IV

(Informacje)

INFORMACJE INSTYTUCJI, ORGANÓW I JEDNOSTEK ORGANIZACYJNYCH UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ

PARLAMENT EUROPEJSKI

PYTANIA PISEMNE Z ODPOWIEDZIĄ

Pytania pisemne skierowane przez posłów do Parlamentu Europejskiego i odpowiedzi na te pytania udzielone przez instytucję Unii Europejskiej

(2013/C 371 E/01)

Treść **Strona**

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-001628/13
προς την Επιτροπή
Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)
(15 Φεβρουαρίου 2013)

Θέμα: Τουρκικές έρευνες σε Κυπριακή ΑΟΖ

Η Τουρκία, σε ναυπηγείο κοντά στην Κωνσταντινούπολη, ετοιμάζει το σεισμογραφικό Polarcus Samur, στοχεύοντας στη δημιουργία έντασης στην Κυπριακή ΑΟΖ. Θα προβεί σε εκτενείς έρευνες στα τεμάχια (4, 5, 6, 7, 8) ώστε να γνωρίζει η ίδια, ή οι συνεταίροι της, πού θα εγκαταστήσει πλατφόρμα για δημιουργία νέων τετελεσμένων.

1. Τι προτίθεται να πράξει η ΕΕ για να αποσοβήσει τον κίνδυνο δημιουργίας νέων αρνητικών τετελεσμένων στην περιοχή, τα οποία πιθανόν να θέσουν σε κίνδυνο την ειρήνη στην ευρύτερη γεωπολιτική περιοχή;

2. Με ποιο δικαίωμα και θράσος η Τουρκία παρεμβαίνει για έρευνες στην Κυπριακή ΑΟΖ;

Απάντηση του κ. Füle εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(9 Απριλίου 2013)

Η Επιτροπή παραπέμπει το Αξιότιμο Μέλος του Κοινοβουλίου στην απάντησή της στις προηγούμενες γραπτές ερωτήσεις E-001320/2013 και P-001325/2013 ([1]).

([1]) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html?tabType=wq#sidesForm

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001628/13
to the Commission
Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)
(15 February 2013)

Subject: Turkish exploration work in Cyprus's EEZ

In a shipyard near Istanbul, Turkey is fitting out the seismographic vessel Polarcus Samur in order to fuel tension in Cyprus's EEZ. It will carry out extensive exploration in plots 4, 5,6,7 and 8 to establish for itself or its partners where to build a platform to create new *faits accomplis*.

1. What will the EU do to avert the risk of creating new adverse *faits accomplis* in the region that could endanger peace in the wider geopolitical area?

2. What entitles Turkey brazenly to intervene and undertake exploration in Cyprus's EEZ?

Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission
(9 April 2013)

The Commission refers the Honourable Member to its answer to previous written questions E-001320/2013 and P-001325/2013 ([1]).

([1]) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html?tabType=wq#sidesForm

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-001629/13
προς το Συμβούλιο
Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)
(15 Φεβρουαρίου 2013)

Θέμα: Νέες προκλητικές Δηλώσεις του Τούρκου Πρωθυπουργού εναντίον της Κύπρου

Από της ιδρύσεως του κυπριακού κράτους με το δοτό Σύνταγμα της Ζυρίχης, η Τουρκία δεν έπαψε να επιδιώκει την κατάλυση και εξαφάνιση της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας.

Καταγγέλλω τις νέες ύβρεις και χαρακτηρισμούς από τον Τούρκο Πρωθυπουργό που έγιναν στο τουρκο-σλαβικό επιχειρηματικό φόρουμ στην Μπρατισλάβα, στην Ουγγαρία και αλλού, ότι τάχα: Δεν υπάρχει χώρα με το όνομα «Κυπριακή Δημοκρατία» παρά μόνο η Ελληνοκυπριακή «διοίκηση» όπως χαρακτήρισε την Κυπριακή Δημοκρατία και η υποτελής στην Άγκυρα «ΤΔΒΚ» ή το «τουρκικό κράτος της Κύπρου».

Και ερωτώ το Συμβούλιο:

1. Δικαιούται η Τουρκία να καθυβρίζει καθημερινά όχι μόνο την Κυπριακή Δημοκρατία αλλά και την ΕΕ στην οποία διεκδικεί θέση και αναγνώριση;

2. Δικαιούται η Τουρκία να θέλει την ΕΕ, «à la carte»;

3. Δικαιούται ο Τούρκος Υπουργός Εξωτερικών Νταβούτογλου στο γνωστό βιβλίο του «Στρατηγικό βάθος» να δηλώνει πως: «Ακόμα και ένας Τούρκος να βρισκόταν στην Κύπρο, η Τουρκία οφείλει να ενδιαφέρεται γι' αυτό το νησί, εξαιτίας της μεγάλης γεωπολιτικής, στρατηγικής και τώρα ενεργειακής αναβάθμισής της»;

4. Πώς προστατεύει η ΕΕ την ασφάλεια της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας από την αδηφάγο και επεκτατική πολιτική της κατοχικής Τουρκίας;

5. Πώς επιδεικνύει έμπρακτα την κοινοτική της αλληλεγγύη σε ένα κράτος-μέλος της που απειλείται διαρκώς από μια χώρα υπό ένταξη;

Απάντηση
(17 Ιουνίου 2013)

Το Συμβούλιο δεν έχει συζητήσει σχετικά με το συγκεκριμένο θέμα και δεν είναι αρμόδιο να σχολιάζει δημόσιες δηλώσεις πολιτικών προσωπικοτήτων.

Σε ό,τι αφορά τα ζητήματα που τέθηκαν με τις ερωτήσεις της αξιότιμης κυρίας βουλευτού, υπενθυμίζεται ότι η αναγνώριση όλων των κρατών μελών αποτελεί αναγκαία συνιστώσα της διαδικασίας ένταξης. Η ΕΕ υπογραμμίζει επομένως τη σημασία που αποδίδει στην ομαλοποίηση των διμερών σχέσεων μεταξύ της Τουρκίας και όλων των κρατών μελών το συντομότερο δυνατόν.

Η Ένωση έχει δηλώσει επανειλημμένα ότι στηρίζει τις τρέχουσες διαπραγματεύσεις στην Κύπρο που αποσκοπούν σε μια δίκαιη, συνολική και βιώσιμη διευθέτηση του κυπριακού στο πλαίσιο του ΟΗΕ, σύμφωνα με τις σχετικές αποφάσεις του Συμβουλίου Ασφαλείας του ΟΗΕ και τις αρχές επί των οποίων εδράζεται η Ένωση. Μια δίκαιη και βιώσιμη διευθέτηση θα συμβάλει στην ειρήνη, τη σταθερότητα και τις αρμονικές σχέσεις στην περιοχή.

Όπως αναφέρεται σε πολλά συμπεράσματα του Συμβουλίου, πλέον πρόσφατα δε στις 11 Δεκεμβρίου 2012, το Συμβούλιο αναμένει ότι η Τουρκία θα υποστηρίξει ενεργά τις τρέχουσες διαπραγματεύσεις που αποσκοπούν στη διευθέτηση αυτή. Η δέσμευση της Τουρκίας για μια συνολική διευθέτηση και η συγκεκριμένη συμβολή της σε αυτήν έχει καίρια σημασία.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001629/13
to the Council
Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)
(15 February 2013)

Subject: More provocative statements made by the Turkish Prime Minister about Cyprus

Since the foundation of the state of Cyprus with the Zurich Constitution which was imposed on the country, Turkey has relentlessly sought the dissolution and demise of the Republic of Cyprus.

I should like to protest about the new insults and disparaging remarks made about Cyprus by the Turkish Prime Minister at a Turkish-Slav Business Forum in Bratislava, as well as in Hungary and elsewhere. He said that there was no such country as the 'Republic of Cyprus', only a Greek Cypriot 'administration', as he described the Republic of Cyprus, and the 'TRNC' or 'Turkish State of Cyprus' (which is dependent on Ankara).

In view of the above, will the Council say:

1. Is Turkey entitled, virtually on a daily basis, to heap insults not only on the Republic of Cyprus but also on the EU, which it wishes join and from which it wants recognition?

2. Is Turkey entitled to seek an '*à la carte*' EU?

3. Is Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu entitled to state, as he does in his well-known book 'Strategic Depth', that even if there was only one single Turk in Cyprus, Turkey would have to take an interest in this island, because of its rapidly growing importance from a geopolitical, strategic and now energy point of view?

4. How is the EU protecting the security of the Republic of Cyprus from the voracious and expansionist policy of Turkey, which is occupying part of the country?

5. How is it demonstrating practical Community solidarity with a Member State which is constantly being threatened by a candidate country?

Reply
(17 June 2013)

This specific matter has not been discussed by the Council, and it is not for the Council to comment on public statements made by political figures.

With regard to the issues raised in the Honourable Member's questions, it is recalled that recognition of all Member States is a necessary component of the accession process. Accordingly, the EU has underlined the importance it attaches to the normalisation of relations between Turkey and all EU Member States, as soon as possible.

The Union has repeatedly expressed its support for the ongoing negotiations in Cyprus aimed at a fair, comprehensive and viable settlement of the Cyprus problem within the UN framework, in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and in line with the principles on which the Union is founded. A just and lasting settlement will contribute to peace, stability and harmonious relations in the region.

The Council, as stated in several Council conclusions, most recently on 11 December 2012, expects Turkey to actively support the ongoing negotiations aimed at such a settlement. Turkey's commitment and contribution in concrete terms to such a comprehensive settlement is crucial.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-001630/13
προς την Επιτροπή
Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)
(15 Φεβρουαρίου 2013)

Θέμα: Νέες προκλητικές Δηλώσεις του Τούρκου Πρωθυπουργού εναντίον της Κύπρου

Από της ιδρύσεως του κυπριακού κράτους με το δοτό Σύνταγμα της Ζυρίχης, η Τουρκία δεν έπαψε να επιδιώκει την κατάλυση και εξαφάνιση της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας.

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Και ερωτώ την Επιτροπή:

1. Δικαιούται η Τουρκία να καθυβρίζει καθημερινά όχι μόνο την Κυπριακή Δημοκρατία αλλά και την ΕΕ στην οποία διεκδικεί θέση και αναγνώριση;

2. Δικαιούται η Τουρκία να θέλει την ΕΕ, «à la carte»;

3. Δικαιούται ο Τούρκος Υπουργός Εξωτερικών Νταβούτογλου στο γνωστό βιβλίο του «Στρατηγικό βάθος» να δηλώνει πως: «Ακόμα και ένας Τούρκος να βρισκόταν στην Κύπρο, η Τουρκία οφείλει να ενδιαφέρεται γι' αυτό το νησί, εξαιτίας της μεγάλης γεωπολιτικής, στρατηγικής και τώρα ενεργειακής αναβάθμισής της»;

4. Πώς προστατεύει η ΕΕ την ασφάλεια της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας από την αδηφάγο και επεκτατική πολιτική της κατοχικής Τουρκίας;

5. Πώς επιδεικνύει έμπρακτα την κοινοτική της αλληλεγγύη σε ένα κράτος-μέλος της που απειλείται διαρκώς από μια χώρα υπό ένταξη;

Απάντηση του κ. Füle εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(26 Μαρτίου 2013)

Η Επιτροπή εφιστά την προσοχή του Αξιότιμου Μέλους στα συμπεράσματα του Συμβουλίου της 10ης Δεκεμβρίου 2012 τα οποία αναφέρουν ότι η Ένωση εξέφρασε εκ νέου σοβαρές ανησυχίες και κάλεσε την Τουρκία να αποφύγει κάθε είδους απειλή ή ενέργεια κατά κράτους μέλους, ή κάθε πηγή προστριβών ή ενεργειών που θα μπορούσαν να βλάψουν τις σχέσεις καλής γειτονίας και την ειρηνική διευθέτηση των διαφορών.

Τα συμπεράσματα του Συμβουλίου αναφέρουν επίσης πως η Τουρκία δυστυχώς δεν έχει προχωρήσει στην απαραίτητη εξομάλυνση των σχέσεών της με την Κυπριακή Δημοκρατία, και πως το Συμβούλιο προσδοκά την ενεργή συμμετοχή της Τουρκίας στις διεξαγόμενες διαπραγματεύσεις που στοχεύουν σε μια δίκαιη, συνολική και βιώσιμη διευθέτηση του κυπριακού προβλήματος στο πλαίσιο των ΗΕ, σύμφωνα με τις σχετικές αποφάσεις του Συμβουλίου Ασφαλείας των ΗΕ και σύμφωνα με τις αρχές επί των οποίων εδράζεται η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση. Η δέσμευση της Τουρκίας και η συμβολή της με συγκεκριμένες ενέργειες στη συνολική αυτή διευθέτηση είναι ζωτικής σημασίας.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001630/13
to the Commission
Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)
(15 February 2013)

Subject: More provocative statements made by Turkish Prime Minister about Cyprus

Since the foundation of the state of Cyprus with the Zurich Constitution which was imposed on the country, Turkey has relentlessly sought the dissolution and demise of the Republic of Cyprus.

I should like to protest about the new insults and disparaging remarks made about Cyprus by the Turkish Prime Minister at a Turkish-Slav Business Forum in Bratislava, as well as in Hungary and elsewhere. He said that there was no such country as the 'Republic of Cyprus', only a Greek Cypriot 'administration', as he described the Republic of Cyprus, and the 'TRNC' or 'Turkish State of Cyprus' (which is dependent on Ankara).

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

1. Is Turkey entitled, virtually on a daily basis, to heap insults not only on the Republic of Cyprus but also on the EU, which it wishes join and from which it wants recognition?

2. Is Turkey entitled to seek an '*à la carte*' EU?

3. Is Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu entitled to state, as he does in his well-known book 'Strategic Depth', that even if there was only one single Turk in Cyprus, Turkey would have to take an interest in this island, because of its rapidly growing importance from a geopolitical, strategic and now energy point of view?

4. How is the EU protecting the security of the Republic of Cyprus from the voracious and expansionist policy of Turkey, which is occupying part of the country?

5. How is it demonstrating practical Community solidarity with a Member State which is constantly being threatened by a candidate country?

Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission
(26 March 2013)

The Commission draws the attention of the Honourable Member to the Council conclusions of 10 December 2012 which state that the Union expresses once again serious concern, and urges Turkey to avoid any kind of threat or action directed against a Member State, or source of friction or actions, which could damage good neighbourly relations and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

The Council conclusions also state that Turkey has regretfully still not made progress towards the necessary normalisation of its relations with the Republic of Cyprus, and that the Council expects Turkey to actively support the ongoing negotiations aimed at a fair, comprehensive and viable settlement of the Cyprus problem within the UN framework, in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and in line with the principles on which the Union is founded. Turkey's commitment and contribution in concrete terms to such a comprehensive settlement is crucial.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001631/13
to the Commission
Chris Davies (ALDE)
(15 February 2013)

Subject: Marine conservation around Gibraltar

With regard to the area up to 5 km from and around the coast of Gibraltar:

1. Which Member State(s) is/are legally responsible for supervision and control of fishing activities?

2. Which Member State(s) is/are legally responsible for activities affecting the seabed?

3. Are any Natura 2000 sites located within the area and, if so, which Member State(s) is/are responsible for their management and protection?

Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission
(3 April 2013)

The Commission is not in a position to comment on the legal responsibilities of Member States in the area in question, as jurisdictional issues concerning these marine waters are a matter for Member States to address in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Additionally, the Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answer to written questions E-3840/2009, E-4972/2009, E-7777/2011 and E-4503/2012.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001632/13
to the Commission
Chris Davies (ALDE)
(15 February 2013)

Subject: Carbon capture and storage projects

The NER300 funding mechanism was intended to be the principal means by which the European Union would support the development of carbon capture and storage demonstration projects, but phase one of the selection process proved a complete failure in this respect.

Will the Commission confirm that, since its decision was announced, it has spoken with all the phase one applicants, many of whom have spent considerable financial sums on developing projects, in order to assess the reasons why they were unable to proceed and seek advice as to what changes must be made if failure is not to be repeated?

Answer given by Ms Hedegaard on behalf of the Commission
(11 April 2013)

1. The Commission has not been in direct contact with NER300 applicants as the official interlocutors in the NER300 programme are the Member States and not the Project Sponsors. However, the Commission has interacted with stakeholder groups such as the Zero Emission Platform.

2. From such interactions, and from the feedback which the Commission has sought from the Member States, we can conclude that in the first NER300 call for proposals high quality applications were received for CCS projects. In fact, the projects that passed the due diligence assessment covered entirely the requirements of the CCS portfolio but they failed at the confirmation stage. Reasons put forward by Member States include funding gaps in public and private contribution, delays in permitting procedures, insufficient maturity and unsynchronised timing of respective national competitions. The second call for proposals will present a new opportunity for CCS demonstration projects. Member States and Project sponsors are therefore being encouraged to swiftly resolve all existing problems with a view to a more successful outcome for CCS projects in the second call for proposals.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-001633/13
προς το Συμβούλιο
Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)
(15 Φεβρουαρίου 2013)

Θέμα: Παραβίαση του FIR (Περιοχή Πληροφοριών Πτήσεως) Λευκωσίας από τουρκικά μαχητικά F16

Τη Δευτέρα 28 Ιανουαρίου 2013, δύο τουρκικά μαχητικά F16 προσέγγισαν δύο διαφορετικά αεροσκάφη από τα Ηνωμένα Αραβικά Εμιράτα (ΗΑΕ) και τους ζήτησαν να συμμορφωθούν στις εντολές του παράνομου κέντρου ελέγχου εναέριας κυκλοφορίας του κατεχόμενου χωριού της Τύμπου στην Κύπρο. Τα αεροσκάφη των ΗΑΕ εισήλθαν στον κυρίαρχο εναέριο χώρο της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας από μια περιοχή πάνω από την κατεχόμενη πόλη της Αμμοχώστου σε πλήρη συνεννόηση με τους ελεγκτές εναέριας κυκλοφορίας της Περιοχής Πληροφοριών Πτήσεως (FIR) της Λευκωσίας. Το κέντρο ελέγχου του παράνομου τουρκοκυπριακού αεροδρομίου της Τύμπου παρενέβη επανειλημμένως διαβιβάζοντας μηνύματα που ζητούσαν από τον κυβερνήτη του αεροσκάφους των ΗΑΕ να επικοινωνεί με αυτούς με τις συχνότητες εκτάκτου ανάγκης.

Ο κυβερνήτης αρνήθηκε να υπακούσει στις εντολές του παράνομου κέντρου ελέγχου της Τύμπου, οι οποίες έρχονταν σε αντίθεση με αυτές που εξέδωσαν οι επίσημοι ελεγκτές εναέριας κυκλοφορίας της Δημοκρατίας της Κύπρου, οι οποίοι έδωσαν σαφείς οδηγίες που ανταποκρίνονταν πλήρως στα εγχειρίδια του Διεθνούς Οργανισμού Πολιτικής Αεροπορίας.

Μετά την άρνηση του κυβερνήτη να ακολουθήσει τις αντιφατικές οδηγίες, δύο τουρκικά μαχητικά αεροσκάφη F16 προσέγγισαν το αεροσκάφος των ΗΑΕ και πέταξαν από πάνω του, αφήνοντας μια απόσταση μόλις 300 ποδών μεταξύ των αεροσκαφών. Η ταχύτητα, το ύψος και η πορεία του Boeing 777-300 των ΗΑΕ παρέμειναν αμετάβλητα.

Σύμφωνα με τη διαδικασίες καταγραφής συμβάντος στα αεροσκάφη των ΗΑΕ, ο κυβερνήτης συνέταξε γραπτή έκθεση των συμβάντων μετά την προσγείωση της πτήσης.

Δεδομένου ότι παρόμοιες παραβιάσεις του FIR Λευκωσίας της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας από τουρκικά μαχητικά αεροσκάφη αποτελούν σύνηθες συμβάν, ερωτάται το Συμβούλιο:

1. Ποια είναι η άποψή του για αυτές τις παραβιάσεις από τις τουρκικές δυνάμεις κατοχής στην Κύπρο, οι οποίες θέτουν σε κίνδυνο την ασφάλεια εκατοντάδων πτήσεων που περνούν από το FIR Λευκωσίας σε καθημερινή βάση;

2. Θα εξακολουθήσει η ΕΕ να αγνοεί ανεύθυνες και επικίνδυνες ενέργειες, όπως αυτή που διέπραξε ένα υποψήφιο μέλος κατά ενός κράτους μέλους;

Απάντηση
(15 Μαΐου 2013)

Το Συμβούλιο δεν έχει συζητήσει τα συγκεκριμένα θέματα που θίγει η αξιότιμη κ. βουλευτής.

Σε γενικότερο επίπεδο, στη θέση που υιοθέτησε στις 22 Ιουνίου 2012, ενόψει της 50ής συνόδου του Συμβουλίου Σύνδεσης με την Τουρκία, το Συμβούλιο επανέλαβε την επείγουσα ανάγκη να αντιμετωπιστεί ο κίνδυνος για την ασφάλεια της περιοχής της νοτιοανατολικής Μεσογείου. Το Συμβούλιο εν προκειμένω προσέθετε ότι η απουσία επικοινωνίας μεταξύ των κέντρων ελέγχου εναέριας κυκλοφορίας της Τουρκίας και της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας ενέχει σοβαρούς κινδύνους για την ασφάλεια των αεροπορικών μεταφορών. Στο πλαίσιο αυτό, υπενθύμισε ότι θα πρέπει να εξευρεθεί κατεπειγόντως επιχειρησιακή λύση σύμφωνη με το ισχύον διεθνές δίκαιο, περιλαμβανομένης και της σύμβασης του Σικάγου.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001633/13
to the Council
Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)
(15 February 2013)

Subject: Turkish F16 fighter planes violate Nicosia Flight Information Region

On Monday, 28 January 2013 two Turkish F16 fighter planes approached two different aircraft from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and asked them to obey commands from the illegal air traffic control centre in the occupied village of Tymvou, Cyprus. The UAE aircraft entered the sovereign airspace of the Republic of Cyprus from an area above the occupied city of Famagusta in full consultation with the Nicosia Flight Information Region (FIR) air traffic controllers. The control centre in the illegal Turkish/Cypriot Tymvou airport repeatedly intervened by transmitting messages asking the UAE captain to communicate with them over the emergency frequencies.

The captain refused to obey the instructions from the illegal Tymvou control centre, which contradicted those issued by the Republic of Cyprus's official air traffic controllers, who gave clear directions that were in full compliance with the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) manuals.

Following the captain's refusal to follow the contradictory instructions, two Turkish F16 fighter aeroplanes approached the UAE aircraft and flew above it, leaving a distance of only 300 feet or less between the aircraft. The UAE Boeing 777-300's speed, altitude and course remained unchanged.

Following UAE aircraft incident procedures, the captain wrote a written report of the events after the flight had landed.

Given that similar violations of the Republic of Cyprus's Nicosia FIR by Turkish fighter aircraft are a regular occurrence, the Council is asked to answer the following:

1. What is its view of such violations by the Turkish occupying forces in Cyprus, which jeopardise the safety of hundreds of flights that pass through the Nicosia FIR on a daily basis?

2. Will the EU continue to ignore irresponsible and dangerous acts such as this committed by a prospective member against a Member State?

Reply
(15 May 2013)

The Council has not discussed the specific issues raised by the Honourable Member.

On a more general level, the Council, in its position adopted on 22 June 2012, in view of the 50th meeting of the Association Council with Turkey, reiterated the urgent need to address the safety risk in the South-East Mediterranean region. The Council added that the absence of communication between air control centres in Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus was seriously compromising air safety. In this context it recalled that an operational solution in line with applicable international law, including the Chicago Convention, should be found urgently.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-001634/13
προς την Επιτροπή
Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)
(15 Φεβρουαρίου 2013)

Θέμα: Τουρκικά μαχητικά αεροσκάφη F16 παραβιάζουν την περιοχή πληροφοριών πτήσης Λευκωσίας

Τη Δευτέρα 28 Ιανουαρίου 2013 δύο τουρκικά αερομαχητικά F16 προσέγγισαν αεροσκάφος από τα Ηνωμένα Αραβικά Εμιράτα (ΗΑΕ) και ζήτησαν από τον κυβερνήτη του να υπακούσει στις εντολές του παράνομου κέντρου ελέγχου εναέριας κυκλοφορίας στο κατεχόμενο χωριό Τύμβου της Κύπρου. Το αεροσκάφος των ΗΑΕ είχε εισέλθει στον εθνικό εναέριο χώρο της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας από περιοχή πάνω από την κατεχόμενη πόλη της Αμμοχώστου σε πλήρη συνεννόηση με τους ελεγκτές εναέριας κυκλοφορίας της περιοχής πληροφοριών πτήσης (FIR) Λευκωσίας. Το κέντρο ελέγχου στο παράνομο τουρκοκυπριακό αεροδρόμιο Τύμβου παρενέβαλλε επανειλημμένως μηνύματα με τα οποία ζητούσε από τον κυβερνήτη του αεροσκάφους των ΗΑΕ να επικοινωνήσει μαζί του μέσω των συχνοτήτων έκτακτης ανάγκης.

Ο κυβερνήτης αρνήθηκε να υπακούσει στις οδηγίες από το παράνομο κέντρο ελέγχου Τύμβου, που αντιτίθεντο στις οδηγίες των επίσημων ελεγκτών εναέριας κυκλοφορίας της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας, οι οποίες ήσαν σαφείς και συμφωνούσαν πλήρως με τα εγχειρίδια του Διεθνούς Οργανισμού Πολιτικής Αεροπορίας (ICAO).

Μετά την άρνηση του κυβερνήτη να ακολουθήσει τις αντιφατικές οδηγίες, δύο τουρκικά αερομαχητικά F16 προσέγγισαν το αεροσκάφος των ΗΑΕ, πετώντας σε ύψος όχι μεγαλύτερο των 300 ποδιών πάνω από αυτό. Η ταχύτητα, το ύψος και η πορεία του Boeing 777-300 παρέμειναν σταθερά.

Σύμφωνα με τις προβλεπόμενες διαδικασίες, ο κυβερνήτης συνέταξε αναφορά των γεγονότων μετά την προσγείωση του αεροσκάφους.

Με δεδομένο ότι παρόμοιες παραβιάσεις του FIR Λευκωσίας στην Κυπριακή Δημοκρατία από τουρκικά μαχητικά αεροσκάφη είναι τακτικό φαινόμενο, ζητείται από την Επιτροπή να απαντήσει στα ακόλουθα:

1. Ποια είναι η άποψή της σχετικά με αυτές τις παραβιάσεις εκ μέρους των τουρκικώνδυνάμεων κατοχής στην Κύπρο, οι οποίες θέτουν σε κίνδυνο την ασφάλεια εκατοντάδωνπτήσεων που περνούν καθημερινά από το FIR Λευκωσίας;

2. Θα εξακολουθήσει η ΕΕ να αγνοεί ανεύθυνες και επικίνδυνες ενέργειες όπως αυτή, τις οποίες διαπράττει εις βάρος κράτους μέλους ένα κράτος που προσδοκεί να γίνει κι αυτό μέλος της ΕΕ;

Απάντηση του κ. Füle εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(5 Απριλίου 2013)

Η Επιτροπή παραπέμπει την προσοχή του Αξιότιμου Μέλους στη θέση που έλαβε η ΕΕ κατά την 50ή σύνοδο του Συμβουλίου Σύνδεσης ΕΕ-Τουρκίας στις 22 Ιουνίου 2012 όπου επαναλαμβάνεται ότι είναι επιτακτική ανάγκη να αντιμετωπιστεί ο κίνδυνος για την ασφάλεια της περιοχής της νοτιοανατολικής Μεσογείου. Η απουσία επικοινωνίας μεταξύ των κέντρων ελέγχου εναέριας κυκλοφορίας της Τουρκίας και της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας ενέχει σοβαρούς κινδύνους για την εναέρια ασφάλεια. Εν προκειμένω, πρέπει να βρεθεί επειγόντως μια λειτουργική λύση.

Επιπλέον, η Επιτροπή παραπέμπει στα συμπεράσματα του Συμβουλίου της 10ης Δεκεμβρίου 2012 που καλούν τη Τουρκία να αποφύγει κάθε είδους απειλή ή ενέργεια κατά κράτους μέλους, ή κάθε πηγή προστριβών ή ενέργειες, που θα μπορούσαν να βλάψουν τις σχέσεις καλής γειτονίας και την ειρηνική διευθέτηση τυχόν διαφορών.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001634/13
to the Commission
Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)
(15 February 2013)

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2. Will the EU continue to ignore irresponsible and dangerous acts such as this committed by a prospective member against a Member State?

Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission
(5 April 2013)

The Commission draws the attention of the Honourable member to the EU's position at the 50th meeting of the EU-Turkey Association Council on 22 June 2012 which reiterates the urgent need to address the safety risk in the South-East Mediterranean region. The absence of communication between air control centres in Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus is seriously compromising air safety. In this context, an operational solution should be found urgently.

Furthermore, the Commission refers to the Council conclusions of 10 December 2012 which urge Turkey to avoid any kind of threat or action directed against a Member State, or source of friction or actions, which could damage good neighbourly relations and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001635/13
to the Commission
Charles Tannock (ECR)
(15 February 2013)

Subject: Alleged excessive noise and air pollution around London's Heathrow airport

A constituent who resides in south-west London has complained to me about the levels of noise and pollution caused by air transport activities at Heathrow airport.

She has specifically asked whether or not the current levels of air quality and noise pollution, which she believes to be too high in her local area, are in breach of the relevant EU directives protecting the environment and the health and safety of Union citizens.

Could the Commission confirm that EU-wide legislation concerning these matters is in force, and provide information on what stage of the codecision procedure any new or proposed legislation has reached? Which authorities are responsible for monitoring compliance with and enforcing the relevant EU directives on a national, regional or local level in the UK?

Has the Commission raised these matters or similar concerns over air quality and noise levels around Heathrow with the UK Government, the Greater London Authority or any other UK regulatory body, and what, if any, steps to enforce EU directives have been considered or taken?

This issue is not only relevant given the effects that noise and air pollution are having on residents, but also in the light of the public debate on whether to increase air traffic at Heathrow by building a third runway or, alternatively, to invest in a new hub airport at a different location further east of London, such as Stansted or the Thames Estuary.

Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission
(4 April 2013)

The Ambient Air Quality legislation consists of Directive 2008/50/EC ([1]) and Directive 2004/107/EC ([2]) (the 'Directives') that are already in force. The Commission has launched a comprehensive review of the EU air quality policies to be completed in 2013 ([3]).

According to the directives establishment of zones and agglomerations for the purpose of air quality assessment and management is an obligation of Member States. Since Heathrow was not designated by the United Kingdom as a separate zone, but was part of the zone UK0001 Greater London Urban Area, the Commission has raised issues concerning the whole zone without invoking matters regarding Heathrow in particular.

The Environmental Noise Directive 2002/49/EC ([4]) addresses the assessment and management of environmental noise. Concerning noise limits, there are currently no ambient noise limits in force at European level, and national authorities are instead responsible. Concerning Heathrow airport, the UK authorities produced an action plan and two noise maps (one referred to the year 2006 and one to the 2011). According to these documents the number of people exposed to environmental noise between 2006 and 2011 has not changed.

According to the directives, the UK nominated the Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) as the competent authority responsible for both air quality and noise.

([1]) OJ L 152. 11.6.2008,.
([2]) OJ L 23. 26.1.2005.
([3]) http://ec.europa.eu/environment/air/review_air_policy.htm
([4]) OJ L 189 18.7.2002.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-001636/13
προς την Επιτροπή
Anni Podimata (S&D) και Elisa Ferreira (S&D)
(15 Φεβρουαρίου 2013)

Θέμα: Ένταξη των χωρών που τελούν υπό προγράμματα προσαρμογής στη διαδικασία Ευρωπαϊκού Εξαμήνου

Το Ευρωπαϊκό Εξάμηνο αποτελεί μια ουσιαστική διαδικασία διαλόγου και διάδρασης σε όλα τα επίπεδα διακυβέρνησης μεταξύ των κρατών μελών της ΕΕ, καθώς και στο εσωτερικό τους. Το Ευρωπαϊκό Εξάμηνο προάγει τη δημοκρατική νομιμότητα, τη διαφάνεια, τον έλεγχο και τη λογοδοσία των κρατικών και ευρωπαϊκών οικονομικών πολιτικών. Παράλληλα, ενισχύει τη λογοδοσία σε σχέση με την αποτελεσματικότητα των συστάσεων και των πολιτικών που εγκρίνονται και εφαρμόζονται, καθώς και σε σχέση με τη συμβατότητά τους με τις πολιτικές και τους στόχους της ΕΕ.

Δυστυχώς η διαδικασία δεν περιλαμβάνει τις χώρες που τελούν υπό προγράμματα προσαρμογής που εφαρμόζονται με χρηματοδοτική στήριξη της ΕΕ και του ΔΝΤ. Η εξαίρεση αυτή συνιστά σαφή διάκριση μεταξύ των κρατών μελών και καθιστά τη διαδικασία άνιση, καθώς δεν υπάρχει δυνατότητα δημοκρατικού διαλόγου και ελέγχου όσον αφορά τις συστάσεις της Τρόικα, τα μέτρα που λαμβάνονται και τα αποτελέσματα των κρατικών πολιτικών.

Η μόνη σύσταση, ουσιαστικά, προς τις χώρες αυτές στο πλαίσιο του Ευρωπαϊκού Εξαμήνου είναι να εφαρμόσουν το πρόγραμμα προσαρμογής τους. Το γεγονός αυτό ενισχύει την άποψη των πολιτών και των κοινοβουλίων, ότι οι πολιτικές που εφαρμόζονται στο πλαίσιο των προγραμμάτων προσαρμογής «επιβάλλονται» ή «υπαγορεύονται» από την Τρόικα με ελάχιστο δημοκρατικό διάλογο και ότι εφαρμόζονται υπό καθεστώς πίεσης, καθώς συχνά η λήψη μιας καθυστερημένης δόσης του δανείου εξαρτάται από την έγκριση των πολιτικών αυτών.

Με βάση τα παραπάνω, η Επιτροπή καλείται να απαντήσει στα ακόλουθα ερωτήματα.

Σκοπεύει να προτείνει τη συμπερίληψη των κρατών μελών που τελούν υπό προγράμματα προσαρμογής στο Ευρωπαϊκό Εξάμηνο;

Σκοπεύει να προβεί σε ανάλυση και να υποβάλει συστάσεις με βάση την ετήσια επισκόπηση της ανάπτυξης και τη διαδικασία μακροοικονομικών ανισορροπιών 2013;

Απάντηση του κ. Rehn εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(20 Μαρτίου 2013)

Τα κράτη μέλη που λαμβάνουν χρηματοδοτική ενίσχυση στο πλαίσιο προγράμματος οικονομικής προσαρμογής δεν εξαιρούνται από τη συνήθη διαδικασία συντονισμού των οικονομικών πολιτικών τους στο πλαίσιο του Συμβουλίου. Το Συμβούλιο απευθύνει στα εν λόγω κράτη μέλη συγκεκριμένες συστάσεις είτε στο πλαίσιο του κανονισμού EFSM ([1]) είτε απευθείας βάσει του άρθρου 136 ([2]).

Τα προγράμματα προσαρμογής που εγκρίνονται οφείλουν να είναι απολύτως σύμφωνα με τους προσανατολισμούς που έχουν αποφασιστεί στο επίπεδο της Ένωσης.

Υπό τις συνθήκες αυτές, για τα κράτη μέλη που λαμβάνουν χρηματοδοτική ενίσχυση, οι συστάσεις που διατυπώνονται στο πλαίσιο του Ευρωπαϊκού Εξαμήνου συμπίπτουν αναπόφευκτα με τους όρους πολιτικής των προγραμμάτων προσαρμογής. Η Επιτροπή παρακολουθεί και άλλες μακροπρόθεσμες οικονομικές προκλήσεις, όπως τους στόχους της στρατηγικής «Ευρώπη 2020» για όλα τα κράτη μέλη. Επιπρόσθετα, διεξάγει αρκετές φορές το χρόνο διμερείς συνεδριάσεις με όλα τα κράτη μέλη, ώστε να τεθούν προς συζήτηση οι προκλήσεις που αντιμετωπίζει κάθε χώρα, οι προτεραιότητες της ΕΕΑ ([3]) και η υλοποίηση της στρατηγικής «Ευρώπη 2020».

([1]) Ιρλανδία, Πορτογαλία.
([2]) Ελλάδα.
([3]) Ετήσια Επισκόπηση της Ανάπτυξης.

Οι χώρες με προγράμματα προσαρμογής θα πρέπει να εστιάσουν στην εφαρμογή του προγράμματος που συμφωνήθηκε από τα εν λόγω κράτη μέλη και οι εκθέσεις που υποβάλλονται στο πλαίσιο του προγράμματος θα πρέπει να συνάδουν με το ΕΕ προς αποφυγή άσκοπων επαναλήψεων. Μετά την έγκρισή του από τους συννομοθέτες, η παρακολούθηση στο πλαίσιο του κανονισμού του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου για την ενίσχυση της οικονομικής και δημοσιονομικής εποπτείας των κρατών μελών τα οποία αντιμετωπίζουν ή απειλούνται με σοβαρές δυσκολίες αναφορικά με τη χρηματοοικονομική τους σταθερότητα στη ζώνη του ευρώ θα αντικαταστήσει την παρακολούθηση και την αξιολόγηση του ΕΕ. Η αναστολή αυτή θα ισχύει καθόλη τη διάρκεια του προγράμματος μακροοικονομικής προσαρμογής.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-001636/13
à Comissão
Anni Podimata (S&D) e Elisa Ferreira (S&D)
(15 de fevereiro de 2013)

Assunto: Inclusão dos países sujeitos a programas de ajustamento no processo do Semestre Europeu

O Semestre Europeu é um processo muito importante de diálogo e interação a todos os níveis de governação entre e nos Estados-Membros da UE. Promove a legitimidade democrática, a transparência, o controlo das e a responsabilidade pelas políticas económicas nacionais e europeias. Reforça igualmente a responsabilidade pela eficácia das recomendações e das políticas adotadas e implementadas, assim como a respetiva compatibilidade com as políticas e os objetivos da UE.

Lamentavelmente, este processo exclui os Estados-Membros sujeitos aos programas de ajustamento implementados com a ajuda financeira da UE e do FMI. A exclusão destes países gera uma clara distinção entre Estados-Membros e torna o processo desequilibrado, já que não é possível um debate democrático sobre e o controlo das recomendações efetuadas pela troika, medidas aplicadas e resultados das políticas nacionais.

De facto, a única recomendação feita a estes países no contexto do Semestre Europeu consiste em aplicar o seu programa de ajustamento. Isso reforça a impressão dos cidadãos e parlamentos de que as políticas aplicadas ao abrigo de programas de ajustamento são «impostas» ou «ditadas» pela troika, acompanhadas de um debate democrático mínimo, e que são adotadas sob pressão, muitas vezes quando a obtenção tardia de uma parcela do empréstimo depende da aprovação dessas políticas.

À luz das anteriores considerações, pede-se à Comissão que responda ao seguinte:

Tenciona propor a inclusão no Semestre Europeu dos Estados-Membros sujeitos a programas de ajustamento?

Tenciona proceder à análise e a recomendações com base na Análise Anual do Crescimento e no Procedimento relativo aos desequilíbrios macroeconómicos 2013?

Resposta dada por Olli Rehn em nome da Comissão
(20 de março de 2013)

Os Estados-Membros que beneficiam de ajuda financeira no contexto de um programa de ajustamento económico não estão excluídos do processo normal de coordenação das suas políticas económicas no âmbito do Conselho. O Conselho dirige-lhes recomendações específicas quer no quadro do Regulamento MEEF ([1]) ou diretamente com base no artigo 136.° ([2]).

Os programas de ajustamento posteriormente adotados têm que ser totalmente compatíveis com as orientações adotadas a nível da União.

Nestas condições, no caso dos Estados-Membros que beneficiam de ajuda financeira é inevitável que as recomendações adotadas no âmbito do Semestre Europeu (SE) coincidam com os condicionalismos políticos dos programas de ajustamento. A Comissão também acompanha outros desafios económicos a longo prazo, como os objetivos da estratégia Europa 2020 para todos os Estados-Membros. A Comissão também realiza, várias vezes por ano, encontros bilaterais com todos os Estados-Membros para discutir os desafios específicos de cada país, as prioridades da Análise Anual do Crescimento (AAC) ([3]) e a implementação da estratégia Europa 2020.

Os países sujeitos a programas de ajustamento devem concentrar-se na aplicação do programa por eles acordado e a elaboração de relatórios ao abrigo do programa deve ser coerente com o SE, evitando, ao mesmo tempo, qualquer duplicação desnecessária. Uma vez adotada pelos colegisladores, o acompanhamento no âmbito do Regulamento do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho relativo ao reforço da supervisão económica e orçamental dos Estados-Membros afetados ou ameaçados por graves dificuldades no que diz respeito à sua estabilidade financeira na área do euro irá, portanto, substituir o acompanhamento e a avaliação no âmbito do SE. Esta suspensão é aplicável durante o período de duração do programa de ajustamento macroeconómico.

([1]) Irlanda e Portugal.
([2]) Grécia.
([3]) Análise Anual do Crescimento.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001636/13
to the Commission
Anni Podimata (S&D) and Elisa Ferreira (S&D)
(15 February 2013)

Subject: Incorporation of the countries under adjustment programmes into the European Semester process

The European Semester is a very important process of dialogue and interaction at all levels of governance among and within EU Member States. It promotes democratic legitimacy, transparency, control of and accountability for national and European economic policies. It also increases accountability for the effectiveness of the recommendations and of the policies adopted and implemented, as well as their compatibility with EU policies and objectives.

Unfortunately, this process excludes Member States undergoing adjustment programmes implemented with EU and IMF financial support. Excluding these countries creates a clear distinction between Member States and makes the process unbalanced, since democratic debate on and control over the recommendations made by the Troika, the measures implemented and the outcomes of national policies are not possible.

In fact, the only recommendation issued to these countries in the context of the European Semester is to implement their adjustment programme. This reinforces the impression that citizens and parliaments have that policies implemented under adjustment programmes are 'imposed' or 'dictated' by the Troika with minimal democratic debate, and that they are adopted under pressure, often when receiving a delayed tranche of the loan depends on such policies being approved.

In the light of the above, the Commission is asked to answer the following:

Does it intend to propose that the Member States undergoing adjustment programmes are included in the European Semester?

Does it intend to provide analysis and recommendations based on the Annual Growth Survey and the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure 2013?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission
(20 March 2013)

Member States receiving financial assistance in the context of an economic adjustment programme are not excluded from the normal process of coordination of their economic policies within the Council. The Council addresses to them specific recommendations either within the framework of the EFSM Regulation ([1]) or directly on the basis of Article 136 ([2]).

The adjustment programmes that are adopted thereafter have to be fully consistent with the orientations decided at the level of the Union.

In those circumstances, for Member States receiving financial assistance it is inevitable that the recommendations adopted within the framework of the European Semester (ES) coincide with the policy conditionality of the adjustment programmes. The Commission also monitors other long-term economic challenges such as the targets of the Europe 2020 strategy for all Member States. It also holds several times a year bilateral meetings with all Member States to discuss country-specific challenges, the priorities of the AGS ([3]) and the implementation of Europe 2020.

Countries with adjustment programmes should focus on the implementation of the programme agreed by the Member States in question and reporting under the programme should be consistent with the ES while avoiding any unnecessary duplication. Once adopted by co-legislators, the monitoring under the 'Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability in the euro area' will therefore replace the monitoring and assessment of the ES. This suspension will be applicable for the duration of the macroeconomic adjustment programme.

([1]) Ireland, Portugal.
([2]) Greece.
([3]) Annual Growth Survey.

(Svensk version)

Frågor för skriftligt besvarande E-001637/13
till kommissionen
Amelia Andersdotter (Verts/ALE)
(15 februari 2013)

Angående: Kan kommissionen göra en uppdelning av statistiken avseende it-brottslighet?

Starten för Europeiska it-brottscentrumets (E3C) verksamhet föregicks av offentliggörandet av KOM(2012)0140, i vilket kommissionen uppskattade den globala kostnaden för it-brottslighet till 388 miljoner US-dollar årligen.

I sitt meddelande KOM(2007)0267 av den 22 maj 2007 fastställde kommissionen tre huvudkategorier av it-brottslighet. Kan kommissionen göra en uppdelning av statistiken avseende it-brottslighet i enlighet med dessa tre kategorier?

Svar från Cecilia Malmström på kommissionens vägnar
(9 april 2013)

I meddelandet *Brottsbekämpning i vår digitala tidsålder: inrättande av ett europeiskt centrum mot it-brottslighet* ([1]) angav Europeiska kommissionen en uppskattning av de totala kostnaderna för it-brottslighet hämtad ur *Norton Cybercrime Report* från 2011, som sammanställts av Symantec ([2]). Definitionen av it-brottslighet som används av Symantec i rapporten ([3]) omfattar de tre kategorier som anges i meddelandet *Att införa en allmän politik för kampen mot IT-relaterad brottslighet* ([4]) från 2007, men är vidare och inbegriper även andra typer av it-brottslighet som inte anges närmare. Det föreligger därmed inget ett-till-ett-förhållande mellan de tre kategorier som nämns i meddelandet och definitionen som används av Symantec. De uppskattade kostnaderna har inte heller redovisats på ett sätt som gör att de kan fördelas mellan de tre kategorierna.

([1]) KOM(2012) 140 slutlig.
([2]) http://us.norton.com/content/en/us/home_homeoffice/html/cybercrimereport/
([3]) Se punkt 9 under Methodology and Definitions.
([4]) KOM(2007) 267 slutlig.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001637/13
to the Commission
Amelia Andersdotter (Verts/ALE)
(15 February 2013)

Subject: Breakdown of cybercrime statistics

The launch of the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) was preceded by the publication of COM(2012)140, in which the Commission estimated that the annual global costs of cybercrime are USD 388 million.

In its communication COM(2007)267 of 22 May 2007, the Commission defined three major categories of cybercrime. Can the Commission break down the total cost of cybercrime into those three categories?

Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission
(9 April 2013)

In its communication on Tackling Crime in our Digital Age: Establishing a European Cybercrime Centre ([1]), the European Commission cited an estimate on the total cost of cybercrime taken from the Norton Cybercrime Report 2011, compiled by Symantec ([2]). The definition of cybercrime used by Symantec, as outlined in its report ([3]), covers the three categories listed in the 2007 Communication 'Towards a general policy on the fight against cybercrime' ([4]), but also goes farther, including other types of cybercrime that are not further specified. There is hence no direct match between the three categories cited in the communication and the definition by Symantec. Furthermore, no breakdown of the cost estimates is provided that would allow for an allocation of the estimate to the three categories.

([1]) COM(2012) 140 final.
([2]) http://us.norton.com/content/en/us/home_homeoffice/html/cybercrimereport/.
([3]) See under 9. Methodology and Definitions.
([4]) COM(2007) 267 final.

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-001638/13
à la Commission
Gilles Pargneaux (S&D)
(15 février 2013)

Objet: Aide humanitaire destinée aux camps de Tindouf

Chaque année depuis 1993, la Commission européenne attribue via ECHO une somme de 10 millions d'euros aux réfugiés sahraouis des camps de Tindouf, administrés par le Front Polisario.

La Commission européenne prend-elle toutes les mesures qui s'imposent pour s'assurer que cette aide humanitaire parvient bien à ses bénéficiaires? Dans l'affirmative, quelles sont ces mesures, sachant que plusieurs enquêtes de l'OLAF font état de fraudes dans l'attribution de cette aide européenne?

La Commission dispose-t-elle d'informations précises et récentes sur le nombre de réfugiés vivant dans les camps de Tindouf, données que réclame le Haut commissariat aux réfugiés des Nations unies?

Sans cette information cruciale, comment la Commission peut-elle envisager de gérer efficacement une aide humanitaire ciblée?

De même, suite aux déclarations du ministre des affaires étrangères malien, qui affirme qu'il y a des combattants du Front Polisario au nord Mali, la Commission envisage-t-elle de prendre des sanctions contre le Front Polisario qui gère cette aide alimentaire?

Réponse donnée par M^me^ Georgieva au nom de la Commission
(26 mars 2013)

1. Les besoins en aide humanitaire dans les camps sont identifiés et quantifiés par les organisations humanitaires présentes sur place telles que le PAM, le HCR, Oxfam, la Croix-Rouge espagnole, Triangle Génération Humanitaire et le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge. En outre, un réseau d'experts humanitaires hautement qualifiés de la Commission est présent sur le terrain pour évaluer les besoins et assurer une supervision régulière des opérations.

2. Par l'intermédiaire de sa direction générale de l'aide humanitaire et de la protection civile (ECHO), la Commission fournit une aide humanitaire aux 90 000 réfugiés sahraouis les plus vulnérables qui vivent dans les camps du sud-ouest de l'Algérie. Il s'agit là du chiffre de planification utilisé par le Haut Commissariat des Nations unies pour les réfugiés sur lequel se fonde la Commission.

3. Les conclusions des dernières enquêtes menées par l'organe de lutte antifraude de la Commission à la suite d'allégations de détournement de fonds destinés aux réfugiés sahraouis n'ont donné lieu à aucune demande de recouvrement de fonds et n'ont pas nécessité non plus d'engager une quelconque procédure judiciaire ou administrative.

4. Il est fondamental pour la Commission d'assurer une aide efficace, une bonne gestion financière et le respect des principes humanitaires, ce qui implique que les représentants de la DG ECHO supervisent les opérations tout au long du projet.

5. La Commission n'a pas été informée de la présence effective de combattants du Front Polisario au nord du Mali.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001638/13
to the Commission
Gilles Pargneaux (S&D)
(15 February 2013)

Subject: Humanitarian aid intended for refugee camps in Tindouf

Every year since 1993 the Commission has allocated, through ECHO, a sum of EUR 10 million for Sahrawi refuges in the Tindouf camps, which are administered by the Polisario Front.

Is the Commission taking all the necessary measures to ensure that this humanitarian aid actually reaches its intended recipients? If so, what are these measures, in view of the fact that several OLAF investigations have uncovered fraud in the allocation of this EU aid?

Does the Commission have any specific, recent information on the number of refugees living in the Tindouf camps, information which has been requested by the UN High Commission for Refugees?

Without this vital information, how can the Commission effectively provide targeted humanitarian aid?

Furthermore, following the Malian foreign minister's statements confirming the presence of Polisario fighters in northern Mali, does the Commission intend to impose sanctions against the Polisario Front, which administers this food aid?

Answer given by Ms Georgieva on behalf of the Commission
(26 March 2013)

1. Humanitarian aid needs in the camps are identified and quantified by humanitarian organisations present in the camps such as WFP, UNHCR, Oxfam, the Spanish Red Cross, Triangle Génération Humanitaire and the International Committee of the Red Cross. In addition to that, the Commission has on the ground a network of highly qualified humanitarian experts who carry out needs assessment and monitor the operations regularly.

2. Through its Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO), the Commission is providing humanitarian aid to the 90,000 most vulnerable Sahrawi refugees living in the camps in south-west Algeria. This is the planning figure used by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on the basis of which the Commission is working.

3. The conclusions of the latest investigations carried out by anti-fraud body of the Commission further to allegations of misapplication of funds to the Sahrawi refugees did not lead to any request for recovery of funds or the necessity to initiate any judicial or administrative proceedings.

4. The Commission attaches fundamental importance to ensuring aid effectiveness, sound financial management and respect of humanitarian principles, which implies monitoring of the action during the lifetime of the project by DG ECHO's representatives.

5. The Commission has not been informed of the confirmed presence of Polisario fighters in northern Mali.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001639/13
alla Commissione
Vito Bonsignore (PPE)
(15 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: Sequestro di prodotti pericolosi per la salute

Negli ultimi mesi la Guardia di Finanza in Italia ha operato diversi sequestri, in alcuni casi anche di svariate migliaia di pezzi, di prodotti ritenuti pericolosi per la salute dei cittadini e dei consumatori. Questi prodotti sono perlopiù di provenienza cinese, e sono stati rinvenuti articoli non conformi alle direttive dell'Unione europea e del Codice del consumo nazionale.

L'iniziativa si inserisce nelle politiche di contrasto all'evasione delle imposte sul commercio, delle normative di sicurezza e di tutela del consumatore, sviluppate attraverso operazioni coordinate.

Sembra ormai un fatto acclarato, e segnalato anche nelle comunicazioni della Guardia di Finanza, l'esistenza di reti organizzative orientate all'importazione di prodotti pericolosi, contraffatti o comunque non legalmente circolanti nel territorio dell'Unione, facenti capo a società riconducibili alla Repubblica popolare cinese.

Alla luce di quanto sopra può la Commissione far sapere:

1. Quali siano i programmi che regolano il contrasto, in una prospettiva di mercato unico, all'immissione di prodotti illegali e pericolosi per il consumatore?

2. Se, in particolare, siano in corso iniziative volte a intercettare le merci illegali alla fonte, ovvero lungo i vettori di immissione sul mercato, conseguendo così risultati migliori rispetto alle attività, più faticose e frammentarie, di contrasto del fenomeno, una volta che le merci siano passate nelle mani dei distributori?

3. In relazione all'ultimo accordo commerciale con la Repubblica popolare cinese, quali siano i passi adottati dall'istituzione, nell'ambito dei colloqui finalizzati al perfezionamento dell'accordo, in relazione a profili di collaborazione delle autorità cinesi nelle attività di contrasto alla frode?

Risposta di Tonio Borg a nome della Commissione
(12 aprile 2013)

Le procedure per i controlli dei prodotti che entrano sul territorio dell'UE sono definite nel regolamento (CE) n. 765/2008 ([1]). Le autorità nazionali, qualora lo ritengano necessario e proporzionato, possono vietare l'immissione sul mercato di certi prodotti nonché distruggere o rendere altrimenti inutilizzabili i prodotti che presentino un rischio grave.

Il sistema RAPEX ([2]) consente alle autorità, comprese quelle doganali, di scambiare informazioni sulle misure adottate. Le informazioni sui prodotti non sicuri di origine cinese sono trasmesse alle autorità cinesi le quali procedono ai necessari interventi ([3]). Il «Pacchetto sicurezza dei prodotti e vigilanza del mercato», adottato dalla Commissione il 13 febbraio 2013, si prefigge anch'esso di accrescere la sicurezza dei prodotti di consumo.

Per combattere il traffico di prodotti contraffatti che presentino un rischio per i consumatori si sono inserite nella struttura di OLAF ([4]) le opportune capacità investigative cui si aggiungono le attività operative condotte dagli Stati membri sulle frontiere esterne dell'UE. Tuttavia, a causa delle limitate risorse disponibili, le priorità investigative dell'OLAF sono concentrate su casi rilevanti al fine di smantellare le organizzazioni fraudolente internazionali.

Nell'ambito del sistema di sorveglianza continuativa (Seamless surveillance) con la Cina, le autorità europee e cinesi hanno avviato un progetto congiunto ([5]) finalizzato a rafforzare i sistemi di controllo.

([1]) Regolamento (CE) n. 765/2008 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 9 luglio 2008, che pone norme in materia di accreditamento e vigilanza del mercato per quanto riguarda la commercializzazione dei prodotti e che abroga il regolamento (CEE) n. 339/93 .
([2]) http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/rapex/index_en.htm
([3]) http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/int_coop/bilateral_en.htm
([4]) Ufficio europeo per la lotta anti-frode.
([5]) http://www.prosafe.org/read_write/file/JA%202011/JA%20China/JA%20China%20newsletter,%20January%202013.pdf

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001639/13
to the Commission
Vito Bonsignore (PPE)
(15 February 2013)

Subject: Seizure of goods that are a health hazard

Italy's Guardia di Finanza police have made several seizures in recent months of goods deemed to be hazardous to public and consumer health. Several thousands of items were seized in some cases. For the most part these goods originate in China and do not comply with EU directives or national consumer codes.

The seizures form part of a policy of combatting evasion of commercial taxes, safety regulations and consumer protection rules through coordinated operations.

It seems clear now that there are organised networks importing hazardous or counterfeit goods, or goods that are in any event circulating illegally within the European Union. Reports from the Guardia di Finanza police confirm this. These networks can be traced back to companies located in the People's Republic of China.

1. Can the Commission clarify which programmes govern measures to stop goods that are illegal and hazardous for consumers entering the single market?

2. In particular, is action being taken at present to intercept illegal goods at source, or along their channels to market, as better results can be achieved at this level than after these goods have reached the hands of the distributors, when operations become more difficult and piecemeal?

3. In light of the latest trade agreement with the People's Republic of China, what steps has the Commission taken, in the context of talks on upgrading the agreement, in regard to ways the Chinese authorities might collaborate on anti-fraud actions?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission
(12 April 2013)

The procedures for the controls of products entering the EU are set out in Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 ([1]). National authorities, where they deem it necessary and proportionate, can prohibit certain products from being placed on the market and also destroy or otherwise render inoperable products presenting a serious risk.

The RAPEX system ([2]) allows the authorities, including Customs, to exchange information about adopted measures. Information on unsafe products of Chinese origin is communicated to the Chinese authorities who ([3]) take actions. The Product Safety and Market Surveillance Package of proposals adopted by the Commission on 13 February 2013 also aims at enhancing the safety of consumer products.

For combating the traffic of counterfeit goods posing a risk to consumers, investigative capacities have been reflected in the OLAF ([4]) structure, in addition to the operational activities conducted by the Member states at the EU's external border. Nevertheless, due to the limited resources available, the OLAF investigation priorities are allocated to significant cases aimed at dismantling international fraud organisations.

Within the 'Seamless Surveillance' with China, European and Chinese authorities launched a joint project ([5]) with the aim to strengthen control systems.

([1]) Regulation (EC) No 765/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 setting out the requirements for accreditation and market surveillance relating to the marketing of products and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 339/93 .
([2]) http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/rapex/index_en.htm
([3]) http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/int_coop/bilateral_en.htm
([4]) European Anti-Fraud Office.
([5]) http://www.prosafe.org/read_write/file/JA%202011/JA%20China/JA%20China%20newsletter,%20January%202013.pdf

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001640/13
alla Commissione
Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)
(15 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: Ruote di ricambio omologate e monopolio

Esiste nel mio paese un'azienda che è l'unico produttore al mondo di ruote di ricambio omologate (cerchioni in lega) ai sensi del Regolamento (CE) n. 124/2006 della Commissione economica per l'Europa delle Nazioni Unite. Tali ruote sono un'esatta riproduzione delle ruote originali prodotte dalle case automobilistiche compresi gli elementi formali e cioè il modello. Esse pertanto sono destinate a sostituire le ruote originali durante l'utilizzo del veicolo, dunque con finalità di ricambio degli originali, e sono soggette alle procedure di omologazione di cui al sopra citato Regolamento (CE) n. 124/2006. L'azienda produce ruote di ricambio omologate di ben 34 marchi di case automobilistiche, svincolando i consumatori dalla scelta obbligata del ricambio del costruttore del veicolo, che verrebbe a trovarsi altrimenti in posizione di monopolio sul mercato dei cerchioni. Questi infatti sono per i consumatori gli unici pezzi di ricambio omologati in concorrenza alle ruote prodotte dalla casa costruttrice dell'autoveicolo, con un risparmio per i consumatori stessi che s'aggira attorno al 70 %. Ciò nonostante, o forse proprio per questo, le case automobilistiche hanno promosso innumerevoli azioni giudiziarie e stragiudiziali nei confronti dell'azienda e dei suoi clienti (grossisti, distributori, ecc.), tutte volte ad escluderla dal mercato. In più, a sostegno delle loro pretese, esse invocano l'esercizio di diritti di privativa, inefficaci se si tiene conto della clausola delle riparazioni prevista dall'art. 110 del Regolamento (CE) n. 6/2002, già prevista tra l'altro, dalla direttiva 98/71/CE.

La Commissione:

1. È al corrente di questo conflitto commerciale?

2. È esatto che la normativa comunitaria di cui all'art. 110 del Regolamento (CE) n.6/2002 non distingua (e quindi non faccia eccezioni con riguardo ai cerchioni omologati) tra componenti che debbano essere considerati come pezzi di ricambio finalizzati alla riparazione dei veicoli?

3. Non conviene che la liberalizzazione del mercato post-vendita nel settore automobilistico è stata voluta dal legislatore comunitario che ha fornito un'ampia e precisa definizione di pezzo di ricambio (cfr. art.1 par. h) del Regolamento (UE) n. 461/2010) all'interno della quale rientrano pertanto anche le ruote omologate?

4. Non crede che tale incertezza interpretativa penalizzi i consumatori europei e favorisca il monopolio?

Risposta di Michel Barnier a nome della Commissione
(15 aprile 2013)

1. La Commissione è a conoscenza della controversia cui fa riferimento l'onorevole parlamentare.

2. Il regolamento (CE) n. 6/2002 del Consiglio su disegni e modelli comunitari ([1]) non definisce quali prodotti debbano essere considerati una componente di un prodotto complesso utilizzata allo scopo di consentire la riparazione del medesimo (pezzi di ricambio).

3. Il regolamento (UE) n. 461/2010 della Commissione ([2]) riguarda l'applicazione delle norme dell'UE sugli accordi anticoncorrenziali a talune categorie di accordi verticali nel settore automobilistico. Conformemente alla definizione di cui all'articolo 1, se i cerchioni vengono incorporati o montati in o su un autoveicolo per sostituirne delle parti componenti, possono essere considerati pezzi di ricambio ai fini dell'applicazione del regolamento (UE) n. 461/2010. Tuttavia questa definizione non è vincolante per l'interpretazione della normativa UE in materia di proprietà industriale.

([1]) GU L 3 del 5.1.2002, pag. 1.
([2]) GU L 129 del 28.5.2010, pag. 52.

4. Poiché non vi è stato accordo tra gli Stati membri, la piena liberalizzazione del mercato secondario dei pezzi di ricambio dell'UE nell'ambito della direttiva 98/71/CE non è stata conseguita. Da allora la Commissione ha presentato tre proposte legislative al fine di armonizzare pienamente e completare il mercato interno in questo settore e resta vigile riguardo a qualsiasi cambiamento nelle condizioni di mercato che possa indurla a riprendere i negoziati sulla liberalizzazione della protezione dei disegni e dei modelli dei pezzi di ricambio destinati a ripristinare l'aspetto di prodotti complessi come gli autoveicoli. Tuttavia l'adozione di tale normativa è di competenza del Consiglio e del Parlamento europeo. Inoltre, come ha sottolineato nella comunicazione ([3]), la Commissione si è impegnata a sostenere la competitività e la sostenibilità del settore.

([3]) CARS 2020: piano d'azione per un'industria automobilistica competitiva e sostenibile in Europa.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001640/13
to the Commission
Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)
(15 February 2013)

Subject: Approved replacement wheels and monopoly

There is a company in Italy which is the sole manufacturer worldwide of replacement wheels (alloy rims) approved under the 2006 Regulation No 124 of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. These wheels are in every respect, including their outer appearance and hence the model, an exact copy of the vehicle manufacturers' original wheels. They are therefore intended to replace the original wheels during the vehicle's lifetime, i.e. they are manufactured as replacements for original wheels and are subject to approval procedures laid down in the aforementioned 2006 Regulation No 124. The company manufactures approved replacement wheels for 34 makes of vehicle. This frees consumers from having to purchase replacement wheels from their vehicle's manufacturer, which would otherwise have a monopoly over the market in its wheel rims. These wheels are in fact the only replacements available to consumers which may officially compete with the wheels produced by the vehicle manufacturers themselves, allowing consumers to make savings of around 70%. Notwithstanding this, or perhaps precisely because of this, vehicle manufacturers have brought countless legal and out-of-court actions against this company and its customers (wholesalers, distributors, etc.) all of which aim to bar it from the market. What is more, vehicle manufacturers invoke in support of their claims the exercise of their patent rights, which are however rendered invalid by the repairs clause in Article 110 of Regulation (EC) No 6/2002, already provided for by Directive 98/71/EC.

1. Is the Commission aware of this trade dispute?

2. Is it correct that Community legislation, namely Article 110 of Regulation (EC) No 6/2002, does not distinguish (and therefore does make an exception in the case of approved rims) between components which shall be considered as spare parts for the purpose of repairing vehicles?

3. Does it not think that in providing a broad and precise definition of spare parts in Article 1(h) of Regulation (EU) No 461/2010 — a definition which therefore encompasses approved wheels — the Community legislator was encouraging the liberalisation of the after-sales market in the automobile sector?

4. Would the Commission not agree that this uncertainty in regard to interpretation penalises EU consumers and encourages monopolies?

Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission
(15 April 2013)

1. The Commission is indeed aware of this dispute.

2. Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 on Community designs ([1]) does not define what products should be considered as a component part of a complex product used for the purpose of the repair of that complex product (spare parts).

3. Commission Regulation (EU) No 461/2010 ([2]) concerns the application of EU rules on anticompetitive agreements to certain categories of vertical agreements in the motor vehicle sector. Pursuant to the definition in Article 1 thereof, so long as wheel rims are to be installed in or upon a motor vehicle so as to replace components of that vehicle, they may be considered as spare parts for the purposes of applying Regulation No 461/2010. However, this definition is not binding for the interpretation of EU rules in the field of industrial property.

4. As there was no agreement among the Member States (MS), a full liberalisation of the spare parts aftermarket in the EU was not accomplished under Directive 98/71/EC. Since then, there were three legislative proposals tabled by the Commission in order to fully harmonise and complete the internal market in this area. The Commission remains watchful to any change in the market conditions that could encourage it to resume negotiations on the liberalisation of design protection of spare parts intended to restore the appearance of complex products such as motor vehicles. It is, however, up to the Council and the EP to adopt such legislation. Moreover, as underlined in the Commission's Communication ([3]), the Commission is committed to support the sector's competitiveness and sustainability.

([1]) OJ L 3. 5.1.2002, p.1.
([2]) OJ L 129, 28.5.2010, p. 52.
([3]) CARS 2020: Action Plan for a competitive and sustainable automotive industry in Europe.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001641/13
to the Commission
Chris Davies (ALDE)
(15 February 2013)

Subject: VAT on equipment purchased by life-saving voluntary organisations (2)

On behalf of the Commission, Mr Šemeta stated in his reply to Written Question E-000102/2013 that Article 132(1)(p) of the VAT Directive (2006/112/EC) clarifies that Member States shall exempt from VAT 'the supply of transport services for sick or injured persons in vehicles specially designed for the purpose, by duly authorised bodies.'

In the case of sick or injured persons being transported off mountain sides or other remote locations it may be impossible to use conventional ambulances.

1. Does EC law forbid Member States from providing a VAT exemption for vehicles suitable for this purpose, such as Land Rovers, that have been specially designed or adapted to transport sick or injured persons in mountainous or remote locations?

2. Does EC law forbid Member States from providing a VAT exemption for the medical and other essential equipment, including stretchers, spades, ladders, ropes and other climbing tools, boots and weather-resistant clothing, that may be carried on such specially designed vehicles in order to assist sick or injured persons in mountainous or remote locations?

Answer given by Mr Šemeta on behalf of the Commission
(26 March 2013)

Member States do not have the right to implement VAT exemptions which go beyond the framework of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 (the 'VAT Directive'). Although certain activities which are in the public interest are exempt from VAT pursuant to Article 132 of the VAT Directive, that provision does not provide for an exemption from VAT for every activity performed in the public interest, but only for those which are listed and described in great detail therein.

According to Article 132 (1) (p), Member States shall exempt from VAT 'the supply of transport services for sick or injured persons in vehicles specially designed for the purpose, by duly authorised bodies'. The term 'vehicles' is not restricted to 'conventional' ambulances and would possibly also encompass other vehicles if they are specially designed in the meaning of this provision. However, the tax exemption only encompasses the transport services supplied by duly authorised bodies. The VAT Directive does not, generally, provide for a tax exemption for the supply of medical or other equipment that may be carried on a vehicle specially designed for transporting sick and injured people.

According to the legislative rules of procedure at the EU level in the field of VAT, any modification of this legal situation would need the unanimous adoption of a respective legal act by the Council, based on a corresponding proposal from the Commission.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-001642/13
προς την Επιτροπή
Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)
(15 Φεβρουαρίου 2013)

Θέμα: Αναγκαστικές υστερεκτομές στην Ινδία

Ιδιωτικές κλινικές σε πολλά ινδικές χωριά προβαίνουν σε παράτυπες ιατρικές πρακτικές πιέζοντας γυναίκες να υποστούν μια αδικαιολόγητη υστερεκτομή. Οι γυναίκες, πολλές ηλικίας 20 και 30 ετών, επισκέπτονται τις κλινικές με συμπτώματα όπως μηνορραγία, πόνους περιόδου, λοιμώξεις της ουροδόχου κύστης και πόνους στην πλάτη. Μετά από ένα και μοναδικό υπερηχογράφημα και χωρίς τη διενέργεια βιοψίας, οι γιατροί εκφοβίζουν τις γυναίκες ώστε να νομίζουν ότι χρειάζονται υστερεκτομή, λέγοντάς τους ότι μπορεί να υπάρχει καρκίνωμα στη μήτρα τους.

Για να βοηθηθούν οι οικογένειες που ζουν κάτω από το όριο της φτώχειας, το εθνικό σύστημα ασφάλισης υγείας στην Ινδία τους επιτρέπει να λάβουν θεραπεία από ιδιωτικά νοσοκομεία αξίας έως 30 000 ρουπίες (USD 550) ετησίως. Οι ιδιωτικές κλινικές επωφελούνται από αυτό το καθεστώς και εκμεταλλεύονται τους ευάλωτους φτωχούς πολίτες, για να ιδιοποιούνται τα κυβερνητικά κεφάλαια.

Επιπλέον, υπήρξαν και περιπτώσεις γιατρών που ζήτησαν χρήματα για την εκτέλεση της υστερεκτομής, ενώ στην πραγματικότητα είχαν κάνει μόνο μια επιφανειακή τομή, αφήνοντας άθικτη τη μήτρα. Η Επιτροπή καλείται να απαντήσει στα ακόλουθα ερωτήματα:

1. Είναι ενήμερη η Επιτροπή για αυτές τις αναγκαστικές υστερεκτομές που πραγματοποιούνται στην Ινδία, και που, σε πολλές περιπτώσεις, αφήνουν τις γυναίκες αδύναμες και ευάλωτες και μπορεί να θέσουν την υγεία τους σε κίνδυνο;

2. Πώς μπορεί η Επιτροπή να συμβάλει στην ενίσχυση των γυναικών στην Ινδία (με προγράμματα, χρηματοδότηση, ανθρωπιστική βοήθεια, εκστρατείες ευαισθητοποίησης, εκπαιδευτικά προγράμματα, κ.λπ.); Ποια από αυτά τα μέτρα έχουν ήδη ληφθεί από την ΕΕ;

Απάντηση του κ. Piebalgs εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(5 Απριλίου 2013)

Η «απάτη της μήτρας» αφορά την εικαζόμενη αφαίρεση μητρών από χιλιάδες γυναίκες, που βρίσκονται κάτω από το όριο της φτώχειας, χωρίς τη συναίνεση τους και αναίτια, από ιδιωτικά νοσοκομεία: η εν λόγω απάτη έχει γνωστοποιηθεί από τα μέσα μαζικής ενημέρωσης και οργανώσεις της κοινωνίας των πολιτών. Ωστόσο, ο ακριβής αριθμός των περιπτώσεων δεν είναι γνωστός καθότι δεν μπορεί να υπολογιστεί από επίσημες πηγές. Δεν έχει διεξαχθεί καμία συνολική έρευνα που θα μπορούσε να θεωρηθεί αντιπροσωπευτική για όλη τη χώρα.

Το 2010, οι κυβερνήσεις του Άντρα Πραντές και του Μαχαράστρα προσάρμοσαν τα από το κράτος επιχορηγούμενα ασφαλιστικά τους συστήματα έτσι ώστε να απαγορεύονται οι υστερεκτομές σε ιδιωτικά νοσοκομεία αφότου έρευνες αποκάλυψαν ότι οι μήτρες ορισμένων ασθενών είχαν αφαιρεθεί απλώς για να ζητηθεί μεγαλύτερη αποζημίωση από τον εκάστοτε ασφαλιστικό φορέα. Το 2012, μετά τους ισχυρισμούς για εξαναγκαστική αφαίρεση μητρών φτωχών γυναικών με απώτερο σκοπό την εκμετάλλευση των ασφαλιστικών παροχών (στην ινδική πολιτεία Μπιχάρ) η κυβέρνηση του ως άνω ομόσπονδου κράτους προέβη σε έρευνες, που διενεργήθηκαν από τους διοικητές περιφέρειας, σε όλα τα ιδιωτικά νοσοκομεία στα οποία το ποσοστό των υστερεκτομών υπερέβαινε το 25% του συνόλου των εγχειρήσεων.

Η ΕΕ συνεργάζεται με τη κυβέρνηση της Ινδίας και με ινδικούς οργανισμούς της κοινωνίας των πολιτών από τις αρχές του 1990, με στόχο τη βελτίωση της υγείας των μητέρων, τη μείωση της παιδικής θνησιμότητας και την προστασία των δικαιωμάτων των γυναικών.

Η ΕΕ στηρίζει την κυβέρνηση της Ινδίας με ολιστικό τρόπο, π.χ. μέσω του προγράμματος «Εθνική αποστολή για την αγροτική υγεία/την αναπαραγωγική υγεία και την υγεία του παιδιού», το οποίο αποβλέπει στον περιορισμό των περιφερειακών ανισοτήτων κατά τη παροχή υπηρεσιών στους τομείς της υγείας των μητέρων, της αναπαραγωγικής υγείας και της υγείας του παιδιού.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001642/13
to the Commission
Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)
(15 February 2013)

Subject: Forced hysterectomies in India

Private clinics in many Indian villages engage in malpractice by pushing women into having unnecessary hysterectomies. Women, many in their 20s and 30s, visit the clinics with symptoms such as heavy periods, period pain, bladder infections and backache. Following a single ultrasound scan and without performing a biopsy, doctors scare women into thinking that they need a hysterectomy by telling them that they may have a cancerous growth in their uterus.

To help families living below the poverty line, a national health insurance scheme in India allows them to receive treatment from private hospitals worth up to 30 000 rupees (USD 550) each year. Private clinics take advantage of this scheme and exploit the vulnerable poor as a way to obtain the government funds.

In addition, there have also been cases of doctors claiming money for performing hysterectomies, when in fact they had made only a superficial incision, thereby leaving the uterus intact. The Commission is asked to answer the following:

1. Is the Commission aware of these forced hysterectomies that are taking place in India, which in many cases leave women weak and vulnerable and may put their health at risk?

2. How can the Commission help to empower women in India (programmes, funding, humanitarian aid, awareness campaigns, education programmes, etc.)? Which of these steps have already been taken by the EU?

Answer given by Mr Piebalgs on behalf of the Commission
(5 April 2013)

The 'Uterus scam,' includes the alleged removal of uteruses of thousands of Below Poverty Line (BPL) women without their consent, or necessity, by private hospitals; it has been reported in the Media and by Civil Society organisations. The exact number of cases is however not known as this could not be proven by official sources. There has not been any comprehensive survey done which could be representative for the whole country.

In 2010, the Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra governments adjusted their state-sponsored insurance schemes to disallow hysterectomies in private hospitals after surveys disclosed that uteruses of a number of beneficiaries were removed merely to claim higher insurance amounts. In 2012, following allegations of the forced removal of poor women's uteruses for insurance benefit (in the Indian state of Bihar) the state Government initiated inquiries under district magistrates against all such private hospitals at which more than 25% of all surgeries are hysterectomies.

The EU has engaged with the Government of India and Indian civil society organisations since the early 1990s, on improving maternal health, reducing child mortality and protecting women's rights.

The EU is supporting the Government of India in a holistic way, e.g. through the National Rural Health Mission/Reproductive and Child Health programme, aimed at reducing regional inequalities in the provision of services in the areas of maternal health, reproductive and child health.

(Magyar változat)

Írásbeli választ igénylő kérdés E-001643/13
a Bizottság számára
Herczog Edit (S&D)
(2013. február 15.)

Tárgy: Magyarországi uniós pályázat kiírásának feltételei

A magyar sajtó szerint több száz vállalkozás és kistelepülés maradt hoppon egy tavaly meghirdetett uniós pályázaton (TÁMOP-6.1.2-11/1) ([1]), mert a kiírás olyan feltételt is szabott, aminek egyetlen jelentkező sem felelhetett volna meg, a Nemzeti Fejlesztési Ügynökség (NFÜ) mégis befogadta 58 pályázó pályázatát. Az NFÜ elismerte a szabálytalanságot, hogy a kiírás ellenére az első napon gyorspostai kézbesítéssel beérkezett pályázatokat is befogadta. Indoklása szerint a könnyített elbírálású pályázatok szabályai alapján az azonos napon beérkezett pályázatokat egy időben beérkezettnek kell tekinteni, és ezek támogatása csak akkor lehetséges, ha az adott nap valamennyi, formailag megfelelő pályázatának támogatására elegendő forrás áll rendelkezésre. A második napon beérkezett pályázatok forrásigénye (7,9 milliárd forint) meghaladta a rendelkezésre álló keretet, ezért azokat kizárták.

