ponadto Komisja Ochrony Środowiska Morskiego Bałtyku (HELCOM), której stroną jest UE, powołała ad hoc grupę ekspertów do spraw zatopionej amunicji chemicznej. Grupa ma za zadanie zgromadzenie informacji na temat działalności dumpingowej po II wojnie światowej, zidentyfikowanie problemów i opracowanie zaleceń i wytycznych dotyczących zatopionej amunicji chemicznej.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002834/13
to the Commission
Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD) and Jacek Olgierd Kurski (EFD)
(11 March 2013)

Subject: Chemical weapons dumped in the Baltic Sea

Historians estimate that around 60 000 tonnes of chemical weapons — including between 12 000 and 13 000 tonnes of toxic warfare agents — were secretly dumped in the Baltic Sea after the Second World War. Currently, three dumping sites have been identified: the Bornholm Trench (to the East of Bornholm), the Little Belt and the south-western part of the Gotland Trench. These bodies of water are identified on navigation charts.

Ecologists warn that the dumped chemical weapons are a ticking time bomb that could blow up at any moment. They pose a threat to the sensitive and fragile Baltic ecosystem, as well as to the health and lives of coastal residents. According to estimates, if just one-sixth of the dumped chemicals leaked from their containers, life in the Baltic Sea and coastal regions could be wiped out for over 100 years.

1. Does the Commission have any information on the chemical weapons abandoned at the bottom of the Baltic Sea?
2. In the Commission's view, how high is the risk posed by the dumping sites? Does the Commission agree with experts who state that the Baltic ecosystem could be destroyed in the event that the containers holding the chemical weapons are damaged?
3. What steps has the Commission taken to secure and remove harmful materials?

Answer given by Mr Potočník on behalf of the Commission
(17 May 2013)

The EU supports the Baltic Sea project 'CHEMSEA — chemical munitions search and assessment', to close knowledge gaps on chemical munitions by mapping and characterising these dumping sites, developing guidelines in order to reduce potential threats to the environment and fishermen and to prepare a region-wide contingency plan to deal with cases of leakage.

In addition, the Baltic Sea Regional Convention (Helcom), to which the EU is a party, has established an ad hoc expert group on dumped chemical munitions to compile information on dumping activities after World War II, identify obstacles and develop recommendations and guidelines on dumped chemical munitions.

(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002835/13
do Komisji**

Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD)

(11 marca 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Wykonanie Europejskiego Nakazu Aresztowania

1. Jaka była liczba wniosków o zastosowanie ENA kierowana do poszczególnych państw członkowskich (proszę o rozbicie danych według państw członkowskich kierujących wniosek), a jaka liczba wniosków została zrealizowana w poszczególnych latach 2010-2012?
2. Jaki był przeciętny czas realizacji ENA, od chwili jego złożenia do faktycznego wydania osoby oskarżonej, w ww. okresie? W których państwach członkowskich czas realizacji nakazu aresztowania był najdłuższy i dlaczego?
3. Które z państw członkowskich najczęściej odrzucały wnioski o użycie ENA i z jakiego powodu?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarz Viviane Reding w imieniu Komisji

(18 kwietnia 2013 r.)

Informacja, o którą zwraca się Szanowny Pan Poseł, zawarta jest w zestawieniu statystyk dotyczących europejskiego nakazu aresztowania, wydawanych przez Radę corocznie od 2005 r. ⁽¹⁾ Zgromadzone dane porównawcze dotyczą 2011 r. W kwietniu 2011 r. Komisja opublikowała trzecie sprawozdanie z realizacji europejskiego nakazu aresztowania ⁽²⁾ wraz z załączonym dokumentem roboczym służb Komisji. Dokument ten zawiera między innymi tabelę z danymi na temat wydanych i wykonanych europejskich nakazów aresztowania, średniego czasu potrzebnego na wydanie osoby oraz średniej liczby wydanych osób na podstawie dostępnych w tym czasie informacji przekazanych przez Radę. Komisja wskazała w swoim sprawozdaniu niedociągnięcia obecne w aktualnym kwestionariuszu oraz opracowała nowy kwestionariusz, który jest omawiany przez grupę roboczą Rady do spraw współpracy w sprawach karnych. Komisja ma nadzieję, że kwestionariusz zostanie wkrótce sfinalizowany i że przyczyni się on do poprawy jakości dostępnych statystyk na temat europejskiego nakazu aresztowania.

⁽¹⁾ Rada 9005/5/06 COPEN 52; 11371/5/07 COPEN 106; 10330/2/08 COPEN 116; 9743/4/09 COPEN 87; 7551/7/10 COPEN 64; 9120/2/11 COPEN 83; 9200/7/12 COPEN 97.

⁽²⁾ COM(2011) 175 final i SEC(2011) 430.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002835/13
to the Commission**

Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD)

(11 March 2013)

Subject: Execution of European Arrest Warrants

1. How many requests for the execution of European Arrest Warrants (ENAs) have been referred to individual Member States (please break down the data by Member State issuing the request), and how many requests were executed each year from 2010 to 2012?
2. What was the average execution time for ENAs, from the moment in which the ENA was issued to the actual extradition of the suspect, in the aforementioned period? Which Member States had the longest ENA execution times and why?
3. Which Member States most frequently rejected requests for ENAs and for what reasons?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission

(18 April 2013)

The information requested by the Honourable Member is contained in collated European arrest warrant (EAW) statistics issued by the Council on a yearly basis since 2005 ⁽¹⁾. The collated figures are for 2011. In April 2011, the Commission issued the third implementation report on the EAW ⁽²⁾ and the accompanying staff document. In it the Honourable Member will find a table of the EAWs issued and executed, the average times of surrender and the average numbers that consent to surrender based on the information from the Council available at the time. In its report the Commission pointed out the shortcomings of the current questionnaire and the Commission has since developed a new questionnaire, which is under discussion at the Council working group on cooperation in criminal matters and it is hoped will soon be finalised and will improve the quality of the available statistics on the EAW.

⁽¹⁾ Council 9005/5/06 COPEN 52; 11371/5/07 COPEN 106; 10330/2/08 COPEN 116; 9743/4/09 COPEN 87; 7551/7/10 COPEN 64; 9120/2/11 COPEN 83; 9200/7/12 COPEN 97.

⁽²⁾ COM(2011) 175 final and SEC(2011) 430.

(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002836/13
do Komisji**

Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD)

(11 marca 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Wpływ pakietu energetyczno-klimatycznego na przemysł produkujący maszyny górnicze

Zapisy pakietu energetyczno-klimatycznego bardzo mocno wpływają na produkcję węgla w Unii Europejskiej. Wraz z kolejnymi ograniczeniami zmniejsza się ilość wydobywanego surowca oraz jego cena. Dlatego dziś, mimo posiadania znacznych zasobów węgla, UE jest jego importerem. Regionalne firmy zamykają kopalnie lub w najlepszym wypadku nie decydują się na otwarcie nowych, nie widząc realnego zysku.

Niepewność dalszego kierunku rozwoju polityki klimatycznej powoduje wstrzymanie wielu inwestycji w sektorze węglowym, np. w Trzebini w Małopolsce.

1. Jak Komisja ocenia wpływ zapisów pakietu energetyczno-klimatycznego na sektor węgla kamiennego w Europie? Które państwa tracą najwięcej? Proszę o podział na kraje członkowskie.
2. Jak pakiet wpłynie na kondycję przemysłu zajmującego się produkcją maszyn górniczych? Również proszę o podział na konkretne państwa członkowskie.
3. Jakie działania planuje podjąć Komisja w ciągu najbliższych siedmiu lat, aby zminimalizować straty w przemyśle produkującym maszyny górnicze?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Günthera Oettingera w imieniu Komisji

(7 maja 2013 r.)

1. i 2. Pakiet klimatyczno-energetyczny ma na celu zmniejszenie emisji gazów cieplarnianych poprzez m.in. wspieranie energii ze źródeł odnawialnych i efektywności energetycznej. We wszystkich scenariuszach dotyczących zużycia energii i wytwarzania energii elektrycznej przewiduje się nieznaczne zmniejszenie do 2020 r. udziału węgla w koszyku energetycznym UE. Fakt zastąpienia w koszyku energetycznym USA znacznych ilości węgla gazem zapewnia obecnie Europie dodatkowe tanie źródło importu węgla, wzmacniając tym samym konkurencyjność elektrowni węglowych, ale jednocześnie stanowi konkurencję dla węgla wydobywanego w Europie. Jeśli chodzi o zrównoważone długoterminowe wykorzystanie węgla, kluczowe znaczenie będzie miało wdrożenie dyrektywy w sprawie wychwytywania i składowania dwutlenku węgla i skuteczna demonstracja projektów CCS wspierana przez program NER 300.

Powyzsze aspekty będą miały wpływ na przemysł węglowy w UE. Komisja Europejska nie dysponuje jednak szczegółowymi ocenami dotyczącymi poszczególnych państw członkowskich.

3. Celem europejskiego partnerstwa innowacji w dziedzinie surowców jest zapewnienie zrównoważonych dostaw surowców dla Europy. W partnerstwie tym uczestniczą przedstawiciele producentów urządzeń górniczych. Planowana realizacja partnerstwa ma zapewnić osiągnięcie – do roku 2020 – kilku istotnych rezultatów, mających znaczenie dla przemysłu urządzeń górniczych, m.in. przeprowadzenie 10 działań pilotażowych w zakresie innowacyjnych technologii i poprawę ram regulacyjnych dla sektora górniczego w UE.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002836/13
to the Commission**

Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD)

(11 March 2013)

Subject: Impact of the climate and energy package on the mining machinery industry

The provisions of the climate and energy package have a profound effect on coal production in the EU. They lead — in conjunction with other restrictions — to a reduction in the amount of coal extracted and in its price. This is why the EU — in spite of its significant coal reserves — is now an importer of coal. Regional firms are closing down mines or, in the best case scenario, deciding against opening new mines in view of the lack of potential for profit.

Uncertainty as to the future path that climate policy will take is resulting in many investments in the coal sector being withheld, as is the case in Trzebinia, in Małopolska province.

1. What is the Commission's assessment of the impact of the climate and energy package on the coal industry in Europe? Which countries stand to lose the most? Please break this down by Member State.
2. How will the package affect the mining machinery industry? Please break this down by individual Member States.
3. What steps does the Commission plan to take over the next seven years with a view to minimising losses for the mining machinery industry?

Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission

(7 May 2013)

1 and 2. The climate and energy package aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, among others by promoting renewable energy and energy efficiency. All energy consumption and electricity generation scenarios anticipate a slight reduction in the contribution of coal to the EU energy mix by 2020. Currently, replacement of significant coal volumes by gas in the US power generation mix provides additional cheap coal import source for Europe, strengthening the competitiveness of coal-fired power generation but indeed competing with European coal. In view of the longer term sustainability of coal, implementation of the Carbon Capture and Storage directive and its successful demonstration, as facilitated by the NER 300 programme, are of key importance.

These factors impact the coal extraction industry in the EU. However, the European Commission does not possess a detailed country-level assessment for each Member State.

3. The European Innovation Partnership on raw materials aims to ensure the sustainable supply of raw materials to Europe. Mining equipment producers are represented in the Partnership. The Partnership plans to deliver by 2020 several major results relevant to mining machinery industry, including 10 innovative technology pilot actions and an improved regulatory framework for the mining sector in the EU.

(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002837/13
do Komisji**

Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD)

(11 marca 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Biopaliwa w Unii Europejskiej

W dyrektywie 2009/30/WE z 2009 r. Komisja Europejska promuje wykorzystanie biopaliw jako narzędzia służącego do zmniejszenia emisji CO₂, przy jednoczesnym zwiększeniu profitów dla rolników. Według założeń Komisji dyrektywa powinna być implementowana do 2013 r. Tymczasem grupa brytyjskich uczonych z uniwersytetu w Leicester w przeprowadzonych przez siebie analizach stwierdziła, że jej wprowadzenie spowoduje zwiększenie niedoborów żywności, cen produktów rolnych oraz odwrotnie niż zapowiadała Komisja wzrost emisji CO₂. Wyniki badań wraz z komentarzem zostały opublikowane w gazecie Nature Climate Change.

1. Czy Komisja zapoznała się z wynikami badań dotyczącymi oddziaływania biopaliw na rynek produktów spożywczych oraz emisję CO₂? Czy Komisja podziela to stanowisko?
2. Jak Komisja ocenia wspomniane badania?
3. Czy i kiedy Komisja zamierza zweryfikować zapisy dyrektywy wprowadzającej biopaliwa?
4. Jak według Komisji wpłynie ona na ceny produktów spożywczych w poszczególnych krajach? Proszę o podział na państwa członkowskie.

Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Günthera Oettingera w imieniu Komisji

(8 maja 2013 r.)

1.–2. Komisja wie, że na Uniwersytecie Leicester prowadzone są badania dotyczące emisji gazów cieplarnianych z plantacji palm olejowych na torfowiskach tropikalnych. Jednakże Komisja nie posiada informacji na temat prac tych naukowców w zakresie emisji gazów cieplarnianych i cen żywności związanych ogólnie z biopaliwami.

Zgodnie z prawodawstwem UE⁽¹⁾, które ma zastosowanie zarówno do biopaliw produkcji krajowej, jak i importowanych, produkcja biopaliw nie może doprowadzić do przekształcenia obszarów o dużej różnorodności biologicznej lub o znacznych zasobach węgla, takich jak lasy lub torfowiska. Ponadto biopaliwa muszą emitować co najmniej 35 % mniej gazów cieplarnianych niż paliwa kopalne. W związku z powyższym Komisja nie uważa, aby wyniki wspomnianego badania podważały podejście UE do biopaliw.

3. W październiku 2012 r. Komisja przyjęła wniosek mający na celu ograniczenie ilości biopaliw produkowanych z upraw roślin spożywczych, które mogą być zaliczane na poczet celów UE na rok 2020 do 5 % łącznego zużycia energii w sektorze transportu. Co więcej, wniosek przewiduje dodatkowe zachęty dla biopaliw, które nie stwarzają dodatkowego zapotrzebowania na grunty⁽²⁾. Niektóre aspekty dyrektyw w sprawie energii odnawialnej i w sprawie jakości paliw zostaną poddane przeglądowi przed końcem 2014 r.

4. Zastosowanie ziarna do produkcji bioetanolu w UE stanowiło 3 % całkowitego wykorzystania zbóż w latach 2010-2011 i szacuje się, że spowodowało wzrost cen o 1-2 % na światowych rynkach zbóż. Szacowany skutek cenowy stosowania biodiesla w UE dla upraw oleistych roślin spożywczych w latach 2008 i 2010 wynosił 4 %⁽³⁾. Informacje na temat wpływu dyrektywy na ceny żywności w poszczególnych państwach członkowskich są dostępne w sprawozdaniach państw członkowskich z postępów w dziedzinie energii odnawialnej⁽⁴⁾.

⁽¹⁾ Dyrektywy 2009/28/WE i 2009/30/WE.

⁽²⁾ Wniosek jest dostępny na stronie: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/renewables/biofuels/land_use_change_en.htm

⁽³⁾ Sprawozdanie z postępów w dziedzinie energii odnawialnej COM (2013) 175 final.

⁽⁴⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/energy/renewables/reports/2011_en.htm

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002837/13
to the Commission
Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD)
(11 March 2013)

Subject: Biofuel in the European Union

In Directive 2009/30/EC of 2009, the Commission promotes the use of biofuels as a means of reducing CO₂ emissions while at the same time increasing profits for farmers. The Commission plans for the directive to be implemented by 2013. Meanwhile, in a study carried out by a group of British academics from the University of Leicester, it was found that the introduction of this directive would lead to an increase in food shortages and in prices of agricultural products, as well as a rise in CO₂ emissions. This contradicts the Commission's predictions. The study's findings and comments were published in the Nature Climate Change journal.

1. Is the Commission familiar with the findings of the study on biofuels' impact on the food market and on CO₂ emissions? Does the Commission hold a similar view?
2. What is the Commission's assessment of this study?
3. Does the Commission intend to review the directive's provisions concerning the introduction of biofuels? If so, when?
4. In the Commission's view, what impact will the directive have on food prices in individual Member States? Please break this down by Member State.

Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission
(8 May 2013)

1-2. The Commission is aware of research carried out at the University of Leicester on greenhouse gas emissions from palm oil plantations on tropical peatland. However, the Commission is not aware of work by these researchers on greenhouse gas emissions and food prices related to biofuels in general.

In accordance with EU legislation ⁽¹⁾ that applies equally to domestically produced and imported biofuels, production of biofuels is not allowed to lead to conversion of areas of high biodiversity or high carbon stocks such as forests and peatland. Moreover, biofuels are required to save at least 35% GHG emissions compared to fossil fuels. The Commission therefore does not consider that the EU's approach on biofuels is put into question by the results of the study mentioned.

3. In October 2012, the Commission adopted a proposal to limit the amount of biofuels produced from food crops that can count towards the EU target for 2020 to 5% of overall energy consumption in transport. Moreover, the proposal provides additional incentives for biofuels that do not create an additional demand for land ⁽²⁾. Certain aspects of the Renewable Energy and Fuel Quality Directives are to be reviewed before end of 2014.

4. Grain use for bioethanol production in the EU constituted 3% of total cereal use in 2010/2011 and is estimated to have increased prices by 1%-2% on the global cereals market. The estimated price effect of the EU biodiesel consumption on food oil crops for 2008 and 2010 was 4% ⁽³⁾. Information on the impact of the directive on food prices in individual Member States is available in the Member States' renewable energy progress reports ⁽⁴⁾.

⁽¹⁾ Directives 2009/28/EC and 2009/30/EC.

⁽²⁾ The proposal is available here: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/renewables/biofuels/land_use_change_en.htm

⁽³⁾ Renewable Energy Progress report COM(2013) 175 final.

⁽⁴⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/energy/renewables/reports/2011_en.htm

(Versiunea în limba română)

Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-002838/13
adresată Comisiei
Vasilica Viorica Dăncilă (S&D)
(11 martie 2013)

Subiect: Gestionarea pădurilor de către proprietarii de păduri

Gestionarea pădurilor în contextul schimbărilor climatice a devenit o provocare pentru proprietarii acestora, mai ales când este vorba de persoane private.

Acești proprietari doresc să știe cum să acționeze, ce măsuri să ia pentru a preîntâmpina uscarea arborilor și ce esențe de pomi să replanteze în cazul tăierii arborilor bolnavi și uscați.

Cum intenționează Comisia să sprijine eforturile autorităților locale și naționale în vederea sensibilizării proprietarilor de păduri privind replantările de arbori și alegerea celor mai adaptate esențe pentru condițiile climatice actuale, precum și schimbul de experiență între actorii locali și regionali din domeniu cu scopul identificării și aplicării celor mai bune practici?

Răspuns dat de dl Potočník în numele Comisiei
(30 aprilie 2013)

Politica forestieră și gestionarea pădurilor țin de domeniul de competență al statelor membre. Cu toate acestea, statele membre pot folosi bugetul UE pentru a sprijini măsurile din sectorul forestier.

Regulamentul privind dezvoltarea rurală 1698/2005 ⁽¹⁾ prevede cofinanțare din partea UE pentru măsurile în sectorul forestier în scopul de a ajuta statele membre în aplicarea programelor și strategiilor forestiere naționale sau regionale, inclusiv modalități de abordare a efectelor schimbărilor climatice.

Propunerea de regulament privind dezvoltarea rurală elaborată de Comisie pentru perioada 2014-2020 [COM(2011) 627/3], în prezent supusă procedurii legislative ordinare, include o serie de măsuri privind sectorul forestier printre care se numără și investițiile în ameliorarea rezilienței și a valorii ecologice a ecosistemelor forestiere. Mai mult, propunerea prevede și posibilitatea de a oferi consiliere proprietarilor de păduri, cu privire la aspecte legate de performanțele de mediu ale exploatației forestiere.

În plus, mediul și atenuarea efectelor schimbărilor climatice, precum și adaptarea la acestea constituie acum obiectivele transversale ale politicii de dezvoltare rurală. Propunerea menționată anterior obligă statele membre să instituie rețele rurale naționale care ar putea fi utilizate și pentru facilitarea schimbului de bune practici și de experiență între diferiții actori ai dezvoltării rurale.

⁽¹⁾ Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1698/2005 al Consiliului din 20 septembrie 2005 privind sprijinul pentru dezvoltare rurală acordat din Fondul European Agricol pentru Dezvoltare Rurală (FEADR), JO L 277, 21.10.2005.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002838/13
to the Commission
Vasilica Viorica Dăncilă (S&D)
(11 March 2013)

Subject: Forest management by forest owners

Forest management in the context of climate change has become a challenge for forest owners, especially in the case of private individuals.

These owners want to know how to act, what measures to take to prevent trees drying out and what tree species to replant when sick and dried out trees are cut down.

How does the Commission intend to support the efforts of local and national authorities in raising awareness amongst forest owners of the replanting of trees and the selection of the species best adapted to the current climatic conditions, as well as the exchange of experience between local and regional actors in the field in order to identify and apply the best practices?

Answer given by Mr Potočník on behalf of the Commission
(30 April 2013)

Forest policy and forest management lie within the competence of Member States. However, Member States can make use of the EU budget for supporting forest related actions.

The Rural Development Regulation (RDR) 1698/2005 ⁽¹⁾ provides for EU co-financing for forest related measures to help Member States implementing their national or regional forest programmes and strategies, including ways to address the effects of climate change.

The Commission's RDR proposal for the period 2014-2020 [COM(2011)627/3], which is currently subject to the ordinary legislative procedure, includes a set of forestry measures among which investments improving the resilience and environmental value of forest ecosystems. Moreover, it also provides for the possibility to provide advice to forest holders on issues linked to the environmental performance of the forest holding.

In addition, the environment and climate change mitigation and adaptation have been made the cross-cutting objectives of rural development policy. The abovementioned proposal obliges Member States to establish national rural network which could also be used to facilitate exchanges of practices and experiences between different actors of rural development.

⁽¹⁾ Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 of 20 September 2005 on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), OJ L 277, 21.10.2005.

(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-002839/13
an die Kommission**

**Peter Liese (PPE), Linda McAvan (S&D), Jo Leinen (S&D), Chris Davies (ALDE), Bas Eickhout (Verts/ALE)
und Sabine Wils (GUE/NGL)**
(11. März 2013)

Betrifft: Diskussion über „Klima 2030“ und das Energiepaket

Kann die Kommission bestätigen, dass die Position des Europäischen Rates vom März 2011 ⁽¹⁾, die Position der letzten Tagung des Rates (Umwelt) vom Dezember 2012 ⁽²⁾ und die Entschließung des Parlaments vom 15. März 2012 zu dem „Fahrplan für den Übergang zu einer wettbewerbsfähigen CO₂-armen Wirtschaft bis 2050“, in der die Senkung der Treibhausgasemissionen bis zum Jahr 2050 im Vergleich zu 1990 um 80 bis 95 % vorgeschlagen wird, Leitgrundlagen ihres Vorschlags zum energie- und klimaschutzpolitischen Rahmen für das Jahr 2030 sein werden?

Beabsichtigt die Kommission, in den Rahmen für 2030 auch verbindliche Ziele für erneuerbare Energien und die Energieeffizienz einzubeziehen, zumal diese als „No-regret“-Optionen in dem Energiefahrplan für 2050 bezeichnet wurden?

Antwort von Frau Hedegaard im Namen der Kommission

(8. Mai 2013)

Wie bereits im Grünbuch „Ein Rahmen für die Klima- und Energiepolitik bis 2030“ (KOM(2013)169) dargelegt, sollte der Rahmen die längerfristige Perspektive berücksichtigen, die von der Kommission 2011 in den Fahrplänen bis 2050 vorgegeben wurde. Diese Fahrpläne wurden in Einklang mit dem Ziel ausgearbeitet, die THG-Emissionen im Rahmen der notwendigen Bemühungen der als eine Gruppe betrachteten Industrieländer bis 2050 um 80-95 % gegenüber dem Stand von 1990 zu verringern. Es besteht ein breiter Konsens darüber, dass Zwischenziele für die THG-Emissionsminderungen ein notwendiger Schritt sind, um der Zielvorstellung einer Reduzierung um 80-95 % bis 2050 gerecht zu werden. In dem Grünbuch werden die Entschließungen des Europäischen Parlaments zu den Fahrplänen bis 2050 gewürdigt, die Rolle der erneuerbaren Energien und Energieeffizienz unterstrichen und Überlegungen zu den Zielvorgaben bis 2030 angestellt. Die Ergebnisse der mit dem Grünbuch eingeleiteten öffentlichen Konsultation wird die Kommission in die Ausarbeitung des Rahmens für 2030 einfließen lassen.

⁽¹⁾ http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/envir/119875.pdf

⁽²⁾ http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/envir/133227.pdf

(Nederlandse versie)

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002839/13
aan de Commissie**

**Peter Liese (PPE), Linda McAvan (S&D), Jo Leinen (S&D), Chris Davies (ALDE), Bas Eickhout (Verts/ALE) en
Sabine Wils (GUE/NGL)**
(11 maart 2013)

Betreft: Debat over het klimaat- en energiepakket tot 2030

Kan de Commissie bevestigen dat de piketpalen voor haar voorstel inzake het beleidskader 2030 voor energie en klimaat zullen worden gevormd door het standpunt van de Europese Raad van maart 2011 ⁽¹⁾, het standpunt van de recente Energieraad van december 2012 ⁽²⁾ en de resolutie van het Parlement van 15 maart 2012 over „een routekaart naar een concurrerende koolstofarme economie in 2050”, waarin het als streefdoel voor de Unie voorstelde dat de uitstoot van broeikasgassen in 2050 80 % tot 95 % lager moet zijn dan in 1990?

Is de Commissie van plan in het kader voor 2030 ook bindende streefcijfers voor hernieuwbare energie en energie-efficiëntie op te nemen, omdat die in de routekaart voor het energiebeleid tot 2050 worden genoemd als opties die alleen maar voordeel opleveren?

Antwoord van mevrouw Hedegaard namens de Commissie
(8 mei 2013)

Zoals aangegeven in het Groenboek „Een kader voor het klimaat- en energiebeleid voor 2030” (COM(2013)169), moet dit kader rekening houden met de langeretermijnvisie die de Commissie in 2011 heeft uiteengezet in de Routekaarten/stappenplannen tot 2050. Deze routekaarten/stappenplannen zijn ontwikkeld in overeenstemming met de doelstelling om de uitstoot van broeikasgassen tegen 2050 met 80-95 % te hebben verminderd, vergeleken met de niveaus van 1990, als onderdeel van de noodzakelijke gezamenlijke inspanningen van de ontwikkelde landen. Er bestaat een brede consensus dat tussentijdse streefwaarden voor broeikasgasemissiereducties een noodzakelijke stap vormen om een vermindering van 80-95 % tegen 2050 te verwezenlijken. In het Groenboek worden de resoluties van het Europees Parlement over de routekaarten/stappenplannen tot 2050 alsmede de belangrijke rol die voor hernieuwbare energie en energie-efficiëntie is weggelegd erkend, en het omvat overwegingen ten aanzien van streefcijfers tot 2030. De Commissie zal de resultaten van de openbare raadpleging die met het Groenboek in gang is gezet, bij haar continue voorbereidingen met betrekking tot het kader voor 2030 betrekken.

⁽¹⁾ http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/envir/119875.pdf

⁽²⁾ http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/envir/133227.pdf

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002839/13
to the Commission**

**Peter Liese (PPE), Linda McAvan (S&D), Jo Leinen (S&D), Chris Davies (ALDE), Bas Eickhout (Verts/ALE)
and Sabine Wils (GUE/NGL)**
(11 March 2013)

Subject: Debate on the 2030 climate and energy package

Can the Commission confirm that the guiding basis for its proposal on the 2030 energy and climate policy framework will be constituted by the European Council position of March 2011 ⁽¹⁾, the position of the recent Environment Council meeting of December 2012 ⁽²⁾ and Parliament's resolution of 15 March 2012 on 'a Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050', which proposed an objective for the Union of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 80-95% by 2050 compared with 1990?

Does the Commission envisage that the 2030 framework will also include binding targets for renewable energy and energy efficiency, given that these are the 'no regrets' options set out in the energy roadmap for 2050?

Answer given by Ms Hedegaard on behalf of the Commission

(8 May 2013)

As indicated in the Green Paper 'A 2030 framework for climate and energy policies' (COM(2013)169), the framework should take into account the longer term perspective which the Commission laid out in 2011 in the 2050 Roadmaps. These Roadmaps were developed in line with the objective of reducing GHG emissions by 80 to 95% by 2050 compared to 1990 levels as part of necessary efforts by developed countries as a group. There is a broad consensus that interim targets for GHG emissions reductions will be a necessary step to reach the aspiration of an 80-95% reduction by 2050. The Green Paper acknowledges the European Parliament's resolutions on the 2050 Roadmaps, the important roles of renewable energy and energy efficiency, and it includes considerations on 2030 targets. The outcome of the public consultation launched by the Green Paper will feed into the Commission's ongoing preparations for the 2030 framework.

⁽¹⁾ http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/envir/119875.pdf

⁽²⁾ http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/envir/133227.pdf

(Version française)

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-002840/13
au Conseil**

Gaston Franco (PPE)

(11 mars 2013)

Objet: Statut sur les fondations européennes

Dans le cadre de l'Acte pour le marché unique, la Commission a proposé la mise en place d'un statut de fondation européenne.

Les fondations dépensent collectivement 150 milliards d'euros par an et représentent près de 1 million d'emplois au sein de l'Union européenne. Les missions et les objectifs qu'elles portent individuellement recourent le plus souvent des préoccupations transnationales ou transfrontalières. Dans le but de faciliter leurs activités, le statut sur les fondations européennes est un outil d'intégration au potentiel très important.

Le 8 février 2012, la Commission a proposé un projet sur ce texte. Depuis cette date, le calendrier semble se ralentir.

Dans ce contexte, pourquoi le Conseil n'a-t-il pas fait de ce projet une priorité dans son programme de travail 2013? Est-il envisageable de parvenir à une adoption durant le premier semestre 2013? Quelles sont les mesures actuellement mise en œuvre pour l'adoption de cette proposition?

Réponse

(28 mai 2013)

La proposition de règlement du Conseil relatif au statut de la fondation européenne (FE) ⁽¹⁾ est actuellement examinée au sein des instances préparatoires du Conseil. Compte tenu de la complexité de cette proposition, il est peu probable qu'elle soit adoptée au cours du premier semestre de 2013.

Étant donné qu'il faut établir des priorités, les dernières présidences du Conseil ont concentré leurs efforts, dans le domaine du droit des sociétés, sur les grands dossiers législatifs ayant d'importantes incidences économiques et qui sont adoptés selon la procédure législative ordinaire, telle que la directive comptable et l'ensemble de textes sur le contrôle des comptes.

⁽¹⁾ Doc. 6580/12.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002840/13
to the Council**

Gaston Franco (PPE)

(11 March 2013)

Subject: Statute for European foundations

As part of the Single Market Act, the Commission proposed the creation of a European Foundation Statute.

Foundations spend a total of EUR 150 billion every year and represent close to 1 million jobs in the European Union. The missions and goals that they each have very often reflect transnational or cross-border concerns. Aiming to facilitate their work, the European Foundation Statute is an integration tool with a very high potential.

On 8 February 2012, the Commission proposed a draft text. Since then, nothing seems to have happened.

In this context, why hasn't the Council made this project a priority in its 2013 work programme? Would it be possible to adopt this project during the first semester of 2013? What measures are currently being implemented for this proposal to be adopted?

Reply

(28 May 2013)

The proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for a European Foundation (FE) ⁽¹⁾ is currently under discussion in the preparatory bodies of the Council. Given the complexity of the proposal, its adoption within the first semester of 2013 is unlikely.

Taking into account the need to prioritise, the main efforts of the last Council presidencies in the area of company law have been concentrated on the large legislative files with major economic impact and which are to be adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure, such as the Accounting Directive and the auditing package.

(1) 6580/12.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002843/13
alla Commissione
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)
(11 marzo 2013)

Oggetto: Nuovo caso di violenza sulle donne nelle Maldive

Sull'isola di Feydhoo, nell'arcipelago delle Maldive, una ragazza di 15 anni è stata condannata a 100 frustate che riceverà al compimento dei 18 anni di età e a 8 mesi di arresti domiciliari da scontare immediatamente, in quanto accusata di aver avuto rapporti sessuali prima del matrimonio infrangendo così la legge coranica in vigore nel Paese. Dalle indagini portate avanti dalla polizia è risultato che la ragazza fosse sottoposta da anni a violenze sessuali da parte del patrigno, attualmente indagato per stupro, ma ancora non processato.

Considerato:

- che le Maldive hanno sottoscritto accordi internazionali che prevedono il rispetto dei diritti umani;
- che l'Alto Rappresentante per gli affari esteri e la politica di sicurezza dell'Unione europea ha rilasciato l'1 marzo una dichiarazione ufficiale nella quale richiama il governo locale, chiedendo il rispetto dei diritti umani;
- che il governo del Paese ha dichiarato che si sarebbe impegnato per modificare la sentenza;
- e alla luce della risposta alla mia interrogazione numero E-007966/2012, dove la Commissione ha affermato che «Il documento di strategia nazionale (2007-2013), che ha descritto l'assistenza prevista dell'UE alle Maldive, si concentra sulla democratizzazione e il buon governo; i settori in cui è prevista la cooperazione sono i diritti umani e il sostegno alle riforme istituzionali, in particolare nei settori della sicurezza e della giustizia»;

può la Commissione:

- informare circa l'andamento del caso sopra descritto;
- indicare come procede il processo di democratizzazione del Paese;
- indicare come intende supportare concretamente il rispetto dei diritti delle donne nelle Maldive?

Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione
(26 aprile 2013)

Nella dichiarazione rilasciata il 1° marzo 2013, l'AR/VP ha esortato il governo delle Maldive a ritirare l'imputazione e annullare la sentenza, e si registrano segnali positivi in tal senso. È stata condotta anche una campagna pubblica online per protestare contro la fustigazione.

Le elezioni presidenziali, previste per settembre 2013, accentrano le speranze di trovare un compromesso tra le forze politiche del paese. L'Unione europea ha richiesto elezioni «credibili, trasparenti, inclusive e pienamente rappresentative» e ha esortato il governo delle Maldive a dare seguito alle raccomandazioni contenute nella relazione della Commissione d'inchiesta nazionale del 2012, che evidenziano, tra l'altro, una serie di questioni attinenti ai diritti umani. Le Maldive sono uno dei paesi pilota dove l'UE è impegnata a dare sostegno alla democrazia; in tal senso sono stati definiti un «profilo democrazia» e un piano d'azione dettagliati.

Durante le sue visite alle Maldive la delegazione dell'Unione europea di Colombo, Sri Lanka, incontra regolarmente la società civile, i gruppi di protezione dei diritti delle donne e la Commissione maldiviana per i diritti umani. La delegazione collabora inoltre strettamente con il consigliere per i diritti umani delle Nazioni Unite a Mali su questioni relative ai diritti umani.

L'Unione europea è pronta a sostenere interventi nel settore dei diritti delle donne tramite inviti concorrenziali a presentare proposte su linee di bilancio tematiche, sebbene lo strumento europeo per la democrazia e i diritti umani (EIDHR) non preveda dotazioni specifiche per le Maldive.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002843/13
to the Commission
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)
(11 March 2013)**

Subject: New case of violence against women in the Maldives

On the island of Feydhoo, in the archipelago of the Maldives, a 15-year-old girl has been sentenced to 100 lashes, which she will receive when she turns 18, and eight months' house arrest, starting immediately. She was charged with having had sexual relations before marriage, infringing the Koranic law in force in that country. Police investigations have shown that the girl had for years been subjected to sexual violence by her stepfather, who is currently under investigation for rape, but has not yet been tried.

— The Maldives have signed international agreements enshrining respect for human rights.

— On 1 March the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy issued an official statement rebuking the government of the Maldives and calling for human rights to be respected.

— The country's government stated that it would seek to change the sentence.

— In answer to my question E-007966/2012, the Commission stated 'The Country Strategy Paper (2007-2013) which outlined the EU's planned assistance to the Maldives focuses on democratisation and governance; areas foreseen for cooperation are human rights and support for institutional reform, in particular policy in the fields of security and justice'.

In view of the above, can the Commission:

- provide information on the progress of the case described above;
- indicate how the country's democratisation process is faring;
- indicate how it intends to provide material support for respect of women's rights in the Maldives?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(26 April 2013)**

In her statement of 1 March 2013, the HR/VP urged the Government of Maldives to abandon the prosecution and retract the sentence. Positive indications have been received in this regard. There has also been a public campaign online to protest against the flogging.

The presidential elections, scheduled for September 2013, are seen as the best hope to bridge the gap between the political forces in the country. The European Union has called for 'credible, transparent, inclusive and fully representative' elections. It has also urged the Government of Maldives to implement the recommendations of the report of the 2012 National Commission of Inquiry (CoNI) which highlighted *inter alia* a number of human rights issues. The Maldives is one of the pilot countries for the EU's democracy support, including a detailed democracy profile and an action plan.

The European Union's Delegation, based in Colombo, Sri Lanka, meets regularly with civil society, including women's rights groups and with the Maldivian Human Rights Commission during its visits to the Maldives. It also cooperates closely on human rights issues with the human rights adviser of the United Nations who is resident in Male.

The European Union also stands ready to support interventions in the field of women's rights on the basis of competitive calls for proposals on thematic budget lines, although there is no country-specific envelope for the Maldives under the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR).

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002844/13

**alla Commissione
Aldo Patriciello (PPE)**

(11 marzo 2013)

Oggetto: Vendite allo scoperto

Facendo riferimento al recente caso della Saipem, società controllata al 42,9 % dalla ENI, il cui titolo è stato sospeso per eccesso di ribasso, la Consob ha avviato accertamenti sull'operazione di collocamento del 2,2 % del capitale di Saipem, realizzata da Bank of America Merrill Lynch prima dell'annuncio del *profit warning* a mercati chiusi. Più nello specifico, le azioni sono state vendute, tramite *accelerated bookbuilding*, a 31 euro, mentre il titolo è sceso in chiusura addirittura a quota 20 euro.

In ragione del sospetto che la società abbia commesso un abuso di mercato tramite l'utilizzo di informazioni riservate, la Consob ha avviato i necessari monitoraggi e, con delibera n. 18454, ha vietato le vendite allo scoperto sul titolo Saipem per la giornata di giovedì 31 gennaio 2013, in virtù dell'applicazione dell'articolo 23 del regolamento (UE) n. 236/2012 relativo alle vendite allo scoperto, poiché la variazione di prezzo è stata superiore alla soglia del 10 %.

Considerato che a livello UE esiste il meccanismo di controllo che ha conferito alla BCE il ruolo di vigilanza su tutte le banche in seno al territorio europeo, e constatando l'esistenza del predetto atto UE finalizzato alla regolamentazione e alla trasparenza di taluni aspetti del mercato azionario, voglia la Commissione, alla luce di tutto quanto fin qui esposto, rispondere al seguente quesito:

Reputa la Commissione che sia auspicabile attivarsi al fine di consentire alla BCE di rendere la propria attività di controllo maggiormente capillare in modo da avere la possibilità di vigilare o regolare anche le cosiddette «vendite allo scoperto»?

Risposta di Michel Barnier a nome della Commissione

(2 maggio 2013)

Il regolamento dell'UE sulle vendite allo scoperto e sulla copertura del rischio di inadempimento dell'emittente ⁽¹⁾ è entrato in vigore il 1° novembre 2012. La vigilanza sulle attività di vendita allo scoperto rientra fra le responsabilità delle autorità nazionali competenti.

Per quanto riguarda la vigilanza da parte della BCE, il 19 marzo 2013 è stato raggiunto un accordo politico sulle proposte della Commissione riguardanti un meccanismo di vigilanza unico (regolamento sul meccanismo di vigilanza unico e regolamento EBA modificato). Il regolamento sul meccanismo di vigilanza unico conferisce compiti specifici alla BCE in materia di politiche riguardanti la vigilanza prudenziale degli enti creditizi nell'area dell'euro.

I compiti di vigilanza della BCE sono chiaramente limitati alla vigilanza prudenziale degli enti creditizi, come stabilito dalla direttiva 2006/48/CE. La BCE dovrà assicurare che gli enti creditizi rispettino le norme in materia di vigilanza prudenziale fissate dai rispettivi atti dell'Unione conformemente alle disposizioni della direttiva 2006/48/CE (per es. requisiti patrimoniali e gestione del rischio). I compiti della BCE non includono il monitoraggio delle attività specifiche del mercato. Per quanto riguarda le vendite allo scoperto, la Commissione ritiene che il quadro legislativo dell'UE in materia assegni poteri chiaramente definiti ai regolatori nazionali affinché intervengano, se necessario, in stretta collaborazione con l'Autorità europea dei mercati e valori mobiliari (ESMA). L'ESMA deve intervenire quando le minacce alla stabilità finanziaria hanno dimensione transfrontaliera.

⁽¹⁾ Regolamento (UE) n. 236/2012 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 14 marzo 2012, relativo alle vendite allo scoperto e a taluni aspetti dei contratti derivati aventi ad oggetto la copertura del rischio di inadempimento dell'emittente (credit default swap), GU L 86, pag. 1.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002844/13
to the Commission
Aldo Patriciello (PPE)
(11 March 2013)**

Subject: Short selling

With reference to the recent case of Saipem, a company in which ENI has a 42.9% holding and whose shares have been suspended as a result of an excessive fall in share price, Consob, the Italian regulatory body, has initiated checks on the placement of 2.2% of Saipem's capital carried out by Bank of America Merrill Lynch prior to the announcement of the profit warning, when markets were closed. The details are that the shares were sold in accelerated book build transactions at EUR 31, while the share price fell at the close to a level of EUR 20.

Because of its suspicions that the company had been guilty of market abuse by taking advantage of confidential information, Consob initiated the necessary monitoring and, under Decision No 18454, prohibited short selling of Saipem shares for the day of Thursday, 31 January 2013. This decision was taken under Article 23 of Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 on short selling, since the price had changed by more than the threshold of 10%.

Since at EU level there is a control mechanism allocating to the European Central Bank (ECB) the role of supervising all banks in European territory, and since there exists the abovementioned EU legal act designed to govern and ensure the transparency of certain aspects of the stock market, could the Commission respond to the following question in the light of all the above?

Does the Commission believe it is desirable to take action to allow the ECB to extend its monitoring activities so that it may monitor or regulate short selling too?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission
(2 May 2013)**

The EU Regulation on short selling and Credit Default Swaps (CDS) ⁽¹⁾ entered into application on 1 November 2012. The supervision short selling activities is entrusted to national competent authorities.

As far as supervision by the ECB is concerned, a political agreement on the Commission proposals for a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM Regulation and amended EBA Regulation) was reached on 19 March 2013. The SSM Regulation confers specific tasks on the ECB concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions established within the euro area.

The scope of the ECB's supervisory tasks is explicitly limited to prudential supervision of credit institutions as defined in Directive 2006/48/EC. The ECB will be responsible for ensuring that credit institutions comply with the standards set out in the relevant Union acts on prudential supervision as provided in Directive 2006/48/EC (e.g. capital requirements, risk management). It does not include monitoring of specific market activities. As regards short selling, the Commission believes that the EU legislative framework concerning short selling provides clear powers for national regulators to intervene when necessary, in close coordination with the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), and for ESMA itself to act in cases where threats to financial stability have cross-border implications.

⁽¹⁾ Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 of the European Parliament and the Council of 14 March 2012 on short selling and certain aspects of Credit Default Swaps (OJ L 86/1).

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002845/13

alla Commissione
Aldo Patriciello (PPE)
(11 marzo 2013)

Oggetto: Iscrizioni universitarie in calo

Secondo quanto prefigurato dall'analisi di DATAGIOVANI sul calo delle immatricolazioni universitarie nell'ambito di studi umanistici e sociali in Italia e in Europa, riportata in data 4 febbraio 2013 dal Consiglio Universitario Nazionale, attualmente le società europee stanno escludendo un'enorme fascia di talento umano prontamente disponibile; inoltre, la comparazione dei tassi d'iscrizione all'istruzione superiore in Europa con quelli di altre parti del mondo è fortemente preoccupante e richiede di intervenire. Ampliare l'accesso all'istruzione superiore non significa aprire le porte a studenti meno qualificati, ma piuttosto sostenere tutti gli studenti che abbiano il potenziale di partecipare all'istruzione superiore, a beneficio proprio e della società. Questo significa coinvolgere una gamma crescente di studenti con differenti motivazioni e interessi: non solo offrendo percorsi formativi per una crescita professionale adattata a un mercato del lavoro in rapido cambiamento, ma anche tenendo conto della domanda sempre più forte di possibilità di crescita personale tramite l'arricchimento culturale che le università offrono.

Considerando le linee guida sull'istruzione permanente in Europa tracciate nella Carta delle Università europee sull'apprendimento permanente, le università rientrano tra le istituzioni chiamate a dare una risposta a tali questioni, avendo la particolare funzione di offrire a studenti che seguono percorsi di apprendimento permanente un'istruzione superiore universitaria basata sulla ricerca. Tutto ciò considerato, le università europee non possono tuttavia concretizzare tali impegni senza azioni concertate da parte dei governi e dei partner regionali nel garantire le risorse necessarie e un contesto giuridico appropriato. L'assunzione di tali impegni è pertanto richiesta tanto alle università quanto ai governi, per assicurare un contesto favorevole, affinché le università possano sviluppare il loro contributo all'apprendimento equo e paritario.

Tutto ciò premesso, voglia la Commissione rispondere al seguente quesito:

- reputa la Commissione che siano auspicabili una sensibilizzazione e un apporto concreto ai singoli Stati membri per migliorare e armonizzare i vari sistemi scolastici?

Risposta di Androulla Vassiliou a nome della Commissione

(14 maggio 2013)

Nella sua comunicazione del 2011 «Un progetto per la modernizzazione dei sistemi di istruzione superiore in Europa», la Commissione ribadisce il ruolo cruciale dell'istruzione superiore nel rendere disponibile il capitale umano altamente qualificato, i risultati della ricerca e il potenziale di innovazione di cui l'Europa ha bisogno. La comunicazione sottolinea l'importanza di assicurare che un numero sufficiente di persone, in particolare giovani, possano accedere all'istruzione superiore e concluderla con un diploma, di accrescere la qualità e la pertinenza delle attività di insegnamento, di ricerca e di innovazione e di creare le condizioni opportune per il finanziamento e la governance del settore dell'istruzione superiore.

Il processo inter-governativo di Bologna ha portato a tutta una serie di riforme volte a rendere i sistemi di istruzione superiore in Europa più coerenti e compatibili. Tuttavia, non è tra gli obiettivi dell'Unione europea promuovere o imporre un modello unico di istruzione superiore nell'Unione. Di fatto, come stabilisce l'articolo 165 del trattato sul funzionamento dell'Unione europea, il contenuto e l'organizzazione dei sistemi di istruzione competono unicamente agli Stati membri. L'obiettivo è piuttosto quello di aiutare le autorità nazionali e le istituzioni di istruzione superiore a sviluppare sistemi di istruzione superiore di alta qualità in grado di rispondere ai bisogni socioeconomici. L'Unione europea offre il suo aiuto facendo opera di analisi e formulando raccomandazioni, anche nel contesto del semestre europeo, nonché incoraggiando la cooperazione tra gli Stati membri, tra l'altro tramite dei propri programmi specifici nel campo dell'istruzione e della formazione e dei Fondi strutturali.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002845/13
to the Commission
Aldo Patriciello (PPE)
(11 March 2013)**

Subject: Fall in university enrolment

According to the analysis by Datagiovani of the fall in university enrolments in humanities and social studies in Italy and Europe, reported on 4 February 2013 by the Italian National University Council, European societies are currently missing out on a huge pool of readily available human talent. Furthermore, a comparison of higher education participation rates in Europe with those in other world regions makes disturbing reading and calls for action. Widening access to higher education is not about introducing less qualified students, but rather about supporting all learners with the potential to benefit both themselves and society through participating in higher education. This means reaching out to an increasingly broad range of learners with different motivations and interests: not only offering programmes for professional development adapted to a fast-changing labour market, but also catering for the growing demand for personal development opportunities through the cultural enrichment that universities offer.

In view of the guidelines on lifelong learning in Europe set out in the European Universities' Charter on Lifelong Learning, the universities are among a spectrum of institutions that need to respond to these issues. They have a particular opportunity to provide research-based higher education for lifelong learners. Despite all this, Europe's universities cannot fulfil these commitments without concerted action by governments and regional partners to provide appropriate legal environments and funding. These commitments are therefore expected from both universities and governments, to ensure that a suitable environment is created for universities to develop their contribution to fair and equal learning.

Could the Commission therefore reply to the following question:

- Does the Commission believe it is desirable to raise awareness in individual Member States and make a concrete contribution to them to improve and harmonise the various different education systems?

**Answer given by Ms Vassiliou on behalf of the Commission
(14 May 2013)**

In its 2011 Communication 'An agenda for the modernisation of Europe's higher education systems', the Commission stresses the crucial role of higher education in delivering the highly-skilled human capital, research output and innovation potential that Europe needs. The communication highlights the importance of ensuring a sufficient number of people — in particular young people — are able to access and graduate from higher education, of enhancing the quality and relevance of teaching, research and innovation activities and creating effective conditions for funding and governance within the higher education sector.

The inter-governmental Bologna Process has led to a range of reforms aiming to make higher education systems in Europe more coherent and compatible. However, it is not the objective of the European Union to promote or impose a single model of higher education in the Union. In fact, according to Article 165 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the content and organisation of education systems is the sole responsibility of the Member States. Rather efforts are focused on helping national authorities and higher education institutions to develop effective, high quality systems of higher education, which respond to social and economic needs. The European Union provides this support through analysis and policy recommendations — including in the context of the European Semester — through facilitating policy cooperation between Member States and through its dedicated education and training programmes and the Structural Funds.

(Versão portuguesa)

**Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002846/13
à Comissão (Vice-Presidente/Alta Representante)**

Nuno Teixeira (PPE)

(11 de março de 2013)

Assunto: VP/HR — Combate ao tráfico de drogas: cooperação UE-CELAC

Considerando:

- Que a Declaração de Santiago, assinada a 27 de janeiro de 2013 pela União Europeia (UE) e pela Comunidade de Estados Latino-Americanos e Caribenhos (CELAC), explicita que ambos os blocos políticos irão desenvolver esforços concretos no que diz respeito ao combate ao tráfico de drogas e estupefacientes através do reforço de mecanismo de cooperação já existente;
- O processo de ratificação nacional relativo ao Diálogo Político e à Cooperação entre a Comunidade Andina de Nações e a UE e Declaração Conjunta aprovada na XI Reunião de Diálogo Especializado a Alto Nível sobre as Drogas entre a Comunidade Andina de Nações, realizada nos últimos dois dias de outubro do ano transato;
- Que os objetivos da Estratégia da União Europeia de Luta contra as Drogas para 2005-2012 consideravam a necessidade de reduzir a oferta de tais substâncias, nomeadamente através da cooperação internacional entre os Estados-Membros e países terceiros;
- Que, de acordo com o Departamento de Estado do Governo dos EUA, vários membros da CELAC («Commonwealth» das Bahamas, Belize, Estado Plurinacional da Bolívia, República da Colômbia, República da Costa Rica, República Dominicana, República do Equador, República de El Salvador, República de Guatemala, República do Haiti, República das Honduras, Jamaica, Estados Unidos Mexicanos, República de Nicarágua, República do Panamá, República do Peru e a República Bolivariana da Venezuela) são os principais produtores de droga a nível mundial;

Pergunta-se à Vice-Presidente da Comissão Europeia e a Alta Representante da União Europeia para os Negócios Estrangeiros e a Política de Segurança:

1. Quais os mecanismos e/ou iniciativas de cooperação entre os países da UE e da CELAC no que diz respeito ao combate contra as redes de tráfico de drogas/estupefacientes?
2. Qual o grau de eficácia de tais mecanismos?
3. Existem dados estatísticos que expressem os resultados dessa cooperação?

Resposta dada pela Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente Catherine Ashton em nome da Comissão

(6 de maio de 2013)

A UE e a CELAC cooperam entre si para combater o tráfico de droga em três grandes domínios, em consonância com a estratégia de luta contra a droga da UE: o diálogo político, a cooperação para o desenvolvimento e os acordos sobre questões relacionadas com a droga. Desde 1999, existe um diálogo birregional com a região da CELAC. Ao abrigo deste quadro, realizam-se anualmente várias reuniões do comité técnico e uma reunião de alto nível que têm por objeto, nomeadamente, as questões do tráfico de droga e da criminalidade organizada. A região andina tem também uma estratégia política com a UE em matéria de luta contra a droga. A UE está atualmente a preparar o lançamento de um diálogo específico sobre a droga com o Brasil, sendo essa questão igualmente tratada no diálogo geral com o México, o Peru, a Colômbia, a Bolívia, e a América Central.

O Copolad é um dos principais programas regionais ou transregionais financiados pela UE, ativo desde 2011 e destinado a reforçar a capacidade de participação dos países CELAC na formulação de políticas sólidas de luta contra a droga com vista à redução tanto da oferta como da procura. Outro programa importante é o programa «Rota da cocaína», ativo desde 2009, que visa lutar contra o tráfico de droga, sobretudo de cocaína, entre os países produtores e os consumidores através da África Ocidental. Aborda questões como o branqueamento de capitais, a cooperação policial e controlo dos aeroportos e portos marítimos. A UE está igualmente envolvida em iniciativas de desenvolvimento alternativo, especialmente na região andina.

A UE tem também sete acordos no domínio específico do controlo dos precursores de drogas com a Bolívia, a Colômbia, o Chile, o Equador, o México, o Peru e a Venezuela.

Tanto o programa Copolad como o programa «Rota da cocaína» são objeto de reexames intercalares separados. Os resultados estarão disponíveis este ano. Para estatísticas gerais em matéria de luta contra a droga na UE, o OEDT ⁽¹⁾ acompanha a situação no que se refere às novas drogas, níveis de consumo e dependência na UE.

⁽¹⁾ Observatório Europeu da Droga e da Toxicodependência.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002846/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

Nuno Teixeira (PPE)

(11 March 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Combating drug trafficking: EU-CELAC cooperation

— The Santiago Declaration signed on 27 January 2013 by the EU and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) states that both political blocs will make concrete efforts to combat drug and narcotics trafficking by strengthening the existing cooperation mechanism.

— A national ratification process took place regarding political dialogue and cooperation between the Andean Community (CAN) and the EU, and a Joint Declaration was adopted at the EU-CAN 11th High-Level Specialised Dialogue on Drugs held on 30 and 31 October 2012.

— The EU Drugs Strategy (2005-2012) deemed it necessary to reduce the supply of such substances, particularly through international cooperation between the Member States and third countries.

— According to the US State Department, several CELAC members (Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Venezuela) are leading drug producers at a global level.

1. What EU-CELAC cooperation mechanisms and/or initiatives are in place to combat drug/narcotics trafficking networks?
2. How effective are these mechanisms?
3. Are there any statistics showing the results of this cooperation?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(6 May 2013)

The EU and CELAC cooperate against drug trafficking in three basic areas, in line with the EU Drugs Strategy: political dialogue, development cooperation and agreements on drug-related issues. Since 1999 a bi-regional dialogue exists with the CELAC region. Under this framework, several technical committee meetings and one High Level Meeting are held every year covering, among other issues, drug trafficking and organised crime. The Andean region also has a dedicated political structure with the EU on drugs. The EU is currently preparing the launching of a specific dialogue on drugs with Brazil, and the issue is also dealt with in general dialogues with Mexico, Peru, Colombia, Bolivia, and Central America.

COPOLAD is one of two outstanding regional or trans-regional programmes financed by the EU, active since 2011 and aimed at enhancing the capacity of participating CELAC countries in formulating sound drug policies both in supply and demand reduction. Another is the Cocaine Route programme, active since 2009, aimed at fighting drug trafficking mainly of cocaine from producing to consumer countries, via West Africa. It tackles issues such as money laundering, police cooperation as well as air- and seaport control. The EU is also involved in alternative development initiatives especially in the Andean region.

The EU also has seven agreements in the specific field of the control of drug precursors with Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.

Both COPOLAD and the Cocaine Route programmes are undergoing separate mid-term reviews. Results will be available this year. For general statistics on drugs in the EU, the EMCDDA ⁽¹⁾ monitors the situation as regards new drugs, levels of consumption and addiction within the EU.

⁽¹⁾ European Monitoring Center on Drugs and Drug Addictions.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002847/13
a la Comisión**

Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)

(11 de marzo de 2013)

Asunto: Comunicación de los logros europeos

Algunas encuestas de opinión están destacando el progresivo incremento del número de ciudadanos europeos que muestra su decepción con respecto a las instituciones europeas. Es cierto que un análisis consciente y bien razonado de la opinión ciudadana pondría de manifiesto que los sentimientos están entremezclados y que las dificultades económicas, la crisis y las incertidumbres son las que abonan en gran medida ese alejamiento de un proyecto europeo.

Resulta indispensable facilitar la máxima información de cuanto se hace en las instituciones europeas y, aunque es cierto que en Bruselas hay muy buenos corresponsales de los grandes medios de información europeos, hay que reconocer que, a veces, son escasos el impacto y la repercusión de sus crónicas en medio de otras informaciones nacionales. Por ello, me permito trasladar a la Comisión Europea la siguiente cuestión:

¿No cree que, junto a medidas que incrementen el apoyo a la labor que hacen los corresponsales de los medios de comunicación de los distintos países europeos, la Comisión debería planificar alguna campaña de publicidad institucional ofreciendo, por ejemplo, cada mes un logro muy concreto de la actuación de las instituciones europeas?

Respuesta de la Sra. Reding en nombre de la Comisión

(14 de mayo de 2013)

Las encuestas de opinión del Eurobarómetro muestran el impacto de la crisis económica sobre la imagen que los ciudadanos tienen de la Unión Europea. En este contexto, además del trabajo realizado para mejorar nuestros servicios para los corresponsales acreditados de los medios de comunicación, la Comisión intenta siempre poner de manifiesto los logros de la Unión Europea a través del sitio web Europa y las redes sociales. Estos canales, en los que se utiliza siempre la lengua correspondiente, representan la manera más rentable de hacer llegar ejemplos y logros que son importantes para ciudades y regiones. Además, se subrayan y explican constantemente los esfuerzos y el progreso hechos a fin de crear el marco necesario para una recuperación satisfactoria de la crisis durante seminarios organizados por la Comisión con periodistas que normalmente no están acreditados en Bruselas, sino que están basados en sus respectivos Estados miembros.

Las Representaciones de la Comisión, las Oficinas de Información del Parlamento Europeo y los más de quinientos Centros de Información de Europe Direct de los Estados miembros utilizan asimismo a diario, en su comunicación con la prensa y el público, logros concretos que demuestran el valor añadido que aporta a nivel local la UE.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002847/13
to the Commission**

Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)

(11 March 2013)

Subject: Communicating EU achievements

Some opinion polls are highlighting the gradual increase in the number of EU citizens expressing their disappointment with regard to the European institutions. It is clear that a conscious and well-reasoned analysis of citizen opinion would reveal that these feelings are mixed, and that the economic difficulties, the crisis and the uncertainties are greatly fuelling this distancing from the European project.

It is therefore essential that as much information as possible should be provided regarding how much is being done in the European institutions and, though it is true that there are very good correspondents in Brussels representing the leading European media, it must be recognised that the impact and effect of their reports in national media is sometimes minimal. Allow me, therefore, to ask the Commission the following question:

Does it not think that, together with measures to increase support for the work done by the correspondents representing the various EU countries' media, the Commission should plan some sort of institutional publicity campaign illustrating, for example, a very concrete achievement each month resulting from the actions of the European institutions?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission

(14 May 2013)

Eurobarometer opinion polls show the impact of the economic crisis on the image of the European Union. Against this background, beyond the work done to improve our services for the accredited media correspondents, the Commission consistently tries to highlight the achievements of the European Union via the Europa website and social media channels. This is the most cost-effective way to showcase examples and achievements which are relevant to people's regions or cities and are explained in the relevant language. Furthermore, the efforts and advances in creating the necessary framework for a fair recovery from the crisis are constantly highlighted and explained during journalist seminars organised by the Commission and normally targeting journalists not accredited in Brussels but based in their Member States.

Concrete achievements demonstrating the added value that the EU brings in a local context are also used on a daily basis by the Representations of the Commission, the European Parliament Information Offices and by the more than 500 Europe Direct Information Centres across the Member States in their communications with the press and the public.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002848/13
a la Comisión**

Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)

(11 de marzo de 2013)

Asunto: De Erasmus a Goethe

Es unánime la opinión del gran éxito del programa Erasmus. Ha posibilitado que más de dos millones y medio de estudiantes europeos hayan estudiado en distintas universidades europeas. Pero, sobre todo, contribuye al fortalecimiento de la Unión Europea con una ciudadanía más consciente de las ventajas de este proyecto europeo. De ahí que, junto al avance de este programa para jóvenes, podrían ponerse en marcha otras actuaciones de intercambio que beneficien a otros ciudadanos europeos.

1. ¿No cree la Comisión que podrían realizarse otros programas de estancia en los países europeos, por ejemplo, uno para que las personas jubiladas pudieran disfrutar de unas semanas de descanso en un balneario o en una zona de montaña o costera de Europa?
2. Si Erasmo de Rotterdam fue un acertado ejemplo de estudio, ¿no cree la Comisión que Wolfgang Goethe, incansable viajero por Europa, podría bautizar este programa?

Respuesta del Sr. Tajani en nombre de la Comisión

(7 de mayo de 2013)

La Comisión reconoce lo importante que es fomentar las actividades turísticas transnacionales a fin de promover la ciudadanía europea y apoyar el crecimiento y el empleo en la UE. De conformidad con el Tratado de Lisboa, su papel se limita a apoyar, coordinar y complementar las acciones de los Estados miembros.

En esta línea, la Comisión puso en marcha en mayo de 2012 la iniciativa «Turismo Senior» a fin de definir unas condiciones marco que fomentaran, entre otras cosas, la organización de determinados viajes combinados transnacionales destinados a esta franja de la población en concreto para hacer así aumentar el número de viajeros mayores en Europa ⁽¹⁾. La iniciativa reconoce el importante potencial de generar turismo que poseen las personas mayores, que disfrutan tanto de poder adquisitivo como de tiempo libre. Así pues, desea incentivar la creación de un mercado interior transnacional para viajeros mayores en el interior de la UE, en particular durante la temporada baja ⁽²⁾ en los diferentes Estados miembros, con el fin de mejorar la competitividad del sector turístico y de promover el desarrollo regional en base a la diversidad en la UE.

En los próximos meses se publicará una convocatoria de propuestas para apoyar esta iniciativa. La Comisión propone poner en marcha esta «iniciativa senior» en el ámbito del turismo como proyecto piloto, desempeñando con ello el papel de facilitador para apoyar, coordinar y complementar las acciones desarrolladas por los Estados miembros y otras partes interesadas en este ámbito, sobre la base de asociaciones entre los sectores público y privado, incluidas las PYME.

A continuación, la Comisión evaluará la iniciativa, incluidos la dimensión de comunicación y marketing y un posible «patrocinador» para la misma. En este contexto, la Comisión aprecia la sugerencia de Su Señoría.

⁽¹⁾ Esta iniciativa se centrará en los ciudadanos europeos de más de 55 años, lo que representa alrededor del 25 % de la población de la UE.

⁽²⁾ La iniciativa contribuiría a mitigar los efectos negativos que la estacionalidad tiene sobre la competitividad de la industria turística de la UE, la motivación y el progreso profesional de los trabajadores y la utilización, mejorable, de las bazas naturales, culturales y materiales, así como las infraestructuras de los destinos turísticos de la UE.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002848/13
to the Commission**

Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)

(11 March 2013)

Subject: From Erasmus to Goethe

Opinion is unanimous as regards the great success of the Erasmus programme, which has made it possible for more than two and a half million European students to study at various EU universities. Above all, however, it helps to strengthen the European Union, with citizens who are more aware of the advantages of this EU project. Hence, together with the advancement of this programme for young people, other exchange activities could be established which are of benefit to other EU citizens.

1. Does the Commission not think that it could carry out other stay programmes in EU countries, such as one that enables retired persons to enjoy several weeks' rest and relaxation at a health resort or in a mountainous or coastal area of Europe, for example?
2. If Erasmus of Rotterdam was a wise exemplar of study, does the Commission not think that Wolfgang Goethe, tireless traveller throughout Europe, could be patron to this programme?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission

(7 May 2013)

The Commission recognises the importance of fostering transnational tourism activities to reinforce European citizenship and to support growth and jobs in the EU. In accordance with the Lisbon Treaty, its role is limited to supporting, coordinating and complementing Member States' actions.

In line with this, in May 2012, the Commission launched a 'senior tourism initiative' to define the framework conditions to enhance senior travel in Europe, encouraging, amongst others, the set-up of specific transnational travel packages for this target population ⁽¹⁾. The initiative acknowledges the important tourism-generating potential of the senior population, which includes individuals with both purchasing power and leisure time. It therefore wishes to incentivise the creation of an EU transnational domestic market for senior travel, in particular during low season ⁽²⁾ in the different EU Member States, thereby improving tourism competitiveness and promoting regional development on the basis of EU diversity.

A call for proposals will be published in the next few months to support this initiative. The Commission proposes to launch this 'senior initiative' in the tourism field as a pilot, acting as a facilitator to support, coordinate and complement actions as developed by Member States and other stakeholders in this field, on the basis of public-private partnerships including SMEs.

The Commission will then assess the initiative, including the communication and marketing dimension as well as a possible 'patron' for it. In this context, the Commission appreciates the Honourable Member's suggestion.

⁽¹⁾ This initiative will target European citizens over 55 years old, which represent around 25% of the EU population.

⁽²⁾ The initiative would contribute to mitigating the negative effects that seasonality has on the competitiveness of the EU tourism industry, on the motivation and career development of its workforce and on the sub-optimal use of the natural, cultural and physical assets and infrastructures of the EU tourism destinations.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002849/13
a la Comisión**

Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)

(11 de marzo de 2013)

Asunto: De nuevo sobre la elusión impositiva de las grandes empresas

Las noticias relativas a la paradoja que existe entre los grandes beneficios obtenidos por conocidas empresas y su reducida contribución impositiva se han multiplicado en las últimas semanas. Por ejemplo, la filial de Google en España ha declarado unas ventas superiores a los 38 millones de euros en 2011; sin embargo, el resultado de su base liquidable es negativo. Y la filial de Apple, con unas ventas de más de 20 millones, ha declarado pérdidas a la Agencia Tributaria española. Y así podría seguir con otros ejemplos que aparecen en los medios de comunicación europeos, porque a muchos inquietan esas prácticas tributarias que desvían cuantiosos beneficios a Irlanda o a Luxemburgo.

Con anterioridad ya he manifestado mi preocupación ante la Comisión Europea (preguntas E-007799/2012 o E-010066/2012) y las respuestas que he recibido resultan insatisfactorias, porque renuncian a afrontar el problema de manera armonizada en el ámbito europeo y esperan una propuesta a nivel mundial.

Soy consciente de que la mejor solución debería ser única, ante empresas que negocian en todo el mundo. Sin embargo, en estos momentos este objetivo es inalcanzable; de ahí que muchos países europeos (Francia, España, Alemania, Gran Bretaña, entre otros) estén intentando resolver esas situaciones de manera individual.

Por ello, insisto en preguntar:

1. ¿Por qué renuncia la Comisión Europea a establecer un criterio armonizado para todos los Estados miembros, lo que haría desaparecer la competencia tributaria entre los mismos?
2. ¿Por qué no estudia la Comisión la sustitución de tratados bilaterales de doble imposición por una normativa única para toda la Unión Europea?
3. ¿Por qué no analiza la Comisión la verdadera relevancia de las filiales y sucursales que tienen actuaciones sustanciales y significativas en el negocio del grupo empresarial con objeto de considerarlas «establecimientos permanentes»?
4. ¿Por qué no introduce los criterios formulados en el Informe de la OCDE sobre la erosión de las bases imponibles y el traslado de beneficios?

Respuesta del Sr. Šemeta en nombre de la Comisión

(30 de abril de 2013)

La propuesta de la Comisión relativa a una base imponible consolidada común del impuesto de sociedades aborda muchos de los problemas que plantea la coexistencia de veintisiete regímenes diferentes de impuestos de sociedades, mediante la armonización de la base imponible de ese impuesto. Esta propuesta se está debatiendo actualmente en el Consejo y corresponde ahora a los Estados miembros alcanzar un acuerdo. La Comisión, en su Comunicación COM(2011) 712 sobre «La doble imposición en el mercado único», ha determinado varias medidas para aquellas actividades transfronterizas que en la actualidad dan lugar a situaciones de doble imposición o de doble no imposición. El Plan de Acción de 6 de diciembre y, en concreto, la Recomendación C(2012) 8806 sobre la planificación fiscal agresiva, siguen insistiendo en este aspecto y recomiendan a los Estados miembros que incluyan en sus respectivos convenios fiscales una cláusula de doble no imposición. La Plataforma de Buena Gobernanza Fiscal supervisará las recomendaciones y aportará ideas para posibles nuevas iniciativas.

La definición de «establecimiento permanente» se basa en directrices de la OCDE respetadas a nivel mundial. La necesidad de actualizar o no esta definición es uno de los asuntos que actualmente está revisando la OCDE en su informe sobre la erosión de las bases imponibles y el traslado de beneficios [Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)], en el que también trabaja la Comisión. En su anteriormente mencionada Recomendación sobre la planificación fiscal agresiva, la Comisión también ha propuesto una norma general común de lucha contra el fraude que permita a los Estados miembros adoptar medidas eficaces contra mecanismos artificiales como filiales o sucursales que no cuentan con un verdadero carácter comercial. El informe BEPS de la OCDE, por su parte, aún no ha propuesto nuevos criterios, solo describe los actuales problemas fiscales internacionales. Para junio de 2013 está previsto un Plan de Acción de la OCDE en el que se identificarán posibles respuestas y metodologías, se establecerá un calendario y se señalarán los recursos necesarios para su ejecución.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002849/13
to the Commission**

Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)

(11 March 2013)

Subject: The tax evasion of large companies once again

Reports concerning the paradox between the huge profits earned by well-known companies and their low tax contribution have increased significantly in recent weeks. For example, Google's subsidiary in Spain has declared sales of more than EUR 38 million in 2011. Profits from its tax base, however, are negative. Moreover, Apple's subsidiary, with sales of more than EUR 20 million, has declared losses to the Spanish Tax Office. I could continue in this vein with other examples that appear in the European media, because many people are concerned by these tax practices that divert substantial profits to Ireland or Luxembourg.

I have already previously expressed my concern to the Commission (questions E-007799/2012 and E-010066/2012), and the answers I have received are unsatisfactory because they fail to tackle the problem in a harmonised manner at European level and are waiting for a proposal at the global level.

I am aware that the best solution should be unique, in view of companies that trade across the world; however at present this objective is out of reach. Hence many EU countries (France, Spain, Germany and Great Britain, among others) are attempting to resolve these situations individually.

That is why I again ask:

1. Why the Commission declines to establish a harmonised criterion for all Member States that would make tax competition between them disappear?
2. Why the Commission does not investigate substituting bilateral double taxation agreements with a single regulation for the entire European Union?
3. Why the Commission does not analyse the true relevance of subsidiaries and branches with substantial and significant activity in their company group's business with the objective of considering them 'permanent establishments'?
4. Why it does not introduce the criteria drawn up in the OECD report on the erosion of tax bases and profit shifting?

Answer given by Mr Šemeta on behalf of the Commission

(30 April 2013)

The Commission's proposal for a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base addresses many of the problems posed by the co-existence of 27 different corporate tax systems by harmonising the corporate tax base. It is currently discussed in Council and it is now for the Member States to reach agreement. Where cross border activities currently lead to double taxation or double non-taxation, the Commission in its communication on double taxation in the single market, COM(2011) 712, has identified several actions. The 6 December Action Plan and specifically the recommendation on Aggressive Tax Planning, C/2012/8806, follows up on this and recommends Member States include a double non-taxation clause in their tax treaties. The Platform for Tax Good Governance will monitor the recommendations and provide input for possible further initiatives.

The definition of a permanent establishment is based on globally respected OECD guidelines. Whether this requires updating is one of the topics currently reviewed by the OECD in the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project. The Commission participates in this work. In its Recommendation on Aggressive Tax Planning referred to above, the Commission has also proposed a common General Anti Abuse Rule that would allow Member States to take effective action against artificial arrangements, such as subsidiaries or branches lacking true economic substance. As regards the OECD BEPS report, there are no new criteria proposed yet. It describes current international tax problems. An OECD Action Plan is planned for June 2013 to identify possible responses and methodologies, to set a timetable and indicate the necessary resources for implementation.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002850/13
a la Comisión**

Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)

(11 de marzo de 2013)

Asunto: Catálogo de árboles centenarios y otras medidas forestales

Al hilo de un concienzudo informe científico publicado en la conocida revista *Science* relativo al grave deterioro de los árboles centenarios, propuse a la Comisión hace varias semanas algunas medidas, entre ellas, la difusión de un catálogo de árboles, así como destinar un pequeño porcentaje de las inversiones en infraestructuras a la repoblación forestal (pregunta E-000374/2013). En la respuesta que he recibido se me indica que «la Comisión no tiene previsto elaborar un catálogo de grandes árboles centenarios» y que «la Comisión no tiene intención de influir en las decisiones que adopten los Estados miembros en materia de gestión de obras públicas».

Aún advirtiendo la contundencia de estas contestaciones, insisto en preguntar a la Comisión:

1. ¿No cree que la difusión de un catálogo de grandes árboles centenarios tendría muchas ventajas, entre las que estarían, por ejemplo, contribuir a enraizar mejor (ya que de bosques hablamos) el conocimiento por los ciudadanos de los distintos ecosistemas europeos, lo que a su vez ayudaría, sin duda, a su mejor protección?
2. ¿Es consciente la Comisión de que configurar tal catálogo resultaría muy económico?
3. ¿Qué criterios tiene la Comisión para realizar un vídeo de promoción como el de «la ciencia es cosa de chicas» y rechazar considerar la publicidad del patrimonio forestal europeo?
4. En ningún momento he propuesto que se influya en la gestión de las obras públicas nacionales. Si se hubiera leído bien mi pregunta se habría advertido que lo que proponía era que se destinara a proyectos de restauración forestal un pequeño porcentaje de los presupuestos de las obras públicas comunitarias (por ejemplo, el 0,5 %). De ahí que insista, una vez más: ¿por qué no se destina un pequeño porcentaje de los proyectos comunitarios a repoblar zonas que lleven un sello de la financiación europea?

Respuesta del Sr. Potočnik en nombre de la Comisión

(25 de abril de 2013)

La difusión de un catálogo de grandes árboles centenarios puede contribuir a una mayor sensibilización sobre los ecosistemas europeos y mejorar, de este modo, su conservación. Este objetivo se ha alcanzado ya a través de una serie de publicaciones sobre grandes árboles centenarios en los Estados miembros, incluidas algunas publicadas por asociaciones de dendrología. Como ya se ha indicado en la respuesta a la pregunta E-000374/2013, los anexos de la Directiva sobre hábitats de la UE ⁽¹⁾ incluyen especies en peligro de extinción y los tipos de ecosistema forestal (es decir, hábitats naturales) que requieren medidas de protección o conservación.

La Comisión pone en marcha actividades de comunicación si considera que estas suponen un valor añadido en términos de apoyo a las políticas y prioridades europeas, en función del presupuesto disponible.

Las medidas de desarrollo rural a que se refiere la Comisión en su respuesta a la pregunta escrita E-00374/2013 ya incluyen ayudas a medidas medioambientales en el sector de la silvicultura, incluida la repoblación forestal, que, desde el punto de vista medioambiental, aportan un valor añadido a través de inversiones no productivas.

(¹) Directiva 92/43/CEE, DO L 206 de 22.7.1992.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002850/13
to the Commission**

Francisco Sosa Wagner (NI)

(11 March 2013)

Subject: Catalogue of old trees and other forest-related measures

Following a thorough scientific report published in the well-known magazine *Science* regarding the rapid global decline in large old trees, I proposed some measures to the Commission several weeks ago, including distributing a catalogue of trees, as well as allocating a small percentage of infrastructure investment to reforestation (question E-000374/2013). The answer that I received states that 'the Commission is not planning to establish a catalogue of large old trees' and that 'the Commission does not intend to influence Member States in their choice of managing public works'.

Whilst I realise that these answers are conclusive, I again ask the Commission:

1. Does it not think that there would be many benefits in distributing a catalogue of large old trees, for example that it would better root (since we are talking about forests) what citizens know about the different European ecosystems, undoubtedly in turn helping to better protect them?
2. Is the Commission aware that compiling such a catalogue would be very cost-effective?
3. What criteria does the Commission have for producing a promotional video such as 'science is for girls' but refusing to consider publicising Europe's forest heritage?
4. At no point have I proposed that the Commission should influence the management of public works. If it had read my question properly, it would have noted that what I was proposing was that a small amount of money (roughly equal to 0.5% of the budget for EU public works, for example) be allocated to forest reforestation projects. I therefore ask once more: Why does it not allocate a small percentage of EU project funding to repopulating areas that carry the stamp of European financing?

Answer given by Mr Potočník on behalf of the Commission

(25 April 2013)

The distribution of a catalogue of large old trees can help raising awareness on European ecosystems and thus improving their protection. This aim is already reached by a series of publications on old large trees in the Member States, including those published by dendrology associations. As already indicated in the reply to Question E-000374/2013, the annexes of the EU Habitats Directive ⁽¹⁾ include species in danger of extinction and the types of forest ecosystem (i.e. natural habitats) that require protection/conservation measures.

The Commission's communication activities are put in place where they are judged to add value in terms of supporting European policies and priorities and according to available budgets.

The rural development measures the Commission refers to in its reply to Written Question E-00374/2013 already provide support for forest-related environmentally targeted actions, including reforestation with enhanced environmental values through non-productive investment.

⁽¹⁾ 92/43/EEC (OJ L 206, 22.7.1992).

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-002851/13
an die Kommission
Ismail Ertug (S&D)
(11. März 2013)

Betrifft: Häusliche Gewalt in der Türkei

In seinem Bericht „He loves you, he beats you“ von 2011 hat die Organisation Human Rights Watch die Rechte der Frauen in der Türkei, insbesondere im Bereich der häuslichen Gewalt, genauestens unter die Lupe genommen. Abschließend wurden im Bericht Empfehlungen u. a. an die Europäische Kommission abgegeben wie folgende:

„Include a detailed analysis of domestic violence and the Turkish government’s progress and failings to address it in the 2011 and subsequent progress reports on Turkey“

(Aufnahme einer ausführlichen Analyse der Situation bezüglich häuslicher Gewalt und der Fortschritte bzw. der Untätigkeit der türkischen Regierung in den Bericht über 2011 und die anschließenden Türkei-Fortschrittsberichte)

Im Türkei-Fortschrittsbericht 2012 der EU-Kommission konnte bedauerlicherweise eine solche detaillierte Analyse nicht gefunden werden.

1. Kann die Kommission erklären, warum in einem so fundamentalen Bereich eine solche Analyse nicht für notwendig erachtet wird?
2. Wie will die Kommission sicherstellen, dass die Türkei in diesem Bereich ihren „Verpflichtungen“ nachkommt, solange die Kommission sich selbst keinen genauen Überblick über die Lage verschafft?

Antwort von Herrn Füle im Namen der Kommission
(2. Mai 2013)

Die Themen Frauenrechte und Geschlechtergleichstellung in der Türkei werden von der Kommission aufmerksam verfolgt, bei jeder geeigneten Gelegenheit mit den türkischen Behörden erörtert und u. a. in den jährlichen Fortschrittsberichten ⁽¹⁾ behandelt.

Wie vom Rat und Parlament gefordert, beziehen sich diese Berichte auf die im Hinblick auf die Beitrittskriterien, darunter die Grundrechte, relevanten Entwicklungen im jeweiligen Berichtszeitraum.

Der Kommission sind die Themen Frauenrechte und Geschlechtergleichstellung in der Türkei ein besonderes Anliegen. Um in diesem Bereich weitere Fortschritte zu erzielen, wird die Kommission diese auch weiterhin aufmerksam verfolgen und mit den türkischen Behörden und allen Interessengruppen — u. a. im Rahmen der Finanzhilfe — eng zusammenarbeiten.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/strategy-and-progress-report/index_de.htm

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002851/13
to the Commission
Ismail Ertug (S&D)
(11 March 2013)**

Subject: Domestic violence in Turkey

In its report 'He loves you, he beats you' from 2011, the organisation Human Rights Watch placed the rights of women in Turkey, in particular in the area of domestic violence, squarely under the microscope. The report concluded with recommendations for the European Commission, among others, as follows:

'Include a detailed analysis of domestic violence and the Turkish government's progress and failings to address it in the 2011 and subsequent progress reports on Turkey'

Turkey's 2012 progress report by the Commission, regrettably, contained no such detailed analysis.