Az ügyben a következő kérdést kívánom feltenni:

1. Valóban EU-s előírás az, hogy könnyített elbírálású pályázatok esetében az azonos napon beérkezett pályázatok befogadása csak az említett feltételekkel történhet?

2. Ha igen, akkor nem volna-e indokoltabb valamilyen objektív szelekciót alkalmazni, amennyiben az egy napon beérkezett nagyszámú, formailag megfelelő pályázat összértéke meghaladja a keretösszeget?

3. Ha viszont az előírás nem a bizottsági joganyagból következik, akkor ellenőrzi-e a Bizottság azt, hogy az egyes tagországokban meghirdetett pályázatok technikai követelményei egyenlő esélyeket biztosítsanak valamennyi potenciális pályázó részére?

4. Hogyan lehet orvosolni az ügyben érintett szervezetek sérelmét, s mit kell tennie az NFÜ-nek, valamint mit kellene tennie az ügyben érintett nemzeti hatóságoknak, hogy további hasonló esetek ne történhessenek meg?

Andor László válasza a Bizottság nevében
(2013. április 12.)

1–2. Az uniós jogszabályok nem írják elő a megosztott irányítású forráselosztási eljárások szabályait. A műveletek kiválasztására szolgáló rendszer kialakítása a tagállamok feladata. A tagállamok ugyanakkor kötelesek az EU költségvetési rendeletében meghatározott, a hatékony és eredményes pénzgazdálkodásra, az átláthatóságra és a megkülönböztetésmentességre vonatkozó alapelveket tiszteletben tartani.

3. A Bizottság végez ellenőrzéseket a műveletekre és az irányítási és kontrollrendszerre vonatkozóan. Egy ilyen ellenőrzés a műveletek kiválasztásának folyamatára is kiterjedhet. Amennyiben az ellenőrzés során hiányosságot vagy szabálytalanságot tárnak fel, korrekciós intézkedésekre kerül sor (megszakítás, kifizetések felfüggesztése, pénzügyi korrekció).

4. Amennyiben egy pályázó úgy véli, jogait megsértették, először a nemzeti közigazgatáshoz vagy bírósághoz kell fordulnia. Amennyiben megállapítást nyer, hogy az irányítási és kontrollrendszer (vagy annak egy része) nem felel meg az uniós vagy a nemzeti jogszabályoknak, a nemzeti hatóságoknak korrekciós intézkedéseket kell tenniük, különben a Bizottság fog ilyen intézkedéseket hozni.

Az Európai Bizottsághoz a közelmúltban több panasz érkezett egyes, az ESZA által társfinanszírozott magyarországi projektek pályázati felhívásának irányítására vonatkozóan; ezek nyomán a Bizottság felkérte a magyar hatóságokat a helyzet értékelésére. A válasz kézhezvétele után a bizottsági szolgálatok elemezni fogják a kapott információkat, és amennyiben szükséges, határozni fognak a következő lépésekről.

([1]) http://index.hu/gazdasag/2013/02/05/tamop-ugy/

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001643/13
to the Commission
Edit Herczog (S&D)
(15 February 2013)

Subject: Conditions attached to call for applications for EU funding in Hungary

According to the Hungarian press, several hundred businesses and small settlements had their funding applications rejected out of hand when they responded to an EU call for applications issued last year (TÁMOP-6.1.2-11/1) ([1]), because the call stipulated a condition with which not a single applicant could have complied, yet the National Development Agency (NFÜ) accepted the submissions of 58 applicants. The National Development Agency acknowledged the irregularity which had been occasioned by its acceptance — contrary to the provisions of the call for applications — of the applications which were received by express mail on the first day. According to its justification, the rules applicable under the streamlined award procedure required it to regard applications received on one and the same day as having arrived simultaneously, so that it was only possible to accept them if sufficient funding was available to accept all the formally correct applications received on the same day. The funding required by the applications received on the second day (HUF 7.9 bn) exceeded the budget available, and they were therefore excluded.

1. Is it true that it is an EU rule that, in the case of streamlined funding award procedures, applications received on the same day can only be accepted under the conditions stated above?

2. If so, would it not be more justifiable to use some kind of objective selection procedure if the large number of formally correct applications received on the same day requires total funding which exceeds the budget?

3. If on the other hand the rules are not derived from Commission law, does the Commission monitor whether the technical consequences of calls for applications issued in individual Member States ensure equal opportunities for all potential applicants?

4. How can the damage which has been suffered by the organisations affected in this case be remedied, and what should the National Development Agency — and the national authorities which are implicated in the case — do to prevent any recurrence of this?

Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission
(12 April 2013)

1 and 2. EU legislation does not prescribe the modalities of funding award procedures within shared management. It is the responsibility of the Member States to set up the system for selection of the operations. However, the Member States must respect the principles of sound financial management, transparency and non-discrimination foreseen in the EU Financial Regulation.

3. The Commission performs audits on operations and management and control systems. The process of selection of operations can be part of such an audit. If, during an audit, a deficiency or irregularity is identified, corrective measures are applied (interruption, suspension of payments, financial correction).

4. If an applicant suspects that his/her rights were violated, s/he should first turn to the national administrative or judicial proceedings. If the management and control system (or its part) is found non-compliant with EU or national legislation, the national authorities must take corrective measures, otherwise the Commission will.

The European Commission has recently received complaints about the management of some calls for proposals concerning the ESF co-financed projects in Hungary and requested the Hungarian Authorities to provide their assessment. Following the receipt of the reply, the Commission Services will analyse the information provided and decide on the next steps, if any.

([1]) http://index.hu/gazdasag/2013/02/05/tamop-ugy/.

(Wersja polska)

Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-001644/13
do Komisji
Sławomir Nitras (PPE)
(15 lutego 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Migracje wewnątrz UE jako reakcja na szok asymetryczny

Zgodnie z teorią ekonomii jednym z mechanizmów dostosowawczych podczas szoków asymetrycznych we wspólnych obszarach walutowych jest migracja siły roboczej. Kryzys finansowy z 2008 r., którego rezultatem był kryzys zadłużenia niektórych krajów strefy euro, spowodował właśnie tego typu szok, z którego skutkami obecnie walczymy. W związku z tym pragnę zapytać szanowną Komisję:

1. Czy szanowna Komisja dysponuje informacjami wskazującymi na to, że obywatele krajów przeżywających problemy gospodarcze migrują za granicę bądź w obrębie własnych krajów w większym stopniu niż przed kryzysem?

2. Które ośrodki gospodarcze i regiony UE, w ocenie szanownej Komisji, mają największe szanse na przyciągnięcie obywateli innych krajów UE?

3. Jakie długookresowe skutki gospodarcze miałoby utrzymanie się wspomnianych trendów migracyjnych?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Lászlo Andora w imieniu Komisji
(10 kwietnia 2013 r.)

1. Analiza przeprowadzona w 2012 r. ([1]) potwierdziła zwiększenie ruchów migracyjnych z państw Europy Południowej oraz Irlandii i krajów bałtyckich w kierunku innych państw UE. Ostatnie dane (3 kwartał 2012 r.) pochodzące z badań aktywności ekonomicznej ludności UE ([2]) wskazują, że liczba skłonnych do przemieszczania się obywateli UE aktywnych ekonomicznie, mieszkających krócej niż cztery lata w innym państwie UE, wzrosła najwięcej (w porównaniu z 3 kwartałem 2008 r.) wśród Greków (+147 %), Łotyszy (+76 %), Hiszpanów (+60 %), Węgrów (+53 %) i Irlandczyków (+37 %). Niemniej jednak dostępne dane statystyczne wykazują, że w ujęciu bezwzględnym ten wzrost jest niewielki w porównaniu z ogółem ludności aktywnej ekonomicznie w krajach pochodzenia migrantów, szczególnie w przypadku obywateli państw Europy Południowej ([3]).

2. Największe szanse na przyciągnięcie obywateli UE skłonnych do przemieszczania się mają państwa o niskim poziomie bezrobocia oraz istotnym niedobrze pracowników lub wykwalifikowanej siły roboczej. Innymi czynnikami przyciągającymi może być język lub istnienie społeczności z kraju pochodzenia danej osoby (poprzez efekt sieci). Ostatnie dane (3 kwartał 2012 r.) pochodzące z badań aktywności ekonomicznej ludności UE wykazują, że Zjednoczone Królestwo i Niemcy są obecnie dwoma głównymi państwami docelowymi, w których aktywni ekonomicznie obywatele UE skłonni do przemieszczania się osiedlili się w ostatnich czterech latach.

3. W perspektywie długookresowej wysoka emigracja – w szczególności wśród absolwentów szkół wyższych – może wpłynąć negatywnie na potencjał wzrostu gospodarczego oraz system opieki społecznej w krajach pochodzenia emigrantów ([4]). Dane pochodzące z badań aktywności ekonomicznej ludności UE potwierdzają, że udział osób z wykształceniem wyższym jest większy wśród osób migrujących w ostatnim czasie niż wśród ogółu ludności aktywnej ekonomicznie ([5]). Jednak aktualny poziom mobilności wydaje się zbyt niski, by wywołać w stopniu istotnym zjawisko „drenażu mózgów" ([6]), należy też wziąć pod uwagę tymczasowy charakter mobilności oraz potencjalne korzyści dla osób migrujących pod względem doświadczenia i umiejętności.

([1]) Zob. kwartalny przegląd dotyczący zatrudnienia i sytuacji społecznej w UE, czerwiec 2012 r., ss. 31-40.
([2]) Badanie aktywności ekonomicznej ludności Unii Europejskiej – Eurostat.
([3]) Na przykład w Niemczech, największym państwie docelowym, dane dotyczące zabezpieczenia społecznego wykazują, że liczba zatrudnionych pochodzących z czterech południowoeuropejskich państw członkowskich (Hiszpania, Włochy, Portugalia, Grecja) wzrosła o 52,9 tysiąca pomiędzy lutym 2011 r. a grudniem 2012 r. Stanowi to wzrost o 12,9 %, jednak nie wpływa to na ogólną liczbę bezrobotnych w tych czterech państwach, która wynosi 11,3 mln osób (dane szacunkowe Eurostatu za grudzień 2012 r.).
([4]) Zatrudnienie i rozwój społeczeństwa w Europie, 2012 r., s. 56.
([5]) Przykładowo, według badań aktywności ekonomicznej ludności UE za 3 kwartał 2012 r., osoby z wykształceniem wyższym stanowią około 46 % osób migrujących w ostatnim czasie (mieszkających poniżej 4 lat w innym państwie) z państw południowoeuropejskich do innych państw UE, podczas gdy pośród ludności aktywnej ekonomicznie w tych państwach stosunek ten wynosi około 27 %.
([6]) Zob. kwartalny przegląd dotyczący zatrudnienia i sytuacji społecznej w EU, czerwiec 2012 r., s. 40.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001644/13
to the Commission
Sławomir Nitras (PPE)
(15 February 2013)

Subject: Migration within the EU in response to an asymmetric shock

According to economic theory, one of the adjustment mechanisms during asymmetric shocks in common currency areas is labour migration. The financial crisis of 2008, which led to the debt crisis in certain eurozone countries, caused just such a shock, the effects of which we are now fighting. In this regard:

1. Does the Commission have any information indicating that citizens of countries experiencing economic problems are migrating, either abroad or within their own country, to a greater extent than before the crisis?

2. Which economic centres and regions in the EU does the Commission believe are most likely to attract citizens of other EU countries?

3. What long-term economic effects would the continuation of such migration trends have?

Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission
(10 April 2013)

1. An analysis conducted in 2012 ([1]) confirmed an increase of mobility flows from Southern European countries as well as Ireland and the Baltics to other EU countries. Recent (2012Q3) EU-LFS ([2]) data indicate that the number of economically active EU mobile citizens established since less than 4 years in another EU country has increased the most (compared to 2008Q3) among Greeks (+147%), Latvians (+76%), Spaniards (+60%), Hungarians (+53%) and Irish (+37%). Nevertheless, available statistics show that in absolute terms the rise is limited, in comparison with the overall labour force in the origin countries, particularly for Southern European citizens ([3]).

2. The countries most likely to attract mobile EU citizens are those with low unemployment and substantial skill or labour shortages. Other pull factors may be language and the existence of a community from the origin country (due to the network effects). Recent (2012Q3) EU-LFS data indicate that the UK and Germany are currently the two main destination countries where economically active EU mobile citizens established since less than 4 years.

3. In the long-run, high emigration, especially of tertiary graduates, may impact negatively on the growth potential and welfare system of the sending countries ([4]). EU-LFS data confirm that the share of tertiary educated persons is higher among the recent movers than in the overall active population ([5]). However, the current measured levels of mobility seem low to result in a sizable phenomenon of 'brain drain' ([6]) and one should also consider the temporary nature of mobility and the potential gains among the movers in terms of experience and skills.

([1]) See EU Employment and Social Situation Quarterly Review, June 2012, pp.31-40.
([2]) European Union Labour Force Survey — Eurostat.
([3]) For example in Germany, the largest destination country, social security data shows that the number of employees from the four Southern European Member states (Spain, Italy, Portugal, Greece) increased by 52.9 thousand between February 2011 and December 2012. While this represents a rise by 12.9%, it does not impact the overall unemployed population in these four countries of around 11.3 million persons (Eurostat estimate for December 2012).
([4]) Employment and Social developments in Europe 2012, p.56.
([5]) For instance, according to EU-LFS figures from 2012Q3, tertiary educated persons represent around 46% of the recent movers (established since less than 4 years) from Southern European Member states to other EU countries while this share is around 27% in the active population of the origin countries.
([6]) See EU Employment and Social Situation Quarterly Review, June 2012, p.40.

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita P-001645/13
a la Comisión
Eva Ortiz Vilella (PPE)
(18 de febrero de 2013)

Asunto: Prórroga medidas antidumping frente a importaciones de mandarinas de China

Los productores españoles de mandarinas en conserva tienen que hacer frente cada año a la fuerte competencia de las producciones de China, cuyas exportaciones por debajo de los costes de producción constituyen una fuerte amenaza para la subsistencia de las industrias españolas. Las empresas españolas, repartidas entre Valencia y Alicante, emplean a 3 000 operadores, y esos puestos de trabajo pueden peligrar si la Unión Europea no mantiene en esta y en las próximas campañas las medidas antidumping frente a ese país. El precio de importación de las mandarinas chinas se sitúa en torno a la mitad de los costes que han de asumir los productores españoles por tener que cumplir exigencias de seguridad alimentaria y sociales mucho más elevadas.

El Comisario europeo de Comercio, Karel de Gucht, tiene previsto restablecer en breve las medidas antidumping que quedaron interrumpidas a la espera de la modificación del reglamento comunitario que fue anulado por el Tribunal de Justicia el pasado año tras las denuncias presentadas por importadores alemanes en contra del procedimiento utilizado para el cálculo de los derechos arancelarios. No obstante, las medidas antidumping dejarían de aplicarse en diciembre de este año una vez cumplido el período de cinco años previsto en la reglamentación.

Muchos operadores han aprovechado ese vacío legal para la importación de mandarinas chinas a precios muy competitivos desde que comenzó la campaña de comercialización, el pasado mes de noviembre.

¿Tiene previsto la Comisión aplicar las medidas antidumping con carácter retroactivo?

¿Tiene intención de iniciar de nuevo una investigación sobre la situación del mercado con vistas a prorrogar en los próximos años las medidas antidumping aplicadas a las exportaciones chinas?

Respuesta del Sr. De Gucht en nombre de la Comisión
(19 de marzo de 2013)

El 22 de febrero de 2013, a propuesta de la Comisión, el Consejo publicó un Reglamento de Ejecución por el que se reestablece un derecho antidumping definitivo sobre las importaciones de determinados cítricos preparados o conservados (principalmente mandarinas, etc.) originarios de la República Popular China (Reglamento de Ejecución (UE) n° 158/2013 del Consejo, de 18 de febrero de 2013 ([1])). Mediante este Reglamento se aplican dos sentencias de los Tribunales de Luxemburgo, la primera de 17 de febrero de 2011 en el asunto T-122/09, en la que el Tribunal General anuló el Reglamento en el que se establecían las medidas originales vigentes en la medida en que afectaban a dos exportadores, y la segunda de 22 de marzo de 2012 en el asunto C-339/10, en la que el Tribunal de Justicia Europeo declaró nulo ese mismo Reglamento.

En lo que respecta a la retroactividad, la Comisión examinará este asunto con detenimiento cuando se disponga de estadísticas de importaciones de mandarinas en conserva procedentes de China. Una vez se disponga de estas estadísticas, volverán a comunicarse las conclusiones a las partes, así como a los Estados miembros en el marco del Comité Antidumping y Antisubvenciones. La Comisión volverá a tomar una decisión sobre este asunto y, en su caso, se transmitirá una propuesta al Consejo.

En cuanto a la posible revisión del Reglamento por el que se establecen las medidas vigentes, se recuerda que las medidas expirarán el 31 de diciembre de 2013 salvo en caso de que se inicie una revisión antes de dicha fecha a petición de la industria de la Unión.

La legislación también prevé la posibilidad de solicitar una revisión de las medidas, en caso de que haya suficientes indicios razonables de que las medidas, o el nivel de estas, ya no sean apropiados para un cambio en la situación del mercado.

([1]) Reglamento de Ejecución (UE) n° 158/2013 del Consejo, de 18 de febrero de 2013, por el que se reestablece un derecho antidumping definitivo sobre las importaciones de determinados cítricos preparados o conservados (principalmente mandarinas, etc.) originarios de la República Popular China, DO L 49 de 22.2.2013.

(English version)

Question for written answer P-001645/13
to the Commission
Eva Ortiz Vilella (PPE)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Reinstating anti-dumping measures against Chinese mandarin orange imports

Each year, Spanish producers of tinned mandarins must face aggressive competition from China, whose exports, sold at less than production costs, pose a serious threat to their future viability. These producers, spread between Valencia and Alicante, employ 3 000 people whose jobs could be threatened if the EU does not reinstate anti-dumping measures against China this season and continue to impose them. The import price of Chinese mandarins represents about half the production costs borne by the Spanish producers, who have to comply with much more stringent food safety and labour standards.

The Commissioner for Trade, Karel De Gucht, plans to reinstate shortly the anti-dumping measures suspended pending amendment of the EU regulation that was annulled by the Court of Justice last year following German importers' complaints about the calculation of tariff duties. The measures in question were at any rate due to expire in December 2013, when the five-year term imposed by the regulation comes to an end.

Many companies have taken advantage of this loophole to import Chinese mandarins at rock-bottom prices since the start of the marketing year in November 2012.

Does the Commission intend to apply anti-dumping measures on a retroactive basis?

Does it intend to open a new investigation into the market situation with a view to restoring anti-dumping measures against Chinese exports in the coming years?

Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission
(19 March 2013)

On 22 February 2013, following a proposal by the Commission, the Council published an implementing Regulation re-imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain prepared or preserved citrus fruits (namely mandarins, etc.) originating in the People's Republic of China (Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 158/2013 of 18 February 2013 ([1])). This regulation implements two judgments by the Courts in Luxembourg, the first of 17 February 2011 in case T-122/09 where the General Court annulled the regulation setting the original measures in place in so far as it concerns two exporters and the second of 22 March 2012 in Case C-339/10, where the European Court of Justice declared invalid the same Regulation.

As to the issue of retroactivity, this matter will be carefully considered by the Commission when statistics of imports of canned mandarins from China are available. Once these statistics are available, conclusions will again be submitted to parties as well as to the Member States in the framework of the Anti-dumping and Anti-subsidy Committee. A decision will again be taken by the Commission on the matter and a proposal will eventually be transmitted to the Council.

As to the possible revision of the regulation setting the measures in place, it is recalled that the measures will expire on 31 December 2013 unless a review is initiated before that date at the request of the Union industry.

The law also provides for the possibility to request a review of the measures, if there is sufficient prima facie evidence that the measures or their level are no longer appropriate in view a change in the market situation.

([1]) Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 158/2013 of 18 February 2013 reimposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain prepared or preserved citrus fruits (namely mandarins, etc.) originating in the People's Republic of China, OJ L 49, 22.2.2013.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης P-001646/13
προς την Επιτροπή
Sophocles Sophocleous (S&D)
(18 Φεβρουαρίου 2013)

Θέμα: Πιθανότητα εμπλοκής ιδιωτικής εταιρείας για την αξιολόγηση του νομοθετικού πλαισίου στην Κύπρο για το ξέπλυμα βρώμικου χρήματος

Στην συνεδρίαση της περασμένης Δευτέρας, το Eurogroup απαίτησε να εμπλακεί ιδιωτική εταιρεία για την αξιολόγηση της εφαρμογής του νομοθετικού πλαισίου στην Κύπρο, απόφαση που είναι θεσμικά και πολιτικά απαράδεκτη.

Ως εκ τούτου, ερωτάται η Επιτροπή,

— Ποια η θέση της για το εν λόγω ζήτημα;

— Πώς εξηγείται η παραγνώριση των διεθνών οργανισμών όπως της FATF, του IMF και της Moneyval;

— Έχει ακολουθηθεί στο παρελθόν η ίδια πρακτική σε άλλα κράτη μέλη; Αν ναι, σε ποια;

— Διασφαλίζεται η τήρηση των κανόνων τραπεζικής εχεμύθειας εάν ζητηθεί αυτή η αξιολόγηση από ιδιωτικό οίκο;

Απάντηση του κ. Barnier εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(3 Απριλίου 2013)

Η Επιτροπή διεξάγει επί του παρόντος συζητήσεις με τους εταίρους της στην Τρόικα σχετικά με τον αποτελεσματικότερο τρόπο αξιολόγησης του νομοθετικού πλαισίου. Στις 4 Μαρτίου 2013, η ευρωομάδα πληροφορήθηκε πως η νέα κυπριακή κυβέρνηση συμφώνησε σε ανεξάρτητη αξιολόγηση της εφαρμογής του πλαισίου καταπολέμησης της νομιμοποίησης εσόδων από παράνομες δραστηριότητες στους χρηματοπιστωτικούς οργανισμούς της Κύπρου.

Η FATF και η Moneyval διενεργούν αξιολογήσεις των μελών τους με βάση τις συστάσεις της FATF. Μολονότι οι εν λόγω αξιολογήσεις περιλαμβάνουν κριτήρια που σχετίζονται με το νομικό πλαίσιο, η υφιστάμενη αξιολόγηση της Κύπρου από την Moneyval (που δημοσιεύτηκε τον Σεπτέμβριο του 2011) δεν καλύπτει σε βάθος την εφαρμογή, εξ ου και η ανάγκη της νέας αξιολόγησης.

Η συγκεκριμένη κατάσταση στην οποία βρίσκεται η Κύπρος δεν έχει προκύψει κατά τρόπο συγκρίσιμο σε άλλα κράτη μέλη. Συνεπώς, η πρακτική αυτή δεν έχει υιοθετηθεί σε άλλα κράτη μέλη.

Οι όροι αναφοράς εξακολουθούν να τελούν υπό οριστικοποίηση και θα σέβονται την ισχύουσα νομοθεσία (συμπεριλαμβανομένης της νομοθεσίας της ΕΕ). Η Επιτροπή παραπέμπει το Αξιότιμο Μέλος στη δήλωση της ευρωομάδας της 4ης Μαρτίου 2013 σχετικά με την Κύπρο ([1]).

([1]) http://www.eurozone.europa.eu/newsroom/news/2013/03/eurogroup-statement-on-cyprus/

(English version)

Question for written answer P-001646/13
to the Commission
Sophocles Sophocleous (S&D)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Possible involvement of a private company in evaluating the legal framework in Cyprus concerning money laundering

At last Monday's meeting, the Eurogroup demanded that a private company be engaged to evaluate the implementation of the legal framework in Cyprus concerning money laundering. This is both institutionally and politically unacceptable.

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

— What is its position on this issue?

— Why are international organisations, such as the FATF, the IMF and Moneyval, not being involved instead?

— Has it already adopted this practice in other Member States? If so, in which ones?

— Are any measures being taken to ensure compliance with banking secrecy rules should a private firm be hired to carry out such an evaluation?

Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission
(3 April 2013)

The Commission is in discussion with its Troika partners on the most effective way forward of evaluating the legal framework. On 4 March 2013, the Eurogroup has been informed that the new Cypriot government has agreed on an independent evaluation of the implementation of the anti-money laundering framework in Cypriot financial institutions.

The FATF and MONEYVAL carries out evaluations of their members against the FATF Recommendations. Whilst these contain criteria relating to the legal framework, the existing MONEYVAL evaluation of Cyprus (published in September 2011) does not cover implementation in depth, hence the need for this review.

The specific situation in Cyprus has not arisen in a comparable manner in other Member States. Hence this practice has not been adopted in other Member States.

The Terms of Reference are still being finalised and will respect applicable laws (including EC law). The Commission would refer the Honourable Member to the 4 March 2013 Eurogroup statement on Cyprus ([1]).

(1) http://www.eurozone.europa.eu/newsroom/news/2013/03/eurogroup-statement-on-cyprus/.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης P-001647/13
προς την Επιτροπή
Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)
(18 Φεβρουαρίου 2013)

Θέμα: Διευκρινίσεις για το θέμα του κατώτατου μισθού στην Ελλάδα

Στις 14.2.2013, ο εκπρόσωπος του Ευρωπαίου Επίτροπου, κυρίου Ρεν, αναφερόμενος στην κοινή απάντηση ερώτησής μου και ανάλογης του συναδέλφου μου κ. Κωνσταντίνου Πουπάκη, ανέφερε τα εξής:

«Λυπάμαι που η απάντηση του κ. Ρεν σε κάποιους ευρωβουλευτές παρερμηνεύτηκε σοβαρά στην Ελλάδα. Για την ιστορία: ο Αντιπρόεδρος κ. Ρεν ποτέ δεν σχολίασε επερχόμενες μειώσεις του κατώτατου μισθού, όταν απάντησε σε αυτές τις ερωτήσεις. Αυτό που είπε απαντώντας στις ερωτήσεις που έγιναν είδηση, ήταν: "Αναθεώρηση του συστήματος για τον ελάχιστο μισθό προβλέπεται για το 2014, με στόχο να βελτιωθεί και να γίνει πιο αποτελεσματικό όσον αφορά την αύξηση της απασχόλησης, την καταπολέμηση της ανεργίας και τη βελτίωση της ανταγωνιστικότητας της οικονομίας. Οι κοινωνικοί εταίροι θα συμμετάσχουν σε αυτήν την αναθεώρηση". Ο κ. Ρεν, δεν ανακοίνωσε τίποτα καινούριο σε αυτή την απάντηση, απλώς επανέλαβε αυτά που συμφωνήθηκαν την περίοδο της τελευταίας αναθεώρησης τον Νοέμβριο του 2012, όταν συμφωνήθηκε στην αναθεώρηση του Μνημονίου για την Ελλάδα ότι πράγματι θα υπάρξει αναθεώρηση του συστήματος του κατώτατου μισθού, το πρώτο τρίμηνο του 2014. Δεν υπήρξε καμία σαφής ή σιωπηρή συμφωνία ότι θα υπάρξουν επιπλέον μειώσεις των μισθών. Ο σκοπός αυτής της αναθεώρησης είναι απλώς να αφήνει ανοιχτή την δυνατότητα "αλλαγής" του πλαισίου για τον κατώτατο μισθό και να διασφαλίζει ότι αυτή η πιθανότητα εξετάζεται βάσει μιας "δομημένης ανάλυσης" των οικονομικών εξελίξεων και των εξελίξεων στην αγορά εργασίας, μέσα σε ένα συνεκτικό πλαίσιο. Δεν υπάρχει καμία προειλημμένη απόφαση για το αποτέλεσμα αυτής της αναθεώρησης».

Ταυτόχρονα, στην Ελλάδα, οι αρμόδιοι Υπουργοί, μεταξύ άλλων, δήλωσαν ότι «Δεν τίθεται θέμα μείωσης του κατώτατου μισθού. Είναι ένα ζήτημα στο οποίο η κυβέρνηση έχει συγκεκριμένη θέση, δεν μειώνεται ο κατώτατος μισθός και έχει ήδη κατέβει σε πολύ χαμηλά επίπεδα».

Με τη βεβαιότητα ότι δεν θα χρειαστεί να εξαντληθεί ο χρόνος της επείγουσας ερώτησής μου, ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

Προκειμένου να μην υπάρξουν περαιτέρω «παρερμηνείες», μπορεί ο Επίτροπος να διαβεβαιώσει κατηγορηματικά ότι η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή δεν πρόκειται να θέσει ζήτημα ή να συναινέσει στη μείωση, με οποιαδήποτε μορφή, του κατώτατου μισθού στην Ελλάδα, και ότι συμφωνεί με αυτό που λέει η ελληνική κυβέρνηση ότι «δεν τίθεται θέμα μείωσης του κατώτατου μισθού, ο οποίος έχει ήδη κατέβει σε πολύ χαμηλά επίπεδα»;

Απάντηση του κ. Rehn εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(25 Μαρτίου 2013)

Σύμφωνα με τα μνημόνια που συμφωνήθηκαν μεταξύ της ελληνικής κυβέρνησης και της Επιτροπής — εκ μέρους των κρατών μελών της ζώνης του ευρώ — της Ευρωπαϊκής Κεντρικής Τράπεζας (ΕΚΤ) και του Διεθνούς Νομισματικού Ταμείου (ΔΝΤ), αναθεώρηση του πλαισίου για τον κατώτατο μισθό προβλέπεται να πραγματοποιηθεί το πρώτο τρίμηνο του 2014.

Η αναθεώρηση του συστήματος για τον κατώτατο μισθό θα γίνει με σκοπό να καταστεί απλούστερο και αποτελεσματικότερο όσον αφορά την προώθηση της απασχόλησης και την καταπολέμηση της ανεργίας και να συμβάλει στη βελτίωση της ανταγωνιστικότητας της οικονομίας. Οι κοινωνικοί εταίροι θα διαδραματίσουν καθοριστικό ρόλο στην αναθεώρηση αυτή.

Δεν υφίσταται καμία απολύτως προειλημμένη απόφαση σχετικά με την αναθεώρηση.

(English version)

Question for written answer P-001647/13
to the Commission
Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Clarifications on the issue of the minimum wage in Greece

On 14 February 2013, Commissioner Rehn's representative stated, in a joint answer to my question and to a related question tabled by my colleague, Konstantinos Poupakis:

'I regret that Mr Rehn's answer to some MEPs has given rise to serious misunderstandings in Greece. For the record: Vice-President Rehn did not comment on upcoming cuts in the minimum wage when he answered these questions. What he actually said in response to these questions and was reported was this: "Provision is being made for a review of the minimum wage system for 2014, with the aim of improving it and making it more effective in terms of boosting employment, combating unemployment and improving the competitiveness of the economy. The social partners will be participating in this review." Commissioner Rehn did not say anything new in this answer, merely reiterating what had been agreed at the time of the previous review in November 2012, when it was agreed, in the revision of the Memorandum for Greece, that there would indeed be a review of the minimum wage system in the first quarter of 2014. There was no express or implied agreement that there would be any further reductions in wages. The purpose of this review is simply to leave open the possibility of a "change" in the framework for the minimum wage and ensure that this possibility is examined on the basis of a "structured analysis" of economic developments and labour market trends within a coherent framework. No decision has been taken which in any way pre-empts the outcome of this review.'

At the same time, the Greek ministers responsible replied, *inter alia*, that: 'There is no question of reducing the minimum wage. It is an issue on which the government has a well-defined position. There will be no reduction in the minimum wage, which has already been reduced to a very low level.'

Bearing in mind the urgency of this question, will the Commission say:

In order to avoid further 'misunderstandings', can the Commissioner confirm categorically that the Commission will not raise this issue, or agree to reduce, in any form, the minimum wage in Greece, and that it agrees with what the Greek Government has said, namely that 'there will be no reduction in the minimum wage, which has already been reduced to a very low level'?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission
(25 March 2013)

According to the memoranda agreed between the Greek Government and the Commission — on behalf of the euro area member states — the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), a review of the minimum wage framework shall take place by the first quarter of 2014.

The review of the minimum wage system will be undertaken with the view to possibly improve it's simplicity and effectiveness to promote employment and fight unemployment and help the competitiveness of the economy. The social partners will have a role to play in this review.

There is absolutely no pre-judgment on that review.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-001648/13
an die Kommission
Hans-Peter Martin (NI)
(18. Februar 2013)

Betrifft: Förderung von Impfstoffen

Impfstoffe sind ein wichtiges Mittel, um langfristig die Kosten im Gesundheitswesen zu senken und den Menschen Krankheit und Leiden zu ersparen. Die Kommission fördert die Entwicklung von Impfstoffen für HIV, Malaria und Tuberkulose.

1. Finanziert die Kommission die Entwicklung von Impfstoffen für weitere Krankheiten, oder fördert sie diese anderweitig?

2. Wenn ja, für welche Krankheiten wird eine solche Impfstoffentwicklung gefördert, und auf welchen Betrag beläuft sich die Förderung?

3. Finanziert die Kommission den Einsatz von Impfstoffen in der EU?

4. Wenn ja, in welchen Mitgliedstaaten wird der Einsatz welcher Impfstoffe gefördert?

Antwort von Herrn Borg im Namen der Kommission
(23. April 2013)

Die Kommission fördert die Erforschung und Entwicklung von Impfstoffen über die Forschungsrahmenprogramme (RP). Aus dem laufenden 7. RP fördert die Kommission die Verbundforschung im Bereich der Impfstoffentwicklung mit mehr als 188 Mio. EUR. Von diesem Betrag werden 45 Mio. EUR in Forschungsprojekte investiert, die die grundlegende Vakzinologie betreffen, und 70 Mio. EUR in die Erforschung und Entwicklung von Impfstoffen für Krankheiten außer HIV/AIDS, Malaria und Tuberkulose. Tatsächlich hat die Kommission die Entwicklung von Impfstoffen für eine Reihe von Krankheiten gefördert, etwa Influenza (15 Mio. EUR), Durchfallerkrankungen (11,5 Mio. EUR), Helminthen (9 Mio. EUR), Leishmaniase (9 Mio. EUR), West-Nil-Virus (4,5 Mio. EUR), Hepatitis C (4,5 Mio. EUR), Buruli Ulcer (4,5 Mio. EUR) und Chikungunya-Fieber (4,5 Mio. EUR).

Darüber hinaus fördert die Kommission über ihre Entwicklungspolitik mit 2,5 Mio. EUR bzw. 5 Mio. EUR Maßnahmen, die auf den Aufbau von Kapazitäten und den Technologietransfer ausgerichtet sind, um die Beteiligung von Forschungszentren in Afrika und die erfolgreiche Durchführung klinischer Versuche zur Entwicklung von Impfstoffen für HIV, Malaria und Tuberkulose zu ermöglichen.

Für die Impfpolitik sind in erster Linie die Mitgliedstaaten zuständig. Die Kommission finanziert den Einsatz von Impfstoffen in der EU nicht. Mit der Empfehlung des Rates zur Impfung gegen die saisonale Grippe (2009/1019/EU) ([1]) werden die Mitgliedstaaten aufgerufen, Aktionspläne oder Strategien festzulegen und durchzuführen, die darauf abzielen, die Durchimpfung gegen die saisonale Grippe zu verbessern. Darüber hinaus trägt die Kommission zur Sensibilisierung im Hinblick auf die Bedeutung der Immunisierung bei. In diesem Zusammenhang hat sie im Oktober eine „Konferenz über den Impfschutz von Kindern: Fortschritte, Herausforderungen und Prioritäten für weitere Maßnahmen“ ([2]) organisiert.

([1]) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:348:0071:0072:DE:PDF
([2]) http://ec.europa.eu/health/vaccination/docs/ev_20121016_mi_en.pdf (auf Englisch)

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001648/13
to the Commission
Hans-Peter Martin (NI)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Promotion of vaccines

Vaccines are an important means of making long-term healthcare savings and preventing illness and human suffering. The Commission is promoting the development of vaccines for HIV, malaria and tuberculosis.

1. Is the Commission financing the development of vaccines for other diseases or promoting them in some other way?

2. If so, for which diseases is the development of vaccines being promoted and how much financial support is being provided?

3. Is the Commission funding the use of vaccines in the EU?

4. If so, in which Member States is the use of vaccines being promoted? Which vaccines are involved?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission
(23 April 2013)

The Commission, through the framework Programmes for Research (FP), provides financial support to vaccine research and development activities. From the current 7th FP (FP7), the Commission has supported collaborative vaccine research with more than EUR 188 million. This includes EUR 45 million invested in research projects addressing basic vaccinology, and EUR 70 million to discover and develop vaccines for diseases other than HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis. The Commission has indeed supported the development of vaccines for a number of diseases, including influenza (EUR 15 million), diarrhoeal diseases (EUR 11.5 million), helminths (EUR 9 million), leishmaniasis (EUR 9 million), West Nile Virus (EUR 4.5 million), hepatitis C (EUR 4.5 million), Buruli ulcer (EUR 4.5 million) and Chikungunya (EUR 4.5 million).

In addition, the Commission, through its development policy, has supported action aimed at building capacity and transferring technology to allow the participation of research centres in Africa and the successful conduct of clinical trials for the development of vaccines for HIV, malaria and tuberculosis, with respectively EUR 2.5 and EUR 5 million.

Vaccination policy is primarily a responsibility of Member States. The Commission does not fund the use of vaccines in the Union. The Council Recommendation on seasonal influenza vaccination (2009/1019/EU) ([1]) encourages Member States to adopt and implement action plans or policies aimed at improving seasonal influenza vaccination coverage. Furthermore, the Commission helps raise awareness on the importance of immunisation. In this context it organised a 'Conference on Childhood immunisation: progress, challenges and priorities for further action' ([2]) in October 2012.

([1]) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:348:0071:0072:EN:PDF.
([2]) http://ec.europa.eu/health/vaccination/docs/ev_20121016_mi_en.pdf

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-001649/13
an die Kommission
Hans-Peter Martin (NI)
(18. Februar 2013)

Betrifft: Grenzüberschreitender Räummittelaustausch

In Österreich wurden in diesem Winter große Mengen an Neuschnee registriert. Dies führte in vielen Städten zu Verkehrsproblemen. In einigen anderen EU-Mitgliedstaaten gab es ebenfalls hohen Schneefall und dadurch ähnliche Probleme.

1. Gibt es auf EU-Ebene Programme oder Initiativen, um im Bedarfsfall Schneeräumfahrzeuge, Salzreserven oder andere Räummittel aus weniger betroffenen Ländern in stärker betroffene Länder zu entsenden?

2. Wenn nicht, plant die Kommission, ein solches Programm einzurichten oder den Mitgliedstaaten vorzuschlagen, entsprechende Abkommen zu schließen?

Antwort von Frau Georgieva im Namen der Kommission
(22. April 2013)

1. Es gibt keine derartigen Programme oder Initiativen auf EU-Ebene. Allerdings kann ein betroffener Mitgliedstaat, dessen Ressourcen erschöpft sind, mithilfedes Gemeinschaftsverfahrens für den Katastrophenschutz ([1]) Hilfe beantragen. Dieses Verfahren dient zur Förderung einer verstärkten Zusammenarbeit zwischen der Union und den Mitgliedstaaten bei Katastrophenschutzeinsätzen in Notfällen aller Art, einschließlich extremer Wetterverhältnisse. Im Jahr 2010 erlebte beispielsweise das Vereinigte Königreich einen ungewöhnlich strengen Winter und erbat über das Gemeinschaftsverfahren die Ermittlung von Streusalzbeständen in anderen Mitgliedstaaten zum sofortigen Kauf.

2. Außer der Überarbeitung des Gemeinschaftsverfahrens, das weiter gestärkt werden soll, gibt es zurzeit keine weiteren Initiativen.

([1]) 2007/779/EG, Euratom: Entscheidung des Rates vom 8. November 2007 über ein Gemeinschaftsverfahren für den Katastrophenschutz (Neufassung) (Text von Bedeutung für den EWR), ABl. L 314 vom 1.12.2007.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001649/13
to the Commission
Hans-Peter Martin (NI)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Transnational pooling of snow clearance equipment

This winter Austria has experienced very heavy snowfall, leading to traffic problems in many cities. Heavy snowfall has also occurred in a number of other EU Member States, causing similar problem.

1. Do any programmes or initiatives exist at EU level to despatch snow ploughs, salt reserves or other snow clearance equipment or material from less affected to more affected Member States, where the need arises?

2. If not, does the Commission intend to draw up a programme of this kind or propose that Member States conclude agreements to this end?

Answer given by Ms Georgieva on behalf of the Commission
(22 April 2013)

1. No, there are no such programmes or initiatives at EU level. However, when the capacities of an affected Member State are exhausted, it can request assistance via the European Civil Protection Mechanism ([1]) (the Mechanism) which facilitates reinforced cooperation between the Union and the Member States in civil protection assistance in all types of emergencies, including severe weather conditions. For example, in 2010 the United Kingdom experienced unusually severe winter weather and activated the Mechanism requesting to facilitate identification of road salt supplies in other Member States, available for immediate purchase.

2. There are currently no other initiatives, other than the revision of the abovementioned EU Civil Protection Mechanism, which will be reinforced.

([1]) 2007/779/EC,Euratom: Council Decision of 8 November 2007 establishing a Community Civil Protection Mechanism (recast) Text with EEA relevance, OJ L 314, 1.12.2007.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-001650/13
an den Rat
Ingeborg Gräßle (PPE)
(18. Februar 2013)

Betrifft: Beschäftigungsverhältnisse beurlaubter Beamter

1. Welche Vorschriften und Verfahren gibt es im Generalsekretariat des Rates für Beamte, die neben ihrer Tätigkeit im Generalsekretariat des Rates einer anderen bezahlten Tätigkeit nachgehen wollen, auch einer Tätigkeit auf Honorarbasis? Wie viele Personen gehen neben ihrer Arbeit im Generalsekretariat des Rates noch einer anderen bezahlten Tätigkeit nach?

2. Welche Vorschriften und Verfahren gibt es für Beamte in unbezahltem Urlaub, die in diesem Urlaub einer bezahlten Tätigkeit — sei es in einer Festanstellung oder auf Honorarbasis — nachgehen? Wie viele Personen im Generalsekretariat des Rates sind unbezahlt beurlaubt? Wie viele gehen einer anderen bezahlten Tätigkeit nach?

3. Wie sieht der Rat die Reputationsrisiken aufgrund derartiger Beschäftigungsverhältnisse?

Antwort
(2. Mai 2013)

1. Nach Artikel 12b des Beamtenstatuts muss der Beamte, der eine Nebentätigkeit gegen Entgelt oder ohne Entgelt ausüben will, hierfür die vorherige Zustimmung der Anstellungsbehörde einholen.

Um diese Zustimmung zu erhalten, muss der betreffende Beamte bei der Anstellungsbehörde auf dem Dienstweg einen ordnungsgemäß ausgefüllten Antrag auf Ausübung der Nebentätigkeit zusammen mit den dazugehörigen Nachweisen einreichen.

Die Zustimmung kann nur dann verweigert werden, wenn die Tätigkeit die Leistungsfähigkeit des Beamten beeinträchtigen kann oder mit den Interessen des Organs nicht vereinbar ist. Ferner muss der Beamte die Anstellungsbehörde über jede Veränderung der Nebentätigkeit informieren, die eingetreten ist, nachdem er die Zustimmung eingeholt hat.

Nach den internen Vorschriften des Generalsekretariats des Rates zu Nebentätigkeiten sind berufsmäßig ausgeübte Erwerbstätigkeiten oder Tätigkeiten für ein kommerzielles Unternehmen nicht zulässig.

Lehr- oder andere Unterrichtstätigkeiten (bis zu 60 Stunden pro akademischem Jahr) und die Ausübung eines öffentlichen Amts im Sinne des Artikels 15 des Beamtenstatuts sind die Tätigkeiten, für die die Zustimmung am häufigsten beantragt und im Allgemeinen auch gewährt wird.

2012 gab es bei den gemäß Artikel 12b des Beamtenstatuts gemeldeten und genehmigten Tätigkeiten 21 Fälle von entgeltlicher Tätigkeit und im laufenden Jahr gibt es bis jetzt neun derartige Fälle.

2. Beamte, die Urlaub aus persönlichen Gründen nehmen, dürfen nur dann einer entgeltlichen oder unentgeltlichen Berufstätigkeit nachgehen, wenn sie hierfür zuvor die Genehmigung vonseiten der Anstellungsbehörde erhalten haben. Artikel 12b des Beamtenstatuts gilt entsprechend.

Dem an den Beamten übermittelten Beschluss über die Gewährung eines Urlaubs aus persönlichen Gründen liegt ein Formular bei, mit dem der Beamte die Zustimmung zu einer Nebentätigkeit beantragen kann. Dieses Formular muss ausgefüllt werden, wenn eine Nebentätigkeit geplant ist.

Zur Zeit befinden sich 110 Beamte des Generalsekretariats des Rates in Urlaub aus persönlichen Gründen; 63 von ihnen haben die Zustimmung zur Ausübung einer Erwerbstätigkeit beantragt und auch erhalten.

3. Wie bereits erwähnt, muss jede Nebentätigkeit eines Beamten der Anstellungsbehörde gemeldet und kann der entsprechende Antrag von ihr abgelehnt werden, wenn die Tätigkeit mit den Interessen des Organs nicht vereinbar ist oder die Leistungsfähigkeit des Beamten beeinträchtigt.

Jeder Beamte, ob im aktiven Dienst oder im Urlaub aus persönlichen Gründen, unterliegt Artikel 12 des Beamtenstatuts, der ihn verpflichtet, sich jeder Handlung und jedes Verhaltens zu enthalten, die dem Ansehen seines Amtes abträglich sein könnten. Gegen einen Beamten, der gegen diese Verpflichtung verstößt, kann eine Disziplinarstrafe verhängt werden.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001650/13
to the Council
Ingeborg Gräßle (PPE)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Employment conditions of officials on leave

1. What are the rules and procedures in the Council Secretariat applicable to officials wishing to take another paid job — including on a fee basis — alongside their jobs in the Council Secretariat? How many persons have another paid job, alongside their work in the Council Secretariat?

2. What rules and procedures are applicable to officials on unpaid leave who take another paid job during this leave, on either a permanent or a fee basis? How many people in the Council Secretariat are on unpaid leave? How many of these have another paid job?

3. What is the Council's position on the risk to its reputation arising from employment conditions of this nature?

Reply
(2 May 2013)

1. Pursuant to Article 12b of the Staff Regulations, an official wishing to engage in an outside activity, whether paid or not, shall first obtain the permission of the Appointing Authority.

In order to obtain such permission, the official concerned must send to the Appointing Authority, through his/her immediate superior, a duly completed request to carry out the external activity, together with the appropriate supporting documents.

Such permission can be refused only if the activity in question is such as to interfere with the performance of the official's duties or is incompatible with the interests of the institution. The official must also inform the Appointing Authority of any change in a permitted outside activity which occurs after the official has sought such permission.

According to the internal rules of the General Secretariat of the Council (GSC) on external activities, gainful activities on a professional basis or activities related to a commercial company are not permitted.

The activities for which permission is most frequently requested, and usually granted, are teaching or other educational activities (up to 60 hours per academic year) and the exercise of public office within the meaning of Article 15 of the Staff Regulations.

Of the activities declared and permitted on the basis of Article 12b of the Staff Regulations, there were 21 cases of paid activity in 2012 and there are currently 9 cases of paid activity this year.

2. Officials taking leave on personal grounds may engage in a professional activity, whether gainful or not, only after having received permission from the Appointing Authority to do so. Article 12b of the Staff Regulations applies *mutatis mutandis*.

The decision granting permission for leave on personal grounds, sent to the official concerned, is accompanied by the relevant form with which the official can request permission for an external activity. Completion of this form is compulsory if an external activity is envisaged.

Currently 110 officials of the GSC are on leave for personal grounds, of whom 63 have applied for, and been granted, permission to engage in gainful activities.

3. As mentioned above, any external activity officials wish to engage in must be declared and may be refused by the Appointing Authority if it is incompatible with the interests of the institution or interferes with the performance of the official's duties.

Every official, whether in service or on personal leave, is bound by Article 12 of the Staff Regulations, which provides that he or she must refrain from any action or behaviour which might reflect adversely upon his/her position. Officials in breach of that obligation are liable to disciplinary action.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001651/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Syed Kamall (ECR)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Sanctions against persons responsible for violating human rights in Russia

I have been contacted by a constituent who is concerned about violations of human rights in Russia.

What consideration has the Vice-President/High Representative given to proposing an EU equivalent of the US Magnitsky Act, which would restrict the movement, use of properties and financial services within the EU of persons responsible for violating human rights in Russia?

Answer given by High-Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(24 April 2013)

The EU has for a long time been insisting on the need for a proper investigation that ensures that any person responsible for the death of Mr Magnitsky and for the corruption scandal he uncovered is brought to justice. The EU raised the case again at the EU-Russia Summit on 21 December and during the Commission visit to the Russian government on 21-22 March 2013. Our position is clear: only a credible and thorough judicial investigation will help creating confidence in the rule of law in Russia.

Therefore, as I said in my statement of 20 March, the Russian decision to close this case prematurely, while at the same time opening a posthumous trial against Magnitsky himself is an additional source of concern as to the state of the due process of law in the Russian Federation.

We have taken note of the Sergey Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act in the US which was signed into law by President Obama on 4 December 2012. Initiatives already taken in the European and some national Parliaments underscore the importance the European public attaches to this and similar cases. The EEAS will continue to make clear our expectation that the investigation of this case be resumed and taken forward appropriately.

Sanctions are a part of an integrated and comprehensive EU policy approach and are considered a measure of last resort. Restrictive measures should only be considered in specific situations and in accordance with established EU guidelines. They are a preventive instrument, which would require the highest level of political support and could only be introduced by unanimous agreement of EU Member States.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001652/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Syed Kamall (ECR)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Concerns over adoption laws in Russia

I have been contacted by a constituent who is concerned about a new adoption law passed in Russia.

Is the Vice-President/High Representative aware that two of the USA's successful athletes at the London Paralympics, Jessica Long and Tatyana McFadden, were both adopted from Russia?

What representations will the Vice-President/High Representative make to the Russian Government about the recent decision of Russia's State Duma to ban US citizens from adopting Russian children from the country's orphanages, many of which house orphans in conditions of the most appalling nature that can lead to premature death?

Does the Vice-President/High Representative see this as a breach of human rights?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(9 April 2013)

The HR/VP is aware of the Russian authorities' response to the Sergey Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act in the US, which was signed into law by President Obama on 4 December 2012.

The issue of the rights of the child is high on the EU's agenda. This question, and the situation of children in Russian orphanages in particular, have been addressed with the Russian Federation at three consecutive meetings of EU-Russia human rights consultations. The last time this was discussed was on December 7, 2012, not long before the adoption law was passed by the Russian Duma. The rights of the child were also one of key issues addressed during the EU field visit to Moscow and St Petersburg in spring of 2012. On this occasion the EEAS, together with the EU Delegation in Moscow, met with a number of NGOs working on this issue. The EU also regularly meets and discusses children rights issues with the Russian children ombudsman Pavel Astakhov.

The EEAS will continue following these developments in the Russian Federation very closely.

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-001654/13
à la Commission
Amelia Andersdotter (Verts/ALE), Nathalie Griesbeck (ALDE), Marietje Schaake (ALDE)
et Paweł Zalewski (PPE)
(18 février 2013)

Objet: Critères utilisés par la Commission pour l'organisation de ses consultations multilingues

Dans le cadre de ses consultations publiques sur la protection du savoir-faire des entreprises et des chercheurs ([1]), la Commission élabore des questionnaires en ligne, consultables par les citoyens dans toutes les langues des États membres; l'outil IPM (initiative d'élaboration interactive des politiques) leur permet d'apporter leurs contributions. Cette avancée dans le processus de consultation de la Commission est très encourageante. Cependant, dans le cas des procédures civiles visant à faire respecter les droits de propriété intellectuelle et de la consultation publique sur l'efficacité des procédures et l'accessibilité des mesures ([2]), le questionnaire n'est accessible qu'à la condition de demander préalablement le lien pour y accéder, à l'unité responsable de la consultation. Par surcroît, après avoir suivi cette procédure, les citoyens se voient proposer un questionnaire rédigé uniquement en anglais.

1. Sur quels critères la Commission s'est-elle basée pour décider que la consultation du questionnaire sur les secrets d'affaires devrait être rendue accessible aux citoyens dans toutes les langues de l'Union européenne?

2. Sur quels critères la Commission s'est-elle basée pour décider que la consultation du questionnaire sur les procédures civiles relative au respect des droits de la propriété intellectuelle ne serait pas accessible dans toutes les langues de l'Union européenne?

3. Pourquoi la Commission a-t-elle considéré ces deux consultations différemment en termes d'accessibilité des citoyens?

Réponse donnée par M. Barnier au nom de la Commission
(15 avril 2013)

1. Le questionnaire sur la protection du savoir-faire des entreprises et des chercheurs représentait la première consultation sur le sujet. Afin d'assurer un nombre satisfaisant de réponses étant donné le caractère technique et a priori peu attractif pour le grand public du sujet, il a été décidé de préparer un questionnaire relativement court, traduit dans toutes les langues.

2. Le questionnaire sur les procédures civiles visant à faire respecter les droits de propriété intellectuelle étant en revanche particulièrement long en raison de la complexité du sujet et du fait qu'il constituait une nouvelle étape d'un processus de consultation engagé depuis la fin 2010. La première consultation du public sur ce sujet s'appuyait d'ailleurs sur un rapport de la Commission traduit dans toutes les langues ([3]).

3. La Commission s'efforce en tous cas d'assurer la meilleure accessibilité du public aux consultations dans les limites des ressources à sa disposition, ce qui signifie qu'elle doit faire des choix puisqu'elle ne peut faire appel qu'à un nombre restreint de traducteurs, dans les limites du budget consacré à cette activité (financée par les contribuables). Si elle a dû pour la deuxième consultation portant sur le respect des droits de propriété intellectuelle prendre en compte la taille du document et les coûts considérables qu'entrainerait la traduction dans l'ensemble des langues officielles de l'Union européenne, elle a cependant traduit le document en trois langues (FR, DE, EN) et allongé la période de consultation de trois à quatre mois. Afin d'améliorer l'accessibilité de la consultation, elle a introduit la possibilité de remplir en plusieurs fois le questionnaire, ce qui explique la procédure d'enregistrement préalable.

([1]) http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2012/trade-secrets_en.htm
([2]) http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2012/intellectual-property-rights_en.htm
([3]) Rapport d'application de la directive 2004/48/CE du 22.12.2010 — COM(2010)779final.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-001654/13
aan de Commissie
Amelia Andersdotter (Verts/ALE), Nathalie Griesbeck (ALDE), Marietje Schaake (ALDE) en Paweł Zalewski (PPE)
(18 februari 2013)

Betreft: Voorwaarden waaronder de Commissie raadpleging uitvoert in meerdere talen

In haar openbare raadpleging over de bescherming van bedrijfs- en onderzoeksknowhow ([1]) heeft de Commissie aan burgers vragenlijsten ter beschikking gesteld in de talen van alle lidstaten, met behulp van een IPM-programma voor vragenlijsten bij raadpleging. Dit is een zeer bemoedigende ontwikkeling aangaande de raadplegingprocedures van de Commissie. In het geval echter van de openbare raadpleging aangaande civielrechtelijke handhaving van intellectuele eigendomsrechten, de effectiviteit van de procedure en de toegankelijkheid van de maatregelen ([2]), wordt de vragenlijst pas beschikbaar gesteld na de nadrukkelijke aanvraag van een link aan de afdeling die verantwoordelijk is voor de raadpleging. Zelfs na deze procedure is de vragenlijst enkel voor burgers toegankelijk in het Engels.

1. Op basis van welke criteria heeft de Commissie besloten om de raadpleging aangaande bedrijfsgeheimen in alle talen van de Europese Unie voor burgers beschikbaar te stellen?

2. Op basis van welke criteria heeft de Commissie besloten om de raadpleging aangaande de civielrechtelijke handhaving van intellectuele eigendomsrechten niet in alle talen van de Europese Unie voor burgers beschikbaar te stellen?

3. Wat is de reden dat de Commissie deze twee raadplegingen verschillend behandelt wat betreft toegankelijkheid voor de burgers?

Antwoord van de heer Barnier namens de Commissie
(15 april 2013)

1. De vragenlijst over de bescherming van bedrijfs- en onderzoeksknowhow was de eerste raadpleging over dit onderwerp. Aangezien het een technisch onderwerp betreft dat op het eerste gezicht weinig aantrekkelijk is voor het grote publiek, is besloten om een relatief korte vragenlijst op te stellen en die in alle talen te vertalen om zo toch voldoende antwoorden te verkrijgen.

2. De vragenlijst over de civielrechtelijke handhaving van intellectuele-eigendomsrechten was daarentegen erg lang omdat het een complex onderwerp betreft en omdat met de lijst een nieuwe fase wordt ingegaan van het raadplegingsproces dat eind 2010 is aangevangen. Aan de basis van de eerste openbare raadpleging over dit onderwerp lag overigens een verslag van de Commissie dat wel in alle talen is vertaald ([3]).

3. De Commissie tracht steeds om de raadplegingen zo toegankelijk mogelijk te maken voor het publiek binnen de grenzen van de middelen die zij ter beschikking heeft. Aangezien de Commissie slechts over een beperkt aantal vertalers beschikt, moet zij keuzes maken om binnen het budget te blijven dat is vrijgemaakt voor deze — door de belastingbetaler gefinancierde — activiteit. Voor de tweede raadpleging over de naleving van de intellectuele-eigendomsrechten moest zij dus rekening houden met de omvang van het betrokken document en de aanzienlijke kosten die aan de vertaling in alle officiële talen van de EU zijn verbonden. Zij heeft het document echter wel in drie talen vertaald (Frans, Duits en Engels) en de raadplegingstermijn van drie naar vier maanden verlengd. Om de toegankelijkheid van de raadpleging te verbeteren, bood de Commissie eveneens de mogelijkheid om de vragenlijst in verschillende keren in te vullen. Dit verklaart meteen ook de voorafgaande registratieprocedure.

([1]) http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2012/trade-secrets_en.htm
([2]) http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2012/intellectual-property-rights_en.htm
([3]) Verslag over de toepassing van Richtlijn 2004/48/EG van 22.12.2010 — COM(2010) 779 definitief.

(Wersja polska)

Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-001654/13
do Komisji
Amelia Andersdotter (Verts/ALE), Nathalie Griesbeck (ALDE), Marietje Schaake (ALDE) oraz Paweł Zalewski (PPE)
(18 lutego 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Warunki przeprowadzania przez Komisję konsultacji wielojęzycznych

W ramach konsultacji publicznych w sprawie ochrony know-how przedsiębiorstw i wiedzy badawczej ([1]) Komisja zamieszcza w Internecie kwestionariusze dostępne dla obywateli we wszystkich językach państw członkowskich. Można je wypełniać korzystając z oprogramowania IPM (interaktywne kształtowanie polityki). Jest to niezwykle obiecująca zmiana w procedurach konsultacyjnych Komisji. Jednak, w przypadku cywilnoprawnego egzekwowania praw własności intelektualnej/publicznych konsultacji w sprawie skuteczności postępowania i dostępności środków ([2]), aby uzyskać dostęp do kwestionariusza, trzeba zwrócić się z prośbą o link do działu odpowiedzialnego za konsultacje. Jednak po wykonaniu tej procedury okazuje się, że kwestionariusz jest dostępny wyłącznie w języku angielskim.

1. W oparciu o jakie kryteria Komisja zdecydowała, że kwestionariusz dotyczący konsultacji w sprawie tajemnic handlowych będzie dostępny dla obywateli we wszystkich językach Unii Europejskiej?

2. W oparciu o jakie kryteria Komisja zdecydowała, że kwestionariusz dotyczący konsultacji w sprawie cywilnoprawnego egzekwowania praw własności intelektualnej nie będzie dostępny dla obywateli we wszystkich językach Unii Europejskiej?

3. Co skłoniło Komisję do różnej klasyfikacji tych dwóch konsultacji pod względem dostępności dla obywateli?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Michela Barnier w imieniu Komisji
(15 kwietnia 2013 r.)

1. Kwestionariusz dotyczący ochrony know-how przedsiębiorstw i wiedzy badawczej stanowi pierwszą konsultację w tej sprawie. Aby zapewnić wystarczającą liczbę odpowiedzi, biorąc pod uwagę techniczny i zasadniczo mało atrakcyjny dla ogółu charakter tego zagadnienia, zdecydowano, by przygotować stosunkowo krótki kwestionariusz, przetłumaczony na wszystkie języki.

2. Natomiast kwestionariusz dotyczący cywilnoprawnego egzekwowania praw własności intelektualnej jest wyjątkowo długi ze względu na złożoność tematu i na fakt, że stanowi on nowy etap procesu konsultacji rozpoczętego pod koniec 2010 r. Pierwsze konsultacje społeczne na ten temat opierały się zresztą na sprawozdaniu Komisji przetłumaczonym na wszystkie języki ([3]).

3. W każdym razie Komisja dokłada wszelkich starań, by w ramach zasobów, jakimi dysponuje, zapewnić ogółowi społeczeństwa jak najlepszy dostęp do konsultacji. Oznacza to, że musi ona dokonywać wyborów, gdyż może skorzystać z pomocy jedynie ograniczonej liczby tłumaczy w ramach budżetu przeznaczonego na to działanie (finansowane z pieniędzy podatników). Ponieważ w przypadku drugiej konsultacji dotyczącej egzekwowania praw własności intelektualnej Komisja musiała uwzględnić wielkość dokumentu i znaczne koszty, jakie pociągnęłoby za sobą jego tłumaczenie na wszystkie języki urzędowe Unii Europejskiej, zdecydowała ona o przetłumaczeniu go na trzy języki (FR, DE, EN) i wydłużeniu terminu przeprowadzenia konsultacji z trzech do czterech miesięcy. Aby zwiększyć dostępność do konsultacji, Komisja wprowadziła możliwość wypełnienia kwestionariusza etapami – stąd konieczność uprzedniej rejestracji.

([1]) http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2012/company_law_en.htm
([2]) http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2012/intellectual-property-rights_en.htm
([3]) Sprawozdanie dotyczące stosowania dyrektywy 2004/48/CE z dnia 22.12.2010 r. – COM(2010)779 final.

(Svensk version)

Frågor för skriftligt besvarande E-001654/13
till kommissionen
Amelia Andersdotter (Verts/ALE), Nathalie Griesbeck (ALDE), Marietje Schaake (ALDE) och Paweł Zalewski (PPE)
(18 februari 2013)

Angående: Kriterierna för att kommissionen ska genomföra flerspråkiga samråd

I sitt offentliga samråd om skydd av affärs- och forskningskunnande ([1]) tillhandahåller kommissionen frågeformulär till medborgarna på samtliga medlemsstaters språk genom sitt IPM-enkätverktyg för samråd. Detta är en mycket uppmuntrande utveckling av kommissionens samrådsförfaranden. När det gäller offentligt samråd om civilrättsligt genomdrivande av immateriella rättigheter – i fråga om förfarandens effektivitet och åtgärders tillgänglighet ([2]) – är frågeformuläret dock endast tillgängligt efter att man uttryckligen har begärt en länk till formuläret från den ansvariga enheten för samrådet. Även efter att man har utfört dessa steg är dock själva frågeformuläret endast tillgängligt på engelska för medborgarna.

1. Utifrån vilka kriterier beslutade kommissionen att samrådet om konfidentiell affärsinformation ska finnas tillgängligt på samtliga EU-språk?

2. Utifrån vilka kriterier beslutade kommissionen att samrådet om civilrättsligt genomdrivande av immateriella rättigheter inte ska finnas tillgängligt på samtliga EU-språk?

3. Vad fick kommissionen att bedöma samråden olika i fråga om tillgänglighet för medborgarna?

Svar från Michel Barnier på kommissionens vägnar
(15 april 2013)

1. Samrådet om skydd av affärs- och forskningskunnande utgjorde det första offentliga samrådet i den frågan. Med tanke på att allmänheten antagligen inte skulle finna frågan särskilt intressant och med hänsyn till frågans tekniska karaktär beslutade man för att få in ett nöjaktigt antal svar på frågeformuläret att ta fram ett relativt kort formulär och översätta detta till alla språk.

2. Frågeformuläret i samrådet Civil enforcement of intellectual property rights: public consultation on the efficiency of proceedings and accessibility of measures var däremot synnerligen långt, dels på grund av frågans komplexa karaktär och dels på grund av att det samrådet utgjorde en ny etapp i en samrådsprocess som inletts i slutet av 2010. Det första offentliga samrådet i frågan stödde sig för övrigt på en rapport ([3]) från kommissionen som översatts till alla språk.

3. Kommissionen bemödar sig i samtliga fall om att inom ramen för de resurser som står till dess förfogande se till att samråd är så lättillgängliga som möjligt för allmänheten. Detta innebär att den måste göra val, eftersom den bara har ett begränsat antal översättare och är tvungen att hålla sig inom den budget som avsatts för översättningen (som finansieras av skattebetalarna). Kommissionen var inför det andra samrådet om säkerställande av skyddet för immateriella rättigheter tvungen att ta frågeformulärets längd och de väsentliga kostnader som översättning av formuläret till alla officiella EU-språk skulle medföra i beaktande, men den lät likväl ta fram formuläret på tre språk (FR, DE och EN). Den förlängde dessutom samrådsperioden från tre till fyra månader. I syfte att göra samrådet mer lättillgängligt gjorde kommissionen det också möjligt att fylla i frågeformuläret i flera omgångar, vilket är förklaringen till förfarandet med registrering på förhand för att (via en särskild länk) få tillgång till formuläret.

([1]) http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2012/trade-secrets_en.htm
([2]) http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2012/intellectual-property-rights_en.htm
([3]) Tillämpning av Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2004/48/EG av den 29 april 2004 om säkerställande av skyddet för immateriella rättigheter (KOM(2010) 779 slutlig, 22.12.2010).

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001654/13
to the Commission
Amelia Andersdotter (Verts/ALE), Nathalie Griesbeck (ALDE), Marietje Schaake (ALDE)
and Paweł Zalewski (PPE)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Conditions according to which the Commission holds multilingual consultations

As part of its public consultation on the protection of business and research know-how ([1]), the Commission makes online questionnaires available to citizens in all the languages of the Member States; contributions can be submitted using the IPM questionnaire tool. This is a very encouraging development in the Commission's consultation procedures. However, in the case of the civil enforcement of intellectual property rights/public consultation on the efficiency of proceedings and accessibility of measures ([2]), the questionnaire is only made available after requesting a link from the unit responsible for the consultation. Even after this procedure has been gone through, the questionnaire itself is available to citizens only in English.

1. According to what criteria did the Commission decide that the questionnaire on trade secrets consultation should be made available to citizens in all the languages of the European Union?

2. According to which criteria did the Commission decide that the questionnaire on intellectual property rights civil enforcement consultation would not be made available to citizens in all the languages of the European Union?

3. What made the Commission assess these two consultations differently in terms of accessibility for citizens?

Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission
(15 April 2013)

1. The questionnaire on the protection of business and research know-how is the first consultation on this subject. In order to ensure a satisfactory number of responses, given that its subject-matter is technical and essentially unappealing to the general public, it was decided that the questionnaire would be relatively short and translated into all the EU languages.

2. The questionnaire on the civil enforcement of intellectual property rights was, on the other hand, particularly long because of the complex nature of the subject-matter and given that it constituted a new phase in the consultation process begun at the end of 2010. The first public consultation on this topic was, in fact, based on a Commission report translated into all the EU languages ([3]).

3. The Commission endeavours in all cases to ensure that citizens have the greatest possible access to consultations within the limits of the resources at its disposal. This means that the Commission has to make choices, as it has only a limited number of translators and a limited budget allocated to this activity (financed by taxpayers). Although in the case of the second consultation on the civil enforcement of intellectual property rights the Commission has had to take into account the length of the document and the considerable costs its translation into all the official languages of the European Union would have entailed, it has nevertheless translated the document into three languages (French, German and English) and extended the consultation period from three to four months. In order to improve accessibility to the consultation, the Commission has made it possible to fill in the questionnaire in several stages, hence the prior registration procedure.

([1]) http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2012/trade-secrets_en.htm
([2]) http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2012/intellectual-property-rights_en.htm
([3]) Rapport d'application de la directive 2004/48/CE du 22.12.2010 — COM(2010) 779 final. Report of 22.12.2010 on the implementation of Directive 2004/48/EC — COM(2010) 779 final.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001656/13
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)
Fiorello Provera (EFD)
(18 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: VP/HR — L'Iran condanna un cristiano americano a otto anni di carcere

Secondo l'organizzazione cristiana Open Doors (Porte aperte), il 28 gennaio 2013 un cittadino statunitense di origine iraniana, Saeed Abedini, è stato condannato a otto anni di carcere avendo un giudice deciso che stava cercando di creare chiese cristiane e con ciò minacciava la sicurezza nazionale dell'Iran. La sentenza è stata annunciata nonostante il signor Abedini non abbia avuto il permesso di assistere a talune parti del suo processo. Il presidente della Commissione degli Stati Uniti sulla libertà religiosa internazionale, Katrina Lantos Swett, ha definito la sentenza «uno scandaloso errore giudiziario».

Saeed Abedini è nato in Iran, ma si è convertito al cristianesimo nel 2000 e ha lavorato per realizzare chiese domestiche. È stato interrogato numerose volte, ma si è poi trasferito negli Stati Uniti. Avuto il permesso di tornare in Iran per costruire un orfanotrofio non religioso, dopo diverse visite è stato arrestato e messo sotto processo. Il presidente del Tribunale giudicante nel suo caso è Abbas Pir-Abbassi, che è stato accusato dall'UE di violazioni dei diritti umani. I procuratori accusano il sig. Abedini di essere responsabile della creazione «di una rete di chiese domestiche cristiane» fin dal 2000, anno in cui ha lasciato l'Islam per il cristianesimo. Il governo sostiene, inoltre, che il sig Abedini voleva influenzare le menti dei giovani iraniani volgendole verso il cristianesimo e contro l'Islam.

1. La Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante è a conoscenza del caso di Saeed Abedini?

2. Quali passi è disposta ad effettuare la Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante, onde esercitare pressioni sul governo iraniano affinché abbandoni le accuse contro il signor Abedini, in aggiunta ai tentativi che sta compiendo il governo degli Stati Uniti?

3. Quali passi ha avviato precedentemente la Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante per invitare il governo iraniano a consentire la libertà religiosa ai suoi cittadini?

Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione
(18 aprile 2013)

L'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente è pienamente a conoscenza del caso di Saeed Abedini e si preoccupa per la condanna di 8 anni inflittagli e per il fatto che ai suoi avvocati non sarebbe stato permesso di difenderlo in maniera appropriata.

L'UE continua ad adoperarsi per migliorare la tutela dei diritti delle minoranze in Iran e, più in generale, dei diritti umani. In diverse occasioni l'AR/VP ha espresso preoccupazione per la mancanza di libertà religiosa in Iran. L'incarcerazione di individui sulla base del loro credo religioso contravviene alla convenzione internazionale sui diritti civili e politici di cui l'Iran è paese firmatario. L'AR/VP continua a sollecitare le autorità iraniane affinché garantiscano la parità dei diritti a tutti i cittadini, incluse la libertà di religione e di culto.

A seguito del deterioramento della situazione dei diritti umani in Iran, compresa quella delle minoranze religiose, l'Unione europea ha imposto sanzioni a 87 funzionari iraniani ritenuti responsabili di violazioni dei diritti umani.

In questo contesto, il giudice Pir-Abbasi, incaricato del processo contro Saeed Abedini, è nel mirino per aver partecipato a procedimenti giudiziari contro dei manifestanti dopo le elezioni presidenziali del 2009 in Iran. È inoltre soggetto a un congelamento dei beni e al divieto di viaggio nell'UE.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001656/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Fiorello Provera (EFD)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Iran sentences American Christian to eight years in prison

According to the Christian organisation Open Doors, on 28 January 2013 a US citizen of Iranian origin, Saeed Abedini, was sentenced to eight years in jail after a judge decided that he was trying to establish Christian churches and was therefore threatening Iran's national security. The sentence was handed down even though Mr Abedini was not allowed to attend parts of his trial. The chair of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, Katrina Lantos Swett, has called this sentence 'an outrageous miscarriage of justice'.

Saeed Abedini was born in Iran, but converted to Christianity in 2000 and worked to set up house churches. He was interrogated a number of times, but later moved to the US. He was allowed to return to Iran to build a non-religious orphanage, but after several visits was arrested and put on trial. The presiding judge in his case is Abbas Pir-Abbassi, who has been accused of human rights violations by the EU. Prosecutors claim that Mr Abedini is responsible for creating 'a network of Christian house churches' starting in 2000, the year he left Islam for Christianity. The government also claims that Mr Abedini wanted to sway the minds of Iranian young people by turning them towards Christianity and against Islam.

1. Is the Vice-President/High Representative aware of the case of Saeed Abedini?

2. What steps is the Vice-President/High Representative prepared to take in order to exert pressure on the Iranian Government to drop the charges against Mr Abedini, in addition to the attempts being made by the US Government?

3. What steps has the Vice-President/High Representative previously taken to call on Iran's government to allow its citizens religious freedom?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(18 April 2013)

The High Representative/Vice-President is fully aware of the case of Saeed Abedini. She is concerned about the 8-year sentence handed down to Mr Abedini, as well as reports that his lawyers were not allowed to present his defence in a proper manner.

The EU remains committed to improving the rights of persons belonging to minorities in Iran, alongside with the protection of human rights more generally. The HR/VP has on several occasions expressed concern over the lack of religious freedom in Iran. Imprisoning individuals on the basis of their religious beliefs contravenes the International Convention of Civil and Political Rights, which Iran is signatory to. The HR/VP continues to call upon the Iranian authorities to guarantee equal rights for all of its citizens, including the freedom of religion or belief and worship.

In reaction to the deterioration of the human rights situaiton in Iran, including that of persons belonging to religious minorities, the European Union has adopted sanctions against 87 named Iranian officials responsible for human rights violations.

In this context, judge Pir-Abbasi, who was in charge of Saeed Abedini's trial, is listed for his participation in the court cases against protesters following the 2009 Presidential elections in Iran. He is subject to an asset freeze and travel ban within the EU.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001657/13
to the Commission
Alyn Smith (Verts/ALE)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: European lobbying donations in the USA

The Commission may be aware that, according to the latest governmental figures from the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), around two million of the roughly eight million firearms within the US domestic gun market in 2010 were European-made or -owned. Furthermore, due to the importance of the US domestic market to European gun producers, many of the European manufacturers are actively funding campaigns in the USA against stronger gun laws.

According to data published by the Washington-based gun control group Violence Policy Centre (VPC), Italian-owned Beretta USA donated between USD 1 million and USD 4.9 million to the National Rifle Association (NRA), and its sister company Benelli USA between USD 500 000 and USD 999 000. Austrian-owned Glock USA and German-owned Blaser USA donated between USD 250 000 and USD 499 000, while Walloon-Government-owned brands FNH USA and Browning each helped the NRA out with between USD 50 000 and USD 99 000, as did German-owned Krieghoff International. German-owned Sig Sauer gave between USD 25 000 and USD 49 000.

Whilst I am aware that the Commission already has established guidelines on ethical practices in third countries and that donations such as these would be very difficult to ban, does it not agree that any donations made by European companies to lobbying organisations should be made public in a central register of overseas political donations?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission
(6 June 2013)

The Commission does not plan to establish a publicly available central register of overseas political donations. Establishment of such a register is not in the competence of the Commission.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001659/13
alla Commissione
Matteo Salvini (EFD)
(18 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: Diffusione di un'allerta meteo di rilevanza regionale a cittadini di altri Stati UE in transito in un'area interessata da fenomeni meteorologici straordinari

In data 11 febbraio 2013, a causa di possibili precipitazioni nevose di intensità straordinaria, è stata proibita la circolazione di veicoli aventi massa superiore a 7,5 tonnellate sulle strade di undici regioni italiane; ciononostante, numerosi mezzi pesanti, perlopiù con targa estera, circolavano ugualmente, probabilmente perché i conducenti erano ignari del divieto imposto dalle autorità italiane per fronteggiare l'emergenza neve.

Con l'unione doganale e il mercato unico europeo, il numero di persone e la quantità di merci che viaggiano su gomma all'interno dell'UE, spesso attraversando più Stati in poche ore, è in continua e prevedibile crescita; inoltre l'estensione e la varietà di configurazioni morfologiche dei territori compresi nell'UE consentono la coesistenza di condizioni meteo estremamente differenti anche in aree distanti poche decine o poche centinaia di chilometri una dall'altra. Alla luce di quanto precede, può la Commissione far sapere:

1. quali strumenti e procedure ha proposto o intende proporre per facilitare una tempestiva comunicazione del verificarsi di eventi meteorologici straordinari a carattere regionale, nonché delle disposizioni emanate dalle autorità competenti per gestire il fenomeno, anche a quei cittadini europei che non risiedono nell'area interessata dal fenomeno, né nel paese ove essa è situata, ma che tuttavia si trovano a dovervi transitare nell'arco temporale interessato dal fenomeno suddetto;

2. se, in un'ottica di integrazione europea, ha valutato o sta valutando la possibilità di rendere più omogenea la cartellonistica stradale, e in special modo autostradale, all'interno dell'UE, anche in riferimento ai pannelli informativi telecontrollati a messaggio variabile?

Risposta di Siim Kallas a nome della Commissione
(23 aprile 2013)

1. Nel quadro della direttiva ITS ([1]) le disposizioni relative alla fornitura di un livello minimo di servizi universali d'informazione sul traffico finalizzati alla sicurezza stradale, la cui adozione è prevista per la fine di aprile 2013, garantiranno che tutti i conducenti siano avvertiti tempestivamente di pericoli imminenti, quali eventi climatici eccezionali o un deterioramento delle condizioni stradali.

In seguito, le specifiche per la fornitura di servizi di informazione sul traffico in tempo reale a livello di Unione europea, previste per l'inizio del 2014, definiranno principi e funzionalità comuni per fornire informazioni sul traffico localizzate e orientate agli utenti.

I servizi di informazione sul traffico in parola saranno disponibili agli utilizzatori finali mediante differenti canali di diffusione, quali pannelli a messaggio variabile, dispositivi personali di navigazione e terminali installati a bordo dei veicoli.

2. L'UE ha promosso l'elaborazione di nuovi pittogrammi indipendenti dal linguaggio e continua la sua opera in sede di gruppo di lavoro dell'UNECE ([2]) per la sicurezza stradale con l'obiettivo di ottenerne l'approvazione da parte della Convenzione di Vienna sulla segnaletica stradale ([3]).

([1]) Direttiva 2010/40/UE del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 7 luglio 2010, sul quadro generale per la diffusione dei sistemi di trasporto intelligenti nel settore del trasporto stradale e nelle interfacce con altri modi di trasporto, GU L 207 del 6.8.2010.
([2]) Commissione economica per l'Europa delle Nazioni Unite.
([3]) Convenzione sulla segnaletica stradale firmata a Vienna l'8 novembre 1968.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001659/13
to the Commission
Matteo Salvini (EFD)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Raising regional weather alerts for citizens of other EU countries transiting through an area being affected by extraordinary weather events

On 11 February 2013, due to the possibility of extraordinarily heavy snowfalls, vehicles weighing more than 7.5 tonnes were banned from circulating on the roads of 11 Italian regions. In spite of that, many heavy goods vehicles, mostly with foreign number plates, were still circulating, probably because drivers were unaware of the ban imposed by the Italian authorities to deal with the snow emergency.

With the customs union and the single European market, the number of people and amount of goods travelling by road in the EU, often crossing several states in just a few hours, is constantly and predictably growing. Moreover, the size and variety of the different kinds of territories in the EU mean that very different weather conditions can coexist even in areas that are a few dozen or few hundred kilometres away from each other. In the light of this, can the Commission say:

1. what tools and procedures it has proposed, or intends to propose, with a view to facilitating the timely announcement of extraordinary regional weather events and of the provisions issued by the relevant authorities to manage the event, even to those EU citizens who do not live in the area — or even in the country — affected by the weather event in question, but who have to pass through it at the time;

2. whether, with a view to European integration, it has considered, or is considering, the possibility of making road signs more uniform in the EU, especially on motorways and with regard to remotely controlled message panels?

Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission
(23 April 2013)

1. In the framework of the ITS Directive ([1]), specifications for the provision of road safety related minimum universal traffic information, which will be adopted by the end of April 2013, will ensure that all drivers are timely warned on incoming dangers such as exceptional weather or dangerous road conditions.

Then specifications for the provision of EU-wide real time traffic information services, which are planned for early 2014, will define common principles and functionalities in order to provide user oriented and location relevant traffic information on EU roads.

This traffic information services will be available to end users via different dissemination channels such as variable message signs, personal navigation devices and in-vehicle terminals.

2. The EU has been promoting the development of new language independent pictograms and its further promotion in the UNECE ([2]) working party on Road Traffic Safety with the aim of getting it endorsed as part of the Vienna Convention on road signs ([3]).

([1]) Directive 2010/40/EU of the European parliament and of the Council of 07 July 2010 on the framework for the deployment of Intelligent Transport Systems in the field of road transport and for interfaces with other modes of transport, OJ L 207, 6.8.2010.
([2]) The United Nation Economic Commission for Europe.
([3]) The Convention on Road Sign and Signals done at Vienna on 8 November 1968.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-001660/13
aan de Commissie
Lucas Hartong (NI)
(18 februari 2013)

Betreft: Subsidieverlening gemeente Rotterdam

Op 16 februari 2013 werd bekend ([1]) dat in de deelgemeente Feijenoord van Rotterdam intimidatie en mogelijke fraudepraktijken plaatsvinden. Citaat: „De verwevenheid tussen Turkse politici en maatschappelijke organisaties zou in Feijenoord te groot zijn. Zo krijgt een reïntegratiebureau, met een PvdA-deelraadslid op de loonlijst, jaarlijks een half miljoen subsidie terwijl het bedrijf volgens een interne evaluatie slecht presteert en jobhunters in dienst heeft die „niet of nauwelijks Nederlands spreken". Ook is er subsidie voor een Turkse migrantenorganisatie die voorheen onderdeel uitmaakte van een vereniging waar Turkse PvdA-politici bij betrokken zijn."

1. Kan de Commissie aangeven hoeveel EU-subsidie de gemeente Rotterdam het afgelopen jaar en voor dit jaar heeft ontvangen?

2. Hoeveel van deze subsidies wordt verleend in het kader van het ESF en dan specifiek met de doelstelling „arbeidsreïntegratie" en „integratie migranten"?

3. Kan de Commissie aangeven of er gedurende de looptijd van de subsidieperiode of in ieder geval achteraf een kosten-batenanalyse van deze subsidieverleningen plaatsvindt? Zo ja, wat zijn de criteria daarvoor? Zo nee, waarom niet?

4. Indien blijkt dat de gemeente Rotterdam onzorgvuldig met de haar toevertrouwde EU-subsidies is omgegaan of onvoldoende transparantie en verantwoordelijkheid heeft getoond, wat is dan de mogelijkheid tot sanctie of terugvordering van de verleende subsidie(s)?

Antwoord van de heer Andor namens de Commissie
(26 april 2013)

In Rotterdam is in de periode 2009-2012 ([2]) voor drie projecten subsidie verleend in het kader van het ESF; deze projecten omvatten de volgende acties:

— Actie A: 9 897 867 EUR (toegekend) / tot nu toe betaald: 936 548 EUR

— Actie J: 2 700 000 EUR (toegekend) / tot nu toe betaald: 2 700 000 EUR

Informatie over toegekende en betaalde bedragen:

1. Er bestaat geen subsidie in het kader van het ESF die specifiek gericht is op de integratie van migranten. Het Nederlandse operationele programma (OP) bevat twee subsidieacties voor re-integratie: actie A voor mensen van boven de 55, mensen met een handicap met een arbeidsongeschiktheidsuitkering en inactieven zonder arbeidsongeschiktheidsuitkering. Actie J bestrijdt jeugdwerkeloosheid. Budget voor het ESF-programma in de periode 2007-2013:

— actie A: 161 200 657 EUR

— actie J: 58 000 000 EUR

2. Op basis van het Nederlandse OP moeten alle projecten die gesubsidieerd worden door het ESF voorzien zijn van indicatoren die de behaalde resultaten weergeven (bv. het aantal opgeleide mensen, het aantal aangelegde wegen of het aantal gevonden banen). De resultaten dienen gerapporteerd te worden in de eindverklaring van het project. De resultaten voor het ESF-programma worden elk jaar door de Nederlandse beheersautoriteit ([3]) samengevat en naar de Europese Commissie gestuurd ([4]).

([1]) http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2013/02/16/turkse-politici-intimideren-bestuurders-rotterdamse-deelgemeente/.
([2]) http://www.agentschapszw.nl/projecten/archief.
([3]) MA (Managing authority).
([4]) Jaarlijks uitvoeringsverslag.

3. Het Nederlandse ESF-programma is opgenomen in een uitgebreid (Europees) regelgevingskader. De Nederlandse ESF-regeling ([5]) bevat regels met betrekking tot projectselectie, toezicht en controle. Alle aanvragen worden beoordeeld op basis van de Nederlandse ESF-regeling. De eindverklaring van het project wordt ter plaatse gecontroleerd door de beheersautoriteit. Activiteiten waarvan geen bewijzen van de gemaakte kosten worden geleverd komen niet in aanmerking voor subsidie. De beheersautoriteit corrigeert administratieve fouten. Het ESF-bedrag waarop de begunstigde recht heeft wordt alleen uitgekeerd wanneer er controle heeft plaatsgevonden. Indien er zich onregelmatigheden voordoen worden OLAF en/of SIOD geraadpleegd om de terugvordering van de ten onrechte uitgekeerde EU-subsidies te garanderen en passende sancties op te leggen die in de EU-wetgeving en de nationale wetgeving zijn vastgesteld.

([5]) http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0026313/geldigheidsdatum_15-03-2013.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001660/13
to the Commission
Lucas Hartong (NI)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Subsidies for Rotterdam

On 16 February 2013, acts of intimidation and possible fraud were revealed to be taking place ([1]) in the Rotterdam district of Feijenoord, with allegations of excessive collusion between Turkish politicians and social organisations. For example, a reintegration agency with PvdA district councillor on its payroll receives an annual subsidy of half a million euro, despite what is, according to an internal evaluation, a poor performance and its employment of job hunters who 'speak little or no Dutch'. A Turkish migrant organisation, previously part of an association with which Turkish PvdA politicians are involved, is also receiving subsidies.

In view of this:

1. Can the Commission indicate what EU subsidies were paid to the municipality of Rotterdam last year and this year to date?

2. What subsidies are allocated from the ESF and what amounts are specifically earmarked for 'work reintegration' and 'the integration of migrants'?

3. Is a cost-benefit analysis in respect of these subsidies carried out while they are being paid or afterwards? If so, on what criteria is it based? If not, why not?

4. If it emerges that the Rotterdam municipal authority has been negligent in its management of EU subsidies or has fallen short of the necessary standards of transparency and responsibility, what possibilities exist of imposing penalties or recovering the subsidies paid?

Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission
(26 April 2013)

Rotterdam was granted ESF for 3 projects in the period 2009-2012 ([2]), covered by the following actions:

— Action A: EUR 9.897.867 (granted) / paid until now: EUR 936.548

— Action J: EUR 2.700.000 (granted) / paid until now: EUR 2.700.000

Information on amounts granted and paid:

1. There is no specific ESF earmarking for integration of migrants. The Dutch operational programme (OP) contains two subsidy actions for re-integration: Action A for people (55+) on benefits, for people on disability benefits and for inactive people without benefits. Action J, tackling youth unemployment. Budgets for the 2007-2013 ESF programme:

— Action A: EUR 161.200.657

— Action J: EUR 58.000.000

2. Based on the Dutch OP all projects funded by ESF must take track of indicators to show results achieved (e.g. number of people educated, pathways finished or jobs found). The results must be reported in the final project declaration. Results for the ESF programme are summarised by the Dutch Managing authority ([3]) each year and sent to the EC ([4]).

([1]) http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2013/02/16/turkse-politici-intimideren-bestuurders-rotterdamse-deelgemeente/.
([2]) http://www.agentschapszw.nl/projecten/archief
([3]) MA.
([4]) Annual Implementation Report.

3. The Dutch ESF programme is implemented under a comprehensive (European) regulatory framework. The Dutch ESF regulation ([5]) contains rules on project selection, monitoring and auditing. All applications are assessed on the basis of the Dutch ESF regulation. The final project declaration is being audited on the spot by the MA. Costs for activities not supported by evidence are not eligible. The MA corrects administrative errors. Only after the audit the eligible ESF amount is paid to the beneficiary. In case of irregularities OLAF and/or the SIOD are consulted in order to guarantee the recovery of unduly paid EU subventions and the application of appropriate sanctions as provided for by EU and national law.

([5]) http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0026313/geldigheidsdatum_15-03-2013

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-001661/13
aan de Commissie
Lucas Hartong (NI)
(18 februari 2013)

Betreft: Labelling „halal kip"

Vandaag werd bekend ([1]) dat het grootste deel van de Nederlandse kipfilet halal geslacht is, dus onverdoofd, ook *als dat niet op de verpakking staat*. Citaat: „Om export van weinig populaire delen van de kip naar moslimlanden mogelijk te maken, wordt voor het gemak alle kip halal geslacht."

1. Is het op grond van EU regelgeving (o.a. Verordening (EU) nr. 1169/2011) toegestaan dat kip halal (onverdoofd) geslacht wordt ter*wijl dit niet vermeld staat op het label dat op de verpakking zit?*

2. De kip wordt onverdoofd geslacht om voor „halal" in aanmerking te komen en daartoe dient een imam aanwezig te zijn. Is op grond van wet- en regelgeving van de EU een imam gecertificeerd om te slachten?

Antwoord van de heer Borg namens de Commissie
(8 april 2013)

De huidige EU-wetgeving inzake de etikettering van levensmiddelen ([2]) vereist niet dat informatie op het etiket van vlees en vleesproducten wordt opgenomen over de religieuze slachtmethode van dieren. De Commissie zal echter overeenkomstig overweging 50 van Verordening (EU) nr. 1169/2011 ([3]), waar het geachte Parlementslid naar verwijst, een onderzoek uitvoeren naar de mogelijkheid informatie te verstrekken aan de consument over het bedwelmen van dieren in het kader van de in 2012 aangenomen strategie van de Europese Unie voor de bescherming en het welzijn van dieren ([4]).

De voorwaarden voor halal producten zijn niet op EU-niveau vastgesteld en zijn met name afhankelijk van particuliere regelingen die per lidstaat verschillen. De EU-wetgeving ([5]) omvat echter de mogelijkheid dieren niet te bedwelmen om religieuze redenen en laat de tenuitvoerlegging van deze uitzondering over aan de lidstaten.

De meest gebruikelijke methode voor het bedwelmen van kippen in de EU (collectieve waterbadbedwelming) kan voor omkeerbare bedwelming worden gebruikt. Daarom wordt slachting zonder bedwelming niet systematisch gebruikt voor het produceren van halal kip, afhankelijk van de behoeften van islamitische klanten.

([1]) http://www.telegraaf.nl/binnenland/21302071/__Alle_kip_halal_geslacht__.html
([2]) Richtlijn 2000/13/EG van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van 20 maart 2000 betreffende de onderlinge aanpassing van de wetgeving der lidstaten inzake de etikettering en presentatie van levensmiddelen alsmede inzake de daarvoor gemaakte reclame, PB L 109 van 6.5.2000.
([3]) Verordening (EU) nr. 1169/2011 van het Europese Parlement en de Raad van 25 oktober 2011 betreffende de verstrekking van voedselinformatie aan de consumenten, PB L 304 van 22.11.2011.
([4]) COM(2012) 6 final.
([5]) Verordening (EG) nr. 1099/2009 van de Raad inzake de bescherming van dieren bij het doden, PB L 303 van 18.11.2009.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001661/13
to the Commission
Lucas Hartong (NI)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Labelling of halal chicken

It was revealed today ([1]) that the majority of Dutch chicken fillets come from birds slaughtered in a halal manner, i.e. without stunning, even when this is not mentioned on the packaging. I quote: 'To make things easier, so that the less popular parts of the chicken can be exported to Muslim countries, all chickens are slaughtered in a halal manner.'

1. Is it permissible under EC law (including Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011) for chickens to be slaughtered in a halal manner (i.e. without stunning) when this is not indicated on the label on the packaging?

2. Chickens are slaughtered without stunning in order to count as halal. For that purpose an imam has to be present. Under EU legislation, is an imam certified to carry out the slaughter of animals?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission
(8 April 2013)

The current EU food labelling legislation ([2]) does not require the information on the religious method used during the animal slaughtering to be provided on the label of meat and meat products. However, in accordance with Recital 50 of Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 ([3]) referred to by the Honourable Member, the Commission will perform a study on the opportunity to provide the consumer with information on the stunning of animals in the context of the Union strategy for the protection and welfare of animals adopted in 2012 ([4]).

The qualification for Halal products is not regulated at EU level and it mainly depends on private schemes which vary among the Member States. However, the EU legislation ([5]) includes the possibility of not stunning animals for religious reasons, the implementation of this derogation being left to the Member States.

The most common method for stunning chicken in the EU (multiple waterbath stunning) can be used to deliver reversible stunning. Therefore, slaughter without stunning is not systematically used to produce Halal chicken, depending on the requirements of the Muslim clients.

([1]) http://www.telegraaf.nl/binnenland/21302071/_Alle_kip_halal_geslacht_.html
([2]) Directive 2000/13/EC of the Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the labelling, presentation and advertising of foodstuffs, OJ L 109, 6.5.2000.
([3]) Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 of the Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on the provision of food information to consumers, OJ L 304, 22.11.2011.
([4]) COM(2012)6 final.
([5]) Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009 on the protection of animals at the time of killing, OJ L 303, 18.11.2009.

(Wersja polska)

Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-001662/13
do Komisji
Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD) oraz Jacek Olgierd Kurski (EFD)
(18 lutego 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Pozycja Gazpromu na rynku Europejskim

W ostatnich dwóch latach Gazprom dokonał wielu zakupów na europejskim rynku energetycznym. W 2011 r. Gazprom Schweiz kupił GWH Gashandel GmbH (Austria) oraz Promgas (Włochy). Dodatkowo rosyjski koncern poczynił znaczne inwestycje w sektorze upstreamu przejmując udziały w złożach gazu miedzy innymi w Niemczech i morzu północnym (miedzy innymi złoża Middelie, Emerald).

Jednocześnie stara się blokować inwestycje związane z ewentualnymi alternatywami na dostawę gazu (blokowanie gazociągu Transkaspijskiego oraz Nabucco).

1. Jak Komisja ocenia zaangażowanie Gazpromu na rynkach unijnych?

2. Jakie działania podejmuje Komisja, aby zwiększyć konkurencyjność na rynku przesyłu oraz handlu gazem dla Europy?

3. Jak komisja reagowała na działania podejmowane przez Gazprom w celu ograniczanie możliwości rozwoju faktycznej konkurencji na rynku gazu.

4. Dlaczego Komisja zgodziła się na zakup przez Gazprom spółek GWH Gashandel GmbH (Austria), Promgas (Włochy)?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Joaquina Almunię w imieniu Komisji
(24 kwietnia 2013 r.)

Każde przedsiębiorstwo prowadzące działalność wewnątrz Unii Europejskiej musi przestrzegać prawa UE, w szczególności przepisów rynku wewnętrznego i zasad konkurencji, w tym rozporządzenia UE w sprawie kontroli łączenia przedsiębiorstw. Niniejsze przepisy obowiązują Gazprom, podobnie jak każde inne przedsiębiorstwo prowadzące działalność na rynkach UE, niezależnie od jego miejsca rejestracji. Przepisy te ustanawiają równe warunki działania, zapewniając nie tylko równe szanse, lecz także równe obowiązki.

Komisja angażuje się w pełne wdrożenie rynku wewnętrznego gazu ziemnego, które przewiduje między innymi wdrożenie w państwach członkowskich trzeciego pakietu energetycznego oraz harmonizację zasad rynkowych. Są to ważne kroki na drodze do stworzenia konkurencyjnych rynków z myślą o unijnych konsumentach.

4 września 2012 r. Komisja ogłosiła wszczęcie dochodzenia w sprawie możliwego naruszenia art. 102 TFUE przez Gazprom. Komisja podejrzewała stosowanie trzech zakłócających konkurencję praktyk:

a) segmentację rynku poprzez uniemożliwianie swobodnego przepływu gazu pomiędzy państwami członkowskimi;

b) stosowanie nieuczciwych cen wobec klientów; oraz

c) tworzenie przeszkód dla dywersyfikacji źródeł dostaw.

Wszczęcie procedury oznacza rozpoczęcie szczegółowego dochodzenia, jednak nie przesądza o jego wyniku.

Nabycie obydwu przedmiotowych przedsiębiorstw (GWH Gashandel GmbH and Promgas S.p.A) [1] zostało zgłoszone zgodnie z ust. 5 lit. b) obwieszczenia Komisji w sprawie procedury uproszczonej. W momencie zgłoszenia Gazprom sprawował już wspólną kontrolę nad przedsiębiorstwami, dlatego też transakcja „nabycia wyłącznej kontroli" odbywała się w oparciu o procedurę uproszczoną. Zgodnie z zastosowaną procedurą uproszczoną i przy braku szczególnych okoliczności transakcje te nie stwarzały podstaw do zastrzeżeń w zakresie konkurencji i zostały odpowiednio zatwierdzone przez Komisję.

[1] Sprawa COMP/M.6409 – GAZPROM SCHWEIZ/PROMGAS i sprawa COMP/M.5985 – ZMB CH/GWH.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001662/13
to the Commission
Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD) and Jacek Olgierd Kurski (EFD)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Gazprom's position in the European market

In the past two years Gazprom have made many acquisitions in the European energy market. In 2011 Gazprom Schweiz bought GWH Gashandel GmbH (Austria) and Promgas (Italy). In addition, the Russian group has made significant investments in the upstream sector, acquiring stakes in gas deposits in, among other places, Germany and the North Sea (including the Middelie and Emerald deposits).

At the same time it is attempting to block investments connected with potential alternative gas supplies (e.g. the Trans-Caspian and Nabucco pipelines).

1. How does the Commission assess Gazprom's involvement in EU markets?

2. What measures is the Commission taking to increase competitiveness in the transmission and trading of gas for Europe?

3. How has the Commission reacted to Gazprom's attempts to restrict opportunities for developing real competition in the gas market?

4. Why did the Commission approve Gazprom's acquisitions of GWH Gashandel GmbH (Austria) and Promgas (Italy)?

Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission
(24 April 2013)

Any company active in the European Union has to abide by EC law and in particular internal market rules and competition rules, including the EU merger regulation. Gazprom is subject to these provisions the same as any other company active in EU markets, regardless of its place of registration. Those rules provide for a level playing field offering equal opportunities, but also equal responsibilities.

The Commission is committed to the completion of the internal market in gas including specifically the implementation of the Third Energy Package in Member States as well as the harmonisation of market rules. These are significant steps towards the creation of competitive markets for the benefit of EU consumers.

On 4 September 2012, the Commission announced the opening of an investigation into a possible infringement of Article 102 TFEU by Gazprom. The Commission suspected three anti-competitive practices:

(a) market segmentation by preventing the free flow of gas between Member States;

(b) unfair prices towards its customers; and

(c) the creation of barriers to diversifying supply.

The opening of proceedings signals the start of an in-depth investigation, but does not prejudge its outcome.

The two acquisitions referred to (GWH Gashandel GmbH and Promgas S.p.A) ([1]) were both notified under paragraph 5(b) of the Commission's simplified procedure notice. At the time of notification, Gazprom already had joint control over the companies, thereby rendering the transaction a 'sole control acquisition' dealt with under the simplified procedure. In light of the application of the simplified procedure, and the absence of special circumstances, the transactions did not give rise to competition concerns and were accordingly cleared by the Commission.

([1]) Case No COMP/M.6409 — GAZPROM SCHWEIZ/ PROMGAS and Case No COMP/M.5985 — ZMB CH / GWH.

(Wersja polska)

Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-001663/13
do Komisji
Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD) oraz Jacek Włosowicz (EFD)
(18 lutego 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Unikanie opłat celnych

W 2010 r. Europejski Urząd ds. Zwalczania Nadużyć Finansowych w raporcie nr OF/2010/0827 stwierdził, że krzem metaliczny sprowadzany z Tajwanu w rzeczywistości pochodzi z Chin. Jego import z Tajwanu pozwalał na ominięcie unijnych ceł ochronnych. Mimo podejrzeń kierowanych ze strony OLAFu, Komisja Europejska nie wszczęła wówczas postępowania w sprawie o obejście przez firmy importerów unijnych opłat antydumpingowych. Pozwoliło to firmom płacić stawki 5,5 % zamiast ceł w wysokości 49 %.

W związku z powyższym chciałbym zadać Komisji następujące pytania:

1. Dlaczego, mimo informacji przekazanych przez OLAF już w 2010 r., Komisja dopiero w lipcu 2012 r. wszczęła postępowania w sprawie o obejście cła antydumpingowego dla importu krzemu metalicznego z Tajwanu?

2. Jakie Komisja podjęła działania, aby zwiększyć monitoring prób obejścia ceł antydumpingowych na produkty metalowe sprowadzane na teren Unii Europejskiej z Chin?

3. Jakie są roczne średnie koszty dla gospodarek państw unijnych oszustw i prób wyłudzenia na cłach antydumpingowych? Proszę o podział na państwa członkowskie.

Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Karela De Guchta w imieniu Komisji
(25 kwietnia 2013 r.)

Artykuł 13 podstawowego rozporządzenia antydumpingowego stanowi, że dochodzenia w sprawie obejścia środków wszczynane są przez Komisję lub na wniosek państwa członkowskiego lub każdej zainteresowanej strony w przypadkach, gdy wniosek zawiera wystarczające dowody dotyczące czynników wymienionych w art. 13 ust. 1. Komisja może zatem wszczynać dochodzenia zgodnie z art. 13 jedynie, gdy posiada wystarczające dowody w celu spełnienia wymogów określonych w przepisach prawa.

Z chwilą uzyskania wystarczających dowodów *prima facie* dotyczących przywozu krzemu metalicznego, Komisja wszczęła dochodzenie w sprawie obejścia środków, a przywóz z Tajwanu objęła obowiązkiem rejestracji. Dnia 5 kwietnia 2013 r. cło antydumpingowe, nałożone rozporządzeniem wykonawczym (UE) nr 467/2010 na przywóz krzemu pochodzącego z Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej, rozszerzono na przywóz krzemu wysyłanego z Tajwanu, zgłoszonego lub niezgłoszonego jako pochodzący z Tajwanu.

Komisja została poinformowana, że krzem metaliczny o zgłoszonej wartości przekraczającej 23 000 000 EUR został przywieziony do 12 państw członkowskich w 607 partiach. Łączna wartość nieuiszczonego cła antydumpingowego obejmuje kwotę około 13 900 000 EUR. Komisja została poinformowana, że wszystkie importujące państwa członkowskie wszczęły postępowania w celu odzyskania środków. Mimo iż ze względu na charakter takich praktyk trudno określić łączne straty z tytułu oszustw celnych i obchodzenia cła antydumpingowego, Komisja monitoruje statystyki przywozu w odniesieniu do produktów objętych środkami ochrony handlu przy wsparciu organów celnych państw członkowskich i podejmuje działania w uzasadnionych przypadkach, jak przedstawiono powyżej.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001663/13
to the Commission
Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD) and Jacek Włosowicz (EFD)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Circumvention of customs duties

In 2010 the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) stated, in report No OF/2010/0827, that silicon metal imported from Taiwan in fact originated in China. The goods were imported from Taiwan in order to avoid paying EU safeguard duties. Despite OLAF's suspicions, the Commission did not at the time initiate proceedings for circumvention of EU anti-dumping duties by import firms. This allowed the companies concerned to pay a rate of 5.5% instead of duties of 49%.

Given the above:

1. Why, despite the information provided by OLAF back in 2010, did the Commission wait until July 2010 to initiate proceedings for circumvention of anti-dumping duties on the import of silicon metal from Taiwan?

2. What action has the Commission taken to step up monitoring of attempts to circumvent anti-dumping duties on metal goods imported into the EU from China?

3. What are the average yearly costs to the economies of EU Member States as a result of fraud and attempts to circumvent anti-dumping duties? Please provide a breakdown by Member State.

Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission
(25 April 2013)

Article 13 of the basic anti-dumping Regulation provides that anti-circumvention investigations shall be initiated on the initiative of the Commission or at the request of a Member State or any interested party on the basis of sufficient evidence regarding the factors set out in Article 13(1). The Commission can therefore only initiate an investigation pursuant to Article 13 when there is enough evidence at its disposal in order to meet the statutory requirements set out in the law.

Once sufficient prima facie evidence was available with respect to imports of silicon metal, the Commission initiated an anti-circumvention investigation and made imports from Taiwan subject to registration. On 5 April 2013, the anti-dumping duties imposed by Implementing Regulation (EU) No 467/2010 on imports of silicon originating in the People's Republic of China were extended to imports of silicon consigned from Taiwan, whether declared as originating in Taiwan or not.

The Commission has been informed that the silicon metal has been imported into 12 Member States with the reported value in excess of EUR 23 000 000 of 607 consignments. The anti-dumping duties at risk amount to approximately EUR 13 900 000. The Commission has been informed that all importing Member States initiated recovery proceedings. While it is difficult to determine the costs of fraud and circumvention of anti-dumping duties, given the very nature of such practices, the Commission monitors import statistics for products under trade defence measures with the assistance from Member States' customs administrations and takes action, where justified, as discussed above.

(Wersja polska)

Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-001664/13
do Komisji (Wiceprzewodniczącej/Wysokiej Przedstawiciel)
Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD) oraz Jacek Włosowicz (EFD)
(18 lutego 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel – Sankcje wobec Iranu

W październiku 2012 r. Unia Europejska rozszerzyła zakres swoich sankcji wobec Iranu. Mimo kontynuowania sankcji Iran wciąż pozostaje znacznym sprzedawcą ropy.

1. Jaka jest podstawa prawna rozszerzenia unijnych sankcji wobec Iranu?

2. Hiszpania, Portugalia oraz Grecja kupowały znaczne ilości irańskiej ropy. Czy Komisja posiada informacje, jakie straty poniosły wspomniane państwa ze względu na decyzję 2012/35/WPZiB dotyczącą zakazu kupowania ropy z Iranu? Jakie są koszty przystosowania instalacji do przetwarzania ropy do nowego surowca?

3. Jak Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel ocenia aktualne sankcje wobec Iranu?

4. Iran sprzedaje swoją ropę do Rosji oraz krajów Środkowo Azjatyckich. Jaka jest pewność, że nie sprzedają one surowca dalej do Europy.

5. Czy środki finansowe przekazywane do Afganistanu, w ramach Wieloletniego Programu Indykatywnego na lata 2010-2013 na odbudowę kraju służą płaceniu za irańską ropę zgodnie z umową dotyczącą dostaw paliwa zawartą między Teheranem a Kabulem w 2011 r.?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez Wysoką Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodniczącą Catherine Ashton w imieniu Komisji
(23 maja 2013 r.)

1. Podstawą prawną polityki UE w zakresie środków ograniczających, w tym środków ograniczających wobec Iranu, jest TUE, a w szczególności jego art. 29. Środki przyjęte na podstawie art. 29 TUE są wprowadzane do unijnego porządku prawnego rozporządzeniem Rady UE, zgodnie z art. 215 Traktatu o funkcjonowaniu UE. Jednym z celów tych środków jest uniemożliwienie Iranowi wykorzystywania dochodów uzyskanych z sektora energetycznego na działalność stwarzającą ryzyko rozprzestrzeniania broni jądrowej.

2. Komisja nie dysponuje dokładnymi informacjami dotyczącymi ewentualnych strat poniesionych przez Hiszpanię, Portugalię lub Grecję na skutek zakazu kupowania ropy. Rafinerie ropy naftowej są dostosowane do przetwarzania ropy naftowej o szczególnych właściwościach. Przetwarzanie różnych typów ropy naftowej może przynosić rezultaty gorsze od optymalnych oraz zmniejszyć marżę zysku. Konkretne straty zależą od okoliczności.

3. Zakaz przywozu irańskiej ropy ma znaczący wpływ na dalsze ograniczenie środków finansowych dostępnych Iranowi na rozwój działań stwarzających ryzyko rozprzestrzeniania broni jądrowej.

4. Rozporządzenie Rady (UE) nr 267/2012 w sprawie środków ograniczających wobec Iranu ustanawia zakaz świadomego i umyślnego uczestnictwa w działaniach, których celem lub skutkiem jest ominięcie zakazu kupowania ropy. W związku z tym podmiotom z UE nie wolno obchodzić zakazu kupowania irańskiej ropy, w tym pozyskiwać jej za pośrednictwem państw trzecich. Główna odpowiedzialność za egzekwowanie sankcji spoczywa na państwach członkowskich.

5. Środki przyznane Afganistanowi w ramach wieloletniego programu indykatywnego na lata 2010-2013 wykorzystywane są w celu wspierana projektów w zakresie zdrowia, rolnictwa i sprawowania rządów, a ich przekazywanie odbywa się za pośrednictwem funduszy powierniczych zarządzanych przez Bank Światowy i ONZ.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001664/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD) and Jacek Włosowicz (EFD)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Sanctions against Iran

In October 2012, the European Union broadened its sanctions against Iran. Despite the continuing sanctions, Iran remains a significant oil trader.

1. What is the legal basis for broadening the EU's sanctions against Iran?

2. Spain, Portugal and Greece were buying significant amounts of Iranian oil. Does the Commission have any information about the losses incurred to these countries as a result of Council Decision 2012/35/CFSP banning the purchase of oil from Iran? What are the costs of converting oil processing facilities to a new raw material?

3. How does the Vice-President/High Representative assess the current sanctions against Iran?

4. Iran sells its oil to Russia and the countries of central Asia. What assurances are there that these countries do not then sell the oil to Europe?

5. Are the funds provided to Afghanistan as part of the Multiannual Indicative Programme 2010-2013 for the reconstruction of the country used to pay for Iranian oil, bought in accordance with the fuel supply contract concluded between Tehran and Kabul in 2011?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(23 May 2013)

1. The legal basis for the EU's restrictive measures policies, including regarding restrictive measures against Iran, is the TEU and in particular Article 29 thereof. The measures decided under Article 29 TEU are enacted in the Union legal order by a EU Council Regulation based on Article 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. One of the objectives of the measures is to prevent Iran from using revenues derived from its energy sector to fund its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.

2. The Commission does not dispose of precise information regarding possible losses incurred by Spain, Portugal or Greece as a result of the oil ban. Crude oil refineries are calibrated to process crude oil with particular characteristics. Processing different crude oils would generally produce sub-optimal results, and could reduce profit margins. The precise losses would depend on the circumstances.

3. The ban on import of Iranian oil is having a significant effect in further restricting the financial resources available to Iran to develop its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activites.

4. Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran provides that it is prohibited to participate, knowlingly or intentionally, in activities the object or effect of which is to circumvent the oil ban. EU operators are therefore under an obligation not to circumvent the Iranian oil ban, including by obtaining it via third countries. The primary responsibility for enforcement of sanctions rests with the MS'.

5. Funds provided to Afghanistan in the framework of the Multiannual Indicative Programme 2010-2013 are used to support health, agriculture and governance projects through trust funds administered by the World Bank and the UN.

(Wersja polska)

Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-001665/13
do Komisji
Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD)
(18 lutego 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel – Zmiany w ukraińskim prawie referendalnym

27 listopada prezydent Ukrainy Wiktor Janukowycz podpisał ustawę o referendum powszechnym, która umożliwia stanowienie prawa bez udziału parlamentu. Istotnie zmienia ona ustrój konstytucyjny Ukrainy, ograniczając rolę parlamentu na rzecz władzy wykonawczej. Ukraińska opozycja wskazuje, że partie polityczne pozbawione zostały wpływu na organizację referendów oraz, że głównym powodem jej uchwalenia jest zamiar wprowadzenia wyboru prezydenta przez parlament zamiast głosowania powszechnego.

1. Jak Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel ocenia nową ustawę o referendum przyjętą na Ukrainie?

2. Czy Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel podziela obawy opozycji ukraińskiej dotyczące jej niedemokratycznego charakteru?

3. Jak Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel ocenia zmiany w ukraińskim prawie, w kontekście ewentualnych starań Ukrainy o przyjęcie do Wspólnoty Europejskiej?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez Wysoką Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodniczącą Catherine Ashton w imieniu Komisji
(24 kwietnia 2013 r.)

Wysoka Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodnicząca jest świadoma, że przyjęcie ustawy o referendum przez ustępujący parlament ukraiński wywołało reakcje społeczeństwa obywatelskiego i przedstawicieli opozycji wskazujących, że przepisy te są niezgodne z konstytucją Ukrainy.

Wysoka Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodnicząca wspiera ścisły dialog pomiędzy władzami Ukrainy a ekspertami Komisji Weneckiej/Radą Europy w celu wyjaśnienia kwestii zgodności ze standardami europejskimi. Wysoka Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodnicząca podkreślała także wielokrotnie potrzebę zapewnienia uczestnictwa i przejrzystości w przypadku tego typu inicjatyw ustawodawczych, którym powinna towarzyszyć szeroka debata publiczna odzwierciedlająca poglądy ogółu obywateli ukraińskich. Owe inicjatywy muszą być również w pełni zgodne z obowiązującymi procedurami. Reforma konstytucji Ukrainy powinna przebiegać zgodnie z mechanizmem ustanowionym przez obowiązującą konstytucję.

Konkluzje w sprawie Ukrainy przyjęte przez Radę do Spraw Zagranicznych 10 grudnia 2012 r. ([1]) wyznaczają ogólny kierunek polityki UE wobec Ukrainy. Tempo zaangażowania UE zależeć będzie od osiąganych przez Ukrainę postępów, między innymi w zakresie wdrażania programu stowarzyszeniowego zgodnie z międzynarodowymi standardami.

([1]) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/134136.pdf

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001665/13
to the Commission
Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Changes to Ukraine's referendum law

On 27 November 2012 Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych signed a referendum law which will pave the way for lawmaking without the involvement of parliament. This major change to Ukraine's constitutional system reduces parliament's power to the benefit of the government. The opposition in Ukraine has pointed out that political parties have been deprived of their influence when it comes to referenda, and that the law was adopted principally with the aim of making it possible for the president to the elected by the parliament, rather than via a general election.

1. What view does the Vice-President/High Representative take of Ukraine's new referendum law?

2. Does the Vice-President/High Representative share the Ukrainian opposition's concern that the law is undemocratic?

3. How does the Vice-President/High Representative assess these changes to Ukrainian law in the context of any aspirations Ukraine may have to join the European Union?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(24 April 2013)

The HR/VP is aware that the adoption of the law on referenda by the outgoing parliament of Ukraine has led to reactions from the civil society and representatives of the opposition pointing to provisions that are in contradiction with the Constitution of Ukraine.

The HR/VP has encouraged a close dialogue between the Ukrainian administration and experts of the Venice Commission/Council of Europe to clarify issues of compatibility with European standards. The HR/VP has also expressed repeatedly the need to ensure inclusiveness and transparency over such legislative initiatives, which should benefit from broad public debates, thus reflecting the views of the Ukrainian society at large. They also need to be in full compliance of required procedures. The reform of the Constitution of Ukraine needs to take place according to the mechanism established by the Constitution in place.

The Conclusions on Ukraine adopted by the Foreign Affairs Council of 10 December 2012 ([1]) provide for the overall EU policy towards Ukraine. Ukraine's performance, including in respect of implementing the Association Agenda through reforms in line with international standards, will determine the pace of the EU's engagement.

([1]) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/134136.pdf

(Wersja polska)

Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-001666/13
do Komisji
Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD)
(18 lutego 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Metale ziem rzadkich

Materiały ziem rzadkich mają decydujące znaczenie dla setek rozwiązań technologicznych. Tym samym są one niezbędnym elementem dalszego postępu technologicznego i zwiększenia innowacyjności Unii Europejskiej. Ich powszechne użycie wpływa na zwiększenie popytu, przy jednoczesnym braku możliwości zwiększenia wydobycia.

Obecnie wydobywa się na świecie 124 tysiące ton tych metali rocznie, a do 2012 r. zapotrzebowanie wzrośnie aż o 50 %. Około 97 % światowego wydobycia pochodzi z Chin i jest to fakt niezwykle istotny, gdyż od 2006 r. Chiny zmniejszają wydobycie oraz eksport, wymagając na firmach przenoszenie części produkcji do Azji.

1. Czy Komisja zamierza wejść w spór z Chinami na płaszczyźnie WTO, podobnie jak zrobiły to Stany Zjednoczone?

2. O ile, według szacunków Komisji, wzrosły ceny podzespołów wykorzystywanych między innymi w fotowoltaice ze względu na zmniejszenie importu metali ziem rzadkich?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza De Guchta w imieniu Komisji
(26 kwietnia 2013 r.)

W dniu 13 marca 2012 r. Unia Europejska wraz z Japonią i Stanami Zjednoczonymi wystąpiła o konsultacje z Chinami na forum Światowej Organizacji Handlu (WTO) w sprawie chińskich ograniczeń wywozowych w odniesieniu do metali ziem rzadkich, wolframu i molibdenu. Mimo tych formalnych konsultacji, które odbyły się w Genewie w dniach 25-26 kwietnia 2012 r., i orzeczenia WTO w sprawie podobnych środków wydanego w dniu 30 stycznia 2012 r., Chiny nie wycofały przedmiotowych ograniczeń. Dlatego w dniu 27 czerwca 2012 r. Unia Europejska (ponownie wraz z Japonią i Stanami Zjednoczonymi) wystąpiła o powołanie zespołu orzekającego WTO do rozstrzygnięcia tego sporu. Obecnie trwa postępowanie w sprawie rozstrzygnięcia tego sporu. Oczekuje się, że w grudniu 2013 r. komisja ta opublikuje sprawozdanie w tej sprawie.

Zasadniczo stopień wzrostu cen dla branż przemysłu wykorzystujących metale ziem rzadkich zależy od ich pozycji w łańcuchu wartości, lokalizacji, stosowanych technologii i warunków rynkowych (tj. zdolności przedsiębiorstw do przeniesienia kosztów na konsumentów oraz realizowanej marży zysku). W niektórych przypadkach, w dolnych ogniwach łańcucha wartości, niewielkie ilości metali ziem rzadkich wykorzystywane w produktach przeznaczonych dla konsumenta końcowego (np. w małym silniku w samochodzie, mechanizmie dysku twardego, wyświetlaczu telefonu komórkowego) wywołają jedynie niewielki wzrost kosztu produktu końcowego w ujęciu bezwzględnym (o kilka procent lub mniej niż jeden procent). W innych przypadkach, na wcześniejszych etapach łańcucha produkcji, takie koszty dla przedsiębiorstw mogą być znaczne, gdyż udział metali ziem rzadkich w zastosowaniach przemysłowych tych przedsiębiorstw może być wysoki (np. 50 % lub więcej) – np. w produkcji magnesów stałych, proszków fosforyzujących lub katalizatorów.

W każdym razie Komisja śledzi uważnie tę kwestię i do lata uruchomi Europejską sieć kompetencji dotyczących pierwiastków ziem rzadkich (ERECON), która będzie skupiać ekspertów z UE i z państw trzecich w celu intensyfikacji wymiany najlepszych praktyk, zwiększenia świadomości na temat właściwości metali ziem rzadkich, formułowania zaleceń dotyczących badań naukowych oraz wspierania zrównoważonego wydobycia, recyklingu i substytucji metali ziem rzadkich.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001666/13
to the Commission
Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Rare earth metals

Rare earth materials are critical to hundreds of technological solutions. They are therefore essential to continued technological progress and greater innovation in the European Union. The fact that they are used so widely means that demand has increased, while opportunities for increasing the amounts extracted are diminishing.

At present, 124 000 tonnes of rare earth elements are extracted annually worldwide, and demand for them will grow by as much as 50% by 2012. Around 97% of global supply is extracted in China, which is crucially important as China has been reducing extraction and exports since 2006, requiring companies to transfer part of their production to Asia.

1. Does the Commission intend to initiate dispute proceedings against China at the WTO, as the USA has done?

2. By how much does the Commission estimate that prices of the components used in, for example, photovoltaics have risen due to reduced imports of rare earth metals?

Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission
(26 April 2013)

On 13 March 2012, the European Union together with Japan and the United States requested consultations with China at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) concerning China's export restrictions on rare earths, tungsten and molybdenum. Despite these formal consultations, which took place in Geneva on 25 and 26 April 2012, and a WTO ruling on similar measures of 30 January 2012, China had not removed the restrictions at issue. Therefore on 27 June 2012, the European Union (again with Japan and the United States) requested the establishment of a WTO dispute settlement panel. Currently the dispute proceedings are ongoing. A report of the panel in the matter can be expected in December 2013.

Generally, the level of price increases for the industries using rare earths elements depends on where they stand in the value chain, their location, the technologies used and market conditions (i.e. the ability of firms to pass on costs to consumers and the profit margins they work with). In some cases, in downstream parts of the value chain, the small amount of rare earths used in the final consumer product (e.g. the small motor in a car, the mechanism of a hard drive, the screen of a mobile phone) will trigger only a small absolute increase in the cost of the end product (a few % or even <1%). In other cases, at more intermediary stages of the production chain, such cost for companies can be significant, as the share of rare earths used in their industrial applications, yet not end-products, can be important (e.g. 50% or more) — e.g. in the production of permanent magnets, phosphor powders or catalysers.

In any case the Commission is looking at this issue closely, and will launch before the summer a network called European Rare-Earth Competency Network (ERECON), that should bring together experts from the EU and outside to advance exchange of best-practice, increase the understanding of the special properties of rare earths, make recommendations on research and promote the sustainable mining, recyclability and substitution of earths.

(Wersja polska)

Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-001667/13
do Komisji
Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD)
(18 lutego 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Cyberbezpieczeństwo w UE

W 2007 r. Estonia stała się celem dla rosyjskich hakerów, w wyniku ich ataku Tallin wprowadził strategię obrony oraz wojny internetowej. Podobne programy posiadają jeszcze USA, Chiny oraz Izrael. Kilka kolejnych krajów, między innymi Iran, Japonia oraz Indie, pracuje nad swoimi wersjami. Wprowadzane strategie zakładają miedzy innymi wykorzystanie wirusów. Każdego dnia w sieci krąży ich około 150 tys. i codziennie zagrożonych zostaje 148 tys. komputerów. Na całym świecie powodują one roczne straty w wysokości około 290 mld rocznie. W samej Europie kwestie bezpieczeństwa internetowego stają się ważnym czynnikiem gospodarczym. Zarazem badanie Eurobarometru z 2012 r. wykazało, że 38 proc. internautów zmieniło swoje zachowania ze względu na kwestie bezpieczeństwa; 18 proc. jest mniej skłonnych do robienia zakupów przez Internet, a 15 proc. mniej chętnie korzysta z usług bankowości internetowej.

1. Jak Komisja ocenia aktualne niebezpieczeństwo cyberkonfliktu na skalę europejską oraz przygotowanie państw członkowskich do ewentualnych ataków hakerskich?

2. Czy Komisja planuje przygotowanie wytycznych dla państw wspólnotowych w celu lepszej koordynacji polityki bezpieczeństwa sieci?

3. Jakie priorytety konieczne do zwiększenia europejskiego bezpieczeństwa sieci zauważa Komisja?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez Wiceprzewodniczącą Neelie Kroes w imieniu Komisji
(9 kwietnia 2013 r.)

Komisja zauważa rosnącą liczbę zagrożeń w cyberprzestrzeni oraz wyraźne braki w przygotowaniu poszczególnych państw członkowskich i niedostateczną współpracę między nimi. W dniu 7 lutego Komisja przedstawiła komunikat w sprawie unijnej strategii w zakresie cyberbezpieczeństwa (JOIN 21013(1)). Celem tej strategii jest przede wszystkim osiągnięcie wysokiego poziomu odporności na zagrożenia w cyberprzestrzeni poprzez (i) zwiększanie zdolności i gotowości, rozwijanie współpracy, zwiększanie wymiany informacji i podnoszenie świadomości na szczeblu krajowym i unijnym, zwłaszcza w oparciu o działania przewidziane we wniosku Komisji dotyczącym dyrektywy w sprawie bezpieczeństwa sieci i informacji (COM(2013) 48); (ii) znaczne ograniczenie cyberprzestępczości; (iii) opracowanie unijnej polityki obrony przed zagrożeniami w cyberprzestrzeni; (iv) wspieranie rozwoju zasobów przemysłowych i technologicznych, które są konieczne, aby można było czerpać korzyści z jednolitego rynku cyfrowego, oraz zwiększenie wydatków na działalność badawczo-rozwojową w obszarze cyberbezpieczeństwa oraz (v) wzmocnienie międzynarodowej polityki UE w zakresie cyberprzestrzeni oraz wspieranie państw trzecich – poprzez budowę potencjału w obszarze cyberbezpieczeństwa – w działaniach służących zwiększaniu odporności infrastruktury informatycznej na świecie.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001667/13
to the Commission
Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Cyber security in the EU

In 2007 Estonia was targeted by Russian hackers, prompting Tallinn to introduce a strategy for Internet defence, or war. The USA, China and Israel have similar programmes. A number of other countries, including Iran, Japan and India, are working to develop their own versions. These strategies include the use of viruses. At any given time, an estimated 150 000 viruses are circulating across the Internet, and 148 000 computers are compromised every day. Worldwide they cause annual losses of around 290 billion. In Europe the issue of Internet security is becoming a major economic factor. At the same, a 2012 Eurobarometer survey found that 38% of Internet users have changed their behaviour because of security concerns; 18% are less likely to buy goods online and 15 are less likely to bank online.

1. How does the Commission assess current security in relation to cyber conflict in Europe and the Member States' preparations for potential attacks by hackers?

2. Is the Commission planning to draw up guidelines for Member States with a view to improving coordination of Internet security policy?

3. What does the Commission see as the essential priorities for increasing European Internet security?

Answer given by Ms Kroes on behalf of the Commission
(9 April 2013)

The Commission considers that cyber threats are increasing and that there are clear gaps in Member States' preparedness and cooperation. On 7 February the Commission has presented a communication on an EU Cybersecurity strategy (JOIN 21013(1)). The EU Cybersecurity Strategy aims in particular at reaching a high level of cyber resilience, by (i) increasing capabilities, preparedness, cooperation, information exchange and awareness at the national and EU level, in particular through a Commission's proposal for a directive on network and information security (COM(2013) 48); (ii) drastically reducing cybercrime; (iii) developing an EU Cyber Defence Policy; (iv) fostering the industrial and technological resources required to benefit from the Digital Single Market and increasing spending on cybersecurity Research and Development; and (iv) enhancing the EU's international cyberspace policy, and assisting third countries, through cybersecurity capacity building, in strengthening the resilience of information infrastructure globally.

(Wersja polska)

Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-001668/13
do Komisji (Wiceprzewodniczącej/Wysokiej Przedstawiciel)
Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD)
(18 lutego 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel – Optymalizacja zatrudnienia w Europejskiej Służbie Działań Zewnętrznych

Europejska Służba Działań Zewnętrznych miała zatrudniać swoich pracowników wobec elastycznie ujętej zasady poszanowania równości narodowej oraz płci. Tymczasem w danych przedstawionych przez Komitet Konsultacyjny Komisji ds. Mianowania ESDZ zawartych w raporcie podsumowującym stan zatrudnienia wyraźnie widać dysproporcje w zatrudnieniu osób z poszczególnych państw członkowskich. Zgodnie z indeksem Kinnocka Polska powinna mieć około 8 % wszystkich zatrudnionych pracowników, tymczasem jest ich tylko 3 %. Spośród 152 ambasadorów tylko 4 jest Polakami.

1. Jakie kroki zamierza podjąć Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel, aby maksymalnie zrównoważyć statystki zatrudnienia względem poszczególnych państw członkowskich?

2. Kiedy nastąpi rewizja założeń zatrudnienia oraz przyjmowania nowych pracowników, szczególnie na stanowiskach ambasadorskich?

3. Parlament wielokrotnie wzywał Europejską Służbę Działań Zewnętrznych do lepszej optymalizacji zatrudnienia celem zmniejszenia kosztów jej działania. Jakie działania podjęła Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel, aby zmniejszyć koszty i zwiększyć efektywność działań podległych jej służb?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez Wysoką Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodniczącą Catherine Ashton w imieniu Komisji
(16 kwietnia 2013 r.)

1. Rekrutacja do ESDZ odbywa się zgodnie z procedurą, której podstawą są „kompetencje, a celem – zagwarantowanie usług personelu o najwyższym stopniu zdolności, skuteczności i uczciwości, przy jednoczesnym zapewnieniu odpowiedniej równowagi geograficznej i równowagi płci oraz zatrudnienia w ESDZ znaczącej liczby obywateli z wszystkich państw członkowskich" (art. 6 ust. 8 decyzji Rady nr 427/2010). W związku z tym Wysoka Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodnicząca Komisji jasno stwierdziła, iż główną podstawą doboru personelu są kompetencje, i w dalszym ciągu zachęca ona kandydatów posiadających kwalifikacje, w szczególności tych, których państwa mogą być reprezentowane w niewystarczającym stopniu, do składania swoich kandydatur na stanowiska w ESDZ. Jak stwierdzono w sprawozdaniu za 2012 r. dotyczącym zatrudnienia w ESDZ, 4,1 % personelu ESDZ na poziomie AD posiada polskie obywatelstwo. Czterech ze 126 szefów delegatur UE posiada polskie obywatelstwo, a trzech z nich zostało zatrudnionych po formalnym utworzeniu ESDZ w styczniu 2011 r.

2. Nadal trwa rotacja stanowisk w delegaturach UE w 2013 r. (w tym stanowisk szefa delegatury/ambasadorów); rozpoczęto już ogłaszanie nazwisk najlepszych kandydatów wybranych na stanowiska ambasadorów i zasadniczo przyjmuje się, że mianowane osoby obejmą te stanowiska w dniu 1 września 2013 r., z zastrzeżeniem zgody zaangażowanych państw trzecich.

W zależności od postępu w kwestii docelowej jednej trzeciej liczby dyplomatów krajowych, ESDZ zamierza dostosować swoje procedury rekrutacji w celu realizacji bardziej zoptymalizowanej polityki kadrowej uwzględniającej perspektywy zawodowe urzędników i wkład w funkcjonowanie ESDZ pracowników zatrudnionych na czas określony.

3. Wysoka Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodnicząca bardzo poważnie traktuje potrzebę zagwarantowania, by ESDZ, w tym procedury rekrutacyjne, były zorganizowane w najbardziej opłacalny sposób. Koszty związane z posiedzeniami paneli będzie można zmniejszyć, kiedy ustabilizuje się liczba pracowników ESDZ.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001668/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Optimising recruitment to the European External Action Service

Recruitment to the European External Action Service (EEAS) was supposed to take place in line with a flexibly applied principle of nationality and gender balance. However, details provided by the Commission's Consultative Committee on Appointments to the EEAS in a report on the state of play with regard to recruitment clearly shows that there is not a balance when it comes to the recruitment of officials from the individual Member States. In line with the Kinnock index, 8% of all officials recruited should be from Poland, but the current figure is just 3%. Only 4 of the 152 ambassadors are Poles.

1. What steps does the Vice-President/High Representative intend to take to balance out the recruitment figures as much as possible for the individual Member States?

2. When will there be a review of the guidelines for recruitment, and when will new staff be taken on, particularly to fill ambassador posts?

3. Parliament has, on a number of occasions, called on the EEAS to improve recruitment processes in order to cut operational costs. What action has the Vice-President/High Representative taken to cut costs and enhance efficiency in the activities of the service for which she is responsible?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(16 April 2013)

1. Recruitment to the EEAS is made on the basis of 'merit, with the objective of securing the services of staff of the highest standards of ability, efficiency and integrity, while ensuring adequate geographical and gender balance, and a meaningful presence of nationals from all Member States' (Article 6(8), Council Decision 427/2010). Accordingly, the HR/VP has made clear that the primary basis for the selection of staff is merit, and continues to encourage qualified applicants, particularly of those nationalities who may be under-represented, to put themselves forward for posts in the EEAS. As set out in the 2012 EEAS Staffing Report, 4.1% of staff at AD level in the EEAS are of Polish nationality. 4 of the 126 Heads of EU Delegations are of Polish nationality, and 3 of those individuals have been recruited in the period since the formal establishment of the EEAS in January 2011.

2. The 2013 rotation of posts in the EU Delegations (including Head of Delegation/Ambassadorial posts) is ongoing; announcements of the successful applicants for these latter positions have begun and in general the appointees are expected to take up their posts on 1 September 2013, subject to the agreement of the third countries involved.

Subject to progress made on the one third target of national diplomats, the EEAS intends to adapt its recruitment procedures to reflect a more refined personnel policy combining career perspectives of officials and the contribution of temporary agents to the EEAS.

3. The HR/VP takes seriously the need to ensure that the EEAS, including its recruitment procedures, is organised in the most cost-efficient way possible. The costs associated with the holding of panels could be decreased once the EEAS population is stabilised.

(Wersja polska)

Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-001669/13
do Komisji (Wiceprzewodniczącej/Wysokiej Przedstawiciel)
Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD)
(18 lutego 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel – Wzrost napięcia na granicy kirgisko-uzbeckiej

6 stycznia na granicy Sochu, enklawy Uzbekistanu na terytorium Kirgistanu, doszło do poważnego incydentu granicznego – ludność uzbeckiej miejscowości Chuszar zaatakowała nowo wybudowaną kirgiską strażnicę graniczną, a następnie wkroczyła na terytorium Kirgistanu. W rezultacie zajść ponad 34 Kirgizów zamieszkujących pobliską wioskę zostało uprowadzonych i uwięzionych w Sochu. Po negocjacjach między państwami 7 stycznia zakładnicy zostali uwolnieni. Sytuacja pozostaje jednak nadal napięta, a obydwie strony oskarżają się nawzajem o spowodowanie incydentu.

1. Czy Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel wie o incydencie oraz towarzyszącym mu wzroście napięcia w obustronnych relacjach miedzy Uzbekistanem a Kirgistanem?

2. Jakie działania podejmuje Europejska Służba Działań Zewnętrznych, aby doprowadzić do trwałego porozumienia pokojowego pomiędzy oboma państwami?

3. Czy mniejszość uzbecka w Kirgistanie otrzymuje pomoc humanitarną z Unii Europejskiej?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez Wysoką Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodniczącą Catherine Ashton w imieniu Komisji
(16 kwietnia 2013 r.)

Unia Europejska jest zaniepokojona doniesieniami o incydentach na granicy kirgisko-uzbeckiej. UE podtrzymuje swoje zaangażowanie w szerzenie pokoju w tym regionie oraz usprawnia prowadzenie współpracy regionalnej w ramach strategii UE wobec Azji Środkowej, prowadząc dwustronne i wielostronne dialogi polityczne z państwami Azji Środkowej oraz realizując konkretne programy współpracy, zwłaszcza Program zarządzania granicami w Azji Środkowej.

Od początku kryzysu w Kirgistanie, tj. od czerwca 2010 r., UE wspiera działania na rzecz stabilizacji między grupami etnicznymi. Unia Europejska przekazuje pomoc humanitarną na rzecz ofiar starć na tle etnicznym, z której to pomocy finansowana jest dystrybucja żywności i pomocy rzeczowej, zapewnione jest schronienie, ochrona i zaopatrzenie w wodę. Ponadto w ramach Instrumentu na rzecz Stabilności uruchomiono środki reagowania na sytuacje kryzysowe. Takie środki służą odbudowie, pojednaniu oraz ustanawianiu demokratycznych ram konstytucyjnych, a w szczególności mają na celu wspieranie rządu w wykonywaniu zaleceń sformułowanych w międzynarodowych i wewnętrznych raportach dotyczących starć na tle etnicznym w 2010 r., a także zwiększenie szans na budowanie wzajemnego zaufania oraz udzielanie wsparcia rządom zaangażowanym w proces demarkacyjny. UE wspiera ponadto inicjatywę na rzecz wspólnoty bezpieczeństwa Organizacji Bezpieczeństwa i Współpracy w Europie (OBWE), której celem jest ochrona praw człowieka, zapobieganie konfliktom oraz system wczesnego ostrzegania. W ramach instrumentu finansowania współpracy na rzecz rozwoju UE wspiera działania Kirgistanu w latach 2011-2013 zmierzające do ustanowienia nowoczesnego systemu ochrony socjalnej, który zakłada niesienie pomocy osobom najbardziej potrzebującym, w tym członkom społeczności etnicznych.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001669/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Heightened tension on the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border

On 6 January, a major border incident took place on the frontier of Sokh, an Uzbek exclave in Kyrgyzstan. People from the Uzbek village of Hushar attacked a newly built Kyrgyz border watchtower and then entered Kyrgyz territory. As a consequence of this incident, 34 Kyrgyz residents from a nearby village were captured and imprisoned in Sokh. On 7 January, following negotiations between the two countries, the hostages were released. However, the situation remains tense and both sides are accusing one another of having incited the incident.

1. Is the Vice-President/High Representative aware of this incident and of the increasing tension in bilateral relations between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan?

2. What action is the European External Action Service taking to bring about a sustainable peace agreement between the two countries?

3. Does the Uzbek minority in Kyrgyzstan receive humanitarian aid from the European Union?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(16 April 2013)

The EU is concerned about reports of incidents at the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border. The EU remains committed to promoting regional peace and has been facilitating regional cooperation under the EU Strategy for Central Asia, through bilateral and multilateral political dialogue with Central Asian countries and specific cooperation programmes, in particular Border Management in Central Asia.

Following the June 2010 crisis in Kyrgyzstan, the EU has remained engaged in supporting inter-ethnic stabilisation. The EU has provided humanitarian assistance to the victims of the inter-ethnic clashes to finance food and non-food items' distribution, shelter, protection and water sanitation activities. Besides, crisis-response measures were activated through the Instrument for Stability (IfS). Such measures aimed at reconstruction, reconciliation and the establishment of a democratic constitutional framework, notably with a view to assisting the Government to follow up on the recommendations from international and internal reports on the 2010 inter-ethnic clashes, increasing confidence-building opportunities and assisting the governments with the border demarcation process. The EU has also been supporting the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Community Security Initiative aimed at human rights protection, conflict prevention and early warning system. Under the Development Cooperation Instrument, the EU is supporting Kyrgyzstan in 2011-2013 on setting up a modern social protection system refocusing assistance towards those most in need, including members of ethnic communities.

(Wersja polska)

Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-001670/13
do Komisji
Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD)
(18 lutego 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Łamanie zasady konkurencyjności poprzez dotowanie energii wiatrowej

Jak wyliczają amerykańscy eksperci energia produkowana przez turbiny musi być subsydiowana i kupowana przez państwowe agencje, ponieważ przegrywa z konkurencją. Jednostka energii pochodzącej z takiego źródła jest dla podatnika droższa co najmniej 12 razy (ze względu na subsydia) niż energia pochodząca ze źródeł kopalnych, takich jak ropa, węgiel czy gaz i 6,5 razy droższa od energii nuklearnej.

1. Ile kosztuje wytwarzanie energii wiatrowej w Europie i jakie są zdaniem Komisji różnice w cenach produkcji pomiędzy energią wiatrową a innymi źródłami energii?

2. Czy dotowanie przez państwo energii wiatrowej nie jest sprzeczne z zasadą konkurencyjności?

3. Czy dotowanie produkcji na przykład przez Niemcy nie zaburza cen prądu elektrycznego w sąsiednich państwach powodujący tym samym przeciążenie sieci oraz nieopłacalność produkcji?

4. Czy Komisja zamierza ustanowić wspólne zasady dotowania energii produkowanej dla wszystkich państw wspólnoty europejskiej?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Günthera Oettingera w imieniu Komisji
(12 kwietnia 2013 r.)

1) Według dostępnych danych koszty wytwarzania elektryczności z energii wiatrowej są mniej więcej na takim samym poziomie, jak w przypadku energii wytwarzanej w tradycyjnych elektrowniach. Porównanie uśrednionych kosztów wytwarzania energii elektrycznej dla różnych technologii wykonane przez MAE w 2010 r. pokazało, że energia wiatrowa jest nieco droższa niż energia wytwarzana z węgla i gazu ([1]). Jednakże koszty wytwarzania energii wiatrowej spadły od tego czasu ([2]).

2) W dyrektywie 2009/28/WE ([3]) określono wiążące cele dla państw członkowskich dotyczące udziału energii ze źródeł odnawialnych i zobowiązano je do wprowadzenia środków zmierzających do realizacji tych celów. Uważa się, że w celu usunięcia nieprawidłowości w funkcjonowaniu rynku należy wprowadzić programy wsparcia. Ponadto zakładając, że wsparcie stanowi pomoc państwa, można je uznać za zgodne z TFUE, o ile spełniono warunki określone w wytycznych w sprawie pomocy państwa na ochronę środowiska (EAG) ([4]) lub w przepisach dotyczących środowiska określonych w rozporządzeniu w sprawie wyłączeń blokowych (GBER) ([5]).

3) Dostępność w Niemczech energii elektrycznej produkowanej po niskich kosztach krańcowych, np. przy użyciu energii wiatrowej, powoduje obniżenie cen hurtowych. W zakresie, w jakim ceny są ze sobą skorelowane z powodu handlu transgranicznego, skutek ten znajdzie również odbicie w niższych cenach hurtowych na sąsiednich rynkach. Jeśli chodzi o sieci, zmiana struktury wytwarzania w Niemczech ([6]) w niektórych przypadkach doprowadziła do zwiększenia nieplanowanych przepływów w ramach sieci państw sąsiadujących. Problem ten należy rozwiązać głównie poprzez wzmocnienie łączy przesyłowych na terytorium Niemiec.

([1]) C. 110 EUR/MWh, podczas gdy w przypadku węgla i gazu ziemnego wynosi 80-90 EUR/MWh, http://www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/ElecCost2010SUM.pdf, s. 18.
([2]) Według ostatnich danych szacunkowych JRC wynoszą one około 70 EUR/MWh. Sprawozdanie na temat obecnej sytuacji w odniesieniu do energii wiatrowej JRC z 2012 r. (2012 JRC wind status report), s. 54.
([3]) Dyrektywa Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady 2009/28/WE z dnia 23 kwietnia 2009 r. w sprawie promowania stosowania energii ze źródeł odnawialnych zmieniająca i w następstwie uchylająca dyrektywy 2001/77/WE oraz 2003/30/WE, Dz.U. L 140 z 5.6.2009.
([4]) http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/reform/environmental_guidelines_en.pdf
([5]) http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/reform/gber_final_en.pdf
([6]) Zwiększona produkcja energii wiatrowej w północnych Niemczech i mniejsze moce wytwórcze na południu kraju.

4) Wspólne przepisy dotyczące wsparcia dla produkcji energii odnawialnej znajdują się w wytycznych w sprawie pomocy państwa na ochronę środowiska (EAG) oraz w przepisach dotyczących środowiska określonych w rozporządzeniu w sprawie wyłączeń blokowych (GBER). Do obu instrumentów wprowadzane są obecnie zmiany. Ponadto Komisja zapowiedziała, że przedstawi wytyczne dla państw członkowskich dotyczące systemów wsparcia dla energii ze źródeł odnawialnych oraz środków mających na celu zagwarantowanie wystarczalności mocy wytwórczych ([7]).

([7]) Por. COM(2012) 271 i COM(2012) 663.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001670/13
to the Commission
Zbigniew Ziobro (EFD)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Wind energy subsidies in violation of competition principles

According to calculations made by US experts, the energy produced by wind turbines has to be subsidised and bought up by state agencies because it is uncompetitive. A unit of energy from this source is at least 12 times more expensive for the taxpayer (taking into account the subsidies) than energy derived from fossil fuels, such as oil, coal or gas, and 6.5 times more expensive than nuclear energy.

1. What is the cost of wind energy production in Europe and what, according to the Commission, are the price differences between the production of energy from wind and from other sources?

2. Is it not the case that state subsidies for wind energy are anti-competitive?

3. Will the subsidising of production by, for example, Germany, not affect electricity prices in neighbouring countries, resulting in network congestion and uneconomic production?

4. Does the Commission intend to establish common rules on subsidies for energy production for all EU countries?

Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission
(12 April 2013)

1. Available evidence suggests that the costs of electricity generation for onshore wind are roughly in the same range as for conventional power plants. A comparison of levelised costs of electricity for different technologies done by the IEA in 2010 puts onshore wind still somewhat higher than coal and gas ([1]). However, costs of onshore wind have further fallen since then ([2]).

2. Directive 2009/28/EC ([3]) sets binding targets for Member States for the share of renewable energy and obliges them to introduce measures designed to achieve those targets. Support schemes are considered necessary to correct a number of market failures. Moreover, if it constitutes state aid, support can be found to be compatible with the TFEU if it respects a number of conditions laid down in the Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection (EAG) ([4]) or the environmental provisions of the General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER) ([5]).

3. The availability in Germany of electricity produced at low marginal costs such as wind has the effect of lowering wholesale prices. To the extent that prices are correlated because of cross-border trade, this effect will also be reflected in lower wholesale prices in neighbouring markets. Regarding networks, the change in the generation structure in Germany ([6]) has in certain cases led to an increase in unscheduled flows in the network of neighbouring countries. This should mainly be addressed by reinforcing transmission links within Germany.

4. Common rules on support to renewable energy production exist in the EAG and the GBER. Both are currently under revision. The Commission has moreover announced that it will come forward with guidance for Member States on support schemes for renewable energy and on measures to ensure generation adequacy ([7]).

([1]) C. 110 EUR /MWh as opposed to 80-90 EUR /MWh for coal and gas, http://www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/ElecCost2010SUM.pdf, p. 18
([2]) A recent estimate by the JRC puts them at around 70 EUR /MWh. 2012 JRD wind status report, p. 54.
([3]) Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, OJ L 140, 5.6.2009.
([4]) http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/reform/environmental_guidelines_en.pdf
([5]) http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/reform/gber_final_en.pdf
([6]) Increased wind production in Northern Germany and reduced generation capacity in the South.
([7]) Cf. COM(2012) 271 and COM(2012) 663.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-001671/13
ao Conselho
Inês Cristina Zuber (GUE/NGL) e João Ferreira (GUE/NGL)
(18 de fevereiro de 2013)

Assunto: Relatório voos CIA

Segundo um relatório divulgado pela organização *Open Society Justice Initiative* (OSJI), mais de 50 países, entre os quais Portugal, deram cobertura ao programa secreto de transferência extrajudicial de prisioneiros suspeitos de terrorismo em voos da CIA, lançado pela Administração Bush após os atentados de 11 de setembro de 2001.

O relatório vem sublinhar o que há muito vimos denunciando, ou seja, que as operações secretas consistiam no rapto, transporte e tortura de indivíduos suspeitos de terrorismo em centros de detenção clandestinos, contando com a colaboração de vários Governos europeus — caso do Reino Unido, Alemanha, Suécia — e de aliados americanos em África e no Médio Oriente.

No relatório desta organização, são mencionados os casos de 136 prisioneiros que foram submetidos a interrogatórios no âmbito do programa. No total, são identificados 54 países que ora albergaram centros de detenção clandestinos, ora colaboraram com a passagem de voos secretos para a chamada «rendição extraordinária» de suspeitos de terrorismo.

Segundo o documento da OSJI, «as detenções em centros clandestinos e as operações de transferência secreta de prisioneiros não poderiam ter sido implementadas sem a participação ativa dos Governos estrangeiros, que [para além dos EUA] também devem ser responsabilizados», o que vem demonstrar uma vez mais a conivência e a cumplicidade de vários governos europeus neste processo.

Assim, pergunta-se ao Conselho:

1. Que avaliação faz deste relatório e da reiterada denúncia da existência de uma rede de sequestro, transporte e tortura de prisioneiros envolvendo os EUA, vários países da UE e países terceiros?

2. Que explicações pretende exigir à Administração dos EUA?

Resposta
(17 de junho de 2013)

O Conselho declarou, em diversas ocasiões, que a luta contra o terrorismo deve ser conduzida em plena conformidade com o direito internacional, incluindo o direito em matéria de direitos humanos, o direito aplicável aos refugiados e o direito humanitário internacional, e que a existência de centros de detenção secretos, nos quais os reclusos são mantidos num vazio jurídico, não está em conformidade com o direito internacional. Há um diálogo regular entre os conselheiros jurídicos da UE e dos EUA sobre os aspetos do direito internacional da luta contra o terrorismo, no âmbito do qual são discutidas matérias tais como a prisão, a detenção, o interrogatório e a transferência dos suspeitos de terrorismo. Nesse diálogo, a UE realça a importância de respeitar o direito internacional e os direitos humanos, mas não aborda as atividades específicas dos serviços de informação.

A UE congratulou-se com a determinação dos Estados Unidos da América em encerrar o centro de detenção da Baía de Guantânamo, juntamente com a adoção de outras medidas que incluem uma revisão aprofundada das suas políticas de detenção, transferência, julgamento e interrogatório na luta contra o terrorismo, e uma maior transparência sobre as práticas do passado no que respeita a estas políticas, bem como o encerramento de centros de detenção secretos. A UE contribuiu para os Grupos de Missão para Revisão das Políticas de Detenção, Interrogatório e Transferência (carta em nome do Conselho dirigida ao Secretário de Estado e ao Secretário de Defesa, como Copresidentes dos Grupos, e uma reunião de informação do Coordenador da Luta Antiterrorista da UE), para garantir o respeito pelos princípios supramencionados na implementação das políticas dos EUA.

Nos termos do artigo 4.°, n.° 2, do Tratado da União Europeia, «a segurança nacional continua a ser da exclusiva responsabilidade de cada Estado-Membro». Isto significa que o trabalho das agências de informação dos Estados-Membros em questões de segurança nacional continua a ser da exclusiva responsabilidade dos mesmos. O Conselho não debateu o relatório do Open Society Institute mencionado pelo Senhor Deputado.

No entanto, todos os Estados-Membros são partes contratantes na Convenção Europeia para a Proteção dos Direitos do Homem e das Liberdades Fundamentais. Todos os atos nacionais, incluindo os que são executados pelos serviços de informação, estão sujeitos à jurisdição do Tribunal Europeu dos Direitos do Homem, o qual é competente para decidir sobre a questão de saber se tais atos respeitam ou não os direitos e as liberdades fundamentais reconhecidos nessa Convenção.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001671/13
to the Council
Inês Cristina Zuber (GUE/NGL) and João Ferreira (GUE/NGL)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: CIA flights report

According to a report by the Open Society Justice Initiative (OSJI), more than 50 countries, including Portugal, facilitated CIA flights for the extrajudicial transfer of prisoners suspected of terrorism, a secret programme launched by the Bush administration following the attacks of 11 September 2001.

The report underlines what we have been saying for some time: that covert operations involved the kidnapping, transport and torture of terrorist suspects in clandestine detention centres, with the help of several European governments — including those of the United Kingdom, Germany and Sweden — and US allies in Africa and the Middle East.

The organisation's report names 136 prisoners who were subjected to interrogation under the programme. In total, 54 countries are identified as having hosted clandestine detention centres or having enabled the passage of secret flights for the so-called 'extraordinary rendition' of terrorist suspects.

According to the OSJI document, 'Secret detention and extraordinary rendition operations […] could not have been implemented without the active participation of foreign governments. These governments [as well as the US Government] too must be held accountable.' This once again demonstrates the collaboration and complicity of several European governments in this process.

1. How does the Council view this report and the repeated accusations that a network involving the US, several EU countries and third countries carried out the kidnapping, transport and torture of prisoners?

2. What explanations will it demand from the US Administration?

Reply
(17 June 2013)

The Council has stated on a number of occasions that the fight against terrorism has to take place in full respect of international law, including human rights law, international humanitarian law and refugee law, and that the existence of secret detention facilities where detained persons are kept in a legal vacuum is not in conformity with international law. There is a regular dialogue between EU and US legal advisers on the international law aspects of the fight against terrorism, where questions such as the arrest, detention, interrogation and transfer of terrorist suspects are discussed. In this dialogue, the EU stresses the importance of respect for international law and human rights, but the specific activities of intelligence services are not addressed.

The EU has welcomed the determination of the United States of America to close the Guantanamo Bay detention facility together with other steps taken, including the intensive review of its detention, transfer, trial and interrogation policies in the fight against terrorism and increased transparency about past practices in regard to these policies, as well as the elimination of secret detention facilities. The EU has provided a contribution to the Detention, Interrogation and Transfer Policy Review Task Forces (a letter on behalf of the Council to the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, co-chairs, and a briefing by the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator) to ensure respect for the above principles in the implementation of US policies.