1. Can the Commission explain why, in such a fundamental area, an analysis of this kind was not considered necessary?
2. How will the Commission ensure that Turkey fulfils its 'obligations' in this area if it does not itself obtain an accurate overview of the situation?

**Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission
(2 May 2013)**

The Commission follows closely women's rights and gender equality issues in Turkey, raises them with the Turkish authorities on all appropriate occasions and reports on them including in the yearly Progress Reports ⁽¹⁾.

These reports refer to developments over the reporting period, under the accession criteria, including fundamental rights, as requested by the Council and the Parliament.

The Commission attaches great importance to women's rights and gender equality issues in Turkey. The Commission will continue following these issues closely and working with the Turkish authorities and all stakeholders, also by means of the financial assistance, to achieve further progress.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/strategy-and-progress-report/index_en.htm

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002852/13
to the Commission**

Alyn Smith (Verts/ALE)

(11 March 2013)

Subject: Horizon 2020 and outreach

EU Universe Awareness (EU-UNAWA) is a highly successful project funded until December 2013 as a result of Amendment 898 of the European Parliament to the 2009 space research budget of the Commission's DG Enterprise and Innovation. This programme is part of the International Astronomical Union's strategy of using astronomy to further global development. It uses astronomy and space to inspire young children in five EU Member States and South Africa, with the emphasis on disadvantaged communities. Furthermore, EU-UNAWA is one of the few existing Seventh Framework Programme (FP7) projects that fully meet the demands of Written Declaration 45/2011, in which Parliament urged the Commission to support radio astronomy as a tool for stimulating capacity-building in Africa.

The Commission is setting great store by Horizon 2020 making the Integrating Projects (IP) and ideas generated by EU-funded research available to as wide a range of stakeholders as possible. While this is very much to be commended, what further consideration has the Commission given to the desirability of a wider outreach requirement for EU-funded science to mesh with the national educational programmes, especially for early-years pupils? A blue skies science like astronomy has considerable wider benefits in educational terms and as a means of enthusing the next generation of scientists and innovators. Would the Commission consider a formal requirement that a percentage of each Horizon 2020 grant be allocated to outreach and publicity work?

Would the Commission agree that this would put a vast resource at the disposal of the EU's schools and teachers, to enthuse the next generation as well as to underline the wider benefits of EU-funded research?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission

(13 May 2013)

The EU-UNAWA project is indeed providing a very useful contribution to the education of young children. It also most certainly will help to motivate young Africans to look for a future occupation at the Square Kilometer Array in South Africa, one of the largest astronomical instruments ever built. Furthermore, the space research unit of DG Enterprise and Industry has created a smartphone application for both IOS and Android, which gives information on the EU-UNAWA project and indeed all FP7 space projects as part of its outreach efforts, including a quiz section directed at young users.

In recognition of the essential role of education and public information on space related actions of the EU for young generations, the Commission intends to support specific initiatives on education and outreach activities in the Horizon 2020 Space programme and, when the subject matter of a research project lends itself to educational outreach, projects will be encouraged to produce materials for use in schools and universities.

The Commission is also engaged in the 'Space Expo', a mobile exhibition, which travels to cities all over Europe and shows the magic of the Universe and demonstrates European efforts in Earth observation, satellite navigation as well as telecommunication and the exploration of our solar system, aimed at raising the awareness of the general public, including specific visits for local schools. So far, more than 100,000 visitors and about 250 school classes with their teachers have visited the exhibition and were enthusiastic about the beautiful decoration and informative presentation by space experts. This kind of outreach activity will be continued.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002853/13
to the Commission**

Alyn Smith (Verts/ALE)

(11 March 2013)

Subject: EU-UNAWA project and outreach

EU Universe Awareness (EU-UNAWA) is a highly successful project funded up to December 2013 as a result of Parliament's Amendment 898 to the 2009 space budget of DG Enterprise and Innovation. This programme is part of the International Astronomical Union's strategy to use astronomy for global development. It uses astronomy and space to inspire young children in five Member States and in South Africa, with emphasis on disadvantaged communities. Furthermore, EU-UNAWA is one of the few existing projects under the Seventh Framework Programme for Research that fully satisfy Parliament's Written Declaration 45/2011 on science capacity-building in Africa, in which Parliament urges the Commission to support radio astronomy as a tool for stimulating capacity-building there.

Building on the successful experience with EU-UNAWA, what steps does the Commission plan to take to facilitate support for the continuation of this programme and expand its reach in order to enable the participation of additional Member States, associated states and other countries with which the Union wishes to strengthen its links in science and technology?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission

(15 May 2013)

The EU-UNAWA project is indeed providing a very useful contribution to the education of young children. In recognition of the essential role of education and public information on space related actions of the EU for young generations, we intend to support specific initiatives on education and outreach activities in the Horizon 2020 Space programme. As such, and notwithstanding the fact that the main focus of our calls will be on research and technology development, the Commission may consider opening topics in this direction over the course of the Horizon 2020 calls.

The Honourable Member should also refer to the response to Parliamentary Question E-002852/2013 for further details on ongoing outreach activities.

(Svensk version)

**Frågor för skriftligt besvarande E-002854/13
till kommissionen
Marita Ulvskog (S&D), Anna Hedh (S&D), Jens Nilsson (S&D), Åsa Westlund (S&D), Göran Färm (S&D) och
Olle Ludvigsson (S&D)
(11 mars 2013)**

Angående: Aktiv handlingsplan för att motverka diskriminering av människor på grund av sexuell läggning eller könstillhörighet

Vid flera tillfällen har en aktiv handlingsplan efterfrågats för att motverka diskriminering och särbehandling av människor på grund av sexuell läggning eller könstillhörighet.

Trots att såväl Europaparlamentet och EESK begärt en handlingsplan har kommissionens vice ordförande och kommissionär för rättvisa, grundläggande rättigheter och medborgarskap Viviane Reding hittills inte tagit initiativ till en sådan handlingsplan.

EU-kommissionen är sedan tidigare väl medveten om den diskriminering och de trakasserier HBTQ-personer utsätts för. Fördomar och diskriminerande handlingar kräver aktiva åtgärder.

Mot denna bakgrund bes kommissionen klargöra följande punkter:

1. Vilka är skälen till att handlingsplanen ännu inte finns på plats?
2. När avser kommissionen ta fram denna handlingsplan?
3. Vilka övriga åtgärder avser EU-kommissionen vidta för att säkerställa att arbetet mot diskriminering mot HBTQ-personer integreras i EU:s alla politikområden?

**Svar från Viviane Reding på kommissionens vägnar
(18 april 2013)**

Kommissionen bedriver en aktiv politik mot diskriminering i medlemsstaterna på grund av sexuell läggning ⁽¹⁾ och har hittills inte ansett det nödvändigt att lägga fram en handlingsplan för det arbetet. Kommissionen prioriterar i nuläget att se till att gällande lagstiftning och politiska insatser faktiskt tillämpas. Jag tänker bland annat på förbudet mot diskriminering utifrån sexuell läggning som fastställs i artikel 21 i Europeiska unionens stadga om de grundläggande rättigheterna, eller på diskriminering i arbetslivet på grund av sexuell läggning som även förbjuds genom rådets direktiv 2000/78/EG. Framstegen i arbetet mot homofobi presenteras varje år i årsrapporten om tillämpningen av stadgan om de grundläggande rättigheterna.

Kommissionen har uppmanat Europeiska unionens byrå för grundläggande rättigheter att samla fakta om homo- och transfobi för att få ett tydligare grepp om hets, brott och våld som riktas mot HBT-personer i medlemsstaterna och Kroatien. Utifrån resultaten av undersökningen kommer kommissionen att se över behovet av ytterligare insatser på området i framtiden.

Kommissionen kommer att fortsätta utnyttja dagens välfungerande samarbete med sina olika avdelningar, övriga EU-institutioner och det civila samhället för att diskrimineringsförbudet mot olika grupper, däribland HBT-personer, ska beaktas i all ny EU-lagstiftning.

⁽¹⁾ Mer information om EU:s åtgärder på området finns här: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/orientation/index_sv.htm

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002854/13
to the Commission**

**Marita Ulvskog (S&D), Anna Hedh (S&D), Jens Nilsson (S&D), Åsa Westlund (S&D), Göran Färm (S&D) and
Olle Ludvigsson (S&D)**
(11 March 2013)

Subject: Positive action plan to counter discrimination against people on grounds of their sexual orientation or gender

On several occasions, a positive action plan has been requested to counter discrimination against, and the special treatment of, people on grounds of their sexual orientation or gender.

Despite both Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee having called for an action plan, the Commission's Vice-President and Commissioner responsible for justice, fundamental rights and citizenship, Viviane Reding, has yet to take the initiative to draw up such a plan.

The Commission has been well aware for some time of the discrimination and harassment suffered by LGBT people. Prejudices and discriminatory actions require active measures.

In view of this, could the Commission clarify the following:

1. What are the reasons for still not having this action plan in place?
2. When does the Commission intend to draw up this action plan?
3. What other steps does the Commission intend to take to ensure that the work to prevent discrimination against LGBT people is integrated into all EU policy areas?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(18 April 2013)

The Commission conducts an active policy to combat discrimination based on sexual orientation in the Member States⁽¹⁾ and it has not considered necessary so far to present such action plan. The Commission's current priority is to ensure that current legislative and policy instruments are effectively implemented. This includes the prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation enshrined in Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and discrimination based on sexual orientation in the area of employment prohibited through Council Directive 2000/78/EC. The progress in the fight against homophobia is presented every year in the Annual Reports on the application of the Charter.

The Commission has asked the Fundamental Rights Agency to collect data on homophobia and transphobia in order to establish a more comprehensive picture on hate speech, crime and violence directed against LGBT people in the Member States and Croatia. On the light of the results of this survey, the Commission will analyse the need of carrying out additional activities in this area in the future.

The Commission will continue using the existing and well-established cooperation mechanisms between different Commission services, EU institutions and civil society to mainstream non-discrimination in all EU policies for different groups, including LGBT people.

⁽¹⁾ More information on EU action in this area can be found at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/orientation/index_en.htm

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta P-002855/13
alla Commissione**

Alfredo Antoniozzi (PPE)

(11 marzo 2013)

Oggetto: Nuovo quadro finanziario 2014-2020 e disoccupazione giovanile in Europa

Il Consiglio dell'Unione europea ha raggiunto un accordo politico durante il vertice tenutosi a Bruxelles il 7 e 8 febbraio 2013. Questo accordo prevede una riduzione dell'8 %, rispetto al 2012, del tetto massimo di spesa per l'Unione europea.

Secondo alcune organizzazioni giovanili (tra cui Youth Intergroup) questo taglio andrà a gravare sugli investimenti in aree di particolare interesse per i giovani come ricerca, innovazione e formazione. Programmi di formazione come «Erasmus for All» o di ricerca come «Horizon 2020» rischiano di subire grossi tagli rispetto alla proposta originale della Commissione che prevedeva un aumento del 70 % dei fondi destinati all'istruzione.

Per «Youth Guarantee», fondo dedicato alla creazione di nuovi posti di lavoro nei paesi con alto tasso di disoccupazione giovanile, sono stati destinati 6 miliardi di euro. Secondo l'Organizzazione Internazionale del Lavoro, sarebbe necessario un investimento di circa 21 miliardi di euro affinché lo «Youth Guarantee» possa avere un impatto significativo sul mercato del lavoro giovanile. Se a questi dati si aggiunge una riduzione pari a circa 14 miliardi di euro degli stanziamenti destinati all'istruzione e alla ricerca rispetto alla proposta originale di Van Rompuy e la recente difficoltà dell'Unione europea di rispettare le scadenze dei pagamenti, il rischio per i programmi destinati alla gioventù europea sembra ancora maggiore.

Alla luce dei dati Eurostat, da cui emerge una situazione allarmante della disoccupazione giovanile in Europa (con picchi fino al 26 % in Spagna e 27 % in Grecia), sarebbe importante sapere se il Consiglio è a conoscenza del rapporto sopra citato dell'Organizzazione Internazionale del Lavoro e se dispone di dati sull'impatto che i finanziamenti ora proposti dal Consiglio avrebbero sull'occupazione giovanile in Europa.

Può la Commissione far sapere quali misure intende intraprendere per far sì che gli investimenti dedicati ai giovani creino un'occupazione stabile di lungo periodo?

Risposta di László Andor a nome della Commissione

(17 aprile 2013)

Il pacchetto per l'Occupazione giovanile ⁽¹⁾ propone quattro iniziative per affrontare le sfide a breve termine e quelle strutturali che sottendono la crisi della disoccupazione giovanile: una raccomandazione del Consiglio che prevede un sistema di garanzia per i giovani, accolta dal Consiglio il 28 febbraio 2013 ⁽²⁾, che accresce la disponibilità di tirocini e apprendistati qualitativamente validi sulla base di un quadro europeo per la qualità degli apprendistati e di un'Alleanza europea per gli apprendistati e migliora la mobilità dei giovani lavoratori. L'attuazione di queste misure sarà sostenuta finanziariamente dal Fondo sociale europeo e dall'iniziativa a favore dell'occupazione giovanile (YEI) ⁽³⁾ che è cofinanziata dal FSE.

Questi sforzi dovrebbero favorire un'occupazione stabile e durevole dei giovani se saranno integrati da altre misure per accrescere l'offerta di posti di lavoro, come proposto nel pacchetto Occupazione dell'aprile 2012 ⁽⁴⁾, atte a stimolare la domanda di lavoro, valorizzando appieno le potenzialità di creazione di lavoro delle industrie chiave e mobilitando gli strumenti finanziari dell'UE a sostegno della creazione di posti di lavoro.

Nel contesto del Semestre europeo 2012 la Commissione ha emanato raccomandazioni per paese a quasi tutti gli Stati membri in relazione alle tematiche che interessano i giovani, raccomandazioni che sono state adottate dal Consiglio nel 2012. La Commissione segue gli sviluppi che si registrano sui mercati del lavoro nazionali e le misure intraprese. Essa presenterà la propria valutazione di insieme nel contesto del Semestre europeo 2013.

⁽¹⁾ COM(2012)727-728 — 729 final del 5 dicembre 2012.

⁽²⁾ <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/13/st06/st06944.en13.pdf>

⁽³⁾ COM(2013)144, 145, 146 del 12 marzo 2012.

⁽⁴⁾ COM(2012)173 final del 18 aprile 2012.

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-002855/13
to the Commission**

Alfredo Antoniozzi (PPE)

(11 March 2013)

Subject: New multiannual financial framework for 2014-2020 and youth unemployment in Europe

At the European Council Summit of 7 and 8 February 2013 in Brussels, political agreement was reached to cap EU expenditure at a level 8% below that of 2012.

A number of youth organisations (including Youth Intergroup) have expressed concern that the cuts will seriously compromise investment in areas of particular importance to young people, such as research, innovation and training. Funding for training and research programmes, for example 'Erasmus for All' or 'Horizon 2020' respectively, is likely to be far below the amount quoted in the Commission's initial proposal, which envisaged a 70% increase in appropriations for education.

EUR 6 billion has been earmarked for the 'Youth Guarantee' fund for job creation in countries with high levels of youth unemployment. However, according to the International Labour Organisation, investment totalling EUR 21 billion would be necessary for it to have any significant impact. This can only serve to undermine still further programmes intended for young people in Europe, particularly in view of the fact that appropriations for education and research are EUR 14 billion below the amount initially proposed by Mr Van Rompuy, in addition to which the EU has recently had difficulties in making payments on schedule.

In the light of the alarming Eurostat youth unemployment figures for Europe (peaking to 26% in Spain and 27% in Greece), it is important to establish whether the Council is aware of the above report by the International Labour Organisation and whether it fully appreciates the anticipated impact of its financial recommendations on youth unemployment in Europe.

In view of this:

What measures are being envisaged by the Commission to ensure that investment intended to benefit young people leads to stable and long-term employment?

Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission

(17 April 2013)

The Youth Employment Package ⁽¹⁾ proposes four initiatives to tackle both the short-term and structural challenges behind the youth unemployment crisis: a Council Recommendation on Establishing a Youth Guarantee, agreed upon by the Council on 28 February 2013 ⁽²⁾, increasing the supply of quality traineeships as well as apprenticeships through a Quality Framework on Traineeships and a European Alliance for Apprenticeships and improving the mobility of young workers. The implementation of these measures will be financially supported by the European Social Fund and the Youth Employment Initiative (YEI) ⁽³⁾ which is co-funded by the ESF.

These efforts should support the stable and long-term employment for young people if they are complemented by other measures to boost the number of jobs on offer, as proposed by the Employment Package of April 2012 ⁽⁴⁾, such as encouraging labour demand, fully exploiting the job creation potential of key industries; and mobilising EU financial instruments in support of job creation.

In the context of the 2012 European Semester, the Commission issued relevant Country Specific Recommendations to nearly all Member States on youth-related areas, which were adopted by the Council in 2012. The Commission is monitoring the developments in the national labour markets and the measures undertaken. It will present its overall assessment in the context of the 2013 European Semester.

⁽¹⁾ COM(2012) 727-728 — 729 final of 5 December 2012.

⁽²⁾ <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/13/st06/st06944.en13.pdf>

⁽³⁾ COM(2013)144, 145, 146 of 12 March 2012.

⁽⁴⁾ COM(2012) 173 final of 18 April 2012.

(българска версия)

Въпрос с искане за писмен отговор E-002857/13

до Комисията

Filiz Hakaeva Huysmenova (ALDE)

(11 март 2013 г.)

Относно: Защита на демокрацията и основните права

Следващият мониторингов доклад за България по механизма за сътрудничество и контрол е предвиден за декември 2013 г. Както стана ясно, редица страни членки незаконно обвързаха приемането на България в Шенгенското пространство с резултатите от докладите на Комисията в областта на съдебната система и правовия ред. Доколкото тези мнения се явяват непреодолима пречка за приемането на България в Шенген, възможно ли е и какъв е механизмът ЕК да подготви и изнесе междинен доклад, който би отразил евентуалния напредък на страната по препоръките на Комисията (държави като Холандия, Германия, Австрия и Финландия приеха за несправедливо за България да няма междинен доклад, какъвто имаше за Румъния)?

В ЕП се проведе дебат за демокрацията и свободата в България, провокиран от покушението срещу лидера на либералната партия Движение за права и свободи д-р Ахмед Доган. Евродепутати отправиха апел към ЕК за наблюдение на разследването и делото по този случай. Счита ли Комисията, че разкриването на обективната истина има високо значение в обществен и политически план за страната и намира ли за удачно да включи към делата, които наблюдава в правосъдната система на България, провеждането на горепосоченото досъдебно производство и съдебно дело?

Отговор, даден от г-н Барозу от името на Комисията

(7 май 2013 г.)

Комисията подкрепя присъединяването на България към Шенгенското пространство. Тя е подчертавала по редица поводи, че не е в подкрепа на въвеждането на каквато и да било формална връзка или обусловеност между Механизма за сътрудничество и проверка (МСП) и присъединяването на България и Румъния към Шенгенското пространство. Наскоро тази позиция бе потвърдена отново на пленарно заседание на ЕП в рамките на изявлението на Комисията относно МСП, направено на 13 март 2013 г. Предвижда се следващите доклади по МСП за България и Румъния да бъдат публикувани преди края на 2013 г. По своя инициатива и във всеки един момент Комисията може да реши да приеме допълнителни доклади, ако прецени, че това е необходимо с оглед развитието на събитията.

Комисията осъди опита за покушение срещу д-р Ахмед Доган, извършен през януари 2013 г., като призова българските власти да проведат пълно разследване на случилото се и да подведат под отговорност извършителите. Тя следи напредъка по случая като част от по-обширните си задължения за мониторинг съгласно МСП. Най-общо казано, Комисията вярва, че наличието на добре функционираща съдебна система и зачитането на върховенството на закона са предпоставки за съществуването на устойчиво и демократично общество.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002857/13
to the Commission**

Filiz Hakaeva Hyusmenova (ALDE)

(11 March 2013)

Subject: Protecting democracy and fundamental rights

The next monitoring report on Bulgaria under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism is scheduled for December 2013. As it became clear, a number of Member States have illegally involved Bulgaria's entry into the Schengen Area with the results from the reports by the Commission on the judicial system and the rule of law. Insofar as these opinions appear to be an insurmountable obstacle for Bulgaria's accession to Schengen, would it be possible and what would be the mechanism for the European Commission to prepare and deliver an interim report reflecting the possible progress the country has made regarding the Commission's recommendations (countries such as the Netherlands, Germany, Austria and Finland believed that it was unfair for Bulgaria not to have an interim report, since there was one for Romania)?

There was a debate in the European Parliament about democracy and freedom in Bulgaria on account of the attempted assassination of Dr Ahmed Dogan, the leader of the liberal party the Movement for Rights and Freedoms. MEPs called on the Commission to monitor the investigation and trial in this case. Does the Commission believe that the course of justice is of great importance in the social and political plan for the country, and does it believe that it is appropriate to include the implementation of the above pre-trial proceedings and court proceedings in cases seen in the Bulgarian judicial system?

Answer given by Mr Barroso on behalf of the Commission

(7 May 2013)

The Commission supports Bulgaria's accession to the Schengen Area. The Commission has on numerous occasions repeated that it does not support any formal link or conditionality between the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) and the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the Schengen area. This position was latest reiterated before the EP Plenary, when the Commission delivered its statement on the CVM on the 13 March 2013. The next CVM reports for both Bulgaria and Romania are planned before the end of 2013. The Commission can at its own initiative and at any moment decide to adopt additional reports, if it considers that developments so require.

The Commission has condemned the assault attempt against Dr Ahmed Dogan in January 2013 and called on the Bulgarian authorities to fully investigate the events and bring those responsible to justice. The Commission is following the developments in the case as part of its wider monitoring obligations under the CVM. In a general sense, the Commission believes that a well-functioning judicial system and the respect for rule of law is a prerequisite for a sustainable, democratic society.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002858/13

à Comissão

Edite Estrela (S&D)

(11 de março de 2013)

Assunto: Resultados do Eurobarómetro sobre «cidadania da União Europeia»

- Tendo em conta os resultados do Eurobarómetro de fevereiro de 2013 sobre «a cidadania da União Europeia»;
- Tendo em conta que o sentimento de cidadania europeia não é correspondido pelo conhecimento dos direitos associados à cidadania europeia, com apenas 36 % dos inquiridos a nível europeu a afirmarem que os conhecem;
- Tendo em conta que a sondagem sugere ainda que, 27 anos depois da adesão de Portugal, o grau de interação dos portugueses com outras realidades da União Europeia é muito baixo;

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Que medidas pensa adotar para promover um sentimento pró-europeu nos diferentes Estados-Membros e para dar a conhecer de maneira mais eficaz os direitos decorrentes da cidadania europeia?

Resposta dada por Viviane Reding em nome da Comissão

(18 de abril de 2013)

O inquérito Eurobarómetro sobre a perceção da cidadania na UE mostra que a vasta maioria (88 %) das pessoas em Portugal está familiarizada com o termo «cidadão europeu» — isto é mais 11 pontos percentuais do que em 2011, e uma clara maioria (59 %) diz que sente que é cidadão da UE. No que diz geralmente respeito ao nível de informação sobre os seus direitos ao abrigo da legislação da UE, a percentagem de cidadãos portugueses que se sentiram bem informados (32 %) está muito perto da média da UE (36 %) e representa um aumento de 6 % comparado a 2007 — uma tendência evidente nos Estados-Membros (+5 % no mesmo período).

No Relatório de Cidadania da UE de 2010, a Comissão identificou a falta de acesso fácil dos cidadãos à informação sobre os seus direitos como um dos obstáculos principais que os cidadãos da UE enfrentam quando procuram exercer os direitos europeus. Por forma a sensibilizá-los, a Comissão centrou os seus esforços nomeadamente no desenvolvimento do «Europe Direct» e do portal web «A sua Europa», que funciona como um ponto de informação único sobre os direitos da EU, e propôs-se a designar o ano de 2013 como o «Ano Europeu dos Cidadãos». Ao longo deste ano, a Comissão estará a trabalhar no sentido de os cidadãos para os seus direitos europeus em Portugal e no restante território da UE.

O Relatório de Cidadania da UE de 2013, esperado para 8 de maio, apresentará outras ações previstas pela Comissão para remover os obstáculos que persistem sobre o usufruto dos direitos dos cidadãos da UE, no sentido de fazer da cidadania europeia uma realidade tangível nas suas vidas quotidianas.

A Comissão já deu início a uma série de diálogos e debates com os cidadãos sobre o futuro da Europa, os quais com o envolvimento pessoal de vários membros do Colégio, conjuntamente com deputados do Parlamento Europeu e líderes locais e nacionais, darão uma contribuição concreta para o envolvimento com os cidadãos e a promoção de uma melhor compreensão da União Europeia e das suas políticas.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002858/13
to the Commission
Edite Estrela (S&D)
(11 March 2013)**

Subject: Eurobarometer results on 'European Union citizenship'

- In the light of the Eurobarometer results on 'European Union citizenship' from February 2013;
 - Given that the sense of European citizenship is not matched by awareness of the rights associated with European citizenship, as only 36% of those surveyed throughout Europe said that they were familiar with their rights;
 - Given that the survey also suggests that, 27 years after Portugal's accession, the level of interaction between the Portuguese and other areas of the European Union is still extremely low;
1. What measures will the Commission adopt to promote pro-European sentiment throughout the different Member States and to more effectively raise awareness of European citizens' rights?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(18 April 2013)**

The Eurobarometer survey on EU Citizenship shows that the vast majority (88%) of people in Portugal are familiar with the term 'EU citizen' — this is 11 percentage points more than in 2007, and a clear majority (59%) say they feel that they are a citizen of the EU. As regards the level of information generally on their rights under EC law, the percentage of Portuguese citizens who feel well informed (32%) is very close to the EU average (36%) and represents an increase of 6% compared to 2007 — a trend evident in all Member States (+5% in the same period).

In the 2010 EU Citizenship Report, the Commission identified the lack of easily accessible information to citizens on their rights as one of the main obstacles that EU citizens face when seeking to exercise their EU rights. To improve their awareness the Commission focused its efforts notably on developing Europe Direct and the Your Europe web portal into a 'one-stop shop' information point on the rights of citizens in the EU and proposed to designate 2013 as the 'European Year of Citizens'. Throughout this year, the Commission is working to raise awareness of European Citizens' rights in Portugal and across the rest of the EU.

The 2013 EU Citizenship Report, due on 8th May, will present further actions envisaged by the Commission to remove persistent obstacles to citizens' enjoyment of their EU rights so as to make EU citizenship a tangible reality in their daily lives.

The Commission has already started a series of dialogues with citizens and debates about the future of Europe. With the personal involvement of many members of the College, together with MEPs and national and local political leaders, these make a concrete contribution to engaging with citizens and promoting better understanding of the EU and its policies.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002859/13
a la Comisión**

Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Kriton Arsenis (S&D), Gaston Franco (PPE), Jacqueline Foster (ECR), Julie Girling (ECR), Mikael Gustafsson (GUE/NGL), Sidonia Elżbieta Jędrzejewska (PPE), Dan Jørgensen (S&D), Jörg Leichtfried (S&D), Kartika Tamara Liotard (GUE/NGL), David Martin (S&D), Cristiana Muscardini (ECR), Bill Newton Dunn (ALDE), Sirpa Pietikäinen (PPE), Pavel Poc (S&D), Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Daciana Octavia Sârbu (S&D), Joanna Senyszyn (S&D), Keith Taylor (Verts/ALE), Janusz Wojciechowski (ECR) y Andrea Zanoni (ALDE)
(11 de marzo de 2013)

Asunto: Informe del Fondo Internacional para el Bienestar Animal sobre la rentabilidad de la caza de ballenas por parte Japón

A la luz del informe «La rentabilidad de la caza de ballenas por parte de Japón» que el Fondo Internacional para el Bienestar Animal ha publicado recientemente, basado en los resultados de las principales agencias con sede en Japón y, en gran medida, en los propios datos del Gobierno de Japón, y habida cuenta de la respuesta del Comisario Potocnik a la pregunta escrita E-002263/2012 y de la respuesta del Comisario De Gucht a la pregunta escrita E-012352/2011:

¿Es consciente la Comisión del informe del Fondo Internacional para el Bienestar Animal o considera debatir con funcionarios japoneses sobre la evidencia del uso de capital público y del desvío de fondos de ayuda al tsunami para fomentar la industria ballenera poco rentable y la falta de valor científico de la denominada «caza científica de ballenas» practicada por Japón, antes de lanzarse a entablar negociaciones comerciales con Japón?

¿Puede asegurar la Comisión que toda disposición relativa al comercio y al desarrollo sostenibles en cualquier futuro acuerdo comercial entre la UE y Japón garantizará también una aplicación efectiva del Convenio Internacional para la Regulación de la Pesca de la Ballena y del Convenio sobre la Diversidad Biológica?

Respuesta del Sr. De Gucht en nombre de la Comisión
(24 de abril de 2013)

La Comisión conoce el informe del Fondo Internacional para el Bienestar Animal «La rentabilidad de la caza de ballenas por parte de Japón» y lo está estudiando.

La UE integra consideraciones de sostenibilidad a su política comercial, especialmente negociando compromisos sobre el medio ambiente y normas laborales en acuerdos bilaterales de libre comercio, y realizando evaluaciones de impacto sobre la sostenibilidad en relación con las negociaciones comerciales.

Por lo que se refiere a las negociaciones sobre el acuerdo de libre comercio con Japón, el objetivo de la Comisión es que tal acuerdo contenga un capítulo amplio y ambicioso sobre comercio y desarrollo sostenible, que debería abordar, entre otras, la conservación, la gestión duradera y el fomento del comercio de recursos naturales—incluidos los pesqueros— sostenibles y obtenidos legalmente. De ese modo, dicho capítulo sobre comercio y desarrollo sostenible ha de contribuir a la aplicación efectiva por parte de Japón de los acuerdos multilaterales sobre medio ambiente, en particular el Convenio sobre la Diversidad Biológica y la Convención sobre el Comercio Internacional de Especies Amenazadas de Fauna y Flora silvestres. La Comisión considera que las disposiciones en materia de comercio y desarrollo sostenible deben perseguir un alto nivel de protección medioambiental y laboral.

En cuanto a la cuestión específica de la pesca de la ballena, la UE ha expresado con frecuencia su posición divergente con Japón y, sin duda, seguirá haciéndolo en los foros pertinentes.

(České znění)

Otázka k písemnému zodpovězení E-002859/13

Komisi

**Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Kriton Arsenis (S&D), Gaston Franco (PPE), Jacqueline Foster (ECR), Julie Girling (ECR), Mikael Gustafsson (GUE/NGL), Sidonia Elżbieta Jędrzejewska (PPE), Dan Jørgensen (S&D), Jörg Leichtfried (S&D), Kartika Tamara Liotard (GUE/NGL), David Martin (S&D), Cristiana Muscardini (ECR), Bill Newton Dunn (ALDE), Sirpa Pietikäinen (PPE), Pavel Poc (S&D), Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Daciana Octavia Sârbu (S&D), Joanna Senyszyn (S&D), Keith Taylor (Verts/ALE), Janusz Wojciechowski (ECR)
a Andrea Zanoni (ALDE)**

(11. března 2013)

Předmět: Zpráva Mezinárodního fondu pro ochranu zvířat (IFAW) o hospodářských aspektech japonského lovu velryb

S ohledem na nedávno zveřejněnou zprávu Mezinárodního fondu pro ochranu zvířat (IFAW) o hospodářských aspektech japonského lovu velryb („The Economics of Japanese Whaling“), která vychází ze závěrů předních japonských agentur a ve značné míře i z údajů samotné japonské vlády, a s ohledem na odpověď komisaře Potočnicka na otázku k písemnému zodpovězení E-002263/2012 a odpověď komisaře De Guchta na otázku k písemnému zodpovězení E-012352/2011:

Je si Komise vědoma zveřejnění této zprávy a/nebo hodlá před zahájením obchodních jednání s Japonskem diskutovat se zástupci japonských orgánů o důkazech o používání veřejných prostředků a zpronevěrování fondů na zmírnění následků tsunami ve prospěch podpory nevydělečného velrybářského odvětví a o tom, že nebyl prokázán vědecký přínos tzv. lovu velryb pro vědecké účely?

Zajistí ustanovení o obchodu a udržitelném rozvoji v jakékoli budoucí obchodní dohodě mezi EU a Japonskem, že bude účinně uplatňována Mezinárodní úmluva o regulaci velrybářství (ICRW) a Úmluva o biologické rozmanitosti (CBD)?

Odpověď Karla De Guchta jménem Komise

(24. dubna 2013)

Komise si je vědoma zprávy Mezinárodního fondu pro ochranu zvířat (IFAW) „The Economics of Japanese Whaling“ a zkoumá ji.

EU do své obchodní politiky začleňuje zřetel udržitelnosti, zejména vyjednáváním závazků v oblasti životního prostředí a pracovních norem v dvoustranných dohodách o volném obchodu a prováděním posouzení dopadů na udržitelnost v souvislosti s obchodními jednáními.

Pokud jde o jednání o dohodě o volném obchodu s Japonskem, cílem Komise je zahrnout do této dohody ambiciózní a zevrubnou kapitolu o obchodu a udržitelném rozvoji, jež by měla mimo jiné řešit ochranu legálně nabytých a udržitelných přírodních zdrojů, včetně zdrojů rybolovných, udržitelné hospodaření s nimi a podporu obchodu těmito zdroji. Kapitola o obchodu a udržitelném rozvoji by tedy měla přispět k tomu, aby Japonsko účinně provedlo mnohostranné dohody o životním prostředí, včetně Úmluvy o biologické rozmanitosti (CBD) a Úmluvy o mezinárodním obchodu ohroženými druhy volně žijících živočichů a planě rostoucích rostlin (CITES). Komise zastává názor, že ustanovení o obchodu a udržitelném rozvoji by měla směřovat k vysoké úrovni ochrany životního prostředí a zaměstnanosti.

Pokud jde o konkrétní otázku lovu velryb, EU již mnohokrát Japonsku vyjádřila svůj rozdílný postoj a bude tak v příslušných souvislostech bezpochyby činit i nadále.

(Dansk udgave)

**Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse E-002859/13
til Kommissionen**

Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Kriton Arsenis (S&D), Gaston Franco (PPE), Jacqueline Foster (ECR), Julie Girling (ECR), Mikael Gustafsson (GUE/NGL), Sidonia Elżbieta Jędrzejewska (PPE), Dan Jørgensen (S&D), Jörg Leichtfried (S&D), Kartika Tamara Liotard (GUE/NGL), David Martin (S&D), Cristiana Muscardini (ECR), Bill Newton Dunn (ALDE), Sirpa Pietikäinen (PPE), Pavel Poc (S&D), Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Daciana Octavia Sârbu (S&D), Joanna Senyszyn (S&D), Keith Taylor (Verts/ALE), Janusz Wojciechowski (ECR) og Andrea Zanoni (ALDE)

(11. marts 2013)

Om: IFAW-rapport om økonomien for japansk hvalfangst

I lyset af den nyligt offentliggjorte IFAW-rapport »The Economics of Japanese Whaling«, som blev udført af førende Japanbaserede agenturer og i høj grad var baseret på den japanske regerings egne oplysninger og på baggrund af kommissær Potocniks svar på skriftlig forespørgsel E-002263/2012 samt i lyset af kommissær De Gucht's svar på skriftlig forespørgsel E-012352/2011, opfordres Kommissionen til at svare på følgende:

Er Kommissionen bekendt med IFAW's rapport, og/eller vil Europa-Kommissionen, forud for lanceringen af handelsforhandlinger med Japan indlede en drøftelse med de japanske embedsmænd om beviset for anvendelsen af offentlige midler og omdirigerede midler fra fonde for støtte til tsunami ofre til at støtte den urentable hvalindustri og manglen på videnskabelig værdi af såkaldt japanske »videnskabelig hvalfangst«?

Vil bestemmelserne om handel og bæredygtig udvikling i en fremtidig handelsaftale mellem EU og Japan også sikre en effektiv gennemførelse af ICRW (den internationale konvention om regulering af hvalfangst) og konventionen om den biologiske mangfoldighed (CBD)?

Svar afgivet på Kommissionens vegne af Karel De Gucht

(24. april 2013)

Kommissionen er bekendt med IFAW's rapport om »The Economics of Japanese Whaling« og er ved at gennemgå denne.

EU integrerer bæredygtighedshensyn i sin handelspolitik, især ved at forhandle om forpligtelser vedrørende miljø- og arbejdsstandarder i bilaterale frihandelsaftaler og ved at foretage bæredygtighedsvurderinger i forbindelse med handelsforhandlinger.

Med hensyn til frihandelsforhandlingerne med Japan er det Kommissionens mål i frihandelsaftalen at få indarbejdet et ambitiøst og omfattende kapitel om handel og bæredygtig udvikling, der bl.a. skal vedrøre spørgsmål om bevarelse og bæredygtig forvaltning af naturressourcer samt fremme af handel med lovligt erhvervede bæredygtige naturressourcer, herunder fiskeressourcer. Kapitlet om handel og bæredygtig udvikling skal således bidrage til, at Japan effektivt gennemfører multilaterale miljøaftaler, herunder konventionen om biologisk mangfoldighed (CBD) og konventionen om international handel med udryddelsestruede vilde dyr og planter (CITES). Kommissionen er af den opfattelse, at bestemmelser om handel og bæredygtig udvikling bør tage sigte på et højt beskyttelsesniveau for miljøet og arbejdstagerne.

Hvad angår det specifikke spørgsmål om hvalfangst har EU ved mange anledninger givet udtryk for, at den har en anden tilgang end Japan, og vil uden tvivl fortsætte med at gøre dette i relevante sammenhænge.

(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-002859/13
an die Kommission**

Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Kriton Arsenis (S&D), Gaston Franco (PPE), Jacqueline Foster (ECR), Julie Girling (ECR), Mikael Gustafsson (GUE/NGL), Sidonia Elżbieta Jędrzejewska (PPE), Dan Jørgensen (S&D), Jörg Leichtfried (S&D), Kartika Tamara Liotard (GUE/NGL), David Martin (S&D), Cristiana Muscardini (ECR), Bill Newton Dunn (ALDE), Sirpa Pietikäinen (PPE), Pavel Poc (S&D), Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Daciana Octavia Sârbu (S&D), Joanna Senyszyn (S&D), Keith Taylor (Verts/ALE), Janusz Wojciechowski (ECR) und Andrea Zannoni (ALDE)

(11. März 2013)

Betrifft: Bericht des Internationalen Tierschutz-Fonds über wirtschaftliche Gesichtspunkte des Walfangs in Japan

Die Kommission wird vor dem Hintergrund des unlängst veröffentlichten IFAW-Berichts zu wirtschaftlichen Gesichtspunkten des Walfangs in Japan („The Economics of Japanese Whaling“), der auf Erkenntnisse führender japanischer Agenturen gestützt wird und in weiten Teilen auf Angaben der japanischen Regierung beruht, und angesichts der Antwort von Kommissionsmitglied Poto auf die schriftliche Anfrage E-002263/2012 und der Antwort von Kommissionsmitglied De Gucht auf die schriftliche Anfrage E-012352/2011 um Beantwortung der nachstehenden Fragen gebeten:

Hat die Kommission Kenntnis von dem IFAW-Bericht und/oder wird sie vor Aufnahme von Handelsverhandlungen mit Japan mit japanischen Beamten über Nachweise über die Nutzung öffentlicher Gelder und die Umleitung von Tsunami-Hilfsgeldern zur Förderung der nicht gewinnbringenden Walfangindustrie sprechen, und über den fehlenden wissenschaftlichen Wert des sogenannten „Walfangs zu wissenschaftlichen Zwecken“ in Japan?

Wird in den Bestimmungen zum Handel und zur nachhaltigen Entwicklung in einem künftigen Handelsabkommen der EU und Japans darüber hinaus die effiziente Umsetzung des Internationalen Walfangübereinkommens (ICRW) und des Übereinkommens über die biologische Vielfalt (CBD) sichergestellt?

Antwort von Herrn De Gucht im Namen der Kommission

(24. April 2013)

Die Kommission hat Kenntnis von dem Bericht des IFAW über die wirtschaftlichen Gesichtspunkte des Walfangs in Japan erhalten und prüft ihn derzeit.

Die EU bringt Überlegungen zur Nachhaltigkeit in ihre Handelspolitik ein, vor allem indem sie bei bilateralen Freihandelsabkommen Verpflichtungen in Bezug auf Umwelt und arbeitsrechtliche Standards aushandelt und im Rahmen von Handelsgesprächen auf Nachhaltigkeit abstellende Folgenabschätzungen durchführt.

Was die Verhandlungen über ein Freihandelsabkommen mit Japan angeht, so strebt die Kommission ein ambitioniertes und umfassendes Kapitel zum Thema „Handel und nachhaltige Entwicklung“ an, in dem u. a. die Erhaltung und die nachhaltige Bewirtschaftung legal erworbener und nachhaltiger natürlicher Ressourcen (z. B. Fischereiresourcen) sowie die Förderung des Handels mit diesen Ressourcen behandelt wird. So sollte das Kapitel über Handel und nachhaltige Entwicklung zur effektiven Umsetzung multilateraler Umweltübereinkommen durch Japan beitragen, u. a. des Übereinkommens über die biologische Vielfalt und des Übereinkommens über den internationalen Handel mit gefährdeten Arten freilebender Tiere und Pflanzen. Nach Auffassung der Kommission sollte bei Bestimmungen über Handel und nachhaltige Entwicklung ein hohes Umwelt- und Arbeitsschutzniveau angestrebt werden.

In Bezug auf die konkrete Frage des Walfangs hat die EU Japan immer wieder darauf aufmerksam gemacht, dass sie eine andere Auffassung vertritt, und wird dies fraglos auch in Zukunft in entsprechenden Zusammenhängen tun.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002859/13

προς την Επιτροπή

Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Kriton Arsenis (S&D), Gaston Franco (PPE), Jacqueline Foster (ECR), Julie Girling (ECR), Mikael Gustafsson (GUE/NGL), Sidonia Elżbieta Jędrzejewska (PPE), Dan Jørgensen (S&D), Jörg Leichtfried (S&D), Kartika Tamara Liotard (GUE/NGL), David Martin (S&D), Cristiana Muscardini (ECR), Bill Newton Dunn (ALDE), Sirpa Pietikäinen (PPE), Pavel Poc (S&D), Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Daciana Octavia Sârbu (S&D), Joanna Senyszyn (S&D), Keith Taylor (Verts/ALE), Janusz Wojciechowski (ECR) και Andrea Zanoni (ALDE)

(11 Μαρτίου 2013)

Θέμα: Έκθεση του Διεθνούς Ταμείου για την Προστασία των Ζώων (IFAW) σχετικά με τις οικονομικές παραμέτρους της ιαπωνικής φαλαινοθηρίας

Υπό το πρίσμα της πρόσφατα δημοσιευμένης έκθεσης του IFAW σχετικά με τις οικονομικές παραμέτρους της ιαπωνικής φαλαινοθηρίας, η οποία βασίστηκε σε ευρήματα κορυφαίων οργανισμών με έδρα την Ιαπωνία και, σε μεγάλο βαθμό, στα ίδια τα στοιχεία της ιαπωνικής κυβέρνησης, και υπό το πρίσμα της απάντησης του Επιτρόπου Ροτςνικ στην ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002263/2012 και της απάντησης του Επιτρόπου De Gucht στην ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-012352/2011:

Είναι ενήμερη η Επιτροπή σχετικά με την έκθεση του IFAW και/ή προτίθεται, πριν από την έναρξη εμπορικών διαπραγματεύσεων με την Ιαπωνία, να συζητήσει με τους Ιάπωνες αξιωματούχους τα αποδεικτικά στοιχεία όσον αφορά τη χρήση δημόσιων κονδυλίων και την εκτροπή πόρων αρωγής σε σχέση με το τσουνάμι για σκοπούς υποστήριξης της μη κερδοφόρας βιομηχανίας φαλαινοθηρίας, καθώς και την έλλειψη επιστημονικής αξίας όσον αφορά την αποκαλούμενη «φαλαινοθηρία για επιστημονικούς σκοπούς» της Ιαπωνίας;

Θα εξασφαλίζουν οι διατάξεις σχετικά με το εμπόριο και τη βιώσιμη ανάπτυξη σε κάθε μελλοντική εμπορική συμφωνία ΕΕ-Ιαπωνίας και την αποτελεσματική εφαρμογή της Διεθνούς Σύμβασης για τη ρύθμιση της φαλαινοθηρίας (ICRW) και της Σύμβασης για τη βιολογική ποικιλότητα (CDB);

Απάντηση του κ. De Gucht εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής

(24 Απριλίου 2013)

Η Επιτροπή είναι ενήμερη για την έκθεση του διεθνούς ταμείου για την προστασία των ζώων (IFAW) σχετικά με τις οικονομικές παραμέτρους της ιαπωνικής φαλαινοθηρίας και τη μελέτά.

Για τη χάραξη της εμπορικής της πολιτικής, η ΕΕ λαμβάνει υπόψη της τον παράγοντα της βιωσιμότητας, κυρίως προβαίνοντας σε διαπραγματεύσεις για περιβαλλοντικά και εργασιακά πρότυπα στο πλαίσιο διμερών συμφωνιών ελεύθερων συναλλαγών (ΣΕΣ) και διενεργώντας εκτιμήσεις των επιπτώσεων στη βιωσιμότητα κατά τις εμπορικές διαπραγματεύσεις.

Όσον αφορά τις διαπραγματεύσεις για τη σύναψη συμφωνιών ελεύθερων συναλλαγών με την Ιαπωνία, ο στόχος της Επιτροπής είναι να συμπεριλάβει στις ΣΕΣ ένα φιλόδοξο και ολοκληρωμένο κεφάλαιο για το εμπόριο και τη βιώσιμη ανάπτυξη, το οποίο θα πρέπει να καλύπτει, μεταξύ άλλων, τη διατήρηση, τη βιώσιμη διαχείριση και την προώθηση του εμπορίου των νομίμως απεκτηθέντων και βιώσιμων φυσικών πόρων, συμπεριλαμβανομένων των αλιευτικών πόρων. Το κεφάλαιο για το εμπόριο και τη βιώσιμη ανάπτυξη, θα πρέπει, κατά συνέπεια, να συμβάλλει στην αποτελεσματική εφαρμογή πολυμερών περιβαλλοντικών συμφωνιών (ΠΠΣ) εκ μέρους της Ιαπωνίας, μεταξύ των οποίων συγκαταλέγεται η σύμβαση για τη βιολογική ποικιλότητα (ΣΒΠ) και η σύμβαση για το διεθνές εμπόριο ειδών άγριας πανίδας και χλωρίδας που απειλούνται με εξαφάνιση (CITES). Η Επιτροπή υιοθετεί την άποψη ότι οι διατάξεις για το εμπόριο και τη βιώσιμη ανάπτυξη θα πρέπει να αποσκοπούν σε υψηλό επίπεδο περιβαλλοντικής και εργασιακής προστασίας.

Σχετικά με το ειδικό ζήτημα της φαλαινοθηρίας, η ΕΕ έχει εκφράσει τη διαφορετική προσέγγισή της με την Ιαπωνία σε πολλές περιπτώσεις και, αναμφίβολα, θα εξακολουθήσει να το πράττει σε συναφή πλαίσια.

(Version française)

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-002859/13
à la Commission**

**Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Kriton Arsenis (S&D), Gaston Franco (PPE), Jacqueline Foster (ECR),
Julie Girling (ECR), Mikael Gustafsson (GUE/NGL), Sidonia Elżbieta Jędrzejewska (PPE),
Dan Jørgensen (S&D), Jörg Leichtfried (S&D), Kartika Tamara Liotard (GUE/NGL), David Martin (S&D),
Cristiana Muscardini (ECR), Bill Newton Dunn (ALDE), Sirpa Pietikäinen (PPE), Pavel Poc (S&D),
Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Daciana Octavia Sârbu (S&D), Joanna Senyszyn (S&D),
Keith Taylor (Verts/ALE), Janusz Wojciechowski (ECR) et Andrea Zannoni (ALDE)**

(11 mars 2013)

Objet: Rapport du Fonds international pour la défense des animaux sur l'économie de la filière japonaise de chasse à la baleine

Le Fonds international pour la défense des animaux (IFAW) a récemment publié un rapport sur l'économie de la filière japonaise de chasse à la baleine qui se fonde sur les conclusions d'agences renommées, situées au Japon, et, dans une large mesure, sur les propres données du gouvernement japonais. Vu les réponses écrites au nom de la Commission par M. Potočnik, à la question E-002263/2012, et par M. De Gucht, à la question E-012352/2011:

La Commission a-t-elle pris connaissance du rapport de l'IFAW et/ou a-t-elle l'intention, avant de lancer des négociations commerciales avec le Japon, de débattre avec les autorités japonaises des preuves d'un recours aux subventions publiques et du détournement de fonds de secours aux victimes du tsunami pour soutenir une industrie baleinière qui n'est pas même rentable, ainsi que de l'absence de toute valeur scientifique à ce que le Japon appelle une chasse «scientifique»?

Les clauses sur le commerce et le développement durable dans tout futur accord commercial entre l'Union européenne et le Japon garantiront-elles la mise en œuvre effective de la Convention internationale pour la réglementation de la chasse à la baleine et de la Convention sur la diversité biologique?

Réponse donnée par M. De Gucht au nom de la Commission

(24 avril 2013)

La Commission a pris connaissance du rapport de l'IFAW sur l'économie de la filière japonaise de chasse à la baleine et est en train de l'examiner.

L'Union européenne tient compte d'aspects liés à la durabilité dans sa politique commerciale, notamment en négociant des engagements sur les normes de l'environnement et du travail dans le cadre des accords bilatéraux de libre-échange et en réalisant des évaluations de l'impact des négociations commerciales sur le développement durable.

Concernant les négociations pour un accord de libre-échange avec le Japon, l'objectif de la Commission est d'inclure un chapitre ambitieux et exhaustif sur le commerce et le développement durable, qui devrait, entre autres, porter sur la conservation, la gestion durable et la promotion du commerce des ressources naturelles légales et durables, y compris celles de la pêche. Ce chapitre devrait donc contribuer à l'application effective par le Japon d'accords multilatéraux sur l'environnement (AME), dont la convention sur la diversité biologique (CBD) et la convention sur le commerce international des espèces de faune et de flore sauvages menacées d'extinction (CITES). La Commission estime que les dispositions relatives au commerce et au développement durable devraient viser un niveau élevé de protection en matière d'environnement et de travail.

Pour ce qui est de la problématique plus spécifique de la chasse à la baleine, l'UE a exprimé à de nombreuses occasions sa différence d'approche avec le Japon et continuera certainement de le faire dans les contextes appropriés.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002859/13
alla Commissione**

Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Kriton Arsenis (S&D), Gaston Franco (PPE), Jacqueline Foster (ECR), Julie Girling (ECR), Mikael Gustafsson (GUE/NGL), Sidonia Elżbieta Jędrzejewska (PPE), Dan Jørgensen (S&D), Jörg Leichtfried (S&D), Kartika Tamara Liotard (GUE/NGL), David Martin (S&D), Cristiana Muscardini (ECR), Bill Newton Dunn (ALDE), Sirpa Pietikäinen (PPE), Pavel Poc (S&D), Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Daciana Octavia Sârbu (S&D), Joanna Senyszyn (S&D), Keith Taylor (Verts/ALE), Janusz Wojciechowski (ECR) e Andrea Zanoni (ALDE)

(11 marzo 2013)

Oggetto: Relazione del Fondo internazionale per il benessere degli animali sull'economia della filiera giapponese di caccia alla balena

Il Fondo internazionale per il benessere degli animali (IFAW) ha di recente pubblicato una relazione sull'economia della filiera giapponese di caccia alla balena, che si basa sulle conclusioni di agenzie rinomate, con sede in Giappone, e, in larga misura, su dati del governo giapponese. Alla luce delle risposte scritte del commissario Potočnik, all'interrogazione E-002263/2012, e del commissario M. De Gucht, all'interrogazione E-012352/2011,

È la Commissione a conoscenza della relazione dell'IFAW e/o intende, prima di avviare negoziati commerciali con il Giappone, discutere con le autorità giapponesi le prove di utilizzo di aiuti pubblici e di sottrazione di fondi destinati alle vittime dello tsunami, a favore di un'industria baleniera non redditizia, nonché dell'assenza di qualsiasi valore scientifico di quella che il Giappone chiama una caccia «scientifica»?

Le clausole sul commercio e lo sviluppo sostenibile di qualsiasi accordo commerciale fra l'Unione europea e il Giappone garantiranno l'attuazione effettiva della Convenzione internazionale sulla regolamentazione della caccia alle balene (ICRW) e della Convenzione sulla diversità biologica (CDB)?

Risposta di Karel De Gucht a nome della Commissione

(24 aprile 2013)

La Commissione è a conoscenza della relazione IFAW sull'economia della filiera giapponese di caccia alla balena e la sta esaminando.

L'UE integra considerazioni in tema di sostenibilità nella sua politica commerciale, in particolare negoziando impegni in tema di standard ambientali e lavorativi nel contesto degli accordi bilaterali di libero scambio (ALS) ed effettuando valutazioni d'impatto di sostenibilità in relazione ai negoziati commerciali.

Per quanto concerne i negoziati di ALS con il Giappone, l'obiettivo della Commissione è includere nell'ALS un capitolo ambizioso e estensivo sul commercio e lo sviluppo sostenibile che dovrebbe tra l'altro affrontare la conservazione, la gestione sostenibile e la promozione del commercio di risorse naturali legalmente ottenute e sostenibili, tra cui le risorse alieutiche. Il capitolo sul commercio e lo sviluppo sostenibile dovrebbe pertanto contribuire all'efficace attuazione da parte del Giappone degli accordi ambientali multilaterali (MEA), tra cui la Convenzione sulla biodiversità (CBD) e la Convenzione sul commercio internazionale delle specie di flora e di fauna selvatiche minacciate di estinzione (CITES). La Commissione ritiene che le disposizioni contenute nel capitolo Commercio e sviluppo sostenibile dovrebbero mirare ad un livello elevato di protezione dell'ambiente e delle condizioni lavorative.

Per quanto concerne la questione specifica della caccia alla balena, l'UE ha espresso al Giappone in diverse occasioni la propria diversità di vedute e certamente continuerà a farlo nei contesti pertinenti.

(Nederlandse versie)

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002859/13
aan de Commissie**

Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Kriton Arsenis (S&D), Gaston Franco (PPE), Jacqueline Foster (ECR), Julie Girling (ECR), Mikael Gustafsson (GUE/NGL), Sidonia Elżbieta Jędrzejewska (PPE), Dan Jørgensen (S&D), Jörg Leichtfried (S&D), Kartika Tamara Liotard (GUE/NGL), David Martin (S&D), Cristiana Muscardini (ECR), Bill Newton Dunn (ALDE), Sirpa Pietikäinen (PPE), Pavel Poc (S&D), Raúl Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Daciana Octavia Sârbu (S&D), Joanna Senyszyn (S&D), Keith Taylor (Verts/ALE), Janusz Wojciechowski (ECR) en Andrea Zannoni (ALDE)

(11 maart 2013)

Betreft: Verslag van het Internationaal Fonds voor dierenwelzijn (IFAW) over de rendabiliteit van de Japanse walvisvangst

In het licht van het onlangs door het IFAW gepubliceerde verslag met de titel „De rendabiliteit van de Japanse walvisvangst”, dat is gebaseerd op conclusies van vooraanstaande, in Japan gevestigde instellingen en grotendeels ook op eigen gegevens van de Japanse regering, en gezien het antwoord van commissaris Potocnik op schriftelijke vraag E-002263/2012 en het antwoord van commissaris De Gucht op schriftelijke vraag E-012352/2011, wordt de Commissie verzocht de volgende vragen te beantwoorden:

Kent zij dit verslag van de IFAW en/of beoogt zij, voorafgaand aan de onderhandelingen over een vrijhandelsvereenkomst met Japan, bij de Japanse autoriteiten aan de orde te stellen dat het gebruik van overheidsgeld en het misbruik van tsunamihulpfondsen voor de ondersteuning van de onrendabele walvisvaart bewezen is, en dat Japans zogeheten „wetenschappelijke walvisvangst” geen wetenschappelijke waarde heeft?

Bieden de bepalingen over handel en duurzame ontwikkeling in een eventuele toekomstige handelsovereenkomst tussen de EU en Japan de garantie dat het Internationale Verdrag tot Regeling van de Walvisvangst (ICRW) en het Verdrag inzake biologische diversiteit (CDB) effectief ten uitvoer worden gelegd?

Antwoord van de heer De Gucht namens de Commissie

(24 april 2013)

De Commissie is zich bewust van het verslag van de IFAW over „de rendabiliteit van de Japanse walvisvangst” en doet hier onderzoek naar.

De EU integreert duurzaamheidsoverwegingen in haar handelsbeleid, met name door te onderhandelen over verplichtingen met betrekking tot milieu en arbeidsvoorwaarden in bilaterale vrijhandelsvereenkomsten en door duurzaamheidseffectbeoordelingen uit te voeren ten opzichte van handelsbesprekingen.

Ten aanzien van de vrijhandelsvereenkomsten met Japan, stelt de Commissie zich ten doel om een ambitieus en uitgebreid hoofdstuk over handel en duurzame ontwikkeling op te nemen in de vrijhandelsvereenkomst, waarin onder andere het behoud, het duurzaam beheer en de bevordering van handel in rechtmatig verkregen duurzame natuurlijke hulpbronnen — waaronder visbestanden — aan de orde zou moeten komen. Het hoofdstuk over handel en duurzame ontwikkeling zou zo kunnen bijdragen aan de effectieve implementatie in Japan van de multilaterale milieuovereenkomsten (MEA's), waaronder het Verdrag inzake biologische diversiteit (CBD) en de Overeenkomst inzake internationale handel in bedreigde in het wild levende dier- en plantensoorten (CITES). De Commissie is van mening dat bepalingen met betrekking tot handel en duurzame ontwikkeling gericht moet zijn op een hoog niveau van milieu- en arbeidsbescherming.

Wat betreft de walvisvangst heeft de EU meerdere malen kenbaar gemaakt dat haar aanpak verschilt met die van Japan; zij zal hier ongetwijfeld mee door blijven gaan als de context zich daartoe leent.

(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002859/13
do Komisji**

Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Kriton Arsenis (S&D), Gaston Franco (PPE), Jacqueline Foster (ECR), Julie Girling (ECR), Mikael Gustafsson (GUE/NGL), Sidonia Elżbieta Jędrzejewska (PPE), Dan Jørgensen (S&D), Jörg Leichtfried (S&D), Kartika Tamara Liotard (GUE/NGL), David Martin (S&D), Cristiana Muscardini (ECR), Bill Newton Dunn (ALDE), Sirpa Pietikäinen (PPE), Pavel Poc (S&D), Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Daciana Octavia Sârbu (S&D), Joanna Senyszyn (S&D), Keith Taylor (Verts/ALE), Janusz Wojciechowski (ECR) oraz Andrea Zanoni (ALDE)

(11 marca 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Sprawozdanie Międzynarodowego Funduszu na rzecz Zwierząt (IFAW) dotyczące ekonomiki japońskiego wielorybnictwa

W świetle nowo opublikowanego sprawozdania IFAW pt. „The Economics of Japanese Whaling” („Ekonomika japońskiego wielorybnictwa”), opartego na wynikach czołowych agencji mających siedziby w Japonii oraz, w znacznej mierze, na danych samego rządu japońskiego, a także w związku z odpowiedzią komisarza J. Potočnika na pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002263/2012 i odpowiedzią komisarza K. De Guchta na pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-012352/2011:

Czy Komisja wie o sprawozdaniu IFAW i/lub czy przed rozpoczęciem negocjacji handlowych z Japonią omówi z urzędnikami japońskimi kwestię dowodów na wspieranie nieprzynoszącego zysków wielorybnictwa z pieniędzy publicznych oraz przez przekierowywanie środków finansowych przeznaczonych na łagodzenie skutków tsunami, a także kwestię braku wartości naukowej prowadzonych w Japonii tzw. połowów wielorybów w celach naukowych?

Czy postanowienia dotyczące handlu i zrównoważonego rozwoju we wszelkich przyszłych umowach handlowych między UE a Japonią będą zapewniać również skuteczne stosowanie Międzynarodowej konwencji o uregulowaniu połowów wielorybów (ICRW) oraz Konwencji o różnorodności biologicznej (CDB)?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Karela De Guchta w imieniu Komisji

(24 kwietnia 2013 r.)

Komisja przyjęła do wiadomości sprawozdanie Międzynarodowego Funduszu na rzecz Zwierząt (IFAW) dotyczące ekonomiki japońskiego wielorybnictwa i obecnie poddaje je analizie.

UE wprowadza kwestie związane ze zrównoważonym rozwojem do swojej polityki handlowej przede wszystkim przez negocjowanie zobowiązań dotyczących ochrony środowiska i norm pracy w ramach dwustronnych umów o wolnym handlu i przeprowadzanie ocen skutków w kontekście zrównoważonego rozwoju w związku z negocjacjami handlowymi.

W przypadku rokowań w sprawie umowy o wolnym handlu z Japonią, celem Komisji jest umieszczenie w umowie ambitnego i kompleksowego rozdziału dotyczącego handlu i zrównoważonego rozwoju, który powinien między innymi dotyczyć ochrony zasobów naturalnych, zrównoważonego zarządzania nimi oraz promowania handlu legalnie pozyskanymi oraz zrównoważonymi zasobami naturalnymi, w tym zasobami rybnymi. Rozdział dotyczący handlu i zrównoważonego rozwoju powinien zatem przyczynić się do skutecznego wdrożenia przez Japonię wielostronnych umów środowiskowych, w tym Konwencji o różnorodności biologicznej (CBD) oraz Konwencji o międzynarodowym handlu dzikimi zwierzętami i roślinami gatunków zagrożonych wyginięciem (CITES). Komisja uważa, że przepisy dotyczące handlu oraz zrównoważonego rozwoju powinny mieć na celu ustanowienie wysokiego poziomu ochrony środowiska i ochrony pracy.

W odniesieniu do kwestii wielorybnictwa, UE wielokrotnie informowała Japonię o stosowaniu odmiennego podejścia do tego zagadnienia i będzie to nadal czynić w stosownych kontekstach.

(Versiunea în limba română)

**Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-002859/13
adresată Comisiei**

**Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Kriton Arsenis (S&D), Gaston Franco (PPE), Jacqueline Foster (ECR), Julie Girling (ECR), Mikael Gustafsson (GUE/NGL), Sidonia Elżbieta Jędrzejewska (PPE), Dan Jørgensen (S&D), Jörg Leichtfried (S&D), Kartika Tamara Liotard (GUE/NGL), David Martin (S&D), Cristiana Muscardini (ECR), Bill Newton Dunn (ALDE), Sirpa Pietikäinen (PPE), Pavel Poc (S&D), Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Daciana Octavia Sârbu (S&D), Joanna Senyszyn (S&D), Keith Taylor (Verts/ALE), Janusz Wojciechowski (ECR) și
Andrea Zanoni (ALDE)**

(11 martie 2013)

Subiect: Raportul Fondului Internațional pentru Protecția Animalelor privind aspectele economice ale vânătorii de balene din Japonia

Având în vedere cel mai recent raport publicat de Fondul Internațional pentru Protecția Animalelor, intitulat „Aspectele economice ale vânătorii de balene din Japonia”, bazat pe concluziile unor agenții importante din Japonia și, într-o mare măsură, chiar pe date ale guvernului japonez, răspunsul comisarului Potocnik la întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-002263/2012 și răspunsul comisarului De Gucht la întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-012352/2011:

Este Comisia la curent cu raportul Fondului Internațional pentru Protecția Animalelor și/sau intenționează, înainte de lansarea negocierilor comerciale cu Japonia, să discute cu demnitarii japonezi pe tema utilizării evidente a banilor publici și a fondurilor destinate întrajutorării victimelor tsunamiului pentru a sprijini industria neprofitabilă a vânătorii de balene și pe tema lipsei valorii științifice a așa-numitei „vânători de balene din motive științifice”?

Vor garanta dispozițiile în materie de comerț și dezvoltare durabilă din cadrul unui viitor acord în domeniul comerțului între UE și Japonia punerea în aplicare efectivă a Convenției Internaționale privind Reglementarea Vânării Balenelor (ICRW) și a Convenției privind diversitatea biologică (CBD)?

Răspuns dat de dl De Gucht în numele Comisiei

(24 aprilie 2013)

Comisia este la curent cu raportul IFAW intitulat „Aspectele economice ale vânătorii de balene din Japonia” și este în curs de examinare a acestuia.

UE include criteriile de durabilitate în politica sa comercială, în special prin negocierea de angajamente privind standardele de mediu și de muncă în cadrul acordurilor bilaterale de liber schimb (ALS) și prin efectuarea de evaluări ale impactului asupra durabilității în legătură cu negocierile comerciale.

În ceea ce privește negocierile ALS cu Japonia, obiectivul Comisiei este să includă în ALS un capitol ambițios și cuprinzător privind comerțul și dezvoltarea durabilă, care ar aborda, printre altele, conservarea, gestionarea durabilă și promovarea comerțului cu resurse naturale obținute în mod legal și durabil, inclusiv resursele piscicole. Capitolul privind comerțul și dezvoltarea durabilă ar trebui, prin urmare, să contribuie la implementarea efectivă de către Japonia a acordurilor multilaterale de mediu (AMM), inclusiv a Convenției privind diversitatea biologică (CBD) și a Convenției privind comerțul internațional cu specii ale faunei și florei sălbatice pe cale de dispariție (CITES). Comisia consideră că dispozițiile în materie de comerț și dezvoltare durabilă ar trebui să vizeze un nivel ridicat de protecție a mediului și a muncii.

În ceea ce privește chestiunea specifică a vânătorii de balene, UE și-a exprimat în repetate rânduri abordarea divergentă față de Japonia și va continua fără îndoială să facă acest lucru în contextele relevante.

(Suomenkielinen versio)

**Kirjallisesti vastattava kysymys E-002859/13
komissiolle**

**Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Kriton Arsenis (S&D), Gaston Franco (PPE), Jacqueline Foster (ECR),
Julie Girling (ECR), Mikael Gustafsson (GUE/NGL), Sidonia Elżbieta Jędrzejewska (PPE),
Dan Jørgensen (S&D), Jörg Leichtfried (S&D), Kartika Tamara Liotard (GUE/NGL), David Martin (S&D),
Cristiana Muscardini (ECR), Bill Newton Dunn (ALDE), Sirpa Pietikäinen (PPE), Pavel Poc (S&D),
Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Daciana Octavia Sârbu (S&D), Joanna Senyszyn (S&D),
Keith Taylor (Verts/ALE), Janusz Wojciechowski (ECR) ja Andrea Zannoni (ALDE)**

(11. maaliskuuta 2013)

Aihe: Kansainvälisen eläinten hyvinvointia edistävän rahaston raportti Japanin harjoittaman valaanpyynnin taloudellisista näkökohdista

Kansainvälinen eläinten hyvinvointia edistävä rahasto (IFAW) julkaisi äskettäin raportin Japanin harjoittaman valaanpyynnin taloudellisista näkökohdista (The Economics of Japanese Whaling). Raportti perustui johtavien Japanissa toimivien virastojen havaintoihin ja suurelta osin Japanin hallituksen omiin tietoihin. Komission jäsen Potocnik vastasi kirjalliseen kysymykseen E-002263/2012 ja komission jäsen De Gucht kirjalliseen kysymykseen E-012352/2011. Voiko komissio nyt vastata seuraaviin kysymyksiin:

Onko komissio tietoinen IFAW:n raportista ja/tai aikooko komissio ennen tulevia Japanin kanssa käytäviä kauppaneuvotteluita keskustella Japanin viranomaisten kanssa todisteista, että julkisia varoja on käytetty ja hyökyaaltoavustusvaroja on suunnattu kannattamattoman valaanpyyntiteollisuuden tukemiseen, ja että Japanin niin kutsutulta ”tieteelliseltä valaanpyynniltä” puuttuu tieteellinen arvo?

Varmistavatko kauppaa ja kestävää kehitystä koskevat määräykset mahdollisissa tulevaisuudessa EU:n ja Japanin kauppasopimuksissa myös valaanpyynnin säätelyä koskevan kansainvälisen yleissopimuksen ja biologista monimuotoisuutta koskevan yleissopimuksen tehokkaan täytäntöönpanon?

Karel de Guchtin komission puolesta antama vastaus

(24. huhtikuuta 2013)

Komissio on tietoinen Japanin harjoittaman valaanpyynnin taloudellisia näkökohtia koskevasta IFAW:n raportista ja tarkastelee sitä parhaillaan.

EU sisällyttää kestävää kehitystä koskevat näkökohdat kauppapolitiikkaansa erityisesti neuvottelemalla ympäristö- ja työnormeja koskevista sitoumuksista kahdenvälisissä vapaakauppasopimuksissa ja laatimalla kauppaneuvottelujen vaikutusta kestävään kehitykseen koskevia arviointeja.

Japanin kanssa käytävien vapaakauppasopimusneuvottelujen yhteydessä komission tavoitteena on sisällyttää vapaakauppasopimukseen kunnianhimoinen ja kattava kauppaa ja kestävää kehitystä koskeva luku, jossa olisi käsiteltävä muun muassa laillisesti saatujen ja kestävien luonnonvarojen, kuten kalavarojen, suojelua, kestävää hoitoa ja niillä käytävän kaupan edistämistä. Kauppaa ja kestävää kehitystä koskevan luvun pitäisi sisällyttää monenvälisten ympäristösopimusten tehokasta täytäntöönpanoa Japanissa. Näitä ovat esimerkiksi biologista monimuotoisuutta koskeva yleissopimus sekä villieläimistön ja -kasviston uhanalaisten lajien kansainvälistä kauppaa koskeva yleissopimus. Komission mielestä kauppaa ja kestävää kehitystä koskevilla määräyksillä olisi pyrittävä korkeatasoiseen ympäristön- ja työelämän suojeluun.

EU on useaan otteeseen ilmaissut olevansa valaanpyynnin suhteen eri linjoilla kuin Japani ja toimii asiaankuuluvissa yhteyksissä epäilemättä vastaisuudessakin näin.

(Svensk version)

**Frågor för skriftligt besvarande E-002859/13
till kommissionen**

Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Kriton Arsenis (S&D), Gaston Franco (PPE), Jacqueline Foster (ECR), Julie Girling (ECR), Mikael Gustafsson (GUE/NGL), Sidonia Elżbieta Jędrzejewska (PPE), Dan Jørgensen (S&D), Jörg Leichtfried (S&D), Kartika Tamara Liotard (GUE/NGL), David Martin (S&D), Cristiana Muscardini (ECR), Bill Newton Dunn (ALDE), Sirpa Pietikäinen (PPE), Pavel Poc (S&D), Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Daciana Octavia Sârbu (S&D), Joanna Senyszyn (S&D), Keith Taylor (Verts/ALE), Janusz Wojciechowski (ECR) och Andrea Zanoni (ALDE)

(11 mars 2013)

Angående: Internationella djurskyddsfondens (IFAW) rapport om ekonomin för japansk valfångst

Mot bakgrund av den rapport som nyligen offentliggjorts av IFAW om ekonomin för japansk valfångst, som bygger på rön från ledande japanskbaserade byråer och till stor del på egna data från den japanska regeringen, samt mot bakgrund av kommissionsledamot Potocniks svar på skriftlig fråga E-002263/2012 och kommissionsledamot De Gucht's svar på skriftlig fråga E-012352/2011 uppmanas kommissionen att svara på följande frågor:

Känner kommissionen till IFAW:s rapport och/eller kommer kommissionen, innan handelsförhandlingar med Japan inleds, att med japanska tjänstemän diskutera de bevis som finns på att offentliga medel och forskningade medel från hjälpfonder för tsunamidrabbade har använts till att stödja den olönsamma valfångstindustrin samt bristen på vetenskapligt värde vad gäller Japans så kallade vetenskapliga valfångst?

Kommer villkoren för handel och hållbar utveckling i eventuella framtida handelsavtal mellan EU och Japan även att garantera ett verkningsfullt genomförande av den internationella konventionen för reglering av valfångsten och konventionen om biologisk mångfald?

Svar från Karel De Gucht på kommissionens vägnar

(24 april 2013)

Kommissionen känner till IFAW:s rapport om de ekonomiska aspekterna av japansk valfångst och håller på att granska den.

EU tar i sin handelspolitik hänsyn till hållbarhetsfrågor, framför allt genom att förhandla fram åtaganden om miljö- och arbetsnormer i bilaterala frihandelsavtal och genom konsekvensbedömningar av hållbarheten i samband med handelsförhandlingar.

I förhandlingarna om ett frihandelsavtal med Japan vill kommissionen att avtalet ska innehålla ett ambitiöst och omfattande kapitel om handel och hållbar utveckling. Det ska bland annat behandla bevarande, hållbar förvaltning och främjande av handel med lagligen erhållna och hållbara naturresurser, däribland fiskeresurser. Kapitel om handel och hållbar utveckling bör därför bidra till att Japan effektivt genomför multilaterala miljöavtal, bland annat konventionen om biologisk mångfald och konventionen om internationell handel med utrotningshotade arter av vilda djur och växter (Cites). Kommissionen anser att bestämmelser om handel och hållbar utveckling ska syfta till en hög nivå av miljö- och arbetarskydd.

När det gäller den specifika frågan om valfångst har EU vid flera tillfällen uttryckt att vi har ett annat synsätt än Japan och kommer utan tvekan att fortsätta att göra det i relevanta sammanhang.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002859/13
to the Commission**

Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Kriton Arsenis (S&D), Gaston Franco (PPE), Jacqueline Foster (ECR), Julie Girling (ECR), Mikael Gustafsson (GUE/NGL), Sidonia Elżbieta Jędrzejewska (PPE), Dan Jørgensen (S&D), Jörg Leichtfried (S&D), Kartika Tamara Liotard (GUE/NGL), David Martin (S&D), Cristiana Muscardini (ECR), Bill Newton Dunn (ALDE), Sirpa Pietikäinen (PPE), Pavel Poc (S&D), Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE), Daciana Octavia Sârbu (S&D), Joanna Senyszyn (S&D), Keith Taylor (Verts/ALE), Janusz Wojciechowski (ECR) and Andrea Zanoni (ALDE)

(11 March 2013)

Subject: International Fund for Animal Welfare report on the Economics of Japanese Whaling

In the light of the newly published IFAW report 'The Economics of Japanese Whaling', which was based on the findings of leading Japan-based agencies and, to a large extent, on the government of Japan's own data, and in view of Commissioner Poto's response to Written Question E-002263/2012 and Commissioner De Gucht's response to Written Question E-012352/2011:

Is the Commission aware of IFAW's report and/or will it, in advance of launching trade negotiations with Japan, discuss with Japanese officials the evidence of the use of public money and diversion of tsunami relief funds to support the unprofitable whaling industry and the lack of scientific value of Japan's so-called 'scientific whaling'?

Will the provisions on trade and sustainable development in any future EU-Japan trade deal also ensure the effective implementation of the International Convention on the regulation of Whaling (ICRW) and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CDB)?

Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission

(24 April 2013)

The Commission is aware of IFAW's report on 'The Economics of Japanese Whaling' and is examining it.

The EU integrates sustainability considerations into its trade policy, most notably by negotiating commitments on environment and labour standards in bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) and by carrying out sustainability impact assessments in relation to trade negotiations.

With regard to FTA negotiations with Japan, the Commission's objective is to include in the FTA an ambitious and comprehensive chapter on Trade and Sustainable Development, which should *inter alia* address the conservation, sustainable management and promotion of trade in legally obtained and sustainable natural resources, including fishery resources. The chapter on Trade and Sustainable Development should therefore contribute to Japan's effective implementation of Multilateral Environment Agreements (MEAs), including the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). The Commission takes the view that provisions on Trade and Sustainable Development should aim at a high level of environmental and labour protection.

Regarding the specific issue of whaling, the EU has expressed its difference of approach with Japan on numerous occasions and will no doubt continue to do so in relevant contexts.

(българска версия)

Въпрос с искане за писмен отговор E-002860/13

до Комисията

Dimitar Stoyanov (NI)

(12 март 2013 г.)

Относно: Преразглеждане на решението за затваряне на трети и четвърти блок на АЕЦ Козлодуй

През последните няколко седмици в България се наблюдава изостряне на социалното напрежение, което доведе до масови протести и политическа криза, като правителството подаде оставка. Станахме свидетели на вече десетки случаи на хора, които отнеха своя живот и този на членовете на своите семейства, поради немотия и бедност, най-драстичният от тях със самоzapалилия се Пламен Горанов. Причината за тези трагични събития е проста — средна заплата от 300 евро и средна пенсия от 100 евро, които са напълно недостатъчни за достоен живот. В тази връзка през 2007 г. Комисията отговори на мой въпрос, като заяви, че официално никога не е било вземано решение от колегиума им за поставяне на изискване към България да затвори 4-те малки блока на АЕЦ „Козлодуй“ (Въпрос Н-0191/07 ⁽¹⁾). Трябва да се има предвид, че при доходи, с които не могат да бъдат посрещнати основните нужди за физическо оцеляване, се стига до пряко нарушаване на членове 1 и 2 от Хартата за основните права на ЕС — правото на достойнство и правото на живот. Ниските доходи и огромните сметки за отопление и електроенергия създават допълнителен проблем от европейска величина — 6 от 10 млади хора декларират твърдо намерение да емигрират. В същото време и може би точно поради тази причина, на България се отказва приемане в Шенген. За справяне със създалата се тежка социална и икономическа ситуация, моля Комисията да отговори на следните въпроси:

1. Смята ли Комисията за възможно, с цел намаляване на социалната тежест от високите сметки за ток, преразглеждането на разпоредбите, касаещи затварянето на 3-ти и 4-ти блок на АЕЦ „Козлодуй“ от Договора за присъединяване на България и Румъния по опростената процедура, предвидена в член 48 от ДЕС?
2. Ако Комисията смята първото за невъзможно, би ли предприела мерки, при които средствата, компенсиращи затварянето на блоковете, да бъдат пренасочени и съответно увеличени, за изграждане на нова ядрена мощност в рамките на АЕЦ „Козлодуй“?
3. Смята ли Комисията, че нищожните доходи и липсата на капитали са пречка за пълното въвеждане на европейските стандарти за качество в България, при което много български производства фалират и се затваря омагьосан кръг на бедност, който води до масова емиграция и социално напрежение в целия ЕС, и какви мерки могат да се предприемат за допълнителното отлагане на това въвеждане?

Отговор, даден от г-н Йотингер от името на Комисията

(24 май 2013 г.)

1. Опростената процедура за преразглеждане, посочена от уважаемия член на Парламента, не може да се прилага по отношение на разпоредбите на договорите за присъединяване ⁽²⁾.
2. България се е ангажирала да затвори и да изведе от експлоатация блокове 3 и 4 на АЕЦ „Козлодуй“ като изрично условие за присъединяването си към ЕС съгласно своя договор за присъединяване.

ЕС вече предостави на България значителна финансова помощ за намаляване на финансовата тежест, произтичаща от разходите по това ранно затваряне и извеждане от експлоатация на посочените блокове ⁽³⁾.

По-голямата част от определените за целта финансови средства по настоящата многогодишна финансова рамка вече са усвоени. Освен това понастоящем се водят преговори за допълнително увеличаване на финансовата подкрепа за периода 2014—2020 г. ⁽⁴⁾. Държавите членки носят обаче крайната отговорност за финансирането и предприемането на самостоятелни действия за извеждането от експлоатация.

Поради това Комисията не смята за целесъобразен варианта с пренасочване на средствата, предназначени за извеждане от експлоатация, към изграждането на нови мощности.

⁽¹⁾ [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/questions/reponses_qh/2007/0191/P6_RH\(2007\)0191_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/questions/reponses_qh/2007/0191/P6_RH(2007)0191_EN.pdf)

⁽²⁾ По-специално опростената процедура за преразглеждане, предвидена в член 48, параграф 6 от Договора за Европейския съюз (ДЕС), се отнася до евентуално преразглеждане на разпоредбите на третата част на Договора за функционирането на Европейския съюз (ДФЕС).

⁽³⁾ В тази помощ бяха включени и мерки, насочени към модернизацията на конвенционалното производство на енергия, постигане на широкомащабна енергийна ефективност, насърчаване на използването на възобновяеми енергийни източници и подобряване на сигурността на енергийните доставки.

⁽⁴⁾ Предложение на Комисията за регламент на Съвета относно помощта от Съюза за програмите за подпомагане на извеждането от експлоатация на ядрени съоръжения в България, Литва и Словакия; COM(2011) 783 окончателен.