Article 4(2) of the Treaty of the European Union states that 'national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State'. This means that the work of Member States' intelligence agencies for national security matters remains the sole responsibility of Member States. The Council has not discussed the Open Society Institute report referred to by the Honourable Member.

Nevertheless, all Member States are contracting parties to the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. All national acts, including those carried out by the intelligence services, are subject to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights, which is competent to declare whether such acts do or do not respect the fundamental rights and freedoms recognised in that Convention.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-001672/13
à Comissão
Edite Estrela (S&D)
(18 de fevereiro de 2013)

Assunto: Exploração de trabalhadores portugueses na Suíça

Notícias recentes dão conta da existência de «intermediários» a tirar partido do aumento da imigração portuguesa para a Suíça, retendo parte do salário dos contratados. De acordo com denúncias feitas aos sindicatos, muitos trabalhadores provenientes de Portugal estarão a receber salários significativamente abaixo daquilo que é estipulado pelas convenções laborais na Suíça, criando uma situação de «dumping» salarial e graves problemas sociais.

Tendo em conta que a criação de comissões mistas com inspeções do trabalho e a colaboração entre autoridades policiais permitiu solucionar questões semelhantes na Espanha e na Holanda, pergunta à Comissão:

Tem conhecimento destas situações?

Pondera a possibilidade de exortar as autoridades suíças para que sejam encontradas soluções, designadamente a criação de comissões mistas, que permitam que redes de exploração deste tipo possam vir a ser desmanteladas?

Resposta dada pela Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente Catherine Ashton em nome da Comissão
(22 de abril de 2013)

A Comissão não tem conhecimento dos factos referidos pela Senhora Deputada. Por enquanto, a Comissão não dispõe de qualquer indício segundo o qual o sistema suíço para a proteção dos trabalhadores seja insuficiente para lidar com este tipo de casos. Importa lembrar que a proteção de trabalhadores da UE na Suíça é da responsabilidade das autoridades suíças que também garantem a sua aplicação através de comités conjuntos compostos pelas autoridades públicas, bem como por representantes dos empregadores e trabalhadores. A Comissão procurará obter informações e esclarecimentos adicionais e tenciona abordar esta questão, em devido tempo, no âmbito dos seus contactos regulares com as autoridades suíças.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001672/13
to the Commission
Edite Estrela (S&D)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Exploitation of Portuguese workers in Switzerland

Recent news reports have revealed that 'middlemen' are taking advantage of the increasing number of Portuguese immigrants entering Switzerland by retaining a proportion of workers' salaries. According to complaints made to the unions, many Portuguese workers receive salaries significantly lower than those stipulated by Swiss labour conventions, creating a situation of wage 'dumping' and serious social problems.

The creation of joint committees, along with labour inspections and cooperation between police authorities, has resolved similar issues in Spain and the Netherlands.

Is the Commission aware of these cases?

Will it consider urging the Swiss authorities to find solutions, including the creation of joint committees, to help dismantle such networks of exploitation?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(22 April 2013)

The Commission is not aware of the facts referred to by the Honourable Member. For the time being the Commission does not have any indication according to which the Swiss system for the protection of workers would be insufficient for dealing with this type of cases. It should be recalled that the protection of EU workers in Switzerland falls under the primary responsibility of the Swiss authorities, which ensure its enforcement also through joint committees of the public authorities and the employers' and employees' representatives. The Commission will seek more information and clarification and intends to raise this case in the context of its regular contacts with the Swiss authorities in due course.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-001673/13
à Comissão
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(18 de fevereiro de 2013)

Assunto: Presença de carne de cavalo em produtos alimentares preparados de carne bovina

Considerando que:

Recentemente têm surgido em vários Estados-Membros da União Europeia suspeitas e confirmações da presença de carne de cavalo em produtos alimentares preparados compostos por carne bovina, sem fazer referência à origem e composição daquela na rotulagem do produto;

A União Europeia possui uma competência exclusiva em matéria de política agrícola, nomeadamente em matéria de comércio de produtos agrícolas, ao abrigo do artigo 38.° TFUE, e que deve garantir a segurança dos abastecimentos, de acordo com o artigo 39.°, n.° 1, alínea d);

Ao abrigo do artigo 169.° TFUE, a União Europeia deve promover os interesses dos consumidores e assegurar um nível de defesa destes, ao contribuir «para a proteção da saúde, da segurança e dos interesses económicos dos consumidores bem como para a promoção do seu direito à informação»;

A Comissão Europeia apelou, a 13 de fevereiro de 2013, a todos os Estados-Membros para que façam testes de ADN aos produtos à base de vaca, em resposta ao escândalo da carne de cavalo em refeições preparadas de bovino,

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Que medidas pretende tomar para normalizar a situação e proteger os consumidores, garantindo-lhes a correta informação na etiquetagem de produtos à base de vaca para indicar a origem da carne?

2. Que medidas pretende tomar para garantir a proteção da saúde pública, eliminando qualquer suspeita relacionada com a possibilidade de a carne de vaca ou de cavalo ser imprópria para consumo?

3. Ao nível criminal, quais as iniciativas previstas para coordenar os inquéritos criminais desencadeados em vários países da UE para determinar a origem da fraude que levou à utilização de carne de cavalo em vez de vaca? E quais as sanções previstas ao nível criminal caso se confirme uma situação de fraude?

Resposta dada por Tonio Borg em nome da Comissão
(5 de abril de 2013)

Até à data, não existe qualquer indicação relativa ao tema que suscite uma preocupação em termos de segurança. No entanto, a falsificação de rótulos induz os consumidores em erro no que diz respeito ao conteúdo dos alimentos e, por conseguinte, a presença não declarada de carne de cavalo em alimentos apresentados como contendo carne de bovino constitui uma fraude na rotulagem dos géneros alimentícios, de acordo com regras da UE em vigor ([1]).

Uma aplicação correta da legislação da UE pode eliminar práticas fraudulentas, principalmente por meio de controlos oficiais regulares baseados numa análise de risco adequada e na imposição de sanções dissuasivas eficazes.

A Comissão tem trabalhado ativamente tanto a nível político como a nível técnico na coordenação dos inquéritos pendentes nos Estados-Membros em causa. A Comissão adotou uma recomendação relativa a um plano de controlo coordenado ([2]), que exige a realização de controlos à escala da União sobre os géneros alimentícios comercializados como contendo carne de bovino, com vista a detetar rotulagem fraudulenta e carne de equídeos destinada ao consumo humano, bem como para detetar fenilbutazona, um medicamento veterinário cuja utilização é permitida apenas em animais não utilizados na alimentação humana. Uma síntese de todos os resultados estará disponível em abril de 2013. O plano é cofinanciado pela União a uma taxa de 75 %.

([1]) Diretiva 2000/13/CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, de 20 de março de 2000, relativa à aproximação das legislações dos Estados-Membros respeitantes à rotulagem, apresentação e publicidade dos géneros alimentícios, JO L 109 de 6.5.2000.

([2]) Recomendação da Comissão, de 19 de fevereiro de 2013, relativa a um plano de controlo coordenado com vista a determinar a prevalência de práticas fraudulentas (2013/99/UE), JO L 48 de 21.2.2013.

Os Estados-Membros em que existe uma investigação criminal em curso relacionada com o caso presente estão a cooperar ativamente com a Europol. De acordo com a legislação alimentar da UE, os Estados-Membros devem estabelecer sanções que sejam efetivas, proporcionadas e dissuasivas. As sanções por violação das normas da cadeia agroalimentar da União não estão harmonizadas nos Estados-Membros. Por conseguinte, o tipo e a escala das sanções que serão aplicadas pelos Estados-Membros em causa no presente caso podem variar.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001673/13
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Horsemeat found in beef ready meals

Suspicions that some beef ready meals may contain horsemeat have recently been confirmed in several EU Member States. The products were not labelled with accurate information regarding the origin and composition of the meat they contained.

The European Union has exclusive competence in agricultural policy, namely the trade in agricultural products, under Article 38 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and must assure the availability of supplies, in accordance with Article 39(1)(d).

Under Article 169 of the TFEU, the EU must promote the interests of consumers and ensure a high level of consumer protection by contributing 'to protecting the health, safety and economic interests of consumers, as well as to promoting their right to information'.

On 13 February 2013 the Commission appealed to all Member States to conduct DNA tests on all beef products, in response to the horsemeat scandal affecting beef ready meals.

1. What steps will the Commission take to normalise the situation and to protect consumers, ensuring that beef products are labelled with accurate information regarding the meat's origin?

2. What steps will it take to protect public health and to eliminate any suspicions that beef and horsemeat may be unfit for consumption?

3. As regards criminal law, what initiatives are planned to coordinate the criminal investigations triggered in several EU countries to determine the origin of the fraud that led to the use of horsemeat instead of beef? What criminal sanctions are planned should fraud be uncovered?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission
(5 April 2013)

To date, there is no indication on the subject which raises a safety concern. However, the falsification of labels misleads the consumers as regards the content of foods and therefore, undeclared presence of horse meat in food products presented as containing beef constitutes fraud in food labelling under existing EU rules ([1]).

Appropriate enforcement of EU legislation can eliminate fraudulent practices, mainly by means of regular official controls based on appropriate risk analysis and the imposition of effective dissuasive sanctions.

The Commission has been active both on political and technical levels in coordinating the pending investigations in the Member States concerned. It adopted a recommendation on a coordinated control plan ([2]) calling for EU-wide controls on foods marketed as containing beef to detect fraudulent labelling and on horse meat destined for human consumption to detect phenylbutazone, a veterinary drug whose use is allowed only in non-food producing animals. A summary of all findings will be available by April 2013. The plan is being co-financed by the Union at a rate of 75%.

Member States in which criminal investigations are ongoing in relation to the present case are actively cooperating with Europol. According to EU food law, Members States shall have in place sanctions which must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. Sanctions in relation to violations of Union agri-food chain rules are not harmonised across the Member States., therefore the type and scale of the sanctions that will be applied by each concerned Member States in the present case may vary.

([1]) Directive 2000/13/EC of the Parliament and the Council of 20 March 2000 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the labelling, presentation and advertising of foodstuffs, OJ L 109, 6.5.2000.

([2]) Commission Recommendation of 19 February 2013 on a coordinated control plan with a view to establish the prevalence of fraudulent practices (2013/99/EU), OJ L 48, 21.2.2013.

(Svensk version)

Frågor för skriftligt besvarande E-001674/13
till kommissionen
Isabella Lövin (Verts/ALE)
(18 februari 2013)

Angående: Långrevsfiske enligt avtal om tonfiskfiske

Enligt flera partnerskapsavtal om fiske får EU-fartyg som fiskar med långrev tillgång till tredjeländers fiskevatten (Kap Verde, Komorerna, Elfenbenskusten, Madagaskar, Moçambique, São Tomé och Príncipe samt Seychellerna).

Kan kommissionen med hänvisning till dessa partnerskapsavtal om fiske ange hur stora fångster de EU-fartyg gör som bedriver långrevsfiske enligt respektive avtal, uppdelat på art (inbegripet tonfisk, hajar, segelfiskar m.fl.) och EU-medlemsstat, för vart och ett av de senaste fem år för vilka det finns uppgifter?

— Utgår kommissionen vid beräkningen av ersättningen för tillträde till fiskevatten enligt respektive avtal enbart från tonfiskfångsterna eller tar den även hänsyn till fångsterna av andra arter än tonfisk (segelfiskar, hajar)?

— Bygger de avgifter som fartygsägarna betalar enligt respektive avtal enbart på tonfiskfångsterna eller även på fångsterna av andra arter än tonfisk (segelfiskar, hajar)?

— Om det förhåller sig så att dessa avgifter bygger enbart på tonfiskfångsterna kan kommissionen förklara varför fångster av dessa andra värdefulla arter inte tas med i beräkningen, särskilt med tanke på att dessa fångster ibland är väldigt stora?

Svar från Maria Damanaki på kommissionens vägnar
(25 april 2013)

Partnerskapsavtalen om fiske, som vanligen benämns avtalen om tonfiskfiske och har undertecknats med kuststater vid Atlanten, Indiska oceanen och Stilla havet, omfattar alla de ständigt vandrande arter som förtecknas i bilaga I till Förenta nationernas havsrättskonvention. Bilagan omfattar andra arter än tonfisk och tonfiskliknande arter, särskilt arter och familjer av elasmobranchii.

Enligt partnerskapsavtalen om fiske skulle fisket av dessa arter dock kunna begränsas eller till och med förbjudas till följd av internationella eller nationella bestämmelser. Därför måste EU:s fiskefartyg följa dessa bestämmelser.

Till följd av partnerskapsavtalens räckvidd grundar sig båda delarna av den ekonomiska ersättningen (EU-budgeten och fartygsägarnas avgifter) för EU-fiskefartygens tillträde till kuststaternas vatten på hela fångster av ständigt vandrande arter, oavsett om dessa är målet för fisket eller inte, och på därmed besläktade arter.

När det är tillåtet att fånga segelfiskar, hajar och andra arter än tonfisk enligt överenskommelsen i partnerskapsavtalen, begränsas dessa fångster självklart av tekniska bevarandeåtgärder och kapacitetsgränser som fastställts på internationell eller nationell nivå och även av fångstbegränsningar i vissa partnerskapsavtal. Målet är att främja ett hållbart utnyttjande, återuppbyggnad och förnyelse av bestånden på nivåer som motsvarar maximalt hållbart uttag och produktiva marina ekosystem. Dessutom ingår sådana fångster i den övergripande referensnivå för fångsterna som används vid fastställande av den del av ersättningen för tillträdet som kommer från EU-budgeten och vid beräkning av de avgifter som ägarna till EU-fartygen ska betalas till kuststaterna. För varje partnerskapsavtal översänds validerade uppgifter om dessa arter till kommissionen och delas med partnerländerna.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001674/13
to the Commission
Isabella Lövin (Verts/ALE)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Longline catches in tuna fisheries agreements

Several fisheries partnership agreements (FPAs) give EU longliners access to third-country waters (Cape Verde, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Madagascar, Mozambique, São Tomé and Príncipe and the Seychelles).

In relation to these agreements, can the Commission provide data on catches by EU longliners operating under each FPA, according to the species (including tuna, sharks, billfish and others) and the EU Member State, for each of the five most recent years for which data are available?

— When estimating the payment for access to waters under each of these agreements, does the Commission base its figures only on the amount of tuna caught, or does it also take into account catches of non-tuna species (billfish, sharks, non-tuna fish)?

— Are the fees that shipowners pay under each of these agreements based only on the amount of tuna caught or also on catches of non-tuna species (billfish, sharks, non-tuna fish)?

— If the fees are based solely on the amount of tuna caught, could the Commission explain why catches of these other valuable species are not taken into consideration, especially given that these catches can sometimes be very large?

Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission
(25 April 2013)

The scope of Fisheries Partnership Agreements (FPA) commonly called 'tuna fisheries agreements' and signed with coastal States in the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific oceans indeed covers all the highly migratory species listed in the Annex I to the Unclos, where other species than tuna and tuna-like species are mentioned, particularly species and families of elasmobranchs.

In the context of FPAs, fishing activities on these species could however be limited or even prohibited, following international or national provisions. Therefore, the EU fishing vessels have to comply with such provisions.

As a consequence of the scope of these FPAs, both components of the financial compensation (EU budget and vessel-owners fees) for access of EU fishing vessels in waters of the coastal States are based on the whole catches made on highly migratory species, being targeted or not, and on associated species.

When allowed, catches of billfish, sharks and other non-tuna species agreed in FPAs are obviously constrained by technical conservation measures and capacity limits established at international and/or national levels and even catch limits in some FPAs, with the aim to favour the sustainability of the exploitation, the rebuilding and renewal of the stocks at Maximum Sustainable Yield levels and the productivity of the marine ecosystems. In addition, such catches are included in the whole reference level of catches used when fixing the part of the compensation for access granted from the EU budget and when calculating the amount of fees to be paid to coastal States by EU vessel-owners. For each FPA, validated data on these species are transmitted to the Commission and shared with partner countries.

(Wersja polska)

Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej P-001675/13
do Komisji
Konrad Szymański (ECR)
(18 lutego 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Konkluzje Rady Europejskiej na temat wieloletnich ram finansowych 2014 – 2020

Czy na podstawie Konkluzji Szczytu Rady Europejskiej z dnia 8.2.2013 Komisja może przedstawić:

— projekcje wysokości kopert narodowych (ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem polityki spójności oraz rolnictwa)

— prognozy składek członkowskich poszczególnych krajów z uwzględnieniem wynegocjowanych rabatów?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Janusza Lewandowskiego w imieniu Komisji
(27 marca 2013 r.)

Środki przeznaczone na większość programów, w odniesieniu do których Komisja zaproponowała nowe podstawy prawne, nie zostały jeszcze przydzielone poszczególnym państwom członkowskim. W przypadku tych programów wiarygodny podział środków przyznanych poszczególnym państwom członkowskim jest możliwy jedynie w trybie ex post. Komisja publikuje wspomniane podziały w rocznym sprawozdaniu finansowym dotyczącym wykonania budżetu i zawsze podkreślała ograniczenia stosowanych metod.

W przypadku programów, w ramach których środki są wstępnie przydzielane poszczególnym państwom członkowskim, Komisja określi wysokość kopert narodowych i poinformuje o nich po osiągnięciu porozumienia przez Parlament Europejski i Radę w sprawie rozporządzenia dotyczącego wieloletnich ram finansowych (WRF) i porozumienia międzyinstytucjonalnego oraz w oparciu o kryteria ustanowione w odpowiednich aktach ustawodawczych (w ramach procedury współdecyzji).

W każdym przypadku specjalne przydziały środków dla państw członkowskich nie odzwierciedlają jednak wartości dodanej, którą programy te wnoszą do rozwoju Unii Europejskiej.

Komisja publikuje składki krajowe państw członkowskich na następny rok z uwzględnieniem wpływu korekt i rabatów wyłącznie w ramach rocznej procedury budżetowej. W przypadku poprzednich budżetów, składki krajowe państw członkowskich publikowane są w sprawozdaniu finansowym.

(English version)

Question for written answer P-001675/13
to the Commission
Konrad Szymański (ECR)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Conclusions of the European Council meeting on the 2014-2020 multiannual financial framework

Based on the conclusions of the European Council meeting on 8 February 2013, can the Commission provide:

— projections of the amounts to be allocated to each Member State (with particular regard to cohesion and agricultural policies);

— forecasts of the membership contributions of each country, taking into account any rebates negotiated?

Answer given by Mr Lewandowski on behalf of the Commission
(27 March 2013)

Expenditures for most of the programmes for which the Commission has proposed new legal bases are not pre-allocated by Member State. For these programmes a reliable split of expenditures by Member State is only possible *ex-post*. The Commission publishes these splits in its annual financial report for executed budgets and has always emphasised the limitations of the methods applied.

For the programmes where commitments are pre-allocated to specific Member States the Commission will determine and communicate the national envelopes after the agreement of the Council and the Parliament on the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) Regulation and the Interinstitutional Agreement and on the basis of the criteria laid down in the respective (co-decided) legislative acts.

In any case the Member States' specific allocations do not reflect the value added that these programmes bring to the development of the European Union.

The Commission publishes Member States' national contributions for the following year taking into account the impact of corrections and rebates only in the framework of the annual budgetary procedure. For past budgets national contributions per Member State are published in the financial report.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-001676/13
à Comissão
Diogo Feio (PPE)
(18 de fevereiro de 2013)

Assunto: Programa de Trabalho da Comissão 2013 — Uma estratégia global para o setor da defesa

A Comissão Europeia, no anexo ao seu plano de trabalho para o corrente ano, prevê promover uma iniciativa não legislativa subordinada ao tema «Uma estratégia global para o setor da defesa.»

Assim, pergunto à Comissão:

— Considera possível a adoção por todos os Estados-Membros de uma estratégia global para este setor?

— Não considera que, pela sua especial delicadeza e ligação estreita ao núcleo da soberania dos Estados, o setor da defesa não poderá deixar de ficar predominantemente sob a alçada dos mesmos?

— O estímulo à competitividade e à eficiência do setor europeu da defesa que se pretende não poderá passar pela sã concorrência entre os Estados-Membros e com a sua agregação em torno de projetos e parcerias concretas que estes queiram desenvolver coletivamente sem que tal passe necessariamente pela definição de uma estratégia global para o setor que arriscaria colidir com os interesses concretos dos Estados-Membros e dos respetivos setores da defesa?

Resposta dada por António Tajani em nome da Comissão
(11 de abril de 2013)

Em 10 de outubro de 2012 a Comissão anunciou que «… irá desenvolver uma estratégia global para apoiar a competitividade da indústria da defesa e reforçar a eficiência do mercado da defesa». A esta estratégia revestirá a forma de uma comunicação cuja adoção deverá ter lugar no verão de 2013. A comunicação será uma contribuição significativa para o Conselho Europeu de dezembro de 2013, que se prevê venha a dar destaque às questões de defesa.

O objetivo é reunir várias políticas e instrumentos da UE por forma a assegurar uma contribuição coerente e prática com valor acrescentado ao setor da defesa da Europa. Deste modo, a Comissão está a adotar uma abordagem pragmática que pode complementar os projetos de colaboração e iniciativas de parceria dos Estados-Membros.

É neste espírito que a Comissão está a elaborar a estratégia, que incluirá uma série de novas propostas em áreas em que a Comissão tem competências específicas e poderá fazer uma diferença significativa ao reforçar as sinergias civis e militares. A total implementação das diretivas relativas à simplificação das condições das transferências de produtos relacionados com a defesa ([1]) e aos contratos públicos nos setores da defesa e segurança ([2]) irá no entanto, continuar a ser uma prioridade fundamental para a Comissão, já que irá promover a abertura dos mercados nacionais à concorrência e permitir às empresas do setor beneficiar das economias de escala que são essenciais à competitividade.

([1]) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:146:0001:0036:PT:PDF
([2]) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:216:0076:0136:pt:PDF

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001676/13
to the Commission
Diogo Feio (PPE)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Commission Work Programme 2013 — a comprehensive strategy for the defence sector

In the annex to its work programme for this year, the Commission intends to promote a non-legislative initiative on 'a comprehensive strategy for the defence sector'.

— Does the Commission think that all the Member States can adopt a comprehensive defence strategy?

— Does it not believe that, as a particularly sensitive issue that goes right to the heart of Member States' sovereignty, defence must remain predominantly a matter for the Member States?

— Will it not be possible to achieve the aim of fostering the competitiveness and efficiency of the European defence sector through competition between the Member States with them collaborating on projects and concrete partnerships that they want to develop together, without necessarily drawing up a comprehensive strategy for the sector, which would likely clash with the specific interests of the Member States and of their individual defence sectors?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission
(11 April 2013)

On 10 October 2012 the Commission announced that it '…will develop a comprehensive strategy to support the competitiveness of the defence industry and enhance the efficiency of the defence market'. This will be in the form of a communication which is expected to be adopted by summer 2013. The communication will be a substantive contribution to the European Council in December 2013 which is planned to have a focus on defence issues.

The objective is to bring together a range of EU policies and instruments to ensure a coherent, practical and value-added contribution to Europe's defence sector. By doing this, the Commission is taking a pragmatic approach that can complement the collaborative projects and partnership initiatives of Member States.

It is in this spirit that the Commission is drafting the strategy. This strategy will put forward a series of new proposals in areas where the Commission has specific competences and could make a significant difference notably by reinforcing civilian-military synergies. The full implementation of the directives on Transfers of Defence-related Products ([1]) and Defence and Security Procurement ([2]) will however remain a key priority for the Commission as it should foster the opening of national markets to competition and allow companies in the sector to benefit from the economies of scale that are essential to competitiveness.

([1]) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:146:0001:0036:EN:PDF
([2]) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:216:0076:0136:en:PDF

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-001677/13
à Comissão
Diogo Feio (PPE)
(18 de fevereiro de 2013)

Assunto: Programa de Trabalho da Comissão 2013 — revisão da estrutura de taxas do IVA

A Comissão Europeia, no anexo ao seu plano de trabalho para o corrente ano, prevê promover uma iniciativa legislativa subordinada ao tema «Tornar o sistema do IVA mais eficaz através de uma revisão da estrutura de taxas» cujo «objetivo é ajustar o âmbito de aplicação das taxas reduzidas, a fim de aumentar a eficiência do sistema do IVA».

Assim, pergunto à Comissão:

1. Quais são, em seu entender, os principais obstáculos à eficiência do sistema do IVA?

2. Considera que deve ser permitida a aplicação de taxas reduzidas para produtos de primeira necessidade, em especial os essenciais às famílias e à vida e fisiologia de crianças e recém-nascidos?

3. Face à crise demográfica na Europa acrescida de uma crise económica e financeira, não considera da mais elementar justiça e bom senso defender políticas de proteção da natalidade?

Resposta dada por Algirdas Šemeta em nome da Comissão
(12 de abril de 2013)

1. Segundo a avaliação da Comissão, a fraude no IVA e a aplicação de taxas reduzidas e isenções são os maiores obstáculos à eficiência do sistema do IVA.

Nos Estados-Membros da UE que são igualmente membros da OCDE, as receitas efetivas de IVA representam apenas 54 % da média das receitas que, teoricamente, seriam cobradas se todo o consumo final fosse tributado à taxa normal. Outros países da OCDE, como o Japão, a Coreia do Sul ou a Suíça, têm um sistema de IVA mais eficaz, elevando-se a referida percentagem a mais de 67 %. ([1])

2. A avaliação económica solicitada pela Comissão durante a consulta pública sobre o sistema do IVA ([2]) veio confirmar as opiniões já expressas em estudos económicos anteriores ([3]), no sentido de que o uso de taxas reduzidas é frequentemente um instrumento pouco adequado para atingir os objetivos da política, particularmente para assegurar a redistribuição às famílias pobres ou para incentivar o consumo de um bem considerado socialmente desejável. No entanto, os benefícios potenciais de uma utilização limitada das taxas reduzidas, se forem definidas e aplicadas de uma maneira racional, não devem ser ignorados. A revisão das atuais estruturas das taxas de IVA anunciada pela comunicação sobre o futuro do IVA ([4]) está em curso. Por conseguinte, nesta fase do processo, não é possível à Comissão comentar sobre a relevância das taxas mais baixas para os bens referidos pelo Senhor Deputado.

3. A Comissão considera que a decisão de ter uma criança cabe à família, enquanto suportar as políticas de apoio à família é da responsabilidade dos Estados Membros. A Comissão manifesta-se no entanto fortemente a favor de políticas que tornem mais fácil aos pais a reconciliação do trabalho e das responsabilidades familiares, como as estruturas de acolhimento de crianças, a licença parental e a flexibilidade do horário de trabalho. As taxas de natalidade são mais elevadas nos países onde é possível às mães realizar trabalho remunerado.

([1]) OCDE, Consumption Tax Trends 2012, VAT/GST and excise rates, trends and administrative issues, p. 103.
([2]) COM(2010) 695 de 1.12.2010.
([3]) Copenhagen Economics, estudo sobre taxas de IVA reduzidas aplicadas a bens e serviços nos Estados-Membros da União Europeia, Relatório final, 21.6.2007.
([4]) COM(2011) 851 de 6.12.2011, Comunicação da Comissão sobre o futuro do IVA — Para um sistema de IVA mais simples, robusto e eficaz à medida do mercado único.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001677/13
to the Commission
Diogo Feio (PPE)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Commission Work Programme 2013 — review of VAT rates structure

In the annex to its work programme for this year, the Commission intends to promote a legislative initiative on 'making the VAT system more efficient through a review of the rates structures' whose 'aim is to readjust the scope of the reduced rates in order to increase the efficiency of the VAT system'.

1. In the Commission's view, what are the main obstacles to the efficiency of the VAT system?

2. Does it believe that lower VAT rates should be permitted for essential goods, particularly those that are vital for families and the lives and physiological needs of children and infants?

3. In view of the demographic crisis in Europe, on top of an economic and financial crisis, does it not consider it fundamentally right and a matter of common sense to promote pro-birth policies?

Answer given by Mr Šemeta on behalf of the Commission
(12 April 2013)

1. In the Commission's view, VAT fraud and the application of reduced rates and exemptions are the main obstacles to the efficiency of the VAT system.

Of the EU Member States that are also members of the OECD, actual VAT revenues represent only 54% on average of the revenues that would, in theory, be collected if all final consumption was taxed at the standard rate. Other OECD countries such as Japan, South Korea or Switzerland have a more efficient VAT system with ratios above 67% ([1]).

2. The economic evaluation commissioned by the Commission during the public consultation on the VAT system ([2]) has confirmed the views already expressed in earlier economic studies ([3]) that the use of reduced rates is often not the most suitable instrument for pursuing policy objectives, particularly for ensuring redistribution to poor households or encouraging the consumption of a good that is deemed socially desirable. However, the potential benefits of a limited use of reduced rates, if rationally defined and applied, should not be disregarded. The review of the current VAT rates structure announced by the communication on the future of VAT ([4]) is ongoing. Therefore, at this stage of the process, the Commission is unable to comment on the relevance of lower rates for the goods mentioned by the honourable member of the Parliament.

3. The Commission thinks that the decision to have a child ought to be a private one while support policies for families are a Member State responsibility The Commission is however strongly in favour of policies that make it easier for parents to reconcile work and family care such as childcare, parental leave and working time flexibility. Birth rates are highest in those countries where it is made possible for mothers to accept paid work.

([1]) OECD, Consumption Tax Trends 2012, VAT/GST and excise rates, trends and administration issues, p. 103.
([2]) COM(2010) 695, 1.12.2010.
([3]) Copenhagen Economics, Study on reduced VAT applied to goods and services in the Member States of the European Union, Final Report, 21.6.2007.
([4]) COM(2011) 851, 6.12.2011, Communication on the future of VAT — Towards a simpler, more robust and efficient VAT system tailored to the single market.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-001678/13
à Comissão
Diogo Feio (PPE)
(18 de fevereiro de 2013)

Assunto: Violações na Índia

Kavita Krishnan, secretária da «All India Progressive Women's Association», defendeu recentemente que a cultura indiana que culpa a vítima de crimes sexuais acaba por ser a principal responsável pelo elevado número de violações naquele país. Esta ativista refere que o governo e os agentes policiais insistiram recentemente em que a maioria dos violadores não pode ser processada na Índia, porque, como disse um oficial, eles são conhecidos das mulheres atacadas. Outros funcionários têm sugerido publicamente que as próprias vítimas estão «a pedi-las» devido ao facto de circularem na rua a qualquer hora. A taxa de condenação por violação na Índia caiu de 46 %, em 1971, para apenas 26 %, hoje.

Assim, pergunto à Comissão:

1. Tem conhecimento destas situações?

2. Já questionou as autoridades indianas sobre as medidas tomadas para impedi-las e garantir a segurança das mulheres indianas?

3. Adotará agora a União uma política forte, que garanta a defesa e o respeito pelos Direitos Humanos na Índia, nomeadamente o direito à vida e à integridade física das mulheres e a punição adequadas dos responsáveis por crimes sexuais?

Resposta dada pela Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente Catherine Ashton em nome da Comissão
(4 de abril de 2013)

A UE toma nota das questões mencionadas pelo Senhor Deputado e está empenhada, desde há já algum tempo, num diálogo com as autoridades indianas e a sociedade civil desse país sobre a violência e a discriminação contra as mulheres e as questões de género. A União Europeia tomou conhecimento do relatório exaustivo apresentado em janeiro pelo Comité presidido pelo antigo Presidente do Supremo Tribunal, J. S. Verma, cujo mandato consistia em analisar possíveis alterações ao direito penal para permitir um julgamento mais rápido e penas mais severas para os criminosos que cometem agressões sexuais contra as mulheres. Cabe agora ao Governo indiano alterar o direito penal com base nas recomendações do relatório Verma, processo que a UE tenciona acompanhar muito atentamente.

As questões de género e os direitos das mulheres ocupam um lugar de destaque, nomeadamente, nas reuniões regulares do diálogo sobre os direitos humanos entre a UE e a Índia realizadas a nível local. A abordagem da UE assenta em três princípios: promoção da igualdade de género e do empoderamento das mulheres; combate à discriminação com base no sexo e à violência contra as mulheres e proteção e promoção dos direitos das crianças, especialmente das raparigas.

As questões de género são igualmente integradas nas atividades da UE no domínio da cooperação para o desenvolvimento, que atribuem especial importância ao bem-estar das mulheres e das raparigas; muitos dos projetos da UE apoiaram as organizações da sociedade civil a combater a discriminação contra as raparigas e a violência contra as mulheres, nomeadamente no âmbito da luta contra o tráfico de seres humanos e o casamento de menores, a violência doméstica e o VIH/SIDA.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001678/13
to the Commission
Diogo Feio (PPE)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Rapes in India

Kavita Krishnan, Secretary of the All India Progressive Women's Association, has recently claimed that the blame-the-victim culture in India when it comes to sex crimes is primarily to blame for the high number of rapes in the country. The campaigner notes that the government and the police recently insisted that most rapists cannot be prosecuted in India because, as one official put it, they are known to the women who are attacked. Other officials have publicly suggested that victims themselves are 'asking for it', because they are out at all hours. The conviction rate for rape in India has fallen from 46% in 1971, to just 26% today.

1. Is the Commission aware of these issues?

2. Has it asked the Indian authorities what steps they have taken to prevent rape and to ensure the safety of women in India?

3. Will the Union now adopt a robust policy to ensure that human rights in India, particularly women's right to life and physical integrity, are safeguarded and respected, and that those guilty of sex crimes are duly punished?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(4 April 2013)

The EU takes note of the issues mentioned by the Honourable Member and has engaged the Indian authorities and civil society for some time already on violence, discrimination against women and gender issues. The EU took note of the extensive report presented in January by the Committee chaired by former Chief Justice J.S. Verma, whose mandate was to look at possible amendments to the Criminal Law to provide for quicker trial and enhanced punishment for criminals committing sexual assault against women. It is now up to the Indian government to amend the Criminal Law drawing upon the recommendations of the Verma Report, a process that the EU will be following with great attention.

Gender issues and women's rights feature prominently, *inter alia*, in the meetings of the regular Human Rights Dialogue between the EU and India, conducted locally. The EU approach is based on three principles: promoting gender equality and women's empowerment; combating gender-based discrimination and violence against women; and protecting and promoting the rights of children, especially girls.

Gender issues are also mainstreamed into the EU's development cooperation activities, which have a strong focus on women and girls' welfare; numerous EU projects have assisted civil society organisations in addressing discrimination against girls and violence against women, including trafficking and child marriage, domestic violence and HIV/AIDS.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-001679/13
à Comissão
Diogo Feio (PPE)
(18 de fevereiro de 2013)

Assunto: Guerra à medicina ocidental leva à morte de 25 pessoas

A vacinação de crianças contra a poliomielite tem custado a vida a vários profissionais de saúde em países como a Nigéria, Paquistão e Afeganistão onde esses profissionais são acusados de estar ao serviço da medicina ocidental contra o islão. Desde dezembro, já morreram 25 pessoas na Nigéria, Paquistão e Afeganistão, em atentados que tiveram na sua origem esse motivo.

A escalada da violência e de ataques em serviços de saúde levou mesmo a Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU) a suspender o programa de vacinação que tinha no Paquistão para erradicar a poliomielite, a qual é endémica neste país.

Assim, pergunto à Comissão:

1. Tem conhecimento destes acontecimentos?

2. De que informações dispõe a este respeito? Como é possível garantir a segurança dos profissionais de saúde no terreno?

3. Já questionou as autoridades locais (Nigéria, Paquistão e Afeganistão) em particular os líderes políticos e religiosos, sobre as medidas tomadas para garantir a segurança do pessoal internacional envolvido nos programas de vacinação?

4. Que medidas podem ser tomadas para motivar a participação e a parceria dos governos e autoridades policiais/exército nestas campanhas de vacinação?

5. De que dados dispõe sobre este tipo de incidentes e o alastramento de doenças infetocontagiosas nestes três países?

Resposta dada pela Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente Catherine Ashton em nome da Comissão
(24 de abril de 2013)

A UE está plenamente consciente destes ataques terríveis contra profissionais de saúde e apresenta as suas condolências às famílias destes corajosos trabalhadores. A União condena veementemente estes ataques sem sentido que comprometem a luta global contra a poliomielite e que atinge particularmente as pessoas nos países mais afetados. A UE tem mantido um contacto regular com as autoridades de todos estes países relativamente a questões de segurança e à proteção dos profissionais de ajuda humanitária e desenvolvimento. É de notar que tanto os líderes políticos como religiosos de todos estes países são praticamente unânimes no seu apoio à vacinação contra a poliomielite.

Em 2012, a Nigéria comunicou ter atingido um nível máximo de 122 casos de poliomielite nos últimos três anos. Em resposta ao ataque contra os profissionais de saúde, a Nigéria reforçou a segurança nos estabelecimentos de saúde na parte norte do país. A UE apoia a campanha de vacinação contra a poliomielite na Nigéria e tem financiado o programa da Organização Mundial da Saúde. O Paquistão ainda tem níveis endémicos de poliomielite mas as hipóteses de uma erradicação bem-sucedida melhoraram substancialmente. O resultado das eleições de 2013 e a situação geral em matéria de segurança poderão determinar a viabilidade da implementação do plano nacional de emergência contra a poliomielite do Paquistão. O Afeganistão registou 37 casos em 2012. O Presidente Karzai aprovou o plano de ação nacional de emergência para a erradicação da poliomielite, que inclui um enfoque particular nas regiões endémicas do sul e ocidente e o recurso a negociadores com acesso a nível local e organizações humanitárias ativas em zonas de conflito. Nas 10 províncias onde a UE tem vindo a financiar a prestação de cuidados de saúde, foram facultadas 1 197 681 de vacinas durante 2011 e 2012, incluindo contra a poliomielite, contribuindo para a descida da taxa de mortalidade infantil do país.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001679/13
to the Commission
Diogo Feio (PPE)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: War on Western medicine leaves 25 people dead

Several health professionals helping to vaccinate children against polio have been killed in countries including Nigeria, Pakistan and Afghanistan, where they are accused of using Western medicine as part of a plot against Islam. Since December, 25 people have been killed in Nigeria, Pakistan and Afghanistan in attacks carried out by opponents of Western medicine.

The escalation of violence and attacks on health services has even led the United Nations to suspend its polio vaccination programme in Pakistan, despite the disease being endemic in that country.

1. Is the Commission aware of these events?

2. What information does it have in this regard? How can health workers' safety be ensured on the ground?

3. Has it questioned the local authorities (in Nigeria, Pakistan and Afghanistan), in particular political and religious leaders, on the measures taken to ensure the safety of international personnel involved in vaccination programmes?

4. What measures can be taken to encourage the participation and partnership of governments and police/military authorities in these vaccination campaigns?

5. What information does it have on these types of incidents and on the spread of infectious diseases in these three countries?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(24 April 2013)

The EU is well aware of these terrible attacks against health professionals. It sends condolences to the families of those brave workers. The EU condemns utterly these senseless attacks that undermine the global fight against polio and impact particularly on the people in those worst-affected countries. The EU is in regular contact with the authorities in all these countries on security matters and the safety of humanitarian and development professionals. It should be noted that both political and religious leaders in all these countries are almost unanimous in their support for polio vaccinations.

In 2012, Nigeria reported having reached a three-year high with 122 cases of polio. In response to the attack on the health workers, Nigeria has scaled up security at health facilities in the northern part of the country. The EU supports the polio vaccination campaign in Nigeria and has been funding the World Health Organisation programme. Pakistan still has widespread transmission of polio, but the chances of successful eradication have greatly improved. The outcome of the 2013 elections and the overall security situation are likely to determine the viability of implementing Pakistan's National Polio Emergency Action Plan. Afghanistan recorded 37 cases in 2012. President Karzai has endorsed the National Polio Eradication Emergency Action Plan, which includes particular focus on endemic southern and western regions and an engagement with local-level access negotiators and humanitarian organisations active in conflict areas. In the 10 provinces in which the EU is funding health service provision, 1 197 681 vaccinations, including polio, were provided during 2011 and 2012, contributing to the decrease in the infant mortality rate in the country.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-001680/13
à Comissão
Diogo Feio (PPE)
(18 de fevereiro de 2013)

Assunto: Debate europeu sobre o crime de violação

Vêm a público preocupantes notícias que dão conta de um debate em Itália sobre se o vestuário e o comportamento das mulheres encorajam a violação e de que na Suécia já se reclama que os violadores que conhecem as mulheres que atacam não sejam processados, porque são, de certa forma, «encorajados» pelas vítimas e pelos seus comportamentos.

Sendo os crimes sexuais atos particularmente graves, aos quais deve corresponder uma adequada moldura penal, pergunto à Comissão:

1. Tem conhecimento destes debates nos Estados-Membros a propósito do enquadramento legal dos crimes sexuais, nomeadamente violações?

2. De que informações dispõe a este respeito?

3. Atenta a gravidade dos crimes sexuais e a particular vulnerabilidade das vítimas, não considera um retrocesso civilizacional que se pretenda, de certa forma, atenuar a gravidade destes crimes, «transferindo a culpa» dos agressores para as vítimas?

4. Como é possível integrar tais debates no quadro da Carta dos Direitos Fundamentais da UE?

Resposta dada por Viviane Reding em nome da Comissão
(9 de abril de 2013)

A violação é uma infração grave aos direitos fundamentais da vítima. A Comissão está ciente do facto de existirem provas substanciais de que, na União Europeia, a maioria dos processos por violação não conduz a uma condenação ([1]). Esta situação deve-se, em parte, à posição vulnerável das vítimas, que tendem a não comunicar estes crimes e — quando os comunicam — às taxas de desistência particularmente elevadas registadas nos inquéritos sobre violações. Os sistemas nacionais de justiça penal aplicam geralmente, em caso de violação e outros crimes sexuais, regimes probatórios complexos, que variam de forma significativa entre os Estados-Membros.

Para proteger e apoiar as vítimas, a Comissão impulsionou a nova Diretiva 2012/29/UE, que estabelece normas mínimas relativas aos direitos, ao apoio e à proteção das vítimas da criminalidade, que foi adotada em outubro de 2012. A diretiva assegurará a aplicação de uma vasta gama de medidas especiais para proteger e apoiar as vítimas vulneráveis, nomeadamente mulheres vítimas de crime sexual. A diretiva salienta igualmente a necessidade de formar os profissionais (polícia, procuradores e juízes) sobre as necessidades das vítimas, elemento crucial para mudar as atitudes em relação às vítimas e as tratar com respeito e reconhecimento.

Todas as disposições da Carta dos Direitos Fundamentais da União Europeia, designadamente as relativas à dignidade, igualdade e justiça, devem ser respeitadas pelas instituições e pelos Estados-Membros da União Europeia quando aplicam o direito da UE.

([1]) Ver Feasibility Study to assess the possibilities, opportunities and needs to standardise national legislation on violence against women, violence against children and sexual orientation violence, publicado pela Comissão Europeia em 2010: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/files/feasibility-study-harmonisation_en.zip

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001680/13
to the Commission
Diogo Feio (PPE)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: European debate on rape

Worrying reports have come to light regarding a debate in Italy on whether women's clothing and behaviour encourages rape and regarding claims in Sweden that rapists who know the women they attack are not prosecuted because they are somehow 'encouraged' by the victims and their behaviour.

Sexual offences are particularly serious, and appropriate criminal procedures must be in place.

1. Is the Commission aware of the debates taking place in Member States on the legal framework for sexual offences, particularly for rape?

2. What information does it have in this regard?

3. Given the seriousness of sexual offences and the particular vulnerability of the victims, does it not believe that attempting to somehow mitigate the seriousness of these crimes by 'shifting the blame' from the perpetrators to the victims is a step backwards for civilisation?

4. How can such debates be incorporated in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(9 April 2013)

Rape is a serious violation of the victim's fundamental rights. The Commission is aware of the fact that there is substantial evidence that across the European Union the majority of rape cases do not result in a conviction ([1]). The reason is partly due to the vulnerable position of the victims who tend not to report these crimes, and — if cases are reported — to the particularly high attrition rates in rape investigations. For rape and other sexual offences, national criminal justice systems apply generally complex evidentiary rules which vary significantly among the Member States.

To protect and support victims, the Commission initiated the new Directive 2012/29/EU establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, which was adopted in October 2012. The directive will ensure that a whole range of special measures will be put in place to protect and support vulnerable victims, among them women victims of sexual crime. The directive also emphasises the need to train practitioners (police, prosecutors and judges) on the needs of victims, which is crucial for changing attitudes towards victims and treating them with respect and recognition.

All the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, notably those concerning dignity, equality and justice, must be respected by EU institutions and by Member States when they implement EC law.

([1]) See further Feasibility Study to assess the possibilities, opportunities and needs to standardise national legislation on violence against women, violence against children and sexual orientation violence, published by the European Commission in 2010: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/files/feasibility-study-harmonisation_en.zip.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-001681/13
à Comissão
Diogo Feio (PPE)
(18 de fevereiro de 2013)

Assunto: Flickr.com: divulgação de fotografias privadas

Notícias recentes dão conta de que um erro nas páginas de partilha e alojamento de imagens na Internet Flickr.com originou a divulgação de fotografias privadas de alguns utilizadores durante um período de 21 dias.

Esta situação, que já não é inédita, põe em causa a efetiva capacidade de serviços como este respeitarem e preservarem a privacidade dos dados que acolhem e que é prometida aos seus utilizadores.

Assim, pergunto à Comissão:

— Tendo presentes os diversos casos de divulgações erróneas de dados considerados privados pelos utilizadores de diversos sítios e serviços da Internet conhecidos nos últimos anos, que medidas tomou, ou prevê tomar, junto das empresas que os exploram, de modo a prevenir situações como estas?

Resposta dada por Viviane Reding em nome da Comissão
(17 de abril de 2013)

As disposições da Diretiva 95/46/CE ([1]) relativa à proteção de dados podem ser aplicadas aos prestadores de serviços de redes sociais (SRS) como Flickr.com, ainda que as suas sedes se situem fora da UE ([2]) (artigo 4.°). Ao abrigo da diretiva, os SRS podem ser considerados responsáveis pelo tratamento dos dados e, por conseguinte, qualquer tratamento de dados pessoais, como imagens pessoais, deve ser efetuado em conformidade com a legislação nacional que transpõe os requisitos estabelecidos na Diretiva 95/46/CE. Em especial, o responsável pelo tratamento deve pôr em prática as medidas técnicas e organizacionais adequadas, «tanto aquando da conceção do sistema de tratamento como da realização do próprio tratamento» para proteger os dados pessoais contra a divulgação ou acesso não autorizados ([3]).

Nos seus esforços para reformar a atual legislação em matéria de proteção de dados, a Comissão Europeia procurou reforçar a segurança do tratamento, propondo a introdução da obrigação pelo responsável pelo tratamento de notificar violações de dados pessoais à autoridade de controlo competente e ao titular dos dados, sempre que a violação de dados pessoais for suscetível de afetar negativamente a proteção dos dados pessoais ou a privacidade do titular dos dados ([4]).

Sem prejuízo das competências da Comissão, na sua qualidade de guardiã dos Tratados, a responsabilidade de garantir que os responsáveis pelo tratamento respeitam as disposições em vigor e uma vez adotadas as propostas de reforma incumbe essencialmente às autoridades de proteção de dados dos Estados-Membros.

([1]) Diretiva 95/46/CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho relativa à proteção das pessoas singulares no que diz respeito ao tratamento de dados pessoais e à livre circulação desses dados, JO L 281 de 23.11.1995, p. 31.

([2]) Parecer 5/2009 sobre as redes sociais em linha, p. 5, Grupo de trabalho do artigo 29.°, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2009/wp163_en.pdf e referência cruzada ao parecer 1/2008 sobre questões de proteção de dados relacionadas com motores de busca.

([3]) Artigo 17.° e considerando 46 da Diretiva 95/46/CE.

([4]) Artigos 31.° e 32.° da proposta de Regulamento do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho relativo à proteção das pessoas singulares no que diz respeito ao tratamento de dados pessoais e à livre circulação desses dados (regulamento geral sobre a proteção de dados) [COM(2012) 11 final].

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001681/13
to the Commission
Diogo Feio (PPE)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Flickr.com: private photographs made public

Recent news reports have revealed that an error on the image sharing and hosting pages of the website Flickr.com led to some users' private photographs being made public for 21 days.

This situation, which is by no means unprecedented, calls into question the effective capacity of such services to respect and uphold data privacy commitments made to their users.

Bearing in mind that there have been several cases in recent years where the private data of users of various websites and Internet services have been accidentally made public, what measures has the Commission taken or does it intend to take, along with the companies operating these websites, to prevent similar situations from arising?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(17 April 2013)

The provisions of the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC ([1]) can apply to providers of social networking services (SNS) such as Flickr.com, even if their headquarters are located outside of the EEA ([2]) (Art. 4). SNS can be considered data controllers under the directive and thus any processing of personal data such as personal images needs to be carried out in line with the national laws implementing the requirements laid down in Directive 95/46/EC. In particular, any controller must implement appropriate technical and organisational measures, 'both at the time of the design of the processing system and at the time of the processing itself' to protect personal data against unauthorised disclosure or access ([3]).

In its efforts to reform the current legislation on data protection, the European Commission has sought to strengthen the security of processing by proposing the introduction of an obligation on the controller to notify personal data breaches to the competent supervisory authority and, where the breach is likely to adversely affect the protection of personal data or privacy of the data subject, to the data subject ([4]).

Without prejudice to the powers of the Commission as guardian of the Treaties, the responsibility to ensure that controllers comply with the current provisions and once adopted the ones proposed for reform lies primarily with the data protection authorities of the Members States.

([1]) Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data; Official Journal, 1995, L 281, p. 31.

([2]) Opinion 5/2009 on online social networking, p. 5, Article 29 Working Party, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2009/wp163_en.pdf and crossreference to Opinion 1/2008 on data protection issues related to search engines.

([3]) Article 17 and Recital 46 of Directive 95/46/EC.

([4]) Articles 31and 32 of the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation), COM(2012) 11.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-001682/13
à Comissão
Diogo Feio (PPE)
(18 de fevereiro de 2013)

Assunto: Programa de Trabalho da Comissão 2013 — comunicações sem fios

A Comissão Europeia, no anexo ao seu plano de trabalho para o corrente ano, prevê promover uma iniciativa não legislativa denominada «Plano de Ação sobre as Comunicações sem Fios para uma Europa Interligada».

Tendo presente a intenção de acelerar a implantação das redes de banda larga sem fios, promover a utilização partilhada do espetro, a exploração dos resultados de I&D da UE sobre comunicações sem fios e reforçar a harmonização mundial do espetro, não posso deixar de questionar a Comissão sobre se dispõe de estudos que garantam a segurança e a saúde dos cidadãos cada vez mais expostos à ação destas redes e se está em condições de garantir que esta exposição não acarretará consequências indesejadas também para os ecossistemas circundantes.

Resposta dada por Tonio Borg em nome da Comissão
(23 de abril de 2013)

A Recomendação 1999/519/CE do Conselho ([1]) prevê a limitação da exposição da população aos campos electromagnéticos (CEM). Além disso, o Comité Científico dos Riscos para a Saúde Emergentes e Recentemente Identificados (Ccrseri) efetua o controlo e a investigação permanentes a nível da UE para avaliar os riscos dos CEM. De acordo com o seu parecer mais recente (2009) ([2]), três elementos de prova independentes (epidemiológicos, estudos *in vivo* e *in vitro*) mostram que a exposição aos campos eletromagnéticos de radiofrequência é pouco suscetível de conduzir a um aumento da incidência de cancro no ser humano.

A Comissão solicita periodicamente uma atualização das provas científicas disponíveis para avaliar os riscos relacionados com os CEM e verifica se continuam a apoiar os limites de exposição, tal como propostos na recomendação do Conselho relativa aos limites de exposição aos CEM. Está a decorrer uma atualização do parecer do Comité Científico sobre os CEM e prevê-se que esteja pronto para consulta pública até ao final de junho de 2013.

Além disso, o programa-quadro de investigação da UE (PQ7 2007-2013) está atualmente a financiar três projetos de investigação sobre os potenciais efeitos dos CEM para a saúde ([3]).

([1]) Jornal Oficial das Comunidades Europeias, L 199/59 de 30. 7. 1999.
([2]) http://ec.europa.eu/health/archive/ph_risk/committees/04_scenihr/docs/scenihr_o_022.pdf
([3]) Para mais informações, consultar o seguinte endereço Web: http://ec.europa.eu/health/electromagnetic_fields/research/funding/index_en.htm

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001682/13
to the Commission
Diogo Feio (PPE)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Commission Work Programme 2013 — wireless communications

In the annex to its work programme for this year, the Commission intends to promote a non-legislative initiative known as the 'Action Plan on Wireless Communications for a Connected Europe'.

Bearing in mind the aim of accelerating the roll-out of wireless broadband networks, fostering shared spectrum use, exploitation of EU R&D results on wireless communications and enhancing global spectrum harmonisation, can the Commission say whether there are any studies that guarantee the safety and the health of the public, who are increasingly exposed to the effects of these networks, and can it guarantee that such exposure will not have undesirable effects also on surrounding ecosystems?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission
(23 April 2013)

Council Recommendation 1999/519/EC ([1]) provides for limitations of exposure of the general public to electromagnetic fields (EMF). In addition, permanent scrutiny and research is being conducted at EU level by the independent Scientific Committee on Emerging and Newly Identified Health Risks (SCENIHR) to evaluate the risks from EMF. According to its latest opinion (2009) ([2]), three independent lines of evidence (epidemiological, *in vivo* and *in vitro* studies) show that exposure to radiofrequency EMF is unlikely to lead to an increase of cancer incidence in humans.

The Commission requests periodically an update of the scientific evidence available to evaluate the risks from EMF and checks whether it still supports the exposure limits as proposed in the Council Recommendation on EMF exposure limits. An update of the Scientific Committee's opinion on EMF is ongoing and scheduled to be ready for public consultation by the end of June 2013.

Moreover, the EU Framework Programme for Research (FP7 2007-13) is currently funding three projects investigating the potential health effects of EMF ([3]).

([1]) *Official Journal of the European Communities*, L 199/59, 30. 7. 1999.
([2]) http://ec.europa.eu/health/archive/ph_risk/committees/04_scenihr/docs/scenihr_o_022.pdf
([3]) The details can be found at the following address: http://ec.europa.eu/health/electromagnetic_fields/research/funding/index_en.htm

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord P-001683/13
aan de Commissie
Marije Cornelissen (Verts/ALE)
(18 februari 2013)

Betreft: Landenspecifieke aanbeveling woningmarkt Nederland

In het kader van het Europees semester 2012 deed de Europese Commissie een landenspecifieke aanbeveling aan Nederland met betrekking tot de woningmarkt. De Commissie riep Nederland op om de woningmarkt onder meer door de volgende maatregelen geleidelijk te hervormen:

„ii) totstandbrenging van een meer marktgericht prijsstelsel op de huurwoningenmarkt en iii) aanpassing van de huren voor sociale woningen aan het inkomen van huishoudens."

Uit het begeleidende werkdocument van de diensten van de Commissie blijkt dat hervormingen in de huurwoningmarkt volgens de Commissie gericht moeten zijn op het beperken van de „reikwijdte en omvang van het segment sociale woningen" (SWD(2012)0322 final, p. 8).

1. Uit welke onderdelen van de beleidssturing en doelstellingen van de EU die ten grondslag liggen aan het Europees semester vloeit de hierboven genoemde aanbeveling aan Nederland voor hervormingen in de woningmarkt voort?

2. Hoe verhoudt zich de oproep van de Commissie tot een meer marktgericht prijsstelsel op de huurwoningenmarkt en aanpassing van de huren voor sociale woningen aan het inkomen van huishoudens de ruime discretionaire bevoegdheid van nationale, regionale en lokale autoriteiten om diensten van algemeen economisch belang te verrichten en organiseren, zoals bepaald in artikel 1 van protocol 26 bij het Verdrag betreffende de werking van de Europese Unie en op welke wijze zal de Commissie tegemoetkomen aan de bezorgdheid die het Europees Parlement heeft geuit ([1]) over de restrictieve definitie die de Commissie hanteert bij het toepassen van staatssteunregels aan socialewoningbouwcorporaties?

3. Kan de Commissie toezeggen dat zij zich bij het opstellen van eventuele landenspecifieke aanbevelingen aan Nederland over hervormingen in de woningmarkt zal beperken tot beleidsaanbevelingen die aansluiten bij de Europa 2020-doelstellingen, de geïntegreerde richtsnoeren en de door de Raad overgenomen onderdelen van de jaarlijkse groeianalyse en Verordening (EU) nr. 1176/2011, en dat zij hierover uitleg verschaft in het begeleidende werkdocument?

Antwoord van de heer Barroso namens de Commissie
(27 maart 2013)

De Commissie wil verduidelijken dat de aanbeveling met betrekking tot de huizenmarkt in Nederland uit 2012 verwijst naar structurele verstoringen die breder zijn dan het element door het geachte Parlementslid wordt aangehaald. De bezorgdheid wordt uitvoerig toegelicht in het begeleidende document ([2]) waarin het nationaal hervormingsplan en het stabiliteitsplan van Nederland inderdaad worden beoordeeld overeenkomstig de geïntegreerde richtsnoeren en de beleidslijnen van de Commissie en de Europese Raad ([3]).

In hun analyse komen de diensten van de Commissie tot de conclusie dat de wisselwerking tussen fiscale prikkels, financiële innovaties, beleidsmaatregelen op het gebied van bankhypotheken en ontwikkelingen op de arbeidsmarkt die de vraag stimuleren enerzijds, en beleidsmaatregelen die het aanbod beperken, inclusief beleidsmaatregelen met betrekking tot sociale huisvesting, anderzijds, de prijzen hebben opgedreven. De kwestie wordt nog ingewikkelder aangezien de waarde van huurwoningen wordt gedrukt door beperkingen ten aanzien van het niveau van de huren. De onderliggende zorg is dan ook dat er onevenwichtigheden op de Nederlandse huizenmarkt kunnen ontstaan die een destabiliserend effect op de economie kunnen hebben.

([1]) Resolutie van het Europees Parlement van 15 november 2011 over de hervorming van de EU-staatssteunregels voor diensten van algemeen economisch belang (P7_TA(2011)0494).
([2]) Werkdocument van de diensten van de Commissie Beoordeling van het nationaal hervormingsprogramma 2012 en het stabiliteitsprogramma 2012 voor Nederland (WDC(2012) 322 final, blz. 6.
([3]) Artikel 2-bis, lid 2 van Verordening (EG) nr. 1466/97 zoals gewijzigd door het „six pack".

De Commissie legt de regels inzake staatssteun voor socialewoningbouwcorporaties niet restrictief uit. Zij eerbiedigt ten volle de autonomie van de lokale autoriteiten om te beslissen welke diensten zij als diensten van algemeen belang beschouwen. Haar bevoegdheden beperken zich tot het controleren op kennelijke fouten. Zodra een dienst echter is aangemerkt als dienst van algemeen economisch belang, moet hij voldoen aan specifieke regels om de goede werking van de eengemaakte markt te garanderen en om ervoor te zorgen dat de dienst tegen de beste voorwaarden wordt verleend.

(English version)

Question for written answer P-001683/13
to the Commission
Marije Cornelissen (Verts/ALE)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Country-specific recommendation concerning the Netherlands housing market

In the context of the 2012 European Semester the Commission issued a country-specific recommendation in which it called on the Netherlands to carry out a gradual reform of its housing market by taking measures which should include the following:

'(ii) providing for a more market-oriented pricing mechanism in the rental market, and (iii) for social housing, aligning rents with household income'.

The accompanying Commission staff working paper makes it clear that in the Commission's view one aim of the housing market reform should be to '[scale] down the scope and size of the social housing segment' (SWD(2012)0322 final, p. 7).

1. What individual EU policies and objectives underpinning the European Semester form the basis for the aforementioned recommendation to the Netherlands concerning the reform of its housing market?

2. How can the Commission's call for a more market-oriented pricing mechanism in the rental market and measures to align rents for social housing with household income be reconciled with the broad discretionary powers enjoyed by national, regional and local authorities to organise the provision of services of general economic interest, as stipulated in Article 1 of Protocol 26 to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and how does the Commission intend to respond to the concerns voiced by the European Parliament ([1]) concerning the Commission's restrictive interpretation of the state aid rules in relation to social housing associations?

3. Will the Commission give an undertaking that, when drawing up any country-specific recommendations to the Netherlands concerning the reform of its housing market, it will confine itself to making recommendations consistent with the Europe 2020 targets, with the integrated guidelines for jobs and growth, with the sections of the Annual Growth Survey approved by the Council and with Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 and that it will explain the thinking behind the recommendations in the accompanying staff working paper?

Answer given by Mr Barroso on behalf of the Commission
(27 March 2013)

The Commission would like to clarify that the 2012 recommendation concerning the Netherlands' housing market refers to structural distortions broader than the element raised by the Honourable Member. These concerns are explained in detail in the accompanying document ([2]) which, indeed, assesses the national reform programme and stability programme of the Netherlands in line with the integrated guidelines and the policy orientations issued by the Commission and the European Council ([3]).

In their analysis, the Commission services conclude that the interaction of, on the one hand, tax incentives, financial innovations, bank mortgage policies and trends in the labour market, which push up demand, and, on the other hand, policies limiting supply, including policies linked to social housing, has driven up prices. To complicate matters further, restrictions to the level of rents reduce the value of rental property. The underlying concern is thus that the Dutch housing market represents an area where imbalances may emerge and could have a destabilising effect on the economy.

The Commission does not have a restrictive interpretation of the state aid rules in relation to social housing associations. The Commission fully respects the autonomy of local authorities in deciding what services they consider to be services of general interest. Its limited powers are restricted to manifest error. Once a service is qualified as service of general economic interest, however, it needs to comply to specifically targeted rules, in order to guarantee the proper functioning of the internal market and ensure that the service is provided under the best conditions.

([1]) European Parliament resolution of 15 November 2011 on the reform of the EU state aid rules on Services of General Economic Interest (P7_TA(2011)0494).
([2]) Commission Staff Working Document Assessment of the 2012 national reform programme and stability programme for The Netherlands (SWD(2012) 322 final, pages 6-8.
([3]) Article 2-a(2) of Regulation 1466/97 as amended by the six pack.

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001684/13
a la Comisión
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)
(18 de febrero de 2013)

Asunto: Agenda Digital en el Estado español

El pasado 15 de febrero, el Consejo de Ministros español aprobó la Agenda Digital para España. Entre las líneas de actuación destaca el «disponer en el año 2013 de una nueva Ley General de Telecomunicaciones, con el objetivo de, entre otros, clarificar la actuación de las Administraciones Públicas en la explotación de redes y provisión de servicios de telecomunicaciones garantizando la no distorsión de la libre competencia».

En este sentido, el anteproyecto de Ley General de Telecomunicaciones española limita el despliegue de infraestructuras de telecomunicaciones por parte de las administraciones públicas españolas, hasta el punto de prohibir la puesta a disposición del mercado del excedente de las redes de telecomunicaciones desplegadas para la autoprestación de servicios. El Gobierno español justifica esta medida para eliminar la distorsión de la competencia en el mercado y el control del gasto público. Cabe tener en cuenta que la finalidad de eliminar la distorsión de la competencia en el mercado de las telecomunicaciones hoy en día es objeto de la normativa siguiente: para la salvaguarda del mercado interior español, la normativa de la ANR española —la CMT—, y para la salvaguarda del mercado interior europeo, las normas de defensa de la competencia de la Unión Europea (separación de cuentas y cumplimiento de los artículos 107 y 108 del TFUE —ver las Broadband Guidelines).

Lo establecido en este proyecto de Ley en ningún caso es una normativa en consonancia con las políticas públicas de la UE, ni de la propia CMT, ni de los otros Estados miembros de la UE. Todo lo contrario. Las políticas públicas de la UE, si bien reconocen que las inversiones deben llevarlas a cabo los inversores privados, consideran que los objetivos de la Agenda Digital Europea no pueden alcanzarse sin el apoyo de los fondos públicos. Es más, en la introducción de las Broadband Guideliness se establece que «por esta razón, la ADE pide a los Estados miembros que utilicen financiación pública en consonancia con las normas sobre ayudas estatales y de competencia de la UE para responder a la cobertura, la velocidad y la asunción de objetivos definidos en UE 2020».

El proyecto de Ley de telecomunicaciones en España no permitirá llevar a cabo estas políticas de cohesión social y territorial, y además enterrará toda la financiación pública que las administraciones territoriales españolas aportan para la necesaria administración electrónica.

A la luz de lo anterior,

¿Cómo se garantizará en España el cumplimiento de los objetivos de la Estrategia Europea 2020? ¿Cómo se garantizarán en España redes y servicios avanzados en las zonas blancas?

Respuesta de la Sra. Kroes en nombre de la Comisión

(9 de abril de 2013)

La Agenda Digital para Europa reconoce la necesidad de ayudas públicas para la financiación de las redes de nueva generación en aquellos sectores en los que el mercado no desempeña su cometido, de conformidad con las normas de la UE en materia de ayudas estatales. Las Directrices para la aplicación de las normas sobre ayudas estatales al despliegue rápido de redes de banda ancha publicadas recientemente establecen que «cuando los mercados ofrecen resultados eficientes, pero considerados insatisfactorios desde el punto de vista de la política de cohesión, las ayudas estatales pueden utilizarse para conseguir un resultado más equitativo y conveniente».

Los fondos de la UE están contribuyendo a este esfuerzo al permitir a las autoridades nacionales de gestión invertir en estas infraestructuras, de conformidad con las normas de la UE en materia de ayudas estatales, a través de distintos instrumentos financieros y modelos de inversión. La iniciativa del Gobierno español completa la acción de la UE en este campo.

El Gobierno español publicó a principios de 2012 un estudio sobre la cobertura de la banda ancha en España y puso en marcha una consulta pública. Tras la adopción de la Agenda Digital española en febrero, el Ministerio de Industria, Energía y Turismo español está elaborando una estrategia nacional sobre redes de alta velocidad y ha notificado también, de conformidad con las normas aplicables a las ayudas estatales, una ampliación del plazo y medios presupuestarios adicionales destinados al Programa de Extensión de la Banda Ancha de Nueva Generación (PEBA-NGA), que la Comisión está evaluando actualmente.

El Gobierno español está elaborando, además, una nueva Ley General de Telecomunicaciones. Ese proyecto de ley no ha sido presentado aún al Congreso de los Diputados para su adopción. Una vez aprobada dicha Ley, la Comisión examinará su conformidad con las normas de la UE en materia de ayudas estatales y comunicaciones electrónicas.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001684/13
to the Commission
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Digital Agenda in Spain

On 15 February 2013, the Spanish Council of Ministers approved the Digital Agenda for Spain. One of the most notable plans of actions is 'to introduce a new General Law on Telecommunications in 2013, with one of its aims being to clarify the role that public administrative bodies play in operating telecommunications networks and providing telecommunication services, in order to ensure that competition is not distorted'.

Accordingly, the draft General Law on Telecommunications limits Spanish public administrative bodies' ability to deploy telecommunications infrastructure, to such an extent that it prohibits surplus telecommunications networks which were launched as self-supply services from being made available to the market. The Spanish Government's justification for this measure is the need to prevent any distortion of competition on the market and to restrict public expenditure. It is worth noting that eliminating distortion of competition on the telecommunications market is currently subject to Spanish and EU guidelines; the rules of the Spanish regulatory body, the Commission for the Telecommunications Market (CMT), protect the Spanish internal market, while the EU's antitrust rules protect the European internal market (accounting separation and compliance with TFEU Articles 107 and 108 — see the Broadband Guidelines).

The draft law does not conform in any way to EU public policies, the CMT rules or the policies in place in other Member States. It does exactly the opposite. Although EU public policies take account of the fact that private investors must be responsible for investment, they also recognise that the Digital Agenda for Europe (DAE) goals will not be achieved without public funding. Indeed, the introduction to the Broadband Guidelines contains the following recommendation: 'for this reason, the DAE calls on Member States to use "public financing in line with EU competition and state aid rules" in order to meet the coverage, speed and take-up targets defined in EU2020.'

The Spanish draft telecommunications law will prevent these social and territorial cohesion strategies from being implemented, while also putting a stop to all public funding provided by Spanish public administrative bodies for e-Government facilities.

How will achievement of the Europe 2020 strategy targets be ensured in Spain? How will the provision of advanced networks and services be guaranteed in 'white areas' in Spain?

Answer given by Ms Kroes on behalf of the Commission
(9 April 2013)

The Digital Agenda for Europe recognises the need for public support for financing Next Generation Neworks in areas where the market does not deliver, in line with EU State aid rules. The recently published Guidelines for the application of state aid rules in relation to the rapid deployment of broadband networks state that 'where markets provide efficient outcomes but these are deemed unsatisfactory from a cohesion policy point of view, State aid may be used to obtain a more desirable, equitable market outcome'.

EU funds are contributing to this effort by enabling national management authorities to invest in this infrastructure, in line with EU State aid rules, using a variety of financial instruments and investment models. The initiative of the Spanish Government is one that complements EU action in this domain.

In early 2012, the Spanish Government published a study on broadband coverage in Spain and launched a public consultation. Following the adoption of the Spanish Digital Agenda in February, the Spanish Ministry of Industry, Energy and Tourism is working on a National Strategy on high speed networks. It has also notified, under the state aid rules, an extension in time and additional budgetary means for its high speed broadband scheme (Programa de Extensión de la Banda Ancha de Nueva Generación (PEBA-NGA) which is currently being assessed by the Commission.

In addition, the Spanish Government is working on a new General Telecommunications Law. The draft law has not yet been submitted to the Spanish Parliament for adoption. When it is approved, the Commission will analyse its conformity with EU State aid and electronic communications rules.

(České znění)

Otázka k písemnému zodpovězení E-001685/13
Komisi
Olga Sehnalová (S&D)
(18. února 2013)

Předmět: Univerzální nabíječka pro mobilní telefony

V roce 2009 podepsalo deset největších výrobců mobilních telefonů, pokrývajících 90 % trhu, memorandum o porozumění, ve kterém dobrovolně přistoupili na sjednocení standardů pro nabíječky mobilních telefonů. Dohoda, ke které se postupně připojili i další výrobci, předpokládala společnou nabíječku založenou na univerzálním micro-USB konektoru.

Podle slov zástupce GŘ ENTR, který navštívil 24. ledna 2013 zasedání výboru IMCO, platnost dobrovolného memoranda vypršela k 31. prosinci 2012 a jednotliví signatáři se doposud nedohodli na jeho prodloužení. Někteří výrobci již navíc v mezidobí představili koncepty unikátních nabíječek pro vlastní telefony. Myšlenka realizace jednotné evropské nabíječky, která je podporována ze strany mnoha zainteresovaných subjektů včetně spotřebitelských organizací (BEUC, ANEC), se tak zdá být ohrožena.

1. Má Komise k dispozici údaje, kolik procent mobilních telefonů na trhu již je v současnosti vybaveno nabíječkou založenou na univerzálním micro-USB konektoru a jak tato čísla ovlivnil vznik zmíněného memoranda?

2. Jaké další kroky momentálně plánuje Komise, včetně případných legislativních kroků, k uskutečnění vlastního konceptu „One charger for all“?

Odpověď Antonia Tajaniho jménem Komise
(9. dubna 2013)

Zpráva o pokroku, kterou nedávno signatáři memoranda o porozumění zveřejnili, ukázala, že signatáři své závazky přijaté v rámci memoranda o porozumění splnili. V současné době se odhaduje, že 90 % nových zařízení uvedených signatáři memoranda o porozumění a jinými výrobci na trh do konce roku 2012 podporuje jednotné nabíjení. To naznačuje, že tato dobrovolná dohoda byla úspěšná a přinesla občanům prospěch.

Komise je přesvědčena, že spotřebitelé a výrobci mohou mít prospěch z rozšíření iniciativy týkající se harmonizace nabíječek na nové kategorie výrobků, jako je nová generace mobilních telefonů, při zohlednění technologických inovací a dalších malých elektronických zařízení, jako jsou digitální fotoaparáty, tablety a hudební přehrávače. Proto Komise připravuje zahájení studie hodnotící výsledky, kterých bylo díky memorandu o porozumění dosaženo, a zváží varianty vhodných následných opatření, včetně dobrovolné dohody a právních předpisů.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001685/13
to the Commission
Olga Sehnalová (S&D)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Universal mobile phone chargers

In 2009 the ten largest mobile phone manufacturers, which account for 90% of the market, signed a joint declaration of intent in which they voluntarily agreed to adopt uniform standards for mobile phone chargers. The agreement, which gradually won the backing of other manufacturers, provided for a common charger with a universal micro-USB connector.

According to the DG ENTR representative, who took part in the IMCO Committee meeting of 24 January 2013, the validity of the voluntary declaration of intent expired on 31 December 2012 and the signatories have so far been unable to agree to extend it. Some manufacturers have now unveiled plans for non-universal chargers for their own phones. Clearly, it is now unsure whether plans for a single European charger which are backed by many stakeholders, including consumer organisations (European Consumers' Organisation, ANEC), will go ahead.

1. Does the Commission have any data on the percentage of mobile phones on the market that are already equipped with a charger incorporating a micro-USB connector and on the extent to which these figures are the result of the abovementioned letter of intent?

2. What further steps is the Commission currently planning, including possibly legislative action, to realise its plan of 'One charger for all'?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission
(9 April 2013)

A recent progress report provided by the MoU signatories has shown that they have met their obligations under the MoU. It is now estimated that 90% of the new devices put on the market by the MoU signatories and other manufacturers by the end of 2012 support the common charging capability. This indicates that the voluntary agreement has been successful in delivering benefits for citizens.

The Commission is convinced that consumers and manufacturers can benefit from an extension of the initiative on harmonisation of chargers to new categories of products such as the new generation of mobile phones while taking into account technological innovations and other small electronic devices, such as digital cameras, tablets and music players. Therefore the Commission is preparing the launch of a study evaluating the results achieved with the MoU, and will consider options for appropriate follow-up including voluntary agreement and legislation.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-001686/13
προς την Επιτροπή
Konstantinos Poupakis (PPE)
(18 Φεβρουαρίου 2013)

Θέμα: Από τις ακριβότερες στον κόσμο η βενζίνη στα κράτη μέλη της ΕΕ

Σύμφωνα με τα αποτελέσματα έρευνας του διεθνούς ειδησεογραφικού πρακτορείου Bloomberg σε 60 χώρες για την τιμή της βενζίνης, οι 8 από τις 10 χώρες με την ακριβότερη βενζίνη παγκοσμίως είναι κράτη μέλη της ΕΕ.

Το γεγονός δε ότι σε αυτές τις 8 περιλαμβάνονται χώρες όπως η Ιταλία, η Πορτογαλία, η Ελλάδα (4η, 5η, 6η θέση στην κατάταξη) που, μέσα από ασφυκτικά δημοσιονομικά προγράμματα, τα νοικοκυριά έχουν υποστεί δραματικές μειώσεις μισθών και εισοδημάτων τα τελευταία χρόνια, αντιμετωπίζοντας σοβαρά προβλήματα ένδειας, καθιστά τα πορίσματα της έρευνας ακόμα πιο ανησυχητικά. Ειδικότερα, στην Ελλάδα, οι καταναλωτές καλούνται να δαπανούν, σύμφωνα με τα στοιχεία του Bloomberg, το 15% του ημερομισθίου τους για την αγορά ενός λίτρου βενζίνης, στην Ιταλία το 10% και στην Πορτογαλία το 17%.

Βάσει των παραπάνω ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Είναι ενήμερη για τα παραπάνω ευρήματα του Bloomberg και αν ναι, προβλέπεται η εκπόνηση αντίστοιχης έρευνας προκειμένου να μελετηθούν τα αίτια που οδηγούν σε αυξημένες τιμές την βενζίνη στην ευρωπαϊκή αγορά αλλά και οι τρόποι εξορθολογισμού της;

2. Ειδικά, σε κράτη μέλη όπως η Ελλάδα, όπου το κυρίαρχο μεταφορικό μοντέλο διακίνησης προϊόντων είναι το οδικό, με συνέπεια οι υψηλές τιμές στα καύσιμα να λειτουργούν αυξητικά στις τιμές των αγαθών, επεξεργάζεται, ως μέλος και της Τρόικας, προτάσεις για την αποκλιμάκωση των τιμών των καυσίμων που, περιορίζοντας το μεταφορικό κόστος, θα μπορούσαν να συντελέσουν σε αντίστοιχη μείωση των τιμών;

3. Πώς η διατήρηση της τιμής των καυσίμων σε τόσο υψηλά επίπεδα συνάδει με το στόχο της μείωσης των τιμών, τουλάχιστον σε βασικά αγαθά και υπηρεσίες, ώστε να διασφαλιστεί η πρόσβαση σε αυτά των Ελλήνων πολιτών, οι οποίοι έχουν απολέσει ένα πολύ σημαντικό μέρος του πραγματικού τους εισοδήματος;

Απάντηση του κ. Oettinger εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(18 Απριλίου 2013)

1. Η Επιτροπή έχει πλήρη επίγνωση του γεγονότος ότι οι τιμές της βενζίνης σε ορισμένα κράτη μέλη της ΕΕ συγκαταλέγονται μεταξύ των υψηλότερων παγκοσμίως. Η εν λόγω κατάσταση είναι κυρίως αποτέλεσμα της υψηλής φορολογίας και πρωτίστως του ΦΠΑ και των ειδικών φόρων κατανάλωσης. Η υποτίμηση του ευρώ έναντι του δολαρίου ΗΠΑ, νομίσματος στο οποίο εκφράζονται οι τιμές του αργού πετρελαίου στις διεθνείς αγορές, συνέβαλε επίσης στη διαμόρφωση του υψηλού επιπέδου των τιμών του πετρελαίου. Η καλύτερη εναρμόνιση των τιμών των καυσίμων στην ΕΕ θα ήταν επωφελής για τους καταναλωτές και θα μπορούσε να επιτευχθεί κυρίως μέσω ομοιογενέστερων συντελεστών ΦΠΑ και έμμεσων φόρων, και ιδίως των ειδικών φόρων κατανάλωσης. Προς τούτο, η Επιτροπή έχει προτείνει αναθεωρημένη «οδηγία για τη φορολογία της ενέργειας» ([1]). Η Επιτροπή παρακολουθεί εκ του σύνεγγυς την κατάσταση στον τομέα των πετρελαιοειδών της ΕΕ. Ειδικότερα, τα δεδομένα σχετικά με τις τιμές των πετρελαιοειδών και την φορολογία στην ΕΕ συλλέγονται εβδομαδιαία και δημοσιεύονται στον δικτυακό τόπο του Παρατηρητηρίου Ενεργειακών Αγορών ([2]).

2. και 3. Σε συμφωνία με την Τρόικα, οι ειδικοί φόροι κατανάλωσης για το πετρέλαιο κίνησης και το πετρέλαιο θέρμανσης εξισώθηκαν στην Ελλάδα από τον Οκτώβριο του 2012, με στόχο να διορθωθεί η υφιστάμενη απάτη στον τομέα καυσίμων. Κατά συνέπεια, οι ειδικοί φόροι κατανάλωσης για το πετρέλαιο κίνησης μειώθηκαν από τα 412 στα 330 ευρώ ανά 1 000 λίτρα, γεγονός που αναμένεται να βοηθήσει τον τομέα των μεταφορών και να συμβάλλει στη μείωση των τιμών των βασικών αγαθών και υπηρεσιών. Επιπλέον, η Επιτροπή, η Ευρωπαϊκή Κεντρική Τράπεζα και το Διεθνές Νομισματικό Ταμείο έχουν εντοπίσει διάφορα προβλήματα που παρεμποδίζουν τον ανταγωνισμό στην ελληνική αγορά καυσίμων, ιδίως στον τομέα των μεταφορών. Σε μνημόνιο συμφωνίας ([3]), η ελληνική κυβέρνηση δεσμεύτηκε να αντιμετωπίσει τα εν λόγω θέματα.

([1]) Πρόταση οδηγίας του Συμβουλίου για την τροποποίηση της οδηγίας 2003/96/ΕΚ σχετικά με την αναδιάρθρωση του κοινοτικού πλαισίου φορολογίας των ενεργειακών προϊόντων και της ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας.
([2]) http://ec.europa.eu/energy/observatory/oil/bulletin_en.htm
([3]) http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2012/pdf/ocp123_en.pdf (βλ. από σελίδα 189 του εγγράφου).

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001686/13
to the Commission
Konstantinos Poupakis (PPE)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Petrol prices in EU Member States among the highest the world

According to a survey by Bloomberg, the international news agency, on petrol prices in sixty countries, eight of the ten countries with the most expensive petrol prices worldwide are EU Member States.

These findings are particularly alarming, given that these eight include countries, such as Italy, Portugal, and Greece (ranked 4th, 5th and 6th, respectively) where stringent fiscal plans have caused dramatic reductions in wages and income in recent years for households which are now experiencing real poverty. More specifically, according to data compiled by Bloomberg, consumers in Greece have to spend 15% of their daily wages to buy a litre of petrol; the corresponding figures for Italy and Portugal are 10%, and 17%, respectively.

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

1. Is it aware of the above findings of the Bloomberg survey and, if so, is it planning to conduct a survey of its own to study the causes of increased petrol prices on the European market and ways of reducing them to reasonable levels?

2. Particularly with regard to Member States such as Greece, where goods are transported mainly by road, so that high fuel costs translate into higher prices for commodities, is the Commission, in its capacity as a member of the Troika, drawing up proposals to ease fuel prices that, by reducing transport costs, could help bring about a corresponding reduction in prices?

3. How is the maintenance of fuel prices at such high levels compatible with the goal of lowering prices, at least for basic goods and services, so as to ensure that Greek citizens, who have seen their real incomes fall sharply, have access to these goods and services?

Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission
(18 April 2013)

1. The Commission is well aware of the fact that petrol prices in a certain number of Member States of the EU are among the highest in the world. This situation is mainly the result of high taxation, notably VAT and excise duties. The depreciation of the Euro versus the US Dollar, currency in which the crude oil prices are expressed on the international markets, has also played a role in the high level of petrol prices. A better harmonisation of fuel prices in the EU would be advantageous for consumers and could be reached notably through a more homogeneous VAT and indirect taxes rates, in particular excise duties. To this end, the Commission has proposed a revised 'Energy Taxation Directive' ([1]). The Commission closely monitors the situation in the EU's oil sector. In particular, data on petroleum products prices and taxation in the EU is collected every week and published on the Market Observatory for Energy website ([2]).

2 and 3. In agreement with the Troika, excise duties on diesel oil and heating gasoil have been equalized in Greece since October 2012 in order to remedy the existing fuel fraud. Consequently, excises duties on diesel oil have decreased from EUR 412 per 1000 litres to EUR 330 which should help the transportation sector and have a downward effect on basic goods and services. Moreover, the Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund have identified various problems which hinder the competition on the Greek fuel market, notably in the transportation sector. In a memorandum of understanding ([3]), the Greek Government made a commitment to address these issues.

([1]) Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2003/96/EC restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity.
([2]) http://ec.europa.eu/energy/observatory/oil/bulletin_en.htm
([3]) http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2012/pdf/ocp123_en.pdf (see from page 189 of the document).

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001687/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Sir Graham Watson (ALDE)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Human rights in China: the case of Uyghur prisoner Alimujiang Yimiti

Alimujiang Yimiti (also known as Alimjan Himit/Yimit) is a Christian convert from the predominantly Muslim Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China. In 2008 he was arrested on criminal charges of 'suspicion of inciting people to secede from China' and 'illegally providing state secrets to foreigners'. The trial process and appeal investigation have been highly secretive, and the verdict on his case was not reached until one year after he was initially detained. In 2009 he was sentenced during secret trials to 15 years in prison and 5 years' deprivation of political rights. In September 2008 the United Nations Human Rights Council Working Group on Arbitrary Detention stated that 'the deprivation of liberty of Mr Alimujiang Yimiti is arbitrary, being in contravention of […] the Universal Declaration of Human Rights' and that he 'is being kept in detention solely for his religious faith'.

Mr Yimiti's quality of life in prison is poor; he was hospitalised in 2009, but prison authorities claimed that it was for a routine health check, whereas witnesses claimed that there were signs of brutality. Moreover, on 23 January 2013 prison authorities informed his wife, Gulinuer, that her monthly visits were being reduced to once every three months, without providing a reason; one visit per month is normally permitted. Mr Yimiti's wife believes that the prison authorities' decision to reduce her visits could be connected to her husband's current appeal against his sentence.

1. Is the Vice-President/High Representative aware of the recent developments in this case?

2. What action does the Vice-President/High Representative intend to take on behalf of Alimujiang Yimiti, with the ultimate aim of securing his release?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(5 April 2013)

The HR/VP is well aware of the case raised by the Honourable Member, which the EEAS has been monitoring for some time. Furthermore, his case was raised several times with the Chinese authorities, in particular as a prominent case during the last Human Rights Dialogue, which took place in May last year and on which occasion, it was stated that the EU considers that Alimjan Yimit's conviction is incompatible with his rights to freedom of expression and freedom of religion and belief and that he should be released from prison. So long as Alimjan Yimit remains in prison, the EU calls on China to allow him regular family visits.

Alimujiang Yimiti's case was also raised in the margins of the 15th EU-China summit and during the 2011 Human Rights Dialogue.

The EU will keep on pressing for his release.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-001688/13
aan de Commissie
Laurence J. A. J. Stassen (NI)
(18 februari 2013)

Betreft: Homo's uit Turks leger ontslagen (vervolgvraag)

Op 4 februari 2013 heeft de heer Füle namens de Commissie antwoord gegeven op schriftelijke vraag E-010756/2012. Daarin schrijft hij onder andere: „De Commissie veroordeelt alle vormen en uitingen van onverdraagzaamheid die niet stroken met de waarden en beginselen waarop de Europese Unie gegrondvest is. Turkije, een land dat met de EU onderhandelt over toetreding, moet de mensenrechten garanderen, en discriminatie verbieden overeenkomstig het Europees Verdrag tot bescherming van de rechten van de mens en de jurisprudentie van het Europees Hof voor de rechten van de mens."

1. Wanneer trekt de Commissie de conclusie dat Turkije, een discriminerend land — in dit geval door homo's uit het Turkse leger te willen ontslaan —, EU-onwaardig is en dat derhalve de toetredingsonderhandelingen dienen te worden gestopt? Met andere woorden, hoezeer dient, in de ogen van de Commissie, de situatie in Turkije verder te verslechteren voordat zij tot deze conclusie komt?

2. Waarop baseert de Commissie haar (impliciete) hoop en verwachting dat de situatie in Turkije, een land dat almaar verder afglijdt, tóch zal verbeteren?

Antwoord van de heer Füle namens de Commissie
(12 april 2013)

Om toe te treden tot de Europese Unie, moeten landen zich aan het acquis van de Europese Unie aanpassen en aan de economische en politieke vereisten voldoen. Het vrijwaren van de mensenrechten, met inbegrip van het discriminatieverbod, vormt daar een essentieel onderdeel van. Tijdens het toetredingsproces wordt Turkije geacht alle onopgeloste kwesties aan te pakken.

Voor een nadere beoordeling van het toetredingsproces en de vooruitgang die is geboekt, verwijst de Commissie het geachte Parlementslid naar haar voortgangsverslag over Turkije van oktober 2012 ([1]).

([1]) http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/strategy-and-progress-report/index_en.htm

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001688/13
to the Commission
Laurence J.A.J. Stassen (NI)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Dismissal of homosexuals from the Turkish army (follow-up question)

On 4 February 2013, Mr Füle replied on behalf of the Commission to Written Question E-010756/2012. In his reply he wrote, *inter alia*: 'The Commission condemns all forms and manifestations of intolerance which are incompatible with the values and principles upon which the European Union is founded. Turkey, as a country negotiating its accession to the EU, needs to guarantee human rights, including the prohibition of discrimination, in line with the European Convention on Human Rights and the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights.'

1. When will the Commission draw the conclusion that Turkey, a country which discriminates — in this case by its desire to dismiss homosexuals from the Turkish army — is not worthy to join the EU and that the accession negotiations should therefore be halted? In other words, how much worse does the Commission consider that the situation in Turkey needs to become before it reaches this conclusion?

2. On what does the Commission base its (implicit) hope and expectation that the situation in Turkey, a country which is constantly regressing, will nonetheless improve?

Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission
(12 April 2013)

In order to join the European Union, countries have to align with the European Union's acquis, as well as the economic and political criteria. Safeguarding human rights, including the prohibition of discrimination, constitutes an essential element in this regard. Turkey is expected to address all outstanding issues in the course of its accession process.

For a closer assessment of the state of the accession process and the progress made, the Commission would like to refer the Honourable Member to its progress report on Turkey of October 2012 ([1]).

([1]) http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/strategy-and-progress-report/index_en.htm

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-001689/13
aan de Commissie (Vicevoorzitter / Hoge Vertegenwoordiger)
Laurence J. A. J. Stassen (NI)
(18 februari 2013)

Betreft: VP/HR — Erdoğan pro-Hamas en anti-Israël (vervolgvraag)

Op 7 februari 2013 heeft vicevoorzitter / hoge vertegenwoordiger Ashton namens de Commissie antwoord gegeven op schriftelijke vraag E-010735/2012. Daarin schrijft zij onder andere: „De hoge vertegenwoordiger/vicevoorzitter roept zowel Turkije als Israël op zich terughoudend op te stellen om een verdere verslechtering van de bilaterale relaties te voorkomen. Zij hecht groot belang aan een constructief toenaderingsproces op basis van dialoog en extra inspanningen om de banden te versterken."

1. Hoe ziet vicevoorzitter / hoge vertegenwoordiger Ashton een „constructief toenaderingsproces" tussen Turkije en Israël concreet voor zich? Hoe succesvol schat zij een dergelijk proces in wanneer Turkije zich overduidelijk anti-Israël, en daarmee juist onconstructief, opstelt? Waarop baseert zij zich wanneer zij impliceert dat de houding van Turkije in dezen zal verbeteren?

Voorts schrijft vicevoorzitter / hoge vertegenwoordiger Ashton: „In de conclusies van de Raad Buitenlandse Zaken van 23 mei 2011 heeft de EU erop aangedrongen dat de verscheidene Palestijnse groeperingen zich verzoenen en zich achter president Mahmoud Abbas scharen als belangrijk element voor de eenheid van een toekomstige Palestijnse staat en voor het verwezenlijken van een tweestatenoplossing."

2. Impliceert vicevoorzitter / hoge vertegenwoordiger Ashton hiermee dat zij haar ondersteuning verleent aan één Palestijnse groepering, bestaande uit Fatah én Hamas, een terroristische organisatie? Deelt zij de mening dat zij het voortbestaan van Hamas, geschaard onder welke groepering dan ook, nimmer dient te ondersteunen maar met de krachtigste bewoordingen dient te veroordelen? Waarom „verdedigt" zij impliciet een organisatie die nota bene op de EU-terreurlijst staat?

3. Is vicevoorzitter / hoge vertegenwoordiger Ashton zich ervan bewust dat er reeds een Palestijnse staat is, genaamd Jordanië? Zo ja, is zij derhalve bereid haar voorkeur voor de „eenheid van een toekomstige Palestijnse staat" en het „verwezenlijken van een tweestatenoplossing" in te trekken?

Antwoord van hoge vertegenwoordiger/vicevoorzitter Ashton namens de Commissie
(3 mei 2013)

Tijdens haar recente bezoek aan Turkije op 3 april heeft de hoge vertegenwoordiger/vicevoorzitter de Turks-Israëlische betrekkingen besproken met premier Erdoğan en minister van Buitenlandse Zaken Davutoğlu. Zij prees de recente toenadering tussen de twee landen als de juiste keuze. Beide gesprekspartners hebben het belang van deze ontwikkeling erkend. De hoge vertegenwoordiger/vicevoorzitter zal deze kwesties blijven bespreken in het kader van een intensievere dialoog over buitenlands beleid met Turkije, zoals beschreven in de conclusies van de Raad van december 2012.

Het EU-beleid met betrekking tot de Palestijnse verzoening is beschreven in de conclusies van de Raad Buitenlandse Zaken (RBZ) van 23 mei 2011 over het vredesproces in het Midden-Oosten. Een nieuwe Palestijnse regering, bestaande uit onafhankelijke personen, moet het beginsel van geweldloosheid naleven en zich blijven inzetten voor het verwezenlijken van een tweestatenoplossing en een middels onderhandelingen bereikte vreedzame regeling van het Israëlisch-Palestijnse conflict, waarbij reeds bestaande overeenkomsten en verplichtingen, inclusief het legitieme bestaansrecht van Israël, worden aanvaard. In de conclusies van de RBZ van 10 december 2012 heeft de EU opnieuw aangegeven dat het met het oog op de eenheid van een toekomstige Palestijnse staat en ter verwezenlijking van een tweestatenoplossing van groot belang is dat de verschillende Palestijnse groeperingen zich verzoenen en zich achter president Abbas scharen, overeenkomstig de in zijn rede van 4 mei 2011 uiteengezette beginselen.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001689/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Laurence J.A.J. Stassen (NI)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Erdoğan pro-Hamas and anti-Israel (follow-up question)

On 7 February 2013, Vice-President/High Representative Ashton answered Written Question E-010735/2012 on behalf of the Commission. In her answer she wrote, *inter alia*: 'The High Representative/Vice-President urges both Turkey and Israel to exercise restraint in order to avoid further deterioration of bilateral relations and places great importance on a constructive rapprochement process, dialogue and further efforts to improve ties.'

1. In practical terms, what form does Vice-President/High Representative Ashton envisage a 'constructive rapprochement process' between Turkey and Israel taking? How successful does she consider such a process to be when Turkey unequivocally adopts an anti-Israeli — and thus anything but constructive — position? On what does she base her implication that Turkey's attitude will improve in this respect?

Vice-President/High Representative Ashton also writes: 'The EU called in the Conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Council of 23 May 2011 for intra-Palestinian reconciliation behind President Mahmud Abbas as an important element for the unity of a future Palestinian state and for reaching a two state solution.'

2. Does Vice-President/High Representative Ashton mean to imply that she supports a single Palestinian group comprising both Fatah and Hamas, a terrorist organisation? Does she agree that she ought never to support the continued existence of Hamas, as part of any group whatsoever, but should condemn it in the strongest terms? Why does she implicitly 'defend' an organisation which — it should be noted — figures on the EU list of terrorist organisations?

3. Is Vice-President/High Representative Ashton aware that there already is a Palestinian state, called Jordan? If so, will she withdraw her preference for 'the unity of a future Palestinian state' and for 'reaching a two state solution'?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(3 May 2013)

During her recent trip to Turkey on 3 April, the HR/VP discussed the issue of Turkish-Israeli relations with both Prime Minister Erdogan and Foreign Minister Davutoglu. She commended the recent rapprochement between the two countries as the right thing to do. Both interlocutors acknowledged the significance of this development. The HR/VP will continue to discuss these issues in the framework of the intensified EU foreign policy dialogue with Turkey as stated in the Council conclusions of December 2012.

EU policy regarding Palestinian reconcilaition is outlined in the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) of 23 May 2011. A new Palestinian government composed of independent figures should uphold the principle of non-violence, and remain committed to achieving a two state solution and to a negotiated peaceful settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict accepting previous agreements and obligations, including Israel's legitimate right to exist. In the FAC conclusions on MEPP of 10 December 2012 the EU reiterated its call for intra-Palestinian reconciliation behind the leadership of President Mahmoud Abbas, in line with the principles set out in his speech of 4 May 2011, as an important element for the unity of a future Palestinian state and for reaching a two-state solution.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-001690/13
aan de Commissie
Laurence J. A. J. Stassen (NI)
(18 februari 2013)

Betreft: Erdoğan wil Ottomaans rijk (vervolgvraag)

Op 7 februari 2013 heeft de heer Füle namens de Commissie antwoord gegeven op schriftelijke vraag E-010872/2012. Daarin schrijft hij: „De Commissie is niet voornemens commentaar te geven bij elke verklaring [aangehaald in genoemde vraag] die door de pers wordt toegeschreven aan Turkse regeringsleden."

1. Op welke verklaringen, afkomstig uit de pers, geeft de Commissie wél en op welke geeft zij geen commentaar? Wat zijn hierbij de criteria? Waarom wenst de Commissie geen commentaar te geven op het bericht „Erdoğan träumt vom Reich der Osmanen" ([1])? Heeft dit met de onwelgevallige inhoud van het bericht te maken of is de Commissie van mening dat het bericht ten onrechte is „toegeschreven aan Turkse regeringsleden" — en waarop baseert zij zich daarbij?

2. Deelt de Commissie alleszins de mening dat een land dat op gebiedsuitbreiding zint, nimmer tot de EU moet toetreden? Zo neen, waarom niet?

Antwoord van de heer Füle namens de Commissie
(22 april 2013)

De Commissie heeft geen verder commentaar bij haar antwoord op vraag E-010872/2012 ([2]) met betrekking tot de voorwaarden voor schorsing van de toetredingsonderhandelingen die in het onderhandelingskader van 2005 zijn vastgesteld.

De Commissie concentreert zich op kwesties die relevant zijn voor het toetredingsproces van Turkije.

([1]) http://www.welt.de/print/die_welt/politik/article111533601/Erdogan-traeumt-vom-Reich-der-Osmanen.html
([2]) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/nl/parliamentary-questions.html?tabType=wq#sidesForm

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001690/13
to the Commission
Laurence J.A.J. Stassen (NI)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Erdoğan wants Ottoman Empire

On 7 February 2013, Mr Füle replied on behalf of the Commission to Written Question E-010872/2012. In his reply he wrote: 'The Commission does not intend to comment on every statement [quoted in the question] attributed by the press to Turkish members of the government.'

1. On what statements derived from the press will the Commission comment and on which will it not? What are the criteria for this? Why will the Commission not comment on the report 'Erdoğan träumt vom Reich der Osmanen' ([1])? Is it because of the unwelcome content of the report, or does the Commission consider that the report was wrongly 'attributed to Turkish members of the government' — and on what does the Commission base this?

2. Does the Commission fully endorse the opinion that a country which seeks to expand its territory should never accede to the EU? If not, why not?

Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission
(22 April 2013)

The Commission has no further comments in addition to its reply to Question E-010872/2012 ([2]) regarding the conditions for suspension of the accession negotiations as set out in the Negotiating Framework from 2005.

The Commission focuses its work on issues that are relevant to Turkey's accession process.

([1]) http://www.welt.de/print/die_welt/politik/article111533601/Erdogan-traeumt-vom-Reich-der-Osmanen.html
([2]) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html?tabType=wq#sidesForm.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001774/13
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)
Fiorello Provera (EFD) e Charles Tannock (ECR)

(20 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Blocco dell'accesso a YouTube in Egitto

A inizio febbraio 2013, il governo egiziano ha imposto un blocco temporaneo di YouTube a causa della controversa pellicola *Innocence of Muslims* (L'innocenza dei musulmani), che ha provocato proteste in tutto il mondo islamico. Un tribunale del Cairo ha chiesto di interrompere l'accesso al sito web per 30 giorni. Secondo Amnesty International, nella sentenza della corte si leggerebbe che «la libertà di opinione non [dovrebbe] attaccare il credo altrui». Il Tribunale amministrativo del Cairo ha affermato che la libertà di opinione non dovrebbe «ferire la sensibilità e suscitare risentimento nei credenti di altre religioni, in particolare quelle monoteistiche» e che i media dovrebbero astenersi dal «diffamare» le figure religiose.

Ciononostante, l'Egitto è parte della Convenzione internazionale sui diritti civili e politici, che tutela la libertà di esprimere le proprie idee, anche se considerate offensive o ingiuriose. Secondo quanto dichiarato dal vicedirettore di Amnesty International per il Medio Oriente e l'Africa settentrionale, «la sentenza costituisce un palese attacco alla libertà di espressione e ha conseguenze di ampio raggio su un paese in cui gli attivisti contano estesamente su YouTube per denunciare gli abusi legati ai diritti umani».

1. Qual è la posizione del Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante in merito al blocco di YouTube da parte del governo egiziano?

2. È il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante pronto a ridurre l'aiuto dell'Unione europea all'Egitto, qualora quest'ultimo dovesse continuare ad agire in contravvenzione della politica «more for more» (maggiori aiuti a fronte di un maggiore impegno)?

3. Qual è la valutazione dei funzionari UE al Cairo sulla limitazione della libertà di espressione in Egitto da parte del governo?

Risposta congiunta di Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione

(16 maggio 2013)

L'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente è a conoscenza dei fatti esposti.

Per quanto riguarda il divieto del film anti islamico, l'UE è fortemente impegnata a sostenere il rispetto della libertà di espressione sancita dal Patto internazionale delle Nazioni Unite sui diritti civili e politici. La necessità di rispettare tale libertà è anche alla base degli impegni in materia di diritti umani assunti dalle autorità egiziane nell'ambito dell'accordo di associazione concluso con l'UE ed è chiaramente menzionata nel piano d'azione concordato tra UE ed Egitto.

L'Unione europea mantiene una posizione ferma e di principio contro la pena di morte la cui abolizione costituisce un obiettivo di primo piano nella sua politica in materia di diritti umani. L'UE è in prima fila, come soggetto istituzionale, nella battaglia per l'abolizione della pena di morte e costituisce il principale donatore nell'ambito della lotta contro di essa. L'abolizione della pena di morte è invocata in tutte le riunioni bilaterali pertinenti con l'Egitto, in particolare nel quadro del dialogo politico tra l'UE e il paese.

Per quanto concerne gli aiuti dell'UE in favore dell'Egitto, l'AR/VP ritiene che la cooperazione e il dialogo politico costituiscano i canali più appropriati per incoraggiare le riforme democratiche nel paese. L'UE ritiene che una sospensione degli aiuti attualmente non si giustifichi.

In questo contesto è importante tenere presente che i programmi dell'Unione europea sostengono il popolo egiziano e i suoi soggetti più vulnerabili. Nel 2012, ad esempio, l'UE ha fornito sostegno in settori chiave quali la creazione di posti di lavoro, la capacità d'inserimento professionale dei giovani e la formazione professionale.

La costruzione della democrazia richiede molto lavoro, impegno e pazienza, sia a livello nazionale che internazionale. È chiaro che l'Egitto si trova ad affrontare gravi ostacoli nel suo processo di transizione e, più che mai, l'Europa, come vicina e come partner, deve impegnarsi e sostenere tale processo, sottolineando nel contempo con forza l'importanza di creare una società fondata sullo Stato di diritto e nel rispetto dei principi in materia di diritti umani riconosciuti a livello internazionale.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-001691/13
aan de Commissie (Vicevoorzitter / Hoge Vertegenwoordiger)
Laurence J. A. J. Stassen (NI)
(18 februari 2013)

Betreft: VP/HR — Christenen ter dood veroordeeld wegens anti-islamfilm (vervolgvraag)

Op 11 februari 2013 heeft vicevoorzitter / hoge vertegenwoordiger Ashton namens de Commissie antwoord gegeven op schriftelijke vraag E-010911/2012. Daarin schrijft zij onder andere: „De EU is principieel fel gekant tegen de doodstraf en de afschaffing ervan is een van de hoofddoelstellingen van haar mensenrechtenbeleid. […] De EU is van oordeel dat samenwerking en politieke dialoog de meest geschikte manieren zijn om democratische hervormingen in Egypte aan te moedigen. Zij meent bovendien dat het opschorten van hulp momenteel niet gerechtvaardigd is. In principe kunnen alle EU-samenwerkingprogramma's worden opgeschort als het begunstigde land zijn verplichtingen niet nakomt inzake eerbiediging van de mensenrechten, de democratische beginselen en de rechtsstaat, en bij ernstige corruptie. De EU is van oordeel dat samenwerking en politieke dialoog de meest geschikte manieren zijn om democratische hervormingen in Egypte aan te moedigen."

1. Impliceert de vicevoorzitter / hoge vertegenwoordiger met haar antwoord dat het uitvoeren van de doodstraf voor haar geen reden is om de financiële ondersteuning van de EU aan Egypte op te schorten resp. definitief af te schaffen, hoewel zij stelt dat dat in principe wél mogelijk is? Deelt de vicevoorzitter / hoge vertegenwoordiger de mening dat dit niet te rijmen valt met haar stelling dat de EU principieel fel gekant is tegen de doodstraf? Hoe verklaart zij deze hypocrisie?

2. Welke andere verschrikkingen, naast het uitvoeren van de doodstraf, dienen er volgens de vicevoorzitter / hoge vertegenwoordiger verder in Egypte nog plaats te vinden, voordat zij besluit de financiële ondersteuning van de EU aan Egypte te beëindigen? Impliceert de vicevoorzitter / hoge vertegenwoordiger dat het uitvoeren van de doodstraf in dezen „niet ernstig genoeg" zou zijn? Zo ja, hoe valt dat de rijmen met haar stelling dat Egypte „democratische hervormingen" zou doormaken? Zo neen, waarom is de financiële ondersteuning dan nog niet beëindigd?

3. Deelt de vicevoorzitter / hoge vertegenwoordiger de mening dat de EU bovendien af dient te zien van de door de heer Van Rompuy aangekondigde additionele financiële ondersteuning van 5 miljard euro aan Egypte?

4. Waarop baseert de vicevoorzitter / hoge vertegenwoordiger haar verwachting dat de situatie in Egypte, middels de financiële ondersteuning van de EU, zal verbeteren?

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-001692/13
aan de Commissie
Laurence J. A. J. Stassen (NI)
(18 februari 2013)

Betreft: Anti-islamfilm verboden in Egypte

Egypte heeft Youtube voor een maand in de ban gedaan vanwege de film *Innocence of Muslims*. De blokkade volgt op de uitspraak van een administratieve rechter: volgens de rechtbank „stond Youtube erop de beledigende film uit te zenden, waarmee het geloof van miljoenen Egyptenaren en de boosheid van alle moslims wordt genegeerd".

1. Is het de Commissie bekend dat Egypte Youtube vanwege de film *Innocence of Muslims* heeft geblokkeerd? Wat vindt de Commissie hiervan? Verwerpt de Commissie deze ordinaire censuur?

2. Deelt de Commissie de mening dat Egypte met de blokkade in strijd handelt met de vrijheid van meningsuiting? Deelt de Commissie de mening dat dit aantoont dat het land almaar verder afglijdt?

3. Heeft de blokkade gevolgen voor de door de heer Van Rompuy aangekondigde verstrekking van 5 miljard euro aan Egypte? Is de Commissie bereid van deze financiële ondersteuning af te zien? Zo neen, hoe verantwoordt de Commissie de financiële ondersteuning van een land dat, naar haar zeggen, een „positieve, democratische ontwikkeling" zou doormaken, maar in feite almaar verder afglijdt, thans door de vrijheid van meningsuiting verder in te perken?

Antwoord van hoge vertegenwoordiger/vicevoorzitter Ashton namens de Commissie
(16 mei 2013)

De hoge vertegenwoordiger/vicevoorzitter is op de hoogte van deze gebeurtenissen.

Wat het verbod van de anti-islamfilm betreft, hecht de EU veel belang aan de eerbiediging van de vrijheid van meningsuiting zoals deze is beschreven in het Internationaal Verdrag inzake burgerrechten en politieke rechten. De eerbiediging van de vrijheid van meningsuiting is eveneens een essentieel onderdeel van de mensenrechtenverbintenissen van Egypte in het kader van de associatieovereenkomst met de EU en wordt ook duidelijk vermeld in het actieplan dat met Egypte is overeengekomen.

De EU is zich sterk en principieel tegen de doodstraf gekant. De afschaffing ervan is een van de kerndoelstellingen van haar mensenrechtenbeleid. De EU is de leidende institutionele actor en belangrijkste donor in de strijd tegen de doodstraf. De afschaffing van de doodstraf komt ter sprake in alle relevante bilaterale contacten met Egypte, in het bijzonder in de politieke dialoog tussen de EU en Egypte.

Wat de steun van de EU aan Egypte betreft, is de hoge vertegenwoordiger/vicevoorzitter van mening dat samenwerking en politieke dialoog de meest geschikte kanalen zijn om democratische hervormingen in Egypte aan te moedigen. De EU is niet van oordeel dat een opschorting van de steun op dit moment gerechtvaardigd is.

In dit verband moet voor ogen worden gehouden dat de EU-programma's steun bieden aan de Egyptische bevolking en met name aan de meest kwetsbare bevolkingsgroepen. In 2012 heeft de EU onder meer steun verleend op belangrijke vlakken als het scheppen van werkgelegenheid, de inzetbaarheid van jongeren en beroepsopleidingen.

De opbouw van democratie vergt veel werk, inzet en geduld, zowel van het land in kwestie als van de internationale gemeenschap. Het is duidelijk dat Egypte in zijn overgang naar democratie te kampen heeft met ernstige belemmeringen, en dat Europa, als buur en partner, de overgang in Egypte nu meer dan ooit moet ondersteunen en tegelijkertijd het belang van de rechtsstaat en van de naleving van internationaal overeengekomen beginselen inzake mensenrechten moet benadrukken.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001691/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Laurence J.A.J. Stassen (NI)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Christians sentenced to death for anti-Islam film (follow-up question)

On 11 February 2013, Vice-President/High Representative Ashton answered Written Question E-010911/2012 on behalf of the Commission. In her reply she wrote, *inter alia*: 'The EU holds a strong and principled position against the death penalty; its abolition is a key objective for the Union's human rights policy. […] The EU considers that cooperation and political dialogue are the most appropriate channels to encourage democratic reforms in Egypt. Moreover, the EU does not consider that suspension of assistance would be justified currently. In principle, all EU cooperation programmes can be suspended if the beneficiary country breaches an obligation relating to the respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law and in serious cases of corruption. The EU considers that cooperation and political dialogue are the most appropriate channels to encourage democratic reforms in Egypt.'

1. Does the answer given by the Vice-President/High Representative imply that in her view carrying out the death penalty is not sufficient grounds to suspend or terminate the EU's financial assistance to Egypt, although she states that in principle this is possible? Does the Vice-President/High Representative agree that this is not consistent with her assertion that the EU holds a strong and principled position against the death penalty? How does she explain this hypocrisy?

2. What other appalling actions, besides carrying out the death penalty, does the Vice-President/High Representative think should occur in Egypt before she decides to terminate the EU's financial assistance to Egypt? Does the Vice-President/High Representative mean to imply that carrying out the death penalty is not 'serious' enough to warrant this? If so, how can that be reconciled with her assertion that Egypt is implementing 'democratic reforms'? If not, why has the financial assistance not yet been terminated?

3. Does the Vice-President/High Representative agree that the EU ought moreover to refrain from providing the additional EUR 5 bn in financial support for Egypt announced by Mr Van Rompuy?

4. On what does the Vice-President/High Representative base her expectation that the situation in Egypt will improve as a result of the EU's financial support?

Question for written answer E-001692/13
to the Commission
Laurence J.A.J. Stassen (NI)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Anti-Islam film banned in Egypt

A month ago, Egypt imposed a ban on YouTube in response to the film 'Innocence of Muslims'. This ban followed a ruling by an administrative court which stated that YouTube had 'insisted on broadcasting the film, disrespecting the beliefs of millions of Egyptians and disregarding the anger of all Muslims'.

1. Is the Commission aware that Egypt has imposed a ban on YouTube in response to the film 'Innocence of Muslims'? What is the Commission's view of this? Does the Commission reject this crude censorship?

2. Does the Commission agree that, in imposing this ban, Egypt is acting in contravention of the freedom of expression? Does the Commission agree that this shows that the country is regressing?

3. Does this ban have any consequences for the EUR 5 billion which Mr Van Rompuy has promised to Egypt? Is the Commission prepared to withdraw this financial support? If not, how does the Commission justify giving financial support to a country which, in the Commission's own words, should be developing in a positive and democratic manner, but which is in fact regressing by restricting the freedom of expression to an even greater extent?

Question for written answer E-001774/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Fiorello Provera (EFD) and Charles Tannock (ECR)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — YouTube ban in Egypt

In early February 2013, the Egyptian Government imposed a temporary ban on YouTube because of the controversial film *Innocence of Muslims*, which sparked protests across the Muslim world. A court in Cairo called for a 30-day block on the website. According to Amnesty International, the court ruling said that 'freedom of opinion [should] not attack the beliefs of others'. Cairo's Administrative Court stated that freedom of opinion should not 'provoke the feelings and resentment of believers of other religions, particularly heavenly religions' and that the media should refrain from 'defamation' of religious figures.

However, Egypt is a state party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which protects the expression of ideas even when they are considered to be offensive or insulting. Amnesty International's Deputy Director for the Middle East and North Africa said: 'this ruling is a clear assault of freedom of expression and has far-reaching consequences in the country where activists have relied heavily on YouTube to expose human rights abuses in the country'.

1. What is the position of the Vice-President/High Representative regarding the blocking of YouTube by the Egyptian Government?

2. Is the Vice-President/High Representative prepared to reduce EU aid to Egypt if it continues to act in contravention of the 'more for more' policy?

3. What is the assessment of EU officials in Cairo regarding the government's curtailment of free expression in Egypt?

Joint answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(16 May 2013)

The HR/VP is aware of the events.

Regarding the ban of the anti-Islam film, the EU is strongly committed to the respect of freedom of expression as set out in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The need to respect freedom of expression is also at the core of the human rights commitments undertaken by Egypt under the Association Agreement concluded with the EU and is also clearly mentioned in the action plan agreed with Egypt.

The EU holds a strong and principled position against the death penalty; its abolition is a key objective for the EU's human rights policy. The EU is the leading institutional actor and largest donor to the fight against the death penalty. The abolition of the death penalty is raised in all relevant bilateral contacts with Egypt, notably in the context of the EU-Egypt political dialogue.

Regarding EU assistance to Egypt, the HR/VP considers that cooperation and political dialogue are the most appropriate channels to encourage democratic reforms in Egypt. The EU does not consider that suspension of assistance would be justified currently.

In this context it is important to keep in mind that EU programmes support the Egyptian people and the most vulnerable among them. For instance in 2012 the EU provided support in key areas such as Job Creation, Youth Employability and Vocational Training.

Democracy building requires hard work, commitment and patience — both domestically and internationally. It is clear that Egypt is facing severe obstacles in its transition, and more than ever, Europe as a neighbour and a partner has to engage and support Egypt's transition while strongly emphasising the importance of establishing a society based on the rule of law and respecting internationally agreed human rights principles.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001693/13
to the Commission
William (The Earl of) Dartmouth (EFD)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Staff in the Protocol Service assigned to each Commissioner

How many people in the Protocol Service are assigned to each Commissioner?

Question for written answer E-001696/13
to the Commission
William (The Earl of) Dartmouth (EFD)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Reducing or increasing the cost of the Protocol Service

Does the Commission have any plans to reduce or increase the cost of the Protocol Service?

Question for written answer E-001700/13
to the Commission
William (The Earl of) Dartmouth (EFD)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Number of staff employed in the Protocol Service

What is the total number of staff employed in the Protocol Service of the European Commission?

Question for written answer E-001704/13
to the Commission
William (The Earl of) Dartmouth (EFD)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Breakdown of grades for Protocol Service staff

Can the Commission provide a breakdown of grades for staff in the Protocol Service of the Commission?

Question for written answer E-001708/13
to the Commission
William (The Earl of) Dartmouth (EFD)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Costs of Protocol Service

What are the costs of the Protocol Service of the European Commission?

Question for written answer E-001711/13
to the Commission
William (The Earl of) Dartmouth (EFD)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Protocol Service of the Commission

Does the Commission find it reasonable to have a Protocol Service?

Joint answer given by Mr Barroso on behalf of the Commission
(5 April 2013)

The Protocol Service is placed under the authority of the Secretary General of the European Commission to assist the President and Members of the Commission in implementing their tasks of external representation of the European Union, entrusted upon them by Article 17 of the Treaty.

On 1 January 2013, the Protocol Service was composed of 12 staff: three administrators and nine assistants. None of the members of the Protocol Service is specifically assigned to any Commissioner, all work for the President, the Vice-Presidents and the Members of the College. In 2012, as a contribution to the 5% staff reduction implemented by the Commission, the size of the Protocol Service has been reduced from 13 to 12 staff members.

The cost of the salaries of the Protocol Service staff are part of the overall staff budget of the Commission. The Protocol Service is attached to the Secretariat General.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001694/13
to the Council
William (The Earl of) Dartmouth (EFD)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Reducing or increasing the cost of the Protocol Service

Does the Council have any plans to reduce or increase the cost of the Protocol Service?

Question for written answer E-001699/13
to the Council
William (The Earl of) Dartmouth (EFD)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Number of staff employed in the Protocol Service

What is the total number of staff employed in the Protocol Service of the Council?

Question for written answer E-001703/13
to the Council
William (The Earl of) Dartmouth (EFD)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Breakdown of grades for Protocol Service staff

Can the Council provide a breakdown of grades for staff employed in the Protocol Service of the Council?

Question for written answer E-001707/13
to the Council
William (The Earl of) Dartmouth (EFD)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Costs of Protocol Service

What are the costs of the Protocol Service of the Council?

Question for written answer E-001710/13
to the Council
William (The Earl of) Dartmouth (EFD)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Protocol Service of the Council

Does the Council find it reasonable to have a Protocol Service?

Joint reply
(2 May 2013)

Given the fact that the General Secretariat of the Council organises each year approximately 6000 multilateral meetings between Member States, some at the highest political level, and that Article 15 TEU provides that the President of the European Council shall, at his level and in that capacity, ensure the external representation of the Union on issues concerning its common foreign and security policy (without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative), a Protocol Service is necessary.

The costs of the Protocol Service are those of the pay of its agents, and the cost of overtime, whenever necessary for the accomplishment of duty, for those agents entitled by the Staff Regulations to financial compensation. They were as follows for 2012:

— staff costs: EUR 1 470 194;

— overtime: EUR 44 362.

As at 1 March 2013, staff of the Protocol Unit of the General Secretariat of the Council were classed in the following grades:

ADMINISTRATORS	GRADE	NUMBER
	12	1
	7	1
	5	1
Total AD		3
ASSISTANTS	GRADE	NUMBER
	7	2
	6	4
	5	2
	4	2
	3	3
	2	2
Total AST		15
CONTRACTUAL AGENT	Function Group III	1
Grand total		19

The Council is not planning either to reduce or to increase the cost of the Protocol Service.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001697/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
William (The Earl of) Dartmouth (EFD)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Reducing or increasing the cost of the Protocol Service

Does the Vice-President/High Representative have any plans to reduce or increase the cost of the Protocol Service?

Question for written answer E-001701/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
William (The Earl of) Dartmouth (EFD)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Number of staff employed in the Protocol Service

What is the total number of staff employed in the Protocol Service of the European External Action Service?

Question for written answer E-001705/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
William (The Earl of) Dartmouth (EFD)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Breakdown of grades for Protocol Service staff

Can the Vice-President/High Representative provide a breakdown of grades for staff employed in the Protocol Service of the European External Action Service?

Question for written answer E-001709/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
William (The Earl of) Dartmouth (EFD)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Costs of Protocol Service

What are the costs of the Protocol Service of the European External Action Service?

Question for written answer E-001712/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
William (The Earl of) Dartmouth (EFD)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Protocol Service of the European External Action Service

Does the Vice-President/High Representative find it reasonable to have a Protocol Service?

Joint answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(24 April 2013)

The Sector of Protocol, Meetings and Conferences of the EEAS was created in July 2012 as part of the Infrastructures Division in the Directorate of Finance and Corporate Support.

This sector mainly deals with incoming visits from Ministerial level and VIP events (meetings, official meals) taking place in the EEAS HQ, diplomatic and protocol related questions for both HQ and delegations, including accreditations as well as the management of meetings and conferences and managing an associated budget (EUR 440.000 in 2012). This could not be handled by the Commission and the GSC protocol services with which the EEAS maintains a close cooperation.

In addition to one AD official working on Protocol issues in the cabinet of the High Representative/Vice-President, the Sector is composed of 8 staff members: the head of sector (AD 5), a second official (AD 12), 3 ASTs and 3 contract agents. These EEAS posts were identified following a screening exercise and they were redeployed from other services.

As a new service, it is not foreseen for the time being to change the size, the activities nor the responsibilities of the Protocol, meetings and conferences sector.

The costs are limited to the cost of the staff composing the Protocol sector and the usual directly related expenses (missions, offices, stationary, etc.).

In this context and for the wide range of services to be provided for handling high level visits in Brussels and dealing with protocol issues in our network of 141 delegations, the creation of this small sector can be considered as an appropriate decision in terms of management and rationalisation of the services. It cannot be compared to the Commission or the General Secretariat of the Council protocol services or even Member States' services.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung P-001713/13
an die Kommission
Herbert Dorfmann (PPE)
(18. Februar 2013)

Betrifft: Ausreisemodalitäten für Minderjährige unter 14 Jahren im Mitgliedstaat Italien

Die Handhabung der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 444/2009 wurde durch eine italienische Bestimmung dahin gehend ergänzt, dass die Erlaubnis der Eltern von einer Behörde, im Fall Italiens die Quästur, beglaubigt und mit Stempel versehen werden muss. Besonders für Bürgerinnen und Bürger in Grenzgebieten, die mehrmals monatlich die Grenzen passieren — zum Beispiel Südtirol — bringt dieser Behördengang eine wesentliche Beeinträchtigung der Reisefreiheit mit sich. Minderjährige, die ohne diese schriftliche Genehmigung reisen, reisen somit nicht legal.

Angesichts dieser Tatsache erlaube ich mir, folgende Fragen an die Kommission zu stellen:

1. Stellt die Verabschiedung des italienischen Gesetzes vom 20. November 2009, Nr. 166 zur Anpassung an die Verordnung (EG) Nr. 444/2009, in Ihren Augen einen Widerspruch zur europäischen Reisefreiheit dar?

2. Was gedenkt die Kommission zu tun, um die Reisefreiheit in grenznahen Gebieten nicht zu beeinträchtigen, sondern zu fördern?

Antwort von Frau Reding im Namen der Kommission
(9. April 2013)

Die durch das Gesetz Nr. 166 vom 20. November 2009 auferlegte Verpflichtung betrifft die Ausstellung von Pässen zum Überschreiten einer Außengrenze. Beim Überschreiten einer EU-Binnengrenze benötigen italienische Bürger lediglich ihren Personalausweis.

Gemäß Artikel 3 des Königlichen Erlasses Nr. 773 vom 18. Juni 1931, in der Fassung des Artikels 10 Absatz 5 des Gesetzesdekrets Nr. 70/2011, können Minderjährige unter 14 Jahren mit ihrem Personalausweis in einen anderen Mitgliedstaat der Europäischen Union einreisen, wenn sie von einem Elternteil oder gegebenenfalls von ihrem Vormund begleitet werden. Minderjährige ohne Begleitung müssen ein Dokument vorweisen, das von einer der vorgenannten Personen ausgestellt und von der zuständigen Behörde bestätigt wurde; darin ist der Name der Person, der Einrichtung oder des Beförderungsunternehmens anzugeben.

Aus Sicht der Kommission erscheint eine solche Maßnahme gerechtfertigt, denn der Schutz Minderjähriger stellt ein legitimes Ziel dar und ist mit dem Vertrag vereinbar. Auch scheint die Maßnahme geeignet, die Erreichung des verfolgten Ziels zu gewährleisten, da ein Elternteil und die zuständigen Behörden zustimmen müssen, wenn Kinder ohne elterliche Begleitung reisen. Zudem scheint die Maßnahme nicht über das zur Zielerreichung erforderliche Maß hinauszugehen, da die Genehmigung ohne Weiteres ausgestellt wird und wenn sie einmal erteilt ist, der Minderjährige in Obhut der angegebenen Person oder Einrichtung so lange und so häufig reisen kann wie gewünscht. Das italienische Gesetz besagt in keiner Weise, dass die Genehmigung nur für eine bestimmte Reise erteilt wird.

(English version)

Question for written answer P-001713/13
to the Commission
Herbert Dorfmann (PPE)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Rules on leaving the country for minors under the age of 14 in Italy

Regulation (EC) No 444/2009 has been supplemented in Italy by a provision stipulating that the written authorisation of parents must be certified and stamped by a competent authority — the local police headquarters ('questura') in Italy. Particularly for people living in border areas who cross the border regularly (such as the inhabitants of South Tyrol), this bureaucracy results in a considerable restriction on the freedom to travel. Minors who travel without this written authorisation therefore do so illegally.

1. In the Commission's view, does the adoption of Italian law No 166 of 20 November 2009 on implementation of Regulation (EC) No 444/2009 contradict the right of Europeans to travel freely?

2. What action does the Commission intend to take in order to ensure that freedom to travel is encouraged rather than restricted in border areas?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(9 April 2013)

The obligation imposed by Law n. 166 of 20 November 2009 concerns the issuance of passports with the aim of crossing an external frontier. However, Italian citizens may cross an internal frontier of the European Union with their identity card.

According to Article 3 of Royal decree of 18 June 1931, No 773, as modified by Article 10(5) of Legislative Decree No 70/2011, minors of 14 years may use their identity card to travel to another Member State of the European Union if accompanied by one of their parents or, as the case may be, their tutor. In case none of these persons accompany the minor the accompanying persons must hold a document issued by one of the mentioned persons and validated by the competent authority mentioning the name of the person, the entity or the transport company.

According to the Commission such a measure seems to be justified as the protection of minor children is a legitimate aim compatible with the Treaty. Furthermore, the measure seems appropriate to ensure the attainment of the objective pursued as one of the parents and the competent authorities are requested to intervene where the children travel without either of their parents. Finally, the measure does not seem to go beyond what is necessary to attain that purpose as, the issuance of the authorisation is simple and once the authorisation has been obtained the minor is free to travel in company of the person or entity identified by the authorisation for as long and as often as desired. There is no indication in the Italian law that would suggest that an authorisation must be issued for individual travelling periods.

(Wersja polska)

Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej P-001714/13
do Komisji
Lena Kolarska-Bobińska (PPE)
(18 lutego 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Umowa międzyrządowa w sprawie gazociągu transadriatyckiego (TAP)

Komisarz ds. energii Günther Ettinger wydał oświadczenie, w którym odniósł się przychylnie do podpisania w dniu 13 lutego 2013 r. umowy między rządami Włoch, Albanii i Grecji w sprawie budowy gazociągu transadriatyckiego (TAP).

W nawiązaniu do decyzji nr 994/2012/UE z dnia 25 października 2012 r. w sprawie ustanowienia mechanizmu wymiany informacji w odniesieniu do umów międzyrządowych w dziedzinie energii między państwami członkowskimi a państwami trzecimi:

1. Czy Komisja została oficjalnie powiadomiona o tej umowie międzyrządowej przez Grecję i Włochy zgodnie z ww. decyzją lub innymi przepisami UE?

2. Czy Komisja została zaproszona do udziału lub odegrała jakąkolwiek rolę w negocjacjach poprzedzających podpisanie tej umowy?

3. Czy Komisja ustaliła, czy przedmiotowa umowa jest zgodna z prawem UE? A jeśli nie, to czy zostanie to sprawdzone?

4. Czy inne państwa członkowskie zostały powiadomione o tej umowie, a jeśli tak, to w jakiej formie?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Günthera Oettingera w imieniu Komisji
(2 kwietnia 2013 r.)

1) Komisja nie otrzymała do tej pory żadnego oficjalnego zgłoszenia dotyczącego Umowy międzyrządowej w sprawie gazociągu transadriatyckiego, wymaganego zgodnie z decyzją 994/2102/UE w sprawie ustanowienia mechanizmu wymiany informacji w odniesieniu do umów międzyrządowych.

2) Komisja nie była zaangażowana w konkretne negocjacje dotyczące przedmiotowej umowy, ale śledzi uważnie cały proces.

3) i 4) Komisja oczekuje, że zarówno Grecja, jak i Włochy dokonają oficjalnego zgłoszenia przedmiotowej umowy zgodnie z decyzją 994/2012/UE, jak tylko zostanie ona ratyfikowana. Przedłożona umowa zostanie zasadniczo, w zależności od poziomu poufności, udostępniona pozostałym państwom członkowskim. Zgodnie z decyzją 994/2012 Komisja ma obowiązek oceniać zgodność nowych umów międzyrządowych z prawem Unii Europejskiej, tylko jeżeli zostanie o to wyraźnie poproszona przez państwo członkowskie przed podpisaniem danej umowy. W praktyce jednak Komisja będzie dokonywać oceny zgodności nowych umów międzyrządowych z prawem Unii Europejskiej. W stosownych przypadkach Komisja będzie w tym względzie wykonywać swoje prerogatywy na mocy Traktatu.

(English version)

Question for written answer P-001714/13
to the Commission
Lena Kolarska-Bobińska (PPE)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Intergovernmental agreement (IGA) on the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP)

The Commissioner responsible for energy, Günther Oettinger, has issued a statement welcoming the signing on 13 February 2013 of an intergovernmental agreement (IGA) between the Governments of Italy, Albania and Greece to build the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP).

Further to Decision No 994/2012/EU of 25 October 2012 establishing an information exchange mechanism with regard to intergovernmental agreements between Member States and third countries in the field of energy:

1. Has the Commission received official notification of this IGA from Greece and Italy, under this decision or other EU legislation?

2. Was the Commission invited to take part in or have any role in the negotiations before this agreement was signed?

3. Has the Commission ascertained whether the agreement is in line with EC law? If not, when will this be checked?

4. Has the agreement been shared with the other Member States, and if so in what form?

Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission
(2 April 2013)

1. The Commission has so far not received any official notification of the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) pursuant to Decision 994/2102/EU establishing an information exchange mechanism with regard to intergovernmental agreements.

2. The Commission has not been involved in the specific negotiations of the IGA in question but has been closely following the process.

3 and 4. The Commission expects that both Greece and Italy will officially submit the TAP IGA in accordance with Decision 994/2012/EU, as soon as it has been ratified. Once submitted, the IGA will, in principle, depending on the level of confidentiality, be shared with the other Member States. Pursuant to Decision 994/2012, the Commission is only obliged to assess the compatibility of new IGAs with European Union law, if it is explicitly asked to do so by a Member State before signing the IGA. In practice, however, the Commission will assess the new IGAs compatibility with European Union law. If appropriate, the Commission will exercise its prerogatives under the Treaty in this respect.

(Dansk udgave)

Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse E-001716/13
til Kommissionen
Jens Rohde (ALDE)
(18. februar 2013)

Om: Høringsfrist i forbindelse med interkalibrering

I 2008 blev arbejdet med 1. vandplanperiode færdiggjort. Forslaget om den efterfølgende vandplanperioder var til afstemning i Udvalget for Vandrammedirektivet den 28. januar 2013. Forud for denne afstemning lå et interkaliberingsarbejde.

Kommissionens udkast til beslutning om fastsættelse i overensstemmelse med Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 2000/60/EF af værdierne for klassifikationerne i medlemsstaternes overvågningssystem som resultat af interkalibreringen (kommissionsbeslutning om interkalibreringsresultater), KOM(2013)XXXX, blev af den danske regering sendt til høring i miljøspecialudvalget fra den 11. til den 18. januar 2013. Det betød, at danske organisationer kun havde fem hverdage til at afgive høringssvar ([1]).

Kan Kommissionen oplyse, om den korte høringsfrist i Danmark skyldtes, at Kommissionen først sendte forslaget til beslutning til den danske regering selvsamme dag, dvs. den 11. januar 2013?

Kan Kommissionen endvidere oplyse, om den mener, at det er rimeligt med en høringsfrist på kun fem dage for en så kompleks videnskabelig og teknisk opgave som interkalibrering?

Svar afgivet på Kommissionens vegne af Janez Potočnik
(3. april 2013)

Medlemsstater deltager fuldt ud i interkalibreringsprocessen ved at indgive resultater/forslag til en arbejdsgruppe (ECOSTAT), som kontrollerer/vedtager disse på grundlag af videnskabelige kriterier.

ECOSTAT omfatter alle medlemsstater, og dens arbejde støttes af Kommissionen. Kommissionen udarbejdede udkastet til den afgørelse, som det ærede medlem henviser til, på grundlag af ECOSTAT's synspunkter og en uafhængig fagfællebedømmelse, som blev forelagt for medlemsstaterne til udtalelse i sommeren/efteråret 2012. Det gjorde det muligt at behandle spørgsmål fra medlemsstaterne forud for afstemningen om Kommissionens endelige afgørelse.

I overensstemmelse med det relevante udvalgs forretningsregler fremsendte Kommissionen udkastet til afgørelsen om interkalibrering til udvalgets medlemmer to uger før afstemningen. Det er op til den enkelte medlemsstat at organisere dets interne høringsproces.

([1]) http://www.eu-oplysningen.dk/upload/application/pdf/40dc1c9a/12176.pdf

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001716/13
to the Commission
Jens Rohde (ALDE)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Deadline for hearing in connection with intercalibration

In 2008 work on the first River Basin Management Plan period was completed. The vote on the proposal for the subsequent River Basin Management Plans was due to be held in the Danish Parliament's Committee on the Water Framework Directive on 28 January 2013. This vote followed on from the intercalibration exercise.

The Commission's proposal for a decision establishing, pursuant to Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, the values of the Member State monitoring system classifications as a result of the intercalibration exercise (Commission decision on intercalibration results), COM(2013) XXXX, was sent by the Danish Government for a hearing in the Committee of Environmental Experts from 11 to 18 January 2013. That meant that the Danish bodies had only five working days to provide the answers from the hearings ([1]).

Can the Commission state whether this short deadline for the hearings in Denmark was due to the fact that the Commission only sent the proposal for a decision to the Danish Government on the same day, 11 January 2013?

Does the Commission consider it is reasonable to set a hearing deadline of only five days for such a complex scientific and technical exercise as intercalibration?

Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission
(3 April 2013)

Member States fully participate in the intercalibration process by submitting results/proposals to a working group (ECOSTAT) for review/acceptance based on scientific criteria.

ECOSTAT includes all Member States and its work is facilitated by the Commission. The Commission developed the draft proposal for the decision referred to by the Honourable Member on the basis of ECOSTAT views and an independent peer review which was submitted to Member States for comment during summer/autumn 2012. This allowed for issues raised by Member States to be addressed in advance of the voting on the final Commission Decision.

The Commission sent the draft intercalibration decision to Committee members 2 weeks in advance of the vote as required by the rules of procedure of the relevant Committee. It is up to Member States to organise their internal consultation process.

([1]) http://www.eu-oplysningen.dk/upload/application/pdf/40dc1c9a/12176.pdf

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001718/13
to the Commission
Martina Anderson (GUE/NGL)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Tobacco lobbying

1. When will the Commission update the existing ethics rules for Commissioners and officials, prescribing the standards with which they should comply in their dealings with the tobacco industry, in accordance with Recommendation 4 of the guidelines for implementation of Article 5.3 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC)?

2. Can the Commission confirm that updated ethics rules for Commissioners and officials dealing with the tobacco industry will ban persons employed by the tobacco industry or any entity working to further its interests from being members of committees and advisory groups that set or implement tobacco control or public health policy?

3. Can the Commission outline how it will ensure that it fulfils its obligations towards the UN and fully implements Article 5.3 of the FCTC, which will require changes to the code of conduct for Commissioners, the Staff Regulations and the Transparency Register, and will mean that registration becomes mandatory for all lobbyists employed by entities from the tobacco industry, affiliated organisations or any entity working to further tobacco interests?

Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the Commission
(11 April 2013)

The Commission would refer the Honourable Member to the answer to Written Question E-11643/2012. The Commission confirms that the Ethical framework applicable to Commissioners and staff is fully compatible with the non-binding measures of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control and therefore does not foresee any major changes in this respect.

The Ethical framework applicable to Commissioners and staff is by its nature not applicable to committees in the meaning of comitology regulation ([1]) and Commission expert groups. Article 11 of the standard rules of procedures for committees ([2]) makes provision concerning conflicts of interests for participants in committee meetings. Rules on conflict of interests in relation to members of expert groups who are appointed in a personal capacity apply according to Commission's framework for Commission expert groups ([3]).

([1]) Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission's exercise of implementing powers, OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13-18.
([2]) Standard rules of procedure for committees, OJ C 206, 12.7.2011, p. 11-13.
([3]) (C(2010)7649).

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-001719/13
aan de Commissie
Frank Vanhecke (EFD)
(18 februari 2013)

Betreft: Financiële steun Palestijnse gebieden

Kan de Commissie mij meedelen hoeveel Europese financiële steun naar de Palestijnse gebieden is gevloeid in 2012 en kan de Commissie daarbij tevens aangeven hoeveel van dit bedrag is gegaan naar rechtstreekse begrotingssteun?

Antwoord van de heer Füle namens de Commissie
(24 april 2013)

In 2012 is uit alle begrotingsposten van de EU voor in totaal 383,45 miljoen euro aan steun voor Palestina en de Palestijnse bevolking uitgetrokken. Daarvan ging 93,8 miljoen euro naar programma's die direct of indirect door de Palestijnse Autoriteit worden uitgevoerd; 27,45 miljoen euro naar institutionele opbouw; 20,10 miljoen euro naar infrastructuur; 11,20 miljoen euro naar rechtstreekse steun voor de privésector; 147 miljoen euro naar UNRWA, met inbegrip van steun uit het stabiliteitsinstrument (*Instrument for Stability* — IfS); 46,75 miljoen euro naar humanitaire hulp en voedselzekerheid; 8 miljoen euro naar Oost-Jeruzalem en 9,7 miljoen euro naar de ondersteuning van de civiele samenleving. Er werd eveneens 19,45 miljoen euro steun verstrekt in het kader van het IfS en de maatregelen van het gemeenschappelijk buitenlands en veiligheidsbeleid. De EU heeft geen begrotingssteun verleend aan de Palestijnse Autoriteit.

Het geachte Parlementslid wordt eveneens verwezen naar het antwoord op de eerdere schriftelijke vraag E-001483/2013 ([1]).

([1]) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/nl/parliamentary-questions.html

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001719/13
to the Commission
Frank Vanhecke (EFD)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Financial assistance for the Palestinian territories

Can the Commission say how much EU financial assistance was given to the Palestinian territories in 2012, and can it also say how much of that amount went on direct budget support?

Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission
(24 April 2013)

In total, EUR 383.45 million was committed for Palestine and for the Palestinian people in 2012 from all EU budget lines. Of this amount, EUR 93.8 million was provided for programmes implemented directly or indirectly by the Palestinian Authority; EUR 27.45 million for institution-building; EUR 20.10 million for infrastructure; EUR 11.20 million for direct support to the private sector; EUR 147 million to UNRWA (including funds from Instrument for Stability (IfS); EUR 46.75 million in Humanitarian Aid and Food Security; EUR 8 million for East Jerusalem; EUR 9.7 million for support to civil society and EUR 19.45 million financed under the IfS and Common Foreign Security Policy Actions. The EU did not provide any budget support to the Palestinian Authority.

The Honourable Member is also referred to the answer to previous Written Question E-001483/2013 ([1]).

([1]) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-001720/13
aan de Commissie
Frank Vanhecke (EFD)
(18 februari 2013)

Betreft: Opvang- en aanwervingscentrum in Mali

Kan de Commissie mij meedelen hoeveel Europese financiële steun er naar het opvang- en aanwervingscentrum in Mali is gevloeid sinds de oprichting van dit centrum?

Hoeveel kandidaat-migranten zijn sinds de oprichting opgevangen, geïnformeerd en geadviseerd over tewerkstellingsmogelijkheden in de EU?

Hoeveel personen zijn door bemiddeling van dit centrum geëmigreerd naar de EU?

Antwoord van de heer Piebalgs namens de Commissie
(25 april 2013)

Het Informatie- en beheerscentrum voor migratie (CIGEM) heeft sinds 6 oktober 2008 10 miljoen EUR ontvangen. Tegen het einde van het project wordt daar nog 2 miljoen EUR ([1]) aan toegevoegd. Het CIGEM heeft ongeveer 8 000 bezoekers ontvangen (onder wie 1 761 terugkerende migranten). Voor deze bezoekers werden individuele informatiegesprekken georganiseerd en ze kregen begeleiding en advies.

Dankzij de oproep tot het indienen van voorstellen voor de opvang van migranten die niet vrijwillig terugkeren en/of migranten die via het Malinese grondgebied doorreizen, was het mogelijk om:

— 2 000 terugkerende migranten op te vangen, te registreren en tijdelijk onder te brengen;

— de terugkeer van 500 personen te vergemakkelijken;

— 1 000 terugkerende migranten over de voorwaarden voor toegang en verblijf in bepaalde gastlanden te informeren;

— een twintigtal arbeidsplaatsen te creëren en 9 tijdelijke opvangcentra op te zetten.

Deze oproep heeft eveneens bijgedragen tot betere medische bijstand (dringende medische zorg), betere juridische bijstand, beter advies en betere psychologische ondersteuning bij de opvang van migranten die niet vrijwillig terugkeren. 200 migranten, onder wie 62 terugkerende migranten, hebben integratie- of re-integratieopleidingen gevolgd. 51 onder hen hebben eveneens een beroepskit ontvangen.

In het kader van een proefproject voor seizoensmigratie dat in juli 2009 tussen Spanje en Mali werd opgestart, heeft het CIGEM 6 migranten aan werk kunnen helpen (op een totaal van 29). In het kader van het programma voor legale studentenmigratie dat met de steun van de Deense ambassade wordt uitgevoerd, zijn 50 beurzen toegekend op het niveau van Afrikaanse referentiescholen.

Het CIGEM ging tijdens verschillende missies op zoek naar (arbeids)mogelijkheden in Europa. Wegens de financiële crisis, de geldende wettelijke voorwaarden en de gevraagde profielen op de arbeidsmarkten zijn die missies echter op niets uitgedraaid.

([1]) Deze 2 miljoen EUR is afkomstig uit het 10e EOF voor Mali.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001720/13
to the Commission
Frank Vanhecke (EFD)
(18 February 2013)

Subject: Reception and recruitment centre in Mali

Can the Commission inform me how much European financial assistance has been provided to the reception and recruitment centre in Mali since the centre was established?

How many applicants for migration have been received, informed and advised about employment opportunities in the EU since the centre was established?

How many people have emigrated to the EU as a result of the centre's acting as an intermediary?

(Version française)

Réponse donnée par M. Piebalgs au nom de la Commission
(25 avril 2013)

Depuis le 6 octobre 2008, le Centre d'information et de gestion des migrations (CIGEM) a reçu 10 millions d'euros auxquels s'ajouteront d'ici la fin du projet 2 millions d'euros ([1]). Le CIGEM a accueilli environ 8 000 visiteurs (dont 1 761 migrants de retour) qui ont été reçus en entretien individuel d'information et d'appui-conseils.

L'appel à candidatures sur la thématique «Accueil des migrants de retour involontaire et/ou en transit sur le territoire malien» a permis de:

— toucher 2 000 migrants de retour qui ont été accueillis, enregistrés et hébergés temporairement;

— faciliter le retour de 500 personnes;

— informer 1 000 migrants de retour sur les conditions d'entrée et de séjour dans certains pays d'accueil;

— créer une vingtaine d'emplois et mis en place 9 centres d'hébergement temporaire.

Cet appel à candidatures a aussi contribué à améliorer la prise en charge des migrants de retour involontaire au niveau de l'assistance médicale (soins de santé d'urgence), l'assistance juridique, le conseil et le soutien psychologique. 200 migrants, dont 62 de retour, ont bénéficié de formations d'insertion et de réinsertion parmi lesquels 51 ont bénéficié aussi de kits professionnels.

Le CIGEM a placé 6 migrants (sur un total de 29) dans le cadre de la migration saisonnière expérimentale mise en œuvre entre l'Espagne et le Mali en juillet 2009. Le programme de migration légale estudiantine mis en œuvre avec l'appui de l'Ambassade du Danemark a attribué 50 bourses au niveau des écoles africaines de référence.

Le CIGEM a effectué des missions de recherches d'opportunités en Europe qui n'ont pas abouti en raison de la crise financière, des exigences légales en vigueur et des profils exigés par les marchés de l'emploi.

([1]) Provenant du 10e FED Mali.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-001723/13
προς την Επιτροπή (Αντιπρόεδρος/Ύπατη Εκπρόσωπος)
Georgios Toussas (GUE/NGL)
(19 Φεβρουαρίου 2013)

Θέμα: VP/HR — Να αποφυλακιστούν άμεσα οι Παλαιστίνιοι πολιτικοί κρατούμενοι από τις ισραηλινές φυλακές

Σε άμεσο κίνδυνο βρίσκεται η ζωή τριών Παλαιστινίων πολιτικών κρατουμένων σε φυλακές του Ισραήλ, οι οποίοι πραγματοποιούν απεργία πείνας διαμαρτυρόμενοι ενάντια στο απαράδεκτο μέτρο της «διοικητικής κράτησης» που επιβάλλει στους Παλαιστίνιους το ισραηλινό κράτος και τις άθλιες συνθήκες κράτησής τους. Εξαιρετικά κρίσιμη είναι η κατάσταση του Παλαιστίνιου πολιτικού κρατούμενου Σαμέρ Ισάουι, που απέχει από τη σίτιση εδώ και 200 ημέρες, ενώ μάχη για τη ζωή δίνουν και οι άλλοι δύο πολιτικοί κρατούμενοι, ο Τάρκε Κααντάν και ο Τζαφάρ Αζιντίν, που διανύουν 78 ημέρες απεργίας πείνας. Το Ισραήλ ρίχνει στις φυλακές, που ονομάζει «διοικητικά κέντρα κράτησης», χιλιάδες Παλαιστίνιους χωρίς δίκη, χωρίς καν οποιαδήποτε κατηγορία σε βάρος τους. Οι Παλαιστίνιοι πολιτικοί φυλακισμένοι κρατούνται κάτω από απάνθρωπες συνθήκες, χωρίς να γνωρίζουν αν και πότε θα τελειώσει η μαρτυρική φυλάκισή τους. Το Ισραήλ είναι υπεύθυνο για τη ζωή των τριών Παλαιστινίων πολιτικών κρατουμένων-απεργών πείνας.

Η θηριωδία του Ισραήλ ενάντια στον Παλαιστινιακό λαό, που δεν έχει τέλος, ενισχύεται και αποθρασύνεται από τη στήριξη της ΕΕ και των ΗΠΑ στα πλαίσια των ιμπεριαλιστικών σχεδιασμών και επεμβάσεών τους στην ευρύτερη περιοχή, με στόχο τον έλεγχο των πλουτοπαραγωγικών πηγών, των δρόμων μεταφοράς τους και την άγρια εκμετάλλευση των λαών.

Ερωτάται η Ύπατη Εκπρόσωπος της ΕΕ για την Εξωτερική Πολιτική:

Καταδικάζει την εγκληματική πολιτική του Ισραήλ ενάντια στον Παλαιστινιακό λαό, που συνεχίζεται με αμείωτη ένταση; Σε τι μέτρα θα προβεί για την άμεση απελευθέρωση των τριών απεργών πείνας, αλλά και των χιλιάδων Παλαιστινίων πολιτικών κρατουμένων, πριν προστεθούν στον ατελείωτο κατάλογο των ισραηλινών εγκλημάτων;

Απάντηση της Ύπατης Εκπροσώπου/Αντιπροέδρου Ashton εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(24 Απριλίου 2013)

Η Ύπατη Εκπρόσωπος/Αντιπρόεδρος (ΥΕ/ΑΠ) έχει παρακολουθήσει εκ του σύνεγγυς το θέμα των Παλαιστινίων απεργών πείνας κατά τη διάρκεια του 2012 και του τρέχοντος έτους. Έχει ζητήσει από την κυβέρνηση του Ισραήλ να καταβάλει κάθε δυνατή προσπάθεια προκειμένου να διαφυλαχθεί η υγεία και τα δικαιώματα των φυλακισμένων αυτών και έχει εκφράσει την ανησυχία της για τις επιπτώσεις που μπορούν να έχουν τέτοια περιστατικά όσον αφορά την κατάσταση ασφάλειας στην Παλαιστίνη. Στις 16 Φεβρουαρίου 2013, ο εκπρόσωπος της ΥΕ/ΑΠ προέβη σε δήλωση στην οποία εκφράζεται ανησυχία σχετικά με την επιδείνωση της κατάστασης της υγείας ορισμένων απεργών πείνας, συμπεριλαμβανομένων των τριών απεργών που αναφέρονται στην ερώτηση του Αξιότιμου Μέλους του Κοινοβουλίου. Η ΕΕ απηύθυνε εκ νέου έκκληση προς την κυβέρνηση του Ισραήλ προκειμένου να αποκατασταθούν άμεσα τα δικαιώματα επίσκεψης των οικογενειών τους και ζήτησε να τηρούνται πλήρως οι διεθνείς υποχρεώσεις για τα ανθρώπινα δικαιώματα έναντι όλων των Παλαιστινίων κρατουμένων και φυλακισμένων. Επί του παρόντος, μόνο ο Σαμέρ Ισάουι συνεχίζει την απεργία πείνας.

Η ΥΕ/ΑΠ έχει λάβει υπόψη το ψήφισμα του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου, της 5ης Ιουλίου 2012, σχετικά με τη Δυτική Όχθη και την Ιερουσαλήμ, και ιδίως την έκκλησή του να δοθεί τέλος στο μέτρο της διοικητικής κράτησης χωρίς την ύπαρξη επίσημης κατηγορίας ή δίκης. Όπως δήλωσε η ΕΕ στο συμβούλιο σύνδεσης ΕΕ-Ισραήλ του 2012, η διοικητική κράτηση θα πρέπει να παραμείνει έκτακτο μέτρο, και «βάσει του διεθνούς δικαίου, οι κρατούμενοι έχουν το δικαίωμα να ενημερώνονται σχετικά με τους λόγους της κράτησης, η διάρκεια της οποίας πρέπει να καθορίζεται νομίμως και αμελλητί». Πρόσφατα, σημειώθηκε μείωση του αριθμού των διοικητικών κρατουμένων, από 307 τον Δεκέμβριο του 2011 σε 160 τον Ιανουάριο του 2013.

Η ΕΕ θα συνεχίσει τις επαφές με το Ισραήλ όσον αφορά το ζήτημα των Παλαιστινίων φυλακισμένων στις ισραηλινές φυλακές, ιδίως διοικητικών κρατουμένων, με σκοπό επίσης την άμεση επίλυση υποθέσεων απεργών πείνας.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001723/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Georgios Toussas (GUE/NGL)
(19 February 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Demand for immediate release of Palestinian political prisoners from Israeli jails

Three Palestinian political prisoners in Israeli jails are on hunger strike in protest against the unacceptable measure of 'administrative detention' imposed by the Israeli state on Palestinians and the wretched conditions under which they are being held. Their lives are now in great danger. The Palestinian political prisoner Samer Issawi, who has been refusing food for 200 days, is in an extremely critical condition, while the two other political prisoners Tareq Qa'adan and Jafar Ezzedine, who have spent 78 days on hunger strike, are fighting for their lives. Israel throws into prison — so-called 'administrative detention centres' — thousands of Palestinians without trial and without even bringing any charges against them. The Palestinian political prisoners are detained under inhuman conditions, without knowing if and when their imprisonment ordeal will come to an end. Israel is answerable for the lives of these three Palestinian political prisoners on hunger strike.

The boundless savagery of Israel against the Palestinian people is boosted and emboldened by the support given by the EU and the US as part of their imperialist schemes and interventions in the region as whole, aimed at controlling the sources of wealth and its transport routes and brutally exploiting the local population.

Will the High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy say:

Will she condemn the criminal policy pursued by Israel against the Palestinian people, which is continuing unabated? What measures will she take to secure the immediate release of the three hunger strikers and also of the thousands of other Palestinian political prisoners before their names are added to the virtually endless list of victims of Israeli crimes?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(24 April 2013)

The HR/VP has closely followed the issue of Palestinian hunger strikers throughout 2012 and this year. She has called on the Government of Israel to do all it can to preserve the health and rights of these prisoners and has expressed concern about the impact that such incidents can have on the security situation in Palestine. On 16 February 2013, her spokesperson issued a statement expressing concern about the deteriorating health condition of a number of hunger strikers, including the three referred to in the Honourable Member's question. This reiterated the EU's call on the Government of Israel to allow for the immediate restoration of their family visiting rights and called for the full respect of international human rights obligations towards all Palestinian detainees and prisoners. Currently only Samer Issawi is continuing his hunger striker.

The HR/VP has taken note of Parliament resolution of 5 July 2012 on the West Bank and Jerusalem, in particular its call for an end to administrative detention without formal charge or trial. As the EU stated in the 2012 EU-Israel Association Council, administrative detention should remain an exceptional measure, and 'under international law, detainees have the right to be informed about the reasons underlying any detention and to have the legality of their detention determined without undue delay.' Recently there has been a decrease in the number of administrative detainees, from 307 in December 2011 to 160 in January 2013.