3. Съществуването на европейски стандарти за качество гарантира доброто функциониране на европейския вътрешен пазар. Въвеждането на такива стандарти в България би довело до разширяване на пазарите за износ на българските производители, което от своя страна ще даде тласък на националната икономика.

Комисията е поела ангажимент да увеличи подкрепата си за българските граждани, за да могат те да подобрят своите условия на живот, и по-специално енергийните характеристики на жилищата си. Комисията оказва подкрепа за инвестиции в енергийната ефективност на жилищния сектор в България чрез специална схема, по която се предоставят общо 25 млн. евро по линия на Европейския фонд за регионално развитие. Целта е съществуващата понастоящем схема да бъде пренесена и да придобие по-машабни измерения в периода 2014—2020 г.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002860/13
to the Commission
Dimitar Stoyanov (NI)
(12 March 2013)

Subject: Re-examination of the decision for closure of unit 3 and unit 4 of the Kozloduy nuclear power plant

Over the last few weeks there has been an exacerbation of social tensions in Bulgaria, which has led to mass protests and a political crisis, prompting the Cabinet to resign. We have already seen dozens of cases of people taking their own lives and those of their family members because of penury and poverty, the most drastic of them being that of Mr Plamen Goranov, who died from self-immolation. The reason for these tragic events is simple — the average salary is equivalent to EUR 300 and the average pension is equivalent to EUR 100, which are utterly inadequate for leading a decent life. In this connection, in 2007 the Commission responded to my question by stating that it had not taken any official decision on requiring Bulgaria to close the four lesser-capacity units of the Kozloduy NPP (Question H-0191/07 ⁽¹⁾). It must be borne in mind that such levels of income, which are insufficient to meet the basic needs for survival, lead to a direct violation of Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union — the right to human dignity and the right to life. The combination of low income and enormous heating and electricity bills is likely to create an additional problem on a Europe-wide scale — 6 out of 10 young people declare a firm intention to emigrate. At the same time, and perhaps precisely for this reason, Bulgaria is being denied accession to Schengen. In order to deal with the existing complicated social and economic situation, I would ask the Commission to respond to the following questions:

1. Would the Commission consider it possible, in order to alleviate the social burden of high electricity bills, to re-examine the provisions concerning the closure of unit 3 and unit 4 of the Kozloduy NPP in the Treaty of Accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania, by applying the simplified revision procedure provided for in Article 48 TEU?
2. If the Commission considers the first option to be impossible, would it take measures to redirect and respectively increase the funds provided to compensate for the decommissioning of the units, for the purpose of building new nuclear capacity within the Kozloduy NPP?
3. Does the Commission consider the paltry incomes and the lack of capital to be obstacles to the introduction of European quality standards in Bulgaria, driving many Bulgarian industries out of business and locking people into a vicious circle of poverty, leading to mass emigration and social tensions across the EU, and what measures could be taken to further postpone this introduction?

Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission
(24 May 2013)

1. The simplified revision procedure mentioned by the Honourable Member cannot be applied to the provisions of Treaties of Accession ⁽²⁾.
2. Bulgaria committed itself to close and decommission units 3 and 4 of the Kozloduy nuclear plant, as an express condition for its accession to the EU, according to its Treaty of Accession.

The EU has already provided Bulgaria with considerable financial assistance for the mitigation of the financial burden represented by the early closure and decommissioning costs of these units ⁽³⁾.

Most of the funds allocated under the current multiannual financial framework have already been committed. In addition, there are ongoing negotiations for a further extension of the financial support for the period 2014-2020 ⁽⁴⁾. It remains, however, the ultimate responsibility of Member States to take over financial responsibility and ownership for decommissioning.

Thus, the Commission does not consider it an appropriate option to redirect the decommissioning funds for the building of new capacity.

⁽¹⁾ [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/questions/reponses_qh/2007/0191/P6_RH\(2007\)0191_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/questions/reponses_qh/2007/0191/P6_RH(2007)0191_EN.pdf)

⁽²⁾ More specifically, the simplified revision procedure provided for in Article 48(6) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) relates to the possible revision of provisions of Part Three of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

⁽³⁾ This assistance has also included measures for the modernisation of conventional energy production, large-scale energy efficiency, enhancement of renewable energy sources and improvement of energy supply security.

⁽⁴⁾ Proposal of the Commission for a Council regulation on Union support for the nuclear decommissioning assistance programmes in Bulgaria, Lithuania and Slovakia of 24 November 2011; COM(2011) 783 final.

3. The existence of European quality standards ensures the smooth operation of the European internal market. The introduction of such standards in Bulgaria would expand the export markets for Bulgarian producers, thus stimulating the national economy.

The Commission is committed to extend its support to Bulgarian citizens to achieve better living conditions and increase in particular the energy performance of their homes. The Commission supports energy efficiency investments in the housing sector in Bulgaria through a dedicated scheme with an overall allocation of EUR 25 million funded by the European Regional Development Fund. The aim is to replicate the ongoing scheme at a more ambitious scale for the period 2014-2020.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002863/13
aan de Commissie
Saïd El Khadraoui (S&D)
(12 maart 2013)

Betreft: Opstart van de „European Registers of Road Transport Undertakings (ERRU)”

Artikel 2 van Verordening (EU) Nr. 1213/2010 van de Commissie van 16 december 2010 tot vaststelling van gemeenschappelijke regels voor de onderlinge koppeling van nationale elektronische registers van wegvervoerondernemingen, bepaalt dat tegen 31 december 2012 de database „European Registers of Road Transport Undertakings (ERRU)” operationeel moet zijn. Dit register zou de verschillende bevoegde autoriteiten in staat moeten stellen te controleren of bepaalde wegvervoerondernemingen in andere lidstaten de regels effectief naleven. Een dergelijk controlemechanisme blijkt uiterst noodzakelijk teneinde eerlijkere concurrentie in de markt van het wegvervoer te garanderen.

Aangezien de datum voor toepassing inmiddels verstreken is, mag men ervan uitgaan dat de Europese Commissie deze koppeling van nationale registers heeft opgestart. Het Europees Parlement heeft hierover echter nog geen nadere informatie ontvangen.

1. Heeft de Commissie daadwerkelijk al stappen ondernomen ter koppeling van de nationale elektronische registers? Is het ERRU operationeel?
2. Zal de Commissie het Europees Parlement verder op de hoogte houden van de vorderingen alsook van de mogelijke problemen die zich in de toekomst zouden kunnen voordoen?

Antwoord van de heer Kallas namens de Commissie
(23 april 2013)

De Commissie heeft de nodige stappen genomen om een onderlinge koppeling van nationale elektronische registers te bevorderen binnen de deadline die is vastgesteld in Verordening (EU) nr. 1213/2010 van 16 december 2010 tot vaststelling van gemeenschappelijke regels voor de onderlinge koppeling van nationale elektronische registers van wegvervoerondernemingen (*European registers of road transport undertakings* — ERRU ⁽¹⁾). Het ERRU-systeem is echter nog niet volledig operationeel omdat de meerderheid van de lidstaten onvoldoende op de koppeling was voorbereid. Er moet worden opgemerkt dat het uitblijven van een koppeling met ERRU niet betekent dat lidstaten niet verplicht zijn om via hun nationale contactpunten informatie over wegvervoerondernemingen uit te wisselen (artikel 18 van Verordening (EG) nr. 1071/2009 ⁽²⁾).

In maart 2013 heeft de Commissie 21 EU Pilot-procedures (pre-inbreukprocedures) geopend tegen lidstaten die op dat moment nog steeds niet het nodige hadden gedaan om de onderlinge koppeling tot stand te brengen. De Commissie houdt het Parlement op de hoogte van de vorderingen in dit verband.

⁽¹⁾ PBL 335 van 18.12.2010.

⁽²⁾ Verordening (EG) van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van 21 oktober 2009 tot vaststelling van gemeenschappelijke regels betreffende de voorwaarden waaraan moet zijn voldaan om het beroep van wegvervoerondernemer uit te oefenen; PB L 300 van 14.11.09.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002863/13
to the Commission**

Saïd El Khadraoui (S&D)

(12 March 2013)

Subject: Launch of the 'European Registers of Road Transport Undertakings' (ERRU)

Article 2 of Commission Regulation (EU) No 1213/2010 of 16 December 2010 establishing common rules concerning the interconnection of national electronic registers of road transport undertakings, stipulates that by 31 December 2012 the database 'European Registers of Road Transport Undertakings' (ERRU) must be operational. This register should enable the various competent authorities to verify whether specific road transport undertakings in other Member States are complying with the rules effectively. Such a control mechanism appears essential to ensure fairer competition in the road transport market.

As the application date has now expired, one may assume that the Commission has launched this linking-up of national registers. However, Parliament has not yet received any further information in this regard.

1. Has the Commission already taken steps to link up the national electronic registers? Is the ERRU operational?
2. Will the Commission continue to keep Parliament informed about progress in this regard as well as possible problems which may arise in the future?

Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission

(23 April 2013)

The Commission has taken all necessary steps to facilitate an interconnection of the national electronic registers within the deadline set in Commission Regulation (EU) No 1213/2010 of 16 December 2010 establishing common rules concerning the interconnection of national electronic registers on road transport undertakings (ERRU) ⁽¹⁾. Nevertheless, the ERRU system is not yet fully operational due to a lack of readiness for connection of the majority of the Member States. It must be noted that a lack of connection to ERRU does not discharge Member States from an obligation to exchange information about the transport undertakings via their national contact points (Article 18 of Regulation (EC) 1071/2009 ⁽²⁾).

In March 2013 the Commission opened 21 EU-Pilot (pre-infringement) cases against those Member States who failed to carry out the necessary interconnection actions by that time. The Commission will keep Parliament informed about the progress in this regard.

⁽¹⁾ OJ L 335, 18.12.2010.

⁽²⁾ Regulation (EC) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 establishing common rules concerning the conditions to be complied with to pursue the occupation of road transport operator; OJ L 300, 14.11.2009.

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002864/13

a la Comisión

Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)

(12 de marzo de 2013)

Asunto: Protección de las aves en Gallecs

Gallecs es un espacio natural protegido ubicado en el Vallés, provincia de Barcelona. Dicho núcleo rural es el hábitat natural y el refugio de aves migratorias y otras especies animales silvestres, muchas de ellas especies protegidas.

La caza con escopeta está prohibida en Gallecs, pero no así la cetrería (caza con aves rapaces y vuelo de rapaces) o la captura de fringílidos. Esta práctica es contraria a la normativa europea, ya que vulnera la Directiva 2009/147/CE por la que, según su artículo 5, letra a), queda prohibido matar o capturar de forma intencionada, sea cual fuera el método empleado, a todas las especies de aves que viven normalmente en estado salvaje en el territorio europeo de los Estados miembros.

Además, dicha Directiva señala que corresponde a los Estados miembros tomar todas las medidas necesarias para preservar, mantener o restablecer una diversidad y una superficie suficiente de hábitats para todas las especies de aves contempladas en la misma. Si bien es cierto que Gallecs se encuentra dentro del PEIN (Plan de Espacios de Interés Natural), este espacio rural sigue siendo objeto de muchos intereses.

Teniendo en cuenta esta normativa:

1. ¿Qué medidas de protección de las aves migratorias puede aplicar la Comisión?
2. ¿Qué medidas de protección para la preservación del hábitat natural de dichas aves propone adoptar?
3. ¿Estaría dispuesta a incluir el espacio natural de Gallecs en la Red Natura 2000?
3. ¿Puede incentivar una mayor protección por parte de la normativa catalana y española?

Respuesta del Sr. Potočnik en nombre de la Comisión

(19 de abril de 2013)

1. La Comisión trabaja para garantizar la aplicación y el cumplimiento plenos de la Directiva sobre aves ⁽¹⁾, que establece un régimen global de protección de todas las especies de aves silvestres que están presentes de forma natural en la Unión Europea, incluidas las especies de aves migratorias.
2. La Comisión continuará trabajando para velar por que los Estados miembros adopten las medidas necesarias para garantizar la plena conformidad con la Directiva sobre aves, incluidas las disposiciones para preservar, mantener o restablecer una diversidad y una superficie suficiente de hábitats para todas las especies de aves contempladas en la Directiva.
3. Los Estados miembros son responsables de designar los lugares más adecuados como zonas de protección especial, que automáticamente pasan a formar parte de la red Natura 2000. Sobre la base de las pruebas científicas disponibles, la Comisión considera que la red de zonas de protección especial en España proporciona actualmente una protección suficiente a todas las especies de aves relacionadas en el anexo I de la Directiva sobre aves. Por lo tanto, no tiene intención de promover la inclusión del espacio natural Gallecs en la red Natura 2000.
4. La Comisión no dudará en adoptar todas las medidas necesarias, incluidas acciones legales, para garantizar el pleno cumplimiento de lo establecido en la Directiva sobre aves.

⁽¹⁾ Directiva 2009/147/CE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 30 de noviembre de 2009, relativa a la conservación de las aves silvestres (DO L 20 de 26.1.2010, p. 7).

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002864/13
to the Commission**

Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)

(12 March 2013)

Subject: The protection of birds in Gallecs

Gallecs is a protected natural area located in Vallés, in the province of Barcelona. This rural hamlet is the natural habitat and sanctuary of migratory birds and other wild animal species, many of which are protected species.

Hunting with rifles is prohibited in Gallecs, but falconry is not (hunting with birds of prey and flying birds of prey) nor is capturing finches. This practice is contrary to European legislation, insofar as it infringes Directive 2009/147/EC whereby, according to Article 5(a), it shall be prohibited to deliberately kill or capture by any method any species of bird that normally lives in the wild in the European territory of the Member States.

Furthermore, the aforementioned Directive notes that Member States shall take the requisite measures to preserve, maintain or re-establish a sufficient diversity and area of habitats for all the species of birds referred to therein. While Gallecs is indeed within the PEIN (Plan for Areas of Natural Interest), this rural area remains subject to many different interests.

Taking into account this legislation:

1. What measures can the Commission take to protect migrating birds?
2. What measures does it intend to take to protect the natural habitat of the aforementioned birds?
3. Is it prepared to include the Gallecs natural area in the Natura 2000 network?
4. Can it encourage greater protection under Catalan and Spanish legislation?

Answer given by Mr Potočník on behalf of the Commission

(19 April 2013)

1. The Commission works to ensure full implementation and enforcement of the Birds Directive ⁽¹⁾, which provides a comprehensive scheme of protection for all wild bird species naturally occurring in the European Union, including migratory bird species.
2. The Commission will continue to work to ensure that Member States undertake the necessary measures to ensure full compliance with the provisions of the Birds Directive, including provisions for the preservation, maintenance and re-establishment of a sufficient diversity area of habitats for all the species of birds referred to in the directive.
3. Member States are responsible for designating the most suitable sites as Special Protection Areas, which automatically become part of the Natura 2000 network. On the basis of the available scientific evidence, the Commission considers that the Special Protection Area network in Spain currently provides sufficient protection to all species of birds listed in Annex I of the Birds Directive. It therefore does not intend to promote the inclusion of the Gallecs natural area in the Natura 2000 network.
4. The Commission will not hesitate to take any necessary measures, including legal action, to ensure full compliance with the provisions of the Birds Directive.

⁽¹⁾ Directive 2009/147/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 30 November 2009, on the conservation of wild birds (OJ L 20/7, 26.1.2010).

(Dansk udgave)

Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse E-002865/13
til Kommissionen
Dan Jørgensen (S&D)
(12. marts 2013)

Om: Elektrosmogs påvirkning af biers adfærd

Flere undersøgelser har vist, at biers adfærd bliver påvirket af elektromagnetisk stråling (elektrosmog). Eksempelvis viser et studie fra 2011 fra Punjab University, at stråling fra mobiltelefoner påvirker biers adfærd, bl.a. ved at føre til nedsat motorisk aktivitet og tegn på stress ⁽¹⁾. Endnu en undersøgelse fra den schweiziske biolog og bieksperter Daniel Favre viser, at elektromagnetiske stråler sammen med bl.a. pesticider kan være en faktor i det drastiske fald i antallet af honningbier i verden ⁽²⁾.

Elektrosmog bliver ydermere koblet sammen med bikollaps (CCD — Colony Collapse Disorder) ⁽³⁾, hvor bikolonier kollapse, fordi bierne pludselig forlader deres kube.

Bier er særdeles afgørende insekter for miljøet. Deres bestøvning af planter og afgrøder er uvurderlig for vores økosystem og landbrug. Det er derfor vigtigt, at årsagerne til faldet i bibestanden i Europa undersøges grundigt for på denne måde at finde løsninger på problemet. Derfor vil jeg bede Kommissionen besvare følgende spørgsmål:

- Er Kommissionen bekendt med elektrosmogs påvirkning af biers adfærd?
- Hvordan vil Kommissionen undersøge sammenhængen mellem elektromagnetisk stråling og CCD?
- Hvilke initiativer vil Kommissionen tage for at forhindre negativ påvirkning af biers adfærd fra elektrosmog?

Svar afgivet på Kommissionens vegne af Tonio Borg
(8. maj 2013)

I Kommissionens svar på skriftlig forespørgsel E-005654/2011, E-010188/2011 og E-010355/2012 gives der omfattende oplysninger om de EU-foranstaltninger, der er blevet truffet for at beskytte tamme bier og støtte biavlsektoren ⁽⁴⁾.

I Kommissionens meddelelse om honningbiers sundhed ⁽⁵⁾ og på dens særlige websted om bier ⁽⁶⁾ gives der yderligere oplysninger om, hvordan Kommissionen, på grundlag af videnskabelige udtalelser fra Den Europæiske Fødevarer sikkerhedsautoritet (EFSA) og med bistand fra EU-referencelaboratoriet for biers sundhed (EURL), vurderer situationen vedrørende biers sundhed, og hvilke foranstaltninger der er blevet truffet (f.eks. om de frivillige overvågningsundersøgelser ⁽⁷⁾ af tab af honningbikolonier, der er iværksat i sytten medlemsstater).

Kommissionen er bekendt med, at der i nogle få artikler har været skrevet om de mulige negative virkninger, som elektromagnetisk stråling kan have på biers adfærd. Ud fra de forholdsvis få foreliggende videnskabelige oplysninger anfører EFSA og EURL ikke, at elektromagnetisk stråling kan være blandt de væsentligste faktorer, der udgør en betydelig risiko for biers sundhed.

Derudover og som led i en indsats, der rækker ud over biers sundhed, overvåger Kommissionen med bistand fra Den Videnskabelige Komité for Nye og Nylygt Identificerede Sundhedsrisici (VKNNPS ⁽⁸⁾) regelmæssigt de videnskabelige fremskridt, der gøres med hensyn til beskyttelse mod virkningerne af elektromagnetiske felter, og de tilhørende forskningsprojekter ⁽⁹⁾.

⁽¹⁾ Artikel fra Toxicology International: <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3052591/>.

⁽²⁾ Artikel fra ABC News: <http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/cellphones-contribute-bee-colony-decline-study-suggests/story?id=13597625>, Artikel fra The Daily Mail: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-1385907/Why-mobile-phone-ring-make-bees-buzz-Insects-infuriated-handset-signals.html>

⁽³⁾ Artikel fra International Journal of Environmental Science: <http://www.ipublishing.co.in/jesvol1no12010/EIJES2044.pdf>

⁽⁴⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/da/parliamentary-questions.html>

⁽⁵⁾ KOM(2010)0714 endelig.

⁽⁶⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/food/animal/liveanimals/bees/index_en.htm

⁽⁷⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/food/animal/liveanimals/bees/financing_en.htm

⁽⁸⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/health/scientific_committees/emerging/index_en.htm

⁽⁹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/health/electromagnetic_fields/research/funding/index_en.htm

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002865/13
to the Commission
Dan Jørgensen (S&D)
(12 March 2013)**

Subject: The effect of electrosmog on bee behaviour

Several studies have shown that the behaviour of bees is affected by electromagnetic radiation (electrosmog). For example, a study from 2011 carried out at Punjab University shows that radiation from mobile telephones affects bee behaviour by, among other things, leading to reduced motor activity and signs of stress ⁽¹⁾. Another study by the Swiss biologist and bee expert, Daniel Favre, shows that electromagnetic radiation, together with other factors such as pesticides, may be contributing to the dramatic decline in the honeybee population around the world ⁽²⁾.

Electrosmog is also implicated in Colony Collapse Disorder (CCD) ⁽³⁾, where bee colonies collapse because the bees suddenly abandon their hive.

Bees are insects that are particularly important for the environment. Their pollination of plants and crops is invaluable for our ecosystems and agriculture. It is therefore important for the causes of the decline in bee populations in Europe to be investigated thoroughly in order to find solutions to the problem.

— Is the Commission aware of the effect of electrosmog on bee behaviour?

— How will it investigate the link between electromagnetic radiation and CCD?

— What initiatives will it take to prevent electrosmog having a negative impact on bee behaviour?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission
(8 May 2013)**

Comprehensive information on the EU actions to protect domestic bees and support to the beekeeping sector has been provided in the Commission replies to Written Questions E-005654/2011, E-010188/2011, and E-010355/2012 ⁽⁴⁾.

Further information on the Commission's assessment of the bee health situation and the actions undertaken, based on the scientific opinions provided by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) and the assistance of the EU reference laboratory for bee health (EURL), is provided in the Commission's Communication on Honeybee Health ⁽⁵⁾ and in its dedicated bee home page ⁽⁶⁾ (e.g. voluntary surveillance studies ⁽⁷⁾ on honeybee colony losses currently ongoing in 17 Member States).

The Commission is aware of a few articles on the possible negative effects of electromagnetic radiation on bee behaviour. From the rather small amount of scientific information available, EFSA and the EURL do not indicate that electromagnetic radiations could be amongst the major factors posing a significant risk to bee health.

In addition to all the above and beyond bee health, the Commission monitors regularly the state of the science in the area of protection against electromagnetic fields effects with the help of the Scientific Committee on Emerging and Newly Identified Health risks (SCENIHR ⁽⁸⁾) and the related research projects ⁽⁹⁾.

⁽¹⁾ Article from Toxicology International: <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3052591/>

⁽²⁾ Article from ABC News: <http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/cellphones-contribute-bee-colony-decline-study-suggests/story?id=13597625>,
Article from The Daily Mail: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-1385907/Why-mobile-phone-ring-make-bees-buzz-Insects-infuriated-handset-signals.html>

⁽³⁾ Article from the International Journal of Environmental Science: <http://www.ipublishing.co.in/jesvol1no12010/EIJES2044.pdf>

⁽⁴⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html>

⁽⁵⁾ COM(2010) 714 final.

⁽⁶⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/food/animal/liveanimals/bees/index_en.htm

⁽⁷⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/food/animal/liveanimals/bees/financing_en.htm

⁽⁸⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/health/scientific_committees/emerging/index_en.htm

⁽⁹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/health/electromagnetic_fields/research/funding/index_en.htm

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-002867/13
an die Kommission
Jutta Steinruck (S&D)
(12. März 2013)

Betrifft: Kinderarbeit in usbekischer Baumwollindustrie

Von Bürgerinnen und Bürgern aus meinem Wahlkreis bin ich auf das Problem von Kinderarbeit in der Baumwollindustrie in Usbekistan hingewiesen worden.

Schulen werden während der Baumwollernte geschlossen, und Kinder, einige nicht älter als neun Jahre, werden für geringes oder kein Entgelt zum Baumwollpflücken gezwungen. Schüler, die ihre Planziele nicht erreichen oder die Arbeit verweigern, werden geschlagen oder müssen mit einem Schulausschluss rechnen. Menschenrechtsgruppen schätzen die Zahl der jährlich betroffenen Kinder auf über hunderttausend. Trotz Zusicherung der usbekischen Regierung, die Zwangsarbeit von Kindern sei seit 2008 gesetzlich verboten, fanden sich weitere Beweise erzwungener Kinderarbeit während der Baumwollernte 2010 in Usbekistan, die von Regierung und Beamten organisiert wurde.

Der größte Abnehmer usbekischer Baumwolle ist der europäische Markt.

Daher möchte ich fragen:

1. Ist sich die Kommission dieses Sachverhalts bewusst?
2. Sind Maßnahmen geplant, die vergünstigten Tarife für usbekische Baumwollimporte in die EU aufzuheben?
3. Sind Maßnahmen geplant, um gegen die Zwangsarbeit von Kindern in der usbekischen Baumwollproduktion vorzugehen?

Antwort von Frau Ashton — Hohe Vertreterin/Vizepräsidentin im Namen der Kommission
(6. Mai 2013)

Das Problem der Kinderarbeit ist wesentlicher Bestandteil der von der EU gegenüber Usbekistan verfolgten Menschenrechtsagenda. Die EU hat das Thema bei jeder Gelegenheit im Rahmen ihrer bilateralen Kontakte auch auf höchster politischer Ebene angesprochen. Es sei darauf hingewiesen, dass bei der Baumwollernte 2012 eine positive Entwicklung festzustellen war, da die jüngsten Schüler weniger zur Erntearbeit herangezogen wurden. Zwangsarbeit scheint jedoch immer noch verbreitet zu sein und wir müssen uns daher weiterhin dafür einsetzen, dass die Zusammenarbeit zwischen Usbekistan und der Internationalen Arbeitsorganisation (ILO) wieder aufgenommen wird.

Usbekistan ist in das Allgemeine Präferenzsystem der EU (APS) einbezogen. Diese Präferenzen können ausgesetzt werden, wenn ein Land auf der Grundlage von Schlussfolgerungen der Überwachungsstellen, d. h. in diesem Fall von Schlussfolgerungen der ILO, für schwerwiegende und systematische Verstöße gegen die in den APS-Übereinkommen verankerten Grundsätze verantwortlich gemacht wird. Der Fall Usbekistan wird auf der ILO-Konferenz im Juni 2013 erörtert werden; dort wird auch geprüft werden, ob auf der Grundlage der ILO-Schlussfolgerungen die Möglichkeit der Rücknahme der Präferenzen untersucht werden sollte.

Darüber hinaus hat sich die EU bemüht, diesbezügliche Kooperationsmaßnahmen zu entwickeln. Mitte 2012 wurde eine Finanzierungsvereinbarung über ein mit 10 Mio. EUR ausgestattetes Programm zur Entwicklung des ländlichen Raums unterzeichnet, das die Diversifizierung der Landwirtschaft fördern und die Abhängigkeit von der Baumwollmonokultur verringern soll.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002867/13
to the Commission
Jutta Steinruck (S&D)
(12 March 2013)**

Subject: Child labour in the Uzbek cotton industry

Some of my constituents have drawn my attention to the problem of child labour in the cotton industry in Uzbekistan.

Schools are closed during the cotton harvest and children, some of them no older than nine, are forced to pick cotton for little or no financial reward. Schoolchildren who fail to reach their targets or who refuse to work are beaten or threatened with expulsion from school. Human rights groups estimate that over one hundred thousand children are affected each year. Despite assurances from the Uzbek Government that forced labour among children has been prohibited by law since 2008, there was further evidence of forced child labour during the 2010 cotton harvest in Uzbekistan which was organised by the government and its officials.

The biggest market for Uzbek cotton is in Europe.

1. Is the Commission aware of this issue?
2. Are there plans to discontinue the reduced tariffs for Uzbek cotton imports into the EU?
3. Are there plans for action against forced labour among children in Uzbek cotton production?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(6 May 2013)**

The issue of child labour forms an essential part of the EU human rights agenda with Uzbekistan. The EU has raised this issue on every occasion in its bilateral contacts including at the highest political level. Overall, it is good to note that the 2012 cotton harvest marked a positive evolution, with the recourse to the youngest schoolchildren working with the harvest curbed. Still it seems forced labour is employed and we shall therefore keep advocating the resumption of cooperation between Uzbekistan and the International Labour Organisation (ILO).

Uzbekistan benefits from the EU Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP). These preferences can be suspended if a country is responsible for serious and systematic violations of principles laid down in GSP conventions on the basis of the conclusions of monitoring bodies, i.e., in this case conclusions of the ILO. The case of Uzbekistan will be discussed during the ILO Conference in June 2013, and will examine whether a withdrawal investigation is warranted on the basis of its conclusions

The EU has also sought to develop relevant cooperation responses. A EUR 10 million Rural Development programme was signed in mid-2012 to promote agriculture diversification and diminish reliance on cotton monoculture.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002868/13

aan de Raad

Marietje Schaake (ALDE)

(12 maart 2013)

Betreeft: Hezbollah op de EU-lijst van terroristische organisaties

Op 5 februari 2013 verklaarde de Bulgaarse minister van Binnenlandse Zaken, Tsvetan Tsvetanov, dat de bom die in een bus in Burgas was ontploft, met de dood van vijf Israëliische toeristen en de Bulgaarse chauffeur tot gevolg, in verband gebracht kon worden met de Libanese organisatie Hezbollah ⁽¹⁾. De directeur van Europol, Rob Wainwright, bevestigde dat het bewijs, de inlichtingen en het patroon van de recente aanvallen allemaal in de richting van Hezbollah wezen ⁽²⁾. Dit is niet de eerste terroristische aanval die in verband is gebracht met deze organisatie. Sinds de oprichting als gewapende organisatie in 1982 is een groot aantal aanvallen toegeschreven aan Hezbollah, meestal op westerse of joodse doelwitten. Meer recentelijk was Hezbollah betrokken bij de crisis in Syrië, door steun te verlenen aan de gewelddadige campagne van Bashar al-Assad tegen de Syrische bevolking. Tevens heeft de organisatie zich beziggehouden met illegale activiteiten in Europa ⁽³⁾ en was in 2005 in verband gebracht met de moord op de president van Libanon, Rafic Hariri ⁽⁴⁾. Naar aanleiding van die moordaanslag heeft het Parlement een resolutie ⁽⁵⁾ aangenomen waarin de aanval werd veroordeeld en de Raad werd opgeroepen alle nodige maatregelen te treffen om Hezbollah aan banden te leggen, aangezien er duidelijk bewijs was van de terroristische activiteiten van die organisatie. Het is daarom hoog tijd dat Hezbollah op de EU-lijst van terroristische organisaties wordt gezet.

1. Kan de Raad toelichten waarom Hezbollah niet op de EU-lijst van terroristische organisaties is geplaatst? Zo niet, waarom niet?
2. Is de Raad het ermee eens dat het verleden van Hezbollah, uitmondend in de recente aanval op grondgebied van de Europese Unie in Burgas, geen twijfel laat dat Hezbollah een terroristische organisatie is?
3. Is de Raad het ermee eens dat het plaatsen van Hezbollah op de EU-lijst van terroristische organisaties zou bijdragen aan het inperken van de terroristische activiteiten die deze organisatie kan uitvoeren met behulp van haar financiële goederen, ondergrondse groepen en activiteiten in de EU?
4. Is de Raad het ermee eens dat, aangezien de leiding van zowel de militante als de politieke vleugel van Hezbollah in handen zijn van dezelfde persoon, het moeilijk is onderscheid te maken tussen de legitieme en de terroristische activiteiten?
5. Is de Raad bereid om, gezien het verleden en de betrokkenheid van Hezbollah bij de aanval in Burgas, er bij de lidstaten op aan te dringen Hezbollah op de EU-lijst van terroristische organisaties te plaatsen?

Antwoord

(17 juni 2013)

Wijzigingen van de lijsten van aangewezen organisaties, entiteiten en personen zijn gebaseerd op juridische en politieke overwegingen, en zijn onderworpen aan een beoordeling door de lidstaten. Het hoofddoel van een aanwijzing is de aangewezen organisaties, entiteiten of personen de toegang tot financiële activa en gerelateerde diensten onder EU-jurisdictie te ontzeggen.

Wat betreft de mogelijkheid om Hezbollah aan te wijzen als terroristische organisatie, wordt erop gewezen dat voor iedere wijziging van de EU-lijst van terroristische organisaties een unanieme beslissing van alle lidstaten nodig is. De plaatsing van Hezbollah op de lijst is bij verschillende gelegenheden besproken, maar er was nooit unanieme steun van de lidstaten.

De aanslag in Burgas wordt momenteel onderzocht, met het doel de omstandigheden van de aanslag te analyseren en de daders te identificeren. De Bulgaarse autoriteiten hebben verklaard dat zij nauw samenwerken met de Libanese autoriteiten.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-21342192>.

⁽²⁾ <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-21342192>.

⁽³⁾ http://www.ajc.org/site/c.70JLSPwFfjSG/b.8482725/k.315F/Hezbollah_Activities_in_Europe.htm

⁽⁴⁾ <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/18/world/middleeast/18lebanon.html>

⁽⁵⁾ P6_TA(2005)0076.

Indien uit het opsporingsonderzoek en de gerechtelijke procedures blijkt dat Hezbollah bij de zaak betrokken is, zal de EU zich beraden op een reactie. De besprekingen over een passende reactie zullen gebaseerd zijn op alle elementen die door de speurders in kaart worden gebracht.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002868/13
to the Council**

Marietje Schaake (ALDE)

(12 March 2013)

Subject: Hezbollah on EU list of terrorist organisations

On 5 February 2013 the Bulgarian Minister of the Interior, Tsvetan Tsvetanov, said that the bomb on a bus in Burgas which killed five Israeli tourists and the Bulgarian driver had been linked to the Lebanese organisation Hezbollah ⁽¹⁾. The director of Europol, Rob Wainwright, confirmed that the evidence, intelligence and the pattern of recent attacks all pointed to Hezbollah ⁽²⁾. This is not the first terrorist attack that has been linked to the group. Since it was established as an armed organisation in 1982, many different attacks, usually on Western or Jewish targets, have been attributed to Hezbollah. More recently, Hezbollah has been involved in the crisis in Syria, backing Bashar al-Assad's violent campaign against the Syrian people. It also conducts illegal activities in Europe ⁽³⁾, and in 2005 was linked to the assassination of the Lebanese President, Rafic Hariri ⁽⁴⁾. In the aftermath of that assassination, Parliament adopted a resolution ⁽⁵⁾ in which it condemned the attack and urged the Council to take all necessary steps to curtail Hezbollah, considering that there was clear evidence of its terrorist activities. The time has come to place Hezbollah on the EU list of terrorist organisations.

1. Is the Council willing to explain why Hezbollah has not been placed on the EU terrorist list? If not, why not?
2. Does the Council agree that the history of Hezbollah, culminating in the recent attack on European Union soil in Burgas, confirms that this group is indeed a terrorist group?
3. Does the Council agree that putting Hezbollah on the EU terrorist list would help curb the terrorist activities carried out by it through its financial assets, support cells and activities in the EU?
4. Does the Council agree that, since the leadership of Hezbollah's militant wing and its political wing are in the hands of the same person, the distinction between legitimate and terrorist activities is difficult to make?
5. Is the Council willing, in light of Hezbollah's history and its link to the attack in Burgas, to urge the Member States to add Hezbollah to the EU list of terrorist organisations?

Reply

(17 June 2013)

Amendments to the lists of designated organisations, entities and persons are based on legal as well as political considerations, subject to assessment by Member States. Depriving the targets of a designation of access to any financial assets and related services under EU jurisdiction is the principal goal of any designation.

Regarding the possibility of designating Hezbollah as a terrorist organisation, all amendments to the EU list of terrorist organisations require a unanimous decision by all Member States. The addition of Hezbollah to the list has been discussed on several occasions, but there has never been unanimous support from Member States.

The Burgas attack is currently the subject of investigations, which aim to examine the circumstances of the attack and identify the perpetrators. The Bulgarian authorities have stated that they are cooperating closely with their Lebanese counterparts.

Should these investigative and judicial processes bring to light any implications for Hezbollah, the EU will consider how it might respond. Discussions on an appropriate response will be based on all elements identified by the investigators.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-21342192>.

⁽²⁾ <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-21342192>.

⁽³⁾ http://www.ajc.org/site/c.70JLSPwFfSG/b.8482725/k.315F/Hezbollah_Activities_in_Europe.htm

⁽⁴⁾ <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/18/world/middleeast/18lebanon.html>

⁽⁵⁾ P6_TA(2005)0076.

(Nederlandse versie)

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002869/13
aan de Commissie (Vicevoorzitter / Hoge Vertegenwoordiger)
Marietje Schaake (ALDE)
(12 maart 2013)**

Betreeft: VP/HR — Hezbollah op EU-lijst met terroristische organisaties

Op 5 februari 2013 verklaarde de Bulgaarse minister van Binnenlandse Zaken, Tsvetan Tsvetanov, dat de bom die in een bus in Burgas was ontploft, met de dood van vijf Israëlische toeristen en de Bulgaarse chauffeur tot gevolg, in verband gebracht kon worden met de Libanese organisatie Hezbollah ⁽¹⁾. De directeur van Europol, Rob Wainwright, bevestigde dat het bewijs, de inlichtingen en het patroon van de recente aanvallen allemaal in de richting van Hezbollah wezen ⁽²⁾. Dit is niet de eerste terroristische aanval die in verband is gebracht met deze organisatie. Sinds de oprichting als gewapende organisatie in 1982 is een groot aantal aanvallen toegeschreven aan Hezbollah, meestal op westerse of joodse doelwitten. Meer recentelijk was Hezbollah betrokken bij de crisis in Syrië, door steun te verlenen aan de gewelddadige campagne van Bashar al-Assad tegen de Syrische bevolking. Tevens heeft de organisatie zich beziggehouden met illegale activiteiten in Europa ⁽³⁾ en was in 2005 in verband gebracht met de moord op de president van Libanon, Rafic Hariri ⁽⁴⁾. Naar aanleiding van die moordaanslag heeft het Parlement een resolutie ⁽⁵⁾ aangenomen waarin de aanval werd veroordeeld en de Raad werd opgeroepen alle nodige maatregelen te treffen om Hezbollah aan banden te leggen, aangezien er duidelijk bewijs was van de terroristische activiteiten van die organisatie. Het is daarom hoog tijd dat Hezbollah op de EU-lijst van terroristische organisaties wordt gezet.

1. Kan de vicevoorzitter / hoge vertegenwoordiger toelichten waarom Hezbollah niet op de EU-lijst van terroristische organisaties is geplaatst? Zo niet, waarom niet?
2. Is de vicevoorzitter / hoge vertegenwoordiger het ermee eens dat het verleden van Hezbollah, uitmondend in de recente aanval op grondgebied van de Europese Unie in Burgas, geen twijfel laat dat Hezbollah een terroristische organisatie is?
3. Is de vicevoorzitter / hoge vertegenwoordiger het ermee eens dat het plaatsen van Hezbollah op de EU-lijst van terroristische organisaties zou bijdragen aan het inperken van de terroristische activiteiten die deze organisatie kan uitvoeren met behulp van haar financiële tegoeden, ondergrondse groepen en activiteiten in de EU?
4. Is de vicevoorzitter / hoge vertegenwoordiger het ermee eens dat, aangezien de leiding van zowel de militante als de politieke vleugel van Hezbollah in handen zijn van dezelfde persoon, het moeilijk is onderscheid te maken tussen de legitieme en de terroristische activiteiten?
5. Is de vicevoorzitter / hoge vertegenwoordiger bereid om, gezien het verleden en de betrokkenheid van Hezbollah bij de aanval in Burgas, er bij de lidstaten op aan te dringen Hezbollah op de EU-lijst van terroristische organisaties te plaatsen?

**Antwoord van hoge vertegenwoordiger/vicevoorzitter Ashton namens de Commissie
(30 mei 2013)**

De Bulgaarse minister van Binnenlandse Zaken en de directeur van Europol hadden het in de verklaringen waar het geachte Parlementslid naar verwijst over een redelijk vermoeden wat de betrokkenheid van Hezbollah betreft, maar zagen af van beslister bewoordingen.

Wat betreft de mogelijkheid om Hezbollah aan te wijzen als terroristische organisatie, wordt erop gewezen dat voor iedere wijziging van de EU-lijst van terroristische organisaties een unanieme beslissing van alle lidstaten nodig is. Hezbollah is in dit verband in het verleden reeds bij verschillende gelegenheden besproken, maar het is nooit tot een consensus tussen de lidstaten gekomen.

Het onderzoek naar de daders en de omstandigheden van de aanslag in Burgas loopt nog. De Bulgaarse autoriteiten hebben verklaard dat zij hiervoor samenwerken met hun Libanese tegenhangers.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-21342192>.

⁽²⁾ <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-21342192>.

⁽³⁾ http://www.ajc.org/site/c.70JLSPwFfjSG/b.8482725/k.315F/Hezbollah_Activities_in_Europe.htm

⁽⁴⁾ <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/18/world/middleeast/18lebanon.html>

⁽⁵⁾ P6_TA(2005)0076.

Wijzigingen van de lijst van terroristische organisaties, entiteiten en personen berusten op zowel wettelijke als politieke overwegingen en worden beoordeeld door de lidstaten. Het hoofddoel van een aanwijzing is de aangewezen organisaties, entiteiten of personen de toegang tot financiële activa en gerelateerde diensten onder EU-jurisdictie te ontzeggen. De afbakening van het voorwerp van de aanwijzing, met inbegrip van het onderscheid dat al dan niet kan worden gemaakt, zou afhangen van de bovenvermelde overwegingen.

Indien het opsporingsonderzoek en de gerechtelijke procedures gevolgen hebben voor Hezbollah, zal de EU verschillende opties overwegen om hierop te reageren, waaronder maatregelen in het kader van de samenwerking op het gebied van recherche en justitie op EU-niveau en wijzigingen van de lijsten van aangewezen organisaties, entiteiten en personen. De EU en de lidstaten zullen zich op basis van alle elementen die door de onderzoekers in kaart zijn gebracht op een passende reactie beraden.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002869/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Marietje Schaake (ALDE)
 (12 March 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Hezbollah on EU list of terrorist organisations

On 5 February 2013 the Bulgarian Minister of the Interior, Tsvetan Tsvetanov, said that the bomb on a bus in Burgas which killed five Israeli tourists and the Bulgarian driver had been linked to the Lebanese organisation Hezbollah ⁽¹⁾. The director of Europol, Rob Wainwright, confirmed that the evidence, intelligence and the pattern of recent attacks all pointed to Hezbollah ⁽²⁾. This is not the first terrorist attack that has been linked to the group. Since it was established as an armed organisation in 1982, many different attacks, usually on Western or Jewish targets, have been attributed to Hezbollah. More recently, Hezbollah has been involved in the crisis in Syria, backing Bashar al-Assad's violent campaign against the Syrian people. It also conducts illegal activities in Europe ⁽³⁾, and in 2005 was linked to the assassination of the Lebanese President, Rafic Hariri ⁽⁴⁾. In the aftermath of that assassination, Parliament adopted a resolution ⁽⁵⁾ in which it condemned the attack and urged the Council to take all necessary steps to curtail Hezbollah, considering that there was clear evidence of its terrorist activities. The time has come to place Hezbollah on the EU list of terrorist organisations.

1. Is the Vice-President/High Representative willing to explain why Hezbollah has not been placed on the EU terrorist list? If not, why not?
2. Does the Vice-President/High Representative agree that the history of Hezbollah, culminating in the recent attack on European Union soil in Burgas, confirms that this group is indeed a terrorist group?
3. Does the Vice-President/High Representative agree that putting Hezbollah on the EU terrorist list would help curb the terrorist activities carried out by it through its financial assets, support cells and activities in the EU?
4. Does the Vice-President/High Representative agree that, since the leadership of Hezbollah's militant wing and its political wing are in the hands of the same person, the distinction between legitimate and terrorist activities is difficult to make?
5. Is the Vice-President/High Representative willing, in light of Hezbollah's history and its link to the attack in Burgas, to urge the Member States to add Hezbollah to the EU list of terrorist organisations?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
 (30 May 2013)

The statements by the Bulgarian Minister of Interior as well as Europol's Director, as referred to in the Honourable Member's question, spoke about a reasonable assumption with regard to Hizbullah's involvement, while refraining from more definite formulations.

Regarding the possibility of designating Hizbullah as a terrorist organisation, all amendments to the EU list of terrorist organisations require a unanimous decision of Member States. Hizbullah was, in this context, discussed on several occasions in the past, but there has never been consensus among Member States.

The Burgas attack is subject to ongoing investigations, which aim at identifying the perpetrators and all circumstances. The Bulgarian authorities informed of their cooperation with their Lebanese counterparts in this regard.

Amendments to the lists of designated organisations, entities and persons are based on legal as well as political considerations, subject to assessment by Member States. Depriving the targets of a designation of access to any financial assets and related services under EU jurisdiction is the principal goal of any designation. The targeting of the designation, including what distinctions can or cannot be made, would be a matter of the aforementioned considerations.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-21342192>.

⁽²⁾ <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-21342192>.

⁽³⁾ http://www.ajc.org/site/c.70JLSPwFfjSG/b.8482725/k.315F/Hezbollah_Activities_in_Europe.htm

⁽⁴⁾ <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/18/world/middleeast/18lebanon.html>

⁽⁵⁾ P6_TA(2005)0076.

Should the ongoing investigative and judicial processes bear implications for Hizbullah, the EU will consider a range of options to respond, which could include steps in the framework of investigative and judicial cooperation at EU level; as well as possibilities of amendments to the lists of designated organisations, entities and persons. The EU and Member States will discuss the appropriate response based on all elements identified by the investigators.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002870/13
προς την Επιτροπή
Kyriacos Triantaphyllides (GUE/NGL)
(12 Μαρτίου 2013)

Θέμα: Ανησυχίες σχετικά με το κλειστό κέντρο κράτησης για μετανάστες στο Kares, Αλβανία

Κατά τη διάρκεια της επίσκεψής του στην Αλβανία τον Δεκέμβριο του 2011, ο ειδικός εισηγητής των Ηνωμένων Εθνών για τα Ανθρώπινα Δικαιώματα των Μεταναστών εξέφρασε την ανησυχία του σχετικά με το κλειστό κέντρο κράτησης στο Kares. Το κλειστό κέντρο κράτησης του Kares, το οποίο άνοιξε το 2010, κατασκευάσθηκε κυρίως με χρηματοδότηση από την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση. Τα ζητήματα της προσβασιμότητας, των συνθηκών κράτησης, των νομικών διασφαλίσεων σύμφωνα με το νόμο και στην πράξη καθώς και η μεταχείριση των κρατούμενων, που αναφέρονται ρητώς στην έκθεση του ειδικού εισηγητή των Ηνωμένων Εθνών, είναι συνεπώς ιδιαίτερα ανησυχητικά.

Στην έκθεση αναφέρονται, ειδικότερα: οι κακές οδικές συνθήκες, οι οποίες παρεμποδίζουν τους κρατούμενους από το να απολαύουν του δικαιώματος της νομικής υπεράσπισης και της ανεξάρτητης παρακολούθησης εκ μέρους εθνικών και διεθνών οργάνων· οι υποδομές και η οργάνωση του κέντρου· οι κακές συνθήκες διαβίωσης και υγιεινής, όπως το κρύο και η υγρασία και η έλλειψη παιθριών διευκολύνσεων ή δραστηριοτήτων, οι οποίες θυμίζουν εκείνες μιας φυλακής μεσαίας έως υψηλής ασφάλειας· οι εσωτερικοί κανονισμοί, οι οποίοι περιέχουν διατάξεις που επιτρέπουν την παρουσία ανηλίκων στο κέντρο· και η έλλειψη κατάλληλης ενημέρωσης σε γλώσσα που ομιλείται από τους κρατούμενους σχετικά με τα δικαιώματά τους και τους λόγους της κράτησής τους.

Λαμβάνοντας υπόψη τη συμφωνία επανεισοχής μεταξύ Αλβανίας και της ΕΕ, η οποία τέθηκε σε ισχύ την 1η Μαΐου 2006 και προϋποθέτει πλήρη σεβασμό των ανθρωπίνων δικαιωμάτων και των θεμελιωδών ελευθεριών, πού βασίστηκε η χρηματοδότηση αυτού του κέντρου κράτησης από την ΕΕ;

Η Επιτροπή εξέφρασε άποψη όσον αφορά τον αρχιτεκτονικό σχεδιασμό και τον εσωτερικό κανονισμό του κέντρου;

Είναι ενήμερη η Επιτροπή σχετικά με την κατάσταση που περιγράφεται ανωτέρω; Εάν ναι, ποια μέτρα έχει λάβει προκειμένου να διορθωθεί η κατάσταση; Εάν όχι, ποια συγκεκριμένα μέτρα προτίθεται να λάβει τώρα;

Απάντηση του κ. Füle εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(8 Μαΐου 2013)

Η Επιτροπή έχει παράσχει στήριξη στην αλβανική κυβέρνηση για τη θέσπιση και την εφαρμογή αποτελεσματικού συστήματος όσον αφορά τη μετανάστευση, το άσυλο, την επιστροφή και την επανεισοχή μεταναστών σύμφωνα με τα ενωσιακά και τα διεθνή πρότυπα. Η ανάπτυξη αρμόζοντος θεσμικού πλαισίου για τη διαχείριση της μετανάστευσης, σύμφωνα με τα ευρωπαϊκά πρότυπα, αποτελεί μέρος των δεσμεύσεων της χώρας, ιδίως σε σχέση με την ελευθέρωση του καθεστώτος θεωρήσεων με την ΕΕ.

Στο πλαίσιο αυτό, η Επιτροπή έχει παράσχει στήριξη για την κατασκευή του κέντρου κράτησης στο Karesi. Το έργο σχεδιάστηκε σε στενή συνεργασία με τον Διεθνή Οργανισμό Μετανάστευσης (ΔΟΜ). Τα κονδύλια της ΕΕ κάλυψαν τις οικοδομικές εργασίες και την επίβλεψή τους. Ο ΔΟΜ παρείχε επίσης συμβουλές σχετικά με τους εσωτερικούς κανονισμούς του Κέντρου.

Μετά την ολοκλήρωση της κατασκευής, η Επιτροπή (μέσω της Αντιπροσωπείας της ΕΕ στα Τίρανα) έθεσε στις αλβανικές αρχές θέματα που επηρεάζουν τη λειτουργία του Κέντρου, ιδίως τη συντήρηση του χώρου και την οδική πρόσβαση. Κατόπιν τούτου, στις αρχές του 2013 ξεκίνησαν εργασίες για την αναβάθμιση της οδικής πρόσβασης. Με τον ίδιο τρόπο, οι αρχές έχουν επίσης κληθεί να επιλύσουν άλλα προβλήματα συντήρησης που επηρεάζουν τις συνθήκες υγιεινής του Κέντρου.

Επιπλέον, το 2010 εφαρμόστηκε σχέδιο της ΕΕ για την κατάρτιση του προσωπικού του κέντρου κράτησης όσον αφορά τα ανθρώπινα δικαιώματα και την καταπολέμηση των βασανιστηρίων, τις βέλτιστες πρακτικές και την ανταλλαγή πληροφοριών και, τέλος, τις θεωρητικές αρχές και το νομικό πλαίσιο της μετανάστευσης.

Η Επιτροπή θα συνεχίσει να παρακολουθεί με τις αλβανικές αρχές τα θέματα που έθεσε το αξιότιμο μέλος.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002870/13
to the Commission
Kyriacos Triantaphyllides (GUE/NGL)
(12 March 2013)**

Subject: Concerns over closed detention centre for migrants in Kareç, Albania

During his visit to Albania in December 2011, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants expressed his concern about the closed detention centre in Kareç. The Kareç closed detention centre, which opened in 2010, was constructed primarily with funding from the European Union. The issues of accessibility, detention conditions, legal safeguards in law and practice and the treatment of detainees, which are explicitly mentioned in the UN Special Rapporteur's report, are therefore particularly worrying.

The report mentions, in particular: the 'bad road conditions, which seriously obstruct the enjoyment of detainees' right to legal defence and independent monitoring by national and international bodies'; the centre's infrastructure and organisation; the poor living and hygienic conditions, such as cold and humidity and the lack of outdoor facilities or activities, which recall those of 'a mid- to high-security prison'; the internal regulations, which contain provisions allowing the presence of 'minors' in the centre; and the lack of adequate information in a language commonly spoken by detainees about their rights and the reasons for their detention.

Taking into account the readmission agreement between Albania and the EU, which entered into force on 1 May 2006 and presupposes full respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, on what basis was this detention centre funded by the EU?

Did the Commission have any say in the architectural planning and internal regulation of the centre?

Is the Commission aware of the situation described above? If so, what steps has it taken to remedy the situation? If not, what concrete steps will it take now?

**Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission
(8 May 2013)**

The Commission has provided support to the Albanian government in establishing and implementing an effective migration, asylum, return and readmission system in compliance with EU and international standards. The development of an adequate and institutional framework for migration management, in accordance with European standards is part of the country's commitments, notably in the context of visa liberalisation with the EU.

In this context the Commission has provided support to the construction of the detention centre in Kareci. The design of the project has been closely coordinated with the International Organisation of Migration (IOM). EU funds covered the actual building works and their supervision. The IOM advised also on internal regulations of the centre.

Following the finalisation of the construction, the Commission (through the EU Delegation in Tirana) has raised with the Albanian authorities issues affecting the functioning of the centre, notably as regards maintenance of the site and access road. As a result works for the upgrading of the access road were launched at the beginning of 2013. Likewise, the authorities have also been called to remedy other problems of maintenance affecting the hygienic conditions of the centre.

Moreover, an EU project provided training to staff of the detention centre in 2010 on human rights and the fight against torture, on best practices and exchange of information, and on migration concepts and legal background.

The Commission will continue the monitoring of the issues raised by the honourable Member with the Albanian authorities.

(Wersja polska)

Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002871/13
do Komisji
Paweł Robert Kowal (ECR) oraz Marek Henryk Migalski (ECR)
(12 marca 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Konsultacje społeczne Komisji Europejskiej w sprawie wydobycia gazu łupkowego

Komisja Europejska rozpoczęła pod koniec grudnia 2012 r. konsultacje społeczne w sprawie wydobycia gazu łupkowego, które docelowo mają służyć zmianom prawnym dotyczącym poszukiwań i eksploatacji węglowodorów ze źródeł niekonwencjonalnych na terenie Unii Europejskiej. Struktura ankiety dot. wydobycia gazu łupkowego nie odpowiada jednak standardom obiektywności i rzetelności, przy przeprowadzaniu badań socjologicznych: Użyte w tytule sformułowanie „niekonwencjonalne paliwa kopalne” może sugerować, że gaz z łupków jest gazem niekonwencjonalnym (a przecież mowa tu o tym samym gazie, tylko złoża wydobycia są inne), a w konsekwencji zrodzić postawę podejrzliwości, nastawiając respondenta negatywnie do całego badania. Pytania o korzyści jak i ryzyka wpływające z wydobycia gazu z łupków nie zostały sformułowane w zbalansowany sposób, obowiązujący w tego typu ankietach: 11 z nich omawia aspekty pozytywne, a aż 18 aspekty negatywne.

Treść merytoryczna pytań wymaga od respondenta wiedzy specjalistycznej z omawianej dziedziny, a przecież celem badania jest poznanie opinii publicznej, a nie eksperckiej. Również przez pierwsze 30 dni konsultacji, ankieta dostępna była tylko w trzech językach europejskich, co znacznie ograniczyło możliwość partycypacji w konsultacjach wielu obywatelom Unii Europejskiej.

Niezrozumiałe jest także, dlaczego respondenci ze wszystkich krajów Unii Europejskiej pytani są o wydanie opinii ogólnej na temat eksploatacji łupków na terenie całej Europy, a nie konkretnego kraju, z którego pochodzą.

Tu warto podkreślić, że dla dobra rozwoju tego sektora, regulacje dotyczące wydobycia gazu z łupków, powinny zostać rozpatrywane na poziomie krajów zainteresowanych i uwzględniać czynniki lokalne, traktując sprawę w sposób indywidualny, a nie na poziomie ogólnoeuropejskim. W wielu krajach, np. w Polsce, istnieją już odpowiednie regulacje prawne, traktat lizboński również potwierdza zwierzchność prawa narodowego nad surowcami kopalnymi, w tej sytuacji nie ma potrzeby tworzenia rozwiązań ponadnarodowych.

1. Jakie cele chce osiągnąć Komisja rozpisując ankietę?
2. Czy projekt ankiety podawany był ekspertyzie socjologicznej i czyjej?
3. Czy planowane jest ponowne zgodne z warsztatem socjologicznym sformułowanie ankiety?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Janeza Potočnika w imieniu Komisji
(3 maja 2013 r.)

1. Celem konsultacji publicznych, których dotyczy pytanie Szanownego Pana Posła, jest przeprowadzenie konsultacji z odpowiednimi zainteresowanymi stronami oraz społeczeństwem w kontekście rozwoju „ram oceny dotyczących środowiska, klimatu i energii, umożliwiających niekonwencjonalne wydobycie węglowodorów” przewidzianych w Programie prac Komisji na rok 2013.
 2. Odpowiedź na pytanie Szanownego Pana Posła brzmi: nie.
 3. Komisja uważa, że ankieta została opracowana w rzetelny sposób i nie planuje powtórzenia przedmiotowych konsultacji społecznych.
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(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002871/13
to the Commission
Paweł Robert Kowal (ECR) and Marek Henryk Migalski (ECR)
(12 March 2013)**

Subject: Public consultation by the Commission on the extraction of shale gas

In late December 2012, the Commission launched a public consultation on the extraction of shale gas, with a view to amending legislation on the exploration for and extraction of hydrocarbons from unconventional sources in the European Union. However, the structure of the questionnaire on the extraction of shale gas does not meet the standards of objectivity and reliability required for sociological research: the use of the phrase 'unconventional fossil fuels' in the title could suggest that shale gas is an unconventional gas, although it is the same as other natural gases, just extracted from different deposits; this may make respondents suspicious and put them off the research in general. The questions relating to the benefits and risks of the extraction of shale gas have not been worded in the balanced way which is obligatory for such questionnaires: 11 of them relate to positive aspects, whereas 18 relate to negative aspects.

The content of the questions requires specialist knowledge from respondents on the area in question, although the aim of the research is to identify the opinions of the public, not experts. In addition, for the first 30 days of the consultation the survey was only available in three European languages, which significantly limited the opportunity for many EU citizens to take part in the consultation.

It is also hard to understand why respondents from all EU Member States have been asked to give their general opinion on shale extraction throughout Europe, rather than in their specific home countries.

It is worth highlighting the fact that the development of this sector would benefit from regulations on the extraction of shale gas being examined at the level of the countries involved, taking local factors into account and using an individualised approach, rather than examining regulations at European level. The relevant legislative provisions are already in place in many countries, for example Poland, and the supremacy of national legislation in the area of fossil fuels was confirmed by the Treaty of Lisbon, which means that there is no need for supranational solutions.

1. What aims did the Commission wish to achieve by publishing this survey?
2. Were experts in the field of sociology asked to review the draft questionnaire, and if so who were they?
3. Are there any plans to issue a revised questionnaire which complies with sociological principles?

**Answer given by Mr Potočník on behalf of the Commission
(3 May 2013)**

1. The purpose of the public consultation mentioned by the Honourable Member is to consult with relevant stakeholders and with the public in the context of the development of an 'environmental, climate and energy assessment framework to enable safe and secure unconventional hydrocarbon extraction', as foreseen in the 2013 Commission Work Programme.
 2. The answer to the question of the Honourable Member is No.
 3. The Commission considers the questionnaire as balanced and has no plans to repeat the public consultation.
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(English version)

Question for written answer E-002872/13
to the Commission
Roger Helmer (EFD)
(12 March 2013)

Subject: Asbestos

In 2003, the Scientific Committee on Toxicity, Ecotoxicity and the Environment undertook a scientific review of the EU directive on chrysotile (white asbestos) ⁽¹⁾, comparing chrysotile and its substitutes and concluding that there was a lack of data regarding substitutes.

In 2009 the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) gave its opinion during the legislative debate on the codification of Directive 2009/148/EC on the protection of workers from the risks related to exposure to asbestos. The workers and employers of the 27 Member States gathered in the EESC said:

'2.2.5. There are some shortcomings in respect of the codification of the recitals. Several of the recitals appearing in previous directives are not included in the codification. In some cases, these omissions represent more than purely editorial changes. They affect fundamental aspects which the EU legislator has judged important to draw attention to.

2.2.6. This is the case of recital (2) of Directive 2003/18/EC where the EU legislator points out the importance of a preventative approach, with regard to substitute fibres for asbestos. This is particularly important to ensure that alternatives used do not pose any health problems' ⁽²⁾.

I understand that the Commission subsequently decided to remove the second statement — recital (2) — of the 'old' Directive.

Given that asbestos is no longer used in the EU and that millions of workers in the EU are therefore exposed to substitutes, can the Commission:

1. explain the scientific reasoning behind the removal of recital (2) of Directive 2003/18/EC;
2. state what progress has been made towards establishing whether there are substitutes for chrysotile that pose measurably less health risks;
3. clarify its position on the level of health risk posed by both white asbestos and its alternatives?

Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission
(24 May 2013)

1. Any changes made to Directive 2003/18/EC during codification are not done for any scientific reason, since the process simply involves consolidating a number of acts to form a single act and does not affect the substance of the acts undergoing codification.

The placing on the market of articles containing asbestos fibres is prohibited in the EU, pursuant to entry 6 of Annex XVII to REACH (Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006). For articles which were already installed and/or in service before 1 January 2005, Member States may allow their sale in their entirety, under specific conditions ensuring a high level of protection of human health (paragraph 2 of entry 6 of Annex XVII to REACH).

Therefore asbestos, including chrysotile, has already effectively been substituted in the EU, with the only exception of chrysotile-containing diaphragms for electrolysis installations. The CSTE opinion quoted by the Honourable Member indicated in its conclusions that 'CSTEE reiterates its previous conclusion that the evidence for harmful potential is more extensive for chrysotile than for its organic substitutes'.

⁽¹⁾ Directive 2003/18/EC.

⁽²⁾ Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the amended proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of workers from the risks related to exposure to asbestos at work- COM(2009) 71 final/2 — 2006/0222 (COD) — OJ C 2009, 306/15.

In this sense it must be noted that registration obligations under REACH for those placing in the market substances used as alternatives to asbestos require that safe use of these substances to be assured. Furthermore, the Commission has requested ECHA to prepare a dossier in accordance with Article 69 of REACH with a view of prohibiting the use of asbestos containing diaphragms. The availability of alternatives presenting lower risks in this application will be assessed in this study.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002873/13
al Consiglio**

Fiorello Provera (EFD) e Charles Tannock (ECR)

(12 marzo 2013)

Oggetto: Presunta presenza di jihadisti stranieri in Siria

Il 6 marzo 2013 un certo numero di fonti di informazione riferiva che i funzionari degli Stati Uniti sono preoccupati per la crescita del numero di video jihadisti che mostrano musulmani radicali di lingua inglese che esortano i giovani musulmani dall'Europa e non solo a recarsi in Medio Oriente, e in particolare in Siria, per unirsi ad elementi affiliati ad al-Qaeda. L'agenzia Reuters ha fatto notare che stanno emergendo video che mirano a suggestionare i militanti descrivendo passo a passo le istruzioni su come costruire bombe e altri dispositivi progettati per uccidere.

In precedenza, nel mese di febbraio, un gruppo di consulenza con sede a New York osservava che sono apparsi almeno due video con un uomo che descrive se stesso come mujahid americano o combattente della guerra santa, che parla del proprio coinvolgimento con i ribelli siriani e chiede che altri vengano a unirsi a lui.

Il governo britannico è anche preoccupato per il flusso di militanti islamisti in Siria. Un certo numero di agenzie di intelligence occidentali sospettano che 60 o 70 cittadini britannici stiano attualmente combattendo in Siria, e molti stanno aderendo a al-Nusra, un gruppo jihadista estremista collegato ad al-Qaeda. Molte di queste persone sono attratte nella regione attraverso questi video in lingua inglese. In Siria, i comandanti dell'esercito libero siriano, come ad esempio Abdel al-Salam Tabsah, dicono che gli stranieri che si uniscono a gruppi come al-Nusra «sono estremisti islamici e danno una errata interpretazione dell'Islam». Un altro comandante FSA osserva che: i jihadisti vengono dall'estero a cercare il martirio, mentre la gente del posto [lotta] per soldi. Molti di loro hanno una famiglia da sfamare, e si uniranno a chiunque paghi loro un salario.

1. Il Consiglio è a conoscenza della crescita del materiale estremista in lingua inglese e dei video online che attraggono jihadisti in Siria?
2. Quali passi sta effettuando il Consiglio o gli Stati membri per controllare i video online e i siti web progettati per portare combattenti stranieri in Siria per unirsi a gruppi estremisti come al-Nusra?
3. Alla luce dei presunti numerosi cittadini del Regno Unito attualmente in Siria, quali sono alcune stime secondo il Consiglio quanto al numero complessivo di cittadini europei che combattono nella regione?
4. Quali passi sta effettuando il Consiglio per combattere «il turismo jihadista» in Siria?

Risposta

(11 settembre 2013)

Il Consiglio è ben consapevole della questione dei vari materiali che hanno lo scopo di attrarre jihadisti in Siria.

Negli ultimi mesi il Consiglio è stato impegnato a discutere la questione dei combattenti stranieri in Siria che può porre seri problemi alla sicurezza in Europa. L'UE sta elaborando una risposta alla questione a tutti i livelli (Stati membri e UE), affrontando tutti i pertinenti problemi di sicurezza interna ed esterna.

Nella sessione del 6 e 7 giugno 2013, il Consiglio ha discusso in maniera approfondita la questione dei combattenti stranieri e rimpatriati sotto il profilo dell'antiterrorismo, in particolare per quanto riguarda la Siria, sulla base di un documento preparato dal coordinatore antiterrorismo dell'UE.

Il Consiglio ha espresso ampio sostegno al documento e al pacchetto di misure proposto ed ha incaricato i pertinenti gruppi di lavoro di preparare, se del caso, misure di esecuzione. Ha inoltre invitato il coordinatore antiterrorismo a presentare una relazione sull'attuazione delle misure proposte nel dicembre 2013.

La questione dei combattenti stranieri è stato uno dei cinque temi principali individuati dal coordinatore antiterrorismo dell'UE per orientare il dibattito nella sessione del Consiglio di marzo sulle implicazioni per la sicurezza della situazione nel Sahel/Maghreb.

Le azioni proposte dal coordinatore antiterrorismo riguardano:

- la necessità di una valutazione comune del fenomeno dei giovani europei che vanno in Siria per la jihad e la necessità di ottenere una migliore visione dei diversi gruppi che combattono in Siria;
 - le misure per impedire la partenza dei giovani per la Siria ed offrirgli assistenza al ritorno;
 - la segnalazione degli spostamenti e la risposta della giustizia penale;
 - la cooperazione con i paesi terzi.
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(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002873/13
to the Council
Fiorello Provera (EFD) and Charles Tannock (ECR)
(12 March 2013)**

Subject: Alleged presence of foreign jihadists in Syria

On 6 March 2013 a number of news sources reported that officials in the United States are concerned by the increase in the numbers of jihadist videos which feature English-speaking radical Muslims who inspire young Muslims from Europe and elsewhere to travel to the Middle East, and in particular to Syria, to join elements affiliated with al-Qaeda. The news agency Reuters noted that English-language videos are surfacing which aim to inspire militants by featuring step-by-step instructions on how to build bombs and other devices designed to kill.

Earlier in February, a New York-based consultancy group noted that at least two videos have appeared featuring a man describing himself as an 'American mujahid' or holy warrior, who talks about his involvement with Syrian rebels and calls for other individuals to come and join him.

The British Government is also concerned by the flow of Islamist militants into Syria. A number of Western intelligence agencies suspect that 60 or 70 British citizens are currently fighting in Syria, and many are joining al-Nusra, an extreme jihadist group linked with al-Qaeda. Many of these individuals are drawn to the region through these English-language videos. In Syria, commanders of the Free Syrian Army, such as Abdel al-Salam Tabsah, say that foreigners joining groups such as al-Nusra 'are Islamic extremists and have an erroneous interpretation of Islam'. Another FSA commander notes: 'Jihadists from abroad come seeking martyrdom, whereas the locals [fight] for money. Many of them have families to feed, and they will join whoever pays them a wage'.

1. Is the Council aware of the growth in English-language online extremist material and videos which are drawing jihadists into Syria?
2. What steps are being taken by the Council or the Member States to monitor online videos and websites which are designed to bring foreign fighters to Syria to join extremist groups such as al-Nusra?
3. In light of the alleged numbers of UK citizens currently in Syria, what are some estimates according to the Council regarding the overall total number of EU citizens fighting in the region?
4. What steps is the Council taking to combat 'jihad tourism' to Syria?

**Reply
(11 September 2013)**

The Council is well aware of the issue of various materials that aim to draw jihadists into Syria.

Over recent months, the Council has been engaged in discussions on the issue of foreign fighters operating in Syria which may pose a serious problem to European security. The EU is developing a response to this issue at all levels (Member States and the EU), addressing all relevant internal and external security issues.

At its meeting on 6-7 June 2013, the Council had an in-depth discussion on the issue of foreign fighters and returnees from a counter-terrorism perspective, in particular with regard to Syria, on the basis of a document prepared by the EU Counter Terrorism Coordinator (CTC).

The Council expressed broad support for the paper and the package of suggested measures and tasked its relevant working groups to prepare the implementing measures where necessary. It also invited the CTC to present a report on the implementation of the proposed measures in December 2013.

The issue of foreign fighters was one of the five major topics identified by the EU CTC in order to steer the debate at the Council in March on the security implications of the situation in the Sahel/Maghreb.

The actions proposed by the CTC relate to:

- the need for a common assessment of the phenomenon of these young Europeans going to Syria for the Jihad and the need to get a better picture of the different groups fighting in Syria;

- measures to prevent youngsters from departing to Syria and to offer assistance upon their return;
 - detection of travel movements and the criminal justice response;
 - cooperation with third countries.
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(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002874/13
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)
Fiorello Provera (EFD) e Charles Tannock (ECR)**

(12 marzo 2013)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Hamas impedisce l'apertura del valico per il transito di merci

Il 4 marzo 2013, l'Associated Press ha riferito che, secondo un portavoce militare israeliano, Hamas a Gaza ha esercitato pressioni su un imprenditore palestinese per mantenere la chiusura del checkpoint Kerem Shalom, che è l'unico valico per merci con Israele. Secondo il maggiore Guy Inbar la riapertura del valico era prevista per il 4 marzo, tuttavia l'operatore ha detto che non sarebbe andato al lavoro.

Kerem Shalom è attualmente controllato dall'autorità palestinese, ma Hamas vuole averne la competenza. Questo punto di controllo è fondamentale in quanto fornisce l'accesso alla maggior parte dei beni di consumo che vengono utilizzati dai palestinesi. È stato chiuso per una settimana dopo che i militanti a Gaza avevano lanciato un razzo sulla città israeliana di Ashkelon.

Israele sta operando per alleggerire le restrizioni sul flusso degli essenziali materiali da costruzione che sono necessari per la ricostruzione civile all'interno della striscia di Gaza, ma la tensione politica tra Hamas e Fatah potrebbe vanificare questo sforzo.

1. Qual è la posizione del Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante in materia di controversie sul checkpoint Kerem Shalom al confine tra Gaza e Israele?
2. Quali misure sono state adottate dal Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante per garantire la sicurezza e l'affidabilità del trasporto merci nella striscia di Gaza?
3. Qual è la valutazione dei funzionari UE nella regione per quanto riguarda le tensioni di Hamas con l'autorità palestinese sul checkpoint Kerem Shalom?

Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione
(6 maggio 2013)

Attualmente non ci sono funzionari dell'Autorità palestinese sulla parte palestinese del valico di frontiera di Karem Abu Salem. Tuttavia, l'impresa che opera su quella parte del confine ha ricevuto l'autorizzazione da parte dell'Autorità palestinese. L'UE non è stata in grado di verificare gli eventi citati dall'onorevole deputato nell'interrogazione.

L'UE ha ribadito a più riprese che la situazione nella Striscia di Gaza è insostenibile e continua a lavorare con le parti interessate per operare un cambiamento radicale della situazione nella Striscia di Gaza, in linea con la risoluzione 1860 del Consiglio di Sicurezza dell'ONU del 2009. L'UE continua ad invocare un'apertura immediata, permanente e incondizionata dei valichi di frontiera per permettere il flusso dell'aiuto umanitario, delle merci e delle persone da e verso Gaza.

Da novembre 2005 a giugno 2007 la missione dell'UE di assistenza alle frontiere a Rafah ha monitorato le operazioni presso il valico di frontiera tra la Striscia di Gaza ed Egitto, dopo l'accordo sulla circolazione e l'accesso concluso il 15 novembre 2005 tra Israele e l'Autorità palestinese. Da allora la missione è rimasta a disposizione delle parti, in attesa di una soluzione politica e pronta a intervenire di nuovo con brevissimo preavviso. **In base agli accordi del 2005, la presenza dell'UE come parte terza tiene conto delle preoccupazioni di Israele riguardo alla sicurezza e garantisce la libertà di circolazione agli 1,5 milioni di palestinesi che vivono nella Striscia di Gaza.**

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002874/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Fiorello Provera (EFD) and Charles Tannock (ECR)
(12 March 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Hamas prevents opening of cargo crossing

On 4 March 2013, the Associated Press reported an Israeli military spokesman as saying that Hamas in Gaza has exerted pressure on a Palestinian contractor to keep the Kerem Shalom checkpoint — the only cargo crossing with Israel — closed. According to Major Guy Inbar, the crossing was expected to be opened on 4 March, but the operator said he would not come to work.

Kerem Shalom is currently controlled by the Palestinian Authority, but Hamas wants to operate it instead. This checkpoint is crucial, as it provides access for most of the consumer goods used by Palestinians. It was closed for a week after militants in Gaza fired a rocket at the Israeli town of Ashkelon.

Israel has been working to ease restrictions on the flow of essential building materials needed for civil reconstruction inside the Gaza Strip. Political tension between Hamas and Fatah could, however, hamper these efforts.

1. What is the position of the Vice-President/High Representative regarding disputes over the Kerem Shalom checkpoint on Gaza's border with Israel?
2. What steps have been taken by the Vice-President/High Representative to help ensure the security and reliability of cargo transports into the Gaza Strip?
3. What is the assessment of EU officials in the region regarding Hamas' tensions with the Palestinian Authority over the Kerem Shalom checkpoint?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(6 May 2013)

There are currently no officials of the Palestinian Authority on the Palestinian side of the Karem Abu Salem border. However the company operating on that side of the border does so with the approval of the Palestinian Authority. The EU has not been able to verify the events referred to in the question by the Honourable Member.

The EU has stated on a number of occasions that the situation in the Gaza Strip is unsustainable. It continues to work with the parties in the region towards a fundamental change in the situation in the Gaza Strip, in line with UNSC Resolution 1860 (2009). The EU continues to call for the immediate, sustained and unconditional opening of crossings for the flow of humanitarian aid, commercial goods and persons to and from the Gaza Strip.

During the period of its operation from November 2005 to June 2007, the EU Border Assistance Mission in Rafah monitored the operations of the border crossing point between the Gaza Strip and Egypt, after Israel and the Palestinian Authority concluded an Agreement on Movement and Access on 15 November 2005. Since then, the mission has remained on standby, awaiting a political solution and ready to re-engage at very short notice. Under the 2005 Agreements, the EU third-party presence takes into account Israel's security concerns and ensures the freedom of movement of the 1.5 million Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002875/13
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)
Fiorello Provera (EFD) e Charles Tannock (ECR)**

(12 marzo 2013)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Stabilità in Asia centrale

A metà febbraio 2013, due ex ambasciatori USA— John Herbst e William Courtney — hanno scritto un commento per Radio Free Europe sulle probabili minacce che possono emergere una volta che le truppe occidentali in Afghanistan saranno ritirate nel 2014, e più in particolare i rischi per la stabilità nei vicini Stati dell'Asia centrale. Gli stupefacenti e la militanza sono le due principali preoccupazioni. Anche con la creazione dell'esercito nazionale afghano, i talebani manterranno il controllo in molte aree pashtun, e saranno attivi all'esterno del paese.

I talebani sono stati determinanti nel sostenere altri gruppi islamici radicali della regione, come il Movimento islamico dell'Uzbekistan (IMU), che opera anche in Tagikistan e Kirghizistan. Nel 2004 è emerso un gruppo estremista scissionista chiamato Unione della Jihad islamica (IJU) che ha rivendicato una serie di attentati suicidi in Uzbekistan di cui sono state bersaglio le ambasciate degli Stati Uniti e di Israele. Attualmente si ritiene che sia l'IMU che l'IJU siano rifugiati in Pakistan, ma senza le truppe NATO nella regione è probabile che tornino negli Stati dell'Asia centrale.

Per quanto riguarda la droga, senza sorveglianza efficace i civili afghani torneranno in numero maggiore alla coltivazione del papavero, che ha un diffuso effetto a catena in tutta l'Asia centrale, la Russia e l'Europa.

I due ex diplomatici statunitensi hanno quindi suggerito che è di fondamentale importanza che si concludano accordi con i governi dell'Asia centrale per migliorare i metodi di condivisione delle informazioni di intelligence su terrorismo, droga e minacce criminali. Hanno inoltre suggerito che la cooperazione con paesi come la Russia e la Cina è importante per contenere i problemi comuni che potrebbero emergere una volta che la NATO sia fuori dall'Afghanistan.

1. Qual è la posizione della Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante dell'UE quanto al coordinamento della politica di sicurezza nei confronti dell'Asia centrale e dell'Afghanistan allorché le forze della NATO partiranno il prossimo anno?
2. La Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante è disposta ad avviare un dialogo con la Cina e la Russia, al fine di sostenere gli Stati dell'Asia centrale preoccupati per i rischi posti dalla militanza e dal previsto aumento del traffico di droga?

Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione

(6 giugno 2013)

La prospettiva del ritiro dell'ISAF dall'Afghanistan nel 2014 è, in effetti, fonte di crescente preoccupazione per la sicurezza della regione. Unitamente ai paesi dell'Asia centrale, l'UE si adopera per affrontare questioni di interesse comune in materia di sicurezza, anche per quanto riguarda l'Afghanistan; nel giugno 2012 il Consiglio «Affari esteri» ha approvato una revisione della strategia per l'Asia centrale adottata dal Consiglio europeo nel giugno 2007, nella quale si proponeva di avviare un dialogo ad alto livello sulla sicurezza tra l'UE e i paesi dell'Asia centrale. Una prima riunione di tale dialogo si terrà a Bruxelles all'inizio dell'estate prossima.

L'UE è fortemente impegnata in Afghanistan e manterrà tale impegno ancora per molti anni. L'appoggio alla polizia civile e allo Stato di diritto resterà un elemento chiave del sostegno fornito dall'UE all'Afghanistan negli anni a venire. Nei prossimi anni sarà importante continuare a rafforzare le sinergie tra i nostri programmi di assistenza nei paesi dell'Asia centrale e in Afghanistan, in particolare per quanto riguarda i programmi nelle regioni frontaliere e attorno ad esse, per promuovere la sicurezza e la cooperazione regionale.

L'Unione europea è impegnata nel dialogo politico con la Russia e la Cina, che contempla gli sviluppi riguardanti l'Afghanistan e l'Asia centrale, comprese le questioni legate al traffico di droga. Tali problemi vanno affrontati attraverso una stretta collaborazione e il coordinamento tra i soggetti internazionali e regionali: la Russia e la Cina hanno chiaramente un ruolo importante da svolgere al riguardo.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002875/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Fiorello Provera (EFD) and Charles Tannock (ECR)
(12 March 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Stability in Central Asia

In mid-February 2013, two former US Ambassadors — John Herbst and William Courtney — wrote a commentary for Radio Free Europe which discussed the threats that are likely to emerge once Western troops pull out of Afghanistan in 2014, and more specifically the risks to stability in neighbouring Central Asian states. Narcotics and militancy are two chief concerns. Even with the creation of the Afghan National Army, the Taliban will maintain control in most Pashtun areas, and will be active outside the country.

The Taliban has been instrumental in supporting other Islamist radical groups in the region, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) which also operates in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In 2004, an extremist splinter group called the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) emerged, taking credit for a number of suicide bombings in Uzbekistan and targeting the US and Israeli Embassies. Both the IMU and IJU are currently believed to be taking refuge in Pakistan, but without NATO troops in the region they are also likely to head back into Central Asian states.

As regards narcotics, without effective oversight Afghan civilians will again turn in greater numbers to poppy cultivation, which has a widespread knock-on effect throughout Central Asia, Russia and Europe.

The two retired US diplomats have therefore suggested it is crucial that arrangements be made with Central Asian governments to improve methods of sharing intelligence information on terrorism, narcotics and criminal threats. They have also suggested that cooperation with states such as Russia and China is important to contain the common problems that could emerge once NATO is out of Afghanistan.

1. What is the position of the Vice-President/High Representative regarding EU security coordination policy towards Central Asia and Afghanistan once NATO forces depart next year?
2. Is the Vice-President/High Representative prepared to initiate a dialogue with China and Russia in order to support Central Asian states concerned about the risks posed by increased militancy and the expected increase in the narcotics trade?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(6 June 2013)

The perspective of ISAF withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014 is indeed creating increased concern about security developments in the region. The EU is actively engaged with Central Asian countries on security issues of shared concern, including those related to Afghanistan, and in June 2012 the Foreign Affairs Council approved a Review of the Central Asia Strategy adopted by the European Council in June 2007, that included a proposal to launch a High Level Security Dialogue between the EU and Central Asian countries. A first meeting of the EU-Central Asia High Level Security Dialogue will be held in Brussels early summer this year.

The EU is heavily engaged in Afghanistan and will continue to be so for many years to come. Support to civilian policing and rule of law will remain key elements of EU support to Afghanistan in the years to come. Over the coming years it will be important to continue to enhance the synergy between our assistance programmes in Central Asian countries and Afghanistan, notably as regards programmes in and around border areas, to promote security and regional cooperation.

The EU is engaged in political dialogue with both Russia and China and developments relating to Afghanistan and Central Asia form part of that dialogue, including issues related to drug trafficking. These challenges need to be tackled through close cooperation and coordination among international and regional actors and Russia and China clearly have an important role to play.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002876/13
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)
Fiorello Provera (EFD) e Charles Tannock (ECR)**

(12 marzo 2013)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Matrimoni infantili in Sud Sudan

In una relazione stilata all'inizio di marzo 2013 sul problema dei matrimoni infantili in Sud Sudan, Human Rights Watch denuncia come questi aggravino il divario fra i sessi esistente nel paese in materia di istruzione e contribuiscano a diffondere problemi di salute. Secondo le statistiche è sposato il 48 % delle ragazze di età compresa tra i 15 e i 19 anni. Inoltre ve ne sono alcune che sono mogli a soli 12 anni.

Le giovani che non vogliono sposarsi e oppongono resistenza si ritrovano prive di qualsiasi forma di tutela. Spesso il matrimonio viene loro imposto perché le famiglie sono interessate al pagamento della dote o perché le ragazze sono sospettate di aver avuto rapporti sessuali prematrimoniali. Purtroppo le ragazze non sanno di avere diritto a ricevere aiuto e quelle che cercano di ottenerlo vanno spesso incontro a gravi conseguenze per mano delle loro stesse famiglie. Pare ad esempio che una ragazza di 17 anni proveniente dalla regione dello Stato dei laghi sia stata legata a un albero e picchiata a morte per aver rifiutato di sposarsi.

I matrimoni infantili hanno gravi ripercussioni poiché interrompono il percorso formativo delle ragazze e le espongono a un maggiore rischio di subire violenze e abusi. Questa situazione pregiudica lo sviluppo economico e sociale del Sud Sudan. Nel 2011 infatti solo il 39 % degli studenti della scuola primaria e il 30 % di quelli della scuola secondaria era di sesso femminile. Inoltre per le ragazze che si sposano giovanissime e rimangono incinte il rischio di andare incontro a complicanze durante il parto è maggiore.

Il direttore della divisione per i diritti delle donne di Human Rights Watch ha dichiarato che le giovani che hanno il coraggio di opporsi al matrimonio prematuro hanno un estremo bisogno di tutela, sostegno e istruzione.

Può la Commissione rispondere alle seguenti domande:

1. Quali misure sta adottando il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante al fine di garantire che il Sud Sudan ratifichi accordi internazionali quali la Convenzione sull'eliminazione di tutte le forme di discriminazione contro le donne (CEDAW) e la Convenzione sui diritti e il benessere del fanciullo (CRC)?
2. Quali azioni sta intraprendendo l'Unione europea, attraverso il programma di aiuti in Sud Sudan, per incoraggiare le ragazze a completare la propria istruzione e contribuire a migliorarne l'accesso alla tutela giuridica e sociale in caso di matrimonio forzato?
3. Quali misure sta inoltre adottando per contribuire a migliorare l'assistenza sanitaria e il sostegno alle ragazze del Sud Sudan che rischiano di andare incontro a complicanze dovute alla gravidanza? Si stanno compiendo degli sforzi per sollecitare il governo a far conoscere, attraverso campagne di educazione alla salute pubblica, i pericoli legati alla gravidanza in giovanissima età?

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-003102/13
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)
Fiorello Provera (EFD)
(19 marzo 2013)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Matrimoni infantili in Sud Sudan

Nel marzo 2013, Human Rights Watch ha presentato una relazione in cui denuncia un numero considerevole di matrimoni infantili in Sud Sudan. La maggior parte di questi concerne ragazze costrette a sposarsi malgrado il loro rifiuto. È sposato circa il 48 % delle giovani con un'età compresa tra i 15 e i 19 anni e si registrano anche casi di ragazze al di sotto di questa età. La maggior parte di esse è stata costretta a contrarre matrimonio con uomini molto più anziani, in cambio di una dote costituita da mucche, denaro o altri doni in natura, e la resistenza che hanno opposto al matrimonio o ai rapporti sessuali è stata punita in modo violento, con percosse, stupro o persino omicidio.

Le ragazze sposate non possono andare a scuola. A ciò si aggiunge il fatto che i parti prematuri comportano ulteriori complicazioni di salute. Come riportato infatti dal Fondo delle Nazioni Unite per la popolazione, per le ragazze di età compresa tra i 15 e 19 anni il rischio di morire durante il parto è doppio rispetto a quello corso delle donne adulte, mentre per le ragazze al di sotto dei 15 anni è cinque volte superiore.

Nel 2008 il Sudan ha adottato il Child Act, il quale è entrato in vigore nel 2009. Il Sud Sudan non ha ancora firmato la Convenzione delle Nazioni Unite sui diritti del fanciullo. Ad oggi mancano nel paese un'attuazione e un'applicazione efficaci delle leggi e delle politiche che garantirebbero i diritti dei minori, la parità di genere, l'istruzione e la salute.

Può la Commissione rispondere alle seguenti domande:

1. È il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante a conoscenza dell'elevato tasso di incidenza dei matrimoni infantili in Sud Sudan?
2. Quali misure ha adottato il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante al fine di promuovere i diritti dei bambini in Sud Sudan attraverso l'adesione del paese alla Convenzione delle Nazioni Unite sui diritti del fanciullo?

Risposta congiunta di Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione
(6 maggio 2013)

L'AR/VP deplora l'elevato numero di matrimoni infantili nel Sud Sudan. L'UE solleva puntualmente questo problema presso il governo del Sud Sudan, richiamando la sua attenzione sull'importanza di firmare e ratificare le Convenzioni internazionali sui diritti dell'uomo, comprese la Convenzione sui diritti del fanciullo e la Convenzione sull'eliminazione di tutte le forme di discriminazione contro le donne. Nell'ambito di tal dialogo con il governo, l'UE offre un sostegno alle istituzioni competenti e alla società civile per garantire l'accesso, rafforzare le capacità di attuazione e favorire la rottura con le tradizioni socioculturali profondamente radicate.

L'UE ha fornito al Sud Sudan ingenti aiuti allo sviluppo nel periodo 2011-2013, dando priorità all'istruzione (41,5 milioni di euro) e all'assistenza sanitaria (61,5 milioni di euro). I programmi finanziati dall'UE in questi settori pongono un forte accento sulla necessità di investire nelle ragazze e nelle donne e colmare ed eliminare le disparità tra i sessi che ostacolano lo sviluppo. Una componente degli attuali programmi dell'UE consiste nel migliorare l'accesso agli studi e il tasso di scolarizzazione delle ragazze e di proseguimento degli studi nel campo dell'istruzione primaria. I programmi dell'UE per la salute tengono conto dell'allarmante tasso di mortalità e promuovono la formazione delle ostetriche, di cui ne mancano circa 2 000 a livello nazionale. A partire dal 2014, l'istruzione di base basic education e l'assistenza sanitaria di base continueranno ad essere un elemento prioritario per l'UE nel Sud Sudan. Non appena quest'ultimo avrà ratificato l'accordo di Cotonou, l'UE prevede di fornire ulteriori aiuti allo sviluppo per investire nelle ragazze e nelle donne.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002876/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Fiorello Provera (EFD) and Charles Tannock (ECR)
(12 March 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Child marriage in South Sudan

In early March 2013, Human Rights Watch wrote a report on the problem of child marriage in South Sudan. The report exposes the way child marriage exacerbates the country's gender gap in education and contributes to widespread health problems. According to statistics, 48% of South Sudanese girls aged 15 to 19 are married, with some brides as young as 12 years old.

Girls who do not wish to marry and who resist are left with no form of protection. Girls are often forced into marriages because their families wish to receive dowry payments or because they are suspected of having had premarital sex. Unfortunately, girls do not know that they have the right to receive help — and those who try to do so often suffer severe consequences at the hands of their families. One 17-year-old girl from the Lakes State region, who had refused the hand of a man in marriage, was allegedly tied to a tree and beaten to death.

The repercussions of child marriage are serious since it disrupts a girl's education, putting her at higher risk of violence and abuse. This jeopardises South Sudan's economic and social development. In 2011, only 39% of primary school students, and 30% of secondary students, were female. Also, girls who marry too young and become pregnant run greater risk of suffering complications when delivering a child.

The Director of Human Rights Watch Women's Rights Division has stated that 'girls who have the courage to refuse early marriages are in dire need of protection, support, and education'.

1. What steps is the Vice-President/High Representative taking to ensure South Sudan ratifies international agreements such as the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (CRC)?
2. What steps is the EU taking, via its aid programme in South Sudan, to encourage girls to complete their education and help improve their access to legal and social protection in cases of forced marriage?
3. What steps is the EU taking to help improve healthcare and support for girls in South Sudan who are at risk of complications due to pregnancy? Are any efforts being made to urge the government to expose, via public health education campaigns, the dangers of young teenage pregnancies?

Question for written answer E-003102/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Fiorello Provera (EFD)
(19 March 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Child marriages in South Sudan

In March 2013 Human Rights Watch reported a significant number of child marriages in South Sudan. Most of these concerned girls forced to marry despite their refusal. About 48% of the girls were 15 to 19 years old at marriage and cases of even younger girls were reported. Most of the girls were forced to be married in exchange for a dowry of cows, money or other gifts in kind. The majority of girls were forced to marry much older men, and their resistance to marriage or sexual intercourse was violently punished by beating, rape or even murder.

Married girls cannot go to school, and premature births cause further health complications. As reported by the UN Population Fund, the risk of dying in childbirth for girls aged between 15 and 19 is twice — and for girls under 15 five times — that for adult women.

In 2008 Sudan adopted the Child Act, which came into force in 2009. South Sudan has not yet signed the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. The country has hitherto been lacking effective implementation and enforcement of laws and policies which would guarantee children rights, gender equality, education and health.

1. Is the Vice-President/High Representative aware of the high incidence of child marriage in South Sudan?

2. What measures has the Vice-President/High Representative taken to promote children's rights in South Sudan through the country's accession to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child?

Joint answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(6 May 2013)

The HR/VP deplores the high number of child marriages in South Sudan. The EU regularly raise these concerns with the Government of South Sudan, and impress on it the importance of signing and ratifying the international conventions on human rights, including the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women.. As part of this dialogue with the Government, the EU offers support to the relevant institutions and civil society to ensure accession, strengthen capacities for implementation and break with deep-rooted socio-cultural traditions.

The EU has a significant development aid portfolio in South Sudan for the period 2011-2013, which prioritises education (EUR 41.5 million) and health (EUR 61.5 million). EU-funded programmes in these sectors put a strong emphasis on the need to invest in girls and women and close the gender disparities that act as a barrier to development. A strong component of the ongoing EU programmes in education is to improve the access, enrolment and retention of girls in primary education, and the EU programmes in health take account of the alarming mortality rate and support the training of midwives, of whom there is a deficit of about 2 000 nationwide. For the period as from 2014, basic education and basic health will continue to be a priority of the EU in South Sudan, with further EU development aid devoted to investing in girls and women once South Sudan ratifies the Cotonou Agreement.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002877/13
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)
Fiorello Provera (EFD) e Charles Tannock (ECR)**

(12 marzo 2013)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Minacce per le forze di pace delle Nazioni Unite nelle alture del Golan

Il 6 marzo 2013 il New York Times ha riferito che i combattenti ribelli siriani avevano catturato 20 caschi blu delle Nazioni Unite sulle alture del Golan, confrontandoli con il termine di 24 ore dopo il quale sarebbero stati trattati come «prigionieri di guerra».

Due video sono stati postati da un gruppo chiamato Martiri della Brigata Yarmouk, che si è assunto la responsabilità della cattura delle forze di pace. I video mostrano membri di questo gruppo in piedi davanti a veicoli delle Nazioni Unite catturati. I ribelli si riferiscono alle Nazioni Unite così: «Sono agenti di Israele, il regime siriano e le Nazioni Unite e tutti i paesi europei, e il regime di Assad, sono tutti agenti di Israele!».

Un portavoce del gruppo ha detto: «Deteniamo le forze della Forza di disimpegno degli osservatori delle Nazioni Unite fino al ritiro delle forze di Bashar al-Assad dal villaggio di al-Jamla e la sua periferia vero le loro posizioni. Chiediamo all'America, alle Nazioni Unite e al Consiglio di Sicurezza che le forze di Assad si ritirino per ottenere la loro liberazione. Non li rilasceremo che dopo il ritiro delle forze del regime di Bashar al-Assad dalla periferia del villaggio di al-Jamla, che si trova al confine con Israele».

Questo episodio è la più grave minaccia per la sicurezza del personale delle Nazioni Unite in Siria da quando la rivolta è iniziata due anni fa, e ci sono preoccupazioni per quanto riguarda la stabilità delle alture del Golan, che potrebbe costituire una seria sfida per Israele e anche portare a un intervento israeliano.

1. Quali passi sta effettuando la Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante per monitorare la situazione sulle alture del Golan dato il potenziale estendersi del conflitto se i caschi blu non fossero in grado di pattugliare e osservare questo confine fragile?
2. La Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante ha in programma di discutere eventuali piani di emergenza con il nuovo Segretario di Stato e il Segretario generale dell'ONU ove la sicurezza sul confine Siria-Israele continuasse a deteriorarsi?
3. Qual è la valutazione dei funzionari dell'UE nella regione sui gruppi, quali la Brigata dei Martiri di Yarmouk e loro affiliati? Ci sono altri gruppi estremistici che rappresentano lo stesso pericolo per gli osservatori stranieri e le forze di pace delle Nazioni Unite?

Risposta dell'Alto Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione

(30 maggio 2013)

L'UE segue costantemente la situazione nella zona di separazione e delimitazione ed è in contatto con i servizi preposti delle Nazioni Unite (ONU) per quanto riguarda lo scambio di informazioni, sia sugli sviluppi e sulle relative valutazioni che su proprie proposte di piani.

Nelle zone di separazione e delimitazione non sono in corso missioni dell'UE, né l'UE dispone di un mandato operativo. È l'ONU l'organizzazione incaricata di questo compito. Qualsiasi eventuale iniziativa di pianificazione comune d'emergenza fra le parti indicate nell'interrogazione deve essere presa su richiesta dell'ONU.

Per quanto riguarda la minaccia agli osservatori stranieri e ai caschi blu dell'ONU, il personale straniero è esposto al rischio di rapimenti a causa dell'elevata instabilità della regione e dell'assenza di controllo statale. Attualmente i combattimenti si stanno intensificando in particolare nella zona meridionale della Siria, per cui aumenta il rischio di azioni collaterali.

I Martiri della Brigata Yarmouk, un gruppo che opera nel settore meridionale delle alture del Golan, non risultano essere affiliati ad una struttura più grande. È difficile etichettare i gruppi armati che si confrontano in Siria. Ciò a causa di una combinazione di fattori: atteggiamento radicale dei gruppi armati, cooperazione tattica che coinvolge l'intero spettro ideologico, retorica pseudo-islamica (al fine di attrarre fondi da reti islamiste). Anche i gruppi di opposizione islamisti più radicali però, compreso il Fronte Al-Nusra, si sono astenuti dal prendere di mira o minacciare interessi o funzionari occidentali in Siria. Si ritiene che i gruppi armati meglio organizzati (Ahrar al-Sham, al-Nusra, Liwa al-Tawhid) non costituiscano, per il momento, una minaccia per obiettivi stranieri, in quanto sono più disciplinati e compiono operazioni ben organizzate, evitando di colpire obiettivi civili o di coinvolgerli in altro modo.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002877/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Fiorello Provera (EFD) and Charles Tannock (ECR)
(12 March 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Threats to UN peacekeepers in the Golan Heights

On 6 March 2013 the *New York Times* reported that Syrian rebel fighters had captured 20 UN peacekeepers in the Golan Heights, confronting them with a 24-hour deadline after which they would be treated as 'prisoners of war'.

Two videos have been posted by a group called the Martyrs of the Yarmouk Brigade, which has taken responsibility for the capture of the peacekeepers. The videos feature members of this group standing in front of captured UN vehicles. The rebels refer to the UN thus: 'They are agents of Israel, the Syrian regime and the United Nations and all the European countries, and the Assad regime; they are all agents of Israel!'

A spokesman for the group has said: 'We are holding the forces of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force until the withdrawal of Bashar al-Assad's forces from the village of al-Jamla and its outskirts to their positions. We ask America, the United Nations and the Security Council that Assad's forces withdraw to obtain their release. We won't release them until after the withdrawal of the forces of the regime of Bashar al-Assad from the outskirts of the village of al-Jamla, which is on the border with Israel'.

This incident is the most serious threat to the safety of UN personnel in Syria since the uprising began two years ago, and there are concerns regarding the stability of the Golan Heights which could pose a serious challenge for Israel and even lead to an Israeli intervention.

1. What steps is the Vice-President/High Representative taking to monitor the situation in the Golan Heights, given the potential for conflict overspill if UN peacekeepers are not able to patrol and observe this fragile border?
2. Is the Vice-President/High Representative planning to discuss contingency plans with the new US Secretary of State and the UN Secretary-General if security on the Syria-Israel border continues to deteriorate?
3. What is the assessment of EU officials in the region regarding groups such as the Martyrs of Yarmouk Brigade and their affiliation? Are there any other extremist groups which pose the same danger to foreign observers and UN peacekeepers?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(30 May 2013)

The EU is constantly monitoring the situation in the area of separation and limitation. The EU is also liaising with relevant United Nations (UN) services with regard to information sharing, both on developments and assessments of future developments and own proposed plans.

The EU is not conducting any mission in the areas of separation and limitation nor does it have a mandate for this. The UN is the organisation responsible for this task. Any possible initiation of joint contingency planning between the parties indicated in the question would have to be initiated upon a request from the UN.

Concerning the threat to foreign observers and UN peacekeepers, foreign personnel are exposed to kidnapping risk due to the high instability and lack of state control. At this moment, fighting is intensifying particularly in Southern Syria so the risk for collateral action is rising.

Martyrs of Yarmouk Brigade is a group that operates in the area of Southern Golan Heights, without a clear affiliation to a larger structure. It is difficult to label armed groups in the Syrian confrontation due to a mix of factors: radical posture of armed groups, tactical cooperation across entire ideological spectrum, false Islamist rhetoric (to attract funds from Islamist networks). Nonetheless, even the radical Islamist opposition groups, including Al-Nusra Front, have abstained to target or even threaten Western interests or officials in Syria. It is assessed that better organised armed groups (Ahrar al-Sham, al-Nusra, Liwa al-Tawhid) do not represent, for the moment, a threat for foreign targets because they are more disciplined and have well organised operations, which avoid targeting civilians or involving them in other ways.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002878/13
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)
Fiorello Provera (EFD) e Charles Tannock (ECR)
(12 marzo 2013)**

Oggetto: VP/HR — Commenti altamente offensivi di un'attivista egiziana per i diritti delle donne

L'8 marzo 2013 il Dipartimento di Stato americano avrebbe dovuto conferire il premio «International Women of Courage» all'attivista per i diritti delle donne Samira Ibrahim. La decisione è stata tuttavia giustamente congelata dopo che si è scoperto che la donna aveva scritto una serie di tweet offensivi in cui pare avesse esaltato, tra l'altro, l'attentato dello scorso luglio a Burgas, in Bulgaria, in cui sono rimasti tragicamente uccisi dei civili, e avesse detto che i leader dell'Arabia Saudita sono più sporchi degli ebrei. L'attivista ha addirittura inneggiato scandalosamente ad al-Qaeda in occasione dell'anniversario dell'11 settembre, augurandosi che l'America possa bruciare tutti gli anni.

È stato riferito che Samira Ibrahim non avanzerà le proprie scuse per i tweet altamente offensivi e profondamente inaccettabili, nonostante il Dipartimento di Stato americano avesse voluto assegnarle un premio per il coraggio dimostrato nel denunciare gli abusi sessuali subiti in Piazza Tahrir nel 2011 quando, assieme ad altre attiviste, è stata sottoposta a test di verginità.

Può la Commissione rispondere alle seguenti domande:

1. Qual è la posizione del Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante rispetto alla comprensibile decisione del Dipartimento di Stato americano di non conferire il premio all'attivista Samira Ibrahim?
2. Quali misure sta adottando il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante al fine di garantire che gli attivisti che si battono per i diritti umani e che godono del sostegno dell'Unione europea e beneficiano dei suoi programmi aderiscano ai principi e ai valori universali ritenuti fondamentali dalla stessa?

**Risposta dell'Alto Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione
(30 maggio 2013)**

L'AR/VP prende atto della decisione del Dipartimento di Stato degli Stati Uniti di non assegnare il premio all'attivista Samira Ibrahim.

Il sostegno dell'UE alla società civile costituisce una componente essenziale della politica europea di vicinato riveduta, che si basa sulla responsabilità reciproca e sull'impegno condiviso a favore dei valori universali dei diritti dell'uomo, delle libertà fondamentali, della democrazia e dello stato di diritto. Il sostegno finanziario alle ONG è generalmente prestato tramite inviti a presentare proposte e durante il processo di selezione dei progetti finanziabili l'Unione europea svolge una valutazione accurata ed esauriente delle proposte di progetto, che devono anche rispettare i principi alla base dei diritti dell'uomo. Inoltre, se nel corso dell'attuazione del progetto le attività del beneficiario, il suo comportamento manifesto e le sue dichiarazioni pubbliche contrastano con le norme internazionali in materia di diritti umani e con i principi e i valori democratici dell'UE, il sostegno dell'UE può essere sospeso ed infine revocato.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002878/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Fiorello Provera (EFD) and Charles Tannock (ECR)**

(12 March 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Deeply offensive comments made by Egyptian women's rights activist

On 8 March 2013, the US State Department had planned to give the International Women of Courage award to women's rights activist Samira Ibrahim. However, the decision was rightly shelved after it was discovered that she had written a series of offensive tweets, in which she allegedly praised, *inter alia*, the bombing in Burgas, Bulgaria last July which tragically resulted in civilian deaths, and called the leaders of Saudi Arabia 'dirtier than the Jews'. She even outrageously praised al-Qaeda on the anniversary of 9/11 with the statement: 'Today is the anniversary of 9/11. May every year come with America burning'.

It has been reported that Ibrahim will not apologise for the highly offensive and deeply unacceptable tweets, even though the State Department had wanted to give her an award for her bravery in speaking out against the sexual abuse she had suffered in Tahrir Square in 2011. She, along with other women activists, was subjected to virginity tests.

1. What is the position of the Vice-President/High Representative regarding the US State Department's understandable decision not to grant an award to activist Samira Ibrahim?
2. What steps is the Vice-President/High Representative taking to ensure that human rights activists who are recipients of EU support and programmes adhere to the same universal principles and values which are fundamental to the EU itself?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(30 May 2013)

The HR/VP takes note of the US State Department's decision not to grant an award to activist Samira Ibrahim.

EU's support to civil society is a key component of the revised European Neighbourhood Policy, which is based on mutual accountability and a shared commitment to the universal values of human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law. Financial Support to NGOs is generally channelled through call for proposals, and during the selection process of potential EU funded projects, the EU engages in a careful and comprehensive evaluation of project proposals that need to be also compliant with human rights principles. Furthermore, if during project implementation the beneficiary's activities, his/her known behaviour and public statements go against international standards for Human Rights and EU democratic principles and values, the EU support could be suspended and ultimately stopped.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002879/13

**alla Commissione
Matteo Salvini (EFD)**

(12 marzo 2013)

Oggetto: Armonizzazione delle normative sullo smaltimento dell'amianto e sugli indennizzi ai soggetti portatori di gravi patologie asbesto-correlate

In considerazione dell'eccezionale potenzialità morbigena delle fibre di asbesto, più noto come amianto (o anche con la denominazione commerciale di eternit), la Regione Lombardia ha stabilito, con la Legge Regionale del 31 luglio 2012, n. 14, diverse misure atte a favorire la bonifica dai materiali contenenti amianto in tutto il territorio regionale, con particolare riguardo a coperture in lamiera per edifici.

Tali misure vanno ad aggiungersi ad un vasto corpo normativo di livello sia regionale sia nazionale, avente per oggetto la graduale e tassativa eliminazione di tutti i manufatti contenenti amianto.

In tutti gli Stati membri dell'Unione sono ormai vietate o limitate a pochissimi impieghi in cui tale materiale risulta insostituibile la produzione e la commercializzazione di manufatti contenenti amianto. Tuttavia, la normativa in materia di smaltimento di detto materiale e quella in materia di indennizzi e trattamenti previdenziali per chi avesse contratto gravi patologie a causa dell'esposizione a polvere di asbesto (pleuromi, asbestosi, tumori di vario genere) risultano tuttora abbastanza disomogenee all'interno dell'UE.

Può la Commissione far sapere:

1. in che modo intende incoraggiare gli Stati membri ad uniformare le normative concernenti lo smaltimento in sicurezza di materiali contenenti amianto nel territorio dell'UE;
2. in che modo intende favorire un'armonizzazione delle varie normative nazionali in materia di indennizzi e trattamenti pensionistici diretti a soggetti che abbiano contratto, sul lavoro o per esposizione ambientale, patologie asbesto-correlate?

Risposta di Janez Potočnik a nome della Commissione

(29 maggio 2013)

1. La Direttiva 87/217/CEE concernente la prevenzione e la riduzione dell'inquinamento dell'ambiente causato dall'amianto ⁽¹⁾ prevede misure per controllare le emissioni di amianto durante la demolizione, la decontaminazione e lo smaltimento. In particolare, occorre garantire che nel corso del trasporto e del deposito di rifiuti contenenti amianto, né fibre né polveri di questo materiale siano immesse nell'atmosfera e che non fuoriescano liquidi che possano contenere fibre di amianto. Se i rifiuti contenenti amianto vengono collocati in discarica, devono essere trattati, imballati o ricoperti, per evitare la dispersione nell'ambiente di particelle del materiale.

La direttiva 2008/98/CE relativa ai rifiuti ⁽²⁾, che tratta anche i rifiuti contenenti amianto, impone agli Stati membri di garantire che la gestione dei rifiuti sia effettuata senza danneggiare la salute umana. A tal fine, si applicano particolare disposizioni alla produzione, alla raccolta e al trasporto dei rifiuti pericolosi, nonché al loro stoccaggio e trattamento. I rifiuti pericolosi non possono essere mescolati ad altre categorie di rifiuti pericolosi o con altri rifiuti, sostanze o materiali.

La direttiva 1999/31/CE relativa alle discariche di rifiuti ⁽³⁾ e la decisione 2003/33/CE del Consiglio che stabilisce criteri e procedure per l'ammissione dei rifiuti nelle discariche ⁽⁴⁾ si applica anche ai rifiuti di amianto.

In questo momento, la Commissione ritiene che non sia necessaria un'ulteriore iniziativa legislativa per lo smaltimento sicuro dei materiali contenenti amianto.

⁽¹⁾ GUL 85 del 28.3.1987, pag. 40.

⁽²⁾ GUL 312 del 22.11.2008, pag. 3.

⁽³⁾ GUL 182 del 16.7.1999, pag. 1.

⁽⁴⁾ GUL 11 del 16.1.2003, pag. 27.

2. Commissione rinvia l'onorevole parlamentare alle risposte fornite alle interrogazioni scritte E-002575/2013, E-009411/2012 ed E-004035/2012, anch'esse concernenti le questioni sollevate. Va segnalato inoltre che il 3 e 4 dicembre 2013 si terrà a Bruxelles una conferenza sulle malattie professionali.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002879/13
to the Commission
Matteo Salvini (EFD)
(12 March 2013)

Subject: Harmonisation of the laws on the disposal of asbestos and on compensation for individuals with severe asbestos-related diseases

In view of the exceptional pathogenic risks associated with asbestos fibre (also known under the trading name of 'Eternit'), the Region of Lombardy has laid down, in Regional Law No 14 of 31 July 2012, various measures to encourage the cleaning up of materials containing asbestos throughout the region, with particular reference to sheet roofing for buildings.

These measures are in addition to a huge body of legislation at both regional and national level, designed to bring about the gradual and mandatory removal of all manufactured products containing asbestos.

In all EU Member States the production and marketing of manufactured products containing asbestos is now prohibited or restricted to a very small number of cases in which there is no substitute for the material. However, legislation on the disposal of asbestos and on compensation and social welfare payments for persons who have contracted severe diseases as a result of exposure to asbestos dust (pleuroma, asbestosis, tumours of various types) still varies considerably within the EU.

1. How will the Commission encourage Member States to standardise the law on safe disposal of materials containing asbestos within EU territory?
2. How will it promote the harmonisation of the various national laws on compensation and direct benefit payments to individuals who have contracted asbestos-related diseases at work or through environmental exposure?

Answer given by Mr Potočník on behalf of the Commission
(29 May 2013)

1. Directive 87/217/EEC on the prevention and reduction of environmental pollution by asbestos ⁽¹⁾ provides for measures to control asbestos emissions during demolition, decontamination and disposal operations. In particular, it has to be ensured that during the transport and deposition of asbestos-containing waste, no asbestos fibres or dust are released into the air and that no liquids which may contain asbestos fibres are spilled. Where asbestos-containing waste is landfilled, it has to be treated, packaged or covered, so that the release of asbestos particles is prevented.

Directive 2008/98/EC ⁽²⁾ on waste, which covers asbestos waste, requires Member States to ensure that waste management is carried out without endangering human health. To this end, particular provisions apply for the production, collection and transportation of hazardous waste, as well as its storage and treatment. Hazardous waste shall not be mixed, either with other categories of hazardous waste or with other waste, substances or materials.

Directive 1999/31/EC on the landfill of waste ⁽³⁾ and Council Decision 2003/33/EC establishing criteria and procedures for the acceptance of waste at landfills ⁽⁴⁾ also apply to asbestos waste.

The Commission considers that no further legislative initiative is required at this time regarding safe disposal of materials containing asbestos.

2. The Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answers to written questions E-002575/2013, E-009411/2012 and E-004035/2012, which also address the issues raised. It should also be highlighted that a conference on occupational diseases will be held on the 3rd and 4th of December 2013 in Brussels.

⁽¹⁾ OJ L 85, 28.3.1987, p. 40.

⁽²⁾ OJ L 312, 22.11.2008, p. 3.

⁽³⁾ OJ L 182, 16.7.1999, p. 1.

⁽⁴⁾ OJ L 11, 16.1.2003, p. 27.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002880/13
a la Comisión**

Josefa Andrés Barea (S&D)

(12 de marzo de 2013)

Asunto: Preferentes de Bankia

A finales de este mes se cumple el plazo para cerrar la operación de las preferentes de Bankia. Miles de pequeños inversores confiaron su dinero, sus ahorros, a lo que creían que era un fondo de inversión sin riesgo, a un producto financiero de gran complejidad que les ha provocado. La solución que se les ofrece es que acepten una quita de entorno a un 30 % y que canjeen el resto por acciones de la entidad. Cabe recordar que, al día de hoy, el precio de una acción de Bankia es de 0,26 € y que probablemente va a descender.

Para participar en esta operación, que parece ser que será arbitrada por un organismo imparcial, se pide a los ahorradores que firmen un compromiso de que no acudirán a los tribunales. Si no aceptan esta operación, entran en un futuro y una situación de total incertidumbre y tendrían que optar por una demanda judicial individual para intentar que se anule la compra y poder recuperar la totalidad de la cantidad invertida por vía judicial.

De este oscuro proceso la única información disponible es la que se publica en prensa. El Gobierno español echa la culpa a «Bruselas» de todo lo que es negativo para los ciudadanos, contribuyendo así a la pérdida de credibilidad de las instituciones.

— ¿Qué papel está desempeñando la Comisión en relación con el establecimiento del proceso de liquidación de las preferentes?

— ¿Qué garantías ha previsto la Comisión para los inversores a fin de que reciban la mejor compensación posible?

— ¿Qué considera la Comisión que deben hacer los inversores que fueron engañados sin paliativos al haberseles vendido un producto supuestamente sin riesgo? ¿Pondrá trabas la Comisión o aceptará las trabas del Gobierno español para que intenten recuperar la totalidad de su dinero por la vía judicial?

— ¿Qué medidas está adoptando la Comisión para que los afectados sean informados del proceso que se seguirá y las garantías que tendrán?

— ¿Está supervisando la Comisión las actuaciones que los bancos rescatados con dinero público llevan a cabo, concretamente en lo que se refiere a los ciudadanos?

Respuesta del Sr. Almunia en nombre de la Comisión

(22 de mayo de 2013)

La Comisión está haciendo un seguimiento del programa de reestructuración del sector financiero español, de acuerdo con el Memorando de Entendimiento entre el Gobierno español y el Eurogrupo de julio de 2012.

El Memorando de Entendimiento establece las condiciones de recapitalización pública de los bancos españoles a fin de garantizar que cumplen las normas en materia de competencia y ayudas estatales de la UE. La participación de los accionistas y los acreedores subordinados en la reestructuración (conocida como el «reparto de cargas») de los bancos beneficiarios de ayudas estatales es una característica clave del Memorando de Entendimiento. Además, el principio del «reparto de cargas» exige que dichos tenedores de títulos hagan frente a las pérdidas que hayan sufrido los bancos en dificultades antes de que lo hagan los contribuyentes.

Las acciones ordinarias, los instrumentos híbridos (tales como las participaciones preferentes) y la deuda subordinada tienen una cierta capacidad de absorción de pérdidas. El método para determinar cómo se reparte esta carga se recoge en las decisiones de la Comisión por las que se aprueba el plan de reestructuración para cada uno de los bancos implicados.

Para obtener más información sobre el tratamiento de las acciones ordinarias y las participaciones preferentes emitidas por BFA/Bankia, puede consultarse el comunicado de prensa del FROB de 22 de marzo de 2012 (www.FROB.es), que proporciona información bastante detallada sobre muchas de las cuestiones que plantea Su Señoría en su carta.

La Comisión es muy consciente de la supuesta práctica de algunos bancos consistente en vender de manera abusiva determinados tipos de valores que están ahora sometidos al reparto de cargas. Sin embargo, considera que este es un asunto que han de abordar las autoridades nacionales competentes caso por caso. El papel de la Comisión se limita a elaborar una legislación de la UE que las autoridades nacionales son responsables de hacer cumplir en sus respectivos países.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002880/13
to the Commission**

Josefa Andrés Barea (S&D)

(12 March 2013)

Subject: Bankia preferred shares

The deadline to cease operating Bankia preferred shares falls at the end of this month. Thousands of small investors entrusted their money, their savings, to what they believed was a risk-free investment fund, which in fact was a highly complex financial product which has proved vexatious. The solution offered to investors was to accept a write-down of approximately 30% and to swap the remainder for shares in the bank. It should be noted that, currently, a Bankia share is worth EUR 0.26, and that figure is likely to fall.

In order to participate in this operation, which apparently will be arbitrated by an impartial body, savers have been requested to sign an agreement that they will not go to court. If they do not accept this operation, their future will be one of total uncertainty and they will have to resort to individual lawsuits to try and annul purchases and recover the total amount invested through legal proceedings.

The only information available about this opaque process is that which can be read in the press. The Spanish Government blames 'Brussels' for everything that adversely affects its nationals, thus contributing to the institutions' loss of credibility.

— What role is the Commission playing in establishing the procedure for winding up the preferred shares?

— What guarantees has the Commission put in place to ensure that investors receive the best possible compensation?

— What does the Commission think that investors, who were clearly cheated and mis-sold a supposedly risk-free product, should do? Will it set obstacles, or accept the Spanish Government's obstacles, to those attempting to recover all their money through legal proceedings?

— What measures is it taking so that those concerned are informed about the procedure to be followed and the guarantees they will have?

— Is it supervising the actions being taken by the banks that have been bailed out with public money, in particular those regarding the public?

Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission

(22 May 2013)

The Commission now monitors the programme to restructure the Spanish financial sector, as outlined in the memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the Spanish Government and the Eurogroup in July 2012.

The MoU sets out conditions for public recapitalisation of Spanish banks to ensure that they satisfy EU competition and state aid rules. The participation of equity holders and junior creditors in restructuring efforts (known as 'burden sharing') of the banks in receipt of state aid is a key feature of the MoU. Moreover, the principle of burden sharing requires that these securities holders should bear losses incurred by troubled banks before the taxpayer does.

Ordinary shares, hybrid instruments (such as preference shares) and subordinated debt all have, to some degree, a capacity for loss absorption. The method for determining how this burden is shared is outlined in Commission decisions approving the restructuring plan for each of the banks involved.

Further information on the treatment of ordinary and preference shares issued by BFA/Bankia can be found in the press release of the FROB of 22 March 2012 (www.FROB.es), which provides fairly detailed information on many of the issues raised in your letter.

The Commission is well aware of the alleged practice by some banks of misselling certain types of security that are now subject to burden sharing. The Commission considers that this is, however, a matter for the national relevant authorities to address on a case-by-case basis. The Commission's role is limited to enacting EU-wide legislation that national authorities are responsible for enforcing in their respective countries.

(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-002881/13
an die Kommission
Michael Theurer (ALDE)
(12. März 2013)**

Betrifft: Verschwendung von EU-Fördermitteln

Laut Presseberichten ⁽¹⁾ bekam die Stadt Cottbus am 7.12.2010 einen Zuwendungsbescheid über rund 5 Mio. EUR von Brandenburgs Umwelt- und Gesundheitsministerium, um die Bahnstraße der Stadt Cottbus von einer 4-spurigen zu einer 2-spurigen Straße rückzubauen. Die Mittel stammen aus dem Europäischen Fonds für regionale Entwicklung (EFRE).

Damit sollte, laut Europäischer Union, eine Senkung der Feinstaubwerte unter den Grenzwert (ab 2011), sowie eine Senkung der Stickstoffdioxidbelastung auf den Grenzwert (ab 2015) erreicht werden.

Laut Umweltbundesamt ⁽²⁾ sind die Grenzwerte für Feinstaub (PM₁₀), die 50 µg/m³ betragen, bis zum 8. März 2013 in nur 3 Monaten auf der Bahnstraße bereits 14 Mal überschritten worden.

1. Welche Grundlagen nahm man zum Anlass, die EFRE-Mittel für das oben genannte Projekt freizugeben?
2. Was passiert, wie im obigen Beispiel, mit den ausgezahlten EFRE-Mitteln bei einem nicht-Erreichen der geplanten Ziele?
3. Gibt es Evaluierungen seitens der Kommission in Bezug auf eine erfolgreiche bzw. gescheiterte Umsetzung von mit EU-Mitteln geförderten Projekten?
4. Welche Konsequenzen zieht die Kommission aus Fehlinvestitionen in Projekte wie die des Umbaus der Bahnstraße in Cottbus?

**Antwort von Herrn Hahn im Namen der Kommission
(13. Mai 2013)**

1. Die umweltverträgliche Sanierung der Bahnhofstraße in Cottbus wurde nach der Richtlinie „Umweltschutz“ des Ministeriums für Umwelt, Gesundheit und Verbraucherschutz von Brandenburg mit Mitteln aus dem EFRE gefördert. Der Luftreinhalteplan muss die Richtlinie 2008/50/EG berücksichtigen. Die Maßnahme wurde primär konzipiert, um die Einhaltung der EU-Grenzwerte der Luftqualität gemäß der Richtlinie 2008/50/EG für Feinstaub PM₁₀ und Stickstoffdioxid (NO₂) zu erreichen. Die Baumaßnahme wurde in nur zwei Jahren realisiert. Die Freigabe für den Verkehr erfolgte am 4.12.2012.

2. Die Festlegung von Grenzwerten, die Beurteilung der Luftqualität und der Nachweis der Wirkung von Maßnahmen und Programmen erfolgt gemäß Richtlinie 2008/50/EG immer bezogen auf ein Kalenderjahr. Die Konzentration von Feinstaub PM₁₀ ist abhängig von meteorologischen Bedingungen. Diesem Umstand hat der Richtliniengeber Rechnung getragen, indem er für eine Überschreitung des Tagesgrenzwertes für PM₁₀ eine Überschreitung an bis zu 35 Tagen im Kalenderjahr als zulässig erklärt hat. In den Heizungsmonaten im Winter gibt es immer mehr Tage, in denen die Grenzwerte überschritten werden. Diese Grenzwertüberschreitungen im Winter dürfen aber nicht auf das ganze Jahr hochgerechnet werden.

3. Evaluierungen der EFRE-Programme werden sowohl durch die Mitgliedstaaten als auch durch die Kommission durchgeführt. Die Kommission ist im wesentlichen für die ex post Bewertung der Programme zuständig, diese werden veröffentlicht. Evaluierungen zum EFRE sind unter der folgenden Webadresse verfügbar:

http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/impact/evaluation/library_en.cfm

4. Die Kommission stuft dieses Projekt gegenwärtig nicht als Fehlinvestition ein.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.mugv.brandenburg.de/cms/detail.php/lbm1.c.380831.de> und
<http://www.lr-online.de/regionen/Geld-fuer-Ausbau-der-Bahnhofstrasse:art96090,3135511>
⁽²⁾ <http://www.env-it.de/umweltbundesamt/luftdaten/trsyear.fwd?comp=PM1>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002881/13
to the Commission
Michael Theurer (ALDE)
(12 March 2013)**

Subject: Waste of EU funding

According to press reports ⁽¹⁾, the city of Cottbus received a grant approval on 7 December 2010 of around EUR 5 million from the Ministry for the Environment and Health of the State of Brandenburg to restore Cottbus' Bahnhofsstraße from a four-lane highway to its original two-lane layout. The funds came from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF).

According to the European Union, this would result in a reduction in particulate matter values to below the limit value (from 2011), and a reduction in nitrogen dioxide levels to the limit value (from 2015).

According to the German Environmental Protection Agency ⁽²⁾, up to 8 March 2013, the limit values for particulate matter (PM₁₀) measuring 50 µg/m³ had already been exceeded 14 times on Bahnhofsstraße in just 3 months.

1. What information was used as the basis for the decision to approve the ERDF funds for this project?
2. What happens to the ERDF funds paid out if the planned targets are not achieved, as in this case?
3. Does the Commission carry out assessments in relation to the successful or unsuccessful implementation of projects supported with EU funds?
4. What conclusions does the Commission draw from the failure of investments in projects like the redevelopment of Bahnhofsstraße in Cottbus?

**Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission
(13 May 2013)**

1. The environmentally sustainable alterations to the Bahnhofsstraße in Cottbus were subsidised in accordance with the 'Environmental Protection' Directive of the Brandenburg Ministry of the Environment, Health and Consumer Protection using ERDF resources. The air quality plan must take account of Directive 2008/50/EC. The project was designed first and foremost to achieve compliance with the EU air-quality limit values for particulate matter (PM₁₀) and nitrogen dioxide (NO₂). The work was completed in only two years, and the road was reopened for traffic on 4 December 2012.
2. Limit values are fixed, air quality assessed and the impact of measures and programmes demonstrated in accordance with Directive 2008/50/EC, always with reference to a calendar year. The concentration of particulate matter (PM₁₀) depends on meteorological conditions. This was taken into account when the directive was drafted, by allowing the daily limit value for PM₁₀ to be exceeded on up to 35 days per calendar year. During the winter months when heating systems are in use, there are always more days when the limit values are exceeded. However, the number of days when limit values are exceeded in winter should not be extrapolated to the entire year.
3. Assessments of ERDF programmes are undertaken both by the Member States and by the Commission. The Commission is mainly responsible for *ex-post* evaluations of programmes, which are published. ERDF evaluations are available at the following address: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/impact/evaluation/library_en.cfm
4. As things stand, the Commission does not regard this project as an investment failure.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.mugv.brandenburg.de/cms/detail.php/lbm1.c.380831.de> and
<http://www.lr-online.de/regionen/Geld-fuer-Ausbau-der-Bahnhofstrasse:art96090,3135511>
⁽²⁾ <http://www.env-it.de/umweltbundesamt/luftdaten/trsyear.fwd?comp=PM1>

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002882/13
προς την Επιτροπή
Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)
(12 Μαρτίου 2013)

Θέμα: Αναδιάρθρωση φορολογικών υπηρεσιών στην Ελλάδα και ευρωπαϊκές βέλτιστες πρακτικές

Σε απάντησή της η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή (E-011435/2012) σε ερώτησή μου για τις αρνητικές συνέπειες που θα έχει η κατάργηση των εφοριών (ΔΟΥ) στα ελληνικά νησιά, αναφέρεται σε μια σειρά από συγκεκριμένα μέτρα εκσυγχρονισμού των φορολογικών υπηρεσιών, καθώς επίσης και συγκεκριμένων βέλτιστων πρακτικών που θα μπορούσαν να ενισχύσουν την αποτελεσματικότητα του φορολογικού μηχανισμού στην Ελλάδα.

Πιο συγκεκριμένα, η απάντησή σας γνωστοποιεί ότι «Έχει ήδη δρομολογηθεί μεγάλη επέκταση των ηλεκτρονικών υπηρεσιών καθώς και η δημιουργία τοπικών σημείων επαφής για την παροχή συνδρομής στους φορολογούμενους (κυρίως για τη συμπλήρωση της δήλωσης)» και αναφερόμενη γενικότερα στο πρόβλημα της φοροδιαφυγής, κάνει λόγο για «ευρωπαϊκές βέλτιστες πρακτικές» που θα προωθήσουν ένα «βελτιωμένο δίκτυο τοπικών εφοριών, με ηλεκτρονικές υπηρεσίες και τηλεφωνικά κέντρα» και ένα «σύστημα αξιολόγησης κινδύνου ώστε να έχουν τη δυνατότητα οι ειδικευμένες ομάδες ελέγχου και εισπραξής να αναζητούν τους φορολογούμενους που δεν είναι συνεπείς προς τις υποχρεώσεις τους».

Κατόπιν των παραπάνω, ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Πότε θα δρομολογηθεί η «επέκταση των ηλεκτρονικών υπηρεσιών» και η δημιουργία «τοπικών σημείων επαφής»;
2. Ποιο είναι το ακριβές χρονοδιάγραμμα για την υλοποίηση των παραπάνω δράσεων; Υπάρχουν συγκεκριμένοι πόροι, εθνικοί ή κοινοτικοί, που θα χρηματοδοτήσουν την υλοποίησή τους; Εάν ναι, ποιοι είναι αυτοί;

Απάντηση του κ. Rehn εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(15 Μαΐου 2013)

Η ελληνική κυβέρνηση είναι υπεύθυνη για τη φορολογική διοίκηση.

Σύμφωνα με στοιχεία που έχει στη διάθεσή της η Επιτροπή, η επέκταση των ηλεκτρονικών υπηρεσιών στη φορολογική διοίκηση συνιστά μία συνεχή διαδικασία, η οποία θα ολοκληρωθεί σταδιακά μέσα στο 2013. Η επιτυχία της εξαρτάται από την εγκατάσταση νέας υποδομής ΤΠ για τη φορολογική διοίκηση, της TAXIS-online, που αναμένεται να ολοκληρωθεί σε όλες τις Δ.Ο.Υ. έως το τέλος του Σεπτεμβρίου 2013. Τοπικά σημεία επαφής για τη φορολογική διοίκηση («Κέντρα Εξυπηρέτησης Φορολογικών Υπηρεσιών» ή ΚΕΦΥ) έχουν ήδη δημιουργηθεί. Το ελληνικό Υπουργείο Οικονομικών τον Οκτώβριο του 2012 ανέφερε την ύπαρξη 99 τέτοιων κέντρων.

Η διαδικασία αναβάθμισης των ηλεκτρονικών υπηρεσιών για τον φορολογούμενο υποστηρίζεται από πόρους της ΕΕ μέσω του επιχειρησιακού προγράμματος «Ψηφιακή Σύγκλιση». Όσον αφορά περαιτέρω λεπτομερή στοιχεία σχετικά με το χρονοδιάγραμμα και εθνικούς πόρους, το ελληνικό Υπουργείο Οικονομικών είναι αρμοδιότερο για τυχόν ερωτήσεις.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002882/13
to the Commission**

Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)

(12 March 2013)

Subject: Restructuring of tax services in Greece and European best practices

In its answer (E-011435/2012) to my question about the negative impact of closing tax offices on Greek islands, the Commission referred to a series of specific measures to modernise tax services and specific best practices that could improve the efficacy of the tax system in Greece.

In fact, in that answer, the Commission advised me that plans had already been made to expand *e-services* across the country and to establish local contact points to provide assistance to taxpayers (mainly with their tax returns). It also referred generally to the problem of tax evasion and mentioned European best practices that would promote an improved network of local tax offices, with *e-services* and call centres and a risk assessment system to enable specialist audit and collection teams to identify taxpayers not paying their taxes on time.

1. When will the expansion of *e-services* and the establishment of local contact points be implemented?
2. What is the precise timetable for implementing these actions? Have either national or EU resources been ring-fenced for these actions? If so, what resources?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission

(15 May 2013)

The Greek Government is responsible for revenue administration.

According to the information available to the Commission, the expansion of *e-services* in the tax administration is an ongoing process, gradually continuing to be implemented in the course of 2013. Its success is contingent on the deployment of the new IT infrastructure for the tax administration, TAXIS-online, now expected to be finalised for all tax offices by the end of September 2013. Local contact points for the tax administration ('Tax Service Centers' or KEFs) have already been created. The Greek Ministry of Finance in October 2012 indicated the existence of 99 such centers.

The process of upgrading of electronic services for the taxpayer is supported by EU resources through the operational programme for digital convergence. Regarding further details on timetable and national resources, the Greek Ministry of Finance is in a better position to provide answers.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002883/13
προς την Επιτροπή
Nikos Chrysogelos (Verts/ALE)
(12 Μαρτίου 2013)

Θέμα: Καθυστερήσεις για την κύρωση της διεθνούς συμφωνίας για την προστασία και την αειφόρο ανάπτυξη του πάρκου Πρεσπών

Στις 2 Φεβρουαρίου του 2010, η Ελλάδα, η Αλβανία, η πΓΔΜ, οι 3 χώρες που μοιράζονται τις Πρέσπες, αλλά και η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή υπέγραψαν τη διεθνή συμφωνία για την προστασία και την αειφόρο ανάπτυξη του πάρκου Πρεσπών ⁽¹⁾. Η συμφωνία καλεί τις 3 χώρες να εφαρμόσουν κοινά σχέδια και προγράμματα για την προστασία και την αειφόρο ανάπτυξη της περιοχής με γνώμονα την προστασία της βιοποικιλότητας. Η ΕΕ (Συμβούλιο και Κοινοβούλιο) ενέκρινε τη συμμετοχή της στη συμφωνία στις 4.10.2011 ⁽²⁾. Η Αλβανία δε χρειάζεται επικύρωση καθώς δεσμεύεται με υπογραφή Υπουργού, ενώ στις 23.7.2012 το Κοινοβούλιο της πΓΔΜ ενέκρινε, χωρίς καμία αρνητική ψήφο, το νομοσχέδιο κύρωσης της διεθνούς συμφωνίας ⁽³⁾. Οι ΜΚΟ και τοπικοί φορείς από τις 3 χώρες είναι έτοιμοι να εργαστούν και να στηρίξουν την υλοποίηση των συμφωνηθέντων ⁽⁴⁾. Παρά ταύτα, σήμερα, 37 μήνες μετά την υπογραφή της, η συμφωνία παραμένει ανενεργή εξαιτίας του γεγονότος ότι η Ελλάδα δεν την έχει ακόμα επικυρώσει, αν και η υπογραφή της συμφωνίας είχε αποτελέσει πρωτοβουλία της τότε ελληνικής κυβέρνησης ⁽⁵⁾.

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

Έχει ενημέρωση από τις ελληνικές αρχές σχετικά με την αιτία αυτής της πολύ μεγάλης καθυστέρησης για την κύρωση μιας διεθνούς συμφωνίας που είναι απαραίτητη για την αποτελεσματική προστασία ενός τόσο σημαντικού οικοτόπου;

Σε τι ενέργειες προτίθεται να προβεί προκειμένου να επικυρωθεί η συγκεκριμένη συμφωνία που η ίδια η ΕΕ έχει κυρώσει δεδομένου ότι οι διακρατικές συμφωνίες σχετικά με τις διεθνείς λεκάνες απορροής της Ελλάδας με τρίτες χώρες αποτελεί προτεραιότητα για την Επιτροπή, σύμφωνα με την απόφαση του Συμβουλίου της 27ης Ιουνίου 2006 ⁽⁶⁾;

Απάντηση του κ. Ροτοτσνίκ εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(8 Μαΐου 2013)

Η Ελλάδα δεν ενημέρωσε την Επιτροπή για τους λόγους για τους οποίους καθυστέρησε να κυρώσει τη «Συμφωνία προστασίας και αειφόρου ανάπτυξης της περιοχής του πάρκου Πρεσπών».

Ωστόσο, δεδομένου ότι η εν λόγω συμφωνία έχει κυρωθεί από την ΕΕ, η Ελλάδα δεσμεύεται ήδη από αυτήν λόγω της συμμετοχής της ΕΕ, όσον αφορά τα θέματα που εμπίπτουν στην αρμοδιότητα της ΕΕ.

Η οδηγία-πλαίσιο για τα ύδατα (ΟΠΥ) ⁽⁷⁾ προβλέπει ότι για τις διεθνείς περιοχές λεκανών απορροής ποταμών που εκτείνονται πέρα από τα όρια της ΕΕ — όπως η λεκάνη απορροής ποταμών των Πρεσπών — τα κράτη μέλη προσπαθούν να παράγουν ενιαία σχέδια διαχείρισης λεκανών απορροής ποταμών (ΣΔΛΑΠ) και, όταν αυτό δεν είναι δυνατόν, ένα σχέδιο το οποίο καλύπτει τα μέρη των διεθνών περιοχών λεκανών απορροής ποταμών που περιλαμβάνονται στο έδαφός τους, κατά προτίμηση σε συντονισμό με τα κράτη μέλη που μοιράζονται την περιοχή της λεκάνης απορροής ποταμού.

Η Ελλάδα δεν δημοσίευσε το ΣΔΛΑΠ για τις δικές της 14 περιοχές λεκανών απορροής ποταμών έως τις 22 Δεκεμβρίου 2009, όπως απαιτείται από την οδηγία-πλαίσιο για τα ύδατα (ΟΠΥ). Η Επιτροπή κίνησε διαδικασία επί παραβάσει κατά της Ελλάδας (υπόθεση C 297/11) και το Δικαστήριο της ΕΕ καταδίκασε την Ελλάδα στις 19 Απριλίου 2012. Μετά την έκδοση της απόφασης, οι ελληνικές αρχές ενημέρωσαν την Επιτροπή ότι όλα τα ΣΔΛΑΠ θα πρέπει να εγκριθούν έως το τέλος του 2013.

Τον Απρίλιο του 2013, η Επιτροπή ενημερώθηκε επίσημα για την έγκριση 5 σχεδίων διαχείρισης λεκανών απορροής ποταμών (ΣΔΛΑΠ), αλλά η Ελλάδα δεν έχει ακόμη υποβάλει έκθεση σχετικά με το ΣΔΛΑΠ της Δυτικής Μακεδονίας (GR09), όπου περιλαμβάνεται το ελληνικό έδαφος της διασυνοριακής λεκάνης των Πρεσπών.

⁽¹⁾ <http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?step=0&redirect=true&treatyId=9102>

⁽²⁾ <http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/downloadFile.do?fullText=yes&treatyTransId=14802>

⁽³⁾ http://www.spp.gr/spp/epikirosi%20symfonias_fyrom_23.7.12.pdf

⁽⁴⁾ http://www.spp.gr/spp/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&catid=6%3A2010-03-04-13-52-03&id=127%3A1-2013-2000-2013-&lang=el

⁽⁵⁾ Κοινή δήλωση Γιώργου Παπανδρέου, Σαλί Μπερίσα και Νικόλα Γκρουέφσκι 27.11.2009

http://www.spp.gr/spp/prime%20ministers%20joint%20communique_pyli%202009_en.pdf

⁽⁶⁾ Council Decision of 26 June 2006 «on the participation of the EC in negotiations aiming at the conclusion of international river basin agreements to improve cooperation in European river basins shared between certain Member States and Third Countries», σελ. 26

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/envir/90281.pdf

⁽⁷⁾ Οδηγία 2000/60/ΕΚ, ΕΕ L 327 της 22.12.2000.

Η Επιτροπή θα συνεχίσει να ενθαρρύνει την Ελλάδα να κυρώσει τη συμφωνία των Πρεσπών και, μόλις υποβληθεί η έκθεση σχετικά με το ΣΔΑΛΠ για τη Δυτική Μακεδονία, θα εξετάσει εάν έχουν τηρηθεί οι απαιτήσεις της ΟΠΥ, επίσης και όσον αφορά διεθνείς λεκάνες απορροής ποταμών.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002883/13
to the Commission**

Nikos Chrysogelos (Verts/ALE)

(12 March 2013)

Subject: Delays in ratification of the International Agreement on the Protection and Sustainable Development of the Prespa Park area

On 2 February 2010, Greece, Albania and the FYROM, the three countries bordering Prespa, and the European Commission signed an International Agreement on the Protection and Sustainable Development of the Prespa Park area ⁽¹⁾. This agreement calls on these three countries to apply joint plans and programmes for the protection and sustainable development of the area, predicated on protecting biodiversity. The EU (Council and Parliament) approved its participation in this agreement on 4 October 2011 ⁽²⁾. Albania has no need to ratify it, as it is bound by the minister's signature and the FYROM Parliament unanimously passed a bill ratifying the international agreement on 23 July 2012 ⁽³⁾. NGOs and local bodies from all three countries are ready to work and support the implementation of the agreed terms ⁽⁴⁾. However, today, 37 months after it was signed, the agreement has not been activated because Greece has still not ratified it, even though the signing of this agreement was an initiative of the Greek Government at the time ⁽⁵⁾.

Have the Greek authorities informed the Commission of the reason for this massive delay in ratifying an international agreement needed for the effective protection of such an important habitat?

What action does the Commission intend to take to obtain ratification of this agreement, which has been ratified by the EU, given that transnational agreements on international river basins between Greece and third countries are a Commission priority under the Council Decision of 27 June 2006 ⁽⁶⁾?

Answer given by Mr Potočník on behalf of the Commission

(8 May 2013)

Greece has not informed the Commission of the reasons for its delay in ratifying the 'Agreement on the Protection and Sustainable Development of the Prespa Park Area'.

However, since the Agreement in question has been ratified by the EU, Greece is already bound by it through the EU participation, in relation to matters within EU competence.

The Water Framework Directive (WFD) ⁽⁷⁾ requires that for international river basin districts extending beyond the EU boundaries — such as the Prespa river basin — Member States endeavour to produce a single River Basin Management Plans (RBMPs) and, where this is not possible, a plan that covers the parts of the international river basin district within their territory, preferably in coordination with the states that share the river basin district.

Greece did not publish the RBMP for its 14 river basin districts by 22 December 2009 as required by the WFD. The Commission opened an infringement procedure against Greece (Case C-297/11) and the EU Court of Justice condemned Greece on 19 April 2012. Following the judgment, the Greek authorities informed the Commission that all RBMP should be adopted by the end of 2013.

In April 2013 the Commission has been officially informed of the adoption of 5 RBMPs, but Greece has not yet reported on the RBMP of Western Macedonia (GR09) which includes the Greek territory of the transboundary Prespa basin.

⁽¹⁾ <http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?step=0&redirect=true&treatyId=9102>

⁽²⁾ <http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/downloadFile.do?fullText=yes&treatyTransId=14802>

⁽³⁾ http://www.spp.gr/spp/epikirosi%20symfonias_fyrom_23.7.12.pdf

⁽⁴⁾ http://www.spp.gr/spp/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&catid=6%3A2010-03-04-13-52-03&id=127%3A1-2013-2000-2013-&lang=en

⁽⁵⁾ Joint statement by George Papandreou, Sali Berisha and Nikola Gruevski of 27 November 2009.

⁽⁶⁾ Council Decision of 26 June 2006 on the participation of the EC in negotiations aiming at the conclusion of international river basin agreements to improve cooperation in European river basins shared between certain Member States and Third Countries, p. 26, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/envir/90281.pdf

⁽⁷⁾ Directive 2000/60/EC, OJ L 327, 22.12.2000.

The Commission will continue to encourage Greece to ratify the Prespa Agreement and, once the RBMP for western Macedonia is reported, will analyse whether the requirements of the WFD have been respected including with regard to international river basins.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002884/13
to the Commission
Nessa Childers (S&D)
(12 March 2013)**

Subject: Sugary drinks

Losing weight is much harder than gaining it, so prevention really is better than cure. Prevention starts with a healthy diet and regular exercise.

In addition, modern lifestyles — both at work and at play — are becoming more sedentary, while our diets have become richer to match our rising prosperity. Public health initiatives are being launched across Europe to get people, especially children, eating healthily and taking up active pursuits.

1. Are the Member States open to placing limits on soda drink bottle, can and container sizes in their domestic markets?
2. Will the Commission consider such limits at EU level?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission
(24 April 2013)**

Since 2007, the Commission has promoted EU action to enhance physical activity levels and promote healthier diets as set out in the strategy for Europe on Nutrition, Overweight and Obesity-related Health issues ⁽¹⁾ — including through partnerships with Member States and EU Stakeholders.

The strategy is implemented through the High Level Group for Nutrition and Physical Activity ⁽²⁾ and the EU Platform for Action on Diet, Physical Activity and Health ⁽³⁾. In the High Level Group, the Commission works closely with Member States on issues such as food reformulation. In the EU Platform, the Commission encourages EU stakeholders to commit to concrete actions on diet and physical activity; industry partners are for example encouraged to engage in the reformulation of food and non-alcoholic beverages and in reducing portion size.

It is essential that actions on diet and health continue to be developed and carried out by Member States at regional and local levels. The Commission is not aware of Member States' plans to place limits on the size of soda drink bottles, cans or containers. The Commission does not foresee the introduction of EU limits on sugary drinks.

⁽¹⁾ COM(2007) 279.

⁽²⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/health/nutrition_physical_activity/high_level_group/index_en.htm

⁽³⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/health/nutrition_physical_activity/platform/index_en.htm

(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-002885/13
an die Kommission
Romana Jordan (PPE) und Karl-Heinz Florenz (PPE)
(12. März 2013)**

Betrifft: Zeitplan und sonstige Bestimmungen im Hinblick auf die neue CO₂-Emissionsliste

Die Kommission beabsichtigt offensichtlich, die Erarbeitung der Liste von Bereichen in der Europäischen Union, bei denen ein erhebliches Risiko einer Verlagerung von CO₂-Emissionen angenommen wird, gemäß Artikel 10a, Absatz 13 der Richtlinie über den Emissionshandel (EHS) ⁽¹⁾ voranzubringen. Dieser Artikel bestimmt: „Bis zum 31. Dezember 2009 und danach alle fünf Jahre legt die Kommission [...] ein Verzeichnis der Sektoren bzw. Teilspektoren gemäß Absatz 12 [...] fest“ („Anlagen in Sektoren bzw. Teilspektoren, in denen ein erhebliches Risiko der Verlagerung von CO₂-Emissionen besteht“). Das neue Verzeichnis sollte daher bis Ende 2014 erstellt sein.

Die Kommission wird in diesem Zusammenhang um Beantwortung der nachstehenden Fragen gebeten:

1. Welchen Zeitplan hat die Kommission für den Abschluss der Überarbeitung des Verzeichnisses der CO₂-Emissionsliste im Auge?
2. Auf welche Methode wird die Kommission bei dieser neuen Bewertung zurückgreifen?
3. Auf welche Art und Weise werden die Interessenträger und insbesondere die in der Liste aufgeführte Industrie bei der erneuten Überprüfung konsultiert und eingebunden?
4. Auf welche Datenquellen wird die Kommission zurückgreifen und wie wird die Frage gelöst, ob die Daten auch zutreffen?
5. Wird die Kommission bei der Erstellung der CO₂-Emissionsliste auch eine zeitliche Verlagerung des EHS und seiner Auswirkungen auf den CO₂-Markt berücksichtigen? Falls dies der Fall ist: Wie wird der Preis für CO₂-Emissionen bestimmt?

**Antwort von Frau Hedegaard im Namen der Kommission
(3. Mai 2013)**

Gemäß der EU-Emissionshandelsrichtlinie hat die Kommission den Auftrag, für den Zeitraum 2015-2019 ein neues Verzeichnis hinsichtlich der Verlagerung von CO₂-Emissionen zu erstellen, und zwar auf Grundlage der in dieser Richtlinie festgelegten Kriterien. Das Ziel dieser Aktualisierung ist es, zu gewährleisten, dass die EU über eine Regelung für die Verlagerung von CO₂-Emissionen verfügt, die sich eng an der tatsächlichen Situation in den betreffenden Sektoren ausrichtet. Die Kriterien für die Festlegung des Verzeichnisses hinsichtlich der Verlagerung von CO₂-Emissionen bleiben gegenüber der bestehenden Liste unverändert, allerdings könnten einige Parameter angepasst werden, um die jüngsten Daten und die vorbereitenden Arbeiten für diese Bewertung, die noch nicht abgeschlossen sind, zu berücksichtigen.

Der neue Beschluss mit einem Verzeichnis der Sektoren, von denen angenommen wird, dass sie einem erheblichen Risiko einer Verlagerung von CO₂-Emissionen ausgesetzt sind, wird rechtzeitig für die Zuteilung 2015 in Kraft sein; daher ist seine offizielle Annahme bis Mitte 2014 vorgesehen, wobei das Ausschussverfahren lange vor diesem Zeitpunkt eingeleitet werden wird.

Die Interessenvertreter werden im Wege von Online-Konsultationen und Tagungen befragt. Für die Zwecke dieser Aufgabe wird die Kommission auf amtliche Daten von Eurostat und den Mitgliedstaaten zurückgreifen. Bei Zweifeln an der Zuverlässigkeit der Daten wird mit den betreffenden Sektoren Kontakt aufgenommen.

⁽¹⁾ Siehe die Richtlinie 2009/29/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 23. April 2009 zur Änderung der Richtlinie 2003/87/EG zwecks Verbesserung und Ausweitung des Gemeinschaftssystems für den Handel mit Treibhausgasemissionszertifikaten, ABl. L 140 vom 5.6.2009.

(Slovenska različica)

Vprašanje za pisni odgovor E-002885/13
za Komisijo
Romana Jordan (PPE) in Karl-Heinz Florenz (PPE)
(12. marec 2013)

Zadeva: Časovno načrtovanje in druge določbe, povezane z novim seznamom ogljikovih emisij

Vtis je, da namerava Komisija nadaljevati pripravo seznama sektorjev v Evropski uniji, v katerih je znatno tveganje selitev ogljikovih emisij, kakor zahteva člen 10a(13) direktive o sistemu trgovanja z emisijami ⁽¹⁾. V skladu s tem členom „Komisija do 31. decembra 2009 in vsakih 5 let po tem datumu /.../ določi seznam sektorjev ali delov sektorjev iz odstavka 12“ (naprave v sektorjih ali delih sektorjev, ki so izpostavljeni visokemu tveganju premestitve emisij CO₂). Novi seznam bi moral biti torej oblikovan do konca leta 2014.

1. Za kdaj je predviden dokončni pregled tega seznama?
2. Katero metodologijo bo Komisija uporabila za to ponovno oceno?
3. Kako se bo posvetovala z zainteresiranimi stranmi, predvsem s sektorji s seznama, in jih vključila v proces ponovne ocene?
4. Katere vire podatkov bo uporabila in kako bo rešila pomisleke glede točnosti podatkov?
5. Ali bo pri sestavljanju seznama preučila učinke zamika dražbe v okviru sistema trgovanja z emisijami in njegove vplive na trg ogljika? In kako se bo v tem primeru določala ceno ogljika?

Odgovor Connie Hedegaard v imenu Komisije
(3. maj 2013)

V skladu z direktivo o ETS je Komisija pooblaščenca, da na podlagi meril, določenih v navedeni direktivi, določi nov seznam selitev emisij CO₂ za obdobje 2015–2019. S to posodobitvijo naj bi se zagotovilo, da ima EU takšen režim selitev emisij CO₂, ki dejansko odraža položaj v zadevnih sektorjih. Merila, na podlagi katerih se določi seznam selitev emisij CO₂, so nespremenjena v primerjavi z obstoječim seznamom, vendar se nekateri parametri lahko prilagodijo tako, da se upoštevajo nedavni podatki, pripravljajno delo za to oceno pa še poteka.

Novi sklep s seznamom sektorjev, ki veljajo za izpostavljene visokemu tveganju selitve emisij CO₂, bo pravočasno pripravljen za dodelitev pravic za leto 2015, kar pomeni, da se njegovo sprejetje načrtuje za sredino leta 2014, postopek komitologije pa se bo začel že dolgo pred tem.

Zainteresirane strani bodo v posvetovanjih sodelovale prek spletnih posvetovanj in srečanj. V ta namen bo Komisija uporabila uradne podatke, ki jih zagotavljajo Eurostat in države članice. V primeru dvoma v zanesljivost podatkov bodo vzpostavljeni stiki z zadevnimi sektorji.

⁽¹⁾ prim. Direktiva 2009/29/ES Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 19. novembra 2008 o spremembi Direktive 2003/87/ES zaradi vključitve letalskih dejavnosti v sistem za trgovanje s pravicami do emisije toplogrednih plinov v Skupnosti (UL L 140, 5.6.2009, str. 3).

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002885/13
to the Commission
Romana Jordan (PPE) and Karl-Heinz Florenz (PPE)
(12 March 2013)**

Subject: Timing and other provisions related to the new carbon leakage list

It seems that the Commission intends to press ahead with the preparation of the list of sectors in the European Union deemed at significant risk of carbon leakage, as required by Article 10a, paragraph 13, of the Emissions Trading System (ETS) Directive ⁽¹⁾. In accordance with the provisions of this article, 'by 31 December 2009 and every five years thereafter [...] the Commission shall determine a list of the sectors or subsectors referred to in paragraph 12' ('installations in sectors or subsectors which are exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage'). The new list should thus be completed by the end of 2014.

1. What is the envisaged timeline for finalising the revision of the carbon leakage list?
2. What methodology will the Commission use for this reassessment?
3. How will the stakeholders, in particular the industries on the list, be consulted and involved in the reassessment exercise?
4. What sources of data will the Commission use and how will concerns about data accuracy be addressed?
5. Will the Commission consider the effects of ETS backloading and its impact on the carbon market when drawing up the carbon leakage list? If so, how will the carbon price be determined?

**Answer given by Ms Hedegaard on behalf of the Commission
(3 May 2013)**

The ETS Directive mandates the Commission to determine a new carbon leakage list for the period 2015-2019, based on criteria laid down in that directive. The objective of this update is to ensure that the EU has a carbon leakage regime that is closely aligned to the real situation of the concerned sectors. The criteria to determine the carbon leakage list remain unchanged compared to the existing list, but some parameters might be adjusted to take into account recent data and the preparatory work for this assessment is ongoing.

The new decision containing a list of sectors deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage will be in place in time for 2015 allocation, and is therefore intended to be formally adopted by mid-2014, with the Comitology process starting well before that time.

Stakeholders will be consulted by means of online consultations and stakeholder meetings. For the purposes of the exercise the Commission will use official data provided by Eurostat and the Member States. In case of doubts on the reliability of data, contacts will be taken with concerned sectors.

⁽¹⁾ cf. Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme of the Community, OJ L 140, 5.6.2009.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002886/13
to the Commission
Stephen Hughes (S&D)
(12 March 2013)**

Subject: Incandescent light bulbs

With the legislation (Regulation (EC) No 244/2009) which phased out incandescent light bulbs now implemented, is the Commission still satisfied with the opinion given in 2009 by the Scientific Committee on Emerging and Newly Identified Health Risks (SCENIHR) on light sensitivity? This opinion stated that 'it has never been conclusively and convincingly shown that there exist any connections between electromagnetic fields (EMF) and the symptoms that are reported by persons with so-called electromagnetic hypersensitivity, although their symptoms are real and in many cases severe', adding: 'There is no scientific evidence of correlation between EMF from compact fluorescent lamps, and symptoms and disease'.

Does the Commission consider that a lack of scientific evidence does not mean there are no negative health risks?

Will the Commission fund peer-reviewed research in this area in order to ensure that, should health risks exist, they will be identified?

**Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission
(2 May 2013)**

The Scientific Committee on Emerging and Newly Identified Health Risks (SCENIHR) further evaluated the health effects of artificial light in its opinion of 2012 ⁽¹⁾, based on a mandate of the Commission. The Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answer to written questions 1940/2013 by Mrs Fiona Hall, 4836/2012 by Mr David Martin, and 7245/2012 by Mr Franz Obermayr for further information.

Regarding potential health risks related to electromagnetic fields, the Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answer to written question 3593/2011 by Mrs Marielle de Sarnez.

Regarding the likelihood of negative health risks, the Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answer to written question 8247/2012 by Mrs Angelika Werthmann.

Regarding the funding of research, the Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answer to written question 1940/2013.

The Commission relies on the best available scientific evidence. If new evidence became available indicating that compact fluorescent lamps do involve a health risk, the Commission would take the necessary action.

⁽¹⁾ Opinion on Health Effects of Artificial Light of 19 March 2012:
http://ec.europa.eu/health/scientific_committees/emerging/docs/scenihr_o_035.pdf

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002887/13
aan de Commissie
Esther de Lange (PPE)
(12 maart 2013)

Betreft: ETS voor glastuinbouwbedrijven

In antwoord op vraag E-007462/2012 over ETS voor glastuinbouwbedrijven geeft de Commissie aan dat er geen andere lidstaten buiten Nederland zijn die installaties van de tuinbouwsector welke onder het toepassingsgebied van de ETS-richtlijn vallen, expliciet hebben uitgesloten. De Commissie geeft verder aan dat voor de derde handelsperiode (2013-2020) installaties (zoals warmtekrachtkoppelinginstallaties) alleen van de EU-ETS uitgesloten kunnen worden als die een nominaal thermisch ingangsvermogen hebben van minder dan 35 MW.

Voor het bepalen of het maximale vermogen van 35MW is bereikt op een bepaald bedrijf, is het van belang te weten of dit vermogen voor iedere afzonderlijke installatie geldt, of dat dit voor alle machines samen geldt die op een bedrijfsterrein staan opgesteld.

1. Wat moet volgens de Commissie verstaan worden onder het begrip „installatie” zoals dat in de EU ETS Richtlijn wordt gebruikt? Moet hieronder worden verstaan iedere afzonderlijke installatie, of moet onder dit begrip worden verstaan alle installaties samen die op één locatie/inrichting staan opgesteld?
2. Kortom, behoort een locatie met 3 installaties, die ieder individueel een nominaal thermisch vermogen hebben van minder dan 35 MW, maar samen meer dan 35 MW, onder de ETS richtlijn of onder nationale regelingen te vallen?
3. Hoe hebben de lidstaten deze definitie van „installatie” uit de ETS richtlijn in nationale wetgeving omgezet? Hebben zij dit op dezelfde manier gedaan? Of zijn er lidstaten die voor de berekening van het vermogen afzonderlijke installaties nemen en andere lidstaten die het geheel van het opgesteld vermogen op één locatie samen nemen?
4. De Commissie gaf in het antwoord ook aan dat het ETS voornamelijk bedoeld is voor op grotere installaties en dat er nationale regelingen zijn voor kleinere. Als gevolg hiervan zou het level playing field tussen bedrijven in dezelfde sector aangetast kunnen worden. In hoeverre hebben lidstaten mogelijkheden om een aantasting van het level playing field te corrigeren tussen enerzijds bedrijven met installaties die onder ETS vallen en anderzijds bedrijven die onder nationale regelingen vallen?

Antwoord van mevrouw Hedegaard namens de Commissie
(30 april 2013)

1. De term „installatie” wordt gedefinieerd in artikel 3, punt e), van de EU-ETS-richtlijn: „*vaste technische eenheid waarin één of meer van de in bijlage I genoemde activiteiten plaatsvinden alsmede andere, daarmee rechtstreeks samenhangende activiteiten plaatsvinden, die technisch in verband staan met de op die plaats ten uitvoer gebrachte activiteiten en gevolgen kunnen hebben voor de emissies en de verontreiniging*”. Een van de activiteiten van de lijst van bijlage I bij de ETS-richtlijn is het „verbranden van brandstof in installaties met een nominaal thermisch ingangsvermogen van meer dan 20 MW [...]”.
2. In bijlage I bij de ETS-richtlijn is bepaald dat het nominaal thermisch ingangsvermogen van alle technische eenheden die deel uitmaken van een installatie bij elkaar opgeteld moeten worden wanneer men wil vaststellen of het totale nominaal thermisch ingangsvermogen van de installatie meer bedraagt dan 20 MW. Dit wordt gewoonlijk de „cumulatieregel” genoemd. Als dit het geval is dan valt de installatie onder de EU-ETS. De drempel van 35 MW is slechts van toepassing als moet worden besloten of een installatie in aanmerking komt voor uitsluiting van de ETS-regeling onder voorbehoud van gelijkwaardige maatregelen overeenkomstig artikel 27 van de richtlijn.
3. Aangezien de cumulatieregel algemeen aanvaard wordt en deel uitmaakt van het wetgevend kader is er geen reden om aan te nemen dat deze niet consequent is toegepast. Dat vooral glastuinbouwbedrijven in Nederland de 20 MW-drempel lijken te overschrijden heeft te maken met bepaalde specifieke eigenschappen van de Nederlandse tuinbouwsector, en niet met een inconsistente toepassing van de cumulatieregel.
4. Emissies uit installaties die tot dezelfde sector behoren maar niet onder de ETS-regeling vallen, vallen onder de beschikking inzake de verdeling van de inspanningen, die de niet-ETS-emissies dekt. Hierdoor kunnen lidstaten beleidsmaatregelen op elkaar afstemmen teneinde verstoring van de mededinging te voorkomen.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002887/13
to the Commission
Esther de Lange (PPE)
(12 March 2013)**

Subject: ETS for greenhouse horticulture businesses

In answer to Question E-007462/2012 on ETS for greenhouse horticulture businesses, the Commission states that no other Member State apart from the Netherlands has explicitly excluded those horticulture sector installations which are covered by the scope of the ETS Directive. The Commission further states that, for the third trading period (2013-2020), installations (such as cogeneration plants) may only be excluded from the EU ETS if they have a rated thermal input of less than 35 MW.

To determine whether the maximum capacity of 35 MW has been reached at a particular firm, it is important to know whether this capacity applies to each individual installation or to all the machines located together at an industrial site.

1. What does the Commission understand by the term 'installation' as used in the EU ETS Directive? Must this be taken to mean each individual installation, or must this term be understood to mean all the installations located together at one location/establishment?
2. In short, is a location with three installations, each with an individual rated thermal input of less than 35 MW, but with a combined input of more than 35 MW, covered by the ETS Directive or by national regulations?
3. How have the Member States transposed this definition of 'installation' from the ETS Directive into national legislation? Have they done so in the same way? Do some Member States calculate the capacity based on individual installations while other Member States use the total combined capacity at one location?
4. In its answer, the Commission also stated that the ETS is primarily intended for larger installations and that national regulations apply to smaller ones. Consequently, the level playing field between firms in the same sector might be affected. To what extent do Member States have the opportunity to correct distortions in the level playing field between firms with installations covered by the ETS on the one hand and firms covered by national regulations on the other?

**Answer given by Ms Hedegaard on behalf of the Commission
(30 April 2013)**

1. The term 'installation' is defined in Article 3(e) of the EU ETS Directive : 'a stationary technical unit where one or more activities listed in Annex I are carried out and any other directly associated activities which have a technical connection with the activities carried out on that site and which could have an effect on emissions and pollution'. One of the activities listed in Annex I of the ETS Directive is 'Combustion of fuels in installations with a total rated thermal input exceeding 20 MW [...]'.

2. The ETS Directive stipulates in Annex I that one needs to add together the rated thermal inputs of all technical units belonging to an installation [...] when calculating whether the total rated thermal input of the installation exceeds the 20 MW. This is commonly referred to as the 'aggregation rule'. If it does, the installation is covered by the EU ETS. The 35 MW threshold is only relevant when deciding whether an installation is eligible for exclusion from the ETS subject to equivalent measures according to Article 27 of the directive.
3. As the aggregation rule is commonly accepted and part of the legal framework, there is no reason to assume that it has not been applied consistently. The reason why primarily Dutch greenhouse horticulture businesses seem to exceed the 20 MW is related to certain specificities of the Dutch horticulture sector rather than to an inconsistent application of the aggregation rule.
4. Emissions from installations belonging to the same sector but not covered by the ETS are covered by the Effort Sharing Decision, dealing with non-ETS emissions, which enables Member States to align policy measures in order to avoid competition distortions.