The EU will continue engaging with Israel on the issue of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails, in particular administrative detainees, also with a view to an immediate resolution of cases of hunger strikers.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001724/13
alla Commissione
Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)
(19 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: I derivati Cds

In Italia il loro volume di scambio corrisponde a quasi 400 miliardi di euro di titoli assicurati, ovvero il 20 per cento circa del debito pubblico. In realtà — dicono i tecnici — le cifre sono contraddittorie ed il mercato è opaco perché vengono scambiati anche i Cds «nudi», utilizzati cioè a puro scopo speculativo, senza un Btp sottostante assicurato, quindi con grande rischio. Questo enorme mercato delle scommesse finanziarie è reso possibile dalla mancanza di una regolamentazione pertinente e dal fatto che esso è oligopolistico, vale a dire gestito da pochi operatori. Questi Cds si possono comprare e rivendere — ed è questo l'aspetto più inquietante — anche senza possedere Btp. Nell'ordine, dopo l'Italia, vengono la Spagna, la Francia e la Germania come mercati di Cds.

Può la Commissione rispondere ai seguenti quesiti:

1. Non ritiene che sia necessario regolamentare tale mercato dei Cds, in attesa che si giunga alla riforma del sistema finanziario internazionale?

2. Non crede sia opportuno, per evitare il peggio, negare validità ai Cds cosiddetti «nudi», e cioè solo speculativi e non legati a un titolo sottostante?

3. Non pensa che questa riforma da applicare in seno all'UE possa contribuire a risolvere quella globale?

Risposta di Michel Barnier a nome della Commissione
(12 aprile 2013)

Il regolamento UE relativo alle vendite allo scoperto e ai credit default swap (CDS) ([1]) è entrato in vigore il 1° novembre 2012. Il regolamento prevede una serie di misure intese a migliorare la trasparenza, a ridurre determinati rischi associati alle vendite allo scoperto effettuate in assenza della disponibilità di titoli e ai CDS nudi in relazione al debito sovrano, e a garantire un approccio normativo comune in tutti gli Stati membri. Il regolamento vieta alle persone fisiche o giuridiche di concludere contratti CDS scoperti o nudi in debito sovrano, per evitare il rischio che i CDS nudi in debito sovrano vengano usati abusivamente per speculare sul declino del valore del debito sovrano in modo tale da aggravarlo. Nel contempo però il regolamento esonera dal divieto i CDS in debito sovrano usati per scopi di copertura legittimi, e consente alle autorità competenti di sospendere temporaneamente il divieto nei casi in cui il mercato del debito sovrano subisca ripercussioni negative.

Il regolamento chiede alla Commissione di presentare una relazione sul riesame del regolamento stesso. La Commissione ha ufficialmente chiesto all'AESFEM ([2]) un parere tecnico sulla valutazione dell'impatto del regolamento, che dovrebbe pervenire alla Commissione entro la fine di maggio 2013.

([1]) Regolamento (UE) n. 236/2012 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 14 marzo 2012, relativo alle vendite allo scoperto e a taluni aspetti dei contratti derivati aventi ad oggetto la copertura del rischio di inadempimento dell'emittente (credit default swap) (GU L 86 del 24.3.2012, pag. 1).

([2]) Autorità europea degli strumenti finanziari e dei mercati.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001724/13
to the Commission
Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)
(19 February 2013)

Subject: CDS derivatives

In Italy their trading volume is equivalent to around EUR 400 billion of insured securities, namely 20% of government debt. But in reality, according to the experts, the figures are contradictory and the market is opaque because 'naked' CDSs are also being traded, i.e. are being used purely for speculative purposes, without an underlying insured Btp (Italian Government bond). This involves great risks. This huge financial betting market is made possible by the lack of relevant legislation and the fact that it is oligopolistic, i.e. run by only a few operators. These CDSs can be bought and sold — and this is the most disturbing aspect of it all — even without holding any Btps. At the top of the CDS market is Italy, followed by Spain, France and Germany.

Can the Commission answer the following questions:

1. Does it not think that the CDS market should be regulated, pending the reform of the international financial system?

2. Does it not agree that it would be prudent, to avoid the worst, to ban the so-called naked CDSs, which are only speculative and not tied to any underlying security?

3. Does it not think that this reform, to be applied within the EU, could help to resolve the global situation?

Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission
(12 April 2013)

The EU Regulation on short selling and Credit Default Swaps (CDS) ([1]) entered into application on 1 November 2012. The regulation comprises a number of measures to enhance transparency, to reduce certain risks associated with uncovered short selling and uncovered CDS in relation to sovereign debt, and to ensure a common regulatory approach across Member States. The regulation prohibits natural or legal persons from entering into uncovered or naked CDS in sovereign debt. It addresses the risk of naked sovereign CDS being used abusively to speculate on a decline in the value of sovereign debt in a way which could exacerbate such a decline. But at the same time it exempts from the ban sovereign CDS used for legitimate hedging purposes, and allows competent authorities to suspend the ban temporarily in cases where the sovereign debt market is being negatively affected.

The regulation requires the Commission to present a report on the review of the regulation. The Commission has formally asked ESMA ([2]) for technical advice on the evaluation of the effects of the regulation, which it expects to receive by end May 2013.

([1]) Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 of the European Parliament and the Council of 14 March 2012 on short selling and certain aspects of Credit Default Swaps (OJ L 86/1).
([2]) European Securities and Markets Authority.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001725/13
alla Commissione
Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)
(19 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: Contraffazione nel gioco d'azzardo

La contraffazione che dilania l'industria manifatturiera europea ha trovato un altro ambito cui allargare i propri malaffari, ovvero il gioco d'azzardo, dove i comportamenti illegali hanno terreno fertile. In Italia questo settore ha fatturato, nel 2012, 70 miliardi di euro, e la criminalità organizzata ci ha messo le mani: la Guardia di Finanza ha riscontrato 3.300 violazioni e sequestrato 2.600 slot machines che alteravano i dati per truffare il fisco, e ha deciso di aprire a Bari una centrale operativa nazionale anticontraffazione .

La Commissione:

1. Intende elaborare nuove comunicazioni che aggiornino il precedente «Verso un quadro normativo europeo approfondito relativo al gioco d'azzardo on-line»?

2. In caso affermativo, quali misure intende adottare riguardo alla pratica della contraffazione in tale ambito?

3. Non ritiene necessario creare un organismo anticontraffazione europeo sullo stampo di quello italiano, vista l'internazionalità del fenomeno?

4. Come ha provveduto a tutelare i consumatori, in particolare quelli più giovani, dalla contraffazione e dalle truffe delle organizzazioni criminali nel gioco d'azzardo?

Risposta di Michel Barnier a nome della Commissione
(15 aprile 2013)

La comunicazione ([1]) riconosce le difficoltà che gli Stati membri incontrano nell'applicazione effettiva dei meccanismi antifrode e antiriciclaggio. La Commissione sta lavorando alle iniziative annunciate nella comunicazione, che non intende aggiornare nel futuro immediato.

La Commissione riconosce che è fondamentale che gli Stati membri attuino la legislazione nazionale in modo efficace, il cui prerequisito è la conformità al diritto dell'UE, per conseguire gli obiettivi di interesse generale che si sono posti. Assicurare il rispetto della normativa nazionale rientra sostanzialmente tra le competenze nazionali. Nell'ambito del gruppo di esperti sul gioco d'azzardo, la Commissione intende agevolare lo scambio di buone pratiche, compresa la lotta alla frode.

L'Osservatorio europeo sulle violazioni dei diritti di proprietà intellettuale (DPI) promuove la cooperazione tra le amministrazioni pubbliche e le organizzazioni competenti degli Stati membri, anche nel settore privato. L'Osservatorio costituisce altresì uno strumento di raccolta, monitoraggio e segnalazione di informazioni e dati in materia e fornirà ai responsabili politici le conoscenze e gli strumenti necessari per migliorare la lotta contro la contraffazione. A livello internazionale Europol e il suo Centro europeo per la lotta alla criminalità informatica contribuiscono alla lotta contro la criminalità e la frode.

La Commissione ha adottato una proposta di revisione della direttiva antiriciclaggio ([2]), il cui ambito di applicazione verrebbe esteso a tutte le forme di gioco d'azzardo.

La Commissione sta preparando due raccomandazioni ([3]) con l'obiettivo di fornire un elevato livello di protezione comune ai consumatori dei servizi connessi al gioco d'azzardo, compresa la tutela dei minori, e di garantire una pubblicità del gioco d'azzardo responsabile. Fra i principi da elaborare rientrano la verifica dell'età e controlli dell'identità dei giocatori.

([1]) «Verso un quadro normativo europeo approfondito relativo al gioco d'azzardo on-line» COM(2012)596 final.
([2]) COM(2013)45 final.
([3]) La cui adozione è prevista entro la fine del 2013.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001725/13
to the Commission
Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)
(19 February 2013)

Subject: Counterfeiting in the gambling business

The counterfeiting that is destroying European manufacturing has found another area in which to extend its unlawful business — that of gambling, in which illegal behaviour has found fertile ground. In Italy, in 2012, the gambling sector had a turnover of EUR 70 billion and organised crime has now become involved in it. The *Guardia di Finanza* (financial police) recently detected 3 300 violations and confiscated 2 600 slot machines in which the data had been altered in order to defraud the tax system. They then decided to open a national anti-counterfeiting operations centre in Bari.

Can the Commission answer the following questions:

1. Will it draw up any further communications to update the previous 'Towards a comprehensive European framework on online gambling'?

2. If so, what measures will it adopt with regard to the practice of counterfeiting in this sector?

3. Does it not agree that a European anti-counterfeiting body should be set up, along the lines of the Italian one, given the international nature of the phenomenon?

4. What steps has it taken to protect consumers, especially younger ones, from counterfeiting and fraud by criminal organisations in the gambling sector?

Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission
(15 April 2013)

The communication ([1]) recognises Member States' challenges as regards the effective application of anti-fraud and anti-money laundering mechanisms. The Commission is now working on the initiatives announced in the communication and will not, in the immediate future, update the communication.

The Commission recognises that effective enforcement by Member States of their national legislation, a prerequisite of which is compliance with EC law, is essential for the attainment of the public interest objectives they pursue. Compliance with national law is primarily a national competence. Within the expert group on gambling services the Commission aims to facilitate an exchange of good practices, including combatting fraud.

The European Observatory on Infringements of IPRs promotes cooperation between the competent public administrations and organisations in the Member States, as well as in the private sector. It is also a resource for gathering, monitoring and reporting relavant information and data and will provide policymakers with the necessary knowledge and tools to enhance the fight against counterfeiting. At international level, Europol and its European Cybercrime Centre contribute to the aim of combatting crime and fraud.

The Commission has adopted a proposal for a revision of the anti-money laundering Directive ([2]). According to this proposal, the scope of the directive would be extended to cover all forms of gambling.

The Commission is preparing two recommendations ([3]) with the aim of providing a high level of common protection of consumers of gambling services, including the protection of minors, and responsible gambling advertising. The principles to be elaborated include age verification and player identification controls.

([1]) 'Towards a Comprehensive European Framework for Online Gambling' COM(2012) 596 final.
([2]) COM/2013/045 final.
([3]) To be adopted by the end of 2013.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001726/13
alla Commissione
Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)
(19 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: Separazione tra credito e speculazione

Sembra ragionevole il progetto tedesco di indurre le banche a separare alcune delle loro attività più rischiose dalle operazioni bancarie tradizionali. Separare infatti l'attività commerciale da quella legata agli investimenti rappresenta una maggiore garanzia per il denaro dei risparmiatori. È vero che la banca universale ha svolto ottime funzioni, ma è vero anche che molte di esse, con l'attività speculativa, hanno recato gravi danni ai risparmiatori, oltre che agli azionisti, ed il loro salvataggio è stato fatto con i soldi dei contribuenti, tutte operazioni riprovevoli sul piano etico e non remunerative sul piano economico.

Può la Commissione rispondere ai seguenti quesiti:

1. Non ritiene che lo spirito del Glass-Steagall Act potrebbe contribuire a risanare tante situazioni bancarie?

2. Non è convinta che la separazione in questione eviterebbe l'uso del denaro dei risparmiatori per operazioni a rischio e quindi da respingere?

3. Non crede all'utilità degli investimenti bancari a sostegno e per lo sviluppo dell'economia reale anziché per il rischio speculativo, soprattutto in momenti di crisi come l'attuale?

Risposta congiunta di Michel Barnier a nome della Commissione
(22 aprile 2013)

Nel febbraio 2012 la Commissione ha istituito un gruppo di esperti di alto livello sulla riforma della struttura del settore bancario dell'UE. Il gruppo, presieduto da Erkki Liikanen, Governatore della Banca di Finlandia, il 2 ottobre 2012 ha pubblicato una relazione in cui raccomanda, tra le altre cose, la separazione obbligatoria di determinate attività di negoziazione rischiose dalle altre attività bancarie. La relazione è stata quindi oggetto di una consultazione fra le parti interessate. La Commissione successivamente ha discusso la questione della riforma strutturale alla luce delle riforme già intraprese. I servizi della Commissione analizzeranno ulteriormente le raccomandazioni del gruppo di esperti al fine di stabilire la forma e i contenuti delle iniziative legislative che seguiranno, previste per l'anno in corso.

La Commissione valuterà di conseguenza diverse opzioni di riforme strutturali, compresa la completa separazione della proprietà, per esempio sulla falsariga delle soluzioni già adottate negli Stati Uniti per effetto del Glass-Steagall Act.

In particolare, valuterà in che modo le diverse opzioni i) tutelano i depositanti riducendo la loro esposizione verso attività bancarie più rischiose e ii) influiscono sulla concessione di crediti a favore dell'economia reale.

(Magyar változat)

Írásbeli választ igénylő kérdés E-001889/13
a Bizottság számára
Gáll-Pelcz Ildikó (PPE)
(2013. február 21.)

Tárgy: A bankreformról szóló bizottsági javaslatról

2013 szeptemberében tehet javaslatot az Európai Bizottság a bankok működési kereteinek módosítására, amely egy szakértői csoport ajánlásainak értelmében a hagyományos betétgyűjtő tevékenység és a kereskedelmi-spekulatív üzletág jogi szétválasztásához vezethet. A Liikanen-csoport ajánlásai szerint a saját számlás és a származékos termékekkel folytatott kereskedés olyan magas fokú kockázatnak kitett ügyleteknek számítanak, amelyeket jogilag, üzletileg és tőkefedezet szempontjából külön kell választani a hagyományos banki tevékenységektől. A bankcsoportoknak ugyanakkor nem kellene megválniuk az egyik vagy másik üzleti tevékenységtől, és továbbra is nyújthatnák a szolgáltatások eddigi széles skáláját, finanszírozva ezzel a reálgazdaság működését.

A szakértői csoport arra a következtetésre jutott, hogy a kockázatos ügyleteket lebonyolító üzletágat nem célszerű kivonni a szabályozás hatálya alól.

1. A Bizottság hol kívánja meghúzni a vonalat a jogilag szétválasztandó üzletágak között?

2. Milyen esetben tartaná célszerűnek a vállalatok és a háztartások hitelezésének teljes elkülönülését?

Michel Barnier egyesített válasza a Bizottság nevében
(2013. április 22.)

2012 februárjában a Bizottság felállította az uniós bankszektor struktúrájának megreformálásával foglalkozó és a finn központi bank elnöke, Erkki Liikanen által elnökölt magas szintű szakértői csoportot. A csoport 2012. október 2-án közzétett jelentése többek között ajánlást tett egyes nagy kockázatú kereskedelmi tevékenységek egyéb banki tevékenységektől való kötelező elkülönítésére. A jelentés elkészítésekor sor került az érdekelt felek bevonására. A Bizottság azt követően a már megkezdett reformok fényében tárgyalta a strukturális reformokat. A bizottsági szolgálatok ennek alapján tovább elemzik a magas szintű szakértői csoport ajánlásait azzal a céllal, hogy meghatározzák az esetleges jogalkotási kísérő intézkedések megfelelő formáját és tartalmát. Ezen intézkedések még az idén elkészülhetnek.

A Bizottság következésképpen a strukturális reformok számos lehetőségét értékelni fogja, ideértve a teljes tulajdonjogi szétválasztást (hasonlóképpen a Glass–Steagall-törvény alapján egykor az Egyesült Államokban alkalmazotthoz).

A Bizottság mindenekelőtt azt fogja értékelni, hogy az egyes lehetőségek i. a kockázatosabb banki tevékenységeknek való kitettségük csökkentése révén mely módon védik a bankbetéteseket, továbbá ii. hogyan befolyásolják a reálgazdaságba irányuló banki hitelezését.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001726/13
to the Commission
Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)
(19 February 2013)

Subject: Separation of credit and speculation

The German plan to persuade banks to separate some of their riskier activities from traditional banking operations would appear to be reasonable. Separating commercial activity from investment-related activity is a better guarantee for savers' money. While universal banking has done an excellent job, it is also true to say that many of these banks, with their speculative activity, have caused serious damage to savers, as well as to shareholders, and have had to be bailed out with taxpayers' money. All of this is reprehensible from an ethical point of view and non-profitable in economic terms.

Can the Commission therefore answer the following questions:

1. Does it not believe that the spirit of the Glass-Steagall Act could help to resolve many banking problems?

2. Is it not convinced that such a separation of activities would prevent savers' money from being used for risky, and therefore unwelcome, operations?

3. Does it not agree that it would be useful for banks to invest in the support and development of the real economy rather than in speculative risks, especially at times of crisis like the present?

Question for written answer E-001889/13
to the Commission
Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE)
(21 February 2013)

Subject: Commission proposal on banking reform

In September 2013, the Commission may submit a proposal concerning changes to the operating framework for banks, which, as recommended by the group of experts, may bring about a legal separation between traditional deposit-taking activities and speculative commercial transactions. According to the recommendations of the Liikanen Group, own-account dealing and derivatives trading are highly risky transactions, which need to be separated legally, commercially and from the point of view of capital cover from traditional banking operations. However, banking groups would not have to opt for one type of business or the other, and they would still be able to provide the same broad range of services as hitherto, thus financing the operation of the real economy.

The expert group has concluded that it would not be appropriate to exempt the risky transactions sector from regulation.

1. Where does the Commission intend to draw the line between the sectors which are to be legally separated?

2. In what circumstances would the Commission consider it appropriate to completely separate credit for businesses and households?

Joint answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission
(22 April 2013)

In February 2012, the Commission set up a High-level Expert Group (HLEG) on reforming the structure of the EU banking sector, chaired by Erkki Liikanen, Governor of the Bank of Finland. The Group published its report on 2 October 2012, recommending among other things the mandatory separation of certain high-risk trading activities from other banking activities. The report was then subject to a stakeholder consultation. The Commission has subsequently discussed the case for structural reform in the light of reforms already undertaken. The Commission services will as a result further analyse the recommendations of the HLEG with a view to determine the appropriate form and substance of any legislative follow up. A legislative follow-up would be envisaged for this year.

The Commission will accordingly assess a number of structural reform options, including full ownership separation (e.g. along the lines previously applied in the United States as a result of the Glass-Steagall Act).

The Commission will notably assess how the different options (i) safeguard depositors by reducing their exposure to more risky banking activities, and (ii) affect the provision of bank credit to the real economy.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001727/13
alla Commissione
Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)
(19 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: Allagamento del Parco archeologico di Sibari

L'alluvione che ha colpito la Calabria il 18 gennaio scorso ha provocato ingenti danni nel Parco archeologico di Sibari, uno dei più importanti d'Italia, rimasto completamente allagato. Il Comune di Cassano allo Jonio e la Direttrice del Museo archeologico di Sibari, che già tre anni fa richiedeva interventi di messa in sicurezza dell'area, chiedono senza risposte un intervento rapido del Governo italiano e della Regione Calabria.

La Commissione:

1. Ritiene possibile un suo intervento con il Fondo per le calamità naturali, al fine di contribuire concretamente alla salvaguardia del patrimonio storico e culturale della Magna Grecia?

2. Non ritiene doveroso prevedere nell'utilizzo dei fondi elargiti alle regioni anche un uso riservato alla tutela del patrimonio culturale del territorio?

3. Perché non promuove un'iniziativa tendente alla redazione di una mappa europea dei rischi idrogeologici?

Risposta di Johannes Hahn a nome della Commissione
(12 aprile 2013)

1. Se le autorità italiane ritengono che siano riunite le condizioni per attivare il Fondo di solidarietà dell'UE esse devono presentare una domanda di aiuto finanziario alla Commissione entro dieci settimane dall'inizio della catastrofe. La Commissione non può attivare il Fondo di propria iniziativa. La Commissione è pronta a fornire orientamenti quanto alla preparazione di una domanda. La soglia che si applica di norma per l'Italia per attivare il Fondo di solidarietà corrisponde a un danno superiore a 3,6 miliardi di euro (3 miliardi di euro ai prezzi del 2002). Occorrerebbero informazioni più dettagliate sulla catastrofe per valutare se sia possibile applicare i criteri eccezionali relativi alle catastrofi di minore entità.

2. Nel periodo 2007-2013 il Fondo europeo di sviluppo regionale può erogare finanziamenti per la protezione del patrimonio culturale. In proposito, la priorità V del programma Calabria 2007-2013 dispone di uno stanziamento complessivo di 360 milioni di euro per azioni a tutela delle risorse naturali, del patrimonio culturale e del turismo sostenibile.

3. In seguito agli Orientamenti per la valutazione e la mappatura dei rischi ai fini della gestione delle catastrofi, emanati dalla Commissione nel 2010, gli Stati membri conducono valutazioni nazionali del rischio e tengono conto dei diversi pericoli potenziali. A tutt'oggi, dodici Stati membri hanno inviato i loro contributi. Su tale base e attingendo alle proprie risorse interne la Commissione produrrà nel 2013 una rassegna intersettoriale del rischio a livello di UE per le calamità naturali e per quelle causate dall'uomo, compresi gli incidenti industriali. Inoltre, come prescritto dalla direttiva UE sulle alluvioni, gli Stati membri devono procedere entro il 2013 a una mappatura dei rischi reali e potenziali di alluvione.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001727/13
to the Commission
Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)
(19 February 2013)

Subject: Flooding of the Archaeological Park of Sybaris

The floods that struck Calabria on 18 January caused extensive damage in the Archaeological Park of Sybaris, one of the most important in Italy, which was completely flooded. The municipality of Cassano allo Jonio and the Director of the Archaeological Museum of Sybaris, who three years ago had already requested that the area be made safe, have been asking in vain for prompt action from the Italian Government and the Region of Calabria.

Can the Commission answer the following questions:

1. Does it think it might be able to take action, through the fund for natural disasters, in order to make a tangible contribution to the preservation of the historical and cultural heritage of Ancient Greece?

2. Does it not agree that it should provide for, in the use of the funding granted to the regions, funds dedicated to the protection of local cultural heritage?

3. Could it not promote an initiative with a view to drawing up a European map of hydrogeological risks?

Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission
(12 April 2013)

1. If the Italian authorities consider that the conditions for activating the EU Solidarity Fund are met they should present an application for financial aid to the Commission within 10 weeks of the start of the disaster. The Commission may not activate the Fund upon its own initiative. The Commission stands ready to provide guidance regarding the preparation of an application. The normal threshold for activating the Solidarity Fund for Italy is damage exceeding EUR 3.6 billion (EUR 3 billion in 2002 prices). More detailed information on the disaster would be needed to assess whether the exceptional criteria for smaller disasters could be applied.

2. The European Regional Development Fund can provide funds for the protection of cultural heritage during the 2007-2013 period. In this respect, priority V of the 2007-2013 Calabria programme has a total allocation of EUR 360 million for actions for the preservation of natural resources, support of cultural heritage and sustainable tourism.

3. Following the 2010 Commission's Risk Assessment and Mapping Guidelines for Disaster Management, Member States are carrying out national multi-hazard risk assessments. To date, 12 Member States have sent contributions. On this basis and internal resources, the Commission will produce in 2013 a cross sectorial EU risk overview of natural and man-made disasters, including industrial accidents. In addition, as required by the EU Floods Directive, Member States are expected to develop national flood hazard and flood risk maps by 2013.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001728/13
alla Commissione
Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)
(19 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: Stop al porno web

In Islanda una consultazione nazionale ha dato un responso largamente positivo al divieto di diffondere la pornografia sul web. Il governo perciò ha avviato un'indagine per decidere i modi di divieto d'accesso al porno su tutta l'isola per proteggere i bambini. Pur essendo una società liberale e progressista in materia di sessualità — afferma il ministro degli Interni — il nostro approccio al problema non è anti-sesso, bensì anti-violenza. Dopo le leggi già approvate sul divieto di stampare pubblicazioni porno e sulla chiusura di night club e topless bar, se il progetto verrà realizzato l'Islanda sarà il primo Paese al mondo a vietare il porno sulla rete.

Può la Commissione rispondere ai seguenti quesiti:

1. Condivide l'intenzione del governo islandese?

2. In caso affermativo, non potrebbe prendere lo spunto da questo progetto per proporre iniziative analoghe a tutela dei minori dell'UE?

3. È in grado di valutare i risultati, positivi o meno, delle azioni intraprese fino ad ora per proteggere i bambini dalla violenza porno veicolata dal web?

Risposta di Neelie Kroes a nome della Commissione
(3 maggio 2013)

In base all'interpretazione della Commissione, in Islanda non esiste ancora una proposta legislativa contro la pornografia online. Come nel caso degli altri paesi candidati, la Commissione segue gli sviluppi da vicino e valuta la compatibilità della legislazione di tali paesi con l'acquis dell'UE.

La Commissione non prevede di proporre un divieto di diffondere la pornografia su Internet.

La tutela dei minori dall'esposizione a contenuti online nocivi rientra nella «Strategia europea per un'Internet migliore per i ragazzi», avviata dalla Commissione nel 2012 ([1]). Tra le misure efficaci figurano l'autoregolamentazione dell'industria, per sviluppare ad esempio meccanismi di segnalazione di contenuti nocivi e strumenti di controllo parentale. Inoltre, le attività di informazione per i minori e i genitori svolte in tutta Europa dai centri «Internet più sicuro» hanno contribuito in maniera rilevante alla sensibilizzazione attraverso la formazione e l'istruzione.

([1]) https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/node/286.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001728/13
to the Commission
Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)
(19 February 2013)

Subject: Putting an end to Internet pornography

In Iceland, a national consultation exercise has shown that a majority of people are in favour of a ban on disseminating pornography on the Internet. The government has therefore initiated an inquiry to decide on ways of banning access to pornography throughout the island to protect children. While our society is liberal and progressive with regard to sexuality — says the Minister of the Interior — our approach to the problem is not anti-sex but anti-violence. After the laws which have already been passed banning the printing of pornographic publications and ordering the closure of night clubs and topless bars, if the plan is carried out, Iceland will become the first country in the world to ban Internet pornography.

1. Does the Commission endorse the intention of the Government of Iceland?

2. If so, might the Commission not be prompted by this project to propose similar initiatives to protect minors in the EU?

3. Can the Commission assess the results, positive or otherwise, of action taken to date to protect children against pornographic violence disseminated over the Internet?

Answer given by Ms Kroes on behalf of the Commission
(3 May 2013)

The understanding of the Commission is that there is not yet any proposed draft legislation on tackling online pornography in Iceland. As with all candidate countries, the Commission follows developments closely and assesses the compatibility of the legislation of candidate countries with the Union's *acquis*.

The Commission has no plans to propose a ban on disseminating pornography on the Internet.

Protecting children from exposure to harmful content online is part of the strategy for a Better Internet for Children launched by the Commission in 2012 ([1]). Among effective approaches is industry self-regulation to e.g. develop reporting mechanisms for harmful content and parental control tools. In addition out-reach to children and parents across Europe through the Safer Internet centres have been instrumental to raise awareness via training and education.

([1]) https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/node/286.

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001729/13
a la Comisión
Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE)
(19 de febrero de 2013)

Asunto: Competitividad de la siderurgia

El sector de la siderurgia está sufriendo una fuerte crisis que está acarreando el cierre y la reestructuración de muchas empresas, incluso multinacionales, en muchos Estados miembros. Tal es el caso de ArcelorMittal.

En este sentido, el pasado 12 de febrero tuvo lugar una reunión de alto nivel en Bruselas para orientar el impulso al sector europeo del acero. Todas las partes competentes estuvieron presentes, desde la Comisión Europea —con varios de sus Comisarios al frente— hasta políticos de diversos estamentos, tales como gobernantes de Estados miembros, eurodiputados, empresarios y sindicatos.

Los participantes apostaron por conseguir un sector competitivo respetuoso del medio ambiente, frenar la deslocalización de las compañías, mantener el nivel de la producción anual y evitar las reestructuraciones empresariales.

La Comisión Europea tiene previsto adoptar un plan de acción sobre la siderurgia que puede basarse en las conclusiones de la reunión del pasado 12 de febrero.

En este sentido,

— ¿Podría indicar la Comisión cuáles han sido las conclusiones de dicha reunión?

— ¿Cómo se plasmarán dichas conclusiones en la propuesta de la Comisión? ¿Cuáles son las acciones que se van a emprender?

— ¿Tiene previsto la Comisión organizar o participar en alguna otra reunión de similares características?

Respuesta del Sr. Tajani en nombre de la Comisión
(9 de abril de 2013)

La Comisión coincide con Su Señoría en la importancia estratégica del sector del acero para la UE y comparte su preocupación por la difícil situación que dicho sector atraviesa, así como por las consecuencias sociales que podrían tener las operaciones de reestructuración. En este sentido, la Comisión está de acuerdo en que es importante evitar la deslocalización de las plantas siderúrgicas, garantizar la seguridad de la mano de obra y mejorar el equilibrio ecológico, y anima a las empresas y a todas las partes interesadas a tener en cuenta las necesidades de su capital humano y a gestionar la reestructuración de manera responsable desde un punto de vista social.

La tercera reunión tuvo lugar el 12 de febrero de 2013 y en ella se adoptó un conjunto definitivo de recomendaciones específicas para la Comisión. Los principales Estados miembros productores de acero han participado en este ejercicio como observadores junto a representantes del Parlamento. Las recomendaciones de la mesa redonda de alto nivel tienen carácter público ([1]).

La Comisión tiene previsto responder a dichas recomendaciones, a partir de junio de 2013, con un plan de acción para el sector del acero de la UE. Dicho plan de acción incluirá una estrategia a escala de la UE destinada a garantizar el establecimiento de las condiciones marco adecuadas. A continuación se enviará al Parlamento y al Consejo para que tomen las medidas oportunas. Para cada problema detectado se propondrán acciones específicas con medidas tanto a corto como a largo plazo.

([1]) http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/metals-minerals/files/high-level-roundtable-recommendations_en.pdf

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001729/13
to the Commission
Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE)
(19 February 2013)

Subject: Competitiveness of the steel industry

The steel industry is experiencing a severe crisis that is causing a large number of companies, including multinationals, to close down or undergo restructuring in many Member States; one such example is ArcelorMittal.

To discuss proposals for giving new impetus to the industry, a high-level meeting was held in Brussels on 12 February 2013. All competent parties were present; representatives from the Commission attended, including several Commissioners, as well as politicians from various political bodies, such as ministers from Member States and MEPs, and representatives from the steel sector and the unions.

The meeting participants recommended focusing on delivering a competitive and environmentally-friendly sector, halting the trend towards relocation, maintaining annual production levels and avoiding company restructuring.

The Commission intends to adopt a plan of action for the steel industry, which may be based on the conclusions reached at the meeting held on 12 February.

— Can the Commission say what conclusions were reached at that meeting?

— How will these conclusions be reflected in the Commission's proposal? What measureswill be introduced?

— Does the Commission intend to organise or take part in any similar meetings?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission
(9 April 2013)

The Commission shares the views of the Honourable Member with regard to the strategic importance of the steel industry for the EU. It is also concerned about the difficult situation of the steel sector as well as the social consequences that restructuring operations could bring. In this regard, the Commission agrees on the importance of preventing the relocation of steel plants, ensuring the security of the workforce and improving environmental performance, and it encourages companies and all stakeholders to anticipate their human capital needs and manage restructuring in a socially responsible way.

The third meeting took place on 12 February 2013 and adopted a final set of specific policy recommendations to the Commission. The most important steel producing Member States have participated in this exercise as observers alongside representatives of the Parliament. The recommendations of the High Level Roundtable are public ([1]).

The Commission plans to respond to these recommendations, by beginning of June 2013 through an Action Plan for the EU steel industry. The action plan will set up an EU-wide policy strategy aiming to ensure that the right framework conditions are in place. It will then be sent to the Parliament and the Council for appropriate action. For every challenge identified specific actions will be proposed with measures being either of a short or long term nature.

([1]) http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/metals-minerals/files/high-level-roundtable-recommendations_en.pdf

(Magyar változat)

Írásbeli választ igénylő kérdés P-001731/13
a Bizottság számára
Bánki Erik (PPE)
(2013. február 19.)

Tárgy: Európai lóhúsbotrány – Marhahúskészítmények lóhússal való szennyeződése az uniós élelmiszerláncon belül

Az élelmiszer-címkézési rendeletet az Európai Parlament 2011 júliusában fogadta el. A szabályozás célja az, hogy a fogyasztók megfelelő és pontos tájékoztatást kapjanak arról, hogy mit tesznek a kosarukba vásárláskor, pontosan mi kerül otthon az asztalra. A jogszabály szerint kötelező feltüntetni a származási országot a sertés-, marha-, bárány- és kecskehús, valamint a baromfi esetében is.

Ez a szabály viszont nem vonatkozik a feldolgozott húsokra, így a hamburgerre, lasagnára, egyéb feldolgozott húskészítményre. 2011-ben, az Élelmiszercímkézési Rendelet háromoldalú tárgyalásai során az EP tárgyalódelegációja felhívta a figyelmet a szabályozás hiányosságaira, ezért szerették volna, ha a feldolgozott húsok származási országának jelölése tekintetében is kötelező szabályozást fogadnak el. Ez azonban a végső szövegbe akkor nem került bele. Cserébe a Bizottság azt ígérte a Parlamentnek, hogy 2 éven belül készít egy jelentést arról, mivel járna, illetve, hogy egyáltalán indokolt-e, hogy a származási hely megjelölésének uniós jogszabályi kötelezettsége kiterjedjen a feldolgozott húsipari termékekre.

A február elején kipattant európai lóhúsbotrány rámutatott, hogy az európai élelmiszer-címkézés területén bizony még komoly hiányosságok vannak, mind a feldolgozott húsok élelmiszerláncban történő nyomon követését, mind a vásárlók tájékoztatását illetően.

Az élelmiszer-címkézési rendelet 2011-es elfogadása óta másfél év eltelt. Milyen stádiumban van a Bizottság ígért jelentése a feldolgozott húsokról?

Milyen intézkedésekkel, jogszabályi módosítással kívánja a Bizottság elkerülni a marhahúskészítménynek eladott lóhús-botrányához hasonló eseteket?

Tonio Borg válasza a Bizottság nevében
(2013. március 18.)

A Bizottság a fogyasztók élelmiszerekkel kapcsolatos tájékoztatásáról szóló 1169/2011/EU rendeletben ([1]) előírt 2013. december 13-i határidő előtt jelentést fog tenni a kötelező eredetmegjelölésnek az összetevőként felhasznált húsokra történő kiterjesztésének lehetőségéről. Ennek érdekében egy külső szerződéses megbízottat kértünk fel egy tanulmány ([2]) elkészítésére, 2013. júliusi határidővel. E tanulmány szolgál majd a jelentés alapjául. A jelentés figyelembe fogja venni a fogyasztók tájékoztatásának szükségességét, a származási ország vagy az eredet helye kötelező megjelölésének alkalmazhatóságát, valamint az ilyen intézkedések költség-haszon elemzését, a jogi következmények és a nemzetközi kereskedelemre gyakorolt hatás elemzését annak érdekében, hogy dönteni lehessen a megfelelő intézkedésekről.

A kötelező eredetmegjelölés nem szolgál eszközül arra, hogy megakadályozza a rosszindulatú gazdasági szereplők csalásait. A jelenlegi botrány megtörténhetett volna akkor is, ha a kérdéses élelmiszerek eredetmegjelölése kötelező lett volna. A megtévesztő gyakorlatok csak az uniós jogszabályok megfelelő végrehajtása által szüntethetők meg; elsősorban a megfelelő kockázatelemzésen alapuló rendszeres hatósági ellenőrzések és a hatékony visszatartó erejű szankciók révén.

Az élelmiszerbiztonsági jogszabályok átfogó rendszere uniós szinten már megvalósult, beleértve az állati eredetű élelmiszerek nyomonkövethetőségi követelményeit ([3]). Ennek a rendszernek köszönhető, hogy a szóban forgó csalások eredetét és mértékét gyorsan azonosítani lehetett.

([1]) A fogyasztók élelmiszerekkel kapcsolatos tájékoztatásáról, az 1924/2006/EK és az 1925/2006/EK európai parlamenti és tanácsi rendelet módosításáról és a 87/250/EGK bizottsági irányelv, a 90/496/EGK tanácsi irányelv, az 1999/10/EK bizottsági irányelv, a 2000/13/EK európai parlamenti és tanácsi irányelv, a 2002/67/EK és a 2008/5/EK bizottsági irányelv és a 608/2004/EK bizottsági rendelet hatályon kívül helyezéséről szóló, 2011. október 25-i 1169/2011/EU európai parlamenti és tanácsi rendeletben, HL L 304, 2011.11.22.

([2]) Tanulmány az élelmiszerek önkéntes eredetmegjelölésére, valamint a származási országnak vagy az eredet helyének kötelező feltüntetésére vonatkozó szabályok alkalmazásáról az összetevőként felhasznált húsokra vonatkozóan. A tanulmányt az élelmiszerlánc-értékelő konzorcium (Food Chain Evaluation Consortium, FCEC) Civic Consulting – Agra CEAS Consulting – Arcadia International – Van Dijk Management Consultants készíti.

([3]) A Bizottság 2011. szeptember 19-i 931/2011/EU végrehajtási rendelete a 178/2002/EK európai parlamenti és tanácsi rendeletnek az állati eredetű élelmiszerek nyomonkövethetőségével kapcsolatban megállapított követelményeiről, HL L 242., 2011.9.20.

(English version)

Question for written answer P-001731/13
to the Commission
Erik Bánki (PPE)
(19 February 2013)

Subject: European horsemeat scandal — contamination of beef products with horsemeat within the EU food chain

In July 2011, the European Parliament approved the regulation on food labelling. The aim of the legislation was to ensure that consumers received appropriate and accurate information as to what they were putting in their shopping baskets and on the table at home. According to the legislation, it is mandatory to indicate the country of origin of pork, beef, lamb, goat's meat and poultry-meat as well.

However, this rule does not apply to processed meat, such as hamburgers, lasagne, etc. In 2011, during the trialogue concerning the regulation on food labelling, the EP delegation drew attention to the inadequacy of the provisions, and therefore expressed the wish for indication of the country of origin of processed meat to be made compulsory too. However, this was not included in the ultimate text. In return, the Commission promised Parliament that it would draw up a report within two years on the possibility of extending compulsory origin labelling under EC law to processed meat products, and whether this was indeed justified at all.

The European horsemeat scandal which emerged at the beginning of February has shown that European food labelling is still seriously deficient, as regards both tracing of processed meat products in the food chain and the information provided to purchasers.

Since the adoption of the regulation on food labelling in 2011, a year and a half has passed. What stage has the report concerning processed meat which was promised by the Commission reached?

By means of what measures, particularly legislative amendments, will the Commission prevent any similar occurrence to the scandal of horsemeat being sold as beef products?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission
(18 March 2013)

The Commission will present the report on the possibility to extend mandatory origin labelling to meat used as an ingredient before the deadline of 13 December 2013 required by Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 on the provision of food information to consumers ([1]). To this effect, an external contractor has been engaged to conduct a study ([2]) which is to be concluded by July 2013. This study will provide the basis for the report. The report will take into account the need of the consumer to be informed, the feasibility of providing the mandatory indication of the country of origin or place of provenance as well as a cost-benefit analysis of such measures, along with an analysis of the legal impact and impact on international trade in order to decide the appropriate course of action.

Mandatory origin labelling is not a tool to prevent fraud by malicious operators. The present scandal could have occurred even if origin labelling was mandatory for the foods in question. Only appropriate enforcement of EU legislation can eliminate deceptive practices; mainly by means of regular official controls based on appropriate risk analysis and the imposition of effective dissuasive sanctions.

A comprehensive system of food safety rules is already in place at Union level, including traceability requirements for foods of animal origin ([3]). It is because of this system that the origin and extent of the fraudulent actions in question were quickly identified.

([1]) Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 of the Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on the provision of food information to consumers, amending Regulations (EC) No 1924/2006 and (EC) No 1925/2006 of the Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Commission Directive 87/250/EEC, Council Directive 90/496/EEC, Commission Directive 1999/10/EC, Directive 2000/13/EC of the Parliament and of the Council, Commission Directives 2002/67/EC and 2008/5/EC and Commission Regulation (EC) No 608/2004 OJ L 304, 22.11.2011.

([2]) Study on the application of rules on voluntary origin labelling of foods and on the mandatory indication of country of origin or place of provenance of meat used as an ingredient, conducted by Food Chain Evaluation Consortium (FCEC) Civic Consulting — Agra CEAS Consulting-Arcadia International — Van Dijk Management Consultants.

([3]) Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 931/2011 of 19 September 2011 on the traceability requirements set by Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the Parliament and of the Council for food of animal origin, OJ L 242, 20.9.2011.

(Magyar változat)

Írásbeli választ igénylő kérdés E-001734/13
a Bizottság számára
Bánki Erik (PPE)
(2013. február 19.)

Tárgy: Egységes Európai Égbolt (SESII) és annak jövője

Az egységes égbolttal foglalkozó bizottság (Single Sky Committee) a 2012 decemberében megtartott konferenciáján tárgyalta a teljesítmény- és a díjszámítási rendeletek módosításait, azonban nem született megegyezés a Bizottság és a tagállamok között, így február 5-én ad hoc ülésre került sor. A rendeletmódosításokról szóló szavazást a Bizottság azonban ismét kénytelen volt elhalasztani a március 7–8. közötti ülésre. Az ok főleg az, hogy nem sikerült megegyezni a tagállamok által korábban javasolt módosításokról. Emiatt újabb konzultációt kívánnak folytatni a légtérfelhasználókkal és társintézményekkel, a következő módosítási javaslat előtt.

A fentiekre való tekintettel, az alábbi fontos kérdések merülnek fel: Mik a Bizottság voltaképpeni rövid- és középtávú SES céljai?

Melyek azok az eszközök, amelyek a Bizottság véleménye szerint hiányoznak a célok eléréséhez?

Hogyan fognak ezek az eszközök megjelenni a jogalkotásban?

Siim Kallas válasza a Bizottság nevében
(2013. április 10.)

A Bizottság tájékoztatja a tisztelt képviselő urat, hogy az egységes égbolttal foglalkozó bizottság (Single Sky Committee) 2013. március 8-án a vizsgálati eljárás keretében a teljesítményről és a díjfelszámításról szóló felülvizsgált rendeleteket kedvezően véleményezte, miután kisebb, technikai jellegű módosításokra került sor a végleges szövegekben.

A Bizottság ezután el fogja fogadni a felülvizsgált rendeleteket, amelyek bizottsági végrehajtási rendeletek, és a Hivatalos Lapban való kihirdetésüket követően lépnek hatályba.

Az új rendeletek fontos lépést jelentenek annak a jogi keretnek a módosításában, amelyben az egységes európai égbolt teljesítményrendszere a második referenciaidőszak alatt (RP2) – 2015 és 2019 között – működni fog.

A rendeletek elfogadását követően első alkalommal kerül sor kötelező érvényű teljesítménycélok elfogadására az egységes európai égbolt teljesítményrendszerének mind a négy, teljesítmény szempontjából kulcsfontosságú területén, vagyis a biztonság, a kapacitás, a környezetvédelem és a költséghatékonyság terén. A rendszer továbbá a léginavigációs szolgáltatásoknak a repülőtéri műveleteket és az útvonalrepülést is magában foglaló teljes láncolatát érintő, úgynevezett „kaputól kapuig” megközelítés keretében fogja növelni a teljesítményt.

A felülvizsgált rendeletek jelentős előrelépést fognak jelenteni a meglévő jogi kerethez képest, különösen az átláthatóság és a légtérfelhasználókra hárított költségek ellenőrzésének területén.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001734/13
to the Commission
Erik Bánki (PPE)
(19 February 2013)

Subject: The Single European Sky (SESII) and its future

At the conference in December 2012, the committee dealing with the Single European Sky (Single Sky Committee) debated changes to the performance and charging regulations, but no agreement was reached between the Commission and the Member States, so on 5 February an ad hoc meeting was held. However, the Committee was again compelled to postpone the vote on the changes to the schemes, this time till the meeting on 7 and 8 March. The main reason was that it did not prove possible to agree on the changes previously recommended by the Member States. Accordingly, there are plans to hold fresh consultations with airspace users and stakeholder organisations before the next amending proposal.

This gives rise to the following important questions.

What are the Commission's actual short- and medium-term objectives?

In the Commission's opinion, what instruments are lacking with a view to attaining the objectives?

What form will these instruments take in legislation?

Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission
(10 April 2013)

The Commission would like to inform the Honourable Member that the Single Sky Committee gave on 8 March 2013 a positive opinion under the examination procedure on the revised performance and charging regulations after few minor technical modifications were introduced into the final texts.

The Commission will now proceed with the adoption of the revised regulations, which are Commission implementing regulations and which will enter into force after publication in the Official Journal.

The new regulations constitute an important step in revising the legal framework under which the SES performance scheme will operate during the second reference period, RP2, from 2015 to 2019.

Once adopted, binding performance targets will be set for the first time in all four key performance areas of the SES performance scheme, namely Safety, Environment, Capacity and Cost-Efficiency. Furthermore, the scheme will improve performance in a so-called 'gate-to-gate' approach covering the entire chain of air navigation services in the terminal and the en-route area.

The revised regulations will entail some significant improvements as compared to the existing legal framework, in particular on transparency and control of costs charged to airspace users.

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001735/13
a la Comisión
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)
(19 de febrero de 2013)

Asunto: Pequeños frutos

La producción de productos agroalimentarios incluidos en el Anexo 1, como es el caso de pequeños frutos, es una actividad excluida del marco de aplicación de la medida 123, de acuerdo con el Reglamento comunitario (CE) n° 1698/2005 de ayudas cofinanciadas por el Feader y el Reglamento (CE) n° 1974/2006 de aplicación del anterior, que regulan las medidas y actuaciones de las regiones europeas.

Esto hace que los pequeños productores de frutos silvestres y frutas del bosque tengan dificultades para hacer rentable su negocio.

Esto es así porque normalmente son pequeñas empresas situadas en territorios montañosos, con poca población y poca actividad económica.

¿No cree la Comisión que los procesos de transformación y producción de frutos silvestres y frutas del bosque deberían estar incluidos en la lista de actividades con ayudas cofinanciadas?

Respuesta del Sr. Cioloş en nombre de la Comisión
(5 de abril de 2013)

La producción y transformación de frutos silvestres y frutas del bosque son actividades subvencionables al amparo del Fondo Europeo Agrícola de Desarrollo Rural (Feader), según las normas previstas en el Reglamento (CE) n° 1698/2005 del Consejo ([1]), pues se trata de productos del anexo I.

La producción y transformación de productos del anexo I pueden recibir ayuda tanto a través de la medida 123 como de la medida 121 (artículos 28 y 26, respectivamente, del Reglamento del Feader). La principal diferencia entre esas dos medidas es el tipo de beneficiario. En el caso de la medida de «Modernización de las explotaciones agrícolas» (medida 121), los beneficiarios son los agricultores que obtienen productos del anexo I; en el del artículo 28 (medida 123), las pequeñas y medianas empresas que transforman productos del anexo I.

([1]) DO L 277 de 21.10.2005.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001735/13
to the Commission
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)
(19 February 2013)

Subject: Small fruit

In accordance with Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 concerning expenditure co-financed by the EAFRD and Commission Regulation (EC) No 1974/2006 laying down detailed rules for the application of Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005, both of which govern measures and actions taken by European regions, the production of any of the food and agricultural products (such as small fruit) listed in Annex I to the Treaty establishing the European Community does not fall within the scope of Measure 123.

As a result small producers of wild and forest fruits, most of whom are located in sparsely populated and economically underdeveloped mountainous areas, are finding it difficult to make their businesses profitable.

Does the Commission not agree that the production and processing of wild and forest fruits should be included in the list of activities eligible for co-funding?

Answer given by Mr Cioloş on behalf of the Commission
(5 April 2013)

Production and processing of wild and forest fruit are eligible activities under European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), which is provided for under Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 ([1]), as these qualify as Annex I products.

Production and processing of Annex I products can be supported under both investment measures 123 and 121 (Articles 28 and 26 respectively of the EAFRD Regulation). The main difference between the two measures is the type of beneficiary. In the case of 'Modernization of agricultural holdings' (measure 121), farmers producing Annex I products shall be targeted; on the other hand, eligible beneficiaries under Article 28 (measure 123) shall be small and medium enterprises processing Annex I products.

([1]) OJ L 277, 21.10.2005.

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001736/13
a la Comisión
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)
(19 de febrero de 2013)

Asunto: Competencia en el sector bancario

El Estado español ha vivido los últimos años un gran proceso de concentración bancaria, en buena parte debido a la crisis y la desaparición de las cajas de ahorros.

En la actualidad siguen funcionando 12 entidades bancarias, aunque algunas de ellas han sido nacionalizadas y serán subastadas en los próximos meses y años ([1]). Esta misma visión tiene el presidente del banco BBVA que cuenta con un 12,5 % de la cuota de mercado en el Estado español y espera que haya en los próximos años nuevas operaciones de concentración en el sector hasta que sólo queden 6 ó 7 entidades ([2]).

A la luz de lo anterior,

1. ¿Comparte la Comisión esta previsión según la cual sólo existirán 6 ó 7 entidades en el sector bancario español?

2. ¿Cree la Comisión que tal reducción de la competencia puede ser perjudicial para los consumidores?

3. ¿Qué medidas cree la Comisión que serían necesarias para aumentar el número de entidades existentes y así mejorar la competencia? ¿Qué medidas propone para facilitar la aparición de nuevas entidades en el sector bancario español?

Respuesta del Sr. Barnier en nombre de la Comisión
(16 de abril de 2013)

La Comisión no tiene una opinión sobre cuántas entidades bancarias distintas operarán en el mercado español en el futuro. Aunque la reducción de la competencia es perjudicial para los consumidores, la Comisión señala que un menor número de agentes económicos en un mercado determinado no significa automáticamente un menor grado de competencia.

El papel de la Comisión en virtud de las normas sobre competencia se limita a garantizar que las ayudas estatales concedidas a las entidades bancarias no falseen indebidamente la competencia. A este respecto, la Comisión ha estudiado detenidamente los planes de reestructuración o liquidación de los bancos españoles que se han acogido a ayudas estatales. En virtud de las normas sobre concentraciones, la Comisión o la autoridad nacional de competencia pueden bloquear las concentraciones que pudieran obstaculizar de forma importante una competencia efectiva. La autoridad nacional de competencia o la Comisión también pueden tratar los posibles casos de acuerdos ilegales entre empresas que restrinjan la competencia o los abusos de posición dominante. Sin embargo, la mera reducción del número de agentes económicos presentes en el mercado bancario español no es un asunto que entre en el ámbito de aplicación de las normas sobre competencia del Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea.

([1]) http://www.expansion.com/2012/06/18/empresas/banca/1340020056.html
([2]) http://economia.elpais.com/economia/2013/02/18/actualidad/1361191005_676610.html

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001736/13
to the Commission
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)
(19 February 2013)

Subject: Competition in the banking sector

In recent years Spain has seen a long-drawn out process of concentration in the banking sector, principally as a result of the crisis and the demise of its savings banks (*cajas*).

Twelve banking institutions are still operating in Spain, although some of them have been nationalised and will be put up for auction in the coming months and years ([1]). The CEO of the bank BBVA, which has a market share of 12.5% in Spain, sees things in a similar light, and hopes to see a further concentration of market until there are only six or seven banking institutions in the country ([2]).

1. Does the Commission also expect there to be only six or seven banks in Spain in the future?

2. Does the Commission think that such a reduction in competition could put consumers at a disadvantage?

3. What measures does the Commission think will be necessary to increase the number of market players and thereby increase competition? What measures does it propose to increase the number of institutions in the Spanish banking sector?

Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission
(16 April 2013)

The Commission does not have a view on how many different banks will be operating on the Spanish market in the future. While reduced competition is harmful for consumers, the Commission notes that fewer players in a certain market does not automatically mean a reduced level of competition.

The role of the Commission under competition rules is limited to ensuring that state aid granted to banks does not unduly distort competition; in this respect the Commission has carefully scrutinised the restructuring or liquidation plans of the Spanish banks which benefitted from state aid. Under merger rules the Commission or the national competition authority can block mergers which would significantly impede effective competition. Possible cases of illegal agreements between undertakings which restrict competition or abuses of a dominant position can also be tackled by the national competition authority or the Commission. However, the mere reduction of the number of players active on the Spanish banking market is not an issue falling under the competition rules of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

([1]) http://www.expansion.com/2012/06/18/empresas/banca/1340020056.html
([2]) http://economia.elpais.com/economia/2013/02/18/actualidad/1361191005_676610.html

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-001737/13
προς την Επιτροπή
Nikos Chrysogelos (Verts/ALE)
(19 Φεβρουαρίου 2013)

Θέμα: Κατάργηση της Ειδικής Υπηρεσίας για την Κοινωνική Ένταξη και την Κοινωνική Οικονομία στο Υπουργείο Εργασίας

Ο νόμος 4019/2011 για την κοινωνική οικονομία γέννησε προσδοκίες κι επιτάχυνε τις προσπάθειες δημιουργίας κοινωνικών συνεταιριστικών επιχειρήσεων. Όμως, με το φορολογικό που ψηφίστηκε αρχές Ιανουαρίου 2013 από την ελληνική Βουλή, καταργήθηκε «η παράγραφος 3 του άρθρου 10 του ν. 4019/2011 (Α' 216)», που θέσπιζε ειδικές φορολογικές ελαφρύνσεις για τις Κοινωνικές Συνεταιριστικές Επιχειρήσεις, σε μια προσπάθεια ενθάρρυνσης τέτοιων οικονομικών δραστηριοτήτων.

Την Παρασκευή 15.2.2013 ανακοινώθηκε και η κατάργηση της Ειδικής Υπηρεσίας του Υπουργείου Εργασίας για την Κοινωνική Ένταξη και την Κοινωνική Οικονομία (ΕΥΚΕΚΟ), στο πλαίσιο της δραστικής μείωσης του δημόσιου τομέα. Σύμφωνα με πληροφορίες, οι αρμοδιότητές της μεταφέρονται εξ ολοκλήρου στην κεντρική υπηρεσία του Υπουργείου. Η ΕΥΚΕΚΟ σχεδίαζε σειρά ενημερωτικών δράσεων, ενώ προσπαθούσε να επιλύσει γραφειοκρατικά εμπόδια και προβλήματα που αντιμετωπίζουν, ήδη από το ξεκίνημά τους, πολλές πρωτοβουλίες κοινωνικών επιχειρήσεων (δημιουργία μητρώου, αποσαφήνιση ασφαλιστικού και φορολογικού καθεστώτος, προϋποθέσεις έναρξης, χρηματοδοτήσεις κ.ά.).

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

— Η επιλογή της συγκεκριμένης υπηρεσίας έγινε κατόπιν υπόδειξης και απαίτησης της Ευρωπαϊκής Επιτροπής που έχει αποτυπωθεί σε συμφωνία μεταξύ του Επιτρόπου Andor και των πρώην Υπουργών Εργασίας κυρίας Κατσέλη και κυρίου Κουτρουμάνη ([1]); Είναι σε γνώση της Επιτροπής οι επιλογές της κυβέρνησης για κατάργηση της συγκεκριμένης υπηρεσίας που έχει υποδειχθεί ως αρμόδια από την Επιτροπή; Συμφωνεί ο εκπρόσωπός της στην τρόικα με την κατάργηση της Ειδικής αυτής Υπηρεσίας;

— Κρίνει ότι η κατάργηση της υπηρεσίας συνεισφέρει στην ενίσχυση της αποτελεσματικότητας της διοίκησης και των αναγκαίων μεταρρυθμίσεων, τη στιγμή που η Ειδική αυτή Υπηρεσία είχε ως αντικείμενο την ανάπτυξη της κοινωνικής οικονομίας και της κοινωνικής επιχειρηματικότητας και προσπαθούσε να άρει τα εμπόδια και να περιορίσει την έλλειψη συνεννόησης μεταξύ των εμπλεκόμενων υπουργείων και υπηρεσιών;

— Ποιο είναι το μέχρι τώρα ποσοστό απορρόφησης των ευρωπαϊκών πόρων που έχουν δεσμευτεί για την ενίσχυση της κοινωνικής οικονομίας στην Ελλάδα;

Απάντηση του κ. Rehn εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(27 Μαΐου 2013)

Για λόγους αρχής, η Επιτροπή δεν εμπλέκεται στην αναδιοργάνωση των εθνικών υπουργείων.

1. Η Επιτροπή δεν έχει ενημερωθεί για την κατάργηση της συγκεκριμένης υπηρεσίας, η οποία δημιουργήθηκε αρχικά μετά από πρωτοβουλία των ελληνικών αρχών στις αρχές της περιόδου προγραμματισμού 2007-2013 για την ενσωμάτωση των αρχών του προγράμματος EQUAL. Αργότερα, εκ νέου μετά από πρωτοβουλία των ελληνικών αρχών επελέγη η υπηρεσία αυτή για τη διαχείριση της κοινωνικής ένταξης και της κοινωνικής οικονομίας.

2. Η Επιτροπή θεωρεί ότι η ανάπτυξη της κοινωνικής οικονομίας, που αποτελεί νέο τομέα της ελληνικής οικονομίας, χρειάζεται ισχυρή διαχείριση, καθοδήγηση και παρακολούθηση. Αρμόδιες για τη διασφάλιση αυτού του ποιοτικού πλαισίου είναι οι ελληνικές αρχές.

3. Οι δράσεις στο πλαίσιο της κοινωνικής οικονομίας δεν έχουν ακόμα δρομολογηθεί. Επομένως, η απορρόφηση περιορίζεται σε προπαρασκευαστικές δράσεις με χαρακτήρα τεχνικής συνδρομής.

([1]) Συνημμένη Επιστολή Πανελλήνιου Συλλόγου Εργαζομένων ΜΟΔ-ΕΣΠΑ με αρ. πρωτ. 1124 προς τον Υπουργό Εργασίας.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001737/13
to the Commission
Nikos Chrysogelos (Verts/ALE)
(19 February 2013)

Subject: Abolition of special Employment Ministry unit responsible for social inclusion and the social economy

Law 4019/2011 concerning the social economy has given rise to great expectations and boosted efforts to introduce social cooperatives. However, at the beginning of January 2013, the Greek Parliament adopted tax legislation revoking Article 10(3) of the above law introducing special tax concessions for social cooperatives in a bid to encourage their activities.

On Friday, 15 February 2013, it was announced that the special Employment Ministry unit responsible for social integration and the social economy was to be wound up following drastic public sector cut-backs, all of its tasks to be reassigned to central Ministry departments. The unit had planned to take a number of measures (provision of registers, insurance and tax guidance, business launch and funding advice, etc) in a bid to make information available and resolve the bureaucratic obstacles and problems being encountered by numerous embryonic social organisations.

1. Was this particular service selected on the recommendation or demand of the Commission as embodied in the agreement between Commissioner Andor and Ms Katseli and Mr Koutroumanis, the former Ministers for Employment ([1])? Is the Commission aware of the government decision to abolish a service to which it had given its endorsement? Does its Troika representative agree with the decision?

2. Does it consider that the abolition of this service, the objective of which was to develop a social economy and social business practices, remove obstacles and improve communication between the ministries and departments involved, will do anything to enhance administrative efficiency and bring about the necessary reforms?

3. What has been the take-up to date of European funding earmarked for development of the social economy in Greece?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission
(27 May 2013)

As a matter of principle, the Commission is not involved in the reorganisation of national ministries.

1. The Commission is not aware of the abolition of this particular service, which was initially created on the initiative of the Greek authorities at the beginning of the 2007-2013 programming period for mainstreaming the principles of EQUAL. Later on, again on the initiative of the Greek authorities, it was selected to manage social integration and the social economy.

2. The Commission considers that the development of social economy, being a new sector in the Greek economy, merits a solid management, guidance and monitoring. The competence of ensuring such a qualitative setup lies with the Greek authorities.

3. Actions under social economy have not been launched yet; therefore, take-up is limited to preparatory actions of technical assistance nature.

([1]) Enclosed letter from the Panhellenic Association of MOD-NSRF Employees to the Minister for Employment (Ref 1124).

(Svensk version)

Frågor för skriftligt besvarande E-001738/13
till kommissionen
Amelia Andersdotter (Verts/ALE)
(19 februari 2013)

Angående: Cyberincidenter samt nät- och informationssäkerhetsincidenter

I arbetsdokumentet från kommissionens avdelningar av den 7 februari 2013, som innehåller en konsekvensanalys av direktivförslaget för nät- och informationssäkerhet (SWD(2013)0032), ger kommissionen i första avsnittet om tillämpningsområde (Scope) en definition av nät- och informationssäkerhet, som baseras på artikel 4c i förordning (EG) nr 460/2004 om inrättandet av den europeiska byrån för nät- och informationssäkerhet.

Därefter talar kommissionen konsekvent om nät- och informationssäkerhetsincidenter (troligtvis i fall där förmågan hos ett nät eller informationssystem, som den definieras i artikel 4c, äventyras) fram till sidan 14 i dokumentet, där termen *cyberincidenter* introduceras efter en sammanfattning av svaren från det offentliga samrådet om nät- och informationssäkerhetsincidenter. Det står att även den mänskliga faktorn eller okunnighet kan orsaka cyberincidenter om de leder till olyckshändelser ("human error or ignorance can also be the cause of cyber incidents by leading to accidental events").

Betyder detta att termerna *cyberincident* och *nät- och informationssäkerhetsincident* motsvarar varandra i kommissionens ögon?

Svar från Neelie Kroes på kommissionens vägnar
(9 april 2013)

Begreppet nät- och informationssäkerhet definierades i lagstiftningen i förordning (EG) nr 460/2004 om inrättandet av den europeiska byrån för nät- och informationssäkerhet. "Nät- och informationssäkerhetsincidenter" enligt kommissionens förslag till direktiv om nät- och informationssäkerhet (KOM(2013) 48) omfattar generellt en omständighet eller händelse som har en faktisk negativ inverkan på säkerheten hos datorer och nät. "Cyberincidenter" är ett allmänt begrepp som ofta används i pressen för att beskriva incidenter som påverkar IT-säkerheten. De båda begreppen används omväxlande i konsekvensanalysen.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001738/13
to the Commission
Amelia Andersdotter (Verts/ALE)
(19 February 2013)

Subject: Cyber incidents and network and information security (NIS) incidents

In the staff working document of 7 February 2013 containing its impact assessment of the proposal for a directive on network and information security (SWD(2013)0032), the Commission, in Section 1 ('Scope'), offers a definition of 'network and information security' (NIS) grounded in Article 4(c) of Regulation (EC) No 460/2004 establishing the European Network and Information Security Agency.

The Commission then consistently refers to 'NIS incidents' (presumably instances where the abilities of networks or information systems as defined by that same Article 4(c) are compromised), up to page 14 of the document, where the term 'cyber incidents' is introduced following a summary of the responses to the public consultation held on NIS incidents. The exact wording is: 'human error or ignorance can also be the cause of cyber incidents by leading to accidental events'.

Does this mean that 'cyber incidents' and 'NIS incidents' are equivalent as far as the Commission is concerned?

Answer given by Ms Kroes on behalf of the Commission
(9 April 2013)

The concept of network and information security ('NIS') was legally defined under Regulation (EC) No 460/2004 establishing the European Network and Information Security Agency. 'NIS incidents' as defined in the Commission's proposal for a directive on network and information security (COM(2013) 48), covers generally any circumstance or event having an actual adverse effect on the security of computers and networks. 'Cyber incidents' is a general concept often used in the press to describe incidents affecting cyber security. The two concepts are used interchangeably in the impact assessment.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-001739/13
an die Kommission
Jutta Steinruck (S&D)
(19. Februar 2013)

Betrifft: Veränderte Arbeitsbedingungen durch Umstrukturierung

Im Zuge von Restrukturierungen sind seit 2008 EU-weit ca. 1,8 Millionen Erwerbstätige entlassen worden. Für die verbliebenen Beschäftigten bedeutet dies eine Zunahme der Arbeitsintensität. Laut einer aktuellen Studie von Eurofund beklagen über die Hälfte der Betroffenen einen sehr engen Zeitrahmen und damit verbunden ein hohes Arbeitstempo. Arbeitnehmerinnen und Arbeitnehmer in restrukturierten Betrieben sind mit ihrer Work — Life — Balance nicht zufrieden und leiden häufiger unter gesundheitlichen Einschränkungen und psychischen Problemen als Arbeitnehmerinnen und Arbeitnehmer in Unternehmen, die nicht von Restrukturierungen betroffen sind.

Diese Entwicklung ist auch Folge einer Arbeitsmarktpolitik, die auf leichte Einstellungen und leichte Entlassungen setzt („external flexicurity model").

1. Ist sich die Kommission dieser Entwicklung im Zusammenhang mit Restrukturierungen von Unternehmen bewusst?

2. Was möchte die Kommission gegen die zunehmende Belastung der Arbeitnehmerinnen und Arbeitnehmer unternehmen?

3. Was möchte die Kommission unternehmen, um zukünftige Umstrukturierungen sozialer zu gestalten?

4. Wird die Kommission den Empfehlungen des Cercas-Berichts folgen und einen Vorschlag für einen Rechtsakt über Unterrichtung und Anhörung von Arbeitnehmern, Antizipation und Management von Umstrukturierungen unterbreiten, der diese Befunde berücksichtigt?

Antwort von Herrn Andor im Namen der Kommission
(18. April 2013)

1. Die Kommission ist sich der potenziell negativen Auswirkungen von Umstrukturierung auf die entlassenen und die verbliebenen Arbeitnehmer wohl bewusst und befürwortet eine frühe Vorbereitung, um die sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Folgen auf ein Mindestmaß zu begrenzen.

2. Die Frau Abgeordnete wird auf die Antworten der Kommission auf folgende schriftliche Anfragen verwiesen: E-010378/2011, E-009623/2011, E-007973/2012, E-008839/2012, E-09561/2012 und E-011207/2012. Sie beziehen sich auf eine Studie zur psychischen Gesundheit am Arbeitsplatz in der EU und in den EWR-/EFTA-Ländern sowie auf den Entwurf von Leitlinien, die derzeit vorbereitet werden, und die sich mit den Auswirkungen von Umstrukturierungen auf Unternehmensebene auf die psychische Gesundheit von Arbeitnehmern beschäftigen. Die für Mitte 2014 erwarteten Ergebnisse werden in angemessener Weise berücksichtigt.

3. Die Kommission ist nicht befugt, in die Entscheidungen der Unternehmen bezüglich Umstrukturierungen oder Schließungen von Unternehmen in Europa einzugreifen. Allerdings legen EU-Rechtsvorschriften ([1]) fest, dass vor Entscheidungen, die Massenentlassungen betreffen, die Arbeitnehmervertreter zu unterrichten und zu konsultieren sind. Solche Konsultationen umfassen Wege zur Vermeidung von Entlassungen, zur Reduzierungen ihrer Zahl sowie zur Abmilderung der Folgen durch begleitende soziale Maßnahmen. Die Kommission fordert alle Interessenträger auf, Umstrukturierungen in einer sozial verantwortlichen Art und Weise vorzubereiten und abzuwickeln und verweist auf den Orientierungsleitfaden für die Bewältigung des Wandels und dessen soziale Konsequenzen ([2]) der Sozialpartner und auf die Checkliste für Umstrukturierungsprozesse ([3]) der Kommission.

([1]) Insbesondere die Richtlinie 98/59/EG des Rates vom 20. Juli 1998 zur Angleichung der Rechtsvorschriften der Mitgliedstaaten über Massenentlassungen, ABl. L 225 vom 12.8.1998.
([2]) UNICE/UEAPME, CEEP und ETUC (November 2003), unter: http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=2750&langId=en
([3]) Europäische Kommission (2009), unter: http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=2741&langId=en

4. Im Anschluss an das Grünbuch ([4]) und die Annahme des Cercas-Berichts stellt die Kommission Überlegungen an, wie eine umfassende Beachtung bewährter Verfahren im Bereich der Umstrukturierung und der Antizipierung des Wandels am besten zu fördern wäre. Sie wird dem Parlament über die geplanten Maßnahmen in diesem Zusammenhang Bericht erstatten.

([4]) KOM(2012)7 endg. vom 17. Januar 2012.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001739/13
to the Commission
Jutta Steinruck (S&D)
(19 February 2013)

Subject: Changes in working conditions due to restructuring

As a result of restructuring operations, some 1.8 million people have been made redundant in the EU since 2008. For the employees who remain, this means that they are having to work more intensively. According to a recent study by Eurofund, more than half of them are complaining about very short deadlines and the related problem of having to work fast. Employees in businesses that have been restructured are not satisfied with their work-life balance, and there is a higher incidence of health complaints and psychological problems among them than among employees of businesses which have not undergone restructuring.

This trend is also due to a labour market policy geared to making it easy to recruit and dismiss employees (the 'external flexicurity model').

1. Is the Commission aware of this trend associated with business restructuring?

2. What will the Commission do to combat the increasingly stressful working conditions of employees?

3. What will the Commission do to ensure that future restructuring operations are carried out in a manner less harsh to employees?

4. Will the Commission adhere to the recommendations made in the Cercas Report and submit a proposal for legislation on informing and consulting employees and on anticipation and management of restructuring, taking these findings into account?

Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission
(18 April 2013)

1. The Commission is aware of the potential negative impact of restructuring on the employees made redundant and those who remain, and encourages early preparation to reduce the social and economic consequences to a minimum.

2. It would refer the Honourable Member to its answers to written questions E-010378/2011, E-009623/2011, E-007973/2012, E-008839/2012, E-09561/2012 and E-011207/2012. These relate to a study of mental health in the workplace in the EU and EEA/EFTA countries and the drafting of a guidance document, which are currently under way and will cover the implications of restructuring at company level for employees' mental health. The results will be available by mid-2014 and will be duly taken into consideration.

3. The Commission has no power to interfere in company decisions involving restructuring or plant closures in Europe. However, EC law ([1]) provides that employers are to inform and consult employees' representatives before deciding to carry out collective redundancies. Such consultation covers ways of avoiding redundancies, reducing their number and mitigating the consequences through accompanying social measures. The Commission urges all stakeholders to anticipate and manage restructuring in a socially responsible way and draws attention to the social partners' Orientations for reference in managing change and its social consequences ([2]) and the Commission's Checklist on Restructuring Processes ([3]).

4. Following the Green Paper ([4]) and the adoption of the Cercas Report, the Commission is considering how to encourage wide observance of best practice in the field of restructuring and anticipation of change. It will inform Parliament of the action it intends taking in response to its request.

([1]) In particular, Council Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies, OJ L 225, 12.8.1998.
([2]) UNICE/UEAPME, CEEP and ETUC (November 2003), at: http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=2750&langId=en.
([3]) European Commission (2009), at: http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=2741&langId=en.
([4]) COM(2012) 7 final of 17 January 2012.

(Wersja polska)

Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-001740/13
do Komisji (Wiceprzewodniczącej/Wysokiej Przedstawiciel)
Adam Bielan (ECR)
(19 lutego 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Wiceprzewodnicząca/Wysoka Przedstawiciel – Projekty wspierane przez UE w Egipcie

2 lata po protestach na placu Tahrir, które doprowadziły do zmiany politycznej w Egipcie, zwracam się z prośbą do Wysokiej Przedstawiciel o następujące informacje:

1. Jaka kwota wsparcia została od 2011 r. przekazana przez UE dla Egiptu?

2. Na jakie projekty zostały przekazane fundusze wsparcia?

3. W jaki sposób Unia Europejska oraz Europejska Służba Działań Zewnętrznych angażują się obecnie w budowę demokratycznego państwa prawa w Egipcie?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Štefana Fülego w imieniu Komisji
(4 czerwca 2013 r.)

Ogólna kwota dwustronnej pomocy finansowej UE dla Egiptu (449 mln EUR) nie uległa zmianie w latach 2011-2013. W następstwie rewolucji w styczniu 2011 r. dostosowano jednak główny kierunek współpracy, tak by wyjść naprzeciw aspiracjom obywateli do demokracji, wyższego poziomu zatrudnienia i lepszych warunków życia.

W 2012 r. UE finansowała programy wspierające tworzenie miejsc pracy (70 mln EUR), kształcenie techniczne i zawodowe (50 mln EUR) oraz gospodarkę wodną i kanalizacyjną (10 mln EUR). Wszystkie te programy mają bezpośredni wpływ na ludność Egiptu, szczególnie na młodzież i bezrobotnych. W 2013 r. planowane są programy o podobnych celach, np. w zakresie gospodarowania odpadami stałymi, rolnictwa i rozwoju obszarów wiejskich.

Jeśli chodzi o wsparcie UE dla procesu demokratyzacji w Egipcie, poza regularnymi spotkaniami na najwyższym szczeblu politycznym i kierowniczym, będącymi źródłem wyraźnych sygnałów dotyczących praw człowieka i wartości demokratycznych, UE – w szczególności delegatura UE w Kairze – intensyfikowała swój dialog ze społeczeństwem obywatelskim. Organizowane są regularne spotkania, a UE zaobserwowała, że biorą w nich udział coraz liczniejsze różnorodne organizacje społeczeństwa obywatelskiego. UE odnotowała także rosnące zapotrzebowanie Egiptu na pomoc unijną. Zintensyfikowanemu dialogowi towarzyszy pomoc finansowa opiewająca na bezprecedensową kwotę 35 mln EUR przekazaną przez UE organizacjom społeczeństwa obywatelskiego od momentu zrywu ludności w styczniu 2011 r.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001740/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Adam Bielan (ECR)
(19 February 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — EU-supported projects in Egypt

It is two years since the protests in Tahrir Square which brought about political change in Egypt. Could the High Representative answer the following questions:

1. What amount of support has the EU provided to Egypt since 2011?

2. To which projects has that support been allocated?

3. How is the European Union and the European External Action Service currently involved in building in Egypt a democratic state based on the rule of law?

Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission
(4 June 2013)

Overall EU financial bilateral assistance to Egypt remained unchanged (EUR 449 million) over 2011-2013. However, the cooperation focus was adjusted following the January 2011 revolution to adequately respond to citizens' aspirations for more democracy, more jobs and better living conditions.

In 2012, the EU funded programmes supporting job creation (EUR 70 million), technical and vocational education (EUR 50 million) and water and sanitation (EUR 10 million). All programmes have a direct impact on the Egyptian population, in particular the youth and the unemployed. For 2013, programmes with a similar objective are in the pipeline, e.g. in the field of solid waste, agriculture and rural development.

As for EU's support to Egypt's democratic transition and apart from regular meetings at top political and senior management level where strong messages on respect for human rights and democratic values are conveyed, the EU — and in particular the EU Delegation in Cairo — has increased its dialogue with civil society. Regular meetings are taking place and overall, the EU has witnessed an increase in the number and variety of Civil Society organisations attending these meetings. The EU has also witnessed an increasing request for EU assistance This increased dialogue has been matched by an unprecedented financial assistance worth EUR 35 Million provided by the EU to Civil Society Organisations since the January 2011 uprising.

(Wersja polska)

Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-001741/13
do Komisji
Adam Bielan (ECR)
(19 lutego 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Ochrona praw mniejszości w Kosowie

Od wejścia w życie Traktatu z Lizbony, ochrona mniejszości stała się fundamentalną wartością Unii Europejskiej. Jednocześnie Unia złożyła obietnicę rozpoczęcia negocjacji akcesyjnych z Kosowem, gdy państwo będzie na to gotowe. Dochodzące sygnały o naruszeniach praw mniejszości etnicznych sugerują jednakże, że kraj ten jest jeszcze daleki od przystąpienia do UE.

Biorąc pod uwagę uznane w Europie standardy ochrony praw członków mniejszości etnicznych, zwracam się zatem z prośbą o odpowiedź na następujące pytania:

1. W jaki sposób Unia Europejska aktualnie angażuje się w działania mające na celu poprawę sytuacji mniejszości etnicznych zamieszkujących Kosowo i monitoruje postępy w tym obszarze?

2. Jak Komisja ocenia działania, które podejmuje rząd Kosowa, aby integrować społeczeństwo kraju, szczególnie mniejszość romską?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Štefana Fülego w imieniu Komisji
(15 kwietnia 2013 r.)