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-002888/13
to the Commission**

Geoffrey Van Orden (ECR)

(13 March 2013)

Subject: EU funding available to alleviate the costs of immigration from other Member States

What funding is available from the EU to pay for the additional costs placed on local authorities resulting from a large influx of citizens from another EU Member State (I am thinking particularly of housing and health costs and the need for bilingual assistants in schools and additional language teachers and facilities)?

What proposals does the Commission intend to make to ensure that a host country is not required to pay social benefits to a migrant's family when they are still living in the country of origin?

What proposals does the Commission intend to make to ensure that medical costs of a migrant to another EU country are paid by that person's country of origin?

Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission

(29 April 2013)

The EU's Structural Funds aim to reduce differences in prosperity and living standards across EU Member States and regions, and therefore promote economic and social cohesion. The ESF ⁽¹⁾ besides promoting employment also supports social inclusion and combatting poverty. The related investments in housing, health infrastructure and urban development are supported by the ERDF ⁽²⁾. For the period 2014-2020 the Commission proposed investment priorities aiming at strengthening this approach. Innovative approaches could also be funded to respond to societal challenges such as intra-EU migration.

An employed or self-employed person active in a Member State is subject to social security legislation of that Member State ⁽³⁾. This means that such a person is entitled to social security coverage, including family benefits and healthcare, on the same terms as nationals of that Member State. The applicable Regulation ⁽⁴⁾ provides that a person is entitled to family benefits in accordance with the legislation of the competent Member State, including for his/her family members residing in another Member State, as if they were residing in the former State. This principle is in place since over 50 years and works well. Migrant workers have to pay both social security contributions and taxes in the competent State and contribute to the economic growth of this State.

⁽¹⁾ European Social Fund.

⁽²⁾ European Regional Development Fund.

⁽³⁾ Article 11-3 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems, OJ L 166, 30.4.2004 (Corrigendum OJ L 200, 7.6.2004), as last amended by Commission Regulation (EU) No 1224/2012 (OJ L 349, 19.12.2012).

⁽⁴⁾ Article 67 of the same regulation.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita P-002889/13

à Comissão

Nuno Teixeira (PPE)

(13 de março de 2013)

Assunto: Regulamento (UE) n.º 29/2013 de 15 de janeiro de 2013

Tendo em conta que:

- O Regulamento (UE) n.º 29/2013 da Comissão, de 15 de janeiro de 2013, que proíbe a pesca de peixe-espada-preto nas águas da UE e águas internacionais das subzonas VIII, IX e X pelos navios que arvoram o pavilhão de Portugal refere que as capturas da unidade populacional esgotaram a quota atribuída para 2012;
- Considera, por conseguinte, necessário proibir as atividades de pesca dessa unidade populacional, cuja quota considera esgotada com efeitos a 19 de dezembro de 2012, sendo proibido manter a bordo, transladar, transbordar ou desembarcar capturas dessa unidade populacional efetuadas por esses navios após a data indicada;

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Referindo-se o regulamento ao esgotamento da quota de capturas para o ano 2012, qual é a quota de capturas fixada para o ano 2013?
2. Caso não esteja ainda fixada, para quando se prevê a fixação da quota para o ano 2013?
3. A proibição estabelecida abrange todos os tipos de arte e frota com pavilhão português?
4. Quais são os tipos de navios de pesca que estão excluídos da aplicação do regime de gestão do esforço de pesca?

Resposta dada por Maria Damanaki em nome da Comissão

(18 de abril de 2013)

Em conformidade com o Regulamento (UE) n.º 1262/2012 do Conselho, de 20 de dezembro de 2012, foi atribuída a Portugal, para 2013, uma quota de 3 659 toneladas de peixe-espada-preto nas águas da UE e nas águas internacionais das subzonas VIII, IX e X. A proibição estabelecida no Regulamento (UE) n.º 29/2013 da Comissão, de 15 de janeiro de 2013, refere-se apenas à quota de pesca atribuída a Portugal para 2012.

Esta proibição afeta todos os tipos de artes de pesca e navios que arvoram o pavilhão de Portugal. O Regulamento (CE) n.º 2347/2002 do Conselho, de 16 de dezembro de 2002, estabelece o regime de esforço de pesca aplicável aos navios que pescam as unidades populacionais de profundidade, incluindo o peixe-espada-preto. Ao abrigo deste regime, só os navios que possuem autorizações para a pesca de profundidade são autorizados a exercer uma pesca dirigida às espécies de profundidade, estando sujeitos a restrições do esforço.

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-002889/13
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(13 March 2013)**

Subject: Regulation (EU) No 29/2013 of 15 January 2013

Commission Regulation (EU) No 29/2013 of 15 January 2013 establishing a prohibition of fishing for black scabbardfish in EU and international waters of VIII, IX and X by vessels flying the flag of Portugal states that the 2012 quota for catches of this stock has been exhausted.

The regulation therefore deems it necessary to prohibit fishing activities for the stock in question and considers the quota to be exhausted as of 19 December 2012, stating that it shall be prohibited to retain on board, relocate, tranship or land fish from that stock caught by those vessels after that date.

Can the Commission answer the following:

1. As the regulation refers to the exhaustion of the fishing quota for 2012, what quota has been set for 2013?
2. If the 2013 quota has not yet been established, when will this be done?
3. Does the above prohibition affect all types of fishing gear and Portuguese-flagged vessel?
4. What types of fishing vessel are excluded from the scope of the fishing effort regime?

**Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission
(18 April 2013)**

In accordance with Council Regulation (EU) No 1262/2012 of 20 December 2012, for 2013 a quota of 3659 tonnes of black scabbard fish in EU and international waters of VIII, IX and X has been allocated to Portugal. The prohibition laid down in Commission Regulation (EU) No 29/2013 of 15 January 2013 refers only to the fishing quota allocated to Portugal for 2012.

This prohibition affects all types of fishing gear and Portuguese-flagged vessels. Council Regulation (EC) No 2347/2002 of 16 December 2002 establishes the fishing effort regime applicable to vessels fishing for deep-sea stocks including black scabbard fish. Under this regime only vessels holding deep-sea fishing permits are allowed to target deep-sea species and are subject to effort restrictions.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002890/13
a la Comisión**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(13 de marzo de 2013)

Asunto: Condonación obligada de deudas

Una multinacional catalana de hemoderivados cobró en 2012 deudas del Gobierno español por valor de 157 millones de euros, pero a cambio fue obligada a condonar 11,6 millones en concepto de intereses adeudados por la Seguridad Social ⁽¹⁾.

Por otro lado, en el artículo 3, letra e), de la Directiva 2000/35/CE se dice: «salvo que el deudor no sea responsable del retraso, el acreedor tendrá derecho a reclamar al deudor una compensación razonable por todos los costes de cobro que haya sufrido a causa de la morosidad de éste.»

A la luz de lo anterior:

¿Investigará la Comisión si la empresa citada no solo no ha cobrado a tiempo, en su relación con la Administración española, sino que además ha sido obligada a condonar 11,6 millones de euros?

¿Cree la Comisión que estas prácticas están de acuerdo con la Directiva 2000/35/CE?

¿Cree la Comisión que estas prácticas están de acuerdo con el principio de seguridad jurídica? ¿Y con el artículo 173 del TUE sobre política industrial?

Respuesta del Sr. Tajani en nombre de la Comisión

(6 de mayo de 2013)

Como ya se ha mencionado en las respuestas a preguntas anteriores (E-000533/2012, E-003060/2012, E-000531/2012, E-000026/2011 y E-000027/2011) ⁽²⁾, la Directiva 2000/35/CE ha sido sustituida por la Directiva 2011/7/UE, que todos los Estados miembros tuvieron que transponer con fecha límite de 16 de marzo de 2013.

España transpuso la Directiva 2011/7/UE el 24 de febrero de 2013 mediante el Real Decreto-ley 4/2013.

La Comisión quisiera destacar que el acreedor tiene el derecho, pero no la obligación, de pedir intereses de demora o una compensación por los costes de cobro.

Por regla general, una vez que se hayan adoptado medidas nacionales de transposición satisfactorias, las infracciones de la legislación nacional deben resolverse normalmente ante los tribunales nacionales. Por tanto, deben buscarse vías de recurso adecuadas para garantizar la correcta aplicación de las normas de desarrollo nacionales.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.expansion.com/agencia/efe/2013/03/10/18149820.html>

⁽²⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/es/parliamentary-questions.html>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002890/13
to the Commission**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(13 March 2013)

Subject: Forced debt cancellation

In 2012, a Catalan multinational in the blood products industry collected debts from the Spanish Government to the value of EUR 157 million, but in exchange was forced to write off EUR 11.6 million in the way of interest owed by the Social Security administration ⁽¹⁾.

However, Article 3(e) of Directive 2000/35/EC states: 'unless the debtor is not responsible for the delay, the creditor shall be entitled to claim reasonable compensation from the debtor for all recovery costs incurred through the latter's late payment.'

Will the Commission investigate whether the aforementioned company has not only not been paid on time, in its dealings with the Spanish authorities, but has also been forced to write off EUR 11.6 million?

Does the Commission think that these practices comply with Directive 2000/35/EC?

Does the Commission think that these practices comply with the principle of legal certainty and with Article 173 of the Treaty on European Union, with regard to industrial policy?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission

(6 May 2013)

As already mentioned in replies to previous questions (E-000533/2012, E-003060/2012, E-000531/2012, E-000026/2011, E-000027/2011) ⁽²⁾ Directive 2000/35/EC has been replaced by Directive 2011/7/EU that all Member States had to transpose by 16 March 2013.

Spain transposed Directive 2011/7/EU on 24 February 2013 by means of R.D.L 4/2013.

The Commission would like to emphasise that the creditor has a right and not an obligation to ask for interest for late payment and compensation for the recovery costs.

As a general rule, once satisfactory national transposition measures have been adopted, contraventions of the national legislation ought normally to be resolved before the national courts. Therefore, appropriate redress should be sought by securing the proper application of the national implementing legislation.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.expansion.com/agencia/efe/2013/03/10/18149820.html>

⁽²⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html>

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002891/13
a la Comisión**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(13 de marzo de 2013)

Asunto: Pregunta complementaria a E-000098/2013

Respecto a la patente única europea, la Comisión decía tener datos sobre el impacto que puede tener sobre las PYME. Aún así, como el Estado español e Italia no participan del acuerdo por cooperación reforzada, sus empresas y sus particulares no podrán hacer uso de esta figura para patentar sus innovaciones. En todo caso, sólo podrán acceder a una patente única europea si tienen una filial en uno de los Estados miembros firmantes.

Además, según la Comisión en su respuesta a la pregunta E-000098/2013: «En el marco del sistema actual, cuesta unos 36 000 euros obtener protección mediante patente en el conjunto de Europa. Este coste bajará considerablemente gracias al nuevo sistema: el coste de obtener la protección mediante patente unitaria en 25 Estados miembros será inferior a 5 000 euros después de que termine el período transitorio y menos de 6 500 euros durante el período de transición, lo que redundará en beneficio sobre todo de las PYME.»

A la luz de lo anterior,

¿Puede confirmar la Comisión que las empresas y particulares con sede legal en el Estado español no podrán hacer uso de la patente única europea?

¿Cree la Comisión que la imposibilidad de utilizar este instrumento y la bajada de costes que supone perjudica la competitividad de las PYME españolas con relación a sus competidoras europeas?

Respuesta del Sr. Barnier en nombre de la Comisión

(27 de mayo de 2013)

La Comisión quiere aclarar que los inventores españoles e italianos, al igual que el resto de inventores establecidos o residentes en el territorio de los 25 Estados miembros participantes, podrán hacer uso del futuro sistema de patentes y beneficiarse, por tanto, de la consiguiente reducción de los costes y cargas administrativas del mismo. La no discriminación entre los Estados miembros constituye uno de los requisitos básicos de la cooperación reforzada.

La Comisión también desea subrayar que el TJUE, en su Decisión de 16 de abril, ha resuelto que la decisión por la que se autoriza la cooperación reforzada para la creación de protección mediante una patente unitaria no perjudica al mercado interior y no constituye una discriminación para los intercambios entre Estados miembros y respeta las competencias, los derechos y las obligaciones de aquellos Estados miembros que no participan en ellas (artículos 326 y 327 del TFUE — asuntos acumulados C-274/11 y C-295/11).

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002891/13
to the Commission**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(13 March 2013)

Subject: Supplementary question to Question E-000098/2013

With regard to the single European patent, the Commission has said that it has data on the impact this could have on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). However, since Spain and Italy are not participating in the enhanced cooperation procedure, their enterprises and citizens will not be able to use this mechanism to patent their innovations. In any event, they will only be able to obtain a single European patent if they have a subsidiary in one of the signatory Member States.

In addition, in its answer to Question E-000098/2013 the Commission states: 'under the current system, it costs about EUR 36 000 to obtain patent protection for the whole of Europe. These costs will be considerably reduced under the new system: the cost to obtain unitary patent protection for 25 Member States will be less than EUR 5 000 after the end of the transitional period (less than EUR 6 500 during the transitional period). This will in particular benefit SMEs.'

Can the Commission confirm that enterprises and individuals established in Spain will not be able to use the single European patent?

Does the Commission believe that the fact that Spanish SMEs cannot use this instrument and benefit from the attendant reduced costs will harm their competitiveness in relation to their European competitors?

Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission

(27 May 2013)

The Commission would like to clarify that Spanish as well as Italian inventors will be able to benefit from the future patent system and thus from the associated reduction of cost and administrative burdens in the same way as inventors established/resident within the territory of the 25 participating Member States. Non-discrimination between the Member States is one of the basic requirements for enhanced cooperation.

The Commission would also like to underline that the CJEU, in its decision of 16 April, has decided that the decision authorising the enhanced cooperation for the creation of unitary patent protection does not undermine the internal market or constitute a discrimination in trade between Member States and respects the competences, rights and obligations of those Member States which do not participate in it (Art. 326 and 327 TFEU — Joined Cases C-274/11 and C-295/11).

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002892/13
a la Comisión**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(13 de marzo de 2013)

Asunto: Modificación de la Directiva 84/500/CEE (II)

En referencia a la respuesta E-009038/2012, del Sr. Šešćovič en nombre de la Comisión, del pasado 28 de noviembre de 2012: «Con objeto de determinar la acción futura, la Comisión lleva a cabo una consulta con los Estados miembros y la industria sobre posibles soluciones, entre otras, nuevas pruebas de laboratorio que reflejen los usos que hacen los consumidores de los MCA de cerámica y la necesidad de adoptar medidas con respecto a las importaciones procedentes de terceros países».

Los empresarios de cerámica catalanes están muy preocupados porque si finalmente se modifica la Directiva 84/500/CEE, con la posible reducción de los niveles de cesión de cadmio y plomo de la cerámica en 400 veces los niveles actuales, ellos no podrán hacer frente al coste que significaría para sus fábricas este cambio en la normativa, en el contexto actual de crisis económica en el Estado español. ¿Ya ha terminado la Comisión las consultas a los Estados miembros y a la industria?

¿Cuándo tiene previsto la Comisión emitir una respuesta definitiva sobre la posible modificación de la Directiva 84/500/CEE?

Respuesta del Sr. Borg en nombre de la Comisión

(24 de abril de 2013)

La Comisión todavía no ha concluido sus consultas sobre la reducción de los límites de cesión de plomo y cadmio fijados en la actualidad por la Directiva 84/500/CEE del Consejo ⁽¹⁾.

El laboratorio de referencia de la Unión Europea para materiales en contacto con alimentos, situado en el Centro Común de Investigación de la Comisión Europea, en Ispra (Italia), está en la actualidad desarrollando y evaluando posibles nuevas pruebas de laboratorio para ser utilizadas en este contexto. Dicho laboratorio de referencia está consultando a todas las partes interesadas pertinentes sobre asuntos relacionados con estas pruebas. Se espera que este trabajo esté concluido para finales de 2013.

La Comisión decidirá sus próximas actuaciones a partir de las nuevas consultas a los Estados miembros y a la industria tan pronto como haya suficiente claridad en torno a los métodos de ensayo.

(1) DOL 277 de 20.10.1984.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002892/13
to the Commission**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(13 March 2013)

Subject: Amendment of Directive 84/500/EEC (II)

In his answer of 28 November 2012 to Question E-009038/2012, Mr Šefčovič, on behalf of the Commission, stated: '[t]o determine further action the Commission is consulting with Member States and industry on potential solutions, amongst others new laboratory tests which better reflect the way ceramic food contact materials (FCMs) are used by consumers and the necessity of measures regarding imports from third countries'.

Catalan ceramics business owners are very concerned: if Directive 84/500/EEC is amended, with a potential reduction in the migration levels of cadmium and lead from ceramics by a factor of 400 from current levels, they will not be able to meet the cost that this change in the law would involve for their factories, in view of the current economic crisis in Spain. Has the Commission already completed its consultations with Member States and industry?

When does the Commission plan to give a final answer on the possible amendment of Directive 84/500/EEC?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission

(24 April 2013)

The Commission has not yet concluded its consultations on the reduction of the limits for the release of lead and cadmium currently set out by Council Directive 84/500/EEC ⁽¹⁾.

The European Union reference laboratory for food contact materials, hosted by the Directorate General Joint Research Centre of the European Commission in Ispra, Italy, is currently developing and evaluating possible new laboratory tests to be used in this context. The reference laboratory consults with all relevant stakeholders on matters relating to these tests. This work is expected to be concluded by the end of 2013.

The Commission will determine its actions on the basis of further consultations with the Member States and industry as soon as sufficient clarity on the testing methods is obtained.

⁽¹⁾ OJ L 277, 20.10.1984.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002893/13
a la Comisión**

Rosa Estaràs Ferragut (PPE)

(13 de marzo de 2013)

Asunto: Seguimiento de la Estrategia Europea de Discapacidad

En noviembre de 2010, la Comisión aprobó la Estrategia Europea de Discapacidad 2010-2020, la cual proporciona un marco de acción a escala europea y nacional con el objetivo de que las personas con discapacidad puedan disfrutar de todos sus derechos, y beneficiarse plenamente de una participación en la economía y la sociedad europea.

El 23 de diciembre de 2010, la UE ratificó la Convención de Naciones Unidas sobre los derechos de las personas con discapacidad (UNCRPD), convirtiéndose así en la primera entidad supranacional que ha llegado a ser parte oficial de la Convención, asumiendo por tanto los deberes y obligaciones impuestos por la misma.

Considerando que la Estrategia 2010-2020 se centra en potenciar los derechos de las personas con discapacidad y ayuda a cumplir las disposiciones de la Convención de las Naciones Unidas sobre los derechos de las personas con discapacidad,

Considerando que el artículo 35 de la Convención establece que los Estados Partes presentarán al Comité de las Naciones Unidas encargado de su implementación, un informe exhaustivo sobre las medidas que hayan adoptado para cumplir sus obligaciones conforme a la Convención y sobre los progresos realizados al respecto en el plazo de dos años a partir de la entrada en vigor de la Convención en el Estado Parte de que se trate,

Considerando que en la propia Estrategia 2010-2020 se menciona que a finales del presente año, la Comisión Europea informará sobre los avances logrados mediante la Estrategia, concretamente sobre la puesta en práctica de medidas, los progresos nacionales y el informe que remite la UE al Comité de las Naciones Unidas sobre los Derechos de las Personas con Discapacidad.

1. ¿Qué medidas piensa adoptar la Comisión a fin de realizar un seguimiento exhaustivo sobre la aplicación efectiva de la Estrategia, y así poder evaluar su impacto real en los Estados miembros?

2. ¿En qué estado se encuentran los informes que la UE, como parte de la Convención, debe presentar al Comité de las Naciones Unidas para cumplir con lo dispuesto en el artículo 35?

Respuesta de la Sra. Reding en nombre de la Comisión

(3 de mayo de 2013)

Según se anunciaba en la Estrategia Europea de Discapacidad 2010-2020, la Comisión presentará a finales de 2013 un informe sobre los progresos alcanzados gracias a dicha iniciativa. Se ha iniciado para ello un estudio especializado independiente ⁽¹⁾ cuyo proceso de preparación incluirá también consultas con las partes interesadas, concretamente representantes de los Estados miembros en el Grupo de Alto Nivel sobre Discapacidades, y de las organizaciones de personas con discapacidades.

Conforme establece el Código de conducta entre el Consejo, los Estados miembros y la Comisión, que fija los dispositivos internos para la aplicación, por parte de la Unión Europea, del Convenio de las Naciones Unidas sobre los Derechos de las Personas con Discapacidad ⁽²⁾, así como para su representación en ese foro, la Comisión está elaborando el informe requerido por el artículo 35 de la CNUDPD sobre las materias de competencia de la Unión. El Informe de la UE seguirá las directrices del Comité de las Naciones Unidas sobre los Derechos de las Personas con Discapacidad para los documentos específicamente recogidos en los Tratados que deben presentar los Estados parte conforme al artículo 35 de la CNUDPD ⁽³⁾.

El estudio mencionado aportará además datos objetivos y elementos de análisis en los que se apoyará la Comisión para la preparación del Informe de la UE para la CNUDPD.

⁽¹⁾ Convocatoria de licitación JUST/2012/DISC/PR/0072/A4 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/contracts/2012_209634_en.htm

⁽²⁾ 2010/C 340/08, punto 12 c).

⁽³⁾ <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CRPD/CRPD-C-2-3.pdf>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002893/13
to the Commission**

Rosa Estaràs Ferragut (PPE)

(13 March 2013)

Subject: Review of the European Disability Strategy

In November 2010, the Commission approved the European Disability Strategy 2010-2020, which set out a framework of action at EU and national level with the aim of ensuring that persons with disabilities can enjoy all their rights and fully benefit from participation in the economy and European society.

On 23 December 2010, the EU ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities (UNCRPD), thus becoming the first supranational entity to become an official party to the Convention, thereby assuming the duties and obligations imposed by it.

The strategy 2010-2020 focuses on strengthening the rights of persons with disabilities and helping to fulfil the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities.

Article 35 of the Convention establishes that the state parties shall submit to the United Nations committee responsible for its enforcement, a thorough report on the measures that they have adopted to fulfil their obligations in accordance with the Convention and on the progress achieved in that respect in the two years from the entry into force of the Convention in the state party concerned.

The strategy 2010-2020 itself mentions that at the end of this year, the Commission will report on the progress made under the strategy, specifically on the implementation of measures, progress at national level and the report that the EU submits to the United Nations Committee on the Rights of People with Disabilities.

1. What action is the Commission planning to take in order to conduct a thorough review of the effective implementation of the strategy, and thus be able to assess its true impact in the Member States?
2. What form will the reports take which the EU, as a party to the Convention, must submit to the United Nations Committee in order to comply with the provisions of Article 35?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission

(3 May 2013)

As announced in the European Disability Strategy 2010-2020, the Commission will by the end of 2013 report on progress achieved through the strategy. An external expert study has been launched ⁽¹⁾ and the preparatory process will also include consultation with the relevant stakeholders, in particular Member States representatives through the Disability High-Level Group and organisations of persons with disabilities.

As stipulated in the Code of Conduct between the Council, the Member States and the Commission setting out internal arrangements for the implementation by and representation of the European Union relating to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities ⁽²⁾, the Commission is preparing the Union Report required by Art. 35 of the UNCRPD in respect of matters falling within the Union competence. The EU Report will follow the reporting guidelines of the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on treaty-specific documents to be submitted by states parties under Article 35 of the CRPD ⁽³⁾.

The mentioned study will also provide factual data and analysis to support the Commission in the preparation of the EU CRPD Report.

⁽¹⁾ Open invitation to tender JUST/2012/DISC/PR/0072/A4 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/contracts/2012_209634_en.htm

⁽²⁾ 2010/C 340/08, point 12(c).

⁽³⁾ <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CRPD/CRPD-C-2-3.pdf>

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002894/13
a la Comisión
Antolín Sánchez Presedo (S&D)
(13 de marzo de 2013)

Asunto: Acuerdo de Libre Comercio con Tailandia y trabajo infantil en el sector conservero

Recientemente se han iniciado las negociaciones para un Acuerdo de Libre Comercio entre la UE y Tailandia, tercer socio comercial europeo en la Asociación de Naciones del Sudeste Asiático (ASEAN), con un comercio bilateral de más de 30 mil millones EUR (exportaciones de la UE de 14,8 mil millones e importaciones de 16,9 mil millones). La UE es el principal inversor internacional en este país.

Hace algunas semanas la organización finlandesa Finnwatch denunciaba la realización de trabajos infantiles y la existencia de abusos laborales en dos de las principales fábricas tailandesas de conservas de atún que abastecen el mercado de la UE y de los EE.UU. (Unicord y Thai Union Manufacturing).

Habida cuenta de lo que antecede,

1. ¿Puede indicar la Comisión si tiene conocimiento de estas denuncias de trabajos infantiles y abusos laborales en el sector conservero tailandés?
2. ¿Qué medidas de control existen para evitar que los productos producidos sin respetar los derechos fundamentales accedan al mercado europeo e internacional?
3. ¿Qué nuevas garantías tiene previsto introducir en el nuevo Acuerdo de Libre Comercio para asegurar una competencia justa y evitar una concurrencia desleal?

En cuanto al contenido estrictamente comercial del Acuerdo, ¿evitará la Comisión que las condiciones arancelarias y no arancelarias para el comercio de conservas de atún puedan dañar injustificadamente al sector europeo?

Respuesta del Sr. De Gucht en nombre de la Comisión
(2 de mayo de 2013)

La Comisión tiene constancia del estudio de Finnwatch. A este respecto, la Comisión remite a Su Señoría a su respuesta a la pregunta E-00618/2013 ⁽¹⁾.

La Comisión trabaja en estrecha colaboración con la Organización Internacional del Trabajo (OIT), que hace un seguimiento de la aplicación de las normas del trabajo por parte de Tailandia en virtud de los Convenios de la OIT, incluido el sector de la pesca. Además, para la UE es muy importante que se incluyan disposiciones sobre comercio y desarrollo sostenible en las negociaciones para un acuerdo de libre comercio (ALC) con Tailandia que se han iniciado recientemente. Promover la aplicación efectiva de las normas fundamentales del trabajo, incluida la eliminación del trabajo infantil, constituye una parte importante de este objetivo. Las disposiciones definitivas en materia de comercio y desarrollo sostenible del ALC también podrían proporcionar un marco para el diálogo en este ámbito, en particular con las partes interesadas pertinentes.

La Comisión es plenamente consciente de que la industria de pescado y marisco envasados es un elemento delicado en esta negociación. Teniendo esto en cuenta, en el acuerdo definitivo la UE intentará alcanzar un equilibrio razonable entre sus intereses de importación y exportación, a fin de tener en cuenta las necesidades de los proveedores de materias primas, los productores y los consumidores, garantizando al mismo tiempo de manera adecuada la protección de los intereses legítimos de este sector de la UE.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html?tabType=wq#sidesForm>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002894/13
to the Commission**

Antolín Sánchez Presedo (S&D)

(13 March 2013)

Subject: Free trade agreement with Thailand and child labour in the canning industry

Negotiations have recently begun for a free trade agreement between the EU and Thailand, the third largest EU trading partner in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), with bilateral trade of more than EUR 30 billion (EU exports of EUR 14.8 billion and imports of EUR 16.9 billion). The EU is the main international investor in this country.

Several weeks ago, the Finnish organisation Finnwatch reported on the practice of child labour and labour abuses in two of the main tinned tuna factories in Thailand that supply the EU and US markets (Unicord and Thai Union Manufacturing).

1. Can the Commission state whether it is aware of these reports of child labour and labour abuses in the Thai canning industry?
2. What controls are there to prevent products produced without respecting the fundamental rights from gaining access to the European and international market?
3. What new guarantees does the Commission plan to introduce in the new free trade agreement to ensure fair competition and prevent unfair competition?

With regard to the strictly trade-related content of the agreement, will the Commission prevent tariff and non-tariff conditions for the tinned tuna trade from unjustifiably damaging the European sector?

Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission

(2 May 2013)

The Commission is aware of the Finnwatch study. In this regard, it refers the Honourable Member to its reply to Question E-00618/2013 ⁽¹⁾.

The Commission works closely with the International Labour Organisation (ILO), which monitors the implementation of labour standards by Thailand under the ILO Conventions, including in the fisheries sector. Furthermore, the EU attaches great importance to including provisions on Trade and Sustainable Development in the recently launched Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations with Thailand. Promoting the effective implementation of core labour standards, including the elimination of child labour, forms an important part of this objective. The final trade and sustainable development provisions in the FTA could also provide a framework for dialogue in this area, including with relevant stakeholders.

The Commission is well aware of the sensitivities of the EU canned fish and seafood industry in this negotiation. Bearing that in mind, in the final agreement the EU will seek to strike a balance between its import and export interests, to take into account the needs of suppliers of raw materials, producers, and consumers, while adequately safeguarding legitimate interests of the EU sector.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html?tabType=wq#sidesForm>.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002896/13
alla Commissione**

Mario Borghezio (EFD)

(13 marzo 2013)

Oggetto: Costi sostenuti dal governo greco per la costruzione della moschea ad Atene

Il quotidiano «Ta Nea» rivela che, nonostante l'economia in profonda crisi, la recessione arrivata al sesto anno consecutivo e rigide misure di austerità che hanno falciato stipendi e pensioni, il governo greco ha deciso di spendere 846 000 EUR per costruire la prima moschea di Atene destinata ai residenti di fede islamica.

Recentemente si è tenuto a Istanbul un vertice del Consiglio di cooperazione fra Grecia e Turchia, rappresentato dai rispettivi Primi ministri. Sul tavolo delle discussioni vi era anche il progetto per la costruzione della moschea nella capitale greca con la collaborazione finanziaria del governo turco.

La Commissione europea sta finanziando questo progetto? E, in caso affermativo, ritiene utile questo intervento finanziario vista la grave crisi che l'Europa sta attraversando?

Risposta di Olli Rehn a nome della Commissione

(4 giugno 2013)

Le questioni sollevate dall'onorevole deputato non formano oggetto di discussione nel contesto del secondo programma di aggiustamento economico per la Grecia. Secondo le informazioni fornite dalle autorità greche, il progetto cui fa riferimento l'onorevole deputato non è cofinanziato dall'UE (FESR e FC).

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002896/13
to the Commission
Mario Borghezio (EFD)
(13 March 2013)**

Subject: Costs incurred by the Greek Government for the construction of the mosque in Athens

According to the newspaper *Ta Nea*, despite the profound economic crisis, the sixth consecutive year of recession and harsh austerity measures which have decimated wages and pensions, the Greek Government has decided to spend EUR 846 000 on building the first mosque in Athens, for Muslim citizens.

The Greek-Turkish High-Level Cooperation Council recently met in Istanbul, with the two prime ministers representing their countries. The agenda included the plan for the construction of the mosque in the Greek capital, with financial assistance from the Turkish Government.

Is the Commission financing this project? If so, does it consider this financial assistance to be helpful given the serious crisis Europe is currently undergoing?

**Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission
(4 June 2013)**

The issues raised by the Honourable Member are not being discussed in the context of the Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece. According to the information provided by the Greek authorities, the project to which the Honourable Member refers is not co-financed by EU funding (ERDF and CF).

(Nederlandse versie)

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002897/13
aan de Commissie
Esther de Lange (PPE) en Ivo Belet (PPE)
(13 maart 2013)**

Betref: Onderzoek Europese Commissie naar mogelijke staatssteun Nederlandse clubs en de Spaanse situatie

Op 6 maart startte de Commissie een grondig onderzoek naar overheidsfinanciering van vijf Nederlandse profvoetbalclubs. In vier gevallen gaat het daarbij om bedragen rond de 2 miljoen euro.

In september 2002 oordeelde de Commissie dat „er onvoldoende redenen waren” om verder onderzoek te doen naar het voordeel dat de voetbalclub Real Madrid genoot met de herbestemming van de gronden die de club in eigendom had en dat opliep tot 600 miljoen euro, omdat het herdefiniëren van „de nieuwe bestemming van het betrokken terrein geen betrekking blijkt te hebben op enige directe of indirecte overdracht van middelen door de stad Madrid of door de autonome gemeenschap van Madrid”.

Oordeelt de Commissie dat het onderscheid tussen de twee bovengenoemde zaken billijk is in het licht van een eerlijke concurrentie tussen voetbalclubs?

Heeft de Commissie alle rechtsargumenten uit bestaande rechtspraak nauwkeurig bestudeerd om na te gaan of het Verdrag inderdaad uitsluit een onderzoek te openen naar de steun aan voetbalclub Real Madrid?

**Antwoord van de heer Almunia namens de Commissie
(27 mei 2013)**

De feiten in deze twee zaken met betrekking tot professionele voetbalclubs verschillen sterk op enkele belangrijke punten. Het gaat met name om de vraag of een voordeel voor een club al dan niet het gevolg is van staatssteun.

De Commissie is van mening dat elke zaak moet worden beoordeeld op basis van de relevante feiten. Bijgevolg kunnen verschillen in de relevante feiten leiden tot verschillende resultaten bij de juridische beoordeling ervan. Dit is met name het geval wanneer de wetgeving zelf, alsook alle juridische argumenten uit de bestaande rechtspraak, zorgvuldig worden afgewogen.

De Commissie is niet op de hoogte van rechtspraak over het begrip staatsmiddelen die aanleiding geeft tot een heropening van het onderzoek naar Real Madrid uit 2002. Zij is echter wel een klacht aan het onderzoeken over een recentere en mogelijk bevoordelende ruil van onroerend goed tussen deze club en de stad Madrid.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002897/13
to the Commission**

Esther de Lange (PPE) and Ivo Belet (PPE)

(13 March 2013)

Subject: European Commission investigation into possible state aid for Dutch clubs and the situation in Spain

On 6 March the Commission began a thorough investigation into public funding at five Dutch professional football clubs. Four cases involve amounts of approximately EUR 2 million.

In September 2002 the Commission decided that 'there were insufficient grounds' for further investigation of the benefit enjoyed by the football club Real Madrid due to the rezoning of land in its possession, which amounted to 600 million euros, because the redefinition of 'the new qualification of the terrain in question does not appear to involve any direct or indirect transfer of resources by either the city of Madrid or the Autonomous Community of Madrid'.

Does the Commission take the view that the distinction between the two aforementioned cases is reasonable in view of fair competition between football clubs?

Has the Commission studied all the legal arguments from existing case-law carefully to determine whether the Treaty actually precludes the opening of an investigation into aid for the football club Real Madrid?

Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission

(27 May 2013)

Important elements of the facts in the two cases regarding professional football clubs are substantially different. This concerns in particular the issue of whether an advantage for a club is the consequence of the involvement of State financial resources.

The Commission takes the view that each case has to be assessed on the basis of the relevant facts. Thus, differences in the relevant facts may lead to different results of their legal assessment. This is in particular the case where the law itself and all the legal arguments from existing case-law are carefully considered.

Regarding Real Madrid, the Commission is not aware of any jurisprudence regarding the notion of State resources that would call for a reopening of the investigation of 2002. However, it is looking into a complaint regarding a more recent possibly advantageous real property swap between this club and the City of Madrid.

(Nederlandse versie)

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002898/13
aan de Commissie**

Esther de Lange (PPE) en Ivo Belet (PPE)

(13 maart 2013)

Betreeft: Onderzoek Europese Commissie naar mogelijke staatssteun Nederlandse clubs

Op 6 maart maakte de Commissie via een persbericht ⁽¹⁾ bekend dat er een onderzoek gestart zal worden naar mogelijke staatssteun door een vijftal Nederlandse gemeenten aan de betaaldvoetbalclubs (NEC, MVV, Willem II, PSV en FC Den Bosch) binnen hun gemeente. De Commissie geeft in hetzelfde persbericht aan op deze zaken geattendeerd te zijn door bezorgde burgers, en naar aanleiding daarvan informatie opgevraagd te hebben. Die informatie is de basis voor verder onderzoek.

1. Zijn de klachten van bezorgde burgers de enige aanleiding geweest tot het onderzoek naar de betreffende gemeenten?
2. Zo ja, is de Commissie met ons van mening dat er in dat geval een gevaar van willekeur ontstaat?
3. Zo nee, welke andere bronnen van informatie, signalen of mogelijke aanleidingen heeft de Commissie om het onderzoek naar deze gemeenten te starten?
4. In welke lidstaten heeft de Commissie op dit moment verzoeken tot informatie uitstaan, en op welke gemeenten en voetbalclubs hebben deze informatieaanvragen betrekking?

Antwoord van de heer Almunia namens de Commissie

(24 april 2013)

De Commissie heeft van burgers klachten over de maatregelen in kwestie ontvangen. Over sommige daarvan is ook bericht door de pers. Geen van de maatregelen is op voorhand bij de Commissie aangemeld, zoals artikel 108, lid 3, VWEU voorschrijft. In dat geval is het de taak van de Commissie om in te grijpen overeenkomstig artikel 10, lid 1, van Verordening (EG) nr. 659/1999 van de Raad, waarin is bepaald dat „indien de Commissie, uit welke bron ook, over informatie beschikt met betrekking tot beweerdelijk onrechtmatige steun, zij die informatie onverwijld aan een onderzoek onderwerpt”. De Commissie deelt bijgevolg niet het standpunt van de geachte Parlementsleden dat haar onderzoek naar die maatregelen willekeurig dreigt te zijn.

De Commissie levert geen commentaar op lopende onderzoeken die niet tot het publieke domein behoren. Over de volgende onderzoeken is reeds verslag uitgebracht in antwoorden aan het Europees Parlement of door de pers:

- onderzoek naar de regeling voor belasting- en socialezekerheidsverplichtingen van Spaanse voetbalclubs;
- klacht over de verkoop van een stuk grond tussen de stad Madrid en Real Madrid in 2011;
- onderzoek naar een maatregel van de regio Valencia ten gunste van drie voetbalclubs in financiële moeilijkheden in 2013;
- klachten over vermeende steun aan Tottenham Hotspurs en West Ham;
- klacht over vermeende steun aan niet-erkende Zweedse voetbalclubs.

⁽¹⁾ http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-192_nl.htm

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002898/13
to the Commission**

Esther de Lange (PPE) and Ivo Belet (PPE)

(13 March 2013)

Subject: European Commission investigation into possible state aid for Dutch clubs

In a press release on 6 March ⁽¹⁾, the Commission announced that an investigation was to be opened into possible public funding by five Dutch municipalities of professional football clubs (NEC, MVV, Willem II, PSV and FC Den Bosch) within their municipality. In the same press release, the Commission stated that it was alerted to these cases by concerned citizens, and consequently asked for information in this regard. This information forms the basis of further investigation.

1. Were concerned citizens' complaints the only reason for the investigation into the municipalities concerned?
2. If so, does the Commission share our view that in that case there is a risk of arbitrariness?
3. If not, what other sources of information, signals or possible reasons does the Commission have for starting an investigation into these municipalities?
4. In which Member States does the Commission currently have outstanding requests for information, and to which municipalities and football clubs do these requests for information relate?

Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission

(24 April 2013)

The Commission had received complaints from citizens about the interventions in question, some of which had also been reported in the press. None of the interventions had been notified in advance to the Commission, as prescribed in Article 108(3) TFEU. In this situation, the Commission has a duty to intervene in accordance with Article 10(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 stating that 'where the Commission has in its possession information from whatever source regarding alleged unlawful aid, it shall examine that information without delay.' The Commission therefore does not share the view of the Honourable Members that its investigation into those measures risks being arbitrary.

The Commission cannot comment on pending investigations which are not in the public domain. The following investigations have been reported in replies to the European Parliament or in the press:

- investigation of the treatment of tax and social security liabilities of Spanish football clubs;
- complaint about a land transaction between the city of Madrid and Real Madrid in 2011;
- investigation of an intervention by the Valencia region in 2013 in favour of three football clubs facing financial difficulties;
- complaints concerning alleged aid to Tottenham Hotspurs and West Ham;
- complaint alleging aid to not incorporated Swedish football clubs.

⁽¹⁾ http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-192_nl.htm

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002899/13
aan de Commissie
Mark Demesmaeker (Verts/ALE), Ivo Belet (PPE) en Philippe De Backer (ALDE)
(13 maart 2013)

Betreeft: Convenant rond Demografische Veranderingen

2012 was het Europees Jaar van actief ouder worden en solidariteit tussen de generaties. De EU onderstreepte hiermee de belangrijke bijdrage van ouderen aan de samenleving. Helaas moeten we vaststellen (Special Eurobarometer 393) dat ouderen nog steeds discriminatie ondervinden bij de toegang tot de arbeidsmarkt en tot goederen en diensten.

Organisaties zoals onder andere AGE Platform Europe zijn daarom van mening dat de ontwikkeling van een leeftijdsvriendelijke omgeving de actieve bijdrage van alle generaties aan de samenleving kan en moet ondersteunen. Aanpassing van de werkomgeving aan de vergrijzende bevolking kan het verspillen van menselijk kapitaal tegengaan en tegelijk een bijdrage leveren aan het halen van de Europa 2020-doelstellingen. Dit vergt een gecoördineerd beleid op Europees, nationaal, regionaal en lokaal niveau vanuit eenzelfde visie op een maatschappij voor alle leeftijden.

In een brief van 3 oktober 2012 roept AGE Platform Europe de Commissie daarom op een Convenant rond Demografische Veranderingen te lanceren naar analogie met de door de Commissie gesteunde „Covenant of Mayors on energy and climate”. Dit convenant moet de lokale en regionale overheden, die oplossingen op het gebied van innovatie, slimme gezondheid en beter leven — ter ondersteuning van het plan „Actief en gezond ouder worden” — willen promoten, bijeen brengen. Dit voorstel vindt ook steun bij het Comité van de Regio's.

1. Heeft de voorzitter van de Commissie het schrijven het AGE Platform Europe goed ontvangen?
2. Hoe staat de Commissie tegenover de idee van een Convenant rond Demografische Veranderingen?
3. Zal de Commissie actie ondernemen om de lancering van het Convenant rond Demografische Veranderingen te ondersteunen?

Antwoord van de heer Andor namens de Commissie
(14 mei 2013)

De Commissie is zich terdege bewust van het voorstel om een Burgemeestersconvenant rond demografische veranderingen, zoals dat door het AGE Platform Europe en het Comité van de Regio's ondersteund wordt, op te stellen. Steden zijn meestal verantwoordelijk voor het verschaffen van sociale, woon- en transportdiensten, voor stedenbouwkundige planning en voor het organiseren van vrijetijds-, sociale en culturele activiteiten. Daarom spelen lokale beleidsmakers een belangrijke rol bij het bevorderen van actief ouder worden en het verbeteren van de levenskwaliteit van ouderen.

Om deze reden heeft de Commissie gedurende het Europees jaar van actief ouder worden en solidariteit tussen de generaties van 2012 het netwerk van leeftijdsvriendelijke steden, dat door de Wereldgezondheidsorganisatie (WHO) geleid wordt, aangemoedigd. Eén van de acties van de Commissie in het kader van de follow-up van het Europees jaar 2012 betreft de voorbereiding van een gezamenlijk project met de WHO om de Global Age-friendly Cities Guide van de WHO aan te passen aan de Europese context en de ontwikkeling van een meetinstrument. Dit project, waarin het AGE Platform en netwerken van Europese regio's en steden (Eurocities, CEMR) betrokken zullen worden, zou mogelijk kunnen bijdragen aan een Convenant rond demografische veranderingen. In het kader van het Europees innovatiepartnerschap inzake actief en gezond ouder worden⁽¹⁾, streeft de actiegroep voor „Innovatie voor ouderenriendelijke gebouwen en steden en een ouderenriendelijke woonomgeving” naar een EU-Convenant rond demografische veranderingen. De belanghebbenden die meedoen met deze actiegroep zullen een campagne opzetten en voeren om politieke steun voor een EU-Convenant rond demografische veranderingen op te bouwen. De Commissie ondersteunt hun werk en kijkt uit naar de resultaten.

Om de toegankelijkheid van Europese steden voor gehandicapten en ouderen te bevorderen, reikt de Commissie sinds 2010 een jaarlijkse Access City Award uit⁽²⁾.

⁽¹⁾ webgate.ec.europa.eu/eiponaha.

⁽²⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/disabilities/award/index_en.htm

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002899/13
to the Commission**

Mark Demesmaeker (Verts/ALE), Ivo Belet (PPE) and Philippe De Backer (ALDE)

(13 March 2013)

Subject: Covenant on demographic change

2012 was the European Year for Active Ageing and Solidarity between Generations, a way for the EU to underline the important contribution of older people to society. Unfortunately, we must conclude (Special Eurobarometer 393) that older people still experience discrimination when accessing the labour market and goods and services.

Organisations such as AGE Platform Europe, among others, therefore take the view that the development of an age-friendly environment can and must support the active contribution of all generations to society. Adjustment of the working environment to the ageing population can counteract the wasting of human resources while at the same time contributing to the attainment of the Europe 2020 objectives. This requires a coordinated policy at European, national, regional and local level based on a single vision of a society for all ages.

In a letter of 3 October 2012, AGE Platform Europe therefore calls on the Commission to launch a Covenant on demographic change by analogy with the 'Covenant of Mayors on energy and climate' supported by the Commission. This covenant must bring together local and regional authorities that want to promote solutions in the field of innovation, smart health and a better life — in support of the 'Active and healthy ageing' plan. This proposal is also supported by the Committee of the Regions.

1. Was the letter from AGE Platform Europe well received by the President of the Commission?
2. How does the Commission view the idea of a Covenant on demographic change?
3. Will the Commission take action to support the launching of the Covenant on demographic change?

Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission

(14 May 2013)

The Commission is well aware of the proposal for creating a covenant of mayors on demographic change as supported by the AGE Platform Europe and the Committee of the Regions. Cities are typically in charge of providing social, housing and transport services, of urban planning and of organising leisure, social and cultural activities. Therefore local policy-makers play a major role in promoting active ageing and improving the quality of life of older people.

For this reason the Commission has promoted during the European Year 2012 for Active Ageing and Solidarity between Generations the network of age-friendly cities run by the World Health Organisation (WHO). As a follow-up action to the European Year 2012 the Commission is preparing a joint project with the WHO to adapt the Global Age-friendly Cities Guide of WHO to the European context and to develop a monitoring tool. This project in which the AGE Platform and networks of European regions and cities (Eurocities, CEMR) will be involved could possibly contribute to Covenant on demographic change. In the frame of the European Innovation Partnership on Active and Healthy Ageing (EIP on AHA) ⁽¹⁾ the Action Group on 'Innovation for age-friendly, buildings cities and environments' promotes an EU covenant on demographic change. The stakeholders committed to this Action Group will build and run a campaign to gather political support for an EU covenant on demographic change. The Commission is supporting their work and looks forward to the outcomes.

In order to promote the accessibility of EU cities to disabled persons and older people, the Commission organises since 2010 the annual Access City Award ⁽²⁾

⁽¹⁾ webgate.ec.europa.eu/eiponaha

⁽²⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/disabilities/award/index_en.htm

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002900/13
aan de Commissie
Mark Demesmaeker (Verts/ALE) en Ivo Belet (PPE)
(13 maart 2013)

Betreeft: Minimuminkomen in Europa

In zijn resolutie van 15 november 2011 over het Europees platform tegen armoede en sociale uitsluiting (P7_TA(2011)0495) roept het Parlement de Commissie op om de mogelijkheden te onderzoeken voor het nemen van een wetgevinginitiatief voor een economisch duurzaam minimuminkomen. De economische recessie treft de meest kwetsbare burgers in veel lidstaten het zwaarste. Ook het risico op armoede bij gepensioneerden dreigt onder druk van de vergrijzing en de financiële crisis toe te nemen. Dit bemoeilijkt het behalen van de Europa 2020-doelstelling voor armoedebestrijding.

1. Welke maatregelen heeft de Commissie genomen in opvolging van bovengenoemde resolutie van het Parlement?
2. Overweegt de Commissie specifieke maatregelen te nemen in de strijd tegen armoede bij gepensioneerden?
3. Wat is de positie van de Commissie aangaande de invoering van een onvoorwaardelijk minimuminkomen voor iedere burger?

Antwoord van de heer Andor namens de Commissie
(7 mei 2013)

1. Het bevorderen van het minimuminkomen blijft een van de pijlers van de aanbeveling van de Commissie van 2008 over actieve inclusie. In haar op 20 februari 2013 aangenomen pakket sociale-investeringsmaatregelen ⁽¹⁾ en het daaraan gehechte werkdocument van de diensten van de Commissie over actieve inclusie geeft de Commissie een gedetailleerde analyse van de manier waarop de lidstaten de aanbeveling ten uitvoer hebben gelegd, waaruit de beste praktijken in de EU naar voren komen. De Commissie werkt op verzoek van het Europees Parlement momenteel aan de uitvoering van een proefproject van 1 miljoen EUR (2011) ter bevordering van de totstandbrenging van een minimuminkomennetwerk en zal in de komende maanden de aanbesteding voor het tweede proefproject (1 miljoen euro, 2012) van start laten gaan om het belang van het beschermen van het minimuminkomen in de lidstaten nog meer onder de aandacht te brengen.
2. In het algemeen zijn gepensioneerden beter beschermd in de crisis dan andere leeftijdsgroepen die uitkeringen ontvangen ⁽²⁾. Toch onderstreept de Commissie en het Comité voor sociale bescherming in het verslag over de adequaatheid van de pensioenen ⁽³⁾ hoe belangrijk de hoogte van pensioenuitkeringen is voor het behalen van de doelstelling voor armoedebestrijding in het kader van Europa 2020. Bovendien volgt de Commissie in het kader van het Europees semester de ontwikkelingen in de armoedecijfers voor personen van 65 jaar en ouder en overweegt zij de lidstaten te vragen of het nodig is deze kwestie in de landspecifieke aanbevelingen aan te kaarten.
3. Het standpunt van de Commissie over de minimale inkomenssteun komt tot uiting in de aanbeveling van de Commissie van 2008 over actieve inclusie ⁽⁴⁾, en korter geleden ook in het pakket sociale-investeringsmaatregelen, waarin de Commissie onder meer heeft aangekondigd samen met de lidstaten een gemeenschappelijke methode voor referentiebudgets te zullen ontwikkelen, die bij moet dragen tot het opzetten van doelmatige en passende inkomenssteun waarin rekening wordt gehouden met sociale behoeften op lokaal, regionaal en nationaal niveau ⁽⁵⁾.

⁽¹⁾ COM(2013) 83 definitief: <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=1044&newsId=1807&furtherNews=yes>.

⁽²⁾ OESO: Pensions Outlook: <http://www.aafp.cl/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/OECD-Pensions-Outlook.pdf>

⁽³⁾ Verslag over de adequaatheid van de pensioenen in de EU 2010-2050: <http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=7805&langId=en>.

⁽⁴⁾ Aanbeveling van de Commissie van 3 oktober 2008 over de actieve inclusie van personen die van de arbeidsmarkt zijn uitgesloten (2008/867/EG, PBL 307 van 18 november 2008).

⁽⁵⁾ Zie de Mededeling van de Commissie aan het Europees Parlement, de Raad, het Europees Economisch en Sociaal Comité en het Comité van de Regio's Naar sociale investering voor groei en cohesie — inclusief de uitvoering van het Europees Sociaal Fonds 2014-2020, COM/2013/083 final.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002900/13
to the Commission
Mark Demesmaeker (Verts/ALE) and Ivo Belet (PPE)
(13 March 2013)

Subject: Minimum income in Europe

In its resolution of 15 November 2011 on the European Platform against Poverty and Social Exclusion (P7_TA(2011)0495), the European Parliament calls on the Commission to explore the possibilities of taking a legislative initiative for an economically sustainable minimum income. The recession hits the most vulnerable citizens in many Member States the hardest. The risk of poverty among pensioners is also in danger of increasing under the pressure of ageing and the financial crisis. This is an obstacle to the achievement of the Europe 2020 objective of poverty reduction.

1. What steps has the Commission taken following the aforementioned resolution by Parliament?
2. Is the Commission considering taking specific steps in the fight against poverty among pensioners?
3. What is the Commission's position on the introduction of an unconditional minimum income for every citizen?

Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission
(7 May 2013)

1. Promoting minimum income remains one of the pillars of the Commission Recommendation of 2008 on active inclusion. In its Social Investment Package ⁽¹⁾ adopted on 20 February 2013 and the annexed Staff Working Document on active inclusion, the Commission makes a detailed analysis on how Member States implemented the recommendation, evidencing best practices across the EU. The Commission is currently implementing a European Parliament commissioned Pilot Project of EUR 1 million (2011) to promote the creation of a minimum income network and will be launching in the next months the tender for the second Pilot Project (EUR 1 million, 2012) to further advance the importance of minimum income protection in the Member States.

2. Generally, pensioners have been better protected in the crisis than other age groups drawing transfer benefits ⁽²⁾. Yet, in the report on Pension Adequacy ⁽³⁾ the Commission with the Social Protection Committee has highlighted the importance of the level of pension benefits for the ability to achieve the Europe 2020 poverty reduction target. Moreover, in the context of the European Semester the Commission is monitoring developments in poverty rates for people aged 65 and above and considering whether there is a need to ask Member States to address this in the Country Specific Recommendations.

3. The Commission position on minimum income support is reflected in the 2008 Recommendation on active inclusion ⁽⁴⁾, and more recently, in the Social Investment Package in which the Commission, among others, announced the development together with the Member States of a common methodology on reference budgets to help designing efficient and adequate income support that takes into account social needs identified at local, regional and national level ⁽⁵⁾.

⁽¹⁾ COM(2013) 83 final : <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=1044&newsId=1807&furtherNews=yes>.

⁽²⁾ OECD: Pensions Outlook: <http://www.aafp.cl/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/OECD-Pensions-Outlook.pdf>

⁽³⁾ Report on Pension Adequacy in the EU 2010-2050: <http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=7805&langId=en>.

⁽⁴⁾ See Commission Recommendation of 3.10.2008 on the active inclusion of people excluded from the labour market (2008/867/EC published in the OJ L 307/11 of 18.11.2008).

⁽⁵⁾ See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Towards Social Investment for Growth and Cohesion — including implementing the European Social Fund 2014-2020 /* COM/2013/083 final */.

(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung P-002901/13
an die Kommission (Vizepräsidentin/Hohe Vertreterin)
Josef Weidenholzer (S&D)
(13. März 2013)**

Betrifft: VP/HR — Wahlen in Kambodscha

Kambodschanischen Medien zufolge plant die Europäische Union die für den 28. Juli 2013 anberaumten Parlamentswahlen durch die Entsendung zweier technischer Experten zu unterstützen. Diese sollen dem von allen oppositionellen Kräften im Land abgelehnten National Election Committee zur Seite stehen. Das National Election Committee hat im Vorfeld der kommenden Wahlen in Kambodscha die beiden Mitglieder des Parlaments Sam Rainsy und Tiouloung Saumara von der Wählerliste gestrichen und sie so ihres Rechtes wieder anzutreten beraubt.

1. Welche Entwicklungen in Kambodscha haben die Hohe Vertreterin zu dieser Maßnahme bewogen?
2. Hat sich der Auswärtige Dienst der Europäischen Union mit der gegenwärtigen Situation der Versammlungs- und Redefreiheit in Kambodscha, einer unverzichtbaren Voraussetzung für freie Wahlen, auseinandergesetzt?
3. Ist der Hohen Vertreterin bewusst, dass mit dieser Entscheidung die Gefahr besteht, dass die Europäische Union als Feigenblatt benutzt wird, um einem undemokratischen Regime Legitimität zu verschaffen?

**Antwort von Frau Ashton — Hohe Vertreterin/Vizepräsidentin im Namen der Kommission
(22. April 2013)**

1. Nach drei aufeinanderfolgenden EU-Wahlbeobachtungsmissionen (EU-EOM) in den Jahren 2002, 2003 und 2008 standen die nächsten Parlamentswahlen vom Juli 2013 in Kambodscha nicht auf der Prioritätenliste für die EU-Wahlbeobachtungsmissionen im Jahr 2013. Die Entscheidung wurde nach Konsultationen mit den Mitgliedstaaten und dem Europäischen Parlament getroffen. Die technische Wahlexpertenmission, die ein sehr eng gefasstes Mandat hat, besteht aus zwei Sachverständigen. Sie werden den Wahlprozess verfolgen, den EU-Organen darüber Bericht erstatten und auf die Empfehlungen der bisherigen EU-Wahlbeobachtungsmissionen hinweisen.

2. Bei seinem Treffen mit dem kambodschanischen Premierminister Hun Sen anlässlich seines Besuches vom 2. bis 4. November 2012 in Kambodscha hat der Präsident des Europäischen Rates nachdrücklich hervorgehoben, wie wichtig die Wahrung der Menschenrechte und die Rechtsstaatlichkeit sind, um günstige Rahmenbedingungen für transparente, demokratische und allen offen stehende Wahlen zu schaffen, bei denen die Wähler, die Kandidaten und die Kommentatoren ihre grundlegenden politischen Rechte ausüben können.

Im Anschluss rief der Leiter der EU-Delegation in Kambodscha am 18. Februar 2013 den kambodschanischen Premierminister Hun Sen im Rahmen einer Demarche auf, ein offenes und förderliches Klima für die Wahlen im Juli 2013 zu schaffen, u. a. in den Bereichen Versammlungsfreiheit und Meinungsfreiheit.

3. Die beiden technischen Sachverständigen sind keine Wahlbeobachter, da es sich nicht um eine EU-Wahlbeobachtungsmission handelt, bei der die Methodik für EU-Wahlbeobachtungsmissionen angewandt wird. Sie sollen vielmehr als Fachleute den EU-Organen ein besseres Verständnis der lokalen Gegebenheiten ermöglichen. Die Unterstützung der Behörden gehört daher nicht zu ihrem Mandat. Sie werden zudem Neutralität wahren und mit allen Interessengruppen einschließlich der Opposition zusammentreffen.

(English version)

**Question for written answer P-002901/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

Josef Weidenholzer (S&D)

(13 March 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Elections in Cambodia

Reports in the Cambodian press state that the EU is planning to send two technical experts to assist with the parliamentary elections, due to take place on 28 July 2013. Their task will be to assist the National Election Committee, which is rejected by all opposition groups in the country. In the build-up to the elections, the National Election Committee has removed the names of the MPs Sam Rainsy and Tioulong Saumara from the voting list, thereby depriving them of their right to stand again.

1. What developments in Cambodia have caused the High Representative to take this step?
2. Has the EU's External Action Service taken issue with the current situation of the freedom of assembly and of speech in Cambodia, which are an essential precondition for free elections?
3. Is the High Representative aware that this decision might cause the EU to be used as a front, veiling an undemocratic regime in a cloak of legitimacy?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(22 April 2013)

1. After three consecutive EU Election Observation Missions (EU EOMs) in 2002, 2003 and 2008, the priority list for the EU EOMs in 2013 did not include Cambodia for the next parliamentary elections of July 2013. This decision was adopted after consultations with the Member States and Parliament. The technical Election Expert Mission of two experts, whose mandate is much narrower, will follow the electoral process and report to the EU institutions, as well as underlining past EU EOM's recommendations.

2. In his meeting with Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen on the occasion of his visit to the country on 2-4 November 2012, the President of the European Council strongly underlined the importance of respect for Human Rights and the rule of law to create an environment conducive to transparent, democratic and inclusive elections, where the voter, the candidate and the commentator can exert their basic political rights.

As a follow-up, on the 18 February 2013, the Head of the EU Delegation to Cambodia delivered a *démarche* to Cambodia's Prime Minister Hun Sen, calling for an open and conducive environment for the upcoming elections in July 2013, including freedom of assembly and freedom of speech.

3. The two technical experts will not be election observers, as there is no EU EOM applying the EU Election Observation methodology. They will rather be specialists to help the EU institutions understand the vicissitudes of the local context. In this regard, their mandate is not to help the authorities. They will also be neutral and meet all stakeholders in the process including the opposition.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002902/13
a la Comisión**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(13 de marzo de 2013)

Asunto: Creación de un consejo presupuestario independiente según el reglamento derivado de la propuesta 2011/0386(COD)

El artículo 4 de la propuesta de Reglamento sobre disposiciones comunes para el seguimiento y la evaluación de proyectos de planes presupuestarios y para la corrección del déficit excesivo de los Estados miembros de la zona del euro dice que los Estados miembros deberán crear un consejo presupuestario independiente ⁽¹⁾.

En su considerando 10 quater se pone el énfasis en que se debe mantener un control sobre la ejecución del presupuesto y se dice literalmente: «Como primer paso, los Estados miembros interesados deben llevar a cabo una evaluación global de la ejecución presupuestaria de las administraciones públicas y sus subsectores». El objetivo es que el gobierno no tome decisiones de forma discrecional que puedan laminar las decisiones tomadas en los presupuestos.

En los próximos meses, el Gobierno español hará una propuesta de ley para la creación de un consejo presupuestario independiente. En el Estado español ha habido en los últimos años problemas con una ejecución discrecional del presupuesto por parte del Gobierno ⁽²⁾.

A la luz de todo lo anterior, ¿cree la Comisión que el consejo presupuestario independiente debería también tener poderes para analizar y asegurar la correcta y rigurosa ejecución del presupuesto, de acuerdo con el reglamento derivado de la propuesta 2011/0386(COD)?

Respuesta del Sr. Rehn en nombre de la Comisión

(18 de abril de 2013)

Los consejos presupuestarios independientes desempeñan una función esencial de cara a favorecer la aplicación de una política presupuestaria eficaz, fiable y realista, que permita lograr unas finanzas públicas sólidas y sostenibles. Esta función está actualmente reconocida no solo en la teoría económica, sino también como característica fundamental del marco de gobernanza económica reforzada de la Unión Europea. Las principales iniciativas políticas a escala europea (la Directiva 2011/85/UE del Consejo, sobre los requisitos aplicables a los marcos presupuestarios de los Estados miembros ⁽³⁾, el Tratado de Estabilidad, Coordinación y Gobernanza en la Unión Económica y Monetaria, y los futuros dos Reglamentos relativos a un seguimiento presupuestario reforzado) prevén la creación de esos órganos presupuestarios independientes, y especifican una serie de cometidos fundamentales, que van desde el control del cumplimiento de las normas presupuestarias nacionales (entre ellas, las que incorporan el objetivo presupuestario a medio plazo al ordenamiento jurídico nacional) a la aplicación del mecanismo de corrección presupuestaria nacional conexas a una norma sobre el equilibrio presupuestario en términos estructurales. El desempeño de estos cometidos exige, entre otras cosas, el control de la ejecución presupuestaria (a fin de poder verificar si se cumplen las normas presupuestarias nacionales, por ejemplo).

Más allá de los cometidos obligatorios, los Estados miembros son libres de dotar a sus consejos presupuestarios de funciones más amplias, al objeto de obtener mayor beneficio de los análisis y opiniones independientes que aquellos puedan proporcionar en relación con aspectos esenciales de las políticas presupuestarias.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.elconfidencial.com/espana/2013/03/08/el-gobierno-creara-un-consejo-presupuestario-que-haga-cumplir-con-el-deficit--116491/>

⁽²⁾ <http://www.lavanguardia.com/economia/20121003/54352219840/gobierno-ejecuto-catalunya-35-presupuestado-frente-111-madrid.html>

⁽³⁾ DO L 306 de 28.11.1996, p. 1.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002902/13
to the Commission**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(13 March 2013)

Subject: Creation of an independent fiscal council in accordance with the regulation resulting from proposal 2011/0386(COD)

Article 4 of the proposal for a regulation on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area states that Member States must create an independent fiscal council ⁽¹⁾.

Recital 10c stresses the fact that control should be maintained over the execution of the budget. It states: '[a]s a first step, Member States concerned should carry out a comprehensive assessment of in-year budgetary execution for the general government and its sub-sectors'. The aim is to avoid the government taking discretionary decisions which might distort decisions taken in the budgets.

In the next few months, the Spanish Government will draw up a proposal for a law for the creation of an independent fiscal council. In recent years, Spain has experienced problems with discretionary execution of the budget by the government ⁽²⁾.

In view of the above, does the Commission think that the independent fiscal council should also have powers to analyse and ensure the correct and rigorous execution of the budget, in accordance with the regulation resulting from proposal 2011/0386(COD)?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission

(18 April 2013)

Independent fiscal councils are instrumental in supporting the pursuit of an effective, credible and realistic fiscal policy with a view to achieving sound and sustainable public finances. This role is now recognised not only in the economic theory, but also as an essential feature of the strengthened economic governance framework in the European Union. Major policy initiatives at European level (Council Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States ⁽³⁾, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union and the forthcoming 'Two-Pack' regulation on enhanced budgetary monitoring) mandate the setting-up of such independent fiscal institutions and lay down a set of core tasks ranging from monitoring compliance with national fiscal rules (including those incorporating the medium-term budgetary objective in the national law) to their role in the implementation of the national fiscal correction mechanism associated to a structural budget balance rule. Fulfilling these tasks would require inter alia monitoring of budgetary execution (to be able to check compliance with national fiscal rules, for example).

Beyond the mandatory requirements, the Member States are free to define a broader remit for their fiscal councils in order to benefit more extensively from the independent assessments and opinions they could provide on key aspects of the national fiscal policy-making.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.elconfidencial.com/espana/2013/03/08/el-gobierno-creara-un-fiscal-council-que-haga-cumplir-con-el-deficit--116491/>.

⁽²⁾ <http://www.lavanguardia.com/economia/20121003/54352219840/gobierno-ejecuto-catalunya-35-presupuestado-frente-111-madrid.html>

⁽³⁾ OJ L 306, 23.11.2011.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002903/13
to the Commission**

Keith Taylor (Verts/ALE)

(13 March 2013)

Subject: Clarifications regarding Transparency Register review

The interinstitutional agreement of June 2011 on the establishment of a joint European Commission-Parliament Transparency Register foresees that the register shall be subject to a review no later than two years following its entry into operation.

A recent EU Citizens opinion survey ⁽¹⁾ conducted in six EU countries (Austria, Czech Republic, France, the Netherlands, and the UK) of over 6 000 respondents found that 80% believe there should be mandatory regulation of lobbying to ensure a balanced participation of different interests in decision-making. This is in line with the European Parliament Resolution of May 2011 in favour of a mandatory register for lobbyists.

In addition, in a speech given on March 15 ⁽²⁾ Commissioner Maros Šefcovič mentioned a meeting with European Parliament Vice-President for Transparency Rainer Wieland, where they discussed the timeline and the process for the review of the transparency register ('We met a few days ago to set our course and I can assure you that we both take the review process very seriously. This is why we have decided to take the necessary time to develop our analysis and our reflections in a timespan that allows for a wide range of consultations to take place both internally and externally.').

1. Following this meeting, can the Commission clarify what the proposed timeline for this review is and what concrete steps it will take to make it a fully participative and open process?
2. According to what the Commissioner and Vice-President discussed, can the Commission clarify how the Commission and the Parliament intend to ensure that the views and suggestions of the citizens concerning improvement of the current Transparency Register can be fully expressed and taken into account in the forthcoming review process?

Answer given by Mr Šefcovič on behalf of the Commission

(8 May 2013)

The review is a joint exercise between the European Parliament and the European Commission. It will consider the views expressed by stakeholders during the public consultation held last year and during the process itself. The Commission cannot comment more until the instances of the Parliament have adopted their own decision on how they wish to proceed.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.foeeurope.org/EUcitizenspoll>

⁽²⁾ http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-235_en.htm

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002905/13
alla Commissione
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)
(13 marzo 2013)**

Oggetto: Sigarette elettroniche: chiarimenti sulla commercializzazione negli Stati membri e sugli studi scientifici effettuati

In seguito alla risposta ricevuta alla mia interrogazione E-000463/2013 sul livello di sicurezza delle sigarette elettroniche, la Commissione può chiarire:

- se vi sono Stati membri in cui le sigarette elettroniche sono commercializzate come prodotti medicinali;
- se in questi Stati si applica quindi la legislazione farmaceutica per quanto riguarda le vendite al consumatore finale;
- se, considerata la grandissima diffusione sul territorio italiano di rivendite di questi prodotti, ha valutato il danno economico e l'impatto su tale mercato, nel caso entrassero in vigore le modifiche proposte dalla Commissione nel documento COM(2012)0788 e tali prodotti venissero venduti solo nelle farmacie;
- se vi sono studi scientifici che dimostrano la non pericolosità delle sigarette elettroniche;
- se le sigarette elettroniche possono essere considerate uno strumento utile per smettere di fumare?

**Risposta di Tonio Borg a nome della Commissione
(8 maggio 2013)**

Gli Stati membri hanno finora seguito impostazioni differenti nel regolamentare le sigarette elettroniche. Circa la metà degli Stati membri considera le sigarette elettroniche e gli altri prodotti contenenti nicotina come prodotti medicinali per analogia funzionale ⁽¹⁾.

La valutazione della Commissione sulle ripercussioni economiche della proposta è riportata nella valutazione d'impatto della Commissione ⁽²⁾. Si ritiene che la proposta della Commissione in merito alla revisione della direttiva relativa ai prodotti del tabacco ⁽³⁾ non abbia grandi ripercussioni sul mercato italiano. La proposta stabilisce che i prodotti contenenti un determinato livello di nicotina siano soggetti alla normativa sui prodotti medicinali.

Secondo quanto affermato nella valutazione d'impatto le sigarette elettroniche attualmente in commercio suscitano qualche perplessità in quanto a salute e sicurezza. Secondo alcuni studi le sigarette elettroniche possono tuttavia essere uno strumento utile per smettere di fumare.

⁽¹⁾ SWD(2012)452 definitivo.

⁽²⁾ SWD(2012)452 definitivo.

⁽³⁾ COM(2012)0788.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002905/13
to the Commission
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)
(13 March 2013)**

Subject: Electronic cigarettes: clarifications on marketing in Member States and the scientific studies carried out

Following the answer received to my Question E-000463/2013 on the safety of electronic cigarettes, can the Commission clarify:

- whether there are Member States in which electronic cigarettes are marketed as medicinal products?
- whether in those States pharmaceutical legislation therefore applies to sales to final consumers?
- whether, in view of the extremely widespread sale of these products in Italy, it has assessed the economic damage to and impact on this market in the event of the entry into force of the amendments proposed by the Commission in document COM(2012)0788, under which such products would be sold only in pharmacies?
- whether there are any scientific studies demonstrating that electronic cigarettes are not dangerous?
- whether electronic cigarettes may be considered a useful tool for stopping smoking?

**Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission
(8 May 2013)**

Member States have so far taken different regulatory approaches to address electronic cigarettes. About half of the Member States have reported that they consider electronic cigarettes and other nicotine containing products as medicinal products by function ⁽¹⁾.

The Commission's assessment of the economic impacts of the proposal is set out in the Commission's Impact Assessment ⁽²⁾. The Commission's proposal for a revised Tobacco Products Directive ⁽³⁾ is not expected to impact disproportionately on the Italian market. The proposal foresees that products which contain a certain nicotine level are subject to the medicinal products' legislation.

As illustrated by the impact assessment, electronic cigarettes which are currently on the market are associated with a number of health and safety concerns. However, some studies highlight electronic cigarettes' potential as smoking cessation aid.

⁽¹⁾ SWD(2012) 452 final.

⁽²⁾ SWD(2012) 452 final.

⁽³⁾ COM(2012)0788.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002906/13
alla Commissione
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)
(13 marzo 2013)**

Oggetto: Scandalo della carne di cavallo: possibile correlazione con la crisi del settore ippico

Si moltiplicano i casi di cronaca che vedono gruppi alimentari operativi in tutta Europa ritirare i propri prodotti a base di carne di manzo perché contenenti anche di carne di cavallo.

Nella mia interrogazione E-000483/2012 avevo sollevato il problema della crisi del settore ippico in Italia e in Europa e del rischio che migliaia di animali prima destinati alle corse venissero inviati alla macellazione.

Può la Commissione far sapere:

1. intende far partire un'indagine per accertare le responsabilità delle aziende coinvolte;
2. se ritiene sospetto il fatto che prima dell'esposizione mediatica nessuno dei controlli, che dovrebbero essere obbligatori da parte delle società in questione, sulle materie prime utilizzate per i propri preparati avessero rivelato la presenza di dna di cavallo;
3. se ritiene possibile un legame fra i fatti sopra descritti e il recente scandalo;
4. se ha valutato il rischio che i cittadini europei abbiano consumato o consumino carne di animali destinati alle corse, spesso trattati con antibiotici, anabolizzanti e ormoni nocivi per la salute degli esseri umani?

**Risposta di Tonio Borg a nome della Commissione
(8 maggio 2013)**

La Commissione sta seguendo attentamente lo scandalo della carne di cavallo venduta come carne di manzo. Le autorità competenti dei rispettivi Stati membri stanno indagando in collaborazione con le autorità di polizia e l'EUROPOL in merito alla frode suddetta.

La normativa UE non vincola gli Stati ad effettuare controlli per rilevare i tipi di carne effettivamente contenuti nei vari prodotti. In quanto primi responsabili dei prodotti posti in commercio gli operatori del settore alimentare effettuano controlli in base alla valutazione dei rischi e ai loro rispettivi piani di controllo. Dopo gli scandali recenti gli operatori del settore alimentare hanno aumentato sensibilmente i controlli in materia.

Ai sensi delle norme vigenti ⁽¹⁾ l'etichettatura degli alimenti non deve trarre in inganno i consumatori quanto alla natura e al contenuto dei prodotti; tutti gli ingredienti devono essere indicati sull'etichetta e le etichette degli alimenti contenenti carni devono anche indicare le specie animali di provenienza.

La Commissione non è in possesso di prove attestanti il legame tra gli scandali recenti e ciò cui l'onorevole parlamentare ha fatto riferimento nella Sua domanda precedente.

La raccomandazione 2013/99/UE della Commissione ⁽²⁾ dispone che si metta a punto un piano d'azione specifico per individuare eventuali residui di fenilbutazone nella carne equina. Uno degli obiettivi di tale raccomandazione consiste nel valutare i rischi rappresentati per i consumatori da eventuali residui della sostanza sopra menzionata. I risultati di tale valutazione avvalorano l'ipotesi che la carne equina destinata al consumo umano abbia una probabilità minima di contenere residui di fenilbutazone (solo lo 0,51 % dei campioni conteneva effettivamente questa sostanza).

⁽¹⁾ Direttiva 2000/13/CE del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 20 marzo 2000, relativa al ravvicinamento delle legislazioni degli Stati membri concernenti l'etichettatura e la presentazione dei prodotti alimentari, nonché la relativa pubblicità, G.U. L 109 del 6.5.2000, pag. 29.

⁽²⁾ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:048:0028:0032:it:PDF>.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002906/13
to the Commission
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)
(13 March 2013)

Subject: Horsemeat scandal: possible link with the crisis in the equestrian sector

There are increasing reports of cases where commercial food groups operating throughout Europe are withdrawing their beef and veal products because they also contain horsemeat.

In my Question E-000483/2012 I raised the issue of the crisis in the equestrian sector in Italy and Europe, and the risk that thousands of animals that had formerly been involved in racing would be sent for slaughter.

1. Does the Commission intend to launch an investigation to ascertain the responsibilities of the firms involved?
2. Does it find it suspicious that prior to the recent media focus, none of the checks on the ingredients used for their own products, which ought to have been mandatory for the companies in question, had revealed the presence of horse DNA?
3. Does it believe that there may be a link between the facts described above and the recent scandal?
4. Has it assessed the risk that European citizens have consumed or are consuming meat from animals intended for racing, which have often been treated with antibiotics, anabolic steroids and hormones that are harmful to human health?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission
(8 May 2013)

The Commission is closely following the situation with regard to horsemeat sold as beef. The competent Authorities in the Member States together with police authorities and Europol are investigating how this fraud was possible.

Tests on the presence of different meat in meat products are not compulsory in the EU legislation. Food business operators, as prime responsible for the products placed on the market, carry out checks based on a risk evaluation and according to their own control plans. With the recent scandal, food business operators substantially increased their own controls in this respect.

Moreover, under existing rules ⁽¹⁾, the labelling of foods must not mislead the consumer as to their nature and content, all food ingredients must be indicated on the label and the labelling of foods containing meat must also indicate the animal species concerned.

The Commission does not have evidence of a possible link between the recent scandal and the fact described in your previous question you refer to.

Commission Recommendation 2013/99/EU ⁽²⁾ put in place a specific action plan for the research of phenylbutazone residues in horse meat. The scope of this recommendation is, *inter alia*, to assess the possible risk for consumers related to the presence of residues of this substance in horse meat. Assessment of the results of this action plan demonstrates that the risk that horse meat destined to human consumption contains phenylbutazone residues is very low (0.51% of the samples were positive for the presence of this substance).

⁽¹⁾ Directive 2000/13/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 20 March 2000 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the labelling, presentation and advertising of foodstuffs, OJ L 109, 6.5.2000, p. 29.

⁽²⁾ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:048:0028:0032:EN:PDF>

(Wersja polska)

Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002907/13
do Komisji
Filip Kaczmarek (PPE)
(13 marca 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Handel bronią między Białorusią a Sudanem

Agencje prasowe poinformowały, że na sudańskich lotniskach zauważono dostawy rakiet i samolotów. Według panelu ekspertów ONZ Sudan i Białoruś ponownie łamią rezolucję Rady Bezpieczeństwa, dotyczącą embarga na zakup broni przez Sudan.

Wojska rządowe wykorzystują zakupione od Białorusi rakiety S-8 oraz silnie opancerzone samoloty szturmowe Su-25 przeciwko powstańcom w Darfurze.

Według Amnesty International podobnych praktyk dopuszczały się również Rosja i Chiny. Między innymi AI odkryło, że w latach 2007-2009 Sudan otrzymał 36 nowych śmigłowców szturmowych Mi-24 od Rosji. Broń dostarczana do Sudanu jest używana w Darfurze zarówno bezpośrednio przez Sudańskie Siły Zbrojne, jak i przez bojówki wspierane przez rząd, takie jak Ludowe Siły Obronne.

Sprzęt wojskowy jest wykorzystywany także przeciwko cywilom zamieszkującym miejscowości i obozy przeciwników Omara al-Bashira.

Ciągłe dostawy broni powodują przedłużanie konfliktu i cierpienia ludności cywilnej.

W związku z tym pytam:

1. Jakie działania zamierza podjąć Komisja w celu poprawienia standardów handlu bronią oraz skuteczniejszego monitorowania i egzekwowania przestrzegania embarga na obrót bronią z państwami objętymi sankcjami?
2. Czy Komisja zamierza podjąć jakies kroki wobec Białorusi w związku z powyższą sprawą?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez Wysoką Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodniczącą Catherine Ashton w imieniu Komisji
(3 maja 2013 r.)

Dążenie do większej przejrzystości i odpowiedzialności w zakresie handlu bronią jest od dawna jednym z priorytetów polityki zagranicznej UE, czego przykładem jest wsparcie i zaangażowanie UE w proces przygotowywania traktatu o handlu bronią w ramach Organizacji Narodów Zjednoczonych (ONZ), w sprawie którego niedawno pomyślnie zakończono negocjacje. Kolejnym przykładem jest udzielanie pomocy wielu państwom trzecim leżącym w bliskim sąsiedztwie UE celem wzmocnienia krajowych systemów kontroli wywozu broni (por. w tej kwestii wsparcie finansowe UE udzielone na mocy decyzji Rady 2009/42/WPZiB⁽¹⁾; 2010/336/WPZiB⁽²⁾; 2009/1012/WPZiB⁽³⁾ oraz 2012/711/WPZiB⁽⁴⁾). Ponadto, zgodnie z rezolucjami Rady Bezpieczeństwa ONZ 1556 (2004 r.) i 1591 (2005 r.), UE wprowadziła dla Sudanu pełne embargo na broń, zabraniające także *expressis verbis* wszelkich działań, których skutkiem lub celem jest obejście tego środka (decyzja Rady 2011/423/WPZiB⁽⁵⁾).

⁽¹⁾ Decyzja Rady 2009/42/WPZiB z dnia 19 stycznia 2009 r. w sprawie wspierania, w ramach europejskiej strategii bezpieczeństwa, działań UE mających na celu promowanie w krajach trzecich procesu prowadzącego do zawarcia traktatu o handlu bronią, Dz.U. L 17 z 22.1.2009.

⁽²⁾ 2010/336/WPZiB: Decyzja Rady 2010/336/WPZiB z dnia 14 czerwca 2010 r. w sprawie działań UE wspierających traktat o handlu bronią w ramach europejskiej strategii bezpieczeństwa, Dz.U. L 152 z 18.6.2010.

⁽³⁾ Decyzja Rady 2009/1012/WPZiB z dnia 22 grudnia 2009 r. w sprawie wspierania działań UE mających na celu propagowanie wśród państw trzecich kontroli wywozu uzbrojenia oraz zasad i kryteriów wspólnego stanowiska 2008/944/WPZiB, Dz.U. L 348 z 29.12.2009.

⁽⁴⁾ Decyzja Rady 2012/711/WPZiB z dnia 19 listopada 2012 r. w sprawie wsparcia dla działań Unii mających na celu propagowanie wśród państw trzecich kontroli wywozu uzbrojenia oraz zasad i kryteriów wspólnego stanowiska 2008/944/WPZiB, Dz.U. L 321 z 20.11.2012.

⁽⁵⁾ Decyzja Rady 2011/423/WPZiB z dnia 18 lipca 2011 r. dotycząca środków ograniczających skierowanych przeciwko Sudanowi i Sudanowi Południowemu i uchylająca wspólne stanowisko 2005/411/WPZiB, Dz.U. L 188 z 19.7.2011.

Odnosnie do kwestii białoruskich dostaw broni dla Sudanu, dochodzenie w sprawie domniemanych naruszeń embargo na broń nałożonych przez ONZ należy do właściwych Komitetów Sankcji ONZ oraz państw członkowskich ONZ, które powinny zapewniać skuteczne wprowadzanie w życie środków ONZ. Ze swojej strony UE zabroniła wywozu na Białoruś broni oraz sprzętu, które mogą być wykorzystywane do stosowania wewnętrznych represji na mocy decyzji Rady 2012/642/WPZiB ⁽⁶⁾. Dlatego też nie powinno być możliwe wywożenie broni pochodzącej z UE z Białorusi do Sudanu.

⁽⁶⁾ Decyzja Rady 2012/642/WPZiB z dnia 15 października 2012 r. dotycząca środków ograniczających skierowanych przeciwko Białorusi, Dz.U. L 285 z 17.10.2012.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002907/13
to the Commission
Filip Kaczmarek (PPE)
(13 March 2013)**

Subject: Arms trade between Belarus and Sudan

Press agencies have reported that deliveries of rockets and aircraft have been observed at Sudanese airports. According to a panel of UN experts, Sudan and Belarus are once again violating the Security Council resolution which placed an embargo on the sale of arms to Sudan.

Government forces are using S-8 rockets and heavily armoured Su-25 attack aircraft purchased from Belarus against rebels in Darfur.

According to Amnesty International, Russia and China are also guilty of similar violations. For example, it was revealed by the organisation that Sudan received 36 new Mi-24 attack helicopters from Russia between 2007 and 2009. The arms supplied to Sudan are used in Darfur both directly by the Sudanese Armed Forces and by government-backed militias such as the People's Armed Forces.

The military equipment is also used against civilians living in villages and camps housing the opponents of Omar al-Bashir.

The constant supply of weapons means that the conflict and the suffering of the civilian population are prolonged.

I would therefore like to ask:

1. What steps does the Commission intend to take to improve standards in the arms trade and to ensure more effective monitoring and enforcement of compliance with the embargo on arms trading with countries subject to sanctions?
2. Does the Commission intend to take any action against Belarus in connection with this matter?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(3 May 2013)**

Making arms trade more transparent and responsible is among the EU's longstanding foreign policy priorities as exemplified by the EU support to and involvement in the Arms Trade Treaty process within the United Nations (UN) where negotiations were recently successfully concluded. It is also exemplified by the assistance to a number of third countries in the EU's close neighbourhood in establishing more robust national arms export control systems (cf. in this regard the EU financial support provided by Council Decisions 2009/42/CFSP⁽¹⁾; 2010/336/CFSP⁽²⁾; 2009/1012/CFSP⁽³⁾ and 2012/711/CFSP⁽⁴⁾). In addition, pursuant to UN Security Council Resolutions 1556 (2004) and 1591 (2005), the EU has a full arms embargo in force against Sudan, also expressis verbis prohibiting any activities the object or effect of which is to circumvent the measure (Council Decision 2011/423/CFSP⁽⁵⁾).

With regard to the issue of Belarusian arms supplies to Sudan, the investigation of alleged violations of UN arms embargoes is the responsibility of the relevant UN sanctions committees and UN Member States who should ensure effective implementation of UN measures. For its part, the EU has already prohibited the export of arms as well as equipment which might be used for internal repression to Belarus under Council Decision 2012/642/CFSP⁽⁶⁾. Therefore it should not be possible for arms of EU origin to be exported from Belarus to Sudan.

⁽¹⁾ Council Decision 2009/42/CFSP of 19 January 2009 on support for EU activities in order to promote among third countries the process leading towards an Arms Trade Treaty, in the framework of the European Security Strategy, OJ L 17, 22.1.2009.

⁽²⁾ 2010/336/CFSP: Council Decision 2010/336/CFSP of 14 June 2010 on EU activities in support of the Arms Trade Treaty, in the framework of the European Security Strategy, OJ L 152, 18.6.2010.

⁽³⁾ Council Decision 2009/1012/CFSP of 22 December 2009 on support for EU activities in order to promote the control of arms exports and the principles and criteria of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP among third countries, OJ L 348, 29.12.2009.

⁽⁴⁾ Council Decision 2012/711/CFSP of 19 November 2012 on support for Union activities in order to promote, among third countries, the control of arms exports and the principles and criteria of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, OJ L 321, 20.11.2012.

⁽⁵⁾ Council Decision 2011/423/CFSP of 18 July 2011 concerning restrictive measures against Sudan and South Sudan and repealing Common Position 2005/411/CFSP, OJ L 188, 19.7.2011.

⁽⁶⁾ Council Decision 2012/642/CFSP of 15 October 2012 concerning restrictive measures against Belarus, OJ L 285, 17.10.2012.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002909/13
al Consejo**

Ulrike Lunacek (Verts/ALE), Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) y Franziska Keller (Verts/ALE)
(13 de marzo de 2013)

Asunto: Fundación Unión Europea-América Latina y el Caribe y su Presidenta

Durante la Sexta Cumbre de Jefes de Estado de la Unión Europea, América Latina y el Caribe, celebrada en Madrid, en mayo del 2010, se decidió la creación de una «Fundación Unión Europea-América Latina y el Caribe». Dicha Fundación empezó a funcionar el 7 de noviembre del 2011, con sede en Hamburgo (Alemania). En la misma fecha, la excomisaria Benita Ferrero Waldner fue nombrada Presidenta de la Fundación.

¿De qué manera se eligió la presidencia de dicha fundación? ¿Quiénes participaron en el comité de selección? ¿Quién propuso a la candidata austriaca? ¿Cuál fue el mecanismo de selección? ¿Se necesitó unanimidad o mayoría cualificada? ¿De qué manera se eligió al Director General de la Fundación, Jorge Valdez, exembajador del Perú y diplomático de su país desde 1974?

¿Sabía el comité de selección que ya en 2010 el Defensor del Pueblo inició una investigación por presunto conflicto de intereses de la excomisaria, por haber favorecido a las mismas empresas privadas a las que sirve como miembro e incluso presidenta de los consejos directivos (o supervisores)? ¿Para cuándo se esperan los resultados de la investigación?

¿Puede el previsto cambio de estatus de la Fundación, al pasar de entidad de derecho alemán a fundación internacional, con inviolabilidad de la organización e inmunidad de su dirección, tal como aspira su presidenta, tener como consecuencia la nulidad de la investigación del Defensor del Pueblo y sus resultados? ¿La inmunidad tendría consecuencias retroactivas, dispensando a la presidenta de posibles consecuencias disciplinarias?

La agenda de actividades de la Fundación muestra hasta la fecha un intensivo empeño promotor de intereses de empresas europeas. ¿Hay un mecanismo de seguimiento dentro de la estructura de la Fundación que vigile la concesión de fondos europeos y contratos para empresas europeas, con el objetivo de poner luz roja, en caso de evidente privilegio de empresas cercanas a la presidenta? ¿Cuántos casos hay hasta ahora? ¿Cuáles son las empresas europeas activas en los proyectos Desertec en el Norte de África, Bii Nee Stepa II en el istmo mexicano, y la excavación del canal de Panamá, con apoyo de algún fondo público europeo? ¿En cuáles de ellas tiene un cargo Benita Ferrero-Waldner?

¿La Presidenta tiene estatus de miembro u observadora para LAIF (Mecanismo de Inversión en América Latina)?

Respuesta

(22 de julio de 2013)

La creación de la Fundación UE-ALC fue acordada por los Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno de la UE y de América Latina y el Caribe en la Cumbre UE-ALC celebrada en Madrid en 2010, con el objetivo de «reforzar nuestra asociación birregional y ... suscitar el debate sobre las estrategias y acciones comunes, así como para mejorar su visibilidad (...)» (apartado 34 de la Declaración final).

La candidatura de Benita Ferrero-Waldner a la Presidencia de la Fundación UE-ALC fue presentada conjuntamente por los 27 Estados miembros de la UE en la XXXIIIª Reunión de Altos Funcionarios UE-ALC (integrada por representantes de la Unión Europea, los 27 Estados miembros de la UE y de 33 países de América Latina y el Caribe), celebrada en Bruselas el 25 de enero de 2011; los países de ALC acogieron positivamente dicha candidatura. El nombramiento fue aprobado por unanimidad en la XXXIVª Reunión de Altos Funcionarios UE-ALC, celebrada en Santiago de Chile el 29 de abril de 2011. Los altos funcionarios señalaron que la Sra. Ferrero-Waldner, en calidad de antigua ministra de Asuntos Exteriores de Austria y Comisaria de Asuntos Exteriores, cumplía el requisito de ser una personalidad muy conocida y respetada tanto en América Latina y el Caribe como en Europa. En la misma sesión, el embajador peruano Jorge Valdez fue designado por unanimidad para el cargo de Director Ejecutivo de la Fundación, de acuerdo con el principio de que si el Presidente designado proviene de un país de la UE, el Director Ejecutivo designado debe provenir de un país de ALC, y viceversa.

El Defensor del Pueblo pidió a la Comisión información relativa a la autorización de la Sra. Ferrero-Waldner de ejercer actividades después de dejar su cargo. La Comisión manifestó claramente en sus intercambios con el Defensor del Pueblo Europeo que consideraba que las preocupaciones del solicitante no se justifican y que no había conflicto de intereses u otra incompatibilidad entre las actividades autorizadas y el mandato anterior de la Sra. Ferrero-Waldner como Comisaria. Aún no se han enviado a la Comisión las conclusiones finales del Defensor del Pueblo sobre la denuncia.

El Consejo de Gobierno de la Fundación, integrado por la UE y los 60 países UE-ALC, es el responsable del seguimiento y control de las actividades de la Fundación, su Presidente y su Director Ejecutivo en general. Un representante [del Parlamento Europeo] de la Mesa Directiva de la Asamblea Parlamentaria Paritaria UE-América Latina [...] (EUROLAT) y uno de la Asamblea Parlamentaria Paritaria ACP-UE tienen derecho a asistir a las reuniones del Consejo de Gobierno en calidad de observadores.

La Fundación UE-ALC está actualmente sometida a la legislación alemana. Aún no han concluido las negociaciones para un Acuerdo Internacional de la UE. Lo más probable es que cualquier inmunidad concedida al personal de la Fundación UE-ALC se defina posteriormente en un «*Accord de Siège*» que se negocie con las autoridades alemanas, siguiendo las normas de la Convención de Viena de 1961. Es muy probable que sólo se aplique a los actos realizados por el personal de la Fundación en su condición oficial.

La Fundación UE-ALC no es responsable de la asignación de fondos del proyecto. Los deberes del Presidente de la Fundación UE-ALC incluyen la representación de la Fundación en sus relaciones exteriores, garantizando un papel visible y representativo a través de contactos de alto nivel con las autoridades de países, instituciones y socios de América Latina y el Caribe y de la UE. Fomentar los contactos entre las comunidades empresariales de la UE y América Latina y el Caribe es pues parte integrante, pero ciertamente no exclusiva, de las funciones de la Fundación. En cuanto al control de los gastos, el Director Ejecutivo se encarga de mantener un sistema de control financiero que permita, en todo momento, garantizar la regularidad y transparencia de las transacciones financieras de la Fundación y la coherencia de los compromisos y los gastos con las asignaciones presupuestarias. En este sentido, se espera que la Fundación publique en su momento un resumen de las cuentas y balances auditados en su sitio web.

Según la información de que dispone el Consejo, la Fundación UE-ALC no está implicada ni presente en el Mecanismo de Inversión en América Latina (LAIF.)

(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-002909/13
an den Rat**

Ulrike Lunacek (Verts/ALE), Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) und Franziska Keller (Verts/ALE)

(13. März 2013)

Betrifft: Stiftung Europäische Union-Lateinamerika/Karibik und deren Präsidentin

Während des sechsten Gipfeltreffens der Staatschefs der Europäischen Union, Lateinamerikas und der Karibik, das im Mai 2010 in Madrid stattgefunden hat, wurde die Gründung einer „Stiftung Europäische Union-Lateinamerika/Karibik“ beschlossen. Diese Stiftung mit Sitz in Hamburg (Deutschland) nahm ihre Arbeit am 7. November 2011 auf. Zum gleichen Zeitpunkt wurde das ehemalige Mitglied der Kommission Benita Ferrero-Waldner zur Präsidentin der Stiftung ernannt.

Auf welche Weise wurde das Führungspersonal dieser Stiftung gewählt? Wer war Mitglied der Auswahljury? Von wem wurde die österreichische Kandidatin vorgeschlagen? Wie gestaltete sich das Auswahlverfahren? War Einstimmigkeit oder eine qualifizierte Mehrheit erforderlich? Auf welche Weise wurde der Generaldirektor der Stiftung Jorge Valdez, ehemaliger Botschafter Perus und seit 1974 im diplomatischen Dienst seines Landes tätig, gewählt?

War sich die Auswahljury der Tatsache bewusst, dass der Bürgerbeauftragte bereits im Jahr 2010 gegen das ehemalige Mitglied der Kommission eine Untersuchung aufgrund eines mutmaßlichen Interessenkonflikts eingeleitet hat, da sie dieselben Privatunternehmen begünstigt haben soll, bei denen sie als Mitglied oder sogar als Vorsitzende in Verwaltungs- (oder Aufsichts)räten fungiert? Wann wird mit den Ergebnissen der Untersuchung gerechnet?

Kann die vorgesehene Satzungsänderung der Stiftung, wenn sie von einer deutschen Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts in eine internationale Stiftung mit der damit einhergehenden Unantastbarkeit der Einrichtung und Immunität des Führungspersonals umgewandelt wird, dazu führen, dass gemäß der Bestrebungen der Präsidentin die Ermittlung des Bürgerbeauftragten und deren Ergebnisse nicht verwendet werden dürfen? Würde die Immunität rückwirkend gelten, so dass der Präsidentin mögliche disziplinarrechtliche Konsequenzen erspart blieben?

Durch die Agenda der Stiftung werden derzeit ausgeprägte Bemühungen ersichtlich, die Interessen von europäischen Unternehmen zu fördern. Existiert innerhalb der Struktur der Stiftung ein Kontrollmechanismus, durch den die Bereitstellung von europäischen Geldern und von Verträgen für europäische Unternehmen überwacht wird, um im Falle einer offensichtlichen Bevorzugung von der Präsidentin nahestehenden Unternehmen die rote Karte zu zeigen? Um wie viele Fälle handelt es sich bislang? Welche europäischen Unternehmen sind mit Unterstützung eines öffentlichen europäischen Fonds im Rahmen der Projekte DESERTEC in Nordafrika, BII NEE STIPA II am mexikanischen Isthmus und bei den Aushubarbeiten am Panamakanal tätig? In welchen von ihnen hat Benita Ferrero-Waldner ein Amt inne?

Hat die Präsidentin im Rahmen der Investitionsfazilität für Lateinamerika (LAIF) den Status eines Mitglieds oder den eines Beobachters?

Antwort

(22. Juli 2013)

Die Gründung der EU-LAK-Stiftung wurde von den Staats- und Regierungschefs der EU, Lateinamerikas und der Karibik auf dem Gipfeltreffen EU-LAK im Jahr 2010 in Madrid mit dem Ziel beschlossen, „die Partnerschaft zwischen unseren Regionen zu stärken und ... eine Debatte über gemeinsame Strategien und Aktionen anzuregen und deren Außenwirkung zu erhöhen (...)“ (Nummer 34 der Schlussklärung).

Frau Benita Ferrero-Waldner wurde gemeinsam von den 27 EU-Mitgliedstaaten auf der XXXIII. Tagung der Hohen Beamten EU-LAK (in der Zusammensetzung von Vertretern der EU, der 27 EU-Mitgliedstaaten und von 33 Staaten Lateinamerikas und der Karibik) am 25. Januar 2011 in Brüssel für das Amt der Präsidentin der EU-LAK-Stiftung vorgeschlagen; diese Entscheidung wurde von den LAK-Staaten begrüßt. Die Ernennung von Frau Benita Ferrero-Waldner wurde auf der XXXIV. Tagung der Hohen Beamten EU-LAK am 29. April 2011 in Santiago de Chile einstimmig beschlossen. Die Hohen Beamten stellten fest, dass Frau Ferrero-Waldner als ehemalige Außenministerin Österreichs und Kommissionsmitglied für Außenbeziehungen die Voraussetzung erfüllt, eine sowohl in Lateinamerika und der Karibik als auch in Europa bekannte und hochgeschätzte Persönlichkeit zu sein. Auf derselben Tagung wurde der peruanische Botschafter Jorge Valdez einstimmig zum geschäftsführenden Direktor der Stiftung ernannt, was dem Grundsatz entspricht, dass im Fall der Besetzung des Amtes des Präsidenten mit einem EU-Staatsangehörigen der geschäftsführende Direktor Staatsangehöriger eines LAK-Landes sein sollte und umgekehrt.

Die an die Kommission gerichtete Anfrage des Bürgerbeauftragten betrifft die Zulässigkeit der Tätigkeit von Frau Ferrero-Waldner nach Ablauf ihrer Amtszeit. Die Kommission hat in ihren Kontakten mit dem Europäischen Bürgerbeauftragten klar herausgestellt, dass die Bedenken des Beschwerdeführers ihres Erachtens nicht gerechtfertigt sind und kein Interessenkonflikt oder sonstige Unvereinbarkeit zwischen den genehmigten Tätigkeiten von Frau Ferrero-Waldner und ihrem vorherigen Mandat als Kommissionsmitglied vorliegt. Das abschließende Urteil des Bürgerbeauftragten zu der Beschwerde ist der Kommission nicht zugeleitet worden.

Der Gouverneursrat der Stiftung, in dem die EU und 60 Staaten Lateinamerikas und der Karibik vertreten sind, ist für die Beaufsichtigung und Kontrolle der Tätigkeiten der Stiftung, ihres Präsidenten und ihres geschäftsführenden Direktors zuständig. Ein Vertreter des Europäischen Parlaments im Exekutivbüro der Parlamentarischen Versammlung Europa-Lateinamerika (EUROLAT) und ein Vertreter der Paritätischen Parlamentarischen Versammlung AKP-EU können als Beobachter an den Sitzungen des Gouverneursrates teilnehmen.

Die EU-LAK-Stiftung unterliegt derzeit deutschem Recht. Die Verhandlungen über ein internationales Abkommen der EU dauern noch an. Die Frage der etwaigen Immunität des Personals der EU-LAK-Stiftung wird aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach in einem Sitzabkommen geregelt, das nach den Bestimmungen des Wiener Übereinkommens von 1961 mit den deutschen Behörden auszuhandeln sein wird. Es ist sehr wahrscheinlich, dass dies nur die dienstlichen Handlungen des Personals der Stiftung betreffen wird.

Die EU-LAK-Stiftung ist nicht für die Zuweisung von Projektmitteln zuständig. Zu den Aufgaben des Präsidenten der EU-LAK-Stiftung gehört es, die Stiftung nach außen zu vertreten, indem er durch hochrangige Kontakte mit Behörden der Staaten Lateinamerikas und der Karibik und den Mitgliedstaaten, Organen und Partnern der EU eine sichtbare und repräsentative Rolle spielt. Die Intensivierung von Kontakten zwischen Unternehmen der EU und der Staaten Lateinamerikas und der Karibik ist daher eine wesentliche, sicher aber nicht die ausschließliche Aufgabe der Stiftung. Was die Überwachung der Ausgaben betrifft, so unterhält der geschäftsführende Direktor ein Finanzkontrollsystem, das es jederzeit ermöglicht, die Ordnungsmäßigkeit und Transparenz der Finanztransaktionen der Stiftung und die Vereinbarkeit der Mittelbindungen und Ausgaben mit den Mittelzuweisungen sicherzustellen. Diesbezüglich ist die Stiftung gehalten, zu gegebener Zeit eine Zusammenfassung der Rechnungsprüfungen und Bilanzen auf ihrer Website zu veröffentlichen.

Nach den Informationen des Rates ist die EU-LAK-Stiftung an der Investitionsfazilität für Lateinamerika (LAIF) weder beteiligt noch in ihr vertreten.

(Nederlandse versie)

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002909/13
aan de Raad**

Ulrike Lunacek (Verts/ALE), Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) en Franziska Keller (Verts/ALE)

(13 maart 2013)

Betreft: De Stichting Europese Unie-Latijns-Amerika en het Caribisch gebied en de voorzitter daarvan

Op de zesde topbijeenkomst van de staatshoofden en regeringsleiders van de EU en Latijns-Amerika en het Caribisch gebied, die in mei 2010 plaatsvond in Madrid, is besloten om een „Stichting Europese Unie-Latijns-Amerika en het Caribisch gebied” op te richten. Deze stichting, met hoofdkantoor in Hamburg (Duitsland), is sinds 7 november 2011 actief. Op diezelfde datum werd voormalig Europees commissaris Benita Ferrero-Waldner tot voorzitter van de stichting benoemd.

Op welke wijze is de voorzitter van deze stichting gekozen? Wie waren de leden van het selectiecomité? Wie heeft de Oostenrijkse kandidaat voorgesteld? Hoe verliep de selectie? Was er eenparigheid van stemmen of een gekwalificeerde meerheid nodig? Hoe is de algemeen directeur van de stichting, Jorge Valdez, voormalig ambassadeur van Peru en Peruaans diplomaat sinds 1974, gekozen?

Wist het selectiecomité dat het Openbaar Ministerie al in 2010 een onderzoek naar de voormalige commissaris wegens vermoedelijke belangenvermenging heeft geopend omdat zij particuliere bedrijven zou hebben bevoordeeld waarin zij lid of zelfs voorzitter van de raad van bestuur (of raad van toezicht) was? Wanneer worden de resultaten van het onderzoek verwacht?

Kan de door de voorzitter gewenste wijziging van de statuten van de stichting, die van vereniging naar Duits recht zou worden omgevormd tot internationale stichting, waardoor de organisatie en haar bestuur onschendbaar zouden worden, tot gevolg hebben dat het onderzoek van het Openbaar Ministerie en de resultaten daarvan nietig worden? Zou de onschendbaarheid terugwerkende kracht hebben, waardoor de voorzitter mogelijke disciplinaire gevolgen zou ontlopen?

Tot nog toe blijkt uit de activiteitenagenda van de stichting dat zij zich sterk inspant om de belangen van Europese bedrijven te behartigen. Is er binnen de structuur van de stichting een monitoringmechanisme om toezicht te houden op de toekenning van Europese financiering en contracten aan Europese bedrijven, zodat het sein op rood kan worden gezet in geval van duidelijke bevoordeling van bedrijven die nauwe banden hebben met de voorzitter? Hoeveel gevallen zijn er tot nog toe? Welke Europese bedrijven zijn betrokken bij de projecten Desertec in Noord-Afrika en Bii Nee Stipa II in de Mexicaanse landengte en bij het uitdiepen van het Panamakanaal? In welke van die bedrijven heeft Benita Ferrero-Waldner een functie?

Heeft de voorzitter de status van lid of waarnemer bij de Investeringsfaciliteit voor Latijns-Amerika (LAIF)?

Antwoord

(22 juli 2013)

De staatshoofden en regeringsleiders van de EU, Latijns-Amerika en het Caribisch gebied hebben tijdens de top EU-LAC van Madrid in 2010 tot oprichting van de EU-LAC-stichting besloten om „ons biregionaal partnerschap te versterken en ... een debat op gang te brengen over gemeenschappelijke strategieën en acties alsook de zichtbaarheid ervan te vergroten (...)” (punt 34 van de slotverklaring).

De kandidatuur van Benita Ferrero-Waldner voor het voorzitterschap van de EU-LAC-stichting is gezamenlijk door de 27 lidstaten van de EU voorgedragen tijdens de XXXIIIe bijeenkomst van hoge ambtenaren van de EU-LAC te Brussel op 25 januari 2011 (waarop vertegenwoordigers van de EU, de 27 lidstaten van de EU en 33 Latijns-Amerikaanse en Caribische landen aanwezig waren); de LAC-landen waren daarmee ingenomen. Haar benoeming werd unaniem goedgekeurd tijdens de XXXIVe bijeenkomst van hoge ambtenaren van de EU-LAC te Santiago de Chile op 29 april 2011. De hoge ambtenaren namen er nota van dat mevrouw Ferrero-Waldner, als voormalig Oostenrijks minister van Buitenlandse Zaken en Commissielid voor Externe Betrekkingen, voldeed aan de eis zowel in Latijns-Amerika en het Caribisch gebied als in Europa een bekende en zeer gerespecteerde persoonlijkheid te zijn. Tijdens dezelfde bijeenkomst werd de Peruviaanse ambassadeur Jorge Valdez met eenparigheid van stemmen tot uitvoerend directeur van de stichting benoemd, volgens het principe dat indien de benoemde voorzitter afkomstig is uit een land van de EU, de benoemde uitvoerend directeur uit een land van de LAC afkomstig moet zijn, en omgekeerd.

Het onderzoek van de ombudsman richt zich op de Commissie wat betreft de toestemming voor de activiteiten van mevrouw Ferrero-Waldner na haar ambt. De Commissie heeft in haar contacten met de Europese ombudsman duidelijk verklaard dat de bezwaren van de klager volgens haar niet gerechtvaardigd zijn en dat er geen belangenconflict of andere onverenigbaarheid is tussen de activiteiten waarvoor toestemming is verleend en het voormalige mandaat van mevrouw Ferrero-Waldner als Commissielid. De definitieve conclusies van de ombudsman over de klacht zijn nog niet aan de Commissie toegezonden.

De raad van bestuur van de stichting, die is samengesteld uit de EU en de 60 landen van de EU-LAC, is verantwoordelijk voor het algemene toezicht en de algemene controle op de activiteiten van de stichting, haar voorzitter en haar uitvoerend directeur. Eén vertegenwoordiger van het Europees Parlement in het uitvoerend bureau van de Euro-Latijns-Amerikaanse Parlementaire Vergadering (EuroLat) en één van de Paritaire Parlementaire Vergadering ACS-EU zijn gerechtigd de vergaderingen van de raad van bestuur als waarnemer bij te wonen.

De EU-LAC-stichting werkt momenteel onder Duits recht. De onderhandelingen over een internationale overeenkomst van de EU lopen nog. Eventuele aan het personeel van de EU-LAC-stichting verleende immuniteit zal later zeer waarschijnlijk worden vastgelegd in een „*Accord de Siège*”, waarover met de Duitse autoriteiten zal worden onderhandeld overeenkomstig de regels van het Verdrag van Wenen van 1961. Het is zeer waarschijnlijk dat het alleen van toepassing zal zijn op handelingen die door personeelsleden van de stichting in hun officiële hoedanigheid worden gesteld.

De EU-LAC-stichting is niet verantwoordelijk voor de toewijzing van projectfinanciering. De voorzitter van de EU-LAC-stichting heeft onder meer tot taak de stichting in haar externe betrekkingen te vertegenwoordigen en daarbij een zichtbare en representatieve rol te spelen door middel van contacten op hoog niveau met autoriteiten van Latijns-Amerika en het Caribisch gebied en landen, instellingen en partners in de EU. Het bevorderen van contacten tussen het bedrijfsleven van de EU, Latijns-Amerika en het Caribisch gebied maakt daarom integraal maar zeker niet uitsluitend deel uit van de werkzaamheden van de stichting. Wat het toezicht op de uitgaven betreft, heeft de uitvoerend directeur tot taak een systeem van financiële controle te handhaven waarmee te allen tijde de regelmatigheid en de transparantie van de financiële transacties van de stichting alsook de samenhang van de vastleggingen en de uitgaven met de begrotingstoewijzingen kunnen worden gewaarborgd. In dit verband wordt van de stichting verwacht dat zij tijdig een overzicht van de gecontroleerde rekeningen en balansen op haar website publiceert.

Volgens de informatie waarover de Raad beschikt, is de EU-LAC-stichting niet betrokken bij noch aanwezig in de investeringsfaciliteit voor Latijns-Amerika (LAIF).

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002909/13
to the Council**

Ulrike Lunacek (Verts/ALE), Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) and Franziska Keller (Verts/ALE)

(13 March 2013)

Subject: European Union-Latin America and Caribbean Foundation and its president

During the Sixth Summit of Heads of State and Government of the European Union, Latin America and the Caribbean, held in Madrid in May 2010, the decision was taken to create a 'European Union-Latin America and Caribbean Foundation'. The foundation took up its activities on 7 November 2011 and is headquartered in Hamburg, Germany. On the same date, former Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner was appointed president of the foundation.

How was the presidency of the foundation decided upon? Who took part in the selection panel? Who proposed the Austrian candidate? What was the selection process? Was unanimity or a qualified majority required? How was the foundation's executive director, Jorge Valdez, former ambassador of Peru and a Peruvian diplomat since 1974, chosen?

Was the selection panel aware that back in 2010 the European Ombudsman launched an investigation into an alleged conflict of interests on the part of the former Commissioner, for having favoured the same private enterprises in which she served on, or even chaired, the board of directors (or supervisory board)? When are the results of the investigation due?

Could the foundation's planned change of status, from an entity governed by German law to an international foundation, meaning inviolability for the organisation and immunity for its directors, which its president is advocating, result in the European Ombudsman's investigation and its results becoming null and void? Will immunity be retroactive, exempting the president from possible disciplinary measures?

The foundation's agenda of activities has to date shown intensive efforts to promote the interests of European enterprises. Is there a monitoring mechanism within the foundation's structure to scrutinise the allocation of European funds and contracts to European enterprises, with the aim of flagging up instances of enterprises close to the president being given clear preferential treatment? How many cases have there been to date? Which European enterprises are actively involved in the Desertec projects in North Africa, Bii Nee Stipa II in the Mexican isthmus, and the excavation of the Panama Canal, with support from European public funds? In which of these enterprises does Benita Ferrero-Waldner hold a post?

Does the president have member or observer status for the Latin American Investment Facility (LAIF)?

Reply

(22 July 2013)

The creation of the EU-LAC Foundation was agreed by the EU and Latin American and Caribbean Heads of State and Government at the EU-LAC Summit held in Madrid in 2010, with the objective of 'strengthening our bi-regional partnership and ... triggering debate on common strategies and actions as well as enhancing its visibility (...)' (paragraph 34 of the Final Declaration).

The candidature of Benita Ferrero-Waldner for President of the EU-LAC Foundation was presented jointly by the 27 EU Member States at the XXXIII EU-LAC Senior Officials Meeting (composed of representatives of the EU, the 27 EU Member States and 33 Latin American and Caribbean countries) held in Brussels on 25 January 2011; it was welcomed with satisfaction by the LAC countries. Her appointment was agreed by unanimity at the XXXIV EU-LAC Senior Officials Meeting held in Santiago de Chile on 29 April 2011. The Senior Officials noted that Ms Ferrero-Waldner, as former Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Commissioner for External Relations, fulfilled the requirement to be a well-known and highly respected personality both in Latin America and the Caribbean and in Europe. At the same meeting, Peruvian Ambassador Jorge Valdez was appointed by unanimity to the post of Executive Director of the Foundation, according to the principle that if the appointed President comes from an EU country, the appointed Executive Director should come from a LAC country, and vice versa.

The Ombudsman enquiry is addressed to the Commission regarding the authorisation of Ms Ferrero-Waldner's post-office activities. The Commission has clearly stated in its dealings with the European Ombudsman that it considers that the complainant's concerns are not justified and that there is no conflict of interest or other incompatibility between the authorised activities and Ms Ferrero-Waldner's previous mandate as Commissioner. The Ombudsman's final conclusions on the complaint have not yet been sent to the Commission.

The Board of Governors (BoG) of the Foundation, composed of the EU and the 60 EU-LAC countries, is responsible of the overall monitoring and control of the activities of the Foundation, its President and its Executive Director. One European Parliament representative from the Executive Bureau of the EU-Latin America Joint Parliamentary Assembly (EUROLAT), and one from the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, are entitled to attend meetings of the BoG as observers.

The EU-LAC Foundation currently operates under the aegis of German Law. The negotiations for an International Agreement of the EU are still ongoing. Any immunity granted to the staff of the EU-LAC Foundation will most likely be defined subsequently in an '*Accord de Siège*' to be negotiated with the German authorities following the rules of the 1961 Vienna Convention. It is very likely that it will apply only to acts performed by the Foundation's staff in their official capacity.

The EU-LAC Foundation is not responsible for allocating project funding. The duties of the President of the EU-LAC Foundation include representing the Foundation in its external relations, ensuring a visible and representative role through high-level contacts with authorities from Latin American and Caribbean and EU countries, institutions and partners. Fostering contacts between EU and Latin American and Caribbean business communities is therefore an integral but certainly not exclusive part of the Foundation's work. As for the monitoring of expenditure, the Executive Director is tasked with maintaining a system of financial control that makes it possible, at all times, to ensure the regularity and transparency of the Foundation's financial transactions and the consistency of the commitments and expenses with budgetary allocations. In this regard, the Foundation will in due time be expected to publish a summary of the audited accounts and balance sheets on its website.

According to the information available to the Council, the EU-LAC Foundation is neither involved nor present in the Latin American Investment Facility (LAIF.)

(Version française)

**Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-002913/13
à la Commission (Vice-Présidente/Haute Représentante)**

Jean-Jacob Bicep (Verts/ALE)

(13 mars 2013)

Objet: VP/HR — Situation des droits fondamentaux au Tibet

Le 14 décembre 2012, Catherine Ashton, Haute Représentante de l'Union pour les affaires étrangères et la politique de sécurité et Vice-présidente de la Commission européenne, faisait une déclaration (17831/1/12 — Presse 535), au sujet de la situation tragique au Tibet.

Cette déclaration faisait notamment écho à la résolution du Parlement européen du 14 juin 2012, qui appelait le représentant spécial de l'Union européenne pour les Droits de l'homme à faire régulièrement état de la situation des Droits de l'homme au Tibet, et qui demandait à la Vice-présidente de la Commission/Haute Représentante de l'Union pour les affaires étrangères et la politique de sécurité de l'Union européenne de nommer un coordinateur spécial dont le mandat consisterait à établir régulièrement des rapports sur le Tibet.

S'indignant expressément du recours croissant de certains tibétains à l'immolation, (situation effectivement alarmante avec 107 immolations depuis 2009) Catherine Ashton a exprimé, en décembre 2012, ses inquiétudes face aux restrictions des droits civils, politiques, économiques, sociaux et culturels des tibétains. À cet égard, elle a sommé les autorités chinoises de respecter le droit d'assemblée des Tibétains ainsi que leur liberté d'expression tout en demandant la libération des prisonniers politiques détenus au seul motif de leur participation pacifique à des manifestations. Par ailleurs, la Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante a appelé la Chine à garantir le libre accès des journalistes et diplomates aux régions autonomes tibétaines.

Dans le contexte politique tragique que connaît le Tibet, et sachant que sa situation ne semble pas s'améliorer depuis le mois de décembre dernier, la Commission peut-elle nous fournir des éléments quant aux suites qui ont été données à cette déclaration?

À titre d'exemple, l'envoi d'une mission au Tibet a-t-il été envisagé afin de rendre compte de la situation des droits fondamentaux? La nomination d'un coordinateur spécial est-elle d'actualité? La situation du peuple tibétain a-t-elle été régulièrement évoquée lors des différentes réunions avec des représentants de la République populaire de Chine? Comment la Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante compte-t-elle poursuivre le traitement de la situation au Tibet?

Réponse donnée par M^{me} Catherine Ashton, Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante au nom de la Commission
(22 mai 2013)

La Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante partage les préoccupations de l'Honorable Parlementaire sur la situation des Droits de l'homme au Tibet. Tout au long de l'année 2012, elle a accordé une attention particulière à ce thème, comme en témoignent le discours qu'elle a prononcé devant le Parlement européen le 12 juin 2012 et sa déclaration sur les immolations au Tibet du 14 décembre 2012. La situation dans les régions habitées par les Tibétains a été évoquée à plusieurs reprises au sein du Conseil des Droits de l'homme et de l'Assemblée générale des Nations unies. Les préoccupations de l'UE ont également été exprimées lors de réunions bilatérales.

L'UE estime que le dialogue UE-Chine sur les Droits de l'homme constitue un canal important pour discuter des questions liées aux Droits de l'homme en Chine.

L'UE a invité à plusieurs reprises les autorités chinoises à veiller au respect des droits civils, politiques, économiques, sociaux et culturels du peuple tibétain, y compris de son droit à la liberté d'expression et à la liberté de réunion, ainsi que de son droit d'avoir sa propre vie culturelle, de pratiquer sa propre religion et d'utiliser sa propre langue. Comme la situation ne s'est guère améliorée, l'UE continuera d'agir dans ce domaine en 2013, en suivant la situation de près et en soulevant la question dans le cadre du prochain dialogue UE-Chine sur les Droits de l'homme et au sein des enceintes internationales.

L'UE n'a pas l'intention de nommer un coordinateur spécial pour le Tibet, étant donné que la Chine et les territoires tibétains font également partie des questions relevant de la responsabilité du représentant spécial de l'UE pour les Droits de l'homme, M. Stavros Lambrinidis.

La délégation de l'UE en Chine suit de près l'évolution de la situation sur le terrain, notamment par des visites. Bien que l'UE ait invité à plusieurs reprises les autorités chinoises à permettre aux diplomates et aux journalistes d'accéder librement au Tibet, l'accès demeure restreint dans la plupart des régions habitées par les Tibétains.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002913/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)**

Jean-Jacob Bicep (Verts/ALE)

(13 March 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Fundamental rights in Tibet

On 14 December 2012, Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission, issued a declaration (17831/1/12 — PRESSE 535) on the tragic situation in Tibet. This declaration echoed the European Parliament resolution of 14 June 2012, which called on the EU Special Representative for Human Rights to report regularly on the human rights situation in Tibet and urged the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to appoint a special coordinator with a mandate to report regularly on Tibet.

In December 2012, deeply concerned by the increasing number of Tibetans committing self-immolation (a particularly alarming situation with 107 self-immolations since 2009), Baroness Ashton expressed her concerns about curbs on the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of the Tibetan people. In this regard, she called upon the Chinese authorities to respect the rights of Tibetans to assembly and expression and to release political prisoners detained solely for taking part in peaceful demonstrations. The High Representative also urged the Chinese authorities to allow free access to all Tibetan autonomous areas for diplomats as well as for international journalists.

In view of the tragic political situation in Tibet and given that it does not seem to have improved since last December, can the Commission say what action has been taken following this declaration?

Is there a plan to send a mission to Tibet to report on the fundamental rights situation there, for instance? Is the appointment of a special coordinator in progress? Has the situation of the Tibetan people been regularly raised at the various meetings with the representatives of the People's Republic of China? How does the High Representative intend to deal with the situation in Tibet?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(22 May 2013)

The HR/VP shares the Honourable Member's concern over the human rights situation in Tibet. Throughout 2012, HR/VP paid particular attention to this topic, as exemplified by her speech before the European Parliament on 12 June 2012 and the statement on Tibetan self-immolations of 14 December 2012. The situation in Tibetan-inhabited areas was raised several times at the UN Human Rights Council and General Assembly of the UN. The EU's concerns were also raised during bilateral meetings.

The EU believes that the EU-China human rights dialogue constitutes an important channel for discussion of human rights issues in China.

The EU has repeatedly called upon the Chinese authorities to ensure that the civil, political, economic, as well as social and cultural rights of the Tibetan people are respected, including their right to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, as well as to enjoy their own culture, to practise their own religion and to use their own language. As the situation has yet to improve, the EU will maintain its commitment in 2013, and will continue to monitor the situation closely, raise it the framework of the next EU-China Human Rights Dialogue and international fora.

The EU does not intend to appoint a Special Coordinator for Tibet, as China and Tibetan areas are also part of the issues covered by the EU's Special Representative for Human Rights, Stavros Lambrinidis.

The EU Delegation in China is closely following developments on the ground, including through visits. The EU has repeatedly called on the Chinese authorities to allow unimpeded access to Tibet for diplomats and journalists. Nevertheless, access remains restricted in most Tibetan-inhabited areas.

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-002914/13
à la Commission
Jean-Jacob Bicep (Verts/ALE)
(13 mars 2013)

Objet: Politique commune de la pêche (PCP) et régions ultrapériphériques de l'Union européenne

La communication de la Commission COM(2012)0287 du 20 juin 2012 insiste sur la nécessité de promouvoir, dans les régions ultrapériphériques (RUP) de l'Union, une économie plus efficace dans l'utilisation des ressources, plus verte et plus compétitive, afin d'aider ces régions à devenir plus autonomes, plus solides sur le plan économique et mieux à même de créer des emplois durables.

Le rapport sur la future politique commune de la pêche, voté et adopté au sein du Parlement il y a quelques mois, ne contient pas l'article 349 du traité sur le fonctionnement de l'Union européenne. Cela signifie que les règles de la PCP seront appliquées de façon indifférenciée pour les RUP françaises. Alors que le volet interne de la PCP encadre de façon si drastique les aides à la structuration de la filière de la pêche, son volet externe conduit l'Union à encourager le développement dans des pays potentiellement concurrents. En effet, l'Union conclut des accords de libre-échange avec des pays situés dans l'environnement géographique direct des RUP françaises, fragilisant ainsi l'économie locale.

Il existe donc aujourd'hui des incohérences entre la politique commerciale de l'Union et les politiques internes en matière de pêche.

1. Quelles clauses peuvent être mises en place pour assurer que les régions ultrapériphériques ne se trouvent pas dans une situation de concurrence déloyale?
2. De quels instruments la Commission dispose-t-elle pour faciliter au maximum la jonction du volet interne et externe de sa politique commune de la pêche?
3. Comment la Commission prend-elle en compte, dans les négociations des accords de partenariat dans le domaine de la pêche, les objectifs spécifiques fixés par l'Union pour les RUP, et comment peut-elle évaluer les effets sur ces régions et sur les pays et territoires d'outre-mer des accords commerciaux qu'elle négocie?

Réponse donnée par M^{me} Damanaki au nom de la Commission
(3 juin 2013)

La politique commune de la pêche (PCP) tient compte des circonstances particulières et des besoins spécifiques des régions ultrapériphériques avec, par exemple, le règlement (CE) n° 791/2007 du Conseil instaurant un régime de compensation des surcoûts qui grèvent l'écoulement de certains produits de la pêche provenant de régions ultrapériphériques, à savoir des Açores, de Madère, des Îles Canaries, de la Guyane française et de la Réunion ⁽¹⁾. Les propositions de réforme de la PCP s'inscrivent dans cette ligne d'action, qu'elles améliorent même, la Commission ayant proposé de l'élargir à toutes les régions ultrapériphériques de l'UE.

La dimension externe de la PCP, en particulier les négociations menées dans le cadre d'accords de partenariat dans le domaine de la pêche et, à un niveau multilatéral, au sein des organisations régionales de gestion des pêches, implique une consultation étroite des États membres, qui informent la Commission des besoins particuliers de leurs régions. De plus, tout accord externe dans le contexte de la PCP doit obtenir, avant son adoption par le Conseil, le consentement du Parlement européen, conformément à l'article 218 du TFUE.

En ce qui concerne les accords commerciaux, lorsqu'elle propose de négocier un nouvel accord, la Commission fournit une analyse d'impact qui, le cas échéant, examine les intérêts des régions ultrapériphériques.

De plus, l'UE peut également tenir compte des intérêts des régions ultrapériphériques lors de la négociation d'un accord commercial avec les pays voisins de celles-ci ou dans des accords commerciaux qui couvrent des biens et des services produits dans les régions ultrapériphériques. Cette analyse est généralement effectuée dans le contexte d'une évaluation de l'impact sur le développement durable.

⁽¹⁾ Règlement (CE) n° 791/2007 du Conseil du 21 mai 2007 instaurant un régime de compensation des surcoûts qui grèvent l'écoulement de certains produits de la pêche provenant de régions ultrapériphériques, à savoir des Açores, de Madère, des îles Canaries, de la Guyane française et de la Réunion, JO L 176 du 6.7.2007.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002914/13
to the Commission**

Jean-Jacob Bicep (Verts/ALE)

(13 March 2013)

Subject: Common fisheries policy (CFP) and the outermost regions of the European Union

The communication from the Commission COM(2012) 287 of 20 June 2012 stresses that a more resource-efficient, greener and more competitive economy should be promoted in the outermost regions of the Union in order to help those regions become more self-reliant, economically more robust and better able to create sustainable jobs.

The report on the future common fisheries policy adopted by Parliament a few months ago takes no account of Article 349 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. That means that CFP rules will apply indiscriminately to the French outermost regions. Whereas the internal dimension of the CFP limits subsidies for the restructuring of the fisheries sector quite drastically, its external dimension means that the Union is encouraging development in countries that are potential competitors. The Union is entering into free trade agreements with countries that are in geographic proximity to French outermost regions, thereby undermining the local economy.

The Union's trade policy is therefore out of line with its internal fisheries policies.

1. What measures can be taken to ensure that the outermost regions are not put at an unfair competitive disadvantage?
2. What instruments does the Commission have to square the internal and external dimensions of its common fisheries policy?
3. When negotiating fisheries partnership agreements, how does the Commission take account of the Union's specific objectives in respect of the outermost regions and what impact does the Commission think the trade agreements it negotiates have on those regions and on overseas countries and territories?

Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission

(3 June 2013)

The common fisheries policy (CFP) takes into account the special circumstances and special needs of outermost regions, for instance, with Regulation (EC) No 791/2007 introducing a scheme to compensate for the additional costs incurred in the marketing of certain fishery products from the outermost regions Azores, Madeira, the Canary Islands, French Guiana and Reunion ⁽¹⁾. The proposals for the reform of the CFP continue this line of action and also improve it since the Commission has proposed to enlarge it to all outermost regions of the EU.

The external dimension of the CFP, and in particular the negotiations conducted in the framework of fisheries partnership agreements and, at the multilateral level, in regional fisheries management organisations, involves close consultation with Member States, which transmit to the Commission the special needs of their regions. Furthermore, any external agreement in the framework of the CFP requires, before its adoption by the Council, the consent of the European Parliament, in accordance with Article 218 TFUE.

With regard to trade agreements, where the Commission proposes to negotiate a new agreement, it provides an Impact Assessment and where relevant, this assessment looks at outermost regions (OR) interests.

In addition, the EU may also take account of the interests of the ORs during the negotiation of a trade agreement with their neighbours or when trade agreements cover goods and services produced in the ORs. This analysis is usually carried in the context of a Sustainable Impact assessment (SIA).

⁽¹⁾ Council Regulation (EC) No 791/2007 of 21 May 2007 introducing a scheme to compensate for the additional costs incurred in the marketing of certain fishery products from the outermost regions the Azores, Madeira, the Canary Islands, French Guiana and Réunion, OJ L 176, 6.7.2007.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης P-002915/13
προς την Επιτροπή
Kriton Arsenis (S&D)
(13 Μαρτίου 2013)

Θέμα: Ένταξη επένδυσης Τοπλού στο «fast track»

Σκιές διαπλοκής παρατηρούνται στο Υπουργείο Ανάπτυξης. Στις 12 Φεβρουαρίου 2013 κατατέθηκε στο ελληνικό Συμβούλιο της Επικρατείας προσφυγή (αίτηση ακύρωσης) κατά της απόφασης της Διυπουργικής Επιτροπής Στρατηγικών Επενδύσεων, με την οποία εντάχθηκε στις διαδικασίες «fast track» που προβλέπονται από το Ν. 3894/2010 το επενδυτικό σχέδιο «ITANOS ΓΑΙΑ». Το επενδυτικό σχέδιο αφορά την τουριστική ανάπτυξη πέντε ξενοδοχείων, συνολικής δυναμικότητας 1 936 κλινών, στη χερσόνησο Σίδερο του δήμου Σητείας που είναι ενταγμένη στο δίκτυο Natura (GR 4320006). Η προσφυγή κατατέθηκε από κατοίκους της περιοχής στην οποία σχεδιάζεται να γίνει η επένδυση.

Οι προσφεύγοντες κάτοικοι κατέθεσαν επίσης αίτηση να τους χορηγηθούν από τη Γενική Γραμματεία Στρατηγικών Επενδύσεων διοικητικά έγγραφα που αφορούν την έγκριση του επενδυτικού σχεδίου, ώστε να αναπτύξουν περαιτέρω, ενώπιον του δικαστηρίου, τους λόγους της προσφυγής τους. Συγκεκριμένα, τα έγγραφα αυτά είναι η αίτηση της εταιρείας προς την ελληνική διοίκηση και οι εισηγήσεις οργάνων του ελληνικού δημοσίου σχετικά με την πραγματοποίηση του συγκεκριμένου επενδυτικού σχεδίου. Η αίτηση των κατοίκων για τη χορήγηση των εγγράφων αυτών απορρίφθηκε με την αιτιολογία ότι δεν διαθέτουν έννομο συμφέρον.

Λαμβάνοντας υπόψη τα παραπάνω,

— Παραβιάζει η άρνηση παροχής των συγκεκριμένων πληροφοριών την οδηγία 2003/4 για την πρόσβαση του κοινού σε περιβαλλοντικές πληροφορίες και τις σχετικές διατάξεις της συνθήκης του Λαρχους;

Επιπλέον, ο βασικός εταίρος και διαχειριστής (managing senior partner) της δικηγορικής εταιρείας που εμφανίζεται στην ιστοσελίδα της εταιρείας που σχεδιάζει την επένδυση στην Κρήτη ως νομικός σύμβουλος της στην Ελλάδα, συμμετέχει ταυτόχρονα ως μέλος στο διοικητικό συμβούλιο (ΔΣ) της υπηρεσίας «Invest in Greece» του υπουργείου. Το ΔΣ ενέκρινε στη συνεδρίαση της 18.9.2012 την εισήγηση της «Invest in Greece» σχετικά με το συγκεκριμένο επενδυτικό σχέδιο.

— Παραβιάζει τις διατάξεις του ευρωπαϊκού δικαίου το γεγονός ότι η έγκριση του συγκεκριμένου επενδυτικού σχεδίου από τη Διυπουργική Επιτροπή βασίστηκε σε εισήγηση του «Invest in Greece» εγκεκριμένη από το ΔΣ στο οποίο συμμετέχει το συγκεκριμένο μέλος;

Απάντηση του κ. Ροτοčνίκ εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(17 Απριλίου 2013)

Σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 3 παράγραφος 1 της οδηγίας 2003/4/EK για την πρόσβαση του κοινού σε περιβαλλοντικές πληροφορίες⁽¹⁾, οι δημόσιες αρχές οφείλουν να καθιστούν διαθέσιμες πληροφορίες ανάλογες με αυτές στις οποίες αναφέρεται το Αξιότιμο Μέλος του Κοινοβουλίου σε όποιον υποβάλλει σχετική αίτηση, χωρίς αυτός να χρειάζεται να επικαλεσθεί οποιοδήποτε συμφέρον. Ωστόσο, σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 4 παράγραφος 2 της εν λόγω οδηγίας, μια τέτοια αίτηση μπορεί να απορριφθεί, εάν η δημοσιοποίηση των πληροφοριών θα μπορούσε να επηρεάσει αρνητικά τη λειτουργία της δικαιοσύνης, τη δυνατότητα κάθε προσώπου για δίκαιη δίκη ή τη δυνατότητα της δημόσιας αρχής να διεξάγει έρευνα ποινικού ή πειθαρχικού χαρακτήρα.

Όσον αφορά τη διαδικασία έγκρισης του σχεδίου και τη σύνθεση των εμπλεκόμενων φορέων, πρόκειται για ζητήματα που εμπίπτουν στην αρμοδιότητα των κρατών μελών.

⁽¹⁾ ΕΕ L 41 της 14.2.2003, σ. 26-32.

(English version)

Question for written answer P-002915/13
to the Commission
Kriton Arsenis (S&D)
(13 March 2013)

Subject: 'Fast-tracking' investments in Toplou

There is evidence of a conflict of interests at the Greek Ministry of Development. On 12 February 2013 an appeal was lodged with the Greek Council of State (revocation application) against the decision of the Interministerial Committee for Strategic Investments to include the 'ITANOS GAIA' investment project in the fast-track procedure provided by Law 3894/2010. This project concerns the development of five tourist hotels with a total capacity of 1 936 beds on the Sidero Peninsula in the municipality of Sitia which forms part of the NATURA network (GR 4320006). The appeal was lodged by residents of the area in which the proposed site of the investment project is located.

The applicants have also applied for the General Secretariat of Strategic Investments to grant them access to the administrative documents relating to the approval of the project so as to enable them to further expound the reasons for their action before the courts. The documents in question are the company's application to the Greek administration and the recommendations by Greek public institutions relating to the implementation of this project. The application by residents to obtain access to these documents was rejected on the grounds that they have no legitimate interest in the matter.

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

- Does the refusal to provide such information constitute a violation of Directive 2003/4 on public access to environmental information and the relevant provisions of the Aarhus Convention?

Moreover, the managing senior partner of the law firm who appears on the website of the company planning to invest in Crete as its legal advisor in Greece is also a member of the board of directors of the Ministry's 'Invest in Greece' service. At its meeting of 18 September 2012, the Board approved the recommendation by 'Invest in Greece' regarding this specific project.

- The project was approved by the Interministerial Committee for Strategic Investments on the recommendation of 'Invest in Greece' which was approved by its Board of Directors, including the Board member in question. Does this constitute a violation of the provisions of European law?

Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission
(17 April 2013)

According to Article 3(1) of Directive 2003/4/EC on public access to environmental information ⁽¹⁾ public authorities are required to make available information of the kind referred to by the Honourable Member to any applicant at his request, without him having to state an interest. Nevertheless, according to Article 4(2) of the same directive, such a request can be refused if disclosure would adversely affect the course of justice, the ability of any person to receive a fair trial or the ability of a public authority to conduct an enquiry of a criminal or disciplinary nature.

As regards the approval procedure of a project and the composition of the involved bodies, these are matters which fall within the competence of Member States.

⁽¹⁾ OJ L 41, 14.2.2003, p. 26-32.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002916/13
a la Comisión**

Andrés Perelló Rodríguez (S&D)

(13 de marzo de 2013)

Asunto: Límite de velocidad y aumento de las emisiones

El Gobierno de España acaba de decidir aumentar a 130 km/h el límite de velocidad para los vehículos que circulen por autovías y autopistas, uniéndose así a los países de la UE donde los niveles de velocidad son más permisivos. La Comisión Europea siempre ha dado una respuesta negativa a las numerosas solicitudes de armonización de los límites de velocidad que ha recibido, tanto por parte de la industria como por parte de entidades ciudadanas, alegando que las cuestiones de tráfico no son competencia comunitaria.

Sin embargo, cualquier aumento de los límites de velocidad comporta, además de mayor riesgo de accidentes, unaafección medioambiental negativa al suponer igualmente el aumento de los gases emitidos por los vehículos. Respecto al riesgo de accidentes, la Comisión impulsó una Carta Europea de Seguridad Vial que en su momento fue un instrumento acertado pero que, en la actualidad y con el aumento del parque móvil y decisiones como la del Gobierno español, despierta dudas sobre su eficacia entre las asociaciones de afectados.

En lo concerniente a las emisiones, la Comisión es concedora de que todo aumento de los límites de velocidad va a suponer un incremento en las emisiones de gases de los vehículos, cosa que podría suponer una contradicción respecto a los esfuerzos que la UE está exigiendo a sus Estados miembros para conseguir llegar a los compromisos internacionales adquiridos sobre gases de efecto invernadero y sobre menor consumo de combustibles fósiles perjudiciales para el medio ambiente y la salud.

Teniendo en cuenta que la aplicación del paquete climático sí que es competencia comunitaria:

¿No considera la Comisión que existe una contradicción entre sus objetivos en materia climática para 2020 y las medidas nacionales sobre aumento de la velocidad que puedan estar tomando gobiernos como el español? ¿Piensa la Comisión actuar en el marco de sus competencias para adaptar los límites de velocidad a los objetivos climáticos de la UE?

¿No cree la Comisión que toda medida de aumento de velocidad en las vías rápidas podría estar fomentando la idea, entre sectores como los jóvenes, de que la velocidad no es un factor de riesgo y, por lo tanto, contribuyendo al aumento del número de accidentes que tanto ha intentado contrarrestar la Comisión con sus campañas institucionales sobre seguridad vial?

Respuesta de la Sra. Hedegaard en nombre de la Comisión

(30 de abril de 2013)

Según una evaluación de la Comisión, la reducción de los límites de velocidad en las autopistas es uno de los medios que permiten reducir las emisiones de CO₂ del transporte por carretera ⁽¹⁾. Dicha evaluación indica que esta reducción puede dar lugar a importantes ventajas colaterales como la mejora de la calidad del aire, la reducción del ruido y el aumento de la seguridad.

En lo que atañe a los objetivos de la UE para 2020 en materia climática, la cuestión de las emisiones de CO₂ del transporte se aborda en la Decisión sobre el esfuerzo compartido ⁽²⁾. Corresponde a los Estados miembros poner en aplicación las políticas y medidas nacionales necesarias para garantizar el cumplimiento de los objetivos fijados en la citada Decisión. La Comisión comprobará cada año el cumplimiento por parte de los Estados miembros de las asignaciones anuales de emisiones fijadas en la Decisión. En caso de incumplimiento de la Decisión, el Estado miembro deberá elaborar un plan de acción correctivo centrado en las políticas y medidas que vayan a ponerse en aplicación a efectos de la consecución de los objetivos. No corresponde a la Comisión sugerir las políticas o medidas que deben ponerse en aplicación, en su caso.

⁽¹⁾ EU Transport GHG: Routes to 2050? Appendix 11 Infrastructure and spatial policy, speed and traffic management; CE Delft & TNO (2009).

⁽²⁾ Decisión n° 406/2009/CE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 23 de abril de 2009, sobre el esfuerzo de los Estados miembros para reducir sus emisiones de gases de efecto invernadero a fin de cumplir los compromisos adquiridos por la Comunidad hasta 2020.

Los Estados miembros pueden fijar libremente los límites de velocidad en su red de carreteras. En esta decisión influyen distintos factores tales como el medio ambiente, la situación y el diseño de las carreteras y del parque móvil, los hábitos de conducción, etc. La Comisión no puede evaluar si el aumento del límite de velocidad de 120 km/h a 130 km/h en las autovías y autopistas españolas que, por otro lado, son más seguras que otros tipos de carreteras, va a fomentar comportamientos de riesgo entre los jóvenes que podrían dar lugar a un aumento del número de accidentes. No obstante, la Comisión seguirá intentando reducir a la mitad la cifra de muertes en las carreteras de aquí al final de la presente década, a través de las iniciativas anunciadas en las orientaciones políticas europeas sobre seguridad vial de 2011-2020 ⁽³⁾.

⁽³⁾ COM(2010) 389 final.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002916/13
to the Commission
Andrés Perelló Rodríguez (S&D)
(13 March 2013)

Subject: Speed limit and increased emissions

The Spanish Government has recently decided to increase the speed limit to 130 km/h for vehicles travelling on main roads and motorways, bringing it into line with EU countries where the speed limits are less restrictive. The Commission has always turned down the numerous requests it has received for harmonisation of speed limits, from the industry and from citizens' organisations, on the grounds that traffic matters are not within Community competence.

However, any increase in speed limit involves, in addition to an increased accident risk, a negative effect on the environment because of increased vehicle emissions. With regard to the accident risk, the Commission initiated a European Road Safety Charter, which was an appropriate tool at the time but which currently, and with the increasing number of vehicles and decisions such as that of the Spanish Government, gives rise to doubts as to its effectiveness amongst the associations concerned.

In terms of emissions, the Commission is aware that any increase in speed limits will lead to an increase in vehicle emissions, something that could be at odds with the efforts that the EU is demanding from its Member States to meet the international commitments undertaken on greenhouse gases and reduced consumption of fossil fuels that are harmful to the environment and to health.

In view of the fact that enforcement of the climate package is indeed within Community competence:

Does the Commission not think that there is a contradiction between its climate objectives for 2020 and national measures to increase speed limits that governments, such as the Spanish Government, are undertaking? Does the Commission think that it is acting within its competences in adjusting speed limits to EU climate objectives?

Does the Commission not think that any measure to increase speed limits on fast roads could be promoting the idea, amongst groups such as young people, that speed is not a risk factor, therefore contributing to an increase in the number of accidents that the Commission has been trying to prevent with its institutional campaigns on road safety?

Answer given by Ms Hedegaard on behalf of the Commission
(30 April 2013)

An assessment for the Commission has shown that lower motorway speed limits are a possible instrument to reduce road transport CO₂ emissions⁽¹⁾. This assessment showed that they can be accompanied by important co-benefits including air quality improvements, lower noise and improved safety.

With regard to EU climate objectives for 2020, transport CO₂ emissions are covered by the Effort Sharing Decision⁽²⁾. It is for Member States to implement internal policies and measures in order to ensure their compliance with the targets under the Effort Sharing Decision. The Commission will verify each year Member States' compliance with the Annual Emission Allocations set under the decision. In case of non-compliance with the decision, the Member State will have to prepare a corrective action plan that will focus on policies and measures to be implemented in order to achieve the targets. It would not be for the Commission to suggest which if any policies or measures should be implemented.

⁽¹⁾ EU Transport GHG: Routes to 2050? Appendix 11 Infrastructure and spatial policy, speed and traffic management; CE Delft & TNO (2009).

⁽²⁾ Decision No 406/2009/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the effort of Member States to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to meet the Community's greenhouse gas emission reduction commitments up to 2020.

Member States are free to set speed limits on their road network. Such decisions are influenced by many different factors, like environment, conditions and design of the roads and of the vehicle fleet, driving culture, etc. The Commission cannot assess whether the increase of the speed limit from 120 km/h to 130 km/h on Spanish main roads and motorways, which are much safer than other types of roads, would promote risky behaviour of young people resulting in an increase of accidents. Nevertheless, the Commission will continue its work to halve road deaths by the end of this decade through the initiatives announced in the European Road Safety Policy Orientations 2011-2020 ⁽³⁾.

⁽³⁾ COM(2010) 389 final.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002918/13
to the Commission
Marian Harkin (ALDE)
(13 March 2013)**

Subject: Inclusion of persons with disabilities in EU external action

On 22 January 2011, the European Union ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). This is the first human rights treaty to be ratified by the European Union as a regional integration organisation and it represents an important step forward in increasing the protection of disability rights in Europe and beyond.

The guiding principles enshrined in the CRPD are mirrored in the European Disability Strategy 2010-2020, which should guide the work of the EU on this matter. Both the CRPD and the European Disability Strategy contain specific provisions vis-à-vis the EU's external action, with a specific focus on international cooperation and humanitarian aid.

In line with Article 35 of the CRPD, two years after its ratification the EU is required to report to the CRPD Committee regarding the work it has carried out in the area of international cooperation. In this connection, who (or which section) deals with the EU's report on how persons with disabilities have been included in its external action?

**Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(3 May 2013)**

As stipulated in the Code of Conduct between the Council, the Member States and the Commission setting out internal arrangements for the implementation by and representation of the European Union relating to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities ⁽¹⁾, the Commission will prepare the Union report required by Art. 35 of the UNCRPD in respect of matters falling within the Union competence.

The EU Report is currently being prepared by the Commission in consultation with the EU Member States in the competent Council working group. The report will also address measures taken and progress made in the field of international cooperation with reference to the list of actions 2010-2015 of the Initial plan of Commission Staff working document 'European Disability Strategy 2010-2020' ⁽²⁾.

Furthermore, the 2013 EU Disability High-Level Group Joint Report on the Implementation of the UNCRPD ⁽³⁾ will include a special thematic chapter on disability and development cooperation, in view of the upcoming High-level meeting of the UN General Assembly on disability and development on 23 September 2013.

⁽¹⁾ 2010/C 340/08, point 12(c).

⁽²⁾ SEC(2010) 1324 final 15.11.2010.

⁽³⁾ The HLG comprises Member State experts on disability matters and stakeholders, in particular organisations of persons with disabilities and service providers. The annual HLG reports published since 2008 are available for download at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/document/index_en.htm#h2-5.

(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-002919/13
an die Kommission (Vizepräsidentin/Hohe Vertreterin)**

Franziska Katharina Brantner (Verts/ALE)

(13. März 2013)

Betrifft: VP/HR — Private Militär- und Sicherheitsunternehmen in Delegationen und Missionen der EU

Am 22. Februar 2013 erzielte eine Gruppe höchst unterschiedlicher Interessenträger, die sich aus Vertretern der beteiligten Unternehmen, Zivilgesellschaften und Regierungen zusammensetzt, einen Konsens über den Internationalen Verhaltenskodex für private Sicherheitsdienstleister (ICoC). Dieser unabhängige Governance- und Aufsichtsmechanismus in Form einer „Satzung“ zielt darauf ab, dass die Umsetzung des Kodex stärker forciert wird. Beinahe 600 private Militär- und Sicherheitsunternehmen haben den Kodex inzwischen unterzeichnet.

1. Welche Fortschritte hat der Europäische Auswärtige Dienst (EAD) innerhalb des letzten halben Jahres dabei erzielt, die Vielzahl seiner Verträge an den ICoC anzupassen, wie in der Antwort auf die Schriftlichen Anfragen P-006050/2012 und E-00655/2012 angekündigt wurde?
2. Wird der EAD angesichts der Tatsache, dass immer mehr private Militär- und Sicherheitsunternehmen dem ICoC beitreten, ab sofort nur noch Verträge für seine Delegationen und Missionen mit Unternehmen abschließen, die den ICoC unterzeichnet haben bzw. dessen Satzung mit Blick auf eine Mitgliedschaft in der ICoC-Assoziation förmlich unterstützen?

Antwort von Frau Ashton — Hohe Vertreterin/Vizepräsidentin im Namen der Kommission

(6. Mai 2013)

1. Alle Sicherheitsunternehmen, mit denen die EAD-Zentrale Verträge geschlossen hat, sind Unterzeichner des ICoC und haben damit begonnen, ihre Verfahren anzupassen, damit sie mit diesem Verhaltenskodex vereinbar sind.
2. Bei der Vergabe von Aufträgen an private Militär- und Sicherheitsunternehmen wollen wir vorbildliche Verfahren einschließlich der Übernahme der ICoC-Normen anwenden, wengleich die vollständige Einhaltung der neuen Charta eine gewisse Zeit in Anspruch nehmen wird.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002919/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Franziska Katharina Brantner (Verts/ALE)**

(13 March 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Private military and security companies at EU delegations and missions

On 22 February 2013, a multi-stakeholder group comprising representatives of signatory companies, civil society and governments reached a consensus on the Charter for the Oversight Mechanism of the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC). This independent governance and oversight mechanism, which takes the form of 'Articles of Association', is aimed at strengthening the implementation of the ICoC. Almost 600 private military and security companies have signed the ICoC so far.

1. Over the last six months, what progress has the European External Action Service (EEAS) made in adapting its broad range of contracts to bring them into line with the ICoC, as announced in the answer given to Written Questions P-006050/2012 and E-006055/2012?
2. Following the increasing level of adherence to the ICoC and the multi-stakeholder consensus on an oversight mechanism, will the EEAS from now on only conclude contracts for its delegations and missions with private military and security companies which have signed the ICoC and formally endorsed its Articles of Association with a view to becoming members of the ICoC Association?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission

(6 May 2013)

1. All of our current security contractors managed by Headquarters are signatories to the ICoC and they are starting to adapt their procedures to be compliant with the document.
 2. We aim to demonstrate best practice in our contracting of private military and security companies including adherence to ICoC standards, although full compliance with the new Charter will take time.
-

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-002920/13

an die Kommission

Jutta Steinruck (S&D)

(13. März 2013)

Betrifft: Standortverlagerung

Die Firma ELOPAK wird 100 Arbeitsplätze ihrer Produktion in Speyer/Deutschland an den Produktionsstandort Aarhus/Dänemark verlagern. Die Verlagerung erfolgt unter dem Aspekt der günstigeren Produktionsbedingungen und der Kosteneinsparungen durch eine Produktion in Dänemark.

Kann die Kommission daher mitteilen, ob vonseiten der dänischen Regierung oder der EU direkt an den Konzern ELOPAK finanzielle Anreize geschaffen wurden, um das Werk in Aarhus zu erweitern?

Antwort von Herrn Almunia im Namen der Kommission

(28. Mai 2013)

Der Kommission ist nicht bekannt, dass die Firma Elopak von den dänischen Behörden oder — im Rahmen der Strukturfonds — von der EU Beihilfen erhalten hätte, um ihren Produktionsstandort in Aarhus zu erweitern. In jedem Fall möchte die Kommission der Frau Abgeordneten mitteilen, dass das Gebiet der Stadt Aarhus, in dem sich die Produktionsstätte der Firma Elopak befindet, nach den Leitlinien für staatliche Beihilfen mit regionaler Zielsetzung 2007-2013 (ABl. C 54 vom 4.3.2006) für regionale Investitionsbeihilfen nicht infrage kommt.

Außerdem möchte die Kommission darauf hinweisen, dass Elopak an dem aus dem Europäischen Sozialfonds finanzierten Programm „KompetenceMidt“ teilgenommen hat, mit dem die Region Mitteljütland (Midtjylland) Unternehmen über regionale Angebote zur beruflichen Bildung informiert. Zweck des Programms ist die Höherqualifizierung der in diesen Unternehmen beschäftigten Arbeitnehmer. Die Informationen sind nicht auf die einzelnen Unternehmen zugeschnitten, und das Programm sieht keine Beratungsangebote vor. Es dient lediglich dazu, Unternehmen bei der Suche nach Berufsbildungsmöglichkeiten Hilfestellung zu geben.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002920/13
to the Commission**

Jutta Steinruck (S&D)

(13 March 2013)

Subject: Relocation

The company Elopak is relocating 100 jobs from its production plant in Speyer in Germany to its production site in Aarhus, Denmark. The reasons for the relocation are the more favourable production conditions and the cost savings that production in Denmark will entail.

Can the Commission therefore say whether the Danish Government or the EU has provided financial incentives directly to the company Elopak to expand its plant in Aarhus?

Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission

(28 May 2013)

The Commission has no information that aid was granted to Elopak by the Danish authorities or the EU in the context of structural funds to expand its plant in Aarhus. In any event, the Commission wishes to inform the Honourable Member of the Parliament that the area of the city of Aarhus where the Elopak plant is located is not eligible for regional investment state aid under the Guidelines on National Regional Aid for 2007-2013 (OJ C 54, 4.03.2006).

The Commission would also like to mention that Elopak has participated in the European Social Fund-financed programme 'KompetenceMidt' (CompetenceMid), in which the region of Mid-Jutland informs businesses about the vocational training offered in the region. The purpose of the programme is to increase the skills of the employees in the businesses. The information is not tailor-made to the individual businesses and the programme does not offer counselling. The programme only assists businesses in finding vocational training.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002921/13

alla Commissione

Matteo Salvini (EFD)

(13 marzo 2013)

Oggetto: Presenza di cesio 137 nei cinghiali della Valsesia e politiche nucleari dell'Unione europea

Nel corso di analisi di routine svolte nelle passate settimane su cinghiali abbattuti in Valsesia (Piemonte) durante la stagione di caccia appena conclusasi, è emersa la presenza, nel corpo di detti animali, di cesio 137, isotopo radioattivo del cesio. In ragione di ciò, si è rilevata, in determinati organi degli animali in oggetto, in particolare modo nella lingua, un'attività radioattiva pari a un massimo di 5.621 Becquerel per chilogrammo, ossia quasi dieci volte superiore al livello massimo ammissibile per legge, che corrisponde a 600 Bq/Kg.

Stante i gravi rischi per la salute pubblica indotti dalla dispersione di sostanze fortemente radioattive nell'ambiente, rischi ancor maggiori quando, come in questo caso, la contaminazione riguarda animali le cui carni sono destinate al consumo alimentare umano, può la Commissione far sapere:

- Se sta considerando o intende considerare la possibilità di istituire una commissione d'inchiesta ad hoc per indagare sull'origine del cesio radioattivo riscontrato nei cinghiali e verificare l'eventuale presenza di detto isotopo anche in altri esemplari di fauna selvatica stanziati nelle aree contigue o comunque prossime al territorio della Valsesia, oltrepassando, se necessario, i confini nazionali italiani per verificare se il problema sussiste anche nei territori francesi confinanti col Piemonte e
- Se abbia o meno intenzione di elaborare, sul medio — lungo periodo, una nuova politica comune a livello europeo sull'energia nucleare, considerato che il vecchio trattato EURATOM è rimasto quasi invariato dal 1957?

Risposta di Günther Oettinger a nome della Commissione

(29 aprile 2013)

1. La Commissione rimanda l'onorevole parlamentare alla risposta all'interrogazione scritta E-2763/2013 presentata dall'onorevole Borghezio.
2. Attualmente la Commissione non ritiene necessario modificare il trattato Euratom. Con il trattato di Lisbona, entrato in vigore il 1° dicembre 2009, i leader dell'UE hanno approvato un numero limitato di modifiche al trattato Euratom, ribadendo al tempo stesso la necessità che le disposizioni dello stesso continuino ad avere pieno valore giuridico ⁽¹⁾.

La Commissione monitora costantemente e, se necessario, modifica la legislazione secondaria Euratom in vigore in relazione all'energia nucleare. Per esempio, ha già adottato una proposta di direttiva per norme fondamentali di sicurezza ⁽²⁾ e intende proporre una revisione della direttiva sulla sicurezza nucleare per tenere conto delle lezioni tratte dall'incidente di Fukushima e delle conclusioni delle prove di resistenza svolte di recente ⁽³⁾.

⁽¹⁾ Cfr. in particolare il protocollo n. 2 che modifica il trattato che istituisce la Comunità europea dell'energia atomica, GU C 306 del 17 dicembre 2007, pag. 199.

⁽²⁾ Proposta di direttiva del Consiglio che stabilisce norme fondamentali di sicurezza relative alla protezione contro i pericoli derivanti dall'esposizione alle radiazioni ionizzanti, COM(2012)242.

⁽³⁾ Per maggiori informazioni, cfr. la comunicazione della Commissione al Consiglio e al Parlamento europeo sulle valutazioni complessive dei rischi e della sicurezza («prove di stress») delle centrali nucleari nell'Unione europea e attività collegate, COM(2012)571 final.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002921/13
to the Commission
Matteo Salvini (EFD)
(13 March 2013)

Subject: Presence of caesium-137 in boars in Valsesia and the European Union's nuclear policies

During routine tests carried out in recent weeks on boars killed in Valsesia (Piedmont) during the hunting season which has just ended, the presence of caesium-137, a radioactive isotope of caesium, was detected in the bodies of the animals. As a result, in specific organs in the animals, particularly the tongue, radioactive activity equal to a maximum of 5.621 Becquerel per kilogram was detected, which is nearly 10 times higher than the maximum level of 600 Bq/Kg permitted by law.

In view of the serious public health risks resulting from the dispersion of highly radioactive substances in the environment, risks which are even higher when, as in this case, the contamination relates to animals whose meat is eaten by humans, can the Commission say:

- whether it is considering or will consider the possibility of setting up an ad hoc inquiry committee to investigate the origin of the radioactive caesium found in the boars and to check whether this isotope is also present in other woodland fauna living in neighbouring areas or in any case close to the territory of Valsesia, going beyond Italian national borders, if necessary, to check whether there is also a problem in French territory bordering Piedmont?
- whether or not it intends, in the medium or long term, to draft a new common European policy on nuclear energy, since the old Euratom Treaty has remained practically unchanged since 1957?

Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission
(29 April 2013)

1. The Commission would like to refer the Honourable Member of Parliament to the reply to the Written Question E-2763/2013. The question was submitted by Mr Mario Borghezio.
2. The Commission does not currently consider it necessary to modify the Euratom Treaty. In the context of the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force on 1 December 2009, EU leaders agreed on a limited number of amendments to the Euratom Treaty, while explicitly recalling the necessity that the provisions of this Treaty should continue to have full legal effect ⁽¹⁾.

The Commission is continuously monitoring, and if necessary revising, existing Euratom secondary legislation in relation to nuclear energy. Thus, it has already adopted a proposal for a new Basic Safety Standards Directive ⁽²⁾ and it intends to propose a revised Nuclear Safety Directive, guaranteeing that lessons learned from the Fukushima accident and the conclusions of the recently conducted stress tests are properly taken into account ⁽³⁾.

⁽¹⁾ See, in particular, Protocol No 2 amending the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community; OJ C 306 of 17.12.2007, at p. 199.

⁽²⁾ Proposal for a Council Directive laying down basic safety standards for protection against the dangers arising from exposure to ionizing radiation; COM(2012) 242.

⁽³⁾ For more information, see the Commission Communication to the Council and the European Parliament on the comprehensive risk and safety assessments ('Stress Tests') of nuclear power plants in the European Union and related activities, COM(2012) 571 final.

(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002922/13
do Komisji**

Ryszard Antoni Legutko (ECR)

(13 marca 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Szczepienia przeciw chorobom zakaźnym

Od pewnego czasu toczy się dyskusja nad ilością szczepień, którym są poddawani mieszkańcy Europy. Wiadomym jest, że szczepienia mają służyć zapobieganiu chorobom zakaźnym, jednakże trzeba zwrócić uwagę na to, że pojawiają się również głosy, iż niektóre ze szczepień nie powodują zwiększenia odporności na choroby; a moda na szczepienia wynika z działalności koncernów medycznych. Niepokój budzi to, że według niektórych ekspertów szczepienia mogą prowadzić do poważnych komplikacji w przypadku wystąpienia skutków ubocznych.

Dyskusja na temat szczepień powinna toczyć się w gronie ekspertów zajmujących się tematyką szczepień, jednakże nie rozstrzygając, która ze stron sporu ma rację, chciałbym zadać następujące pytania Komisji Europejskiej:

- w jakim stopniu przepisy Unii Europejskiej regulują kwestie związane z przymusem szczepień dla obywateli państw członkowskich?
- czy Unia Europejska monitoruje dane dotyczące ilości osób, które co roku zapadają na choroby po zastosowaniu szczepionek?
- czy Unia Europejska posiada przepisy, które umożliwiają osobom poszkodowanym przez skutki uboczne szczepionek uzyskanie odszkodowań od koncernów farmaceutycznych?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Tonía Borga w imieniu Komisji

(8 maja 2013 r.)

Krajowe polityki w zakresie szczepień wchodzą w zakres wyłącznych kompetencji państw członkowskich. Komisja wspiera państwa członkowskie w utrzymaniu lub zwiększeniu wskaźnika szczepień przeciw zwalczanym tą drogą chorobom, na przykład w odniesieniu do szczepień u dzieci. W zaleceniu Rady 2009/1019/UE⁽¹⁾ w sprawie szczepień przeciw grypie sezonowej nadal zachęca się do szczepienia osób z grup ryzyka, takich jak osoby starsze i pracownicy opieki zdrowotnej.

Ponadto, zgodnie z prawem Unii Europejskiej szczepionki dopuszcza się do obrotu tylko wtedy, gdy dokonano oceny ich jakości, bezpieczeństwa i skuteczności oraz gdy stwierdzono, że korzyści wynikające z ich stosowania przeważają nad ryzykiem.

Komisja monitoruje dane dotyczące pacjentów, którzy w następstwie stosowania szczepionek chorują lub doświadczają działań niepożądanych. Niezależnie od uzyskania pozwolenia na dopuszczenie do obrotu produkt leczniczy podlega ścisłemu nadzorowi także po wprowadzeniu do obrotu. Europejska Agencja Leków jest odpowiedzialna za wykrywanie, ocenę i minimalizowanie ryzyka związanego z niepożądanymi działaniami leków oraz za informowanie o tym ryzyku.

Jeżeli chodzi o nadzór, Europejskie Centrum ds. Zapobiegania i Kontroli Chorób koordynuje nadzór nad chorobami zaraźliwymi, w tym nad chorobami, którym zapobiega się poprzez szczepienia.

Wreszcie, odpowiedzialność cywilna i administracyjna za wszelkie skutki wywoływane przez leki, w tym odszkodowania od firm farmaceutycznych, leży w zakresie kompetencji sądów krajowych i jest ustalana odrębnie dla każdego przypadku. W niektórych przypadkach może mieć również zastosowanie odpowiedzialność za produkty wadliwe określona w dyrektywie Rady 85/374/EWG⁽²⁾.

⁽¹⁾ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:348:0071:0072:pl:PDF>

⁽²⁾ Dyrektywa Rady 85/374/EWG z dnia 25 lipca 1985 r. w sprawie zbliżenia przepisów ustawowych, wykonawczych i administracyjnych państw członkowskich dotyczących odpowiedzialności za produkty wadliwe (Dz.U. L 210 z 7.8.1985).