UE udziela doradztwa i wsparcia rządowi Kosowa w zakresie rozwoju i umacniania poszanowania dla praw człowieka i podstawowych wolności w Kosowie ([1]), w tym wsparcia technicznego i finansowego w zakresie ochrony mniejszości w ramach Instrumentu Pomocy Przedakcesyjnej.

W studium wykonalności z 10 października 2012 r. ([2]) Komisja podkreśliła, że władze Kosowa powinny skupić się na promowaniu wieloetnicznego Kosowa oraz stworzyć niezbędne warunki do osiągnięcia tego celu. Komisja zaznaczyła także, że Kosowo musi rozwiązać kilka problemów dotyczących, zarówno egzekwowania prawa, jak i ram politycznych. Odnośnie do integracji społeczności romskich, aszkalskich i egipskich, doświadczających trudnej sytuacji pośredniej i bezpośredniej dyskryminacji, studium wykonalności wskazało, że, zarówno na szczeblu centralnym, jak i lokalnym, brakuje wdrożenia specjalnej strategii i ściśle ukierunkowanych działań.

Perspektywa europejska Kosowa jest zbieżna z perspektywą krajów Bałkanów Zachodnich. W konkluzjach Rady z grudnia 2012 r. zwrócono uwagę, że Komisja zamierza zaproponować wytyczne negocjacyjne dotyczące układu o stabilizacji i stowarzyszeniu, pod warunkiem że Kosowo zrealizuje szereg kluczowych priorytetów. Nie jest to równoznaczne z rozpoczęciem negocjacji akcesyjnych.

([1]) „Użycie tej nazwy nie ma wpływu na stanowiska w sprawie statusu Kosowa i jest zgodne z rezolucją Rady Bezpieczeństwa ONZ 1244 oraz opinią Międzynarodowego Trybunału Sprawiedliwości na temat ogłoszenia przez Kosowo niepodległości".
([2]) COM(2012) 602 final.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001741/13
to the Commission
Adam Bielan (ECR)
(19 February 2013)

Subject: Defence of minority rights in Kosovo

Since the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, defence of minorities has been a fundamental value of the European Union. At the same time, the Union has promised to open accession negotiations with Kosovo when the country is ready. However, indications of violations of the rights of ethnic minorities suggest that the country is still far from joining the EU.

Taking into account European standards relating to the protection of the rights of members of ethnic minorities, I would like to ask the following questions:

1. How is the European Union currently engaged in action to improve the situation of ethnic minorities living in Kosovo and monitoring progress in this regard?

2. How does the Commission assess the action being taken by the Government of Kosovo to build an integrated society, and in particular to integrate the Roma minority?

Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission
(15 April 2013)

The EU offers advice and support to the Government of Kosovo on the development and consolidation of the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in Kosovo ([1]) including through technical and financial support to the protection of minorities under the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance.

In the Feasibility Study of 10 October 2012 ([2]), the Commission underlined that Kosovo needs to focus on promoting a multi-ethnic Kosovo and create the necessary conditions to achieve this. It also outlined that there are several challenges Kosovo needs to address, relating both to the enforcement of legislation and to the political framework. As regard the integration of the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian (RAE) community, which is a vulnerable minority suffering from both direct and indirect discrimination, the Feasibility Study indicated that implementation of a specific strategy and targeted action is lacking, both at central and municipal levels.

Kosovo shares the European perspective of the western Balkans. The Council conclusions of December 2012 noted that the Commission will propose negotiating directives for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement provided Kosovo has addressed a number of key priorities. This should not be mixed up with the opening of accession negotiations.

([1]) 'This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the IJC Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence'.
([2]) COM(2012) 602 final.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001742/13
alla Commissione
Lorenzo Fontana (EFD) e Matteo Salvini (EFD)
(19 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: Violazione dei principi di sussidiarietà e proporzionalità nella proposta di direttiva COM(2012)0788 relativa ai prodotti del tabacco

Con riferimento alla proposta di direttiva COM(2012)0788 sul ravvicinamento delle disposizioni legislative, regolamentari e amministrative degli Stati membri relative alla lavorazione, alla presentazione e alla vendita dei prodotti del tabacco e dei prodotti correlati, il Senato della Repubblica italiana ha espresso un parere motivato, rilevando che vi sono elementi contrari ai principi di sussidiarietà e proporzionalità enunciati dal Protocollo n. 2 del TFUE.

Si consideri che l'articolo 24 della proposta, in cui si afferma che gli Stati membri sono liberi di adottare differenti regolamentazioni del settore, potrebbe essere in contrasto con l'articolo 114 del TFUE che la Commissione ha posto come base giuridica della proposta.

Inoltre, tenendo presente che uno degli scopi basilari e universalmente condivisi della proposta è la tutela della salute dei cittadini, alcune disposizioni restrittive ivi contenute paiono in contrasto con il principio di proporzionalità, in quanto potrebbero disincentivare o rendere meno efficaci gli investimenti da parte dell'UE e degli Stati membri in ricerca e innovazione finalizzati ad introdurre politiche sanitarie di riduzione del rischio derivato dal fumo.

Alla luce di quanto precede, può la Commissione rispondere ai seguenti quesiti:

1. ritiene opportuno rivedere le disposizioni della proposta tenendo in debita considerazione sia i principi di sussidiarietà e proporzionalità, sia le ricadute economiche sui lavoratori interessati dalle proposte modifiche della legislazione in vigore?

2. ritiene opportuno modificare la base giuridica della proposta, aggiungendo l'art. 168 TFUE all'art. 114?

3. ritiene opportuno valutare adeguatamente le ripercussioni della proposta in termini economici e occupazionali su tutta la filiera del tabacco, dai coltivatori, ai rivenditori, alle entrate erariali degli Stati membri?

Risposta di Tonio Borg a nome della Commissione
(4 aprile 2013)

La proposta di revisione della direttiva sui prodotti del tabacco è corroborata da un'attenta analisi degli impatti economici, sociali e sanitari delle misure prospettate nonché da un'analisi delle ripercussioni sul mercato interno considerato nel suo insieme. La Commissione ha anche condotto un'ampia consultazione degli stakeholder, tra cui i coltivatori di tabacco e i fabbricanti. In detta proposta la Commissione è stata particolarmente attenta ad assicurare il pieno rispetto dei principi di proporzionalità e sussidiarietà.

Le misure previste in forza della proposta sono intese a ridurre il consumo di tabacco del 2 % in un quinquennio. In termini economici gli effetti sono moderati per l'industria del tabacco, in particolare se si tiene conto delle misure contro i traffici illeciti. Se si stima che 5 700 posti di lavoro andrebbero persi nel settore del tabacco, si deve tener presente che questi sarebbero compensati dalla creazione di circa 8 000 nuovi posti di lavoro in altri settori, come illustrato nella valutazione d'impatto.

La scelta dell'articolo 114 del trattato sul funzionamento dell'Unione europea quale base legale per disciplinare i prodotti del tabacco è stata confermata dalla Corte di giustizia dell'Unione europea per quanto concerne l'attuale direttiva, che per l'essenziale persegue gli stessi obiettivi dello strumento proposto per la sua revisione. Tale base legale è appropriata per aggiornare l'armonizzazione, rimuovere gli ostacoli sul mercato interno dovuti a sviluppi normativi divergenti negli Stati membri e per prevenire l'elusione delle regole che disciplinano il mercato interno. Questa base giuridica consente un'armonizzazione piena, parziale o minima e può lasciare certe questioni alle competenze regolamentari degli Stati membri.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001742/13
to the Commission
Lorenzo Fontana (EFD) and Matteo Salvini (EFD)
(19 February 2013)

Subject: Violation of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality in the proposal for a directive COM(2012)0788 on tobacco products

The Senate of the Italian Republic has issued a reasoned opinion on the proposal for a directive COM(2012)0788 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning the manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco products and related products stating that there are aspects of the proposal which breach the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality laid down in Protocol No 2 to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

Article 24 of the proposal, which states that the Member States are free to adopt different rules for the sector, could be contrary to Article 114 TFEU, which the Commission took as the legal basis for the proposal.

Moreover, bearing in mind that one of the fundamental and universally accepted objectives of the proposal is to protect public health, some of the restrictive provisions it incorporates would appear to run counter to the principle of proportionality, as they could discourage or render less effective investment by the EU and the Member States in research and innovation designed to lead to the introduction of healthcare policies which lower the risks associated with smoking.

1. Does the Commission believe that the proposal should be reviewed, with due regard for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and to take account of the financial impact on workers affected by the proposed changes to current legislation?

2. Does it believe that the legal basis for the proposal should be amended in order to add Article 168 TFEU?

3. Does it believe that there should be a proper assessment of the financial and employment-related impact of the proposal on the entire tobacco industry, from growers and retailers through to the tax revenue for Member States?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission
(4 April 2013)

The proposal to revise the Tobacco Products Directive is underpinned by a thorough analysis of the economic, social and health impacts of the measures put forward, as well as an analysis of impacts on the internal market as a whole. The Commission has also carried out extensive stakeholder consultations, including with tobacco growers and manufacturers. The Commission has been particularly careful in ensuring full respect of the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity in this proposal.

The measures foreseen under the proposal are estimated to reduce tobacco consumption by 2% in five years. In economic terms the effects are moderate for the tobacco industry, in particular if one takes into account the measures against illicit trade. While it is estimated that 5 700 jobs would be lost in the tobacco sector, this would be compensated by the creation of approximately 8 000 new jobs in other sectors, as presented in the impact assessment.

The choice of the legal base of Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to regulate Tobacco products has been confirmed by the European Court of Justice with regard to the current Directive, which largely pursues the same aims as foreseen under the proposal for its revision. This legal base is appropriate to update harmonisation, to remove obstacles to the internal market due to divergent regulatory developments in the Member States, and to prevent circumvention of internal market rules. This legal base allows for full, partial or minimum harmonisation and can leave certain matters to the Member States to regulate.

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita P-001743/13
a la Comisión
Pablo Zalba Bidegain (PPE)
(20 de febrero de 2013)

Asunto: Ola de expropiaciones de empresas europeas por parte de Bolivia

Desde que Evo Morales asumió la presidencia de Bolivia se ha producido en este país una ola de expropiaciones de empresas europeas. Empresas como ENTEL, con capital italiano, empresas filiales de las británicas Ashmore y British Petroleum, la Compañía Logística de Hidrocarburos, con capital alemán, la empresa Transredes, con capital anglo-holandés, o la empresa Ecoenergy International, subsidiaria de la francesa GDF Suez, entre otras empresas, han sufrido nacionalizaciones en Bolivia.

Bolivia expropió este pasado lunes la filial de las empresas españolas Abertis y AENA que gestiona tres aeropuertos bolivianos sin previo aviso y con ocupación por la fuerza pública de las instalaciones expropiadas. Esta expropiación es la tercera nacionalización de una empresa española en este país en los últimos 10 meses. El pasado mes de mayo Bolivia expropió una filial de Red Eléctrica, y el pasado diciembre las cuatro filiales con las que Iberdrola operaba en el país.

Bolivia se beneficia bajo el régimen de preferencias generalizadas de un marco comercial con la UE muy ventajoso y es además uno de los mayores receptores de ayuda europea para el desarrollo de Latinoamérica. Esta ola de expropiaciones dificulta el clima de entendimiento y cooperación que la Unión Europea mantiene y quiere seguir manteniendo con Bolivia, daña su imagen como país serio donde se respeta la seguridad jurídica de las inversiones y pone en peligro el flujo de inversiones directas hacia este país.

La UE debe exigir firmemente a sus socios comerciales el respeto de la seguridad jurídica de las inversiones de las empresas europeas, especialmente a países que reciben un trato comercial y de ayuda al desarrollo preferencial.

1. ¿Qué acciones ha emprendido o emprenderá la Comisión para asegurar que se respeten los derechos de Abertis y AENA y se garantice la seguridad jurídica de las inversiones de las empresas europeas en Bolivia?

2. ¿Puede realizar la Comisión un cálculo aproximado de los beneficios que le reporta a Bolivia la relación preferencial que tiene con la UE en términos comerciales y de ayuda al desarrollo?

3. A raíz de esta ola de expropiaciones de empresas europeas, ¿tiene la Comisión la intención de reevaluar el marco de relaciones bilaterales con Bolivia?

Respuesta del Sr. De Gucht en nombre de la Comisión
(18 de marzo de 2013)

El Gobierno boliviano tiene, en principio, derecho a realizar nacionalizaciones. Sin embargo, de conformidad con las disposiciones de los tratados bilaterales vigentes en materia de inversiones, esto solamente debería hacerse con fines de política pública legítimos, conforme a los procedimientos legales vigentes, de una manera no discriminatoria y a cambio del pago de una indemnización rápida, adecuada y efectiva. Desde un punto de vista jurídico, si una empresa considera que Bolivia no ha respetado sus obligaciones se trata de un asunto entre esa empresa y el Gobierno boliviano.

La Comisión ha comunicado sus inquietudes a través de una serie de declaraciones y directamente ante el Embajador de Bolivia en Bruselas.

El 13 % de las exportaciones bolivianas a la UE se benefician de un acceso preferente en el marco del Sistema de Preferencias Generalizadas Plus (GSP+). Los cinco grupos principales de estos productos (es decir, el 75 % de las exportaciones preferenciales) se ahorran unos 1,3 millones de euros al año en aranceles reducidos. El importe de la ayuda bilateral al desarrollo concedida en el Documento de Estrategia Nacional de Bolivia del periodo 2007-2013 a través del Instrumento de Financiación de la Cooperación al Desarrollo es de 249 millones de euros. La cooperación bilateral se centra en tres sectores principales: generar oportunidades económicas, luchar contra la producción de drogas ilícitas y gestionar los recursos naturales. Bolivia también recibe fondos de cooperación regionales y temáticos.

El Presidente de Bolivia se ha comprometido a indemnizar a los inversores afectados. La Comisión realizará un estrecho seguimiento de los progresos en este sentido y, en caso necesario, seguirá insistiendo en la importancia de garantizar un marco legal predecible y estable, tal como subrayaron tanto Bolivia como la UE en la reciente Declaración de la Cumbre de Santiago entre la UE y la CELAC ([1]).

([1]) CELAC = Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños.

(English version)

Question for written answer P-001743/13
to the Commission
Pablo Zalba Bidegain (PPE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Wave of expropriations of European companies by Bolivia

Since Evo Morales entered into office as president, Bolivia has been carrying out a wave of expropriations of European companies. Companies such as the Italian-backed ENTEL, subsidiaries of UK companies Ashmore and British Petroleum, the German-owned Compañía Logística de Hidrocarburos, the Anglo-Dutch Transredes or Ecoenergy International, a subsidiary of France's GDF-Suez, have been nationalised by Bolivia.

On Monday, 18 February Bolivia nationalised, without notice, a joint venture owned by the Spanish companies Abertis and AENA which had been running three Bolivian airports, and had its security forces occupy its premises in the third nationalisation of a Spanish company in Bolivia in the past 10 months. In May 2012 Bolivia expropriated a subsidiary of Red Eléctrica and in December nationalised the four subsidiaries of Iberdrola that had been active in the country.

Bolivia trades with the EU on very advantageous conditions under the generalised scheme of preferences and is one of the largest recipients of European development aid for Latin America. This wave of expropriations risks poisoning the climate of understanding and cooperation that the EU wishes to cultivate with Bolivia, undermines its image as a credible country that ensures the legal security of investments and jeopardises the flow of foreign direct investments into it.

The EU must compel its trading partners, especially countries afforded preferential treatment and development aid, to guarantee the legal security of investments by European companies.

1. What stance and what measures will the Commission take to ensure respect for the rights of Abertis and AENA, and to guarantee the legal security of European companies' investments in Bolivia?

2. Can the Commission make an estimate of the benefits that Bolivia derives its preferential relationship with the EU, both in terms of trade and development aid?

3. Does the Commission intend to review relations with Bolivia in the wake of this wave of expropriations?

Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission
(18 March 2013)

The Bolivian Government has in principle the right to proceed to nationalisations. In accordance with the provisions of existing bilateral investment treaties this should, however, only be done for legitimate public policy objectives, under due process of law, in a non-discriminatory manner and against payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation. From a legal point of view, if a company believes Bolivia has not respected its obligations it is a matter for the company and the Bolivian Government.

The Commission has raised its concerns through a series of statements and directly with the Bolivian Ambassador in Brussels.

13% of Bolivian exports to the EU enjoy preferential access under the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+) scheme. The main five groups of these products (i.e. 75% of preferential exports) save about EUR 1.3 million per year in reduced tariffs. The amount for bilateral development aid allocated to Bolivia's Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013 through the Development Cooperation Instrument is EUR 249 million. Bilateral cooperation is focused on three main sectors: generating economic opportunities, fight against illicit drug production and management of natural resources. Bolivia also benefits from regional and thematic cooperation funds.

The President of Bolivia has committed to provide compensation to the investors in question. The Commission will closely follow the progress in this sense and if necessary continue to highlight the importance of ensuring a predictable and stable legal framework, as underlined by both, Bolivia and the EU, in the recent EU-CELAC ([1]) Santiago Summit declaration.

([1]) CELAC = Community of Latin American and Caribbean States.

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita P-001744/13
al Consejo
María Auxiliadora Correa Zamora (PPE)
(20 de febrero de 2013)

Asunto: Ola de expropiaciones de empresas europeas por parte de Bolivia

Desde que Evo Morales asumió la presidencia de Bolivia se ha producido en este país una ola de expropiaciones de empresas europeas. Empresas como ENTEL, con capital italiano, empresas filiales de las británicas Ashmore y British Petroleum, la Compañía Logística de Hidrocarburos, con capital alemán, la empresa Transredes, con capital anglo-holandés, o la empresa Ecoenergy International, subsidiaria de la francesa GDF Suez, entre otras empresas, han sufrido nacionalizaciones en Bolivia.

Bolivia expropió este pasado lunes la filial de las empresas españolas Abertis y AENA que gestiona tres aeropuertos bolivianos sin previo aviso y con ocupación de la fuerza pública de las instalaciones expropiadas. Esta expropiación es la tercera nacionalización de una empresa española en este país en los últimos 10 meses. El pasado mes de mayo Bolivia expropió una filial de Red Eléctrica, y el pasado diciembre las cuatro filiales con las que Iberdrola operaba en el país.

Bolivia se beneficia bajo el esquema de preferencias generalizadas de un marco comercial con la UE muy ventajoso y es además uno de los mayores receptores de ayuda europea para el desarrollo más importantes de Latinoamérica. Esta ola de expropiaciones dificulta el clima de entendimiento y cooperación que la Unión Europea mantiene y quiere seguir manteniendo con Bolivia, daña su imagen como país serio donde se respeta la seguridad jurídica de las inversiones, y pone en peligro el flujo de inversiones directas hacia este país.

La UE debe exigir firmemente a sus socios comerciales el respeto de la seguridad jurídica de las inversiones de las empresas europeas, especialmente a países que reciben un trato comercial y de ayuda al desarrollo preferencial.

A raíz de esta ola de expropiaciones de empresas europeas por el gobierno de Bolivia, ¿tiene el Consejo la intención de adoptar alguna decisión con arreglo al artículo 29 del TUE?

Respuesta
(24 de junio de 2013)

El Consejo no ha debatido el asunto particular de las expropiaciones de Bolivia.

En términos generales, las nacionalizaciones o expropiaciones de sociedades europeas envían una señal muy negativa a la comunidad empresarial internacional, que busca estabilidad y previsibilidad para sus inversiones en momentos de incertidumbre económica. En virtud de los tratados bilaterales relativos a la inversión, las nacionalizaciones sólo pueden hacerse con objetivos legítimos de política pública, dentro del respeto de las garantías procesales, sin discriminaciones y previo pago puntual de una indemnización suficiente y efectiva.

La UE anima a Bolivia en su esfuerzo por crear una legislación relativa a las inversiones que favorezca el crecimiento económico duradero y la creación de empleo. Es esencial que el entorno empresarial de Bolivia proporcione a las inversiones futuras un marco que sea previsible, transparente y sujeto al principio de legalidad.

El Parlamento Europeo y el Consejo han dado pasos para garantizar la seguridad jurídica de los acuerdos bilaterales sobre las inversiones entre los Estados miembros de la UE y terceros países por medio del Reglamento (UE) n° 1219/2012 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 12 de diciembre de 2012, por el que se establecen disposiciones transitorias sobre los acuerdos bilaterales de inversión entre Estados miembros y terceros países. El Reglamento permite que los acuerdos firmados antes del 1 de diciembre de 2009 sigan en vigor o entren en vigor, establece las condiciones en las que los Estados miembros están facultados para celebrar o mantener en vigor acuerdos bilaterales de inversión firmados entre el 1 de diciembre de 2009 y el 9 de enero de 2013, y establece las condiciones en las que los Estados miembros están facultados para modificar o celebrar acuerdos bilaterales de inversión con terceros países, después del 9 de enero de 2013.

No ha llegado al Consejo solicitud formal alguna de un Estado miembro ni de la Alta Representante de adoptar una decisión que afecte a Bolivia en virtud del artículo 29 del TUE.

(English version)

Question for written answer P-001744/13
to the Council
María Auxiliadora Correa Zamora (PPE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Wave of expropriations of European companies by Bolivia

Since Evo Morales entered into office as president, Bolivia has been carrying out a wave of expropriations of European companies. Companies such as the Italian-backed ENTEL, subsidiaries of UK companies Ashmore and British Petroleum, the German-owned Compañía Logística de Hidrocarburos, the Anglo-Dutch Transredes or Ecoenergy International, a subsidiary of France's GDF-Suez, have been nationalised by Bolivia.

On Monday, 18 February Bolivia nationalised, without notice, a joint venture owned by the Spanish companies Abertis and AENA which had been running three Bolivian airports, and had its security forces occupy its premises in the third nationalisation of a Spanish company in Bolivia in the past 10 months. In May 2012 Bolivia expropriated a subsidiary of Red Eléctrica and in December nationalised the four subsidiaries of Iberdrola that had been active in the country.

Bolivia trades with the EU on very advantageous conditions under the generalised scheme of preferences and is one of the largest recipients of European development aid for Latin America. This wave of expropriations risks poisoning the climate of understanding and cooperation that the EU wishes to cultivate with Bolivia, undermines its image as a credible country that ensures the legal security of investments and jeopardises the flow of foreign direct investments into it.

The EU must compel its trading partners, especially countries afforded preferential treatment and development aid, to guarantee the legal security of investments by European companies.

In the wake of this wave of expropriations of European companies by the Bolivian Government, can the Council state whether it intends to adopt a decision under Article 29 TEU?

Reply
(24 June 2013)

The Council has not discussed the specific question of expropriations by Bolivia.

In general, nationalisations or expropriations of European companies send a very negative signal to the international business community, which seeks stability and predictability for its investments in times of economic uncertainty. In accordance with bilateral investment treaties, nationalisations can only be made for legitimate public policy objectives, under due process of law, in a non-discriminatory manner and on payment of prompt adequate and effective compensation.

The EU is encouraging Bolivia's efforts towards an investment law which would favour sustainable economic growth and job creation. It is essential that the business environment in Bolivia provides future investments with a framework that is predictable, transparent and subject to the rule of law.

The European Parliament and the Council have taken steps to ensure the legal certainty of bilateral investment agreements between the EU Member States and third countries via regulation (EU) No 1219/2012 establishing transitional arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between Member States and third countries. The regulation allows for agreements signed before 1 December 2009 to be maintained in force or enter into force, lays down the conditions under which Member States are empowered to conclude and/or maintain in force bilateral investment agreements signed between 1 December 2009 and 9 January 2013 and lays down the conditions under which Member States are empowered to amend or conclude bilateral investment agreements with countries after 9 January 2013.

The Council has not received any formal request from a Member State or the High Representative to adopt a decision concerning Bolivia under Article 29 TEU.

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite P-001745/13
à la Commission
Isabelle Thomas (S&D)
(20 février 2013)

Objet: Approbation de l'accord de pêche avec la Norvège

L'accord de pêche en vigueur avec la Norvège date de 1981. Il concerne des millions de tonnes de poissons, pêchés par la flotte communautaire dans les eaux de l'Union, notamment le cabillaud et le merlan bleu. Malgré l'importance de cette négociation et les impacts considérables sur les pêcheries européennes, mais aussi sur la ressource, la procédure de renégociation de ces accords se fait par échange de lettres, sans approbation ni même consultation du Parlement européen.

Au vu des récentes évolutions réglementaires, de l'importance de la préservation de la ressource halieutique, des impacts socio-économiques pour les pêcheries européennes et de l'importance sans cesse accrue du Parlement européen dans le processus législatif communautaire, est-il prévu de soumettre une prochaine révision des accords à l'approbation ou au moins à la consultation du Parlement européen?

Réponse donnée par M^me^ Damanaki au nom de la Commission
(5 avril 2013)

Les relations dans le domaine de la pêche entre l'Union européenne et la Norvège sont actuellement régies par l'accord de 1980. Cet accord prévoit seulement l'organisation de consultations entre les parties mais ne prévoit pas l'adoption de mesures communes ayant un effet juridique sur lesdites parties. La tenue de ces consultations et les résultats qui en ressortent font par conséquent l'objet de procès-verbaux agréés non contraignants. Ces procès-verbaux agréés ne constituent pas des accords internationaux ou des décisions au sens de l'article 218 du traité. Les procès-verbaux agréés sont utilisés par les deux parties pour recommander à leurs autorités respectives l'adoption de mesures internes découlant de la conclusion des consultations, mais aucune obligation juridique formelle ne pèse sur lesdites autorités pour agir en ce sens.

C'est pourquoi aucun mandat de négociation formel n'est nécessaire pour procéder à ces consultations annuelles. Les procès-verbaux agréés ne sont pas conclus par le Conseil et ne requièrent pas non plus l'approbation du Parlement européen.

Néanmoins, la Commission continuera d'informer le Parlement, à intervalles réguliers, des résultats du processus de consultation.

(English version)

Question for written answer P-001745/13
to the Commission
Isabelle Thomas (S&D)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Approval of the fisheries agreement with Norway

The current fisheries agreement with Norway dates back to 1981. It relates to catches in EU waters, by the Community fleet, of millions of tonnes of fish, including cod and blue whiting. Despite the significance of this agreement and the substantial impacts on European fisheries and on fish stocks, the procedure for renegotiating such agreements consists of an exchange of letters, without approval by — or even consultation of — the European Parliament.

In the light of recently-adopted rules, the importance of conserving fish stocks, the social and economic impacts on European fisheries and the increasingly important role of Parliament in the Community legislative process, are there any plans to submit reviews of these agreements to Parliament for approval, or at least to consult it on them?

Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission
(5 April 2013)

Relations on fisheries between the European Union and Norway are currently governed by the 1980 Agreement. This Agreement only provides for consultations to be conducted between the Parties, but does not provide for the adoption of common measures having a legal effect on the Parties. The conduct of these consultations and the results thereof are therefore contained in non-binding Agreed Records. These Agreed Records do not constitute international agreements or decisions in the sense of Article 218 of the Treaty. The Agreed Records are used by both Parties to recommend to their respective authorities the adoption of internal measures resulting from the conclusion of the consultations, but there is no formal legal obligation on the authorities to do so.

For this reason, no formal negotiating mandate is necessary for the conduct of these annual consultations. The Agreed Records are neither concluded by the Council, nor do they require the consent of the European Parliament.

Nevertheless, the Commission will continue to inform Parliament, at regular intervals, of the outcomes of the consultation process.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord P-001746/13
aan de Commissie
Wim van de Camp (PPE)
(20 februari 2013)

Betreft: Invoering van een vreemdelingentaks door de stad Antwerpen

Uit mediaberichten, waaronder een artikel op de site http://www.deredactie.be/cm/vrtnieuws/regio/antwerpen/130212_Vreemdelingenloket_kritiek, blijkt dat het stadsbestuur van Antwerpen voornemens is om vreemdelingen voortaan een bedrag van 250 euro te laten betalen wanneer zij zich inschrijven aan het vreemdelingenloket.

1. Heeft de Commissie kennis genomen van berichten dat het stadsbestuur van Antwerpen voornemens is om een vreemdelingentaks in te voeren?

2. Heeft de Commissie een overzicht van het aantal vreemdelingen in de stad Antwerpen?

3. Kan de Commissie aangeven in hoeverre de voorgenomen vreemdelingentaks in strijd is met het vrije verkeer van personen in de Europese Unie?

4. Ziet de Commissie mogelijkheden om de stad Antwerpen te weerhouden van het invoeren van een vreemdelingentaks?

5. Kan de Commissie aangeven in hoeverre de stad Antwerpen een bevoegdheid heeft tot het invoeren van een vreemdelingentaks?

Antwoord van mevrouw Reding namens de Commissie
(27 maart 2013)

Mediaberichten hebben de aandacht van de Commissie gevestigd op de beslissing van de nieuwe gemeenteraad in Antwerpen.

Volgens de officiële Belgische bevolkingsstatistieken verbleven er op 1 januari 2011 39 184 EU-burgers en 47 598 onderdanen van derde landen in Antwerpen.

De Commissie heeft de Belgische autoriteiten om verduidelijking gevraagd over de reikwijdte en aard van deze leges om te oordelen of ze verenigbaar zijn met het EU-recht. De verplichtingen uit hoofde van het Verdrag betreffende de werking van de Europese Unie gelden voor alle overheden en overheidsdiensten van de lidstaten, ongeacht hun niveau, en bijgevolg ook voor gemeenten.

Indien de beslissing van de gemeenteraad eveneens geldt voor EU-burgers en hun familieleden, moet worden opgemerkt dat in Richtlijn 2004/38/EG betreffende vrij verkeer, duidelijk wordt gesteld dat alle verblijfsdocumenten voor EU-burgers kosteloos worden verstrekt of tegen een bedrag dat het voor de afgifte van soortgelijke documenten van eigen onderdanen verlangde bedrag niet te boven gaat. Dit geldt eveneens voor familieleden van EU-burgers, zelfs als zij onderdanen van derde landen zijn.

Bovendien zijn Richtlijn 2003/109/EG betreffende langdurig ingezetenen en Richtlijn 2003/86/EG betreffende gezinshereniging ook van toepassing op onderdanen van derde landen die in de EU verblijven. Deze twee richtlijnen bevatten geen expliciete regels met betrekking tot de leges die voor de afgifte van onder hun werkingssfeer vallende verblijfsvergunningen mogen worden aangerekend. Het Hof van Justitie heeft echter reeds een uitspraak gedaan over een mogelijke beperking van de leges. In zijn arrest van 26 april 2012 (C-508/10) oordeelde het Hof dat de uitoefening van de bij Richtlijn 2003/109/EG toegekende rechten kan worden belemmerd door aan onderdanen van derde landen te hoge en onevenredige leges te vragen en dat Nederland de krachtens deze richtlijn op hem rustende verplichtingen dus niet is nagekomen.

(English version)

Question for written answer P-001746/13
to the Commission
Wim van de Camp (PPE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Imposition of a tax on aliens by the city of Antwerp

Reports in the media, including an article on the site
http://www.deredactie.be/cm/vrtnieuws/regio/antwerpen/130212_Vreemdelingenloket_kritiek
indicate that, from now on, the Antwerp city authorities intend to compel aliens to pay EUR 250 when they register as aliens.

1. Is the Commission aware of reports that the Antwerp city authorities intend to impose a tax on aliens?

2. Does the Commission have an overview of the number of aliens in the city of Antwerp?

3. Can the Commission indicate to what extent the proposed tax on aliens breaches the principle of free movement of persons in the European Union?

4. Does the Commission see any way of preventing the city of Antwerp from imposing a tax on aliens?

5. Can the Commission indicate the extent to which the city of Antwerp has the power to impose a tax on aliens?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(27 March 2013)

Media reports have drawn the attention of the Commission on the new city council decision in Antwerp.

According to Belgian official population statistics, 39,184 EU citizens and 47,598 third-country nationals resided in Antwerp on 1 January 2011.

The Commission is currently contacting the Belgian authorities to receive clarifications on the scope and the nature of this fee in order to assess its compatibility with EC law. The obligations deriving from the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union sit on all national authorities and administrations, whatever their level, hence also on municipalities.

If the city council decision would include EU citizens and the members of their family, it should be noted that directive 2004/38/EC on free movement clearly states that all documents linked to residence of EU citizens shall be issued free of charge or for a charge not exceeding that imposed on nationals for the issuing of similar documents, this also applies to family members including those who are third-country nationals.

In the same time, Directive 2003/109/EC on Long-Term Residents and Directive 2003/86/EC on Family Reunification are applicable to nationals of third countries living in the EU. Even if these two directives do not have explicit rules on the fees to be charged for the residents permits delivered under their scope, the Court of Justice ruled already on the limit that might be imposed on such fees. In a judgment from 26 of April 2012 (C-508/10) the Court found that by applying to third-country nationals excessive and disproportionate administrative charges which are liable to create an obstacle to the exercise of the rights conferred by Directive 2003/109/EC the Netherlands has failed to fulfil its obligations under that directive.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001747/13
alla Commissione
Mario Borghezio (EFD)
(20 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: Necessità di ulteriori finanziamenti all'ESA in relazione al pericolo meteoriti, asteroidi e comete

In seguito all'eccezionale pioggia di meteoriti sugli Urali del 15 febbraio e all'asteroide 2012 D4 sfrecciato vicino alla Terra, molti si sono accorti della necessità di rilanciare seriamente la ricerca scientifica prima che sia troppo tardi. Autorevoli scienziati di tutto il mondo hanno fatto capire che l'umanità ha una missione comune: difendere la Terra da asteroidi, meteore e comete, presenti attorno a noi molto più di quanto si immagini.

L'Agenzia spaziale europea (ESA) — la cui missione è «sostenere e promuovere per scopi esclusivamente pacifici la cooperazione tra gli Stati europei nella ricerca e tecnologia spaziale e nelle loro applicazioni» (articolo 2 della Convenzione dell'ESA) — un anno fa ha lanciato un programma di ricerca sugli oggetti pericolosi nello spazio denominato NEO Shield (Near Earth Objects).

Ciò premesso, la Commissione, alla luce dei nuovi eventi, non intende assumere le più opportune iniziative affinché tale programma di ricerca venga adeguatamente finanziato, al fine di contribuire urgentemente e significativamente alla difesa strategica della Terra?

Risposta di Antonio Tajani a nome della Commissione
(11 aprile 2013)

Il progetto NEOshield, avviato il 1° gennaio 2012, è in effetti gestito dalla Commissione e finanziato nell'ambito del tema Spazio del Settimo programma quadro di ricerca e dimostrazione tecnologica, e non dall'ESA. L'obiettivo del progetto è valutare le metodologie di mitigazione delle collisioni di oggetti vicini alla terra (Near Earth Objects — NEO) con il nostro pianeta. Il progetto coinvolge centri di ricerca di punta europei (DE, ES, FR, UK) e internazionali (US, RU) assieme a partner dell'industria spaziale europea. Nell'arco dei tre anni e mezzo in cui è portato avanti il progetto il consorzio effettuerà un'analisi delle opzioni realistiche per prevenire la collisione di un asteroide con la terra e fornirà falsarighe dettagliate per i concetti di mitigazione del rischio maggiormente fattibili.

Il progetto NEOshield riveste una grande importanza scientifica e politica e integra le attività del Gruppo di lavoro-14 in seno alla commissione delle Nazioni Unite sull'uso pacifico dello spazio extra-atmosferico (UN COPUOS). Con questo progetto gli attori europei adottano per la prima volta una posizione strategica in questo ambito di ricerca globale.

Nel contesto dell'iniziativa Orizzonte 2020 ([1]), con il capitolo spaziale «Leadership in enabling industrial technologies» (Leadership nel favorire le tecnologie industriali), la Commissione ha proposto attività di ricerca volte ad agevolare la R&S europea nel contesto dei partenariati spaziali internazionali, compresa la sorveglianza dell'ambiente spaziale (ad esempio, analisi dell'ambiente spaziale, stazioni a terra, protezione dei sistemi spaziali dalle collisioni con frammenti e dagli effetti delle eruzioni cromosferiche). La Commissione è pertanto pronta a sostenere un'attività di ricerca di lungo respiro con un'eventuale missione di dimostrazione internazionale verso un asteroide. In tal caso, si assicurerà il coordinamento con le attività pianificate dell'ESA in relazione ai NEO.

([1]) Decisione concernente il programma specifico, allegato, parte II, sezione 1.6.2 «Consentire progressi nell'ambito delle tecnologie spaziali».

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001747/13
to the Commission
Mario Borghezio (EFD)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: More funding needed for the European Space Agency to address dangers posed by meteorites, asteroids and comets

Following the exceptional meteor shower over the Ural Mountains on 15 February 2013 and the close fly-by of asteroid 2012 DA14, many agree that further serious research into such phenomena is needed before it is too late. Leading scientists from around the world have stressed that humanity needs to work together to protect the Earth from asteroids, meteors and comets, which are present in near space in bigger numbers than we realise.

One year ago the European Space Agency (ESA), whose purpose is 'to provide for and to promote, for exclusively peaceful purposes, cooperation among European States in space research and technology and their space applications' (Article II of the ESA Convention), launched the NEO Shield research programme into hazardous Near Earth Objects.

In the light of recent events, will the Commission take appropriate steps to ensure that the programme has sufficient funding so that it can make a full and urgently needed contribution to discussions on how to protect our planet from these hazardous Near Earth Objects?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission
(11 April 2013)

The NEOshield project, which started on 1 January 2012, is in fact, managed by the Commission and funded by the Space Theme of the 7th Framework Programme for Research and Technological Demonstration, not by ESA. The objective of this project is to assess mitigation methodologies for Near Earth Objects (NEOs) collisions with our planet. The project involves leading European (DE, ES, FR, UK) and international (US, RU) research centres together with partners from European space industry. During the 3 ½-year project period, the consortium will carry out an analysis of realistic options for preventing the collision of an asteroid with the Earth and provide detailed test-mission designs for the most feasible risk mitigation concepts.

The NEOshield project is of major scientific and political importance, as it complements activities of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UN COPUOS) Action Team-14. With this project European actors are, for the first time, taking a strategic position in this global research field.

In Horizon 2020 ([1]) under the space chapter of Leadership in enabling industrial technologies, the Commission has proposed research activities aiming at enabling European R&D in the context of international space partnerships including space situational awareness (e.g. analysis of the space environment, ground stations, protecting space systems from collision with debris and effects of solar flares). Therefore, the Commission is ready to support a longer-term research activity with a possible international demonstration mission to an asteroid. In that case, coordination with planned ESA activities in the NEO field will be ensured.

([1]) Specific Programme Decision, Annex, Part II, Section 1.6.2 Enabling advances in space technologies.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-001785/13
an die Kommission
Evelyne Gebhardt (S&D)
(20. Februar 2013)

Betrifft: Situation ausländischer Lektoren an italienischen Universitäten

Bereits in mehreren höchstrichterlichen Urteilen hat der Europäische Gerichtshof auf die Diskriminierung ausländischer Sprachlehrer an italienischen Universitäten hingewiesen (unter anderem in der Entscheidung C-119/04 vom 18. Juli 2006). Zwar ist Italien mit der sogenannten „Gelmini-Reform" 2010 rechtsetzend aktiv geworden, um die Stellung ausländischer Lektoren an italienischen Universitäten im Einklang mit dem Gemeinschaftsrecht zu gestalten. Allerdings klagen Betroffene nach wie vor über Ungleichbehandlung und fühlen sich in ihrem Recht auf Arbeitnehmerfreizügigkeit eingeschränkt.

Am 8. Dezember 2011 hat die Kommission in ihrer Antwort auf mehrere Schriftliche Anfragen zu diesem Thema folgendes verlauten lassen: „The issue of working conditions of former and current foreign language lecturers (lettori) and collaboratori e esperti linguistici (CELs) in Italy is being followed up closely by the Commission services".

Außerdem erklärte die Kommission in derselben Antwort, dass sie mit den italienischen Behörden im Kontakt stehe, um die Auslegung sowie die praktischen Auswirkungen der „Gelmini-Reform" auf die Situation von „lettori" klarzustellen und — sofern erforderlich — weitere Schritte einzuleiten.

1. Welche Maßnahmen wurden seither von den italienischen Behörden sowie seitens der Kommission ergriffen, um die arbeitsrechtliche Situation ausländischer Lektoren an italienischen Universitäten denen ihrer inländischen Kollegen anzugleichen?

2. Welche Erkenntnisse hat die Kommission über die Auswirkungen der „Gelmini-Reform" auf die Situation ausländischer Lektoren an italienischen Universitäten? Liegt auch weiterhin eine Ungleichbehandlung vor, die gegen Gemeinschaftsrecht verstoßen könnte?

3. Erwägt die Kommission derzeit, in dieser Sache ein Vertragsverletzungsverfahren gegen Italien einzuleiten?

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-001794/13
an die Kommission
Angelika Werthmann (ALDE)
(20. Februar 2013)

Betrifft: Ungleichbehandlung von ausländischen Fremdsprachenlektoren in Italien

Wie der Kommission wiederholt zugetragen wurde (E-1697/10, E-009585/2011 u. a.), ist die Problematik der Behandlung von ausländischen Fremdsprachenlektoren in Italien — im Zuge einer Umstellung und Umbenennung der Berufskategorie — nach zahlreichen rechtlichen Schritten noch immer nicht gelöst werden. Hierbei handelt es sich um eine Diskriminierung im Vergleich zu inländischen Lektoren in derselben Position.

1. Wie gedenkt die Kommission in diesem Kontext weiter zu verfahren, insbesondere mit dem Ziel, diese Ungleichbehandlung zu beenden?

2. Ist der Kommission die Schwere der Problematik im Zusammenhang mit der Grundfreiheit des freien Dienstleistungsverkehrs innerhalb der EU bewusst?

Gemeinsame Antwort von Herrn Andor im Namen der Kommission
(18. April 2013)

Die Kommission verweist die Abgeordneten auf ihre Antwort auf die schriftliche Anfrage E-000936/2013.

In Abhängigkeit von den Ergebnissen der Untersuchungen im Rahmen der EU-Pilot-Verfahren wird die Kommission über die weiteren Schritte entscheiden.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001749/13
alla Commissione
Francesca Barracciu (S&D)
(20 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: Condizioni legislative, contrattuali, retributive, di lavoro e di pensionamento discriminatorie nei confronti di lettori e CEL di madrelingua nelle Università italiane

In diverse occasioni, negli anni passati, la Commissione europea è stata interessata, anche a seguito di diversi pronunciamenti di condanna del governo italiano da parte della Corte di giustizia dell'Unione europea, del caso relativo alle condizioni legislative e retributive discriminatorie perpetrate nei confronti dei lettori di lingua straniera e dei collaboratori e esperti linguistici (CEL) nelle Università italiane.

Le interrogazioni E-006822/2012, E-006582/2012, E-002636/2011, E-1697/2010 hanno già sollevato la questione.

Nella sua ultima risposta, del 28 agosto 2012, all'interrogazione E-006822/2012, la Commissione ha comunicato all'interrogante che «Alla luce dei commenti ricevuti da parte del governo italiano, la Commissione è attualmente in fase di valutazione della situazione dei lettori stranieri in Italia, al fine di stabilire se la nuova legge in quanto tale e/o la prassi amministrativa stia violando il diritto comunitario».

Essendo passati, da allora, sei mesi e considerato che la situazione di discriminazione di numerosi lettori e CEL di madrelingua in diverse Università italiane perdura e, per certi versi, si drammatizza con nuove misure discriminatorie in altre università e procedure di licenziamento collettivo applicate,

— è la Commissione in grado di dare una risposta sull'esito delle sue valutazioni?

— ha la Commissione valutato quali ulteriori iniziative intraprendere per favorire una soluzione definitiva dopo tanti anni?

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-002103/13
alla Commissione
Giommaria Uggias (ALDE)
(26 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: Discriminazione economica e normativa dei lettori/collaboratori linguistici nelle università italiane

I collaboratori esperti linguistici (CEL) di madrelingua straniera o italiana svolgono l'insegnamento di una lingua nelle università italiane e vivono ormai da decenni in una situazione di discriminazione, trovandosi ancora senza un profilo professionale definito.

La legge n. 236 del 21 giugno 1995 riforma l'insegnamento della lingua straniera. In questo contesto, la funzione di «lettore di lingua straniera» viene sostituita con quella di «collaboratore linguistico» trasformando, solo sulla carta, le funzioni da questi svolte.

A seguito dell'entrata in vigore di questa legge, molti ex lettori di lingua straniera si sono rivolti alla Commissione lamentando un trattamento discriminatorio applicato da parte delle università italiane. Queste ultime non hanno assicurato loro il riconoscimento dei diritti, garantito invece alla generalità dei lavoratori nazionali e non hanno loro riconosciuto l'anzianità di servizio in termini di trattamento economico e previdenziale.

Il 26 giugno 2001 la Corte di giustizia europea, nella causa C-212/99, ha condannato l'Italia per non aver riconosciuto i diritti quesiti agli ex lettori di lingua straniera, venendo meno agli obblighi fissati dall'art. 39 TFUE che garantisce la libera circolazione dei lavoratori.

La Commissione, ritenendo che l'Italia non avesse dato corretta esecuzione alla suddetta sentenza, ha adito nuovamente la Corte di giustizia ex art. 260 TFUE (C-119/04). La Corte, tuttavia, sulla base degli elementi forniti dalla Commissione, non è stata in grado di constatare che l'inadempimento persistesse.

Ciò nondimeno la situazione di discriminazione sofferta dai CEL sembra persistere.

Alla luce di quanto detto, può la Commissione far sapere quali provvedimenti intende adottare al fine di garantire tale adempimento e il rispetto dei diritti quesiti dai collaboratori linguistici?

Risposta congiunta di László Andor a nome della Commissione
(18 aprile 2013)

La Commissione rinvia gli onorevoli deputati alla propria risposta all'interrogazione scritta E-000936/2013.

Sulla base dei risultati delle indagini condotte nel quadro delle procedure EU-Pilot la Commissione deciderà quali passi intraprendere.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001749/13
to the Commission
Francesca Barracciu (S&D)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Discriminatory legal, contractual, pay, working and retirement conditions applied to foreign-language lettori and collaboratori e esperti linguistici in Italian universities

In recent years the case concerning the discriminatory legal and pay conditions applied to foreign-language *lettori* and *collaboratori e esperti linguistici* (CEL) in Italian universities has been referred to the Commission on a number of occasions, including in the wake of various European Court of Justice rulings against the Italian Government.

This issue has already been raised in questions E-006822/2012, E-006582/2012, E-002636/2011 and E-1697/2010.

In its last answer, dated 28 August 2012, to Question E-006822/2012, the Commission informed the author that, 'In the light of the comments received from the Italian Government, the Commission is currently in the process of evaluating the situation of foreign lecturers in Italy in order to establish if the new law as such and/or the administrative practice is violating EC law.'

Since six months have now gone by, and given the ongoing situation concerning the discriminatory treatment of numerous foreign-language *lettori* and CEL in various Italian universities, which in some respects is being made worse by the application of new discriminatory measures in other universities as well as collective redundancy procedures,

— can the Commission comment on the outcome of its evaluations;

— has it assessed what further action can be taken to help find a permanent solution after so many years?

Question for written answer E-001785/13
to the Commission
Evelyne Gebhardt (S&D)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: The situation of foreign lecturers at Italian universities

The European Court of Justice has already referred to the discrimination faced by language teachers from abroad at Italian universities in several judgments (including judgment C-119/04 of 18 July 2006). Although Italy has actively implemented legislation in the form of what is known as the 'Gelmini reform' in order to bring the position of foreign lecturers at Italian universities into line with Community law, those concerned still complain of unequal treatment and feel that their right, as workers, to free movement is restricted.

On 8 December 2011, the Commission stated the following in its answer to several questions for written answer on this subject: 'The issue of working conditions of former and current foreign language lecturers (*lettori*) and *collaboratori e esperti linguistici* (CELs) in Italy is being followed up closely by the Commission services'.

In the same answer, the Commission also stated that it is in contact with the Italian authorities in order to clarify the interpretation and practical consequences of the Gelmini reform as regards the situation of *lettori* and to take additional steps, where necessary.

1. What steps have been taken since then by the Italian authorities and by the Commission in order to bring the status under labour law of foreign lecturers at Italian universities into line with their Italian colleagues?

2. What information does the Commission have concerning the effects of the Gelmini reform on the situation of foreign lecturers at Italian universities? Does there continue to be unequal treatment which could contravene Community law?

3. Is the Commission currently considering initiating infringement proceedings against Italy in this case?

Question for written answer E-001794/13
to the Commission
Angelika Werthmann (ALDE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Unequal treatment of foreign language lecturers from abroad in Italy

As the Commission has repeatedly been informed (E-1697/10, E-009585/2011, for example), the problem of the treatment of foreign language teachers from abroad in Italy — in connection with a change to and renaming of their occupational category — has still not been resolved after numerous legal measures. This is a case of discrimination compared with Italian teachers holding the same position.

1. How does the Commission intend to proceed in this regard, in particular in respect of the goal of ending this unequal treatment?

2. Is the Commission aware of the seriousness of the problem in connection with the fundamental freedom to provide services within the EU?

Question for written answer E-002103/13
to the Commission
Giommaria Uggias (ALDE)
(26 February 2013)

Subject: Financial and regulatory discrimination against lettori/collaboratori linguistici in Italian universities

Foreign-language and Italian mother-tongue *collaboratori esperti linguistici* (CEL) play a language-teaching role in Italian universities and have been discriminated against for decades, as they still to this day lack a precise professional profile.

Law No 236 of 21 June 1995 reformed foreign-language teaching. As part of the reform, the role of foreign-language *lettore* was replaced by that of *collaboratore linguistico*, with the nature of the duties changing only on paper.

Following the entry into force of that law, many former foreign-language *lettori* contacted the Commission to complain about the discriminatory treatment they had received from Italian universities. The universities failed to ensure the recognition of their rights, whereas those rights were recognised in respect of the majority of Italian employees, and they also failed to recognise their length of service in terms of pay and social security contributions.

On 26 June 2001 the Court of Justice of the European Union, in Case C-212/99, sentenced Italy for its failure to recognise the acquired rights of former foreign-language *lettori*, since it had failed to fulfil the obligations laid down in Article 39 TFEU, which guarantees the free movement of workers.

The Commission, believing that Italy had failed to comply with the aforesaid judgment correctly, referred the matter back to the Court of Justice under Article 260 TFEU (Case C-119/04). On the basis of the evidence provided by the Commission, the Court was, however, unable to conclude that the breach of obligations had persisted.

Nevertheless, it seems that CELs are still being discriminated against.

Can the Commission therefore say what action it intends to take in order to ensure the fulfilment of obligations and respect for the acquired rights of *collaboratori linguistici*?

Joint answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission
(18 April 2013)

The Commission would invite the Honourable Members to refer to its answer to Written Question E-000936/2013.

Depending on the outcome of the investigation in the framework of the EU-Pilot procedures, the Commission will decide what further steps to take.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001750/13
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)
Mario Mauro (PPE)
(20 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Sette lavoratori stranieri rapiti in Nigeria

Il 16 febbraio scorso sette lavoratori stranieri sono stati rapiti in territorio nigeriano, prelevati con la forza nel corso di un attacco contro una compagnia di costruzioni, la Setraco, a Jamaare, nello Stato settentrionale di Bauchi.

Il rapimento è stato rivendicato dal gruppo terroristico islamico Ansaru — Avanguardia per la protezione dei musulmani nell'Africa nera — nato nel 2012 da una costola del gruppo terroristico Boko Haram, accusato di centinaia di omicidi dal 2009 e di violenti attacchi alla comunità cristiana residente nel Paese. Nel comunicato i terroristi affermano di aver compiuto il sequestro a causa delle «violazioni e atrocità perpetrate contro la religione di Allah dai paesi europei in molte nazioni, tra le quali Afghanistan e Mali».

Davanti alla continua escalation di violenze subite dalla minoranza cattolica in territorio nigeriano e di fronte alla drammatica situazione vissuta dai sette lavoratori rapiti lo scorso 16 Febbraio, può il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante dire:

1. quali provvedimenti prenderà l'Unione europea per salvaguardare l'incolumità dei sette lavoratori stranieri rapiti dal gruppo Ansaru?

2. quali provvedimenti ha preso l'Unione europea per limitare l'azione del gruppo terroristico Boko Aram, protagonista di continue violenze contro la minoranza cattolica in Nigeria?

3. quali provvedimenti prenderà l'Unione europea per proteggere in futuro l'incolumità di lavoratori ed aziende straniere presenti in territorio nigeriano?

Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione
(11 aprile 2013)

L'inasprirsi delle violenze in alcune zone della Nigeria settentrionale, che hanno preso di mira civili innocenti, sia musulmani che cristiani, e le istituzioni dello Stato, è fonte di crescenti preoccupazioni per chi si trova all'interno e all'esterno del paese. L'UE ha sollevato periodicamente con le autorità la questione della sicurezza degli ostaggi. Purtroppo, si ritiene che gli ostaggi cui fa riferimento l'onorevole parlamentare siano stati uccisi dai loro sequestratori. L'UE condanna questo atto di crudeltà, così come tutte le prese di ostaggi e gli atti di terrorismo e di violenza. A tal proposito, l'AR/VP ha reso una dichiarazione l'11 marzo 2013.

L'UE sta collaborando con il governo e con la società civile della Nigeria per combattere l'attuale ciclo di violenza e terrorismo, sia mediante un costante dialogo politico sulle strategie per affrontare i problemi, sia con interventi di aiuto mirati. Di recente, è stata inviata una missione UE in Nigeria per esaminare forme specifiche di sostegno alle autorità nigeriane per realizzare l'obiettivo di una sicurezza duratura (sostegno antiterrorismo) e per agire sui fattori che conducono alla radicalizzazione e alla violenza. Inoltre, l'UE ha già avviato una serie di programmi di assistenza sociale, ad esempio, in materia di immunizzazione, maternità e risorse idriche nel nord del paese. L'obiettivo dell'UE è di assistere le autorità nigeriane nell'assicurare pace, sicurezza, stabilità, sviluppo e rispetto dello Stato di diritto e dei diritti umani.

Non è possibile garantire l'incolumità di tutte le aziende e di tutti i lavoratori stranieri presenti in Nigeria. L'UE sta collaborando con gli Stati membri e con altri soggetti ad Abuja per coordinare la consulenza in materia di sicurezza degli stranieri in Nigeria e per assicurare che tutti siano pienamente consapevoli dei rischi derivanti dall'attuale situazione.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001750/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Mario Mauro (PPE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Seven foreign workers kidnapped in Nigeria

On 16 February 2013 seven foreign workers were taken hostage during an attack on the Setraco construction company at Jama'are in the northern Nigerian state of Bauchi.

The Islamist terrorist group Ansaru, which stands for 'Vanguard for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa', has claimed responsibility for the kidnapping. The group emerged in 2012 as a breakaway from Boko Haram, a terrorist organisation thought to be responsible for hundreds of murders in 2009 and for violent attacks against Nigeria's Christian community. Ansaru claims to have abducted the workers in response to 'the transgressions and atrocities perpetrated against the religion of Allah by European countries in many places including Afghanistan and Mali'.

In the light of the escalating violence against Nigeria's Catholic minority and the kidnapping of the seven foreign workers on 16 February:

1. Can the Vice-President/High Representative say what steps the EU will take to guarantee the safety of the workers taken hostage by Ansaru?

2. What has the EU done to contain the threat posed by Boko Haram, which is responsible for ongoing violence against the country's Catholic minority?

3. What will it do to guarantee the future safety of foreign workers and companies operating in Nigeria?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(11 April 2013)

The escalating violence in parts of northern Nigeria is a growing cause of concern for those inside and outside the country and targets innocent civilians, both Christians and Muslims, and the institutions of the state. The EU has regularly raised the issue of the safety of hostages with the authorities. It is believed that the hostages referred to by the Honourable Member have sadly been killed at the hands of their captors. The EU condemns this cruel act, all hostage-taking, acts of terrorism and violence. The HR/VP has made a statement to that effect on the 11 March 2013.

The EU is working with the government and civil society of Nigeria to combat the current cycle of violence and terrorism through continuous political dialogue on approaches to the problems, as well as targeted aid interventions. An EU mission was recently in Nigeria to examine specific forms of supporting the Nigerian authorities in creating durable security (counter-terrorism support) and dealing with the factors conducive to radicalisation and violence. In addition, the EU already undertakes a number of programmes providing social assistance, e.g. through immunisation, maternal care, and water resources in the North. The EU's objective is to assist the Nigerian authorities in ensuring peace, security, stability and development, and respect for the rule of law and human rights.

It is not possible to guarantee the safety of all foreign workers and companies in Nigeria. The EU is working with Member States and others in Abuja to coordinate security advice to foreigners in Nigeria and to ensure that all are fully aware of the risks.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001751/13
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)
Mario Mauro (PPE)
(20 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Prete cattolico ucciso a Zanzibar

Lo scorso 17 febbraio un sacerdote cattolico è stato ucciso davanti alla sua chiesa a Stone Town nella capitale di Zanzibar in Tanzania. L'omicidio rischia di riaccendere le violenze tra musulmani e cristiani in un paese dove il 90 % degli abitanti è sunnita.

Nonostante nessun gruppo terroristico abbia rivendicato l'omicidio le responsabilità sono state attribuite al gruppo islamista Uamsho che nello scorso maggio aveva rivendicato l'incendio di due chiese in Tanzania.

L'escalation di violenza religiosa tra islamici e cattolici è ripresa in seguito lo scorso novembre quando un gruppo di aggressori aveva gettato dell'acido sul volto di un religioso islamico acuendo una tensione che, nel giorno di Natale, ha portato ad un attacco armato contro un prete cattolico, rimasto gravemente ferito.

Davanti a tali avvenimenti, che rischiano di compromettere definitivamente i rapporti religiosi tra cattolici e islamici in Tanzania, può il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante precisare:

1. quali provvedimenti ha preso l'Unione europea dopo gli attentati dello scorso maggio rivendicati dal gruppo islamista Uamsho per fermare l'escalation di violenza religiosa in Tanzania?

2. quali provvedimenti intende prendere l'Unione europea per frenare la serie di attentati religiosi in atto in Tanzania dallo scorso maggio?

3. quali provvedimenti intende prendere l'Unione europea per proteggere la minoranza cattolica in Tanzania?

Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione
(23 maggio 2013)

Non vi è una tradizione di violenza religiosa in Tanzania, paese in cui persone di fedi diverse convivono pacificamente. Nonostante ciò, lo scorso anno sono avvenuti molti incidenti, di cui sono state vittime sia cristiani che musulmani.

L'Unione europea ha condannato tutti gli episodi di violenza commessi per motivi religiosi. La delegazione dell'Unione europea e le missioni degli Stati membri dell'Unione, attraverso i contatti con i funzionari governativi e con i leader religiosi, hanno costantemente perorato la libertà di religione o di credo. Nel novembre del 2012 le tensioni religiose erano all'ordine del giorno del dialogo politico con la Tanzania previsto dall'articolo 8. Inoltre, nel febbraio 2013 è stata rilasciata una dichiarazione locale dell'Unione europea in occasione dell'uccisione di un sacerdote cattolico, in cui si chiedeva l'avvio di indagini approfondite sugli atti di violenza a carattere religioso, sottolineando la necessità della tolleranza e del dialogo tra religioni.

I capimissione dell'Unione europea hanno concordato alcune misure per rafforzare il controllo della condizione dei diritti umani nel paese. Ciò è particolarmente vero per Zanzibar in cui le tensioni politiche e religiose sono strettamente collegate e in cui le proteste da parte del movimento Uamsho derivano principalmente dallo status di Zanzibar nel contesto della Repubblica unita della Tanzania. La necessità di un controllo rafforzato deve essere collocata nell'ambito più ampio di una revisione costituzionale in Tanzania.

L'Unione europea difende la libertà di religione o di credo di chiunque e in ogni luogo, principio che implica la libertà di praticare la propria religione senza temere intolleranza o attentati. L'Unione europea continuerà a impegnarsi con i partner interessati, tra cui le comunità religiose, le autorità governative e i media, per sostenere un processo di dialogo aperto.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001751/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Mario Mauro (PPE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Catholic priest killed in Zanzibar

On 17 February 2013, a Catholic priest was killed in front of his church in Stone Town in the capital of Zanzibar in Tanzania. The murder risks sparking renewed violence between Muslims and Christians in a country in which 90% of the population is Sunni.

Although no terrorist group has claimed responsibility for the murder, the Islamist group Uamsho, which in May 2012 claimed responsibility for burning down two churches in Tanzania, has been blamed.

Religious violence between Muslims and Catholics escalated again in November 2012 when a group of attackers threw acid in the face of a Muslim cleric, increasing tensions which, on Christmas Day, resulted in an armed attack on a Catholic priest, seriously injuring him.

In the face of these incidents, which may permanently jeopardise religious relations between Catholics and Muslims in Tanzania, can the Vice-President/High Representative say:

1. what measures the European Union has taken following last May's attacks, for which the Islamist group Uamsho claimed responsibility, in order to stop the escalation of religious violence in Tanzania;

2. what measures the European Union intends to take to curb the string of religiously motivated attacks that have been carried out in Tanzania since last May;

3. what measures the European Union intends to take to protect the Catholic minority in Tanzania?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(23 May 2013)

There is no tradition of religious violence in Tanzania, where persons of various faiths have lived together peacefully. This notwithstanding, several incidents happened last year, of which both Christians and Muslims have been victims.

The European Union has condemned all violent incidents committed on religious grounds. The EU Delegation and EU Member State Missions through their contacts with government officials and religious leaders have consistently advocated for freedom of religion or belief. Religious tensions were on the agenda of the article 8 Political Dialogue with Tanzania in November 2012. Also, a local EU statement was issued upon the killing in February 2013 of a Catholic priest, calling for a full investigation of the acts of religious violence and stressing the need for interfaith dialogue and tolerance.

EU Heads of Mission have agreed on measures to strengthen the monitoring of the country's human rights situation. This holds particularly true for Zanzibar where political and religious tensions are intertwined and where protests by Uamsho have related mainly to the status of Zanzibar within the Union with the mainland. The need for strengthened monitoring is to be seen in the broader context of Tanzania's constitutional review.

The European Union defends freedom of religion or belief for everyone everywhere. This entails the freedom to practise one's religion without fear of intolerance or attacks. The EU will continue to engage with relevant partners, including religious communities, government authorities and the media, in support of a process of open dialogue.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001752/13
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)
Mario Mauro (PPE)
(20 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Nove volontarie anti-polio uccise in Nigeria

Nove volontarie anti-polio sono state uccise in due diversi attacchi in centri medici nel nord della Nigeria. Il primo attacco è avvenuto nella cittadina di Kano mentre il secondo, effettuato dallo stesso commando, in un altro centro medico poco fuori la città.

Il doppio attacco non è stato rivendicato da alcun gruppo terroristico ma, con tutta probabilità, le responsabilità sono da attribuirsi al gruppo islamista Boko Haram, una setta che condanna l'utilizzo dei medicinali occidentali in territorio nigeriano.

La strenua opposizione alla vaccinazione effettuata dal gruppo Boko Haram e da altri leader islamisti è una delle principali ragioni per cui la Nigeria è uno degli unici tre paesi al mondo in cui la poliomelite è ancora endemica.

Alla luce di tali avvenimenti, si chiede al Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante:

1. Quali provvedimenti ha intrapreso l'Unione europea per ostacolare l'azione del gruppo islamista Boko Haram, responsabile di numerosi attacchi terroristici in territorio nigeriano?

2. Quali provvedimenti intende prendere in futuro l'Unione europea per promuovere la vaccinazione in Nigeria, superando gli ostacoli religiosi?

3. Quali provvedimenti intende prendere in futuro l'Unione europea per rendere più sicura l'attività dei volontari in territorio nigeriano?

Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione
(18 aprile 2013)

Di recente, una missione UE inviata in Nigeria ha esaminato forme specifiche di sostegno alla lotta al terrorismo. L'obiettivo dell'UE è anche quello di assistere le autorità nigeriane nel garantire il rispetto dello Stato di diritto e dei diritti umani.

L'UE sostiene la campagna per la vaccinazione anti-polio e ha finanziato il programma dell'Organizzazione mondiale della sanità (OMS) nell'ambito del 9° e del 10° Fondo europeo di sviluppo (FES). L'UE sta prestando molta più attenzione alla sicurezza di tutto il personale, inclusi tirocinanti e volontari. Insieme alle autorità nigeriane e attraverso altre missioni, soprattutto UE, l'Unione europea controlla periodicamente la sicurezza del personale.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001752/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Mario Mauro (PPE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Nine polio volunteers killed in Nigeria

Nine polio volunteers have been killed in two separate attacks in medical centres in northern Nigeria. The first attack took place in Kano city, while the second was carried out in another medical centre just outside the city, by the same gunmen.

No terrorist group has claimed responsibility for the two attacks, but the Islamist group Boko Haram, a sect that condemns the use of Western medicine in Nigeria, was most probably to blame.

The strong opposition of the Boko Haram group and other Islamist leaders to vaccination is one of the main reasons why Nigeria is one of only three countries in the world in which polio is still endemic.

In the light of these incidents, can the Vice-President/High Representative say:

1. what measures the European Union has taken to impede the actions of the Islamist group Boko Haram, which is responsible for numerous terrorist attacks in Nigeria;

2. what measures it intends to take in the future to promote vaccination in Nigeria, overcoming religious obstacles;

3. what measures it intends to take in the future to make voluntary work in Nigeria safer?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(18 April 2013)

An EU mission was recently in Nigeria to examine specific forms of support to fight terrorism. The EU's objective is also to assist the Nigerian authorities in ensuring the respect for the rule of law and human rights.

The EU supports the polio vaccination campaign and has been funding the World Health Organisation (WHO) programme under the 9th and the 10th European Development Fund (EDF). The EU is paying much greater attention to the security of all staff including trainees and volunteers. The EU regularly monitors staff security issues with the Nigerian authorities and other missions, notably EU, on the spot.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001753/13
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)
Mario Mauro (PPE)
(20 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Donna somala in prigione per aver denunciato il suo stupro

Lo scorso 5 gennaio una donna somala è stata condannata dal Tribunale di Mogadiscio ad un anno di reclusione dopo aver denunciato lo stupro subito nel campo profughi della capitale.

La donna ha raccontato la sua esperienza durante un'intervista effettuata da un giornalista freelance di Al Jazeera, denunciando i continui stupri commessi dalle forze di sicurezza del paese nei campi profughi.

La condanna, che ha coinvolto anche il giornalista che ha effettuato l'intervista punito con un anno di carcere, costringerà la donna vittima dello stupro alla reclusione per un anno non appena terminerà il periodo di allattamento del figlio.

Davanti a tale episodio, che conferma la mancanza di rispetto dei diritti fondamentali delle donne in territorio somalo, si chiede al Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante:

1. È a conoscenza della continua violazione dei diritti fondamentali delle donne in territorio somalo?

2. Quali provvedimenti ha intrapreso l'Unione europea per ristabilire il rispetto dei diritti delle donne in Somalia?

3. Quali provvedimenti potrebbe intraprendere l'Unione europea per ottenere l'annullamento della condanna del Tribunale di Mogadiscio, evitando così il carcere alla donna somala e al giornalista freelance?

Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione
(25 aprile 2013)

I diritti umani e i diritti delle donne sono al centro della politica estera dell'Unione europea e sono elementi fondamentali della politica dell'UE in Somalia. L'UE ha intensificato gli sforzi per promuovere questi diritti in tutte le sue iniziative in Somalia e partecipa inoltre attivamente al gruppo di lavoro sui diritti umani per la Somalia, costituito di recente. L'inviato speciale dell'UE in Somalia segue inoltre da vicino la situazione nel paese. L'UE ribadisce l'impegno a integrare i diritti umani e i diritti delle donne in tutti gli aspetti della sua linea d'azione in Somalia.

L'AR/VP ha espresso più volte pubblicamente preoccupazione per il caso cui fa riferimento l'onorevole parlamentare, preoccupazioni ribadite personalmente al Presidente Sheikh Mohamud, in occasione della sua visita lo scorso gennaio a Bruxelles. Nella stessa occasione l'AR/VP ha inoltre sollevato la questione più ampia della lotta contro le violazioni dei diritti umani, la violenza di genere e la gravissima situazione della libertà di stampa in Somalia.

I giudici somali hanno recentemente deciso di ritirare gli addebiti contro la donna e il giornalista è stato scarcerato. Il 6 marzo l'Alta Rappresentante ha rilasciato una dichiarazione in proposito in cui chiede protezione statale e accesso alla giustizia per le vittime di violenze sessuali e difende la libertà di espressione dei giornalisti affinché possano svolgere il proprio lavoro senza timore di essere arrestati oppure di subire violenze o intimidazioni.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001753/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Mario Mauro (PPE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Somali woman jailed for reporting her rape

On 5 January 2013, a Somali woman was sentenced to a year's imprisonment by the court of Mogadishu after reporting that she had been raped in the capital's refugee camp.

The woman described her experience in an interview carried out by a freelance journalist from Al Jazeera, during which she revealed the repeated rapes committed by the country's security forces in its refugee camps.

Under the terms of the sentence, which also involved the journalist who carried out the interview, who was given a one-year prison term, the female rape victim's year-long imprisonment will begin as soon as she has finished breastfeeding her child.

In the light of this episode, which confirms the lack of respect for women's fundamental rights in Somalia, can the Vice-President/High Representative say:

1. whether she is aware of the constant violation of women's fundamental rights in Somalia;

2. what measures the European Union has taken to ensure that women's rights are respected once again in Somalia;

3. what measures the European Union could take to have the Mogadishu court's sentence overturned, thus ensuring that the Somali woman and the freelance journalist avoid prison?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(25 April 2013)

Human rights, including women's rights are at the core of EU foreign policy and are fundamental elements of EU policy towards Somalia. The EU has stepped up efforts to promote human rights across its activities in Somalia and is also actively participating in the newly-established Human Rights Working Group for Somalia. The EU Special Envoy to Somalia is closely following the human rights situation in the country too. The EU remains fully committed to mainstream human rights, including women's rights in all aspects of its policy towards Somalia.

The HR/VP has raised concerns publically a number of times about the specific case you are referring to. She reiterated her concerns personally with President Sheikh Mohamud as well as the broader question of tackling human rights violations, gender-based violence and the dire situation of press freedom in Somalia during his visit to Brussels at the end of January.

The Somali judiciary have recently made the decision to drop charges against the woman and the journalist has been released from prison. The High Representative released a statement in this regard on the 6 March, calling for the state's protection and access to justice for victims of sexual violence and supporting the freedom of expression for journalists to work without fear of arrest, violence or intimidation.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-001754/13
aan de Commissie
Ivo Belet (PPE)
(20 februari 2013)

Betreft: Maatregelen tegen criminaliteit in de Frans-Belgische grensstreek

Naar aanleiding van haar antwoord op vraag E-010388/2012 willen wij de Commissie erop wijzen dat de criminaliteit in de Frans-Belgische grensstreek (in het bijzonder in de provincie West-Vlaanderen) in de afgelopen maanden opnieuw is toegenomen. Tal van nieuwe gewelddadige feiten doen de onrust en de angst bij de bevolking sterk toenemen.

Een belangrijk element hierbij is dat de Belgische politieagenten nog steeds niet de bevoegdheid hebben om criminelen bij een achtervolging op Frans grondgebied staande te houden en te ondervragen, terwijl dit — zoals geregeld in de bilaterale verdragen — in Luxemburg en Duitsland wel het geval is.

1. Heeft de Commissie al contact gehad met de Franse minister van binnenlandse zaken over het probleem van de grenscriminaliteit of heeft ze een dergelijk overleg gepland?

2. Hoe reageert de Commissie op de weigering van Frankrijk om Belgische politieagenten de bevoegdheid te geven om criminelen tijdens een achtervolging op Frans grondgebied tegen te houden en te ondervragen?

3. Is de Commissie van mening dat de tijdelijke herinvoering van grenscontroles — zoals is voorzien in de Schengengrenscode — aan bepaalde grensovergangen aan de Frans-Belgische grens zou kunnen bijdragen tot het aanpakken van de grenscriminaliteit?

4. Welke andere maatregelen zal de Commissie nemen om de grenscriminaliteit aan te pakken?

Antwoord van mevrouw Malmström namens de Commissie
(10 april 2013)

De Commissie heeft geregeld contact met nationale autoriteiten over grensoverschrijdende samenwerking bij rechtshandhaving, met name in het kader van de Raad van de Europese Unie en via Europol en Frontex.

De Commissie is ingenomen met het recente initiatief van België en Frankrijk om hun samenwerking te versterken door de huidige bilaterale grensoverschrijdende politie- en douanesamenwerkingsovereenkomst te herzien. Volgens de verstrekte informatie bevat de nieuwe overeenkomst bepalingen krachtens welke een agent een verdachte mag aanhouden op het grondgebied van de andere partij bij de overeenkomst: a) in gemengde Frans-Belgische rechtshandhavingsteams of b) op voorlopige basis voor feiten waar een gevangenisstraf op staat, als een agent de verdachte op heterdaad betrapt. Deze tweede mogelijkheid kan zich bijvoorbeeld voordoen bij een achtervolging of bij surveillance. De overeenkomst heeft geen betrekking op ondervraging van een verdachte door een politieagent op het andere grondgebied.

Overeenkomstig artikel 21 van Verordening (EG) nr. 562/2006 (de Schengengrenscode), doet de afschaffing van het grenstoezicht aan de binnengrenzen geen afbreuk aan de uitoefening van de politiebevoegdheid in binnengrensgebieden, voor zover de uitoefening van die bevoegdheid niet hetzelfde effect heeft als grenscontroles. Bovendien kunnen werkelijke grenscontroles aan de binnengrenzen overeenkomstig artikel 23 van de Code enkel in geval van een ernstige bedreiging van de openbare orde of de binnenlandse veiligheid worden heringevoerd. Een dergelijke herinvoering is bijgevolg geen passende algemene maatregel voor de bestrijding van grensoverschrijdende criminaliteit op langere termijn.

De Commissie ondersteunt de lidstaten bij de bestrijding van grensoverschrijdende criminaliteit, bijvoorbeeld door middel van de EU-beleidscyclus tegen zware en georganiseerde criminaliteit, gemeenschappelijke onderzoeksteams en gezamenlijke politie- en/of douaneoperaties, en zal spoedig een nieuwe rechtsgrondslag voor Europol voorstellen.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001754/13
to the Commission
Ivo Belet (PPE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Measures to control crime in the Franco-Belgian border region

Further to the Commission's answer to Question E-010388/2012, we would like to draw its attention to the fact that crime in the Franco-Belgian border region (particularly in the province of West Flanders) has again increased in recent months. Numerous fresh cases of violent crime have fanned public concern and fear.

A significant element in this is that Belgian police officers still do not have the power to stop and question criminals in the event of a pursuit on French territory, whereas — as provided for in bilateral agreements — they can do so in Luxembourg and Germany.

1. Has the Commission already been in contact with France's Minister of the Interior to discuss the problem of cross-border crime, or does it have plans for consultations on the subject?

2. What is the Commission's response to France's refusal to authorise Belgian police officers to stop and question criminals during a pursuit on French territory?

3. Does the Commission consider that temporarily reintroducing border controls — as permitted by the Schengen Border Code — at certain crossings on the Franco-Belgian border could help to tackle cross-border crime?

4. What other measures will the Commission take to tackle cross-border crime?

Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission
(10 April 2013)

The Commission has regular contact on cross border law enforcement cooperation with national authorities, notably within the EU Council framework and through Europol and Frontex.

The Commission welcomes the recent initiative undertaken by Belgium and France to reinforce their cooperation by reviewing the current bilateral cross border police and customs cooperation agreement. According to information received, the new agreement includes provisions whereby an officer can arrest a suspect on the territory of the other treaty party: a) in mixed Belgian/French law enforcement teams or b) provisionally for offences punishable by imprisonment, when an officer encounters someone in flagrante delicto. This second possibility can for example occur with a hot pursuit or surveillance. The agreement does not include interrogation of a suspect by a police officer in the other territory.

According to Article 21 of the Schengen Borders Code, Regulation (EC) No 562/2006, the abolition of control at internal borders shall not affect the exercise of police powers in the internal border areas, insofar as this does not have an effect equivalent to a border check. In parallel, following Article 23 of the Code, actual border control at internal borders may only be reintroduced in exceptional cases of serious threat to public policy and internal security. Such a reintroduction is not therefore an appropriate measure to fight cross-border crime in general over a longer period of time.

The Commission supports Member States in fighting cross-border crime, for example with the EU policy cycle against serious and organised crime, Joint Investigation Teams, joint police and/or customs operations and will soon propose a new legal basis for Europol.