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002922/13
to the Commission**

Ryszard Antoni Legutko (ECR)

(13 March 2013)

Subject: Vaccination against infectious diseases

The number of vaccines being given to European citizens has been a subject of debate for some time. It is well known that vaccines are intended to help prevent infectious diseases, but note should also be taken of the doubts that have been voiced as to whether they do all increase resistance to disease, and claims that the fashion for vaccination is the result of efforts by medical companies. It is concerning that some experts believe that vaccination can lead to serious complications if side effects are experienced.

Debate on vaccination should continue among experts in the field, and without passing judgment on which side is right, I would like to ask the Commission the following questions:

- to what extent does European Union legislation regulate issues relating to the compulsory vaccination of citizens of Member States?
- does the European Union monitor data on the number of people who fall ill each year after being vaccinated?
- has the European Union adopted any legislation allowing individuals who have been harmed by the side effects of vaccines to receive compensation from the pharmaceutical companies involved?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission

(8 May 2013)

National Vaccination policies fall under the exclusive competence of the Member States. The Commission does support the Member States in maintaining or increasing rates of vaccination against vaccine-preventable diseases, for example as regards childhood vaccination. The Council Recommendation 2009/1019/EU ⁽¹⁾ on Seasonal Influenza vaccination further encourages vaccination among risk groups, such as the elder and healthcare workers.

In addition, European Union legislation foresees rules to ensure that a marketing authorisation is granted to a vaccine only after its quality, safety and efficacy have been evaluated and a positive benefit-risk balance related to its use has been concluded.

The Commission monitors data on patients who fall ill or suffer adverse reactions following the use of vaccines. After its authorisation, the medicinal product is subject to strict post-marketing surveillance. The European Medicines Agency is responsible for the detection, assessment, minimisation and communication relating to the risk of adverse reactions of medicines.

As regards surveillance, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control is coordinating the surveillance of communicable diseases including vaccine preventable ones.

Finally, the civil and administrative liability for any consequence of a medicine, including compensation from the pharmaceutical companies, is in the remit of the national courts and is decided upon on a case by case basis. The liability for defective products as provided by Council Directive 85/374/EEC ⁽²⁾ can also be evoked in certain cases.

⁽¹⁾ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:348:0071:0072:EN:PDF>.

⁽²⁾ Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products (OJ L 210, 7.8.1985).

(Wersja polska)

**Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-002923/13
do Komisji**

Ryszard Antoni Legutko (ECR)

(13 marca 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Stan przygotowań Wrocławia do projektu Europejskiej Stolicy Kultury w roku 2016

Decyzją instytucji Unii Europejskiej Wrocław w roku 2016 stanie się Europejską Stolicą Kultury. W listopadzie br. roku przedstawiciele Komisji Europejskiej mają przeprowadzić kontrolę stanu przygotowań Wrocławia.

W związku z powyższym proszę o odpowiedź na następujące pytania:

- jaki stan przygotowań Wrocławia do projektu Europejskiej Stolicy Kultury zostanie w listopadzie br. uznany przez Komisję za zadowalający?
- jakie konkretne zadania związane z przygotowaniem do roku 2016 powinny zostać zrealizowane przez Wrocław do listopada br.?
- w jakim terminie zostaną przeprowadzone przez Komisję kolejne kontrole stanu przygotowań Wrocławia do organizacji Europejskiej Komisji Kultury?
- jakie obiekty kultury, instytucje zamierza Komisja skontrolować w listopadzie br.?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarz Androullę Vassiliou w imieniu Komisji

(8 maja 2013 r.)

Mimo że ogólna odpowiedzialność za udaną realizację obchodów Europejskiej Stolicy Kultury spoczywa na miastach przyjmujących ten tytuł i odnośnych państwach członkowskich, na etapie przygotowawczym wspiera je komisja monitorująco-doradcza.

W skład tej komisji wchodzi siedmiu niezależnych członków wyznaczonych przez instytucje europejskie. Komisja obraduje dwukrotnie przed rozpoczęciem obchodów w celu udzielania porad i podsumowania dotychczasowych prac w zakresie przygotowań do obchodów. Ma to na celu pomoc miastom w opracowaniu wysokiej jakości programu o wyraźnym wymiarze europejskim i uwzględniającego zaangażowanie obywateli. Jeśli chodzi o Wrocław, pierwsze spotkanie monitorujące odbędzie się jesienią 2013 r., a drugie wiosną 2015 r.

Podczas pierwszego spotkania monitorującego miasta przedstawiają osiągnięte postępy w zakresie przygotowań obchodów oraz są proszone o wypełnienie kwestionariusza. W tej kwestii miasta są proszone o zdanie relacji z postępów w kontekście zaleceń, które wspomniana komisja sformułowała w momencie wyboru danego miasta. Zalecenia te są opublikowane na stronie internetowej Komisji ⁽¹⁾.

⁽¹⁾ Zalecenia dla Wrocławia są dostępne na stronie: http://ec.europa.eu/culture/our-programmes-and-actions/doc/ecoc/selection-report-poland_en.pdf

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002923/13
to the Commission**

Ryszard Antoni Legutko (ECR)

(13 March 2013)

Subject: Progress made by Wrocław in preparing for its role as European Capital of Culture in 2016

It has been decided by the European Union institutions that Wrocław will become a European Capital of Culture in 2016. Commission representatives are to carry out checks in November 2013 to find out how preparations by Wrocław are progressing.

I would therefore like to ask the Commission:

- in November 2013, what will it regard as satisfactory progress by Wrocław in preparing for its role as European Capital of Culture?
- which concrete tasks relating to preparations for 2016 should Wrocław have completed by November 2013?
- when will the Commission make further inspections of the progress made by Wrocław in its preparations to organise the European Capital of Culture event?
- which cultural sites and institutions does the Commission intend to check in November 2013?

Answer given by Ms Vassiliou on behalf of the Commission

(8 May 2013)

While the overall responsibility for the successful implementation of the European Capital of Culture initiative falls under the responsibility of the cities holding the title and the Member States concerned, a Monitoring and Advisory Panel accompanies the cities during the preparation phase.

The Panel is composed of seven independent members designated by the European institutions. It is convened twice before the beginning of the event in order to give advice on, and take stock of the preparation leading up to the event. This is done with a view to helping the cities develop a high quality programme with a strong European dimension and citizens' involvement. As regards Wrocław, the first monitoring meeting will take place in autumn 2013 and the second in spring 2015.

At the first monitoring meeting cities present the progress which they have achieved in preparing for the event and are invited to respond to a questionnaire. In this context, cities are asked to report on the progress they have made with a view to the recommendations which the Panel gave at the time of selection. These recommendations are published on the Commission website ⁽¹⁾.

⁽¹⁾ For Wrocław it is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/culture/our-programmes-and-actions/doc/ecoc/selection-report-poland_en.pdf

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002924/13
aan de Commissie
Auke Zijlstra (NI)
(13 maart 2013)

Betref: Europese waarden boven alles

De Europese Unie verklaart dat vier lidstaten aandringen op een mechanisme ter bescherming van de „fundamentele waarden” die het blok verenigen.

In een brief aan Commissievoorzitter José Manuel Barroso hebben de ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken van Duitsland, Nederland, Finland en Denemarken gesteld dat de EU snel en doeltreffend moet kunnen reageren om de naleving van de fundamentele waarden van het blok door de 27 lidstaten te verzekeren.

Hoewel in de brief geen enkele lidstaat met naam wordt genoemd, hebben Duitsland en andere lidstaten kritiek geuit aan het adres van Hongarije wegens de schending van bepaalde rechten, zoals de onafhankelijkheid van de rechterlijke macht, die van fundamenteel belang worden geacht voor de cohesie van het blok.

1. Is de Commissie op de hoogte van de inhoud van bovengenoemde brief?
2. Kan de Commissie nadere informatie verstrekken over het voorgestelde mechanisme ter bescherming van de fundamentele waarden? Houden de voorgestelde wijzigingen verband met artikel 7 VEU?
3. Kan de Commissie een nadere definitie geven van wat een ernstige inbreuk op de fundamentele waarden van de Europese Unie inhoudt, en concrete voorbeelden geven?
4. Hoe ziet de Commissie de verhouding tussen een geval waarbij een lidstaat een ernstige inbreuk op de fundamentele waarden constateert en het beginsel van niet-inmenging in de interne aangelegenheden van soevereine staten, een van de grondbeginselen van het internationale recht? Deelt de Commissie mijn mening dat ongefundeerde kritiek van een lidstaat op een andere de soevereiniteit van de betrokken lidstaat ernstig ondermijnt?
5. Is de Commissie het ermee eens dat indien het gemakkelijker wordt maatregelen te nemen uit hoofde van artikel 7 VEU, dit betekent dat alweer bevoegdheden van de lidstaten worden overgeheveld naar de Europese Unie?

Antwoord van de heer Barroso namens de Commissie
(2 mei 2013)

1. De Commissie is op de hoogte van de inhoud van de brieven die zij ontvangt, en bijgevolg ook van de inhoud van de brief waar het geachte Parlementslid naar verwijst.
2. Er moet aan worden herinnerd dat de voorzitter van de Commissie in zijn State of the Union-toespraak van september 2012 heeft benadrukt dat in een politieke unie ook de fundamenten waarop de Unie is gebouwd, moeten worden versterkt. Deze grondslagen zijn de eerbiediging van de fundamentele waarden, van de rechtstaat en van democratie. Hij heeft eveneens benadrukt dat de juridische en democratische structuur in sommige lidstaten onder vuur lag en dat zo de beperkingen van de huidige institutionele regelingen aan het licht zijn gekomen. Er is een bredere waaier van instrumenten nodig, die meer keuze geeft dan alleen die tussen de „soft power” van politieke overreding en de „nucleaire optie” van artikel 7 van het Verdrag betreffende de Europese Unie. De Commissie is ingenomen met het feit dat in de brief van de ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken van Duitsland, Nederland, Finland en Denemarken dezelfde kwestie aan de orde wordt gesteld.
3. Het geachte Parlementslid wordt verwezen naar de mededeling van de Commissie van 15 oktober 2003 (COM(2003) 606 definitief).
4. De Unie is gebouwd op de gemeenschappelijke waarden die in artikel 2 van het Verdrag betreffende de Europese Unie zijn neergelegd. De volledige eerbiediging van deze waarden door elke lidstaat, die verder gaat dan enkel de naleving van de plichten die door het recht van de Unie zijn opgelegd, is essentieel voor de werking van de Unie en van de regels en mechanismen die op grond van het recht van de Unie zijn vastgesteld, met name de regels en mechanismen voor de samenwerking tussen autoriteiten van de lidstaten en voor de wederzijdse erkenning van beslissingen.

5. De Commissie is van mening dat nieuwe mechanismen voor de volledige eerbiediging van de waarden in artikel 2 van het Verdrag betreffende de Europese Unie door de lidstaten, niet noodzakelijk afbreuk doen aan de bevoegdheidsverdeling zoals die in de verdragen is vastgesteld.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002924/13
to the Commission
Auke Zijlstra (NI)
(13 March 2013)

Subject: European values first and foremost

The European Union has said that four Member States are urging the establishment of a mechanism to protect the 'fundamental values' that unite the bloc.

In a letter to Commission President José Manuel Barroso, the Foreign Ministers of Germany, the Netherlands, Finland and Denmark said that the EU 'must be able to react swiftly and effectively to ensure compliance' by its 27 Member States with the bloc's basic values.

While the letter did not mention any specific Member State, Hungary has been criticised by Germany and other countries for violating rights, such as the independence of the judiciary, that are seen as fundamental to the bloc's cohesion ⁽¹⁾.

1. Is the Commission familiar with the content of the aforementioned letter?
2. Could the Commission provide further information about the proposed mechanism for the protection of fundamental values? Are the proposed changes related to Article 7 TEU?
3. Could the Commission state the definition of a serious breach of the fundamental values of the European Union, and give concrete examples?
4. What is the Commission's opinion on the relationship between the case of one Member State determining a serious breach of fundamental values and the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states, which is one of the basic principles of international law? Does the Commission share my opinion that unfounded criticism of one Member State by another seriously undermines the sovereignty of the Member State concerned?
5. Does the Commission agree that the potential simplification of the application of measures under Article 7 TEU would mean another shift of Member States' competence to the European Union?

Answer given by Mr Barroso on behalf of the Commission
(2 May 2013)

1. The Commission is familiar with the content of the letters it receives, including that to which the Honourable Member is referring.
2. It should be recalled that the President of the Commission in his speech on the state of the Union of September 2012 has stressed that a political union also means that the foundations on which the Union is built must strengthen: the respect for the fundamental values, for the rule of law and democracy. He also stressed that threats to the legal and democratic fabric in some of the Member States revealed limits of the current institutional arrangements within the Union and the need for a better developed set of instruments — not just the alternative between the 'soft power' of political persuasion and the 'nuclear option' of Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union. The Commission welcomes the fact that the letter of the Foreign Ministers of Germany, the Netherlands, Finland and Denmark now raises the same issue.
3. The Honourable Member is referred to the Commission's communication of 15 October 2003 (COM(2003) 606 final).
4. The Union is founded on the common values enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union. Full respect for these values by each MS — beyond mere compliance with precise obligations under Union law is vital for the functioning of the Union and of the rules and mechanisms established under Union law, including notably those providing for cooperation between Member States' authorities and for mutual recognition of decisions.
5. In the Commission's view new mechanisms aimed at ensuring full respect by Member States for the values enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union do not necessarily affect the system of competences as laid down in the treaties.

⁽¹⁾ <http://mobile.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-08/eu-is-urged-to-set-up-mechanism-to-protect-basic-values.html>

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002925/13
aan de Commissie
Saïd El Khadraoui (S&D)
(14 maart 2013)

Betreeft: Witwaspraktijken

Het effectief aanpakken van witwaspraktijken is een politieke prioriteit voor de EU. Het heeft er echter alle schijn van dat sommige lidstaten gevoeliger zijn voor witwaspraktijken dan andere. Het Instituut voor Religieuze Werken, dat bekendstaat onder het Italiaanse acroniem IOR, of nog algemener als de bank van het Vaticaan, bedient katholieke kerkelijke instellingen, curies, en priesters en nonnen over de hele wereld, en beheert 33 404 rekeningen. Na de aanvaring van de bank met de Italiaanse autoriteiten in 2010 riep paus Benedictus XVI het IOR op de internationale normen voor de bestrijding van witwaspraktijken na te komen. Italiaanse aanklagers, die bang waren dat de bank van het Vaticaan werd gebruikt om geld wit te wassen voor Italiaanse criminele organisaties, legden beslag op 23 miljoen EUR (27 miljoen USD) van de bezittingen van het IOR, na kennis te hebben genomen van verdachte transacties.

De Heilige Stoel onderwierp het IOR aan het toezicht van de waakhond voor witwaspraktijken van de Raad van Europa, het Comité van deskundigen inzake de evaluatie van maatregelen ter bestrijding van het witwassen van geld en de financiering van terrorisme (Moneyval). In zijn verslag van 4 juli 2012 verklaarde Moneyval dat het Vaticaan „in korte tijd veel had bewerkstelligd” om de „bouwstenen” van een controlesysteem aan te leggen. De experts van Moneyval „bevalen ten zeerste aan” dat er op de bank van het Vaticaan „in de nabije toekomst onafhankelijk toezicht wordt uitgeoefend door een bedrijfseconomische toezichthoudende instantie”.

Tegen deze achtergrond wordt de Commissie verzocht de volgende vragen te beantwoorden:

1. Is zij zich bewust van deze aantijgingen met betrekking tot de kwetsbaarheid van het IOR op het gebied van witwaspraktijken?
2. Deelt zij de conclusies die uiteengezet zijn in de samenvatting van het verslag van Moneyval ⁽¹⁾, met name in de paragrafen 17 en 18 op bladzijde 5, en zo ja, welke geschikte stappen overweegt zij te nemen om de transparantie te verbeteren en pogingen tot witwaspraktijken te verijdelen?
3. Zal het IOR onder de toezichthoudende bevoegdheid van de ECB vallen als de verordening inzake de bankenunie eenmaal is aangenomen?

Antwoord van de heer Barnier namens de Commissie
(8 mei 2013)

Het aanpakken van witwaspraktijken is voor de Europese Commissie een belangrijke prioriteit. In de zogenaamde antiwitwasrichtlijnen ⁽²⁾ is een deel van het kader voor de bestrijding van witwaspraktijken en terrorismefinanciering in de EU uitgewerkt. De Commissie ziet toe op de toepassing van EU-wetgeving in alle lidstaten overeenkomstig de in het Verdrag vastgelegde procedures.

De Commissie is op de hoogte van de beweringen over de kwetsbaarheid van het IOR en van de conclusies van het Moneyval-verslag.

Noch de Heilige Stoel, noch Vaticaanstad zijn lidstaten van de EU. De EU heeft een monetaire overeenkomst gesloten met Vaticaanstad en de Commissie ziet toe op de uitvoering ervan. Overeenkomstig een bijlage bij die overeenkomst moet Vaticaanstad de EU-wetgeving, met inbegrip van de EU-wetgeving voor de bestrijding van witwaspraktijken, in nationale wetgeving omzetten. De toepassing van de betreffende AML-wetgeving van de EU is middels een *motu proprio* van paus Benedictus XVI uitgebreid tot de Heilige Stoel.

De Commissie heeft vorig jaar de ontwikkelingen en de vorderingen van de Heilige Stoel met betrekking tot de bestrijding van witwaspraktijken gevolgd. De wetgeving ter bestrijding van witwaspraktijken is op 30 december 2010 aangenomen ⁽³⁾.

⁽¹⁾ [http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/Evaluations/round4/MONEYVAL\(2012\)17SUMM_HS_en.pdf](http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/Evaluations/round4/MONEYVAL(2012)17SUMM_HS_en.pdf)

⁽²⁾ AML-richtlijn (anti money laundering — AML).

⁽³⁾ De „wet betreffende de preventie en bestrijding van het witwassen van opbrengsten uit criminele activiteiten en uit de financiering van terrorisme” is in april 2011 in werking getreden.

De Heilige Stoel is waarnemer bij Moneyval. De Commissie is ingenomen met de wederzijdse evaluatie die Moneyval in 2011 heeft uitgevoerd. De Commissie zal verdere samenwerking tussen Moneyval en de Heilige Stoel steunen en bijstand blijven verlenen om het kader voor de bestrijding van witwaspraktijken te verbeteren.

Onlangs is een politiek akkoord bereikt over het voorstel voor een verordening van de Raad waarin specifieke taken betreffende het beleid op het gebied van het bedrijfseconomisch toezicht op kredietinstellingen, aan de ECB zouden worden overgedragen. Dit voorstel maakt geen deel uit van de bijlage bij de monetaire overeenkomst tussen de EU en Vaticaanstad.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002925/13
to the Commission
Saïd El Khadraoui (S&D)
(14 March 2013)**

Subject: Money laundering

Tackling money laundering effectively is a political priority for the EU. However, it seems that some Member States are more vulnerable to money laundering abuses than others. For example, the Institute for Religious Works, known by its Italian acronym IOR or — more commonly — as the Vatican Bank, serves Catholic church institutions, curia, and priests and nuns around the world, and has 33 404 accounts. After it fell foul of Italian authorities in 2010, Pope Benedict XVI ordered the IOR to bring itself into compliance with international standards on combatting money laundering. Italian prosecutors, fearing that the Vatican Bank was being used to launder money for Italian criminal syndicates, seized EUR 23 million (USD 27 million) of the IOR's holdings after having taken note of suspicious transactions.

The Holy See submitted the IOR to the supervision of the Council of Europe's money-laundering watchdog, the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (Moneyval). In its report of 4 July 2012, Moneyval stated that the Vatican had 'come a long way in a short time' to put in place the 'building blocks' of a monitoring system. The Moneyval experts 'strongly recommended' that the Vatican Bank should be 'independently supervised by a prudential supervisor in the near future'.

In light of this, the Commission is asked to answer the following:

1. Is it aware of these allegations regarding the vulnerability of IOR to money laundering?
2. Does it share the conclusions presented in the executive summary of the Moneyval report ⁽¹⁾, in particular paragraphs 17 and 18 on page 5, and, if so, which appropriate steps is it considering taking to improve transparency and tackle money laundering attempts?
3. Will the IOR fall under the supervisory authority of the ECB once the Banking Union Regulation is adopted?

**Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission
(8 May 2013)**

Tackling money laundering is an important priority for the European Commission. The so-called AML Directives ⁽²⁾ set up part of the framework designed to fight money laundering and terrorist financing in the EU. The Commission monitors the application of EU legislation in all Member States according to the procedures laid down in the Treaty.

The Commission is aware of the allegations regarding the vulnerability of IOR and of the conclusions of the Moneyval report.

Neither the Holy See nor the Vatican City State are Member States of the EU. The EU has signed a Monetary Agreement with the Vatican City State and the Commission is monitoring the implementation of this Agreement. Pursuant to an annex to that Agreement, the Vatican City State has to transpose EU legislation including EU AML law into national law. The application of the relevant EU AML law was extended to the Holy See by a *motu proprio* of Benedictus XVI.

The Commission followed up last year's developments and progress made by the Holy See as regards fight against money laundering. AML legislation was adopted on 30 December 2010 ⁽³⁾.

The Holy See is an observer member of Moneyval. The Commission welcomes the mutual evaluation conducted by Moneyval in 2011. The Commission will support further cooperation between Moneyval and the Holy See and continue to offer assistance to improve the framework against money laundering.

⁽¹⁾ [http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/Evaluations/round4/MONEYVAL\(2012\)17SUMM_HS_en.pdf](http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/moneyval/Evaluations/round4/MONEYVAL(2012)17SUMM_HS_en.pdf)

⁽²⁾ Anti money laundering Directive.

⁽³⁾ 'Law concerning the prevention and countering of the laundering of proceeds from criminal activities and of the financing of terrorism' entered into force in April 2011.

A political agreement was recently found on the proposal for a Council Regulation conferring specific tasks on the ECB concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions. This proposal is not part of the annex to the Monetary Agreement between the EU and the Vatican City State.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002926/13
alla Commissione
Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)
(14 marzo 2013)

Oggetto: Escissione «estetica»

In una dichiarazione fatta dal deputato Ellouze del partito islamista Ennahda al giornale «Le Magreb» di Tunisi si afferma che nelle regioni africane in cui fa caldo si è costretti a praticare alle ragazze l'escissione clitoridea per ragioni terapeutiche. Secondo il parlamentare islamista l'ablazione sessuale non è una mutilazione, ma semplicemente una pratica «estetica» e come tale, si suppone, assolutamente legittima per migliorare la bellezza del corpo femminile, come avviene per altre parti come il volto o il seno. È vero che in un secondo momento il deputato ha dichiarato che le sue affermazioni sono state deformate, ma è altrettanto vero che esse rispondono ad una concezione che si diffonde sempre più ampiamente a giustificazione della pratica delle mutilazioni genitali femminili.

La Commissione, attraverso le dichiarazioni fatte ai parlamentari europei dal Commissario Reding il 6 marzo scorso, ha preso ulteriormente posizione contro le mutilazioni genitali femminili (MGF) in occasione della Giornata della Donna contro la violenza usata nei suoi confronti.

Può essa dire:

1. se condivide l'opinione che l'escissione in questione non è altro che un'operazione estetica e non una mutilazione genitale;
2. se si rende conto che un'interpretazione simile dà il via libera alle mutilazioni genitali, negando la violenza implicita praticata sul corpo femminile e l'attentato alla sua integrità;
3. se considera urgente realizzare campagne di sensibilizzazione al problema, prevedendo strumenti e prodotti fruibili dalle comunità interessate, insieme alle associazioni femminili africane e a quelle che in Europa si battono contro le MGF?

Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione
(16 maggio 2013)

Come ricordato nell'interrogazione, la Commissione condanna la pratica della mutilazione genitale femminile.

Per quanto riguarda la Tunisia, attualmente non esistono prove tangibili che la società tunisina mostri maggiore tolleranza nei confronti della pratica della mutilazione genitale femminile o che la giustifichi. Dopo la rivoluzione, l'associazione delle donne e le organizzazioni della società civile hanno difeso attivamente e rafforzato i diritti delle donne.

L'UE promuove attivamente campagne di sensibilizzazione a questa problematica. Per esempio, ha sostenuto, in collaborazione con l'UNICEF, il progetto «Contributing to the Abandonment of Social Norms Harmful to Girls and Women: A Matter of Gender Equality» (Contribuire ad abbandonare norme sociali dannose per le ragazze e le donne: una questione di parità fra uomo e donna), che ha offerto la possibilità di favorire il cambiamento di mentalità a proposito di norme sociali profondamente radicate che prevedono pratiche dannose per i bambini, in particolare i matrimoni infantili e la mutilazione genitale femminile/escissione clitoridea in diversi paesi africani.

Nel corso del 2013 la Commissione avvierà una serie di attività per affrontare questo tema. Il 6 marzo 2013 il commissario responsabile di giustizia, diritti fondamentali e cittadinanza ha organizzato una tavola rotonda sulle mutilazioni genitali femminili. I risultati di una consultazione pubblica lanciata lo stesso giorno serviranno a sviluppare la politica della Commissione in materia. La Commissione fornirà inoltre assistenza agli Stati membri per le attività di informazione e comunicazione volte a porre fine alla violenza contro le donne, anche a proposito delle mutilazioni genitali femminili (mediante il programma Progress), e alle organizzazioni sul campo per i progetti tesi a lottare contro le mutilazioni e altre pratiche dannose (mediante il programma Daphne).

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002926/13
to the Commission
Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)
(14 March 2013)**

Subject: 'Aesthetic' excision

In a statement made to the Tunis newspaper 'Le Maghreb', Member of Parliament Habib Ellouze of the Islamist party Ennahda claimed that in African regions with warm climates, clitoral excision has to be performed for therapeutic reasons. He expressed the view that sexual ablation is not mutilation, but simply an 'aesthetic' practice, and thus, presumably, entirely legitimate for the purpose of enhancing female beauty, in the same way as operations involving other parts of the body such as the face or the breasts. Although Mr Ellouze subsequently stated that his comments had been distorted, it is also true that they reflect an increasingly widely-held conception justifying female genital mutilation.

In a statement made by Commissioner Viviane Reding to MEPs on 6 March 2013, the Commission has adopted a position against female genital mutilation (FGM) ahead of International Women's Day, taking a stand against the violence involved in such practices.

Will the Commission say:

1. whether it agrees that this type of excision is a purely aesthetic operation and does not constitute genital mutilation;
2. whether it is aware that an interpretation of this kind constitutes a green light for genital mutilation and denies the implicit violence to which women's bodies are subjected and the attack on their physical integrity;
3. whether it considers awareness campaigns on this problem to be a matter of urgency, providing instruments and mechanisms which can be used by the international community, in conjunction with women's associations in Africa and in Europe currently fighting against FGM?

**Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(16 May 2013)**

As mentioned in the question, the Commission condemns the practice of female genital mutilation.

With regard to Tunisia, there is no tangible indication so far that Tunisian society would show a greater tolerance or justify the practice of female genital mutilation. Since the revolution, women's association and civil society organisations have been very active to defend and expand women's rights.

The EU has been active to promote awareness campaigns on this issue. To give an example, in cooperation with Unicef, the EU has supported the project 'Contributing to the Abandonment of Social Norms Harmful to Girls and Women: A Matter of Gender Equality'. The project provided the opportunity to promote change in deeply entrenched social norms that uphold practices that are harmful to children, in particular child marriage and female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C) in several African countries.

In 2013, the Commission will launch a series of activities to address FGM. On 6 March, the Member of the Commission responsible for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship hosted a Round-Table on FGM. The results of a public consultation launched the same day will feed into the Commission's policy development on FGM. The Commission will also support Member States' information and communication activities aiming at ending violence against women including FGM (through the Progress programme) and grass-root level organisations for projects aiming at fighting FGM and other harmful practices (through the Daphne programme).

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002927/13
alla Commissione
Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)
(14 marzo 2013)

Oggetto: Gioco d'azzardo e minori

Da una ricerca sulla condizione dell'infanzia e dell'adolescenza 2012 svolta da Eurispes e Telefono Azzurro emergono alcuni dati sul fenomeno del gioco d'azzardo: l'8 per cento dei bambini tra i 7 e gli 11 anni gioca con i soldi online; il 15,3 per cento scommette in quelli offline. E ancora: gioca online il 12 per cento dei ragazzi tra i 12 e i 18 anni. Il 27 per cento punta soldi su giocate tradizionali. A un adolescente su quattro capita a volte di perdere tutti i soldi a disposizione. Il 33,7 % dei più piccoli sceglie il «gratta e vinci», mentre l'11,4 % e l'11,1 % giocano rispettivamente alle Lotterie e a Bingo. Gli adolescenti invece preferiscono Internet (39,9 per cento) o in sala giochi (17,8 per cento) o nelle tabaccherie (14,4 per cento). A parte gli aspetti educativi che con l'azzardo non sono certamente da consigliare, è sempre presente il rischio ludopatico. Questa patologia è in aumento in diversi Stati membri dell'Unione, alcuni dei quali l'hanno inclusa come malattia riconosciuta dal Servizio sanitario nazionale.

Può la Commissione far sapere:

1. se ritiene che il fenomeno possa rappresentare un handicap per una corretta formazione dei giovani verso la maturità;
2. se, in analogia alla normativa in vigore per la protezione dei minori da Internet, reputa conveniente proibire ai minori il gioco d'azzardo — compreso l'acquisto di «Gratta e vinci» e simili — nelle sale pubbliche e in tutti i luoghi in cui si pratica, come si è fatto con le bevande alcoliche e con il tabacco;
3. per qual motivo non valuta l'opportunità di una raccomandazione agli Stati membri in questa materia?

Risposta di Michel Barnier a nome della Commissione
(13 maggio 2013)

1. La Commissione condivide le preoccupazioni sollevate dall'onorevole parlamentare. Una larga maggioranza di bambini, e sempre più precocemente, utilizza Internet attraverso una serie di dispositivi connessi⁽¹⁾. È quindi importante adottare misure protettive contro contenuti potenzialmente pericolosi, come il gioco d'azzardo, agevolando al tempo stesso l'accesso di bambini e ragazzi ai vantaggi offerti da Internet per quanto riguarda attività ricreative, forme di apprendimento e altre interazioni online positive.

La Commissione ritiene che gli Stati membri debbano disporre anche di misure preventive per impedire che gli adolescenti abbiano accesso a lotterie e giochi d'azzardo offline.

2. Per quanto riguarda il gioco d'azzardo, non sono attualmente in vigore norme specifiche dell'UE in questa particolare materia. È responsabilità degli Stati membri fissare i limiti di età per impedire che bambini e ragazzi abbiano accesso a giochi di sorte e lotterie e possano acquistarli. L'applicazione effettiva delle norme in materia è anch'essa di competenza degli Stati membri.

3. Come annunciato nella recente comunicazione sul gioco d'azzardo online⁽²⁾, la Commissione intende adottare una raccomandazione al fine di garantire un elevato livello di protezione dei consumatori di servizi di giochi d'azzardo, inclusa la tutela di bambini e ragazzi. Tra i principi che vanno elaborati dovrebbero figurare l'accertamento dell'età e dell'identità del giocatore.

(1) In Europa il 75 % dei giovani tra i 5 e i 17 anni usano Internet COM(2012)196 def. — Flash Eurobarometro 2008.

(2) http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/services/gambling_en.htm

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002927/13
to the Commission
Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)
(14 March 2013)

Subject: Gambling and minors

Research into the conditions of childhood and adolescence in 2012, conducted by Eurispes and Telefono Azzurro (the 'Blue Telephone' helpline), has produced data on the incidence of gambling: 8% of children aged between 7 and 11 years gamble with money online; 15.3% place bets offline. In addition, 12% of children aged between 12 and 18 years engage in online gambling. 27% place money on traditional games. One adolescent in four loses all the money he has. 33.7% of younger children choose scratch cards, while 11.4% and 11.1% respectively take part in lotteries and bingo. Adolescents, on the other hand, prefer to play on the Internet (39.9%), in games halls (17.8%) or in tobacconists' shops (14.4%). Apart from any educational aspects that may be involved which are certainly not to be recommended in the case of games of chance, the risk of becoming addicted to gambling is ever-present. This pathology is on the increase in various Member States of the Union, some of which have included it as a disease recognised by the national health service.

Can the Commission say:

1. Whether it considers that the phenomenon may represent a handicap to the proper development of young people towards maturity?
2. Whether, by analogy with the legislation in force for the protection of minors from the Internet, it thinks it appropriate to ban minors from games of chance — including the purchase of scratch cards or their equivalents — in public gaming-rooms and in all places where they are played, as is the case with alcoholic beverages and tobacco?
3. Why it does not consider issuing a recommendation to the Member States on this matter?

Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission
(13 May 2013)

1. The Commission shares the concerns raised by the Honourable Member. A large majority of children use the Internet, increasingly at younger ages through a range of connected devices ⁽¹⁾. Therefore, it is important to take protective measures against potentially harmful content such as gambling while at the same time facilitating access of children and young people to the benefits of the Internet, such as leisure activities, learning and other positive online interactions.

The Commission believes that preventive measures in the Member States should also be in place to preclude adolescents from gaining access to lotteries and gambling offline.

2. As regards gambling, there is currently no EU specific legislation in force on this particular matter. It is the Member States's responsibility to set the age limits to preclude access or the sale of games of chance and lottery products to children and young people. The effective enforcement of these rules is also the competence of the Member States.

3. As announced in the recently adopted Communication ⁽²⁾ regarding online gambling, the Commission intends to adopt a recommendation with the aim of providing a high level of common protection of consumers of gambling services, including the protection of children and young people. The principles to be elaborated should include age verification and player identification controls.

⁽¹⁾ 75% of 5-17-year-olds in Europe use the Internet COM(2012) 196 final — Flash Eurobarometer 2008.

⁽²⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/services/gambling_en.htm

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002928/13
alla Commissione
Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)
(14 marzo 2013)**

Oggetto: Prodotti alimentari italiani contraffatti

Un'inchiesta giornalistica realizzata dal programma televisivo «Striscia la Notizia» e messa in onda nella puntata di domenica 10 marzo 2013 evidenzia come in un supermercato di Lindau, Germania, sono presenti e in vendita alimenti e bevande prodotti in Germania, ma con chiari riferimenti a prodotti italiani. La produzione e la distribuzione di prodotti con denominazioni quali «Parmesan», «Gorgonzola» o «Prosecco», realizzata da produttori in zone ben lontane da quelle che danno a questi prodotti qualità e denominazione, è proibita dalle normative comunitarie e costituisce una vera e propria falsificazione.

Può la Commissione riferire:

1. se è al corrente di questa situazione;
2. cosa intende fare per proteggere i produttori italiani e i consumatori tedeschi da questa falsificazione;
3. se ritiene che a fronte di tali situazioni sia urgente pensare a un'accelerazione dell'iter di approvazione del regolamento sul «Made In»;
4. se ritiene necessario, come già ho evidenziato nella mia interrogazione sulle carni equine del 19 febbraio 2013 e nella mia proposta di risoluzione del 28 febbraio 2013, intensificare i controlli sulla provenienza e la qualità dei prodotti alimentari?

**Risposta di Tonio Borg a nome della Commissione
(24 aprile 2013)**

Le denominazioni «Gorgonzola» e «Prosecco» godono di tutela in forza del regolamento (UE) n. 1151/2012⁽¹⁾ e del regolamento (CE) n. 1234/2007⁽²⁾ e possono pertanto essere usate soltanto sui prodotti ottenuti nelle aree geografiche definite e sulla base delle specifiche che si applicano a tali prodotti. Il termine «Parmesan» risulta evocare il termine «Parmigiano Reggiano». L'uso della parola «Parmesan» per un formaggio che non rispetti il capitolato valido per il «Parmigiano Reggiano» è stato pertanto ritenuto violare la protezione conferita a quest'ultimo dal regolamento (UE) n. 1151/2012⁽³⁾.

Per quanto concerne la questione dei controlli ufficiali e dell'etichettatura d'origine quale strumento per prevenire le frodi, la Commissione rinvia l'onorevole deputata alla propria risposta alle interrogazioni scritte P-001731/2013 e E-001410/2013⁽⁴⁾. Le regole vigenti prescrivono l'indicazione d'origine sull'etichetta degli alimenti in tutti i casi in cui la sua omissione potrebbe trarre in inganno i consumatori⁽⁵⁾. Inoltre, l'etichettatura d'origine obbligatoria è prevista attualmente per prodotti specifici come le carni bovine e i prodotti a base di carni bovine, l'olio d'oliva, la frutta e la verdura, il vino, il miele e le uova. Le regole vigenti sono state rivedute di recente⁽⁶⁾. A decorrere dal 13 dicembre 2014, l'etichettatura d'origine diverrà obbligatoria anche per le carni non trasformate preconfezionate di suini, pollame, ovini e caprini.

⁽¹⁾ Regolamento (UE) n. 1151/2012, del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 21 novembre 2012, sui regimi di qualità dei prodotti agricoli e alimentari, GUL 343 del 14.12.2012, pag. 1.

⁽²⁾ Regolamento (CE) n. 1234/2007 del Consiglio, del 22 ottobre 2007, recante organizzazione comune dei mercati agricoli e disposizioni specifiche per taluni prodotti agricoli (regolamento unico OCM), GUL 299 del 16.11.2007, pag. 1.

⁽³⁾ Causa C-132/05, sentenza della Corte (grande sezione) del 26 febbraio 2008, RACC. 2008, pag. I-00957.

⁽⁴⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html>

⁽⁵⁾ Direttiva 2000/13/CE del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 20 marzo 2000, relativa al ravvicinamento delle legislazioni degli Stati membri concernenti l'etichettatura e la presentazione dei prodotti alimentari, nonché la relativa pubblicità, GUL 109 del 6.5.2000, pag. 29.

⁽⁶⁾ Regolamento (UE) n. 1169/2011 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 25 ottobre 2011, relativo alla fornitura di informazioni sugli alimenti ai consumatori, che modifica i regolamenti (CE) n. 1924/2006 e (CE) n. 1925/2006 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio e abroga la direttiva 87/250/CEE della Commissione, la direttiva 90/496/CEE del Consiglio, la direttiva 1999/10/CE della Commissione, la direttiva 2000/13/CE del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, le direttive 2002/67/CE e 2008/5/CE della Commissione e il regolamento (CE) n. 608/2004 della Commissione, GUL 304 del 22.11.2011, pag.18.

Inoltre, sempre dal 13 dicembre 2014, una dichiarazione volontaria che possa essere considerata alla stregua di un'indicazione d'origine dovrebbe conformarsi alle nuove norme stabilite nel regolamento (UE) n. 1169/2011. In base a tali norme il paese d'origine degli alimenti trasformati non ottenuti completamente in un unico paese corrisponde al paese dell'ultima trasformazione sostanziale dell'alimento. Se l'ingrediente principale è originario di un luogo diverso, si dovrà anche indicare il paese d'origine o il luogo di provenienza di tale ingrediente.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002928/13
to the Commission**

Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)

(14 March 2013)

Subject: Counterfeit Italian food products

An investigation carried out by the television programme 'Striscia la Notizia', which was broadcast during the show's Sunday slot on 10 March 2013, revealed that a supermarket in Lindau in Germany is selling food and beverages that have been produced in Germany but carry clear references to Italian products. The production and distribution of products with names such as 'Parmesan', 'Gorgonzola' or 'Prosecco', manufactured by producers a long way from the regions with which the quality and the name of those products is associated, is prohibited under EC law and amounts to actual counterfeiting.

Can the Commission say:

whether it is aware of this situation?

what it intends to do to protect Italian producers and German consumers from such counterfeiting?

whether it considers that, faced with situations of this kind, the question of speeding up the process for adopting the 'Made in' regulation should be addressed as a matter of urgency?

whether it considers it necessary, as I pointed out in my question of 19 February 2013 on horsemeat and in my motion for a resolution of 28 February 2013, to step up checks on the origin and quality of food products?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission

(24 April 2013)

The names 'Gorgonzola' and 'Prosecco' enjoy protection under Regulations (EC) No 1151/2012⁽¹⁾ and 1234/2007⁽²⁾ and may thus only be used on products produced in the geographical areas established in and according to the specifications for these products. The term 'Parmesan' has been found to be an evocation of the term 'Parmigiano Reggiano'. Use of the word 'Parmesan' for cheese which does not comply with the specification for 'Parmigiano Reggiano' has therefore been held to infringe the protection provided to the latter via regulation 1151/2012⁽³⁾.

As regards the issue of official controls and origin labelling as a tool to prevent fraud, the Commission refers the Honourable Member to its reply to Written Questions P-001731/2013 and E-001410/2013⁽⁴⁾. Existing rules require the origin on the label of foods in all cases where its omission could mislead the consumer⁽⁵⁾. Furthermore, mandatory origin labelling is currently foreseen for specific products, such as beef and beef products, olive oil, fruit and vegetables, wine, honey and eggs. The existing rules have been recently revised⁽⁶⁾. As of 13 December 2014, origin labelling will become mandatory also for prepacked unprocessed meat of pig, poultry, sheep and goat. Moreover, any voluntary statement that can be considered as an indication of origin should, from 13 December 2014, comply with the new rules established in Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011. According to them, the country of origin of processed foods not wholly obtained in one single country corresponds to the country of the last substantial transformation of the food. If its primary ingredient originates from a different place, the country of origin or place of provenance of this ingredient should be also provided.

⁽¹⁾ Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs, OJ 2012 L 343/1.

⁽²⁾ Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 establishing a common organisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products (single CMO Regulation), OJ 2007, L 299/1.

⁽³⁾ Case 132/05, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 26 February 2008, ECR 2008 page I-00957.

⁽⁴⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html>

⁽⁵⁾ Directive 2000/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the labelling, presentation and advertising of foodstuffs, OJ L 109, 6.5.2000, p. 29.

⁽⁶⁾ Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on the provision of food information to consumers, amending Regulations (EC) No 1924/2006 and (EC) No 1925/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Commission Directive 87/250/EEC, Council Directive 90/496/EEC, Commission Directive 1999/10/EC, Directive 2000/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, Commission Directives 2002/67/EC and 2008/5/EC and Commission Regulation (EC) No 608/2004, OJ L 304, 22.11.2011, p.18.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002929/13

à Comissão

Nuno Teixeira (PPE)

(14 de março de 2013)

Assunto: Relações entre a União Europeia e a República de Cuba

Considerando que:

- Nos passados dias 26 e 27 de janeiro, se realizou, em Santiago do Chile, uma reunião de cúpula entre a Comunidade de Estados Latino-Americanos e Caribenhos (CELAC) e a União Europeia (UE), que marca um importante passo nas relações entre duas organizações regionais que, em conjunto, representam 60 países, oferecendo igualmente uma oportunidade para se refletir sobre as áreas em que a cooperação deve ser aprofundada;
- A CELAC foi criada a 23 de fevereiro de 2011 e conta atualmente com 33 Estados membros, de entre os quais a Venezuela, tendo como objetivo projetar a região à escala global em temas como o respeito do Direito internacional, a igualdade entre Estados, o respeito pelos Direitos Humanos e a cooperação, contribuindo também para facilitar a configuração de uma identidade regional própria e de posições latino-americanas e caribenhas comuns sobre a integração e o desenvolvimento;
- As relações entre a UE e Cuba são enquadradas nos termos da Posição Comum adotada em 1996, tendo o diálogo político até 2003 vindo a ser aprofundado em função de um abrangente leque de temas, incluindo questões políticas, económicas, de Direitos Humanos, de cooperação para o desenvolvimento e de ordem científica e cultural; e que, a 12 de maio de 2010, a Comissão adotou o primeiro documento estratégico («country strategic paper») entre a UE e Cuba, com uma atribuição de verbas na ordem dos 20 milhões de euros para o período de 2011 a 2013, ao abrigo do Instrumento de Cooperação ao Desenvolvimento, orientado em torno de três prioridades: segurança alimentar; ambiente e adaptação às alterações climáticas; e intercâmbio de competências, formação e educação;

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Qual o atual ponto da situação nas relações entre a UE e Cuba?
2. Como pode a recente aproximação da UE à CELAC contribuir para o aprofundamento das relações entre a UE e Cuba?
3. Quais as principais áreas de cooperação com interesse para a UE no quadro de um eventual aprofundamento das relações entre a UE e Cuba?

Resposta dada pela Alta Representante /Vice-Presidente Catherine Ashton em nome da Comissão

(6 de maio de 2013)

O diálogo político e a cooperação entre a UE e Cuba foram reatados em outubro de 2008. O diálogo político com Cuba abrange uma série de questões, que incluem os direitos humanos e as liberdades fundamentais. Estas questões são discutidas com as autoridades cubanas ao mais alto nível, tanto em Bruxelas como em Havana. A UE é o segundo parceiro comercial mais importante e o maior investidor externo de Cuba.

A UE está a cooperar estreitamente com Cuba durante a sua Presidência da CELAC. A Presidência cubana mostrou uma atitude positiva e construtiva, continuando a melhorar as relações UE-CELAC na sequência da recente cimeira de Santiago do Chile.

Desde 2008, a UE disponibilizou cerca de 67 milhões de euros para a cooperação em matéria de reabilitação e reconstrução pós-furacões, segurança alimentar, alterações climáticas e energias renováveis, cultura, educação, setores sociais e autoridades locais. Cuba também participa em diversos programas regionais financiados pela UE. O primeiro documento de estratégia/programa indicativo nacional para Cuba (adotado em 12 de maio de 2010) disponibiliza um montante adicional de 20 milhões de euros entre 2011 e 2013 para a segurança alimentar, a adaptação às alterações climáticas e o intercâmbio de peritos. São estes os domínios identificados para a cooperação com Cuba.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002929/13
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(14 March 2013)

Subject: EU-Cuba relations

On 26 and 27 January 2013, a summit meeting of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and the EU was held in Santiago (Chile), marking a major step forward in relations between these two regional groups, which represent a total of 60 countries, as well as providing an opportunity to reflect on areas in which cooperation needs to be strengthened.

CELAC was created on 23 February 2011 and currently has 33 Member States, including Cuba. Its aim is to promote the region at a global level in areas such as respect for international law, equality among states, respect for human rights, and cooperation, as well as helping to build a regional identity and common Latin American and Caribbean positions on integration and development.

EU-Cuba relations are framed by the Common Position adopted in 1996. The political dialogue which took place up to 2003 was expanded to include a broad range of topics covering political, economic, human rights, development cooperation and scientific and cultural issues. On 12 May 2010, the Commission adopted the first EU-Cuba country strategic paper, with a budget allocation under the Development Cooperation Instrument of around EUR 20 million for the 2011-2013 period, directed towards the three priorities of food safety, environment and adaptation to climate change, as well as the exchange of expertise, training and education.

Can the Commission say:

1. What is the current state of EU-Cuba relations?
2. How can the EU's recent closer involvement with CELAC help to strengthen EU-Cuba relations?
3. Which areas of cooperation are of most interest to the EU in terms of potentially strengthening its relationship with Cuba?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(6 May 2013)

The EU-Cuba political dialogue and cooperation were resumed in October 2008. Political dialogue with Cuba covers a number of issues including human rights and fundamental freedoms. These questions are discussed with the Cuban authorities at the highest level both in Brussels and in Havana. The EU is Cuba's second most important trading partner and Cuba's biggest external investor.

The EU is cooperating closely with Cuba during its pro-tempore presidency of CELAC. The Cuban presidency has shown a positive and constructive stance in continuing to improve EU-CELAC relations, following the recent Summit in Santiago.

Since 2008, the EU has made available around EUR 67 million for cooperation on post-hurricane reconstruction and rehabilitation, food security, climate change and renewable energy, culture, education, social sectors and local authorities. Cuba also takes part in several EU-funded regional programmes. The first Country Strategy Paper/National Indicative Programme for Cuba (adopted on 12 May 2010) makes available an additional EUR 20 million between 2011 and 2013 for food security, climate change adaptation, and expertise exchanges. These are the areas identified for cooperation with Cuba.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-002930/13

à Comissão

Nuno Teixeira (PPE)

(14 de março de 2013)

Assunto: Relações entre a União Europeia e a República Bolivariana da Venezuela

Considerando que:

- Nos passados dias 26 e 27 de janeiro, se realizou, em Santiago do Chile, uma reunião de cúpula entre a Comunidade de Estados Latino-Americanos e Caribenhos (CELAC) e a União Europeia (UE), que marca um importante passo nas relações entre duas organizações regionais que, em conjunto, representam 60 países, oferecendo igualmente uma oportunidade para se refletir sobre as áreas em que a cooperação deve ser aprofundada;
- A CELAC foi criada a 23 de fevereiro de 2011 e conta atualmente com 33 Estados membros, de entre os quais a Venezuela, tendo como objetivo projetar a região à escala global em temas como o respeito do Direito internacional, a igualdade entre Estados, o respeito pelos Direitos Humanos e a cooperação, contribuindo também para facilitar a configuração de uma identidade regional própria e de posições latino-americanas e caribenhas comuns sobre a integração e o desenvolvimento;
- As relações entre a UE e a Venezuela têm vindo a ser desenvolvidas numa base regional e bilateral, nomeadamente através do diálogo institucional entre a UE e o Grupo do Rio; que, em 2012, a Venezuela se tornou membro efetivo do Mercosul, passando a integrar o diálogo e as negociações conjuntas entre a UE e o Mercosul com vista a um futuro acordo de associação; e que o documento estratégico da União («country strategic paper») define dois setores específicos como principais áreas de cooperação, a saber, o apoio à modernização do Estado e das instituições e a diversificação da economia;

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Qual o atual ponto da situação nas relações entre a UE e a Venezuela?
2. Como pode a recente aproximação da UE à CELAC contribuir para o aprofundamento das relações entre a UE e a Venezuela?
3. Como pode o futuro acordo de associação entre a UE e o Mercosul contribuir para alcançar os objetivos de apoio à modernização do Estado e das instituições, bem como de diversificação da economia?
4. Quais as principais áreas de cooperação com interesse para a UE no quadro de um eventual aprofundamento das relações entre a União e a Venezuela?
5. Qual o papel da União Europeia no contexto da realização de novas eleições na Venezuela, ao abrigo de uma relação renovada no quadro da cooperação entre as várias organizações que promovem a cooperação birregional?

Resposta dada pela Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente Catherine Ashton em nome da Comissão

(2 de maio de 2013)

A UE está pronta a reforçar as relações com a Venezuela, tanto através dos mecanismos de integração regional como bilateralmente. Antevê potencial em novos setores de diálogo, inclusive sobre questões como a energia, a cooperação económica, o ambiente e a integração regional.

A UE pretende igualmente promover a importância do Estado de direito, da democracia, do respeito pelos direitos humanos e da proteção do ambiente, bem como o acesso da sua indústria ao mercado e a remoção dos entraves ao comércio.

No período 2007-2013, o montante total da cooperação financeira da UE para o desenvolvimento ascendeu a 14 milhões de euros, fortemente incidentes no apoio a organizações da sociedade civil. Durante o próximo Quadro Financeiro Plurianual, a Venezuela terá direito a financiamento no âmbito do pacote regional. Continuarão disponíveis outros instrumentos financeiros para atividades de cooperação (por exemplo, com organizações da sociedade civil e operadores económicos).

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002930/13
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(14 March 2013)

Subject: Relations between the EU and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela

On 26 and 27 January 2013, a summit meeting of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and the EU was held in Santiago (Chile), marking a major step forward in relations between these two regional groups, which represent a total of 60 countries, as well as providing an opportunity to reflect on areas in which cooperation needs to be strengthened.

— CELAC was created on 23 February 2011 and currently has 33 Member States, including Venezuela. Its aim is to promote the region at a global level in areas such as respect for international law, equality among states, respect for human rights, and cooperation, as well as helping to build a regional identity and common Latin American and Caribbean positions on integration and development

— EU-Venezuela relations have been developed on a regional and bilateral basis, principally through institutional dialogue between the EU and the Rio Group. In 2012 Venezuela became a full member of Mercosur, enabling it to take part in the joint EU-Mercosur dialogue and negotiations towards a future association agreement. The country strategic paper identifies two specific sectors as the main areas of cooperation: support to the modernisation of the state and its institutions and diversification of the economy.

Can the Commission say:

1. What is the current state of EU-Venezuela relations?
2. How can the EU's recent closer involvement with CELAC help to strengthen EU-Venezuela relations?
3. How will the future EU-Mercosur association agreement help to attain the objectives of supporting the modernisation of the state and its institutions and economic diversification?
4. Which areas of cooperation are of most interest to the EU in terms of potentially strengthening its relationship with Venezuela?
5. What role might the EU play in connection with the holding of fresh elections in Venezuela, as part of a renewed relationship within the framework of cooperation between the various organisations working to promote bi-regional cooperation?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(2 May 2013)

The EU is keen on strengthening the EU-Venezuela relations, both through regional integration mechanisms and bilaterally. It sees potential in new areas of dialogue including on issues such as energy, economic cooperation, environment and regional integration.

Furthermore the EU aims to promote the importance of the Rule of Law, democracy, the respect of human rights and the protection of environment as well as promote market access for EU industry and removal of trade barriers.

Total funding for EU financial cooperation to development for 2007-13 was EUR 14 million. This was largely centred on support to civil society organisations. During the next Multiannual Financial Framework, Venezuela will be eligible for funding under the regional envelope. Other financial instruments will remain available for cooperation activities e.g. with civil society organisations and economic operators.

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002931/13

a la Comisión

Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)

(14 de marzo de 2013)

Asunto: Exclusión de biólogos en el campo de genética humana

El artículo 53, apartado 2, del TFUE reconoce la existencia de tres tipos de profesiones sanitarias, que son las médicas, paramédicas y las farmacéuticas. Actualmente, los biólogos se encuentran excluidos del régimen específico de reconocimiento automático de cualificaciones profesionales adoptado para la especialidad de la Genética Humana.

Los profesionales no médicos que trabajan en Genética Humana tienen la consideración de profesionales sanitarios paramédicos, de acuerdo con el parecer del Comité Económico y Social Europeo y del Comité de Ministros de los Estados miembros de la Unión.

La creación de la especialidad sanitaria de Genética únicamente para médicos es contraria al dictamen sobre el tema «La asistencia sanitaria» del Comité Económico y Social Europeo, por el que se establece que «no es posible reconocer nuevas especialidades médicas sin emprender en primer lugar una racionalización de las disciplinas médicas y una revalorización de las profesiones paramédicas». Y a su vez es contraria a la recomendación CM/Rec (2010)11 del Comité de Ministros de los Estados miembros, por el que se establece que los científicos del laboratorio de Genética expertos en citogenética y genética molecular, deberían ser reconocidos como especialistas.

Por ello es difícil entender la exclusión de los biólogos que trabajan en el campo de la Genética Humana, de un sistema específico de reconocimiento automático de cualificaciones profesionales reconocido en la Directiva 2005/36/CE.

1. ¿Por qué la Comisión continúa adoptando medidas en detrimento de profesiones emergentes como la de biólogo?
2. ¿Cómo pretende pues facilitar la libre circulación de profesionales dentro de la Unión?
3. ¿Se plantea crear el título de Especialista en Genética Humana?
4. ¿Puede reconocer la capacidad de acceso al mismo por parte de los biólogos?

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-003357/13

a la Comisión

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(25 de marzo de 2013)

Asunto: Barreras a la libre competencia entre distintos profesionales de la genética clínica o genética humana

El artículo 53, apartado 2, del TFUE reconoce la existencia de tres tipos de profesiones sanitarias: médicas, paramédicas y farmacéuticas. La Directiva 2005/36/CE establece un sistema general de reconocimiento automático de cualificaciones profesionales y siete específicas para otras tantas profesiones, que son las de médico, enfermero responsable de cuidados especiales, odontólogo, veterinario, matrona, farmacéutico y arquitecto. De estas siete profesiones con reconocimiento específico de cualificaciones profesionales, al menos las de enfermero responsable de cuidados especiales y de matrona son profesiones sanitarias paramédicas.

Por su parte, la Recomendación CM/Rec(2010)11, del Comité de Ministros a los Estados miembros, de 29 de septiembre de 2010, establece, en su apartado 8, que «los científicos del laboratorio de genética expertos en citogenética y genética molecular deberán ser reconocidos como especialistas». Pero en cambio, el pasado 4 de marzo de 2011, la UE publicó el Reglamento (UE) n° 213/2011 de la Comisión, de 3 de marzo de 2011, por el que se modifican los anexos II y V de la Directiva 2005/36/CE, creando la especialidad de genética médica, con acceso exclusivo para los médicos.

Este reglamento, además de no tener en cuenta la citada Recomendación CM/Rec(2010)11, es un acto legislativo que no se ajusta al dictamen «La asistencia sanitaria» del Comité Económico y Social Europeo, de 16 y 17 de julio de 2003 (DO C 234 de 30.9.2003, p. 36), en cuyo apartado 3.6.3 se explicita que «no es posible reconocer nuevas especialidades médicas sin emprender en primer lugar una racionalización de las disciplinas médicas y una revalorización de las profesiones paramédicas».

¿Tiene previsto la Comisión llevar a cabo lo previsto en el apartado 8 de la Recomendación CM/Rec(2010)11 y el apartado 3.6.3 del dictamen «La asistencia sanitaria» de 16 y 17 de julio de 2003?

En caso contrario, ¿qué valoraciones ha hecho la Comisión para no tener en cuenta tales planteamientos?

En caso de no prever la creación de la especialidad de genética clínica o genética humana para las profesiones paramédicas, ¿por qué considera la Comisión que el mantenimiento de la actual discriminación no implica una restricción de la competencia?

Respuesta conjunta del Sr. Barnier en nombre de la Comisión

(8 de mayo de 2013)

La Directiva 2005/36/CE ⁽¹⁾ establece el marco europeo para el reconocimiento de las cualificaciones profesionales y coordina además las condiciones mínimas de formación para siete profesiones, lo que permite el reconocimiento automático de los títulos de formación que estas requieren. Los médicos especialistas en Genética Humana también están cubiertos por este régimen, y veintiún Estados miembros participan actualmente en el reconocimiento automático de esta especialidad médica. La admisión a la formación médica especializada está supeditada a la conclusión de estudios básicos de medicina ⁽²⁾.

Para reconocer las cualificaciones de otras profesiones, esta Directiva prevé un estudio caso por caso que persigue el reconocimiento mutuo del título de formación de que se trate (el llamado «Régimen general» ⁽³⁾). Los profesionales no médicos, como los biólogos y los profesionales sanitarios paramédicos, pueden beneficiarse del reconocimiento de sus títulos de formación en virtud de este sistema.

En diciembre de 2011, la Comisión presentó una propuesta ⁽⁴⁾ de modernización de dicha Directiva. En caso de adoptarse, la propuesta prevé una nueva posibilidad de reconocimiento automático sobre la base de unos principios comunes de formación, es decir, un conjunto común de conocimientos y competencias necesarios para el ejercicio de una profesión específica. La propuesta, en la cual se fijan las condiciones y el procedimiento necesarios para introducir estos nuevos principios, no excluye que este nuevo régimen pueda cubrir también a los profesionales no médicos que trabajan en el campo de la Genética Humana.

⁽¹⁾ Directiva 2005/36/CE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 7 de septiembre de 2005, relativa al reconocimiento de cualificaciones profesionales (DO L 255 de 30.9.2005, p. 22).

⁽²⁾ Artículo 25 de la Directiva 2005/36/CE.

⁽³⁾ Capítulo I del título III de la Directiva 2005/36/CE.

⁽⁴⁾ Se espera lograr un acuerdo político sobre esta propuesta en junio, con miras a su adopción formal antes de finales de año.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002931/13
to the Commission**

Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)

(14 March 2013)

Subject: Exclusion of biologists from the field of human genetics

Article 53(2) of the TFEU recognises the existence of three types of health profession: medical, paramedical and pharmaceutical. At present, biologists are excluded from the specific regime for the recognition of professional qualifications which was adopted for the specialised field of human genetics.

Non-medical professionals working in the field of human genetics are treated as paramedical health professionals, as established by the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Ministers to EU Member States.

The creation of a health speciality in genetics which is only open to medical professionals contradicts the European Economic and Social Committee's opinion on healthcare, according to which 'a rationalisation of medical disciplines and an assessment of paramedical professions must take place before new medical specialities can be recognised'. It also contravenes Recommendation CM/Rec (2010)11 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States, which establishes that genetic laboratory scientists specialised in molecular and cytogenetics should be recognised as specialists.

This makes it difficult to understand why biologists working in the field of human genetics should be excluded from the specific system for the automatic recognition of professional qualifications recognised under Directive 2005/36/EC.

1. Why does the Commission continue to adopt measures prejudicial to emerging professions such as biology?
2. How does this contribute to the free movement of professionals within the Union?
3. Is there any plan to create the category of 'specialist in human genetics'?
4. Does the Commission accept that it should be possible for biologists should be admitted to this category?

**Question for written answer E-003357/13
to the Commission**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(25 March 2013)

Subject: Barriers to free competition between various clinical genetics and human genetics professionals

Article 53(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) recognises the existence of three types of health professionals: medical, allied and pharmaceutical. Directive 2005/36/EC establishes a general system for the automatic recognition of professional qualifications and specific provisions for seven professions: doctor, special care nurse, dentist, veterinary surgeon, midwife, pharmacist and architect. Of these seven professions, whose professional qualifications are specifically recognised, special care nurse and midwife are regarded as allied health professions.

Meanwhile, paragraph 8 of Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)11 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States of 29 September 2010 states that: 'Genetic laboratory scientists with expertise in cytogenetics and molecular genetics should be recognised as specialists.' However, on 4 March 2011 the EU published Commission Regulation (EU) No 213/2011 of 3 March 2011 amending Annexes II and V to Directive 2005/36/EC, creating the speciality of medical genetics, with exclusive access for doctors.

As well as failing to take account of Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)11, this regulation does not comply with the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on 'Healthcare' of 16 and 17 July 2003 (OJ C 234 of 30 September 2003, p.36), paragraph 3.6.3 of which states that: 'A rationalisation of medical disciplines and an assessment of paramedical professions must take place before new medical specialities can be recognised.'

Will the Commission carry out the provisions of paragraph 8 of Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)11 and paragraph 3.6.3 of the opinion on 'Healthcare' of 16 and 17 July 2003?

If not, why has it decided to ignore these approaches?

Why does the Commission not interpret the failure to create the specialty of clinical genetics and human genetics for allied health professions, and the maintenance of current discrimination, as a restriction on competition?

Joint answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission

(8 May 2013)

Directive 2005/36/EC ⁽¹⁾ constitutes the European framework for the recognition of professional qualifications. For seven professions, the directive even coordinates the minimum training conditions, which allow for the automatic recognition of the professional qualifications concerned. This regime covers medical specialists in human genetics. Currently 21 Member States are participating in the automatic recognition of this medical specialisation. Admission to medical specialist trainings is contingent upon the completion of basic medical studies ⁽²⁾.

As for the recognition of qualifications of other professions, the directive foresees a case-by-case examination with the objective of the mutual recognition of the qualification (the so-called general system ⁽³⁾). Non-medical professionals, such as biologists and paramedical health professionals, can benefit from the recognition of their professional qualifications under this system.

In December 2011, the Commission presented a proposal ⁽⁴⁾ for the modernisation of the directive. If adopted, the proposal would introduce a new possibility for the automatic recognition based on common training principles, i.e. a common set of knowledge and competences necessary for the pursuit of a specific profession. The proposal, which sets out the conditions and the procedure necessary to introduce new principles, does not exclude that this new regime might also cover non-medical professionals working in the field of human genetics.

⁽¹⁾ Directive 2005/36/EC of Parliament and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on the recognition of professional qualifications, OJ L 255, 30.9.2005.

⁽²⁾ Article 25 of Directive 2005/36/EC.

⁽³⁾ Chapter I of Title III of Directive 2005/36/EC.

⁽⁴⁾ It is expected that a political agreement should be reached on this proposal in June, with formal adoption before the end of the year.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002932/13
a la Comisión**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(14 de marzo de 2013)

Asunto: Retraso del Estado español en la elaboración y aprobación de los planes hidrológicos de cuenca en cumplimiento de la Directiva 2000/60/CE

En referencia a las respuestas parlamentarias de la Comisión E-001047/2011 ⁽¹⁾, E-005592/2009 ⁽²⁾, E-004005/2010 ⁽³⁾, E-004006/2010 ⁽⁴⁾, E-004007/2010 ⁽⁵⁾ y E-002229/2012 ⁽⁶⁾, sobre el retraso del Estado español en la elaboración y aprobación de los planes hidrológicos de cuenca en cumplimiento de la Directiva 2000/60/CE y en referencia a la sentencia del Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea ⁽⁷⁾ del pasado 4 de octubre de 2012, ¿de qué plazo dispone el Reino de España para dar cumplimiento a la sentencia?

En estos cuatro meses transcurridos desde la sentencia, ¿ha presentado el Reino de España alguna documentación a la Comisión para dar cumplimiento a la sentencia? En caso afirmativo, ¿la podría ilustrar?

¿Puede informar la Comisión de la cantidad económica que han supuesto las costas de este juicio?

Respuesta del Sr. Potočnik en nombre de la Comisión

(26 de abril de 2013)

El 25 de marzo de 2013, la Comisión envió a España una carta de emplazamiento, con arreglo al artículo 260 del Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea, porque las autoridades españolas no habían adoptado todas las medidas necesarias para ejecutar la sentencia de 4 de octubre de 2012 en el asunto C 403/11.

Hasta la fecha, las autoridades españolas han adoptado, publicado y comunicado a la Comisión los planes hidrológicos de cuenca correspondientes a cinco demarcaciones hidrográficas. Aún tienen que ser adoptados, publicados y comunicados veinte planes más.

En lo que atañe a estos planes pendientes, España ha completado la fase de información y consultas públicas correspondiente a once demarcaciones hidrográficas y ha iniciado esta fase para los planes correspondientes a otras tres. Sin embargo, no ha iniciado aún los planes correspondientes a seis demarcaciones hidrográficas.

España tiene ahora la oportunidad de presentar sus observaciones. Si la Comisión considera, tras haber examinado toda la información disponible, que España no ha adoptado las medidas necesarias para la ejecución de la sentencia, podrá someter de nuevo el asunto al Tribunal con una propuesta de aplicación de una suma a tanto alzado o de una multa coercitiva de un importe específico. La decisión final sobre la imposición de la sanción establecida en el artículo 260 recae en el Tribunal de Justicia, que tiene plena competencia en este ámbito.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2011-001047+0+DOC+XML+V0//ES>

⁽²⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=WQ&reference=E-2009-5592&language=ES>

⁽³⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=WQ&reference=E-2010-4005&language=ES>

⁽⁴⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=WQ&reference=E-2010-4006&language=ES>

⁽⁵⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=WQ&reference=E-2010-4007&language=ES>

⁽⁶⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2012-002229+0+DOC+XML+V0//ES>

⁽⁷⁾ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62011CJ0403:ES:HTML>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002932/13
to the Commission**

Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)

(14 March 2013)

Subject: Delay by Spanish Government in drafting and adopting river basin management plans in compliance with Directive 2000/60/EC

Further to the Commission's answers to Written Questions E-001047/2011 ⁽¹⁾, E-005592/2009 ⁽²⁾, E-004005/2010 ⁽³⁾, E-004006/2010 ⁽⁴⁾, E-004007/2010 ⁽⁵⁾ and E-002229/2012 ⁽⁶⁾, on the Spanish Government's delay in drafting and adopting river basin management plans in compliance with Directive 2000/60/EC, and in the light of the EU Court of Justice ruling ⁽⁷⁾ of 4 October 2012, how long does Spain have to take action to comply with this judgment?

Has Spain presented any documents to the Commission since the judgment was delivered four months ago to show that it has complied with it? If so, could the Commission provide details?

Can the Commission say how much this court case cost?

Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission

(26 April 2013)

On 25 March 2013 the Commission sent a Letter to Spain of Formal Notice under Article 260 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union as the authorities had not taken all the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of 4 October 2012, in Case C 403/11.

The authorities have to date adopted, published and communicated to the Commission the River Basin Management Plans corresponding to five river basin districts. Twenty more plans are yet to be adopted, published and communicated.

With regards to these outstanding plans, Spain has completed the public information and consultation stage corresponding to eleven river basin districts, and has initiated this stage for the plans corresponding to three river basin districts. However, Spain has not yet initiated it for the plans corresponding to six river basin districts.

Spain has now the opportunity to submit its observations. If the Commission considers, after having assessed all the available information, that Spain has not taken the necessary measures to comply with the judgment, it may bring again the case before the Court with a proposal for the application of a lump sum and/or penalty payment of a specific amount. The final decision on the imposition of the sanctions laid down in Article 260 lies with the Court of Justice, which has full jurisdiction in this area.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2011-001047+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>.
⁽²⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=WQ&reference=E-2009-5592&language=EN>.
⁽³⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=WQ&reference=E-2010-4005&language=EN>.
⁽⁴⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=WQ&reference=E-2010-4006&language=EN>.
⁽⁵⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=WQ&reference=E-2010-4007&language=EN>.
⁽⁶⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2012-002229+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>.
⁽⁷⁾ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62011CJ0403:ES:HTML>.

(Versión española)

**Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-002933/13
a la Comisión**

Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)

(14 de marzo de 2013)

Asunto: Abejas y prohibición de plaguicidas

Es un hecho que las abejas de todo el mundo se están muriendo, lo que supone una amenaza para la biodiversidad y la cadena alimentaria. Entre las causas de esta plaga destacan los plaguicidas neonicotinoides. Estos plaguicidas afectan al sistema nervioso de las abejas, que pierden el sentido de la orientación, y les impiden regresar a las colmenas, causándoles también parálisis y hasta la muerte.

Por ello resulta extraño que la Comisión Europea, conocedora del impacto tóxico de dichos plaguicidas, no haya exigido a los Estados miembros el cumplimiento de la Directiva 21/2010/UE, que modifica el anexo I de la Directiva 91/414/CEE por lo que respecta a disposiciones específicas relativas a la clotianidina, el tiametoxam, el fipronil y el imidacloprid, que obliga a los Estados miembros a poner «en marcha programas de seguimiento para verificar la exposición real de las abejas melíferas a [estas sustancias] activas en zonas comúnmente utilizadas por las abejas para libar o por apicultores».

Además, el Reglamento de la UE (CE) n° 1107/2009 sobre plaguicidas establece que ningún plaguicida puede ser autorizado si tiene un efecto perjudicial sobre las abejas (artículo 4, apartado 2, letra b)). El objetivo de este Reglamento es garantizar un nivel elevado de protección del medio ambiente y la base de esta regulación es la aplicación del principio de precaución. Sin embargo, hoy en día siguen siendo autorizados los neonicotinoides y el Gobierno de España, hasta ahora, se ha opuesto a la prohibición de estos productos específicos. Si bien es cierto que la Comisión se ha pronunciado al respecto, la medida continúa siendo débil, por lo que resulta recomendable una prohibición total del uso de estos plaguicidas por parte de todos los Estados miembros.

Con ello, ¿pretende la Comisión integrar la apicultura como un activo prioritario dentro de su política ambiental? ¿Considera la Comisión la posibilidad de aplicar el principio de precaución? ¿Sabe la Comisión que cambiar los métodos de producción hacia una agricultura sostenible crearía más de 1 millón de puestos de trabajo en la EU? ¿Podría incentivar a los Estados miembros a adoptar medidas de protección de las abejas no solo en el caso de los cultivos de colza, maíz y girasol?

Respuesta del Sr. Borg en nombre de la Comisión

(17 de mayo de 2013)

La Comisión ruega a Su Señoría que consulte la respuesta dada a la pregunta escrita E-000450/2013 ⁽¹⁾.

Los días 14 y 15 de marzo, la Comisión presentó asimismo al Comité Permanente de la Cadena Alimentaria y de Sanidad Animal una propuesta que restringe de forma significativa el uso de los tres neonicotinoides tiametoxam, clotianidina e imidacloprid. No obstante, la medida proyectada no obtuvo la mayoría cualificada, y la Comisión la remitió al Comité de Apelación. El 29 de abril, este Comité no pudo emitir un dictamen. De conformidad con el artículo 6, apartado 3, del Reglamento (UE) n° 182/2011 ⁽²⁾, la Comisión prevé adoptar el acto.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/es/parliamentary-questions.html>

⁽²⁾ DOL 55 de 28.2.2011, p. 13.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002933/13
to the Commission**

Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)

(14 March 2013)

Subject: Bees and a pesticide ban

Bees are dying all over the world, which poses a threat to biodiversity and the food chain. One of the main causes of the declining bee population is the use of neonicotinoid pesticides. Neonicotinoid pesticides damage the nervous system of bees, causing them to lose their sense of direction and hampering their ability to navigate back to their hives. Exposure to neonicotinoids can also paralyse or even kill bees.

Consequently, it is astonishing that the Commission — aware as it is of the toxic effect of neonicotinoid pesticides — has not insisted that all EU Member States comply with Commission Directive 2010/21/EU amending Annex I to Council Directive 91/414/EEC as regards the specific provisions relating to clothianidin, thiamethoxam, fipronil and imidacloprid. This directive requires all Member States to ensure that ‘monitoring programmes are initiated to verify the real exposure of honey bees to [these substances] in areas extensively used by bees for foraging or by beekeepers’.

Moreover, Article 4(2)b of Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 on pesticides states that plant protection products that have an adverse impact on bees are not authorised for use. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure a high level of environmental protection, based on the application of the precautionary principle. However, neonicotinoids remain legal and the Spanish Government still opposes a ban on such pesticides. While it is true that the Commission has voiced its opposition to neonicotinoids, in reality the steps taken have had very little impact, which is why a total ban on neonicotinoids should be imposed in all the Member States.

In this regard, is the Commission planning to incorporate beekeeping as a priority field in EU environmental policy? Is it considering applying the precautionary principle? Is it aware that a shift in production methods towards sustainable agriculture would create over one million jobs in the EU? Could the Commission encourage Member States to adopt bee protection measures in relation to other crops as well as oilseed rape, maize and sunflowers?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission

(17 May 2013)

The Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answer to Written Question E 000450/2013 ⁽¹⁾.

In addition, on 14-15 March the Commission presented to the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health a proposal to significantly restrict the use of the three neonicotinoids thiamethoxam, clothianidin and imidacloprid. However, the draft measure did not get a qualified majority. The Commission referred the measure to the Appeal Committee. On 29 April 2013 the Appeal Committee failed to deliver an opinion. In accordance with Article 6(3) of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011, the Commission will adopt the act ⁽²⁾.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html>

⁽²⁾ OJ L 55, 28.2.2011.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-002934/13
an die Kommission
Ismail Ertug (S&D)
(14. März 2013)

Betrifft: Rechtliche Situation der alevitischen Cem-Häuser in der Türkei

Die Lage der Aleviten in der Türkei ist immer wieder Gegenstand von Diskussionen. Da ihre Cem-Häuser keinen offiziellen Status in der Türkei besitzen, stoßen alevitische Bürger auf unüberwindbare bürokratische Hindernisse, wenn sie neue Cem-Häuser zur Begehung ihrer religiösen Zeremonien eröffnen möchten.

1. Beobachtet die Kommission konkrete Schritte der türkischen Regierung, um den rechtlichen Status der Cem-Häuser in der Türkei zu verbessern?
2. Sind der „Demokratischen Initiative“ der türkischen Regierung von 2009 konkrete Schritte zur Verbesserung der Situation der Aleviten in der türkischen Gesellschaft gefolgt?
3. Was gedenkt die Kommission bezüglich dieser Themen zu unternehmen?

Antwort von Herrn Füle im Namen der Kommission
(13. Mai 2013)

Mit der von der türkischen Regierung unterstützten Öffnung zu den Aleviten von 2009 sollten Fortschritte bei den wichtigsten Problemen der Gemeinschaft der Aleviten in dem Land erzielt werden. Sieben Workshops fanden mit verschiedenen Gesellschafts- und Berufsgruppen und mit alevitischen Vertretern statt. Anschließend wurde im März 2011 ein Abschlussbericht veröffentlicht. Die Kommission hat diesen Prozess eingehend verfolgt und ist in ihren jährlichen Fortschrittsberichten darauf eingegangen.

Allerdings gibt es (laut Fortschrittsbericht zur Türkei von 2012) keine konkreten Folgemaßnahmen zu der Öffnung. Cem-Häuser wurden trotz Entscheidungen einiger Gerichte erster Instanz noch nicht offiziell als Gebetsstätten anerkannt. Die Aleviten stoßen nach wie vor auf Schwierigkeiten bei der Einrichtung neuer Gebetsstätten. Das Urteil des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte Zengin/Türkei zu Religionskultur- und Ethikunterricht muss noch umgesetzt werden.

Als Land, das über seinen EU-Beitritt verhandelt, muss die Türkei ein Umfeld im Einklang mit der Europäischen Konvention zum Schutz der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten (EMRK) schaffen, so dass die Aleviten-Gemeinschaft keinerlei unangemessenen Zwängen unterworfen ist. Die Kommission wird weiterhin alle damit zusammenhängenden Fragen, einschließlich der Rechte von Minderheiten wie den Aleviten, genau beobachten.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002934/13
to the Commission
Ismail Ertug (S&D)
(14 March 2013)**

Subject: Legal situation of Alevi assembly houses in Turkey

The situation of the Alevis in Turkey is a recurrent topic for discussion. As their assembly houses do not have any official status in Turkey, Alevi citizens who wish to open new assembly houses in which to perform their religious ceremonies face insuperable bureaucratic obstacles.

1. Has the Commission observed any practical measures by the Turkish Government to improve the legal status of Alevi assembly houses in Turkey?
2. Was the Turkish Government's 'Democratic Initiative' of 2009 followed by any practical steps to improve the situation of the Alevis in Turkish society?
3. What does the Commission plan to do with regard to these subjects?

**Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission
(13 May 2013)**

The 2009 Alevi opening, sponsored by the Turkish authorities, aimed at making headway on the main issues the Alevi Community faces in the country. Seven workshops were held with different social and professional groups and with Alevi representatives. Following these workshops, a final report was issued in March 2011. The Commission followed this process closely and reported on it in its yearly Progress Reports.

However, (as reported in the 2012 Turkey Progress Report), a concrete follow-up of the opening is lacking. Cem houses, despite decisions of some first-instance courts, have not yet been officially recognised as places of worship. Alevis continue to experience difficulties in establishing new places of worship. The *Zengin v Turkey* ECHR judgment on religious culture and ethics classes has yet to be implemented.

Turkey, as a country negotiating its accession to the EU, needs to establish an environment in line with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), so that the Alevi community can function without undue constraints. The Commission will continue to monitor closely all related issues, including the rights of minorities such as the Alevis.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002935/13
προς την Επιτροπή
María Eleni Koppa (S&D)
(14 Μαρτίου 2013)

Θέμα: Αντιμετώπιση της ανεργίας στην περίοδο της κρίσης

Διαστάσεις ορμητικού ρεύματος έχει λάβει η μετανάστευση από την Ελλάδα νέων επιστημόνων και ειδικευμένου εργατικού δυναμικού σε χώρες της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης αλλά και σε τρίτες χώρες. Η ανάγκη των νέων για φυγή αποτυπώνεται πλήρως στα στοιχεία της ευρωπαϊκής πύλης Europass. Η κύρια αιτία αυτού του φαινομένου είναι η ραγδαία αύξηση της ανεργίας, η οποία σύμφωνα με τα στοιχεία, το τρίτο τετράμηνο του 2012 άγγιξε το 25,6%, ποσοστό που κατατάσσει την Ελλάδα στην πρώτη θέση της ΕΕ. Η φυγή στο εξωτερικό φαντάζει μονόδρομος, ιδιαίτερα για τους νέους (15-24 ετών) καθώς το ποσοστό της ανεργίας έφτασε το 56,8%. Με ορατό πλέον τον κίνδυνο διάρρηξης του κοινωνικού ιστού και λαμβάνοντας υπόψη τις προβλέψεις για αρνητικό ρυθμό ανάπτυξης της ελληνικής οικονομίας και το 2013 (-4,4%), ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Προτίθεται να καταρτίσει ένα «Στρατηγικό Σχέδιο» για την αντιμετώπιση αυτών των έκτακτων συνθηκών, με στόχο την απορρόφηση και την αξιοποίηση των πανεπιστημιακών αποφοίτων και του ειδικευμένου εργατικού δυναμικού από την ελληνική αγορά εργασίας;
2. Θα καταρτίσει, στα πλαίσια της «δέσμης μέτρων για την απασχόληση», νέο πρόγραμμα δράσης που θα ανταποκρίνεται στα νέα δεδομένα ώστε να επιτευχθούν οι στόχοι της «Ευρώπης 2020» για αύξηση της απασχόλησης σε ποσοστό 70%, για γυναίκες και άνδρες ηλικίας 20-64 ετών;
3. Ποιες στοχευμένες δράσεις προτίθεται να αναλάβει για:
 - α) την αύξηση του ποσοστού των εργαζόμενων γυναικών, οι οποίες, σύμφωνα με την εαρινή έκθεση της Επιτροπής, αποτελούν μόλις το 44,8% του συνολικού γυναικείου πληθυσμού ηλικίας 20-64 ετών.
 - β) την κατηγορία των μακροχρόνια ανέργων, μια κατηγορία που έχει ιδιαίτερα χαρακτηριστικά και χρίζει προσοχής καθώς είναι πολύ ανησυχητικό το υψηλό ποσοστό, το οποίο στην περίπτωση της Ελλάδας αγγίζει το 15%.
 - γ) την κατηγορία των νέων ανέργων (25-30 ετών), καθώς δεν μπορούν να αποκτήσουν πρόσβαση στην αγορά εργασίας;
 - δ) την κατηγορία των ανέργων που πλησιάζουν στην ηλικία συνταξιοδότησης (50-65 ετών) και καθίσταται αδύνατη η πρόσβαση τους στην αγορά εργασίας;

Απάντηση του κ. Andor εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(7 Μαΐου 2013)

Ένα σχέδιο δράσης για την απασχόληση, όπως προβλέπεται στο πρόσφατο πρόγραμμα οικονομικής προσαρμογής, αναμένεται να καταρτιστεί από τις ελληνικές αρχές. Κύριος στόχος του είναι, με τη βοήθεια πολιτικών για την αγορά εργασίας που απευθύνονται σε εκείνους που έχουν μεγαλύτερη ανάγκη, να καταπολεμηθεί η ανεργία και ιδιαίτερα να αποφευχθεί το να καταστεί μόνιμο το σημερινό υψηλό ποσοστό ανεργίας.

Το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινωνικό Ταμείο (ΕΚΤ) αποτελεί θεμελιώδες μέσο για την εφαρμογή ενεργών πολιτικών αγοράς εργασίας με συνολικό προϋπολογισμό για την Ελλάδα περίπου 4,4 δισεκατομμυρίων ευρώ. Οι ενέργειες που αναλαμβάνονται στο πλαίσιο των επιχειρησιακών προγραμμάτων (ΕΠ) του ΕΚΤ απευθύνονται μεταξύ άλλων σε γυναίκες (επιχειρηματικότητα, συνδυασμός προσωπικής και επαγγελματικής ζωής, κ.λπ.), νεολαία, άτομα που πλησιάζουν στη συνταξιοδότηση (π.χ. μηχανισμός επιδότησης για πρόσληψη σε επιχειρήσεις τοπικής αυτοδιοίκησης) και μακροχρόνια άνεργοι (ως οριζόντια προτεραιότητα για όλα τα μέτρα). Το ΕΠ για την ανάπτυξη του ανθρώπινου δυναμικού ενισχύει την ικανότητα των εταιρειών και των εργαζομένων να προσαρμοστούν στον διεθνή ανταγωνισμό και υποστηρίζει την πρόσβαση στην αγορά εργασίας για το σύνολο του πληθυσμού, καθώς επίσης και για τις λιγότερο εκπροσωπούμενες και ευάλωτες ομάδες. Το ΕΠ για το εθνικό αποθεματικό για απρόβλεπτα υποστηρίζει με πιο συγκεκριμένο τρόπο ανθρώπους που έχουν επηρεαστεί από τις επιπτώσεις των απρόβλεπτων κρίσεων, π.χ. με την παροχή βοήθειας για τη δημιουργία μιας επιχείρησης. Το ΕΠ για την εκπαίδευση και τη διά βίου μάθηση υποστηρίζει τη δημιουργία δεσμών μεταξύ εκπαίδευσης και αγοράς εργασίας.

Στο πλαίσιο της πρωτοβουλίας για την παροχή ευκαιριών στους νέους, η Ελλάδα έχει λάβει μέτρα για να αντιμετωπίσει το δραματικό επίπεδο ανεργίας των νέων με ένα προϋπολογισμό άνω των 600 εκατομμυρίων ευρώ (85% εκ των οποίων προέρχεται από κονδύλια της ΕΕ) για να βοηθήσει 350 000 νέους ηλικίας έως 35 ετών. Αυτός ο προϋπολογισμός προέρχεται κυρίως από τα προαναφερόμενα ΕΠ, ενώ το Ευρωπαϊκό Ταμείο Περιφερειακής Ανάπτυξης συμβάλλει επίσης ουσιαστικά μέσω του ΕΠ για τον ανταγωνισμό και την επιχειρηματικότητα.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002935/13
to the Commission
Maria Eleni Koppa (S&D)
(14 March 2013)**

Subject: Tackling unemployment at a time of crisis

The flow of emigration of young graduates and skilled workers from Greece to other EU countries and third countries has now become a torrent. The need for young people to flee the country is fully reflected in data of the European portal Europass. The main factor responsible for this phenomenon is the rapid increase in unemployment, which was running at 25.6% in the third quarter of 2012, giving Greece the highest unemployment rate in the EU. The exodus abroad appears to be permanent, especially for young people (15-24 years of age) for whom the unemployment rate is now 56.8%. Given the very real risk of destruction of the social fabric, and taking into account the renewed negative growth forecasts for the Greek economy in 2013 (-4.4%), will the Commission say:

1. Will it draw up a 'Strategic Plan' to address these exceptional circumstances, so that the Greek labour market can absorb and find jobs for university graduates and skilled workers?
2. Will it, as part of the 'employment package', draw up a new action plan to respond to the new data in order to attain the 'Europe 2020' target of increasing employment to 70% for women and men between 20 and 64 years of age?
3. What targeted actions does it intend to take:
 - (a) to increase the proportion of working women, who, according to the Commission's Spring Report, represent only 44.8% of the total female population between 20 and 64 years of age?
 - (b) to assist the long-term unemployed, a category with special features that deserves particular attention, as the proportion of such workers is alarmingly high and in Greece stands at 15%?
 - (c) to assist unemployed young people (25-30 years old), since they are unable to gain access to the labour market?
 - (d) to assist the unemployed who are approaching retirement age (50-65 years old) and find it impossible to access the labour market?

**Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission
(7 May 2013)**

An Employment Action Plan, as foreseen in the recent Economic Adjustment Programme is to be formulated by the Greek authorities. Its main objective is to fight against unemployment and in particular to prevent the currently high unemployment from becoming permanent through labour market policies targeted to those most in need.

The European Social Fund (ESF) is a key instrument in implementing active labour market policies with a total budget for Greece of approximately EUR 4.4 billion. Actions taken under the ESF operational programmes (OP) target *inter alia* women (entrepreneurship, reconciliation of personal and professional life, etc.), youth, people nearing retirement (e.g. subsidy scheme for recruitment in local government enterprises) and long term unemployed (as a horizontal priority for all measures). The Human Resources Development OP reinforces the ability of firms and workers to adapt to international competition and supports access to the labour market for the general population but also for under-represented and vulnerable groups. The National Contingency Reserve OP supports in a more targeted way people affected by the consequences of unforeseen crises, e.g. by helping them set up a business. The Education and Lifelong Learning OP supports the establishment of links between education and the labour market.

Under the Youth Opportunities Initiative, Greece has taken steps to tackle the dramatic levels of youth unemployment with a budget of over EUR 600 million (85% of which comes from EU funds) to help 350 000 youngsters up to 35 years old. This budget comes mainly from the abovementioned OPs while the European Regional Development Fund also contributes substantially through the Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship OP.

(Deutsche Fassung)

**Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-002936/13
an die Kommission
Keith Taylor (Verts/ALE) und Michael Cramer (Verts/ALE)
(14. März 2013)**

Betrifft: Indikatorensystem für den Tourismus in Europa und der Tierschutz

Wir begrüßen die Neuigkeit, dass die Kommission ein Indikatorensystem für den Tourismus in Europa erarbeitet und kürzlich eingeführt hat. Man kam um die Initiative, mit der Reiseziele in Europa für Nachhaltigkeit sensibilisiert und hierzu ermutigt werden sollen, nicht umhin.

Die Kommission wird in diesem Zusammenhang um Beantwortung der nachstehenden Fragen gebeten

1. Kann die Kommission Einblick darüber verschaffen, in welcher Form und zu welchem Zeitpunkt die Initiative durchgeführt wird und welche Maßnahmen ergriffen werden, um die Mitgliedstaaten zur Annahme des Systems zu ermutigen?
2. Der Tierschutz ist im Rahmen des Tourismus ein bedeutendes Thema, das allerdings noch nicht vom Indikatorensystem erfasst ist: Kann die Kommission bestätigen, dass auch die Frage des Tierschutzes behandelt werden wird?

**Antwort von Herrn Tajani im Namen der Kommission
(30. April 2013)**

Das Europäische Tourismusindikatorensystem (ETIS) wurde am 22. Februar 2013 auf einer offenen Konferenz in Brüssel erfolgreich vorgestellt. An der Veranstaltung nahmen etwa 250 Vertreter mehrerer öffentlicher und privater europäischer Interessenträger im Bereich des Tourismus teil. Ziel der Kommission ist es nun, Reiseziele in der gesamten EU zur Umsetzung des ETIS zu motivieren und von ihnen Rückmeldungen über die Effizienz des Systems zu erhalten, damit sie es gegebenenfalls anpassen kann. Die Pilotphase, an der sich alle interessierten Reiseziele auf freiwilliger Basis beteiligen können, wird etwa 18 Monate dauern.

Alle einschlägigen Unterlagen (das System und ein praktischer Leitfaden mit einer Nutzungsanleitung) sind auf der Website Europa⁽¹⁾ veröffentlicht und stehen allen potenziellen Nutzern, etwa Organisationen zum Reisezielmanagement oder -marketing, Fremdenverkehrsämtern, regionalen Behörden sowie Tourismusverbänden, zur Verfügung.

Die Kommission wird fachliche Sitzungen zur Steuerung des Prozesses und zur Festlegung des Aktionsplans für die nächsten 18 Monate veranstalten.

Von den 27 Basisindikatoren ist ein ganzer Abschnitt den Aspekten im Zusammenhang mit den Umweltauswirkungen gewidmet. Darunter ist ein Indikator zum Schutz der Landschaft und der Artenvielfalt, der implizit auch das Thema Tierschutz abdecken könnte. Nach Auswertung der Rückmeldungen der an der Pilotphase teilnehmenden Reiseziele könnte die Kommission auch einen Vorschlag für einen besonderen Indikator zum Tierschutz in Erwägung ziehen.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/tourism/sustainable-tourism/indicators/index_en.htm

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002936/13
to the Commission
Keith Taylor (Verts/ALE) and Michael Cramer (Verts/ALE)
(14 March 2013)**

Subject: European Tourism Indicators System and animal welfare

We welcome the news that the Commission has developed and recently launched the European Tourism Indicators System. The initiative, intended to influence and encourage sustainability in European tourism destinations, is much needed.

1. Would the Commission please provide an insight as to how and when this initiative will be implemented and what actions will be taken to encourage Member States to adopt it?
2. As the welfare of animals used within tourism is an important issue, but one which does not yet seem to be covered by the Indicators System, could the Commission please confirm that the issue of animal welfare will also be addressed?

**Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission
(30 April 2013)**

The European Tourism Indicator System (ETIS) was successfully presented in an open conference in Brussels on 22 February 2013. About 250 representatives from several EU public and private tourism stakeholders attended. The Commission's objective is now to motivate destinations to implement ETIS across the EU and gather their feedback on the efficiency of the system for possible adjustments. The pilot phase will last for about 18 months and will be open to all interested destinations on a voluntary basis.

All relevant documents (the System and a practical toolkit with instructions for use) are published on the Europa website ⁽¹⁾ and are at the disposal of all potential users, such as destination management organisations, destination marketing boards, tourist boards, local/regional authorities, as well as tourism associations.

The Commission will organise technical meetings to steer the process and define the action plan for the next 18 months.

Within the set of 27 core indicators, an entire section is dedicated to environmental impact related aspects. This section includes an indicator related to the landscape and biodiversity protection which implicitly could also refer to the issue of animal welfare. After the assessment of the feedback provided by the destinations participating in the pilot phase, the Commission could also envisage proposing a specific indicator targeting animal welfare.

⁽¹⁾ http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/tourism/sustainable-tourism/indicators/index_en.htm

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-002937/13
an die Kommission
Michael Cramer (Verts/ALE) und Franziska Keller (Verts/ALE)
(14. März 2013)

Betrifft: Karpasin: Zerstörung geschützter Habitats von bedrohten Tierarten

Bei der Halbinsel Karpaz (oder Karpasin) handelt es sich um eine der wertvollsten Naturschätze Nordzyperns. In dem Gebiet finden sich wertvolle Habitats und dort leben Arten, die global und europaweit wichtig sind und streng geschützt werden müssen. Zu den bedrohten Habitats und Arten gehören unter anderem die mediterranen Küsten- und Bergwälder, anfällige Sanddünen am Meer, die kritisch gefährdete Mönchsrobbe und zwei Arten der gefährdeten Meeresschildkröte. Im Frühjahr und Herbst ist die Halbinsel Karpasin zudem ein bedeutender Migrationskorridor für Tausende von Vögeln. Aufgrund dieser hohen Schutzbedürftigkeit wurde dieses Gebiet unter der Bezeichnung „Besonderes Schutzgebiet (BSG) Karpasin“ als mögliches Natura-2000-Projekt ausgewählt.

Wir sind nun darauf aufmerksam geworden, dass — ungeachtet der hohen ökologischen Bedeutung dieses spezifischen Gebiets — im September 2013 eine dreitägige Veranstaltung, das Seidenstraßen-Festival, zu dem 80 000 Besucher erwartet werden, am Golden Beach und damit einem der anfälligsten Strände der Halbinsel, stattfinden soll. Diese Pläne haben in Nordzypern und auch andernorts zu öffentlicher Empörung geführt, es wurde eine Petition verfasst und den Behörden der türkisch-zyprischen Volksgemeinschaft überreicht. Ungeachtet dessen und ohne vorherigen öffentlichen Dialog haben Planiermaschinen und Lastkraftwagen mit dem Ausbau der Straße zum Golden Beach begonnen. In den Plattformen sozialer Netzwerke wurden Fotos verbreitet und so entstand die „Initiative zum Schutz des Nationalparks Karpasin“, durch die die derzeitige Zerstörung im BSG verhindert werden soll.

Die Kommission wird in diesem Zusammenhang um die Beantwortung der nachstehenden Fragen gebeten:

1. Hat die Kommission in ihrer Eigenschaft als Verwaltungsbehörde der Natura-2000-Projekte Kenntnis von diesen Vorhaben? Falls dies der Fall ist: Welche Maßnahmen beabsichtigt sie bei der gegenwärtigen Sachlage zu ergreifen? Wird sie Untersuchungen im Hinblick auf das Ausmaß und die Umweltauswirkungen der verursachten Schäden durchführen?
2. Wird eine derartige Zerstörung möglicher Natura-2000-Gebiete Gegenstand künftiger Gespräche der Kommission und der türkisch-zyprischen Volksgemeinschaft sein?
3. Wurden EU-Mittel aus Fonds oder sonstige EU-Gelder zur Förderung oder (Ko-)Finanzierung der gegenwärtigen Infrastrukturen und/oder Fremdenverkehrsprojekte auf der Halbinsel Karpasin, und zwar insbesondere für die vorgenannte Veranstaltung, beantragt oder bewilligt, und falls dies der Fall ist, um welche Gelder handelt es sich?
4. Welche Maßnahmen gemäß den EU-Rechtsvorschriften wären in diesem Fall anwendbar, um den Schutz der Habitats der gefährdeten Arten durchzusetzen?

Antwort von Herrn Füle im Namen der Kommission

(6. Mai 2013)

Die Kommission verweist den Herrn Abgeordneten und die Frau Abgeordnete auf ihre Antwort auf die schriftlichen Anfragen P-001173/2013 und P-001217/2013 (¹).

Die Kommission wird die Situation weiterhin genau beobachten und mit der türkisch-zyprischen Gemeinschaft erneut über die Notwendigkeit des Schutzes des ökologisch empfindlichen Gebiets Karpasin/Karpaz im Allgemeinen und des Golden Beach im Besonderen sprechen. In diesem Zusammenhang scheint aus Informationen, die die Kommission vor kurzem erhielt, hervorzugehen, dass das Festival nicht in den besonderen Schutzgebieten stattfinden wird.

Im Rahmen des Hilfeprogramms für die türkisch-zyprische Gemeinschaft finanziert die Kommission keine Tätigkeiten, die mit dem Ausbau der erwähnten Straße oder dem Festival im Zusammenhang stehen.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/de/parliamentary-questions.html>

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002937/13
to the Commission
Michael Cramer (Verts/ALE) and Franziska Keller (Verts/ALE)
(14 March 2013)**

Subject: Karpaz: destruction of protected habitats of endangered species

The Karpaz peninsula (or Karpasia) is one of the most precious natural treasures of Northern Cyprus. The territory offers precious habitats and is home to species which are important on a global and European scale and which need to be strictly protected. The habitats and species under threat include, among others, Mediterranean coastal and mountain forests, fragile coastal sand dunes, the critically endangered Monk Seal and two species of endangered sea turtles. Each spring and autumn, the Karpaz peninsula is also an important migratory corridor for thousands of birds. Due to its high sensitivity, this area, designated the Karpasia Special Environmental Protection Area (SEPA), has been selected as a potential Natura 2000 project.

It has now come to our attention that, despite the high ecological significance of this specific area, a three-day event — the Silk Route festival, which is expected to attract 80 000 visitors — is to be held in September 2013 on Golden Beach, one of the most sensitive beaches on the peninsula. These plans have triggered public outrage in Northern Cyprus and beyond, and a petition has been prepared and handed over to the authorities of the Turkish Cypriot community. This notwithstanding, without any further public dialogue, bulldozers and trucks have begun work to widen the road leading to Golden Beach. Photographs of this have circulated on social media platforms and have given birth to the 'Karpasia National Park Protection Initiative' aiming to prevent the destruction that is taking place in the SEPA.

1. Is the Commission, as managing authority of Natura 2000 projects, aware of these plans? If so, what does it intend to do about the situation as it now stands? Will it carry out investigations into the extent and environmental impact of the damage caused?
2. Will such destruction of potential Natura 2000 sites be addressed in future talks between the Commission and the Turkish Cypriot community?
3. Have EU funds or any other EU sources of funding been requested or allocated for the purpose of promoting or (co-)financing any current infrastructure and/or tourism projects on the Karpaz peninsula, in particular as regards the aforementioned event, and, if so, which?
4. Under EC law, what measures would in this instance be applicable to enforce the protection of the habitats of endangered species?

**Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission
(6 May 2013)**

The Commission refers the Honourable Members to its answer to previous written questions E-001173/2013 and E-001217/2013 ⁽¹⁾.

The Commission will continue to closely monitor the situation and will again raise with the Turkish Cypriot community the need to protect the environmentally sensitive area of Karpasia/Karpaz in general and the Golden Beach in particular. In that respect, information received recently seems to indicate that the festival will not take place in the Special Environment Protected Areas.

In the framework of its assistance programme to the Turkish Cypriot community, the Commission is not financing any activities linked to the road construction or to the festival.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html>

(Nederlandse versie)

**Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-002938/13
aan de Commissie**

Lambert van Nistelrooij (PPE) en Romana Jordan (PPE)

(14 maart 2013)

Betref: Rendabiliteit van investeringen in energie-efficiëntieprojecten in overheidsgebouwen

Sinds 2000 heeft de Europese Unie bijna 5 miljard EUR aan financiering uit het cohesiebeleid beschikbaar gesteld voor de cofinanciering van energie-efficiëntie maatregelen in de lidstaten. De Commissie deelt de verantwoordelijkheid voor het gezonde financieel beheer van deze fondsen met de nationale en regionale autoriteiten.

Onlangs heeft de Rekenkamer onderzocht of deze investeringen in energie-efficiëntie uit hoofde van het cohesiebeleid rendabel zijn. De Rekenkamer heeft audits uitgevoerd voor 24 investeringsprojecten voor overheidsgebouwen in Tsjechië, Italië en Litouwen, omdat deze landen voor de periode 2007-2013 de hoogste subsidies hebben ontvangen voor energie-efficiëntie maatregelen op het vlak van cohesie en regionale ontwikkeling.

De Rekenkamer concludeerde dat er geen goede voorwaarden waren gesteld in de programmering en de financiering om rendabele energie-efficiënte investeringen mogelijk te maken en dat de gecontroleerde energie-efficiëntieprojecten in overheidsgebouwen niet rendabel waren. In het verslag staat vermeld dat slechts 10 % van de voor energie-efficiëntie bestemde EU-cohesiefondsen correct besteed is. Volgens een van de leden van de Rekenkamer was bij het besteden van het geld voor de renovatie van overheidsgebouwen energie-efficiëntie voor de lidstaten in het beste geval slechts van secundair belang. Het doel moet weliswaar zijn om bij de besteding van overheidsgeld een duidelijk en snel rendement van de investering te garanderen, maar de algemene beoordeling van de Rekenkamer is dat de uitgaven in kwestie zich gemiddeld pas na 50 jaar uitbetalen.

1. Is de Commissie op de hoogte van de resultaten van dit verslag, en wat vindt zij van de conclusies van de Rekenkamer?
2. Vindt de Commissie ook niet dat het concept van rendabiliteit — de beste verhouding tussen de ingezette hulpmiddelen en de bereikte resultaten — het leidende beginsel moet zijn bij het investeren van cohesiefondsen?
3. Kan de Commissie aangeven of de cohesiefondsen die zijn toegekend aan de particuliere sector doeltreffender worden besteed, aangezien in het verslag van de Rekenkamer alleen werd gekeken naar investeringen door overheidsinstanties?
4. Kan de Commissie commentaar geven op het idee om steden en plattelandsgebieden die duurzame energieactieplannen hebben ontwikkeld en een bewezen staat van dienst hebben op het vlak van rendabiliteit, voorrang te geven bij het toekennen van EU-fondsen?
5. Hoe kijkt de Commissie aan tegen het stellen van een vaste termijn, bijvoorbeeld 5 tot 10 jaar, voor de maximale terugverdientijd, die per geval wordt bepaald voor elke afzonderlijke lidstaat?
6. Welke maatregelen zal de Commissie treffen om rendabele investeringen in energie-efficiëntie te waarborgen met financiering uit het cohesiebeleid, en welke voorwaarden kan de Commissie stellen voor zulke investeringen?

Antwoord van de heer Hahn namens de Commissie

(6 mei 2013)

1. Het antwoord van de Commissie is opgenomen in het verslag van de Rekenkamer.
2. Een optimale verhouding tussen de ingezette middelen en de verkregen resultaten is een van de in het Financieel Reglement opgenomen beginselen.
3. Hoewel er meer en meer wordt geïnvesteerd in de energie-efficiëntie van gebouwen en er verscheidene goede voorbeelden zijn van bestaande programma's, is er zowel op Europees als op nationaal niveau nog maar weinig informatie beschikbaar over de doeltreffendheid van de verschillende steunmaatregelen. Investeringen in energie-efficiëntie zijn een nieuw gebied van het cohesiebeleid in de lopende periode; de resultaten van de steunmaatregelen zullen in de evaluatie achteraf worden beoordeeld.

4. De ontwikkeling van actieplannen voor duurzame energie en voor stedelijke mobiliteit moet worden aangemoedigd en ondersteund als onderdeel van koolstofarme strategieën voor een betere coördinatie van sectorale investeringen en als onderdeel van een bredere strategie voor stedelijke ontwikkeling. In het voorstel voor een verordening over gemeenschappelijke bepalingen wordt voorgesteld om de methodologie en criteria voor de selectie van projecten te laten onderzoeken en goedkeuren door comités voor toezicht op de programma's.
5. In het kader van langetermijninvesteringen in energie-efficiëntie is het niet zinvol om enkel en alleen de terugverdienperiode in aanmerking te nemen. Investeringen in isolatie van gebouwen betreffen de langere termijn, waarbij het terugverdieneffect in verhouding staat tot het niveau van renovatie. Om te voldoen aan de energiedoelstellingen van de EU voor 2020 en daarna zullen allesomvattende renovaties nodig zijn, met verbeteringen van de energie-efficiëntie die verder gaan dan de kostenoptimale niveaus. Dat zal op de langere termijn nuttig zijn om verdere besparingen te creëren en te vermijden dat er over vijf tot vijftien jaar lock-in-effecten optreden of extra werk nodig is, waardoor de totale investeringskosten zelfs nog hoger zouden oplopen.
6. De Commissie verwijst het geachte Parlementslid naar haar antwoord op schriftelijke vraag E-000373/2013 ⁽¹⁾.

⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/nl/parliamentary-questions.html>

(Slovenska različica)

Vprašanje za pisni odgovor E-002938/13
za Komisijo
Lambert van Nistelrooij (PPE) in Romana Jordan (PPE)
(14. marec 2013)

Zadeva: Stroškovna učinkovitost naložb v energetska učinkovitost projektov v javnih zgradbah

Od leta 2000 do danes je Evropska unija za kohezijsko politiko dala na voljo skoraj 5 milijard EUR, in sicer za sofinanciranje ukrepov za energetska učinkovitost v državah članicah. Komisija z nacionalnimi in regionalnimi organi deli odgovornost za dobro finančno poslovodenje s temi sredstvi.

Računsko sodišče je nedavno ocenilo, ali so bile naložbe v energetska učinkovitost v okviru kohezijske politike stroškovno učinkovite. Revidiralo je 24 naložbenih projektov v javne zgradbe v Češki republiki, Italiji in Litvi, saj so te države v obdobju 2007–2013 v okviru kohezije in regionalnega razvoja prejele največ finančne podpore za ukrepe energetske učinkovitosti.

Ugotovilo je, da za programe in financiranje niso bili določeni pogoji, ki bi omogočili stroškovno učinkovite naložbe v energetska učinkovitost, in da revidirani projekti v javnih stavbah niso bili stroškovno učinkoviti. V poročilu je navedlo, da je bilo samo 10 % kohezijskih sredstev EU, namenjenih energetski učinkovitosti, porabljenih pravilno. Eden od članov Računskega sodišča je izjavil, da so države članice denar sicer porabile za obnovo javnih poslopij, vendar je bila energetska učinkovitost pri tem v najboljšem primeru drugotnega pomena. Čeprav bi moral biti pri uporabi javnega denarja glavni namen nedvoumna in čimprejšnja donosnost naložbe, je Računsko sodišče ocenilo, da se bo poraba v teh primerih v povprečju povrnila v 50 letih.

1. Ali je Komisija seznanjena z ugotovitvami tega poročila in kakšno je njeno mnenje o zaključkih Računskega sodišča?
2. Ali se Komisija strinja, da bi moral biti koncept stroškovne učinkovitosti – najboljše razmerje med vloženimi sredstvi in doseženimi rezultati – vodilno načelo pri vlaganju kohezijskih sredstev?
3. Ali lahko Komisija glede na to, da je Računsko sodišče preučevalo samo naložbe javnih organov, pojasni, ali so kohezijska sredstva, dodeljena zasebnemu sektorju, porabljena učinkoviteje?
4. Ali lahko Komisija izrazi stališče glede zamisli, da bi imela mesta in podeželska območja, ki so razvila trajnostne energetske akcijske načrte in so se že večkrat izkazala kot strokovno učinkovita, prednost pri pridobivanju sredstev EU?
5. Kaj Komisija meni o tem, da bi kot najdaljše možno obdobje odplačila določili fiksno obdobje, na primer od 5 do 10 let, in sicer od primera do primera po posameznih državah članicah?
6. Kako namerava Komisija ukrepati, da bo zagotovila stroškovno učinkovitost vlaganja sredstev kohezijske politike v energetska učinkovitost in kakšne pogoje lahko uvede za te naložbe?

Odgovor g. Hahnona v imenu Komisije
(6. maj 2013)

1. Odgovor Komisije je vključen v poročilo Računskega sodišča.
2. Najboljše razmerje med uporabljenimi sredstvi in doseženimi rezultati je eno od načel, navedenih v finančni uredbi.
3. Kljub temu, da se naložbe v energijsko učinkovitost stavb povečujejo in je v uporabi že več dobrih primerov shem, razpolagamo le z omejeno količino podatkov glede učinkovitosti različnih podpornih ukrepov, tako na ravni EU kot na nacionalnih ravneh. Naložbe v energetska učinkovitost so novo področje v kohezijski politiki tekočega obdobja, zato bodo rezultati teh posegov ocenjeni v okviru postopka naknadnega ocenjevanja.
4. Razvoj akcijskih načrtov za trajnostno energijo in akcijskih načrtov za mobilnost v mestih bi bilo treba spodbujati in podpirati kot del nizkoogljičnih razvojnih strategij za boljše usklajevanje sektorskih naložb in sicer kot del širše strategije za razvoj urbanega okolja. Predlog uredbe o skupnih določbah določa, da odbori za spremljanje programov preverijo in odobrijo metodologijo ter merila za izbor projektov.

5. Osredotočanje zgolj na enostavno vračilno dobo ni primerno pri dolgoročnih naložbah v energetsko učinkovitost. Naložbe v nameščanje izolacije je bolj dolgoročno, pri čemer so vračila sorazmerna s stopnjo prenove. Da bi dosegli energetske cilje EU do leta 2020 in po njem, bo potrebno celostno prenoviti stavbe, pri čemer bodo izboljšave energijske učinkovitosti presecale stroškovno optimalne ravni. Na dolgi rok bo tak pristop koristen, saj bo ustvaril višje prihranke, izogniti pa se bo mogoče tudi dodatnim investicijskim stroškom, ki bi nastali z izvajanjem dodatnih del v prihodnjem 5–15-letnem obdobju in stroškom zaradi zaprtih sistemov (*lock-ins*).
6. Komisija želi spoštovano poslanko opozoriti na svoj odgovor na pisno vprašanje E-000373/2013 ⁽¹⁾.
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(¹) <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/sl/parliamentary-questions.html?sessionId=EDFEF9D4A06B8E29C0C3E5C8FC53C042.node2>

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002938/13
to the Commission
Lambert van Nistelrooij (PPE) and Romana Jordan (PPE)
(14 March 2013)

Subject: Cost-effectiveness of investments in energy efficiency projects in public buildings

Since 2000, the European Union has made almost EUR 5 billion worth of cohesion policy funding available for the co-financing of energy efficiency measures in the Member States. The Commission has shared the responsibility for the sound financial management of these funds with national and regional authorities.

Recently, the Court of Auditors assessed whether these cohesion policy investments in energy efficiency were cost-effective. It audited 24 investment projects for public buildings in the Czech Republic, Italy and Lithuania, as these were the countries that received most cohesion and regional development funding support for energy efficiency measures in 2007-2013.

The Court of Auditors concluded that the right conditions in programming and financing had not been set to enable cost-effective energy efficiency investments and that the audited energy efficiency projects in public buildings were not cost-effective. The report states that only 10% of EU cohesion funds earmarked for energy efficiency were being used correctly. According to one of the members of the Court, while Member States were using the money to refurbish public buildings, energy efficiency was, at best, a secondary concern. While it should be the aim, when using public money, to ensure a clear and swift return on investment, the general assessment of the Court is that, on average, the spending involved would not be recouped for 50 years.

1. Is the Commission aware of the outcome of this report, and what is its opinion on the Court of Auditors' conclusions?
2. Does the Commission agree that the cost-effectiveness concept — the best relationship between resources employed and results achieved — should be the leading principle when investing cohesion funds?
3. Given that the Court of Auditors' report only looked at investments made by public authorities, can the Commission indicate whether cohesion funds allocated to the private sector are spent more effectively?
4. Can the Commission comment on the idea of granting cities and rural areas that have developed sustainable energy action plans, and that have a proven track-record when it comes to cost-efficiency, priority access to EU funds?
5. How does the Commission look at setting a fixed range, such as 5-10 years, for the maximum payback period, set on a case-by-case basis for each individual Member State?
6. What steps will the Commission take to ensure cost-effective investments in energy efficiency through cohesion policy funding, and what conditions can the Commission introduce for such investments?

Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission
(6 May 2013)

1. The Commission's reply is included in the Court of Auditor's report.
2. The best relationship between resources employed and results achieved is one of the principles listed in the Financial Regulation.
3. Although investment in energy efficiency in buildings is increasing and there are several good examples of schemes already in place, there is still only limited information on the effectiveness of different support measures, both at EU and national levels. Energy efficiency investments are a new area for cohesion policy in the current period and the results of the interventions will be evaluated in the *ex post* evaluation exercise.
4. The development of sustainable energy action plans and urban mobility action plans should be encouraged and supported as part of low-carbon strategies to facilitate coordination of sectoral investments and as part of a broader urban development strategy. The draft Common Provisions Regulation proposes that programme monitoring committees shall examine and approve the methodology and criteria for the selection of projects.

5. The sole focus on a simple payback period is not appropriate in the context of long-term energy efficiency investments. Investment in building insulation is longer-term, with paybacks proportionate to the level of renovation. Comprehensive renovation of buildings will be needed in order to meet the EU energy targets for 2020 and beyond, with energy efficiency improvements that go beyond cost-optimal levels. This will be valuable in a longer perspective, to generate higher savings and avoid lock-ins and additional work in 5-15 years, which would make the total investment costs even higher.
6. The Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answer to Written Question E-000373/2013 ⁽¹⁾.
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⁽¹⁾ <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html>

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-002939/13

à la Commission

Marc Tarabella (S&D)

(14 mars 2013)

Objet: Changement de système de taxes pour que les supermarchés redistribuent la nourriture

Certaines chaînes de supermarchés, sur ordre de marques, ont ordonné de détruire tous les lots de nourriture contenant de la viande chevaline. Il est scandaleux de constater que des marques préfèrent jeter de la nourriture saine aux ordures plutôt que d'en faire don à des associations ou de la vendre au rabais à des familles ayant du mal à boucler les fins de mois. Des supermarchés préfèrent donc nourrir les rats plutôt que les gens.

Pour rappel, des millions de citoyens dépendent directement de l'aide aux plus démunis pour survivre et ce chiffre ne cesse de croître alors que les moyens européens pour pallier à cette situation ne cessent de baisser.

Mais ce dossier particulier souligne une constante: de nombreux supermarchés préfèrent jeter leurs invendus plutôt que de les redistribuer ou de les mettre à disposition des associations.

Une raison à cela: la TVA. Un supermarché qui jette ne paye pas la TVA alors que celui qui la distribue doit la payer. Le système n'avait pas prévu qu'un jour la surproduction d'une part et le gaspillage d'autre part deviendraient astronomiques, qui plus est dans une période de profonde crise économique et sociale.

Dès lors, il est devenu primordial que les autorités, en ce qui concerne la redistribution et la lutte contre le gaspillage, mettent en place des outils incitatifs plutôt que dissuasifs.

1. Quelle est la position de la Commission sur la question d'un régime de TVA adapté qui incite la redistribution plutôt que de l'en dissuader?
2. La Commission compte-t-elle tout mettre en œuvre pour corriger/adapter cela et mettre ainsi fin à un gaspillage colossal de nourriture dont tant de démunis ou moins nantis pourraient profiter?
3. Quel levier la Commission entend-elle dans ce but (diplomatique, législatif, ...)?

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-003730/13

à la Commission

Dominique Vlasto (PPE)

(3 avril 2013)

Objet: Lutte contre le gaspillage alimentaire — TVA

Le gaspillage alimentaire s'aggrave d'année en année, alors que les matières premières se raréfient et que la malnutrition s'étend en Europe. 89 millions de tonnes de nourriture sont jetées chaque année (soit 179 kg/an/personne), dont la majeure partie est pourtant saine et comestible.

Alors même que des millions de citoyens dépendent directement de dons alimentaires, il semble nécessaire de rechercher les causes de ce gaspillage afin de réduire ce phénomène et d'aider les plus démunis.

Parmi les raisons identifiées figure un système de TVA qui décourage les dons de la grande distribution en faveur des banques alimentaires.

En effet, un supermarché qui jette des aliments approchant de la date limite de consommation ou endommagés ne paye pas la TVA, alors que celui qui en fait don à des banques alimentaires y est assujéti, conformément à la directive n° 2006/112/CE.

Au regard de ces éléments, et sachant que la Commission a prévu de publier une nouvelle communication en 2013 sur le gaspillage alimentaire, entend-elle proposer une révision du système de TVA qui s'applique aux dons de denrées alimentaires, afin de lutter contre le gaspillage alimentaire et d'aider les plus démunis?

Réponse commune donnée par M. Šemeta au nom de la Commission
(7 mai 2013)

Le 6 décembre 2011, la Commission européenne a présenté au Parlement européen, au Conseil et au Comité économique et social européen une communication sur l'avenir de la TVA ⁽¹⁾. Il a été reconnu que l'une des caractéristiques essentielles d'un éventuel futur système de TVA de l'UE serait que celui-ci continue de remplir sa fonction d'augmentation des recettes. Il s'agit donc de concevoir un système de TVA plus simple, plus solide et plus efficace adapté au marché unique.

La mise en place de systèmes de TVA sur mesure afin de résoudre des problèmes concrets irait à l'encontre de la simplicité et de l'efficacité du système, et nuirait à la neutralité de la taxe. Par conséquent, la Commission considère que toute action visant à encourager une juste redistribution de la nourriture devrait plutôt être menée dans d'autres domaines que la TVA.

Consciente des difficultés rencontrées par les citoyens de l'Union européenne, la Commission a discuté avec les États membres des conséquences en matière de TVA du don de nourriture aux personnes démunies ⁽²⁾. Il a été convenu ⁽³⁾ que dans le cadre du don de nourriture, la valeur sur laquelle la TVA est calculée doit être ajustée selon les circonstances et l'état des marchandises au moment où elles sont distribuées. Lorsque le don a lieu alors que la date de consommation recommandée est proche ou que les marchandises ne peuvent plus être vendues, cette valeur devrait être assez basse, voire proche de zéro.

Il revient aux États membres d'appliquer ce principe avec flexibilité afin de ne pas empêcher les assujettis de donner de la nourriture à des associations caritatives.

La «communication sur l'alimentation durable» que la Commission entend adopter avant la fin de l'année 2013 comprend un chapitre sur la prévention et la réduction des pertes et du gaspillage de nourriture à toutes les étapes de la chaîne d'approvisionnement sans que la sécurité alimentaire soit compromise. Les mesures concrètes qui seront proposées ne sont pas encore déterminées. Une consultation publique sera ouverte en mai.

⁽¹⁾ COM(2011) 851.

⁽²⁾ Lors de la 97^e réunion du comité de la TVA.

⁽³⁾ Les orientations convenues sont publiées à l'adresse:

http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/vat/key_documents/vat_committee/2012_guidelines-vat-committee-meetings_fr.pdf

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002939/13
to the Commission
Marc Tarabella (S&D)
(14 March 2013)**

Subject: Changing the tax system to encourage supermarkets to redistribute food

Some supermarket chains have been instructed by food companies to dump all food products containing horsemeat. It is outrageous that food companies should prefer to throw out perfectly good food, rather than donating it to charities or selling it at a reduced price to families who find it difficult to make ends meet. It would appear that supermarkets are keener to feed rats than people.

It should not be forgotten that millions of people depend entirely on EU aid for the most deprived in order to survive and that this number is continuing to grow even as European resources set aside to address this problem are continuing to dwindle.

This specific issue is part of a larger problem, however: many supermarkets prefer to throw away unsold produce, rather than redistributing it or giving it to charity.

One reason for this is VAT. Supermarkets that throw out produce do not pay VAT, while those that redistribute produce do. This system was not designed for an era in which overproduction and waste has reached astronomical levels, what is more against the backdrop of a deep economic and social crisis.

It is now vital, therefore, that the authorities should take measures that incentivise food redistribution and that combat waste, rather than encouraging it.

1. What view does the Commission take of the idea of introducing a tailored VAT system that would encourage rather than discourage food redistribution?
2. Does the Commission intend make every effort to remedy the current state of affairs and put an end to the colossal wastage of food that could be used to help the needy and the less fortunate?
3. What forms of pressure does the Commission intend to exert (through diplomacy, legislation, etc.)?

**Question for written answer E-003730/13
to the Commission
Dominique Vlasto (PPE)
(3 April 2013)**

Subject: Combating the problem of food wastage — VAT

The problem of food wastage is growing worse every year, even as basic resources are becoming increasingly scarce and malnutrition is spreading in Europe. Eighty-nine million tonnes of food are thrown away each year (179 kg/year/person), even though most of it is perfectly safe to eat.

At a time when millions of people are dependent on food donations, surely we must think carefully about the causes of food wastage in an effort to reverse this trend and help those most in need.

One such cause often cited is a VAT system that discourages supermarkets from making donations to food banks.

In accordance with Directive 2006/112/EC, a supermarket which throws away food that is near its use-by date or damaged does not pay VAT, whereas one which donates the products concerned to a food bank does.

Given that the Commission is planning to publish a new communication on food wastage in 2013, does it intend to propose a revision of the VAT system as it applies to food donations, in order to combat the problem of food wastage and help those most in need?

Joint answer given by Mr Šemeta on behalf of the Commission
(7 May 2013)

On 6 December 2011, the European Commission presented a communication to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee on the Future of VAT ⁽¹⁾. Recognising that one of the fundamental features of a future EU VAT system is that it can continue to perform its function of raising revenues, focus is on moving towards a simpler, more robust and efficient VAT system tailored to the Single Market.

Introducing tailored VAT systems to address concrete problems would run counter to the simplicity and efficiency of the system and would hamper the neutrality of the tax. The Commission therefore believes that any action to encourage a fair redistribution of food should rather be taken in areas other than VAT.

Conscious of the difficult situation that European citizens are facing the Commission has discussed with Member States the VAT implications of donating foodstuff to the poor ⁽²⁾. It was agreed ⁽³⁾ that where foodstuff is donated, the value on which the VAT is calculated would need to be adjusted according to the circumstances and the state the goods are in at the moment they are donated. Where the donation takes place close to the best before date or where goods are not fit for sale, that value should be fairly low, even close to zero.

It is up to the Member States to apply this principle with flexibility so as not to impede taxable persons from donating foodstuff to charities.

The 'Communication on Sustainable Food' that the Commission intends to adopt before the end of 2013 will include a chapter on the prevention and reduction of food losses and food waste at all the levels of the food chain without compromising food safety. The precise measures that will be proposed are not decided yet. A public consultation will be launched in May.

⁽¹⁾ COM(2011) 851.

⁽²⁾ At the 97th meeting of the VAT Committee.

⁽³⁾ The guidelines agreed are published at:

http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/vat/key_documents/vat_committee/2012_guidelines-vat-committee-meetings_en.pdf

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-002940/13
à la Commission
Marc Tarabella (S&D)
(14 mars 2013)

Objet: Stratégie industrielle européenne

Les fermetures des usines Arcelor, PSA, Ford et de plusieurs sites d'Iveco en Europe, ou les restructurations comme celle de Caterpillar illustrent bien les conséquences dramatiques de la crise économique et sociale pour les ouvriers de l'automobile, les PME sous-traitantes et l'industrie européenne. Cette crise industrielle, nous aurions tort de la croire limitée à l'automobile, à la sidérurgie ou au textile, car elle touche de plus en plus de secteurs à forte teneur technologique. Un exemple: l'industrie des télécoms. Sur les huit industriels occidentaux qui dominaient le marché il y a dix ans, seuls quatre existent encore aujourd'hui. Dans le même temps, deux industriels chinois, Huawei et ZTE, sont devenus des champions mondiaux. 80 % des innovations et 75 % des exportations de l'UE proviennent de l'industrie. Pour chaque emploi manufacturier, il s'en crée deux dans le secteur des services. Nous avons besoin d'industrie, et nous pouvons la développer, en particulier si nous nous dotons d'une politique industrielle à 27 plutôt que de 27 politiques nationales.

1. Quelles sont les leçons que tire la Commission de ces milliers de restructurations et licenciements?
2. La Commission compte-t-elle mettre en place une stratégie européenne de compétitivité industrielle intégrée et solidaire? Et si oui, laquelle?
3. À cette fin, que pense la Commission de l'idée de développer des politiques communes de formation professionnelle et continue en termes de mobilité qui ne soient plus déconnectées de la production, de l'industrie?
4. La Commission compte-t-elle démultiplier les coopérations industrielles dans tous les secteurs et dans tous les territoires via un cadre incitatif?
5. La Commission entend-elle mettre en place une stratégie d'action économique extérieure en nouant des partenariats sur des projets d'intérêt commun avec les autres régions du monde?
6. Qu'en est-il du passeport européen pour les fonds de capital-risque, qui devrait améliorer l'accès des PME innovantes aux financements?

Réponse donnée par M. Tajani au nom de la Commission
(17 mai 2013)

1. La Commission a adopté en 2012 un livre vert sur les restructurations ⁽¹⁾ et réfléchit actuellement à la meilleure manière d'encourager le respect des bonnes pratiques.
2. La Commission a récemment actualisé sa politique industrielle ⁽²⁾ en se concentrant sur quatre domaines clés: l'innovation industrielle, l'accès aux marchés, l'accès au financement ainsi que le capital humain et les compétences professionnelles.
3. La Commission convient de la nécessité de politiques visant à la création d'emplois et d'outils permettant d'anticiper les compétences requises à l'avenir. Le financement des conseils sectoriels européens pour les compétences est destiné à renforcer la coopération avec les organismes d'enseignement et de formation.
4. Les propositions de la Commission pour le prochain cadre financier pluriannuel visent notamment à améliorer la compétitivité, y compris au moyen du programme «Horizon 2020» pour la recherche et l'innovation et du programme COSME.

(1) «Restructurations et anticipation du changement: quelles leçons tirer de l'expérience récente?», COM(2012) 7 final du 17 janvier 2012.: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0007:FIN:FR:PDF>.

(2) «Une industrie européenne plus forte au service de la croissance et de la relance économique — Mise à jour de la communication sur la politique industrielle», COM(2012) 582 final du 10 octobre 2012.: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0582:FIN:FR:PDF>.

5. La politique commerciale de l'UE consiste à renforcer les différents secteurs d'activité par divers moyens: ouverture des marchés, diplomatie commerciale soutenant les intérêts de l'UE et exercice du droit d'accès non discriminatoire au marché. La Commission organise aussi des «Missions pour la croissance» qui aident à créer des partenariats et à nouer des relations commerciales.
 6. Le règlement relatif aux fonds européens de capital-risque a été formellement approuvé en mars 2013 et devrait entrer en vigueur cet été. Il fonctionnera comme un passeport volontaire valable à l'échelle de l'UE pour les administrateurs des fonds de capital-risque et il simplifiera la mobilisation transfrontalière de fonds.
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(English version)

Question for written answer E-002940/13
to the Commission
Marc Tarabella (S&D)
(14 March 2013)

Subject: European industrial strategy

The closure of Arcelor, PSA and Ford factories and a number of Iveco sites in Europe, and the restructurings carried out by firms such as Caterpillar, are a clear sign of how hard the economic and social crisis has hit car workers, subcontractor SMEs and, indeed, European industry as a whole. Because it would be wrong for anyone to think that the industrial crisis is confined to traditional sectors such as the car, steel and textile industries. It is increasingly being felt in high-tech sectors, such as telecoms, as well. Of the eight western manufacturers that dominated the telecoms market 10 years ago, only four are still in existence today. During the same period two Chinese manufacturers, Huawei and ZTE, have become global leaders. Industry accounts for 80% of EU innovations and 75% of EU exports. And for every manufacturing job, two jobs are created in the service sector. So we need industry. And we can help it to develop, in particular by adopting an industrial policy for the EU as a whole rather than retaining 27 different national policies.

1. What lessons has the Commission learned from the thousands of restructurings and redundancies that have occurred?
2. Does it intend to establish an integrated, mutually supportive European strategy for industrial competitiveness? If so, what form will it take?
3. In this context, what is its view on developing common policies on vocational training, lifelong learning and mobility that reflect the needs of industry?
4. Does it plan to strengthen industrial cooperation in all sectors and throughout the EU through a system of incentives?
5. Does it intend to establish an external economic action strategy that will forge partnerships with other parts of the world on projects of shared interest?
6. What is the situation with regard to the European passport for venture capital funds, which should help innovative SMEs to secure funding?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission
(17 May 2013)

1. The Commission has adopted in 2012 a Green Paper on restructuring ⁽¹⁾ and is currently considering how best to encourage observance of best practices.
2. The Commission has recently updated its industrial policy ⁽²⁾ focusing on four key areas: industrial innovation; access to markets; access to finance; human capital and skills.
3. The Commission agrees that policies aimed at job creation and tools to anticipate skills needs are necessary. The financing of European Sector Skills Councils aims to strengthen cooperation with education and training providers.
4. The Commission proposals for the next Multiannual Financial Framework notably aim at boosting industry's competitiveness, including through the Horizon 2020 programme for research and innovation and the COSME Programme.
5. EU trade policy is strengthening industries through various means: opening markets; trade diplomacy supporting EU interests; enforcing rights to secure non-discriminatory market access. The Commission also organises 'Missions for Growth' that help forge partnerships and business relations.

⁽¹⁾ 'Restructuring and anticipation of change: what lessons from recent experience?' (COM(2012)7 final of 17 January 2012), at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0007:FIN:EN:PDF>

⁽²⁾ 'A Stronger European Industry for Growth and Economic Recovery' (COM(2012) 582 final of 10 October 2012), at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0582:FIN:EN:PDF>

6. The European Venture Capital Funds Regulation has been formally approved in March 2013. The regulation should come into effect in the summer and will act as a voluntary EU-wide passport for VC fund managers and simplify cross-border fundraising.

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-002941/13
à la Commission
Marc Tarabella (S&D)
(14 mars 2013)

Objet: Investissement commun vers les technologies de demain

L'Europe est née d'une politique industrielle! Soixante ans après la Communauté européenne du charbon et de l'acier, pour retrouver l'audace des pères fondateurs, quels sont les plans et les perspectives imaginées par la Commission vers de nouveaux investissements communs, orientés cette fois vers les technologies-clés génériques — nanotechnologies, micro et nanoélectronique, matériaux avancés, biotechnologies — et les biens et services nouveaux qu'elles permettent de produire dans les secteurs des véhicules propres, de la construction durable, des réseaux intelligents et de l'espace?

Réponse donnée par M. Tajani au nom de la Commission
(8 mai 2013)

Les technologies clés génériques (TCG) ⁽¹⁾ constituent l'une des priorités de la Commission, comme celle-ci l'a indiqué dans sa communication sur la politique industrielle ⁽²⁾.

Afin d'encourager les investissements et conformément à sa communication sur les TCG ⁽³⁾, la Commission a accordé une attention particulière à la recherche et à l'innovation et à leur déploiement industriel dans les instruments stratégiques de l'Union européenne concernés (Horizon 2020, Fonds structurels, instruments financiers innovants avec le soutien de la Banque européenne d'investissement). La proposition de la Commission pour Horizon 2020 prévoit près de sept milliards d'euros pour les TCG au titre de l'objectif «Primauté dans le domaine des technologies génériques et industrielles» ⁽⁴⁾. Le financement combiné de projets est également encouragé ⁽⁵⁾.

La Commission mise sur le fort potentiel des TCG pour soutenir des domaines comme les transports propres, la construction durable et les réseaux intelligents ⁽⁶⁾.

Les partenariats public-privé (PPP) dans des domaines clés constituent un moyen efficace de relever les défis les plus exigeants pour l'industrie en matière de recherche et d'innovation.

Horizon 2020 s'appuiera sur les expériences des programmes antérieurs, comme le septième programme-cadre (7 PC) ou le programme pour l'innovation et la compétitivité (CIP), et pourra apporter un soutien supplémentaire aux entreprises communes, conformément à l'article 187 du traité. Parmi ces entreprises communes, figurent les initiatives concernant les piles à combustible et hydrogène (FCH), les transports aériens (Clean Sky), les médicaments innovants (IMI), les systèmes informatiques embarqués (Artemis) et la nanoélectronique (ENIAC).

D'autres PPP relevant du 7 PC pourraient bénéficier d'une aide supplémentaire, comme «Usines du futur», «Bâtiments économes en énergie», «Voitures vertes» et «Internet du futur». Dans le cadre du programme Horizon 2020, de nouveaux PPP pourront également voir le jour, par exemple dans le domaine des industries de transformation et de la photonique.

⁽¹⁾ Les TCG sont: les nanotechnologies, la microélectronique et la nanoélectronique, les matériaux avancés, la photonique, la biotechnologie industrielle et les systèmes de fabrication avancés.

⁽²⁾ «Une industrie européenne plus forte au service de la croissance et de la relance économique», COM(2012)582.

⁽³⁾ «Une stratégie européenne pour les technologies clés génériques — Une passerelle vers la croissance et l'emploi», COM(2012)341.

⁽⁴⁾ «Proposition de règlement du Parlement européen et du Conseil portant établissement du programme-cadre pour la recherche et l'innovation "Horizon 2020" (2014-2020)», COM(2011)809 final.

⁽⁵⁾ Grâce à Horizon 2020, aux Fonds structurels, aux prêts de la BEI et au secteur privé.

⁽⁶⁾ Auxquels il est fait référence dans la communication sur la politique industrielle et dans le plan d'action en faveur de l'éco-innovation — «L'innovation pour un avenir durable — Le plan d'action en faveur de l'éco-innovation (PAEI)», COM(2011)899 final.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002941/13
to the Commission**

Marc Tarabella (S&D)

(14 March 2013)

Subject: Joint investment in the technologies of tomorrow

Sixty years ago the founding fathers decided to take a new approach to industrial policy by establishing the European Coal and Steel Community. The Commission is no doubt keen to show that such vision is not a thing of the past. If so, what plans and ideas does it have for new joint investments, this time focusing on key enabling technologies — nanotechnology, microelectronics, nanoelectronics, advanced materials and biotechnology — and the new goods and services they can generate in sectors such as clean transport, sustainable construction, smart grids and space?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission

(8 May 2013)

Key Enabling Technologies (KETs) ⁽¹⁾ are one of the Commission's priorities as set out in its Industrial Policy Communication ⁽²⁾.

In order to favour investments and in line with its communication on KETs ⁽³⁾, the Commission has paid special attention to R&I and their industrial deployment in relevant EU policy instruments (Horizon 2020, structural funds, innovative financial instruments with the support of the European Investment Bank). The Commission's proposal for Horizon 2020 includes almost EUR 7 billion for KETs under 'Leadership in Enabling and Industrial Technologies' ⁽⁴⁾. The combined financing of projects is promoted ⁽⁵⁾.

The Commission counts on the strong potential that KETs have to support areas such as clean transport, sustainable construction and smart grids ⁽⁶⁾.

Public private partnerships (PPPs) in key areas are considered an effective vehicle to address the most demanding R&I challenges for industry.

Horizon 2020 will build on the experience from previous programmes such as FP7 or CIP (Competitiveness and Innovation Programme), and may provide further support to Joint Undertakings under Article 187 of the Treaty. This includes, e.g., Fuel Cells and Hydrogen (FCH), Clean sky, Innovative Medicines, Embedded computing systems (ARTEMIS) and Nano-electronics (ENIAC).

Other PPPs under FP7, for which further support may be provided are, e.g., Factories of the Future, Energy-efficient Buildings, the European Green Cars Initiative and Future Internet. New PPPs may also be launched under Horizon 2020, e.g., for the process industries and photonics.

⁽¹⁾ KETs are: nanotechnology, micro- and nano-electronics, advanced materials, photonics, industrial biotechnology, advanced manufacturing systems.

⁽²⁾ 'A Stronger European Industry for Growth and Economic Recovery', COM(2012) 582.

⁽³⁾ 'A European strategy for Key Enabling Technologies — A bridge to growth and jobs', COM(2012) 341.

⁽⁴⁾ 'Establishing Horizon 2020 — The framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2014-2020)', COM(2011) 809 final.

⁽⁵⁾ Through Horizon 2020, Structural Funds, EIB loans and the private sector.

⁽⁶⁾ Referred to in the Industrial Policy Communication and in the Eco-Innovation Action Plan — 'Innovation for a sustainable Future — The Eco-innovation Action Plan (Eco-AP)', COM(2011) 899 final.

(Versione italiana)

**Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002942/13
alla Commissione**

Cristiana Muscardini (ECR), Niccolò Rinaldi (ALDE), Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Tiziano Motti (PPE) e Andrea Zanoni (ALDE)
(14 marzo 2013)

Oggetto: Uso di psicofarmaci negli animali

In più occasioni le istituzioni europee si sono giustamente occupate del benessere degli animali, mentre vi è una sempre maggior presenza, nelle case dei cittadini europei, di animali d'affezione, da compagnia e di sostegno come i cani educati all'aiuto delle persone disabili o al loro salvataggio in caso di calamità.

Purtroppo però sta prendendo sempre più piede l'utilizzo di psicofarmaci destinati a un uso umano, che vengono spesso utilizzati per contenere «supposti» disturbi o patologie comportamentali, senza che spesso sia rispettato il protocollo secondo cui è prevista l'obbligatorietà di accertamenti che escludano eventuali patologie organiche attraverso specifici esami atti ad individuare appunto eventuali disfunzioni organiche.

L'utilizzo di tali psicofarmaci non può comunque contenere l'eventuale iperattività o aggressività dei cani nel lungo periodo a patto di non pensare ad una loro vita da «sedati» contraria alla naturale essenza di qualunque essere vivente: uno psicofarmaco comunque non educa il cane alla normale convivenza con gli esseri umani e con altri animali, ma nel tempo può essere gravemente nocivo per la salute.

Può la Commissione far sapere se:

1. è a conoscenza di questa pratica e, nel caso non lo fosse, intende informarsi del problema con un'indagine sia presso le case farmaceutiche sia presso i sistemi veterinari nazionali degli Stati membri;
2. intende intervenire per scoraggiare tale uso e vietarlo al di fuori di eventuali comprovate e temporanee necessità veterinarie?

Risposta di Tonio Borg a nome della Commissione
(30 aprile 2013)

La Commissione non è a conoscenza del tipo di abusi menzionati dagli onorevoli deputati.

Conformemente all'articolo 13 del trattato sul funzionamento dell'Unione europea ⁽¹⁾, si tiene conto del benessere degli animali soltanto negli ambiti in cui il trattamento degli animali possa interferire con certe politiche dell'UE ⁽²⁾, come quelle relative all'agricoltura o al mercato interno.

Pertanto, la questione rimane di competenza esclusiva degli Stati membri.

⁽¹⁾ GU C 83 del 30.3.2010, pag. 47.

⁽²⁾ Agricoltura, pesca, trasporti, mercato interno, ricerca e sviluppo tecnologico e spazio.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002942/13
to the Commission**

**Cristiana Muscardini (ECR), Niccolò Rinaldi (ALDE), Sonia Alfano (ALDE), Tiziano Motti (PPE)
and Andrea Zanoni (ALDE)**
(14 March 2013)

Subject: Use of psychotropic drugs on animals

On several occasions the European institutions have rightly concerned themselves with animal welfare, while European citizens have more and more pets and support animals such as dogs trained to help disabled people or to rescue them from accidents.

Unfortunately, however, ever-increasing use is being made of psychotropic drugs intended for human use, often to address supposed disorders or behavioural problems, but without compliance with the protocol requiring checks to rule out any organic pathologies by specific examinations carried out to precisely identify any organic problems.

However, the use of such psychotropic drugs over a long period to deal with cases of canine hyperactivity or aggressiveness cannot but make one think of them as living sedated lives, contrary to the nature of any living being; a psychotropic drug does not train a dog to live normally with human beings and other animals, but may over time be seriously harmful to its health.

1. Is the Commission aware of this practice, and if not, will it look into the issue by making inquiries either to the pharmaceutical companies or the national veterinary systems of the Member States?
2. Will the Commission intervene to discourage such use and ban it except in cases of confirmed and temporary veterinary need?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission
(30 April 2013)

The Commission is not aware of the type of abuses mentioned by the Honourable Member.

According to Article 13 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ⁽¹⁾, animal welfare is taken into consideration only in areas where the treatment of animals may interfere with some EU policies ⁽²⁾, like agriculture or internal market.

Therefore, this matter remains under the sole competence of the Member States.

⁽¹⁾ OJ C83, 30.3.2010, p. 47.

⁽²⁾ Agriculture, fisheries, transport, internal market, research and technological development and space policies.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002943/13
alla Commissione
Roberta Angelilli (PPE)
(14 marzo 2013)

Oggetto: Possibili finanziamenti per le imprese operanti nel settore dei trasporti su gomma, traslochi e depositi

Nel Comune di Civitavecchia è sorta nel 2010 un'impresa specializzata nei trasporti su gomma, traslochi su tutto il territorio nazionale e internazionali e spedizioni con container per destinazioni intercontinentali, nonché in numerosi altri servizi.

In seguito al consolidamento dell'attività, dell'esperienza e della clientela, tale impresa vorrebbe ampliare i propri servizi con la costruzione di un centro di stoccaggio merci adiacente allo scalo portuale di Civitavecchia (Roma), godendo così di una posizione strategica per il trasporto e lo stoccaggio delle merci. La realizzazione del progetto prevede l'acquisto di numerosi container, di un autocarro e di un carrello elevatore, l'allestimento di un deposito nei pressi del porto che possa ospitare almeno 100 contenitori e altresì di una struttura mobile utilizzabile anche come ufficio, all'interno della quale un addetto sarà impiegato a registrare la qualità, quantità e tipologia delle merci in deposito nonché le date di carico e scarico delle stesse merci.

Infine, il progetto prevede anche l'installazione di un impianto di videosorveglianza attivo 24h su 24h, che dovrà coprire l'intero raggio della proprietà ed essere dotato di accesso remoto, tramite un software gestionale, al fine di garantire la gestione a distanza di tutti i dati in tempo reale.

Premesso che servizi come quelli offerti da questa azienda non solo creano posti di lavoro ma contribuiscono a migliorare la competitività europea e il buon funzionamento della rete transeuropea del trasporto (TEN-T) che ha come obiettivo l'eliminazione delle strozzature, il rinnovo e miglioramento delle infrastrutture e lo snellimento delle operazioni transfrontaliere di trasporto per passeggeri e imprese, si chiede alla Commissione di rispondere alle seguenti domande:

1. Esistono finanziamenti per le imprese che operano nel settore dei trasporti, soprattutto nell'acquisto di beni materiali?
2. Esistono finanziamenti per l'acquisto di software gestionali?
3. È in grado di fornire un quadro generale della situazione?

Risposta di Siim Kallas a nome della Commissione
(14 maggio 2013)

Ai sensi dell'articolo 171, paragrafo 1, del TFUE ⁽¹⁾, il sostegno finanziario dell'UE può essere concesso solo a progetti di interesse comune individuati come tali dagli orientamenti dell'UE riguardanti gli obiettivi, le priorità e le linee principali delle azioni previste nel settore delle reti transeuropee. I centri di stoccaggio di merci non sono considerati una parte dell'infrastruttura TEN-T negli attuali orientamenti dell'UE per la TEN-T ⁽²⁾.

Il testo modificato degli orientamenti in materia di TEN-T ⁽³⁾, attualmente in corso di adozione da parte del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, comprende «l'infrastruttura necessaria per le operazioni di trasporto all'interno dell'area portuale», oltre ai terminal merci e alle piattaforme logistiche ⁽⁴⁾. Tuttavia, il progetto di centro di stoccaggio merci descritto dall'onorevole deputata non sembra rientrare in nessuna di queste due categorie di componenti dell'infrastruttura TEN-T.

Le spese di acquisto del software potrebbero beneficiare di un co-finanziamento dell'UE per le TEN-T solo se sono sostenute nell'ambito di un progetto di sviluppo dell'infrastruttura TEN-T e se il software è direttamente collegato allo sviluppo o al funzionamento della rispettiva infrastruttura TEN-T.

⁽¹⁾ Trattato sul funzionamento dell'Unione europea.

⁽²⁾ Decisione n. 661/2010/UE del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 7 luglio 2010, sugli orientamenti dell'Unione per lo sviluppo della rete transeuropea dei trasporti, G.U.L. 204 del 5.8.2010.

⁽³⁾ Proposta di regolamento del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio sugli orientamenti dell'Unione per lo sviluppo della rete transeuropea dei trasporti, COM(2011)650 definitivo.

⁽⁴⁾ Articolo 24, paragrafo 1, lettera c), e articolo 32, COM(2011)650.

In linea di principio, gli interventi a favore dello sviluppo economico delle imprese possono beneficiare di un co-finanziamento a titolo del Fondo europeo di sviluppo regionale, nel rispetto di determinate disposizioni stabilite nei regolamenti pertinenti dell'UE e nei programmi operativi.

Conformemente al principio della gestione condivisa applicato per l'amministrazione dei Fondi strutturali, la selezione e l'attuazione del progetto rientrano tuttavia fra le responsabilità delle autorità nazionali. Per ottenere maggiori informazioni sul tipo specifico di progetti che possono beneficiare di un co-finanziamento a titolo del programma, la Commissione invita pertanto l'onorevole deputata a contattare direttamente l'autorità di gestione del programma operativo regionale ⁷.

(⁷) Autorità di gestione del programma operativo regionale della Regione Lazio 2007-2013
Via R. R. Garibaldi, 7 00145 Roma - adgcomplazio@regione.lazio.it

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002943/13
to the Commission
Roberta Angelilli (PPE)
(14 March 2013)

Subject: Possible funding for companies active in the road transport, removals and warehousing sector

A company specialising in road transport, national and international removals and intercontinental container shipping, as well as in various other services, has been established in the municipality of Civitavecchia since 2010.

Following consolidation of its activities, experience and customer base, the company would like to expand its services by constructing a goods storage centre adjacent to the port of Civitavecchia (Rome), thus benefiting from a strategic position for the transport and storage of goods. Implementation of the project involves the purchase of a large number of containers and a lorry and a fork-lift truck, the fitting-out of a warehouse near the port, with the capacity to accommodate at least 100 containers, and a mobile structure that can also be used as an office, in which an employee will record the quality, quantity and type of goods stored and the dates of their loading and unloading.

Finally, the project also provides for the installation of a 24-hour video surveillance system, which must cover the entire property and will be equipped with remote access, using business software, in order to ensure remote management of all data in real time.

Given that services such as those offered by this company not only create jobs, but also help to improve Europe's competitiveness and the smooth operation of the trans-European transport network (TEN-T), the purpose of which is to eliminate bottlenecks, renew and improve infrastructure, and simplify cross-border transport for passengers and businesses:

1. Can the Commission say whether there is funding for companies active in the transport sector, particularly for the purchase of tangible fixed assets?
2. Is funding available for the purchase of business software?
3. Can the Commission provide an overall picture of the situation?

Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission
(14 May 2013)

According to Art. 171 (1) of TFEU ⁽¹⁾, EU financial support can be provided only to projects of common interest identified as such in EU guidelines covering the objectives, priorities and broad lines of measures envisaged in the sphere of trans-European networks. Goods storage centres are not considered as part of the TEN-T infrastructure in the current EU TEN-T Guidelines ⁽²⁾.

The revised text of the TEN-T Guidelines ⁽³⁾ currently in the process of adoption by the Parliament and the Council, includes 'the infrastructure necessary for transport operations within the port area', as well as freight terminals and logistic platforms ⁽⁴⁾. However, the planned goods storage centre as described by the Honourable Member does not appear to fit either of these two types of TEN-T infrastructure components.

Costs for software acquisition could be eligible for EU TEN-T co-funding only insofar as these costs are incurred as part of a TEN-T infrastructure development project and the software is directly linked to the development or operation of the respective TEN-T infrastructure.

Interventions to support the economic expansion of enterprises are in principle eligible for co-financing from the European Regional Development Fund, subject to specific provisions set in the relevant EU Regulations and in the Operational Programmes.

⁽¹⁾ Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

⁽²⁾ Decision No 661/2010/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2010 on Union guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network, OJ L 204, 5.8.2010.

⁽³⁾ Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Union guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network, COM(2011) 650 final.

⁽⁴⁾ Art. 24(1)(c) and Art. 32-32, COM(2011) 650.

In line with the shared management principle used for the administration of Structural Funds, project selection and implementation is, however, the responsibility of the national authorities. For more information on the specific type of projects eligible to co-financing under the Programme, the Commission therefore suggests that the Honourable Member contact directly the Managing Authority of the regional operational programme ^(¹).

⁽¹⁾ Autorità di gestione del programma operativo regionale della Regione Lazio 2007-2013 .
Via R. R. Garibaldi, 7 00145 Roma.
adgcomplazio@regione.lazio.it.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002944/13

alla Commissione

Roberta Angelilli (PPE)

(14 marzo 2013)

Oggetto: Possibili finanziamenti per la realizzazione di un centro di accoglienza per donne vittime di violenza

Nuovi Orizzonti è un'associazione senza fini di lucro che si batte da anni contro ogni forma di violenza, soprusi, maltrattamenti, stupri e mutilazioni genitali che le donne subiscono quotidianamente in ogni parte del mondo. Nella sua attività d'informazione, raccolta di testimonianze, assistenza alle denunce e ai vari aspetti legati, supporto in ospedale e lotta contro l'emarginazione sociale e la discriminazione razziale, tale associazione si avvale della collaborazione di professionisti quali psichiatri, psicologi, psicoterapeuti e avvocati. Dal lavoro svolto fino ad ora è nato il progetto GAD (Gruppo Autonomia Donne) che prevede la realizzazione in un'area industriale dismessa del Comune di Collegno (TO) di un grande centro di accoglienza per donne con o senza figli, vittime di violenza o in situazioni di disagio. Tale centro che potrà ospitare circa 900 persone potrebbe diventare un punto di riferimento nazionale per l'accoglienza di donne provenienti da tutto il territorio nazionale offrendo un luogo sicuro e tutelato, con percorsi di inserimento e di autonomia gestionale, permanenza temporanea e aiuti specifici come, ad esempio, un servizio terapeutico di supporto del rapporto madre/figlio volto a recuperare o rafforzare le capacità genitoriali.

Al contempo tale associazione si prefigge di costituire una banca dati nazionale con lo scopo di raccogliere statistiche sul fenomeno della violenza sulle donne e studiare strategie d'intervento mirate e più efficienti. Si vorrebbe, altresì, creare una unità di strada, composta da una mediatrice culturale, un'assistente sociale e volontari, al fine di informare le donne sulla prevenzione delle malattie sessualmente trasmissibili, come l'AIDS, e contro le gravidanze indesiderate.

Premesso ciò, può la Commissione far sapere se:

1. esistono finanziamenti finalizzati alla realizzazione del centro di accoglienza;
2. esistono progetti simili finanziati con i fondi comunitari e se sì, quali;
3. è in grado di fornire un quadro generale della situazione?

Risposta di Viviane Reding a nome della Commissione

(3 maggio 2013)

La Commissione è impegnata a dare una risposta politica forte per combattere tutte le forme di violenza contro le donne, come confermato dal programma di Stoccolma e dalla Strategia per la parità tra donne e uomini (2010-2015). Il programma Daphne III fornisce tuttavia un sostegno finanziario in questo settore per le misure «soft» (conferenze, campagne di sensibilizzazione, attività di formazione, ecc.) mediante sovvenzioni per progetti transnazionali, ossia progetti che coinvolgono almeno due organizzazioni di due Stati membri diversi.

Di conseguenza, la creazione di un centro di accoglienza in un sito industriale dismesso non può essere finanziata dal programma DAPHNE III per due motivi: da una parte, l'atto di base del programma non prevede il finanziamento di questo tipo di azioni e, dall'altra, poiché DAPHNE III riguarda solo i progetti transnazionali e il progetto in questione è strettamente nazionale, quest'ultimo non può beneficiare di un finanziamento.

Alla luce delle suddette limitazioni imposte da DAPHNE III, nessun altro progetto analogo è stato finanziato da questo programma.

Questo tipo di azione potrebbe essere finanziato mediante i fondi strutturali dell'UE, gestiti in maniera congiunta affidando i compiti di attuazione ai singoli Stati membri.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-002944/13
to the Commission
Roberta Angelilli (PPE)
(14 March 2013)

Subject: Possible funding for the creation of a refuge for women who are victims of violence

Nuovi Orizzonti is a non-profit association which has fought for years against all forms of violence, abuse, mistreatment, rape and genital mutilation which women around the world endure every day. The association's work involves raising awareness, gathering evidence, helping women report incidents and providing related support, visiting victims in hospital and fighting against social exclusion and racial discrimination. For this it relies on input from professionals such as psychiatrists, psychologists, psychotherapists and lawyers. A project called *Gruppo Autonomia Donne* (Women's Independence Group) has been set up on the basis of the association's work so far. This project intends to turn a disused industrial site in Collegno (Turin province) into a large refuge centre for women, with or without children, who are victims of violence or experiencing difficult situations. Such a centre, which could accommodate around 900 people, would become a national reference point, providing refuge for women from all over Italy. It would offer a safe haven and support, helping women to integrate and to manage their affairs independently as well as providing temporary accommodation and specific assistance, such as therapy focusing on the mother-child relationship and aimed at regaining or improving parenting skills.

In parallel, the association has decided to build a national database to collect statistics relating to violence against women, which it will use to develop targeted and more effective strategies for intervention. It would also like to create a mobile unit, made up of a female cultural mediator, a social worker and volunteers, which would go out on the streets to inform women about the prevention of sexually transmitted diseases (such as AIDS) and of unwanted pregnancy.

Given the above, could the Commission inform us whether:

1. there is funding available for the creation of the refuge centre;
2. similar projects have been funded using EU funding and if so, which;
3. it is able to give a general overview of the situation?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(3 May 2013)

The Commission is committed to a strong policy response to combat all forms of violence against women, as confirmed in the Stockholm Programme and the strategy for equality between women and men (2010-2015). The Daphne III Programme provides however financial support in this field for 'soft measures' actions (conferences, awareness raising campaign, training activities etc.) through grants awarded to transnational projects, i.e. projects involving at least two organisations from two different Member States.

Consequently, the creation of a refuge centre after rehabilitation of a disused industrial site cannot be funded under the DAPHNE III programme for two reasons: on one hand, the basic act of the programme does not allow to fund this type of actions and, on the other hand, as the project is strictly national and DAPHNE III is only open to transnational projects, it cannot receive a grant from this programme.

Therefore, taking into account the limitations of the DAPHNE III programme as mentioned above, no similar projects have been financed under the programme.

This type of action could be funded through EU structural funds, which are implemented under shared management where implementation tasks are delegated to Member States.

(Tekstas lietuvių kalba)

Klausimas, į kurį atsakoma raštu, Nr. E-002945/13

Komisijai

Rolandas Paksas (EFD)

(2013 m. kovo 14 d.)

Tema: Tiesioginių išmokų moduliacijos pereinamuoju laikotarpiu taikymas

Nuo šių metų Lietuvai, kaip ir kitoms naujosioms ES valstybėms narėms, pradėtas taikyti naujas išmokų skaičiavimo būdas. Pagal tiesioginių išmokų moduliaciją žemės ūkio subjektams, kurių bendra Europos Sąjungos ir nacionalinių išmokų už pieną, galvijus, žemės naudmenas ir kitos paramos suma viršija 5 000 EUR, šią sumą viršijanti paramos suma mažinama 10 % sumažinant nacionalinę išmoką. Ūkininkams, kurių išmokos viršija 300 000 EUR, finansavimas mažinamas 4 %.

Atkreiptinas dėmesys į tai, kad Lietuvos žemdirbiai konkuruoja su kitų ES valstybių ūkininkais vienoje produkcijos, darbo jėgos ir žemės ūkio žaliavų rinkoje. Tačiau Lietuvos žemdirbių gaunamos tiesioginės išmokos gerokai mažesnės už ES vidurkį, o gamybos sąnaudos beveik nesiskiria. Be to, nustatant pereinamąjį laikotarpį sudaromos nevienodos konkurencinės sąlygos.

Ar, Komisijos nuomone, gali būti taikoma moduliacija naujoms ES valstybėms narėms pereinamuoju laikotarpiu?

Ar nebus iškreiptos konkurencijos sąlygos ir pažeisti teisėti Lietuvos žemdirbių lūkesčiai?

D. Ciološo atsakymas Komisijos vardu

(2013 m. balandžio 30 d.)

Europos Parlamento ir Tarybos reglamentu (ES) Nr. 671/2012⁽¹⁾ buvo iš dalies pakeistas Tarybos reglamentas (EB) Nr. 73/2009⁽²⁾ ir įtraukta galimybė ES 10 valstybėms narėms, taikančioms vienkartinės išmokos už plotus schemą, 2013 m. skirti pereinamojo laikotarpio nacionalinę paramą pagal naują 133a straipsnį. Ta nuostata taip pat reikalaujama, kad pereinamojo laikotarpio nacionalinės paramos skyrimo sąlygos būtų tokios pačios, kokiomis leista išmokėti papildomas nacionalines tiesiogines išmokas (PNTI) 2012 m.

Pagal Tarybos reglamento (EB) Nr. 73/2009 121 straipsnį 2012 m. ES 10 valstybėse narėse tiesioginių išmokų lygis sudarė 90 proc. ES 15 valstybėse narėse taikomų tiesioginių išmokų lygio. Taikant Tarybos reglamento (EB) Nr. 73/2009 7 straipsnyje numatytą moduliavimą (t. y. visas ūkininkui skiriamų tiesioginių išmokų sumas, didesnes nei 5000 EUR, sumažinant 10 proc.), ES 15 valstybėse narėse tiesioginių išmokų, kurių sumos didesnės nei 5000 EUR, lygis taip pat sudarė 90 proc. taikomų tiesioginių išmokų lygio.

Todėl, pritaikius moduliavimą ir Tarybos reglamento (EB) Nr. 73/2009 132 straipsnio 2 dalyje numatytą mechanizmą, 2012 m. buvo būtinas tam tikras PNTI sumažinimas siekiant užtikrinti, kad tiesioginės paramos, kurią ūkininkas turi teisę gauti, lygis neviršytų ES 15 valstybių narių lygio. Kadangi pagal Tarybos reglamento (EB) Nr. 73/2009 133a straipsnį pereinamojo laikotarpio nacionalinės paramos skyrimo sąlygos turi būti tokios pačios, kokiomis leista išmokėti PNTI 2012 m., pateiktame klausime nurodytas paramos mažinimo mechanizmas turi būti taikomas ir pereinamojo laikotarpio nacionalinei paramai 2013 m.

Todėl pereinamojo laikotarpio nacionalinės paramos mažinimas 2013 m. yra grindžiamas ES teisės aktais ir nepažeidžia teisėtų galimybių apsaugos principo ar konkurencijos taisyklių.

⁽¹⁾ O L L 204, 2012 7 31.

⁽²⁾ O L L 30, 2009 1 31.

(English version)

**Question for written answer E-002945/13
to the Commission**

Rolandas Paksas (EFD)

(14 March 2013)

Subject: Application of the modulation of direct payments in the transitional period

The new method of calculating payments applies to Lithuania from this year onwards, as it does to the other new EU Member States. Under the modulation of direct payments, farmers who receive the total amount of European Union and national payments for milk, cattle, agricultural land and other support in excess of EUR 5 000, the amount of support exceeding this amount is reduced by 10% by reducing the national payment. Financing is reduced by 4% for farmers whose payments exceed EUR 300 000.

It should be noted that Lithuanian farmers compete with farmers from other Member States in production, labour and agricultural raw material markets. However, Lithuanian farmers receive direct payments that are significantly lower than the EU average, while there is virtually no difference in the cost of production. Furthermore, establishing a transitional period creates unequal conditions of competition.

In the Commission's opinion, can the modulation be applied to the new Member States during the transitional period?

Would this not distort the conditions of competition and infringe the legitimate expectations of Lithuanian farmers?

Answer given by Mr Ciołoş on behalf of the Commission

(30 April 2013)

Regulation (EU) No 671/2012⁽¹⁾ of the European Parliament and of the Council has amended Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009⁽²⁾ to include the possibility for EU-10 Member States applying the single area payment scheme to grant transitional national aid in 2013 under a new Article 133a. That provision also requires that the conditions for granting transitional national aid shall be identical to those authorised for the granting of complementary national direct payments (CNDPs) in 2012.

In 2012, in accordance with Article 121 of Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 the level of direct payments in EU-10 Member States was 90% of the level applicable in EU-15. Due to application of modulation provided in Article 7 of Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 (i.e. generally a 10% reduction for any amount of direct payments a farmer would receive in excess of EUR 5 000), the level of direct payments in the EU-15 for amounts above EUR 5 000 was also 90% of the level applicable.

As a consequence of modulation and the mechanism foreseen in Article 132(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009, a certain reduction of CNDPs was thus necessary in 2012 to ensure that the level of direct support a farmer would be entitled to receive would not exceed the EU-15 level. As the conditions for granting the transitional national aid shall, according to Article 133a of Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009, be identical to those authorised for the granting of CNDPs in 2012, the mechanism of reduction referred to in the question also needs to be applied to transitional national aid in 2013.

Therefore, reductions of the transitional national aid in 2013 follow from the EU legislation and do not infringe the principle of protection of legitimate expectations or competition rules.

⁽¹⁾ OJL 204, 31.7.2012.

⁽²⁾ OJL 30, 31.1.2009.