(Wersja polska)

Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-001755/13
do Komisji
Elżbieta Katarzyna Łukacijewska (PPE)
(20 lutego 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Piesze przejścia graniczne z Białorusią, Rosją i Ukrainą

Piesze przejścia graniczne to jedna z form przekraczania granicy państwa. Służą one nie tylko pieszym i rowerzystom, zamieszkującym tereny przygraniczne, ale także przyczyniają się do rozwoju turystyki i handlu przygranicznego oraz ograniczenia ruchu samochodowego i nielegalnego przemytu.

W związku z faktem, że na wschodniej granicy Polski, będącej jednocześnie zewnętrzną granicą Unii Europejskiej, funkcjonują 2 piesze przejścia graniczne – w Białowieży z Białorusią oraz w Medyce z Ukrainą – oraz w związku z ich możliwym dużym znaczeniem w rozwoju gospodarczym regionów Bieszczad, Roztocza, Podlasia czy Suwalszczyzny zwracam się do Komisji Europejskiej z następującymi z zapytaniami:

1. Jaki jest stosunek Komisji do kwestii rozwijania istniejących i budowy nowych pieszych przejść granicznych Polski z Białorusią, Rosją (Obwodem Kaliningradzkim) i Ukrainą?

2. Jakie warunki muszą zostać spełnione, aby możliwe było otwarcie nowego pieszego przejścia granicznego na zewnętrznej granicy UE?

3. Jakie działania Komisja podejmuje w celu popularyzacji budowy nowych pieszych przejść granicznych na zewnętrznych granicach UE, w tym szczególnie na wschodniej granicy Polski?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Štefana Füleg w imieniu Komisji
(18 kwietnia 2013 r.)

1. Komisja wspiera rozwój istniejących i budowę nowych pieszych przejść granicznych na zewnętrznych granicach UE jako formę zwiększania sprawnie zarządzanej mobilności osób oraz rozszerzania kontaktów międzyludzkich.

2. Decyzja o otwarciu nowych zewnętrznych przejść granicznych należy do zainteresowanych państw członkowskich. Zgodnie z art. 34 kodeksu granicznego Schengen, państwa członkowskie zgłaszają Komisji wykaz swoich przejść granicznych.

3. Programy w zakresie współpracy transgranicznej na lata 2007-2013 w ramach Europejskiego Instrumentu Sąsiedztwa i Partnerstwa (ENPI) wspierają rozbudowę infrastruktury przejść granicznych na zewnętrznych granicach UE. Pomoc dotycząca wschodnich granic Polski została przewidziana w programie Litwa-Polska-Rosja oraz Polska-Białoruś-Ukraina.

Z powodu wyczerpania budżetu nie przewiduje się udzielenia wsparcia w ramach trwających programów dla żadnych dodatkowych działań. Niemniej jednak wsparcie dla budowy nowej infrastruktury przejść granicznych, w tym pieszych przejść granicznych, może być uwzględnione w programach współpracy transgranicznej na lata 2014-2020, które powstaną w ramach Europejskiego Instrumentu Sąsiedztwa (ENI) i które są obecnie opracowywane.

Programy te będą realizowane na zasadzie zarządzania dzielonego, zatem ich realizacja powierzona zostanie instytucjom zarządzającym państw członkowskich. Państwa uczestniczące w każdym konkretnym programie decydować będą o tym, które działania otrzymają współfinansowanie.

Ponadto istnieje możliwość synergii z działaniami realizowanymi w ramach programu operacyjnego „Rozwój Polski Wschodniej", współfinansowanego z Europejskiego Funduszu Rozwoju Regionalnego (EFRR).

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001755/13
to the Commission
Elżbieta Katarzyna Łukacijewska (PPE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Cross-border footpaths into Belarus, Russia and Ukraine

Cross-border footpaths are one way of passing from one country into another. As well as being used by pedestrians and cyclists living in border areas, they also foster the development of tourism and cross-border trade, and cut levels of road traffic and smuggling.

On Poland's eastern border, which is also one of the EU's external borders, there are two cross-border footpaths: one at Białowieża, going into Belarus, and one at Medyka, going into Ukraine. Such footpaths could be hugely important for the economic development of the regions around the Bieszczady mountains, Roztocze and Podlasie, and of the Suwałki region. With that in mind:

1. What is the Commission's stance on the development of existing cross-border footpaths, and the building of new ones, between Poland, Belarus, Russia (the Kaliningrad Oblast) and Ukraine?

2. What conditions need to be met in order for a new cross-border footpath to be opened on the EU's external border?

3. What action is the Commission taking in order to promote the building of new cross-border footpaths at the EU's external borders, in particular the eastern borders of Poland?

Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission
(18 April 2013)

1. The Commission supports the development of existing border crossing footpaths and the construction of new ones along the EU's external borders as a means of increasing the well-managed mobility of people and enhancing people to people contacts.

2. It is up to the Member State concerned to decide whether or not to open new external border crossing points. In accordance with Article 34 of the Schengen Borders Code, Member States shall notify the list of their border crossing points to the Commission.

3. The 2007-2013 Cross-border cooperation programmes under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) have supported the construction of border crossing infrastructure at the EU's external borders. In the case of Poland's eastern borders, support has been provided by the Lithuania-Poland-Russia and the Poland-Belarus-Ukraine programmes.

As the budget has been used up, no additional activities will be supported under the ongoing programmes. However, support to the construction of new border crossing infrastructure, including footpaths, could be considered under the 2014-2020 Cross-border cooperation programmes that will be established under the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) which are currently under preparation.

As the programmes will be implemented in shared management, their implementation will be entrusted to Managing Authorities in the Member States. It will be up to the countries participating in each individual programme to decide which activities to co-finance.

In addition, synergies might be sought with the activities implemented under the Operational Programme 'Development of Eastern Poland,' co-funded by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF).

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001757/13
a la Comisión
Ana Miranda (Verts/ALE)
(20 de febrero de 2013)

Asunto: Uso de seres vivos para experimentación en la EU en el periodo 2009-2012

El reciente anuncio del Comisario Borg sobre la implantación efectiva de la Directiva 76/768/CEE y el consecuente fin de la experimentación en seres vivos en el sector cosmético pone sobre la mesa un evidente debate sobre el uso de animales en toda clase de ensayos. De forma gradual la sociedad ha manifestado un apoyo más decidido a la reducción de la experimentación animal y a su sustitución por modelos y sistemas alternativos.

En el caso concreto de Galicia, el Bloque Nacionalista Galego ha presentado enmiendas presupuestarias destinadas a dotar a los investigadores de medios económicos para desarrollar trabajos que no empleen animales, e incluso ha planteado la necesidad de crear un premio institucional para la mejor investigación sin seres vivos.

En la Unión Europea la ciudadanía también reclama medidas, como la Iniciativa Ciudadana que propone el fin de estos ensayos.

Muchos de los ensayos, como el caso de los cosméticos, son pruebas prácticamente inútiles y repetitivas, y constituyen un auténtico museo de los horrores, con experimentos realmente crueles de dudosa eficacia real.

1. ¿Cuántos animales han sido empleados en experimentos de toda clase en el conjunto de la UE durante el periodo 2009-2012?

2. ¿Tiene previsto la Comisión desarrollar una nueva normativa sobre el bienestar y el refinamiento y sustitución de los experimentos con animales?

Respuesta del Sr. Potočnik en nombre de la Comisión
(26 de marzo de 2013)

1. El sexto Informe sobre las estadísticas relativas al número de animales utilizados para experimentación y otros fines científicos en los Estados miembros de la Unión Europea ([1]) se ocupó de la utilización de animales en la EU en 2008. El séptimo informe contendrá datos desde 2011, y su elaboración aún no ha concluido. El informe de la UE se redacta cada tres años, de acuerdo con el artículo 26 de la Directiva 86/609/CEE ([2]), referida a la protección de los animales utilizados para experimentación y otros fines científicos.

2. La Directiva 2010/63/UE ([3]), relativa a la protección de los animales utilizados para fines científicos, entró plenamente en vigor en enero de 2013. Refuerza y mejora considerablemente la legislación en el ámbito de la experimentación animal en la EU. La piedra angular de esa Directiva es el principio de las tres «R», es decir, el reemplazo, la reducción y el refinamiento de la utilización de animales. Establece una serie de disposiciones que tienen por objeto minimizar significativamente la utilización y el sufrimiento de animales en procedimientos científicos, y asignar recursos suplementarios al desarrollo de estrategias y métodos alternativos.

([1]) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52010DC0511R(01):EN:NOT
([2]) DO L 358 de 18.12.1986.
([3]) DO L 276 de 20.10.2010.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001757/13
to the Commission
Ana Miranda (Verts/ALE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Use of live animals for testing in the EU during the period 2009-2012

Commissioner Borg's recent statement on the implementation of Directive 76/768/EEC, and the resulting end of testing on live animals in the cosmetics sector, raises the important issue of the use of animals in all kinds of testing. Over time, society has shown firmer support for reducing animal testing and replacing it with alternative models and systems.

In Galicia, for example, the Bloque Nacionalista Galego has tabled budgetary amendments aimed at giving researchers the financial means to conduct research without using animals, and it has even raised the need to establish an institutional prize for the best example of research not using live animals.

EU citizens are also calling for action, such as the Citizens' Initiative, to put an end to this testing.

Much of the testing, as is the case with cosmetics, is repetitive, virtually useless and truly horrific, with experiments that are in reality cruel and of questionable effectiveness.

1. How many animals have been used in experiments of all kinds in the EU as a whole during the period 2009-2012?

2. Is the Commission planning to develop new legislation on animal welfare and the refinement and replacement of animal testing?

Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission
(26 March 2013)

1. The 6th Statistical Report on the number of animals used for experimental and other scientific purposes covered the use of animals in EU for 2008 ([1]). The 7th Report will include data from 2011 and is currently under preparation. The EU report is prepared every three years in line with Article 26 of Directive 86/609/EEC ([2]) on the protection of animals used for experimental and other scientific purposes.

2. In January 2013, Directive 2010/63/EU ([3]) on the protection of animals used for scientific purposes came into full effect. It strengthens and significantly improves the legislation in the area of animal experimentation in the EU. The Principle of the 3Rs to replace, reduce and refine the use of animals forms the cornerstone of the directive. It contains a number of measures designed to minimise significantly the use and suffering animals in scientific procedures, and to channel further resources towards the development of alternative methods and strategies.

([1]) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52010DC0511R(01):EN:NOT.
([2]) OJ L 358, 18.12.1986.
([3]) OJ L 276, 20.10.2010.

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001759/13
a la Comisión (Vicepresidenta/Alta Representante)
Raimon Obiols (S&D)
(20 de febrero de 2013)

Asunto: VP/HR — Ayuda de la UE a la Autoridad Palestina (AP) y UNWRA

Hace unas semanas, la UE anunció que adelantaría 100 millones de euros de ayuda para la Autoridad Palestina (AP) y para apoyar la agencia de refugiados de la ONU (UNWRA) con el fin de evitar que se interrumpiese la prestación de servicios esenciales.

Ante este anuncio, la Alta Representante de Política Exterior y Seguridad Común, Catherine Ashton, instaba a otros donantes internacionales a seguir con el ejemplo europeo para no perjudicar a la población y sostener la capacidad de la AP y la UNWRA.

La Alta Representante también informó de que, al margen de los 100 millones de ayuda, la UE destinaría una ayuda adicional de 2 millones de euros para reconstruir alojamientos para un centenar de familias palestinas refugiadas en el campamento de Jerash, situado al norte de Jordania.

1. ¿Tiene la Vicepresidenta/Alta Representante información acerca de otros donantes que también hayan adelantado sus ayudas a la AP y/o UNWRA a inicios de año?

2. ¿Existen mecanismos para analizar la aplicación de la ayuda europea en las reformas del Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Palestino para mejorar el funcionamiento de la administración palestina y la prestación de servicios públicos esenciales a la población?

3. ¿Se plantea la Vicepresidenta/Alta Representante una ayuda específica a los refugiados palestinos en Siria que, según cifras de la UNWRA, serían alrededor de 500 000 personas, que se están viendo afectadas por la situación nacional del país?

Respuesta de la Vicepresidenta/Alta Representante Ashton en nombre de la Comisión
(6 de mayo de 2013)

La Vicepresidenta/Alta Representante no tiene datos actualizados de los fondos de ayuda que recibe el Organismo de Obras Públicas y Socorro de las Naciones Unidas para los Refugiados de Palestina (UNRWA) de otros donantes. Hay información que indica que Japón ha comprometido 20 millones USD para el Fondo General y que Turquía, Rusia y Malasia han prometido cantidades más pequeñas, mientras que Brasil podría estar preparando también una contribución significativa. Arabia Saudí contribuye a proyectos del UNRWA.

El presupuesto de Palestina, incluida la ayuda de los donantes, se publica en línea mensualmente ([1]).

En marzo de 2013 comenzó una evaluación de la ayuda que la UE concede a Palestina. Los proyectos en curso son objeto también de informes de seguimiento orientados a los resultados y están sujetos a la supervisión interna de la oficina del Representante de la UE en Jerusalén Este.

La Comisión proporciona ayuda financiera humanitaria a los refugiados palestinos en Siria, a través de su socio para labores humanitarias, el UNRWA, por un total de 6,5 millones de euros. Esta ayuda se centra en actividades destinadas a salvar vidas, como la asistencia médica y la ayuda alimentaria de emergencia. Está dirigida a los palestinos más vulnerables que viven en Siria, es decir, los que se encuentran actualmente desplazados y los que viven en regiones afectadas por el conflicto.

Además, el UNRWA ha recibido una subvención de 7,5 millones de euros de un paquete de ayuda regional financiado con 20 millones de euros del Instrumento de Estabilidad, adoptado en noviembre de 2012, para ayudar a los afectados por la crisis en el interior del país y en la región vecina. En Siria, el programa apoya los esfuerzos por mantener en funcionamiento los servicios existentes a pesar del actual conflicto. Algunas de las actividades apoyadas son el funcionamiento de un instrumento de microfinanciación, el acceso de los niños a las actividades educativas y la aplicación de medidas de seguridad para las instalaciones y el personal de las Naciones Unidas que ayuda a prestar servicios básicos a los refugiados palestinos y las comunidades de acogida.

([1]) http://www.pmof.ps/documents/10180/268204/feb.2013.eng.pdf

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001759/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Raimon Obiols (S&D)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — EU aid to the Palestinian Authority (PA) and UNRWA

Some weeks ago, the EU announced that it would provide EUR 100 million in aid to the Palestinian Authority (PA) and to support the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) to prevent any disruption to the provision of essential services.

Before this announcement, Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, urged other international donors to follow the EU's example to help the Palestinian people and to sustain the capacity of the PA and UNRWA.

The High Representative also said that along with the EUR 100 million in aid the EU would allocate an additional EUR 2 million in aid to rebuilding the homes of 100 Palestinian families living in the Jerash refugee camp in the north of Jordan.

1. Does the Vice-President/High Representative have information on other donors that have also provided aid to the PA and/or UNWRA since the beginning of this year?

2. Are mechanisms in place to analyse the implementation of EU aid in Palestinian National Development Plan reforms to improve the functioning of the Palestinian Administration and the provision of essential public services to the Palestinian people?

3. Does the Vice-President/High Representative plan to provide specific aid to the 500 000 Palestinian refugees in Syria who, according to UNRWA figures, are being affected by the country's national situation?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(6 May 2013)

The HR/VP does not have up to date records of aid funds UNRWA receives from other donors. There are indications that Japan has pledged USD 20 million to the General Fund and that smaller contributions have been promised from Turkey, Russia and Malaysia, with Brazil also possibly preparing a significant contribution. Saudi Arabia is contributing to UNRWA projects.

The Palestinian Authority's budget, including donor support, is available online on a monthly basis ([1]).

An evaluation of EU assistance to Palestine commenced in March 2013. Ongoing projects are also subject to Results Oriented Monitoring reports and internal monitoring from the EU Representative office in East Jerusalem.

The Commission provides humanitarian financial support to the Palestinian Refugees in Syria, through its humanitarian partner UNRWA, for a total amount of EUR 6.5 million. This aid focuses on life-saving activities, including health and emergency food. It targets the most vulnerable Palestinians living in Syria, i.e. those who are now displaced and those living in conflict-impacted regions.

Furthermore, UNWRA has received a grant of EUR 7.5 million from a regional support package funded with EUR 20 million from the Instrument for Stability, adopted in November 2012, to assist those affected by the crisis inside the country and the neighbouring region. In Syria, the programme supports efforts to maintain existing services in operation despite the ongoing conflict. Activities include support to the functioning of a micro-finance facility, assistance to maintain children's access to educational activities and the implementation of security measures for the facilities and of UN staff which help to deliver basic services to Palestinian refugees and host communities.

([1]) http://www.pmof.ps/documents/10180/268204/feb.2013.eng.pdf

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-001761/13
an die Kommission
Jörg Leichtfried (S&D)
(20. Februar 2013)

Betrifft: Urheberrecht im Binnenmarkt

Versucht man, sich mit einer österreichischen IP-Adresse einen in Dänemark produzierten Fernsehfilm auf der Webseite des deutschen, öffentlich-rechtlichen Fernsehsenders ZDF anzuschauen, wird einem der Zugriff auf ebendiesen Film verweigert. Der Zugriff ist nur innerhalb Deutschlands, das heißt mit einer in Deutschland registrierten IP-Adresse, möglich. Grund dafür ist offensichtlich, dass die Ausstrahlungsrechte vom ZDF nur für Deutschland erworben wurden; denn trotz bestehender Richtlinien, zuletzt der Richtlinie 2001/29/EG, mit denen die EU versucht, die Regeln zu harmonisieren, hat jeder Mitgliedstaat auch seine eigene Gesetzgebung zum Urheberrecht.

1. Ist die Einschränkung der Verfügbarkeit bestimmter Inhalte auf einzelne Mitgliedstaaten mit geltendem EU-Recht, insbesondere mit den vier Freiheiten des Binnenmarktes, vereinbar?

2. Gedenkt die Kommission, das Urheberrecht auf den gesamten europäischen Binnenmarkt auszuweiten bzw. die Regelungen der einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten weiter zu harmonisieren, und wenn ja, in welchem Zeitrahmen?

Antwort von Herrn Barnier im Namen der Kommission
(24. April 2013)

In den Rechtssachen C-403/08 und C-429/08 ging es um die verschlüsselte Live-Übertragung von Fußballspielen via Satellit im Kontext der Vertragsbestimmungen zum Waren- und Dienstleistungsverkehr und zum Wettbewerb sowie mehrerer Richtlinien ([1]). Die Anfrage des Herrn Abgeordneten bezieht sich jedoch auf die Übertragung von Fernsehsendungen im Internet, die unter Artikel 3 der Richtlinie 2001/29 (Recht der öffentlichen Wiedergabe) fällt. In der Rechtssache C-607/11 hat der Gerichtshof bestätigt, dass jede Sendung oder Weiterverbreitung eines Werks, die nach einem spezifischen technischen Verfahren erfolgt, grundsätzlich vom Urheber des betreffenden Werks einzeln erlaubt werden muss. Wurde lediglich die Online-Übertragung in einem Hoheitsgebiet erlaubt, kann der Dienstleistungsanbieter das Werk nicht ohne Genehmigung des Rechteinhabers darüber hinaus verbreiten. In erster Linie ist es Sache des Diensteanbieters, die Zusatzkosten für das Recht zur Ausstrahlung in mehr als einem Land gegenüber anderen Gesichtspunkten zu gewichten. Einige öffentlich-rechtliche Rundfunkanstalten berücksichtigen dabei gegebenenfalls auch den Umstand, dass sie aus Gebühren finanziert werden, die ausschließlich von Gebietsansässigen entrichtet werden.

Das Urheberrecht wurde auf der EU-Ebene weitgehend harmonisiert, insbesondere was ausschließliche wirtschaftliche Rechte anbelangt. In ihrer Mitteilung vom 18. Dezember 2012 ([2]) hat die Kommission die Frage der Gebietsbindung von Urheberrechten ausdrücklich thematisiert und angekündigt, im kommenden Jahr darüber zu befinden, ob sie einen Vorschlag zur Reform der aktuellen Gesetzgebung vorlegen wird. Darüber hinaus hat die Kommission vor kurzem das Forum „Lizenzen für Europa“ auf den Weg gebracht, in dem zusammen mit allen Beteiligten im Kontext des digitalen Binnenmarkts nach von der Wirtschaft getragenen Lösungen u. a. für den grenzüberschreitenden Inhaltezugang gesucht wird.

([1]) Richtlinie 98/84/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 20. November 1998 über den rechtlichen Schutz von zugangskontrollierten Diensten und von Zugangskontrolldiensten (ABl. L 320 vom 28.11.1998, S. 54), (die sogenannte Zugangskontrolldienste-Richtlinie); Richtlinie 93/83/EWG des Rates vom 27. September 1993 zur Koordinierung bestimmter urheber- und leistungsschutzrechtlicher Vorschriften betreffend Satellitenrundfunk und Kabelweiterverbreitung, ABl. L 248/1993, S. 15 (die sogenannte Satellitenrundfunkrichtlinie); Richtlinie 89/552/EWG des Rates vom 3. Oktober 1989 zur Koordinierung bestimmter Rechts- und Verwaltungsvorschriften der Mitgliedstaaten über die Ausübung der Fernsehtätigkeit (ABl. L 298/1989, S. 23), geändert durch die Richtlinie 97/36/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 30. Juni 1997 (ABl. L 202/1997, S. 60 (die Richtlinie über „Fernsehen ohne Grenzen“); Richtlinie 2001/29/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 22. Mai 2001 zur Harmonisierung bestimmter Aspekte des Urheberrechts und der verwandten Schutzrechte in der Informationsgesellschaft (ABl. L 167/2001, S. 10, Korrigendum in ABl. L 6/2002, S. 70 (die sogenannte Urheberrechtsrichtlinie).

([2]) Mitteilung der Kommission vom 18. Dezember 2012 über Inhalte im digitalen Binnenmarkt (KOM(2012) 789 endg.).

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001761/13
to the Commission
Jörg Leichtfried (S&D)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Copyright in the internal market

If someone with an Austrian IP address tries to view a television film produced in Denmark on the website of the German public service television broadcaster ZDF, access to this particular film is denied. Access is only possible within Germany, in other words using an IP address registered in Germany. The reason for this is clearly that ZDF has only acquired the broadcasting rights for Germany, as, despite existing directives, most recently Directive 2001/29/EC, with which the EU attempts to harmonise the rules, each Member State also has its own copyright legislation.

1. Is restricting the availability of particular content to individual Member States compatible with current EC law, in particular with the four freedoms of the internal market?

2. Does the Commission intend to extend copyright to the whole of the European internal market or to further harmonise the regulations of the individual Member States? If so, within what timeframe?

Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission
(24 April 2013)

Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 addressed questions related to satellite broadcasting of live football matches in the case of encrypted broadcasting services in the context of the Treaty rules on goods and services, competition and several directives ([1]). The question of the Honourable Member, however, concerns web-based transmissions of broadcasts and such transmissions fall under Article 3 of Directive 2001/29 which concerns the right of communication to the public. In Case C-607/11 the Court confirmed that each transmission of a work which uses a specific technical means must, as a rule, be individually authorised by the relevant rightholder. Where that right has only been licensed for online transmission in one territory, the service provider cannot communicate the works further without the authorisation of the rightholder. It is primarily up to the provider of the service to weigh the additional costs of clearing this right in more than one territory against other considerations. Some public broadcasters may also take into account that they are financed by fees that are exclusively paid by the public in their country of establishment.

There has been extensive harmonisation of copyright at EU level, in particular with regard to exclusive economic rights. In its communication of 18 December 2012 ([2]), the Commission explicitly addressed the issue of copyright territoriality in the internal market, and announced to take a decision in 2014 whether to table legislative reform proposals. In addition, the Commission has recently launched 'Licenses for Europe', a stakeholder dialogue on content in the Digital Single Market which aims at identifying industry-lead solutions concerning, *inter alia*, cross-border access to content.

([1]) Directive 98/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 1998 on the legal protection of services based on, or consisting of, conditional access (OJ 1998 L 320, p. 54; 'the Conditional Access Directive'); Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the coordination of certain rules concerning copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission (OJ 1993 L 248, p. 15; 'the Satellite Broadcasting Directive'); Council Directive 89/552/EEC of 3 October 1989 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities (OJ 1989 L 298, p. 23), as amended by Directive 97/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 1997 (OJ 1997 L 202, p. 60) ('the Television without Frontiers Directive'); Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society (OJ 2001 L 167, p. 10, corrigendum at OJ 2002 L 6, p. 70; 'the Copyright Directive').

([2]) Communication from the Commission of 18 December 2012 on content in the Digital Single Market (COM(2012) 789 final).

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-001762/13
an die Kommission
Angelika Werthmann (ALDE)
(20. Februar 2013)

Betrifft: Modifikation des Ley de Costas

Jüngsten Informationen zufolge wird die Änderung des Küstengesetzes (Ley de Costas) in Spanien als Instrument zur Stimulierung der Wirtschaft (insbesondere Bauboom) genutzt.

1. Ist dieser Umstand der Kommission bekannt?

2. Wenn ja, wie beurteilt die Kommission die Entwicklung, dass einerseits nahe der Küste große Gebäudekomplexe entstehen und andererseits zuvor private Bürger, wie zum Beispiel Fischer, „enteignet" wurden und werden?

3. Wie lässt sich eine solche Entwicklung unter dem Aspekt Küstenschutz/Umweltschutz/Naturschutz gegenüber den Bürgern, insbesondere den betroffenen Bürgerinnen und Bürgern, rechtfertigen?

Antwort von Herrn Potočnik im Namen der Kommission
(17. April 2013)

Die Kommission ist über den Rechtsetzungsprozess zur Änderung des spanischen *Ley de Costas* unterrichtet.

Die Kommission ist der Ansicht, dass die Strategien für das Management von Küstengebieten u. a. auf dem Schutz der Küstenumwelt, dem nachhaltigen Management der natürlichen Ressourcen und der Schaffung nachhaltig günstiger Bedingungen für die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und die Beschäftigungslage ([1]) basieren sollten.

Die Kommission wird prüfen, ob nach dem Inkrafttreten der geänderten Rechtsvorschriften besondere Maßnahmen erforderlich sind, um die Einhaltung des EU-Besitzstandes sicherzustellen.

([1]) Gemäß der Empfehlung des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates zur Umsetzung einer Strategie für ein integriertes Management der Küstengebiete in Europa, 2002/413/EG, ABl. L 148/24 vom 6.6.2002.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001762/13
to the Commission
Angelika Werthmann (ALDE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Changes to the *Ley de Costas* (Spanish Coastal Law)

According to recent information, the amendment of the Coastal Law (*Ley de Costas*) in Spain is being used as an instrument for stimulating the economy (in particular a construction boom).

1. Is the Commission aware of this situation?

2. If so, how does it view the developments taking place in that, on the one hand, large building complexes are being built near to the coast and, on the other, prior to this happening, private individuals, such as fishermen, have been and continue to be 'dispossessed'?

3. How can such developments be justified to citizens from the point of view of coastal/environmental protection and nature conservation, particularly those citizens affected by this?

Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission
(17 April 2013)

The Commission is aware of the legislative process to introduce amendments to the Spanish *Ley de Costas*.

The Commission considers that the strategies for the management of coastal areas should be based on the protection of the coastal environment, the sustainable management of natural resources and the creation of sustainable economic opportunities and employment options, *inter alia* ([1]).

The Commission will assess whether any particular action is needed to ensure the respect of the relevant EU *acquis* once the modified legislation has entered into force.

([1]) As stipulated by the recommendation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the implementation of Integrated Coastal Zone Management in Europe, 2002/413/EC, OJ L 148/24, 6.6.2002.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-001763/13
an die Kommission
Jutta Steinruck (S&D)
(20. Februar 2013)

Betrifft: Befristete Arbeitsverträge bei Berufsanfängern

In Deutschland findet jeder dritte Hochschulabsolvent nach seiner Ausbildung als erste Stelle nur eine befristete Tätigkeit. Besonders groß ist der Anteil an Berufseinsteigern mit befristeten Stellen an Hochschulen, in Krankenhäusern und in der öffentlichen Verwaltung. In Wissenschaftseinrichtungen liegt der Anteil sogar bei 81 % aller akademisch ausgebildeten Berufseinsteiger mit höchstens 3 Jahren Berufserfahrung. Hinzu kommt, dass die befristet Beschäftigten über bis zu 30 % weniger Einkommen verfügen als Absolventen mit unbefristeten Arbeitsverträgen.

Das führt bei den Beschäftigten zu einem erheblichen Einkommensnachteil und zu einer erheblichen psychischen Belastung durch die fehlende Sicherheit eines Einkommens. Hinzu kommt, dass mit der Umstellung der staatlichen Förderung von Hochschulabschlüssen auf Darlehensbasis der Start in das Arbeitsleben mit einer zusätzlichen finanziellen Belastung einhergeht.

Neben den individuellen Folgen für eine verlässliche Familienplanung und für die Anschaffung von Eigentum entstehen dadurch auch den Sozialkassen erhebliche Nachteile, da häufig Übergangszeiten von einem Vertrag in den nächsten als Arbeitslosigkeit überbrückt werden.

Kann die Kommission dazu folgende Frage beantworten:

— Gibt es Daten aus anderen europäischen Ländern zum Anteil an befristeten Arbeitsverträgen für Hochschulabsolventen mit weniger als drei Jahren Berufserfahrung?

Antwort von Herrn Šemeta im Namen der Kommission
(30. April 2013)

Die Kommission verfügt über keine Informationen darüber, wie hoch der Anteil befristeter Arbeitsverträge bei Hochschulabsolventen mit weniger als drei Jahren Berufserfahrung ist. Die Arbeitskräfteerhebung der Europäischen Union gibt allerdings Aufschluss über den Anteil der Beschäftigten im Alter von 25 bis 34, die Hochschulabsolventen sind (d. h. mit abgeschlossener Hochschulbildung laut Definition nach der Klassifikation ISCED ([1])) und lediglich einen befristeten Arbeitsvertrag ([2]) haben. Folgende Tabelle enthält den durchschnittlichen Prozentsatz der drei aktuellsten verfügbaren Jahre.

Anteil der Beschäftigten mit einem befristeten Vertrag (Durchschnitt 2009-2011, ISCED 5-6, Alter: 25-34):

BE:	16%
BG:	2 %
CZ:	13 %
DK:	19 %
DE:	27 %
EE:	2 %
IE:	12 %
EL:	20 %
ES:	41 %
FR:	20 %
IT:	39 %
CY:	16 %
LV:	2 %
LT:	1 %
LU:	15 %
HU:	10 %
MT:	5 %
NL:	27 %
AT:	23 %
PL:	33 %
PT:	57 %
RO:	2 %
SI:	39 %
SK:	6 %
FI:	31 %
SE:	31 %
UK:	8 %

([1]) ISCED-Stufen 5 und 6. Näheres zur ISCED (auf Englisch): http://www.uis.unesco.org/Library/Documents/isced97-en.pdf

([2]) Beschäftigte mit einer befristeten Tätigkeit/einem befristeten Vertrag sind Beschäftigte, deren Hauptarbeitsverhältnis entweder nach einer im Vorhinein festgesetzten Dauer endet oder nach einer nicht von vornherein bekannten, jedoch von objektiven Bedingungen abhängenden Dauer. Dies umfasst saisonale Arbeitskräfte, von einem Zeitarbeitsunternehmen beschäftigte Personen, die zur Ausführung eines „Arbeitsauftrags" an Dritte weiterverliehen werden (es sei denn, es liegt ein unbefristeter Arbeitsvertrag mit dem Zeitarbeitsunternehmen vor), und Personen mit bestimmten Ausbildungsverträgen, die eine Vergütung einschließen (Auszubildende, Trainees).

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001763/13
to the Commission
Jutta Steinruck (S&D)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Fixed-term employment contracts for career entrants

In Germany, the first job obtained by one in three graduates after finishing their training is one with a fixed-term contract only. The proportion of career entrants with fixed-term posts in universities, hospitals and public administration is particularly high. In scientific institutions, this is the case for as much as 81% of all career entrants with academic qualifications and no more than three years' professional experience. Moreover, the income of employees with fixed-term contracts is up to 30% lower than that of graduates with permanent employment contracts.

This results in a considerable disadvantage in terms of income for these employees and in a great deal of psychological stress on account of the lack of a secure income. In addition, with the switch to a loan system for the State support for university degrees, graduates are starting their working lives with an additional financial burden.

In addition to the consequences for individuals in terms of reliable family planning and the acquisition of property, this is also extremely problematic for the social security system, as periods between one contract and the next are frequently bridged by unemployment.

In light of the above, can the Commission answer the following:

- Are there any data from other European countries on the proportion of fixed-term employment contracts held by graduates with less than three years' professional experience?

Answer given by Mr Šemeta on behalf of the Commission
(30 April 2013)

The Commission has no information on the proportion of fixed-term employment contracts held by graduates with less than three years' professional experience. However, the European Union Labour Force Survey provides data on the proportion of employees aged 25-34 who are graduates (defined as having completed tertiary education according to the ISCED classification ([1])) and have a fixed-term contract ([2]). The table below averages the three most recent years available.

Proportion of employees having a temporary contract of limited duration
(Average 2009-2011, ISCED 5-6, Age 25-34):

BE:	16%
BG:	2 %
CZ:	13 %
DK:	19 %
DE:	27 %
EE:	2 %
IE:	12 %
EL:	20 %
ES:	41 %
FR:	20 %
IT:	39 %
CY:	16 %
LV:	2 %
LT:	1 %

([1]) ISCED codes 5 and 6. Details of ISCED found in http://www.uis.unesco.org/Library/Documents/isced97-en.pdf

([2]) Employees with a limited duration job/contract are employees whose main job will terminate either after a period fixed in advance, or after a period not known in advance, but nevertheless defined by objective criteria. This group includes persons with a seasonal job, persons engaged by a temporary employment agency and hired out to a third party for the carrying out of a 'work mission' (unless there is a work contract of unlimited duration with the employment agency) and persons with specific paid training contracts (apprentices, trainees).

LU:	15 %
HU:	10 %
MT:	5 %
NL:	27 %
AT:	23 %
PL:	33 %
PT:	57 %
RO:	2 %
SI:	39 %
SK:	6 %
FI:	31 %
SE:	31 %
UK:	8 %

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-001764/13
προς την Επιτροπή
Nikos Chrysogelos (Verts/ALE)
(20 Φεβρουαρίου 2013)

Θέμα: Επιπτώσεις στη δημόσια υγεία και την οικονομία από το λαθρεμπόριο καυσίμων

Σύμφωνα με το Υπουργείο Οικονομικών, η αύξηση του Ειδικού Φόρου Κατανάλωσης στο πετρέλαιο θέρμανσης στο 80% του πετρελαίου κίνησης αύξησε τα έσοδα του κράτους από φόρους κατά περίπου 5,189 εκατομμύρια ευρώ στο τρίμηνο Οκτωβρίου-Δεκεμβρίου 2012 ([1]) και συνέβαλε στη μείωση του λαθρεμπορίου καυσίμων. Δημιουργήθηκαν όμως και πολλά άλλα προβλήματα. Το Υπουργείο εκτιμά πάντως ότι η συνολική απώλεια εσόδων από το λαθρεμπόριο — κυρίως μέσω του ναυτιλιακού πετρελαίου — εξακολουθεί να ανέρχεται στα 600 εκατ. ευρώ ([2]). Παρόλα αυτά, το ΣΔΟΕ εξακολουθεί να μη διενεργεί ελέγχους για την αντιμετώπιση του λαθρεμπορίου καυσίμων αξιοποιώντας τα 2 σκάφη που έχει στη διάθεσή του, λόγω έλλειψης προσωπικού, όπως παραδέχθηκε στη Βουλή ο υφυπουργός Οικονομικών ([3]). Το λαθρεμπόριο πετρελαίου όμως έχει και σημαντικές επιπτώσεις στο περιβάλλον και τη δημόσια υγεία. Σύμφωνα με τα συμπεράσματα του διαλόγου που πραγματοποίησε το Ecocity ([4]), το πετρέλαιο που είναι προϊόν νοθείας με πετρέλαιο θέρμανσης ή ναυτιλίας έχει υψηλότερη περιεκτικότητα σε θείο, με αποτέλεσμα να παρατηρείται αύξηση της πρωτογενούς εκπομπής μικροσωματιδίων από τον κινητήρα, ιδιαίτερα αυτών που ανήκουν στην κατηγορία των ultrafine με διάμετρο της τάξεως των 10 nm, πράγμα που αποτελεί μεγαλύτερη απειλή για τη δημόσια υγεία, καθώς τα μικρότερα σωματίδια εισχωρούν βαθύτερα στους πνεύμονες. Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Έχει ενημέρωση από τις ελληνικές αρχές για το ύψος της φοροδιαφυγής από το λαθρεμπόριο καυσίμων; Επιβεβαιώνει ότι το μεγαλύτερο ποσοστό προέρχεται από το πετρέλαιο ναυτιλίας;

2. Έχει ενημέρωση από τις ελληνικές αρχές σχετικά με την πορεία θέσπισης της μοριακής ιχνηθέτησης για όλα τα καύσιμα;

3. Υπάρχει πρόνοια σχετικά με την ενίσχυση της Ελλάδας με προσωπικό και μέσα για την αντιμετώπιση της φοροδιαφυγής από το λαθρεμπόριο καυσίμων; Έχουν εξεταστεί λύσεις με εφαρμογή συστήματος AIS σε οχήματα μεταφοράς καυσίμων;

4. Έχουν εξεταστεί τρόποι συγχρηματοδότησης της εφαρμογής του συστήματος ηλεκτρονικής παρακολούθησης των ποσοτήτων που πωλούνται από τις αντλίες καυσίμων;

5. Προτίθεται να συνεργαστεί με τις ελληνικές αρχές έτσι ώστε η απελευθέρωση της πετρελαιοκίνησης σε Αθήνα και Θεσσαλονίκη, που έγινε χωρίς προηγουμένως να αντιμετωπισθεί αποτελεσματικά το λαθρεμπόριο καυσίμων, να μην καταλήξει να επιδεινώσει τη δημόσια υγεία;

Απάντηση του κ. Šemeta εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(6 Ιουνίου 2013)

Εναπόκειται στα κράτη μέλη να συλλέγουν φόρους και να ασχολούνται άμεσα με τη φορολογική απάτη και τη φοροδιαφυγή. Οι υπηρεσίες της Επιτροπής δεν έχουν ενημερωθεί για εκτεταμένες περιπτώσεις θαλάσσιας διακίνησης καυσίμων που φέρονται ως έχουσες σημαντικό αντίκτυπο στο περιβάλλον και τη δημόσια υγεία. Λαμβάνοντας αυτό υπόψη, οι ερωτήσεις που σχετίζονται με πιθανά εφαρμοστέα μέτρα θα πρέπει να απευθυνθούν στην Ελλάδα.

Ωστόσο, οι υπηρεσίες της Επιτροπής θα εξετάσουν το θέμα στο πλαίσιο της εν εξελίξει τεχνικής βοήθειας που παρέχεται στη νεοσυσταθείσα Γενική Γραμματεία Δημοσίων Εσόδων (SGPR), στην οποία θα μεταφερθεί η ευθύνη του ΣΔΟΕ για την αντιμετώπιση του παράνομου εμπορίου.

([1]) «ΕΦΚ στα καύσιμα: Μια εκ των υστέρων αξιολόγηση του μέτρου», Άρθρο Αναπληρωτή Υπουργού Οικονομικών κ. Χρήστου Σταϊκούρα στη Real News, 20.1.2013. http://goo.gl/kOh7J
([2]) Ευρεία σύσκεψη για το λαθρεμπόριο καυσίμων. http://goo.gl/wDpyv
([3]) Πρακτικά Βουλής 19/11/2012, σελίδα 167. http://goo.gl/tEoCF
([4]) Καταγγελία του Ecocity στην ΕΕ για το λαθρεμπόριο και τις επιπτώσεις στη χώρα μας. http://goo.gl/j9Lv6

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001764/13
to the Commission
Nikos Chrysogelos (Verts/ALE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Public health and economic impact of fuel trafficking

The Finance Ministry has announced that, following a hike in excise duties on heating oil to 80% of those on diesel oil, tax revenue was increased by around EUR 5 189 million in the fourth quarter of 2012 (October to December) ([1]). Furthermore, the measure has also helped to reduce fuel trafficking. However, many other problems have arisen. The Ministry estimates that a total of around EUR 600 million in revenue is still being lost as a result of such trafficking, principally in marine fuel ([2]). Despite this, the SDOE, the Greek organisation responsible for the prevention and investigation of financial crimes, is still failing to make full use of the two vessels at its disposal to clamp down on such practices, as admitted in Parliament ([3]) by the Deputy Finance Minister, who attributed this to manning shortages. At the same time, fuel trafficking is having a major impact on the environment and public health. According to the findings of the ECOCITY dialogue ([4]), diesel fuel adulterated with heating oil or marine fuel has a higher sulphur content, resulting in increased primary emissions of micro particles from vehicles, particularly those in the ultrafine category, i.e. around 10nm in diameter, which penetrate the lungs more deeply and accordingly pose a greater public health threat.

In view of this:

1. Has the Commission received any information from the Greek authorities regarding the extent of tax evasion related to fuel trafficking? Is it true that this principally concerns marine fuels?

2. Has it received information from the Greek authorities regarding progress made in particle tracking for all fuels?

3. Are measures being taken to step up manpower and resources in Greece to combat tax evasion arising from fuel trafficking? Has consideration been given to the possibilities of applying the AIS system to road tankers?

4. Has consideration been given to possible funding for the electronic monitoring of fuel volumes from petrol pumps?

5. Will it take measures in cooperation with the Greek authorities to ensure that, in the absence of any previous measures to combat fuel trafficking effectively, diesel fuel deregulation in Athens and Thessaloniki will not have any negative impact on public health?

Answer given by Mr Šemeta on behalf of the Commission
(6 June 2013)

It is a matter for Member States to collect taxes and to deal directly with tax fraud and tax evasion. The Commission services have not been informed of widespread cases of marine fuel trafficking having a major impact on the environment and public health. Taking this into account, the questions related to possible measures to be implemented should be addressed to Greece.

However, the Commission services will look into this matter in the context of the ongoing technical assistance provided to the newly created Secretariat General for Public Revenue (SGPR), to whom the responsibility of the SDOE for tackling illicit trade will be transferred.

([1]) Excise duty on fuel: *ex-post* assessment — article by Christos Staikouras, Deputy Finance Minister in Real News, 20 January 2013 htttp://goo.gl/kOh7J
([2]) Wide-ranging debate on fuel trafficking http:/goo.gl/wDpyv
([3]) Parliamentary records of 19 November 2012, p. 167 http:/goo.gl/tEoCF
([4]) Complaint by ECOCITY to the EU regarding trafficking and its impact on Greece http:/goo.gl/j9Lv6

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-001766/13
προς την Επιτροπή
Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)
(20 Φεβρουαρίου 2013)

Θέμα: Αποτελεσματική λειτουργία Ειδικής Υπηρεσίας Επιθεωρητών Περιβάλλοντος στην Ελλάδα

Με βάση τη σύσταση 2001/331/ΕΚ του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου, λειτούργησε το 2004 στην Ελλάδα η Ειδική Υπηρεσία Επιθεωρητών Περιβάλλοντος (ΕΥΕΠ). Στόχος της Υπηρεσίας είναι η παρακολούθηση της εφαρμογής της κείμενης περιβαλλοντικής νομοθεσίας και της τήρησης των περιβαλλοντικών όρων για την πραγματοποίηση έργων. Η ΕΥΕΠ, έχει πραγματοποιήσει μέχρι το 2011 περίπου 2 000 επιθεωρήσεις σε συστήματα υποδομών, βιομηχανίες, έργα υποδομών, κ.α. και έχει επιδείξει πολύ σημαντικό έργο.

Η ΕΥΕΠ χρηματοδοτείται από το συγχρηματοδοτούμενο έργο «Συνέχιση της υποστήριξης λειτουργίας της Ειδικής Υπηρεσίας Επιθεωρητών Περιβάλλοντος - Πανελλαδικά».

Με δεδομένο ότι, στο πλαίσιο διοικητικών αλλαγών, η ελληνική κυβέρνηση αποφάσισε πρόσφατα τη μείωση των επιθεωρητών της ΕΥΕΠ αλλά και την υποβάθμιση της ΕΥΕΠ από Ειδική Γραμματεία σε Τμήμα του Υπουργείου Περιβάλλοντος, με αποτέλεσμα να χάνεται ο όποιος βαθμός ανεξαρτησίας της, ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Θα εξακολουθήσει να υπάρχει συγχρηματοδότηση από ευρωπαϊκούς πόρους στην υπηρεσία, αν γίνει υπηρεσία του Υπουργείου;

2. Τι δυνατότητες διαθέτει η Επιτροπή να πείσει την ελληνική κυβέρνηση να διατηρηθεί η όποια ανεξαρτησία διαθέτει μέχρι σήμερα η εν λόγω υπηρεσία, στην οποία ανεξαρτησία οφείλεται κυρίως το θετικό έργο που μέχρι σήμερα η υπηρεσία έχει προσφέρει;

Απάντηση του κ. Potočnik εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(15 Απριλίου 2013)

Οι εθνικές αρχές είναι οι αρμόδιες για την επιλογή των έργων που θα συγχρηματοδοτηθούν από την ΕΕ. Επιπλέον, ελλείψει σχετικής ενωσιακής νομοθεσίας, η Επιτροπή δεν είναι σε θέση να παρέμβει όσον αφορά την οργάνωση ή τη λειτουργία της Ειδικής Υπηρεσίας Επιθεωρητών Περιβάλλοντος. Τα εν λόγω θέματα εμπίπτουν αποκλειστικά στην αρμοδιότητα των κρατών μελών.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001766/13
to the Commission
Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Effectiveness of the Greek special environmental inspectorate

In accordance with the recommendation of the European Parliament and the Council (2001/331/EC), the EYEP (Special environmental inspectorate) was set up in Greece in 2004 to monitor compliance by projected works with environmental legislation and standards. By 2011, it had amply proved its worth, having carried out around 2000 inspections of infrastructural systems, projects, factories, etc.

It is funded under arrangements to ensure continued support for the operation of the pan-Hellenic special environmental inspectorate.

Following administrative restructuring, the Greek Government has recently decided to cut the number of EYEP inspectors and downgrade its special inspectorate status to that of an Environment Ministry department with a resulting loss of independence.

In view of this:

1. Can the Commission say whether the inspectorate will continue to receive EU funding if it becomes a ministry department?

2. What pressure can the Commission bring to bear on the Greek Government with a view to ensuring that the inspectorate retains its present degree of independence, which is largely to thank for its impressive results to date?

Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission
(15 April 2013)

It is the national authorities that are responsible for the selection of actions to be co-financed by EU funding. Furthermore, in the absence of any relevant EU legislation, the Commission is not in a position to intervene as regards the organisation or the functioning of the special environmental inspectorate. Such issues fall exclusively within the competence of Member States.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-001767/13
προς την Επιτροπή
Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)
(20 Φεβρουαρίου 2013)

Θέμα: Επιβολή κυρώσεων για παραβάσεις περιβαλλοντικής νομοθεσίας στην Ελλάδα

Η Ειδική Υπηρεσία Επιθεωρητών Περιβάλλοντος (ΕΥΕΠ) στην Ελλάδα είναι η αρμόδια υπηρεσία που πραγματοποιεί περιβαλλοντικούς ελέγχους για την τήρηση της περιβαλλοντικής νομοθεσίας και των περιβαλλοντικών όρων, και εισηγείται στην πολιτική ηγεσία πρόστιμα. Σύμφωνα με τις ετήσιες εκθέσεις της ΕΥΕΠ, κατά την διάρκεια του 2010 συνέταξε προτάσεις επιβολής προστίμων στα κατά νόμο αρμόδια όργανα επιβολής τους, συνολικού ύψους 5 521 035,00 ευρώ, και κατά το έτος 2011 προτάσεις προστίμων συνολικού ύψους 4 013 950,00 ευρώ.

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Πόσες από τις εισηγήσεις της ΕΥΕΠ έχουν υπογραφεί από τις αρμόδιες αρχές και τι χρηματικό ποσό έχει τελικά εισπραχθεί από το κράτος κατά τα έτη 2010-2012; Ποιες είναι οι κατά νόμο αρμόδιες αρχές για την τελική επιβολή των περιβαλλοντικών προστίμων στην Ελλάδα;

2. Γιατί, στην περίπτωση παραβιάσεων της περιβαλλοντικής νομοθεσίας στην Ελλάδα, δεν ισχύει το ίδιο όπως ισχύει π.χ. στις παραβιάσεις φορολογικών υποθέσεων που, όταν επιβάλλεται ένα πρόστιμο από τις αρχές και μέχρι να τελεσιδικήσει η υπόθεση (σε περίπτωση ένστασης), υποχρεώνεται ο «κατηγορούμενος» να καταβάλλει μέρος του προστίμου;

Απάντηση του κ. Potočnik εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(19 Απριλίου 2013)

Οι ερωτήσεις του Αξιότιμου Μέλους αφορούν θέματα τα οποία υπάγονται στην αρμοδιότητα της Ελλάδας. Η Επιτροπή δεν διαθέτει πληροφορίες για τα θέματα αυτά.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001767/13
to the Commission
Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Penalties for infringement of environmental legislation in Greece

The EYEP, the Greek special environmental inspectorate, is responsible for monitoring compliance with environmental legislation and standards and recommending fines to be imposed by the authorities for any infringement thereof.

Its annual reports reveal that it recommended imposition by the authorities legally responsible of fines totalling EUR 5 521 035 in 2010 and EUR 4 013 950 in 2011.

In view of this:

1. What proportion of fines recommended by the EYEP was endorsed by the competent authorities and what was the corresponding state revenue for the period 2010-2012? Which are the authorities legally responsible for imposing environmental fines in Greece?

2. Why is it that the arrangements applicable with regard to alleged tax infringements, for example, requiring the 'accused' to pay an advance on the amount of the fine being sought by the authorities pending the final ruling (in case of appeal) do not also apply to infringements of environmental law?

Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission
(19 April 2013)

The questions raised by the Honourable Member relate to issues which fall within the responsibility of Greece. The Commission does not possess any information on the subjects mentioned.

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001768/13
a la Comisión
Ana Miranda (Verts/ALE)
(20 de febrero de 2013)

Asunto: El uso de las lenguas oficiales

En respuesta a la Pregunta E-009021/2012, Michel Barnier afirmó lo siguiente:

«En términos generales, la Comisión Europea ha declarado, en repetidas ocasiones, que las lenguas deben ser un factor de integración en vez de exclusión, y que los requisitos que limitan la libertad de circulación o el acceso a los mercados por razones de competencias lingüísticas deben justificarse debidamente».

Algunas comunidades autónomas del Reino de España tienen otra lengua oficial además del español. Un ejemplo de ello es la comunidad autónoma del País Vasco, donde tanto el vasco como el español son lenguas oficiales.

¿Considera la Comisión que está debidamente justificado que se haga de las competencias en determinadas lenguas un requisito para el acceso a los mercados donde estas son oficiales?

Respuesta de la Sra. Vassiliou en nombre de la Comisión
(22 de abril de 2013)

La Comisión confirma que, como principio general, cualquier limitación a la libre circulación o al acceso a los mercados debe estar debidamente justificada por una razón imperiosa de interés general y ha de ser proporcionada.

Respecto a la cuestión que expone Su Señoría, que se refiere al planteamiento general seguido por la Comisión cuando dichas restricciones están motivadas por exigencias lingüísticas, la Comisión considera que toda ocasión en que se haga de las competencias en determinadas lenguas un requisito para el acceso a los mercados, cuando las lenguas en cuestión sean lenguas oficiales, solo puede evaluarse caso por caso.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001768/13
to the Commission
Ana Miranda (Verts/ALE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Use of official languages

In answer to Question E-009021/2012, Mr Barnier stated the following:

'As a general rule, the European Commission has repeatedly stated that languages should be a factor of integration, rather than of exclusion, and that conditions limiting the freedom of circulation or the access to markets on the basis of language competences should be duly justified.'

Some of the Autonomous Communities of the Kingdom of Spain have another official language besides Spanish. One example of this is the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country, where both Basque and Spanish are official languages.

Does the Commission consider that making competences in certain languages a requirement for access to markets where they are official is duly justified?

Answer given by Ms Vassiliou on behalf of the Commission
(22 April 2013)

The Commission confirms that, as a matter of principle, any limitation to freedom of movement or access to markets would need to be duly justified by an overriding reason of public interest and proportionate.

As regards the specific question posed by the Honourable Member, which concerns the general approach followed by the Commission when such restrictions are motivated by language requirements, the Commission takes the view that any instance of making competences in certain languages a requirement for access to markets, in those cases where the languages concerned are official languages, can only be assessed on a case-by-case basis.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001769/13
to the Commission
Nicole Sinclaire (NI)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: EU aid volunteers

The Commission's 'EU aid volunteers' proposal includes a budget of EUR 239.1 million, which will be used for an extensive training package (EUR 58 million), deployment (EUR 137 million), capacity-building in communities hit by disasters (EUR 35 million), and supporting activities.

Can the Commission explain which budget line this funding is to be drawn from?

Also, will this figure now be affected by the new agreements on the EU budget?

Answer given by Ms Georgieva on behalf of the Commission
(5 April 2013)

The 'EU Aid Volunteers' proposal will be financed, as from the EU budget 2014, from the newly created budget line 23.04.01, in Chapter 23.04. It is to be noted that the Preparatory Action for the Instrument — European Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps has been funded from the budget line 23.02.04 for the years 2011, 2012 and 2013, i.e. from Chapter 23.02 ('Humanitarian aid including aid to uprooted people, food aid and disaster preparedness').

With respect to the amount for the new 'EU Aid Volunteers', clearly the European Council agreement of 7-8 February 2013, which is nonetheless subject to the agreement by Parliament, will lead to a reconsideration of the amounts of all external programmes, given the proposed reduction of 16.14% for Heading 4. It is however premature to indicate what would be the concrete impact on this proposal, given that the negotiations are currently ongoing at Interinstitutional level, as well as within the Commission.

(Svensk version)

Frågor för skriftligt besvarande E-001770/13
till kommissionen (Vice-ordföranden / Höga representanten)
Amelia Andersdotter (Verts/ALE)
(20 februari 2013)

Angående: VP/HR – utrikestjänstens slutsatser om begränsade förluster till följd av it-brottslighet

I sitt pressmeddelande av den 7 februari 2013 ([1]) informerar Europeiska utrikestjänsten om den aktuella situationen vad gäller it-säkerhet, inklusive följande uttalande om it-brottslighet: ”de som utsätts för it-brott världen över förlorar sammanlagt cirka 290 miljarder euro varje år och […] it-brottsligheten [genererar] vinster på 750 miljarder euro årligen”.

Vilka slutsatser drar Europeiska utrikestjänsten av det faktum att de förluster som it-brottsligheten ger upphov till tycks vara mindre än hälften så stora som de vinster som samma verksamhet genererar?

Svar från den höga representanten/vice ordföranden Catherine Ashton på kommissionens vägnar
(14 maj 2013)

Att bekämpa it-brottslighet på global nivå är en krävande uppgift som EU är aktivt engagerad i. Det citerade pressmeddelandet innehåller följande statistiska uppgifter: ”Symantec uppskattar att de som utsätts för it-brott världen över förlorar sammanlagt cirka 290 miljarder euro varje år och enligt en studie som gjorts av McAfee genererar it-brottsligheten vinster på 750 miljarder euro årligen”.

Det handlar om två separata uppskattningar i olika undersökningar som inte har något samband med varandra. EEAS kan inte kommentera hur man har kommit fram till dessa uppskattningar i undersökningarna. Det är emellertid viktigt att notera att även om statistiken kan variera – bland annat på grund av olika definitioner av it-brottslighet och betydande underrapportering – råder det allmän enighet om att it-brottsligheten är på uppgång och att både EU-länder och andra länder måste göra gemensamma ansträngningar för att problemet ska kunna hanteras på ett effektivt sätt.

([1]) http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-94_en.htm

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001770/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Amelia Andersdotter (Verts/ALE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — EEAS conclusions on limited losses resulting from cybercrime

In its press release of 7 February 2013 ([1]), the External Action Service makes a number of points about the current situation as regards cybersecurity, including the following statement on cybercrime: 'cybercrime victims worldwide lose around EUR 290 billion each year, while […] cybercrime profits [are put] at EUR 750 billion a year'.

What conclusions has the EEAS drawn from the fact that the losses resulting from cybercrime appear to be less than half as bad as the gains derived from those same activities?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(14 May 2013)

Fighting cybercrime worldwide is an ambitious task that the EU is actively engaged in. The statistics in the press release cited read as 'Symantec estimates that cybercrime victims worldwide lose around EUR 290 billion each year, while a McAfee study put cybercrime profits at EUR 750 billion a year.'

These are two separate estimates by different studies which bear no relation to one another. The EEAS cannot comment on how the studies arrived at their estimates. However, it is important to note that while statistics may vary — *inter alia* due to different definitions of cybercrime and significant underreporting — there is universal agreement that cybercrime is on the rise and an effective response requires a concerted effort across all Member States and beyond.

([1]) http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-94_en.htm

(Dansk udgave)

Forespørgsel til skriftlig besvarelse E-001771/13
til Kommissionen
Christel Schaldemose (S&D), Marisa Matias (GUE/NGL) og Baroness Sarah Ludford (ALDE)
(20. februar 2013)

Om: EU's indsats efter Europa-Parlamentets beslutning om tackling af diabetesepidemien i EU.

Diabetes er en af Europas største folkesundhedsudfordringer. I Den Europæiske Union skønnes sygdommen at berøre mere end 32 mio. borgere (næsten 10 % af den samlede befolkning i EU), med yderligere 32 mio. borgere, der endnu ikke er diagnosticeret, eller som har prædiabetes. I dag tegner diabetes sig for over 10 % af sundhedsudgifterne i de fleste EU-medlemsstater ([1]).

Den 14. marts 2012 vedtog Europa-Parlamentet en beslutning om tackling af diabetesepidemien i EU (P7_TA(2012)0082). I beslutningen opfordres Kommissionen bl.a. til at udvikle og gennemføre en målrettet EU-diabetesstrategi, ligesom medlemsstaterne opfordres til at udvikle, gennemføre og overvåge nationale diabetesprogrammer.

Kan Kommissionen på den baggrund oplyse følgende:

1. Hvornår planlægger Kommissionen at afslutte sin igangværende overvejelse omkring kroniske sygdomme, og vil den anbefale særlige foranstaltninger til at sætte en stopper for den voksende diabetesepidemi?

2. Har Kommissionen truffet, eller har den planer om at træffe foranstaltninger til at følge op på Europa-Parlamentets beslutning om tackling af diabetesepidemien i EU og sikre en rettidig gennemførelse af Parlamentets opfordringer både på EU-plan og på nationalt plan?

3. Overvejer Kommissionen muligheden af at udvikle en mere målrettet EU-diabetesstrategi?

4. Hvordan agter Kommissionen af sikre, at diabetesforskningen får en tilstrækkeligt fremtrædende plads i det kommende rammeprogram for forskning Horisont 2020?

Svar afgivet på Kommissionens vegne af Tonio Borg
(16. april 2013)

Udfaldet af refleksionsprocessen mellem medlemsstater og Kommissionen vil blive drøftet i Rådets arbejdsgruppe på højt niveau for folkesundhed under det litauiske formandskab. Denne proces har til formål at kortlægge mangler og områder med merværdi i EU's indsats over for kroniske sygdomme snarere end at fremsætte anbefalinger vedrørende individuelle sygdomme.

I overensstemmelse med Parlamentets beslutning gennemfører Kommissionen tiltag vedrørende forebyggelse, forvaltning og forskning inden for diabetes. Den behandler diabetes som en prioritet inden for indsatsen vedrørende de fælles risikofaktorer for alvorlige kroniske sygdomme, især ernæring og manglende motion. Kommissionen har for eksempel finansieret flere projekter, der vedrører diabetes, under sundhedsprogrammet. Derudover er man ved at udarbejde en fælles indsats mellem medlemsstaterne og Kommissionen, der medfinansieres af sundhedsprogrammet. En del af denne indsats er specifikt rettet mod type II-diabetes med henblik på at undersøge hindringer for forebyggelse, screening og behandling af diabetes for at forbedre koordineringen mellem medlemsstaterne.

([1]) Diabetes — The Policy Puzzle: towards benchmarking in the EU 27 (2007). http://www.idf.org/sites/default/files/ThePolicyPuzzleBook.pdf

I det sjette og syvende rammeprogram for forskning og teknologisk udvikling finansierede Kommissionen flere forskningsprojekter inden for ernæring ([2]) og sund livsstil ([3]) samt nedbringelse af mængden af salt, fedt og sukker i fødevarer ([4]). Kommissionens forslag til Horisont 2020 (2014-2020) ([5]) udpeger sundhed og fødevaresikkerhed som to af de seks samfundsmæssige udfordringer, der skal klares. Denne tilgang giver mulighed for tværfaglige synergier og fællestræk for forebyggelse, diagnosticering og behandling af kroniske sygdomme, herunder diabetes. Derudover er Kommissionen for nylig gået med i organisationen Global Alliance for Chronic Diseases ([6]), der har identificeret type II-diabetes som den næste store udfordring.

([2]) IDEFIX (Identification and prevention of dietary and lifestyle-induced health effects in children and infants) — http://www.eufic.org/article/en/rid/idefics-diet-lifestyle-health-children-infants/.
EARLY NUTRITION (Long-term effects of early nutrition on later health) — http://www.project-earlynutrition.eu/.

([3]) EATWELL (Interventions to promote healthy eating habits: evaluation and recommendations http://www.eatwellproject.eu/ En cache — Pages similaires .
I.FAMILY (Determinants of eating behaviour in European children, adolescents and their parents) — http://www.ifamilystudy.eu/project-information/.

([4]) PLEASURE (novel processing approaches for the development of food products low in fat, salt and sugar reduced) — http://www.eurofir.net/about_us/projects/pleasure.
TERIFIQ (Combining Technologies to achieve significant binary Reductions in Sodium, Fat and Sugar content in everyday foods whilst optimizing their nutritional Quality) — http://www.terifiq.eu/.

([5]) http://ec.europa.eu/research/horizon2020/index_en.cfm?pg=h2020-documents.

([6]) http://www.gacd.org/research/priorities/priorities.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-001771/13
à Comissão
Christel Schaldemose (S&D), Marisa Matias (GUE/NGL) e Baroness Sarah Ludford (ALDE)
(20 de fevereiro de 2013)

Assunto: Ação da UE na sequência da resolução do Parlamento Europeu sobre as medidas para fazer face à epidemia de diabetes

A diabetes é um dos maiores desafios da Europa no domínio da saúde pública. Calcula-se que haja, na União Europeia, mais de 32 milhões de cidadãos afetados (cerca de 10 % da população total da UE) e outros 32 milhões de pessoas ainda não diagnosticadas ou padecendo de pré-diabetes. Atualmente, a diabetes é responsável por mais de 10 % das despesas de saúde na maioria dos Estados-Membros da UE ([1]).

Em 14 de março de 2012, o Parlamento aprovou uma resolução sobre as medidas para fazer face à epidemia de diabetes na UE (P7_TA(2012)0082). Este documento exorta a Comissão a desenvolver e a pôr em prática uma estratégia para a diabetes à escala da UE e os Estados-Membros a desenvolverem, executarem e monitorizarem programas nacionais de combate a esta doença.

1. Quando é que a Comissão pretende concluir o processo de reflexão em curso sobre as doenças crónicas e recomendar ações específicas para pôr termo à galopante epidemia de diabetes?

2. A Comissão encetou, ou tenciona encetar, ações de acompanhamento da resolução do Parlamento sobre as medidas para fazer face à epidemia de diabetes na UE, salvaguardando a sua aplicação em tempo útil, quer a nível da UE, quer no plano nacional?

3. Pondera a Comissão o desenvolvimento de uma estratégia mais focalizada de combate à diabetes na UE?

4. De que forma tenciona a Comissão garantir que a pesquisa sobre a diabetes integre o próximo Programa-Quadro de Investigação Horizonte 2020?

Resposta dada por Tonio Borg em nome da Comissão
(16 de abril de 2013)

Os resultados do processo de reflexão entre os Estados-Membros e a Comissão serão discutidos no Grupo de Trabalho do Conselho em matéria de Saúde Pública reunido ao nível de altos funcionários, sob a presidência da Lituânia. Este processo tem por objetivo identificar as lacunas e as áreas de valor acrescentado na capacidade de resposta da UE às doenças crónicas, em vez de apresentar recomendações sobre doenças individuais.

Em conformidade com a Resolução do Parlamento, a Comissão realiza ações sobre a prevenção, a gestão e a investigação no domínio da diabetes. Considera esta doença uma prioridade no âmbito dos seus trabalhos sobre os fatores de risco comuns das principais doenças crónicas, nomeadamente a alimentação e a falta de atividade física. Por exemplo, a Comissão financiou vários projetos relacionados com a diabetes no âmbito do Programa de Saúde. Além disso, os Estados-Membros e a Comissão estão a desenvolver uma ação conjunta sobre as doenças crónicas, cofinanciada pelo Programa de Saúde. Parte desta ação incide especificamente na diabetes de tipo II, por forma a estudar quais são as barreiras que se colocam à prevenção, os exames de rastreio e tratamento da diabetes e para melhorar a cooperação entre os Estados-Membros.

([1]) «Diabetes, The Policy Puzzle: Is Europe Making Progress?», 2008, http://www.idf.org/sites/default/files/ThePolicyPuzzleBook.pdf

No sexto e sétimo programa-quadro de investigação e desenvolvimento tecnológico, a Comissão financiou vários projetos de investigação na área da nutrição ([2]) e dos estilos de vida saudáveis ([3]), bem como da reformulação da alimentação ([4]). A proposta da Comissão para o Horizonte 2020 (2014-2020) ([5]) — identifica a Saúde e Segurança Alimentar como dois dos seis desafios societais que devem ser abordados. Esta abordagem permitirá criar sinergias transdisciplinares e pontos comuns para a prevenção, o diagnóstico e o tratamento de doenças crónicas, como a diabetes. Além disso, a Comissão decidiu recentemente aderir à Aliança Mundial para as Doenças Crónicas ([6]), que considerou a diabetes de tipo II como a próxima prioridade.

([2]) Idefix (Identificação e prevenção, através da alimentação e dos estilos de vida — Efeitos induzidos na saúde das crianças e dos bebés) — http://www.eufic.org/article/en/rid/idefics-diet-lifestyle-health-children-infants/
Early Nutrition (Efeitos a longo prazo da nutrição precoce na saúde posterior) — http://www.project-earlynutrition.eu/

([3]) Eatwell (Intervenções para promover hábitos alimentares saudáveis: avaliação e recomendações http://www.eatwellproject.eu/ En cache — Pages similaires .
I.Family (Fatores determinantes do comportamento alimentar em crianças, adolescentes e seus pais, na Europa) — http://www.ifamilystudy.eu/project-information/

([4]) Pleasure (Novas abordagens para o desenvolvimento de produtos alimentares com um teor reduzido de gordura, sal e acúçar) — http://www.eurofir.net/about_us/projects/pleasure
Terifiq (Tecnologias combinadas para alcançar reduções binárias significativas de sal, gordura e açúcar na alimentação diária e aumentar a sua qualidade nutritiva) — http://www.terifiq.eu/

([5]) http://ec.europa.eu/research/horizon2020/index_en.cfm?pg=h2020-documents

([6]) http://www.gacd.org/research/priorities/priorities

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001771/13
to the Commission
Christel Schaldemose (S&D), Marisa Matias (GUE/NGL) and Baroness Sarah Ludford (ALDE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: EU action following Parliament's resolution on addressing the EU diabetes epidemic

Diabetes is one of Europe's biggest public health challenges. In the European Union it is estimated to affect more than 32 million citizens (nearly 10% of the total EU population), with an additional 32 million citizens not yet diagnosed or having pre-diabetes. Today, diabetes is responsible for over 10% of healthcare expenditure in most EU Member States ([1]).

On 14 March 2012, Parliament adopted a resolution on addressing the EU diabetes epidemic (P7_TA(2012)0082). It includes calls for the Commission to develop and implement a targeted EU Diabetes Strategy and for Member States to develop, implement and monitor national diabetes programmes.

1. When is the Commission planning to complete its ongoing reflection process on chronic diseases, and will it recommend specific actions to put an end to the growing diabetes epidemic?

2. Has the Commission taken or planned to take any actions to follow up Parliament's resolution on addressing the EU diabetes epidemic and ensure its timely implementation at both EU and national level?

3. Is the Commission considering the development of a more targeted EU Diabetes Strategy?

4. How is the Commission planning to ensure that diabetes research properly features in the forthcoming framework for research, Horizon 2020?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission
(16 April 2013)

The outcome of the Reflection Process between Member States and the Commission will be discussed at the Council Working Party on Public Health at Senior Level under the Lithuanian Presidency. This process aims to identify gaps and areas of added value in the EU response to chronic diseases rather than to make recommendations on individual diseases.

In line with the Parliament Resolution, the Commission carries out actions on diabetes prevention, management and research. It addresses diabetes as a priority within its work on the common risk factors of major chronic diseases, in particular nutrition and lack of physical activity. For example, the Commission has financed several projects related to diabetes under the Health Programme. Moreover, a joint action on chronic diseases is being developed between Member States and the Commission, co-financed by the Health Programme. Part of this action is specifically devoted to diabetes type II, to study barriers to prevention, screening and treatment of diabetes and to improve cooperation among Member States.

([1]) 'Diabetes, The Policy Puzzle: Is Europe Making Progress?', 2008, http://www.idf.org/sites/default/files/ThePolicyPuzzleBook.pdf

In the Sixth and Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development, the Commission funded several research projects in the area of nutrition ([2]) and healthy lifestyle ([3]) as well as food reformulation ([4]). The Commission's proposal for Horizon 2020 (2014-2020) ([5]) — identifies Health and Food security as two of the six societal challenges to be tackled. This approach will allow for cross-disciplinary synergies and commonalities for the prevention, diagnostic and treatment of chronic diseases, including diabetes. Furthermore, the Commission has recently joined the Global Alliance for Chronic Diseases ([6]) which has identified type 2 diabetes as the next priority.

([2]) IDEFIX (Identification and prevention of dietary and lifestyle -induced health effects in children and infants) — http://www.eufic.org/article/en/rid/idefics-diet-lifestyle-health-children-infants/.
EARLY NUTRITION (Long-term effects of early nutrition on later health) — http://www.project-earlynutrition.eu/.

([3]) EATWELL (Interventions to promote healthy eating habits: evaluation and recommendations http://www.eatwellproject.eu/ En cache — Pages similaires .
I.FAMILY (Determinants of eating behaviour in European children, adolescents and their parents) — http://www.ifamilystudy.eu/project-information/.

([4]) PLEASURE (novel processing approaches for the development of food products low in fat, salt and sugar reduced) — http://www.eurofir.net/about_us/projects/pleasure.
TERIFIQ (Combining Technologies to achieve significant binary Reductions in Sodium, Fat and Sugar content in everyday foods whilst optimizing their nutritional Quality) — http://www.terifiq.eu/.

([5]) http://ec.europa.eu/research/horizon2020/index_en.cfm?pg=h2020-documents.

([6]) http://www.gacd.org/research/priorities/priorities.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-001772/13
aan de Commissie
Marietje Schaake (ALDE)
(20 februari 2013)

Betreft: Vooruitgang van de „No Disconnect Strategy" en de heer Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg

De „No Disconnect Strategy" (NDS) is op 9 december 2011 aangekondigd door commissaris Kroes ([1]). Op 12 december 2011 is de heer Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg ([2]) uitgenodigd door de commissaris om „de vrijheid op internet wereldwijd te bevorderen ([3])". Op 4 juni 2012 is er een oproep tot het indienen van voorstellen gepubliceerd, genaamd „Het bevorderen van het respect voor mensenrechten en de fundamentele vrijheden waar deze het meest worden bedreigd en het steunen van mensenrechtenverdedigers" ([4]) (referentie „EuropeAid/132760/C/ACT/Multi"), met een budget van in totaal 20 miljoen euro, waarvan 3 miljoen euro is toegekend aan ICT-projecten. De oproep is afgesloten op 20 juli 2012. Het indicatief tijdschema bepaalt dat aanvragers in mei 2013 op de hoogte worden gesteld van hun aanvraag en te ontvangen toelagen. De NDS bestaat uit vier pijlers: i) hulpmiddelen beschikbaar stellen, ii) zorgen voor begeleiding, iii) situationeel bewustzijn opbouwen en iv) samenwerking.

1. Welke vooruitgang is er bij alle vier de pijlers van de NDS geboekt, inclusief concrete resultaten en projecten, en wat is daarin de rol geweest van de heer Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, binnen de EU of daarbuiten (bijv. in de Verenigde Staten)?

2. Hoeveel toelagen, als die er zijn, zijn er sinds de lancering van de NDS op 9 december 2011 toegekend aan hoeveel projecten, anders dan die onder referentie „EuropeAid/132760/C/ACT/Multi" en wat is hun totale waarde? Als er geen aanvragen zijn, hoe wil de Commissie dit proces versnellen? Hoeveel middelen zijn er (naar verwachting) beschikbaar voor de NDS voor de resterende duur van het huidige mandaat van de Commissie?

3. Welk verband is er tussen de NDS en de nieuwe EU-strategie inzake cyberveiligheid?

4. Zal er een officiële evaluatie komen van zowel de NDS als van de prestaties van de heer Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg nadat de toelagen in mei 2013 zijn toegekend? Zo niet, waarom niet?

5. Op welke manieren heeft de commissaris succesvol samengewerkt met andere leden van de Commissie bij het ontwikkelen en uitvoeren van de NDS, in het bijzonder met de vicevoorzitter/ hoge vertegenwoordiger Ashton en commissaris voor Handel De Gucht?

6. Wanneer verwacht de Commissie de leidraden voor mensenrechten voor de ICT-sector aan te nemen en uit te voeren, evenals de richtlijn over verplichte bekendmaking van niet-financiële informatie door bedrijven?

([1]) http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-11-866_en.htm?locale=en.
([2]) http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl-Theodor_zu_Guttenberg.
([3]) http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-1525_en.htm
([4]) https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/europeaid/online-services/index.cfm?ADSSChck=1337616216735&do=publi.detPUB&searchtype=AS&Pgm=7573843&zgeo=38220&aoet=36539&debpub=&orderby=upd & orderbyad=Desc & nbPubliList=15&page=1&aoref=132760.

Antwoord van mevrouw Kroes namens de Commissie
(12 april 2013)

De Commissie heeft oproepen tot het indienen van voorstellen ter waarde van 5 miljoen euro uitgeschreven: „Trustworthy ICT" ([5]); Studie over internetmonitoringinstrumenten en -methoden ([6]) FIRE ([7])([8]); CONFINE ([9]); OpenLab ([10]) en CAPS ([11]). De voorstellen worden momenteel geëvalueerd en de aanbestedingsprocedure voor het platform „European Capability for Situational Awareness" wordt voorbereid. Andere acties in het kader van de „No Disconnect Strategy" worden uitgevoerd via algemene mensenrechteninstrumenten van de EU zoals het strategisch kader en het actieplan voor mensenrechten en democratie ([12])via Action 24, met inbegrip van medewerking aan de ontwikkeling van openbare richtsnoeren voor vrijheid van meningsuiting online en offline. De NDS draagt bij tot het opstellen van beperkende maatregelen (Syrië ([13]), Iran ([14])) en ondersteunt de actualisering van de EU-verordening inzake het tweeërlei gebruik van de uitvoer van ICT. Normaal worden weldra richtsnoeren met betrekking tot mensenrechten en ICT voor Europese internet- of ICT-bedrijven bekendgemaakt. De lidstaten van de EU voeren op nationaal niveau reeds actieplannen voor maatschappelijke verantwoordelijkheid van bedrijven uit. De NDS biedt ondersteuning om ervoor te zorgen dat bij de ontwikkeling van beleidsmaatregelen en programma's met betrekking tot cyberveiligheid rekening wordt gehouden met mensenrechten.

De NDS bevindt zich slechts in het beginstadium. Het is dus nog te vroeg voor een officiële evaluatie. De Commissie voert geen „officiële evaluatie" uit van het werk van onbetaalde adviseurs. De heer zu Guttenberg heeft in elk geval nuttig advies gegeven over de samenwerking met de EU-lidstaten, de ICT-sector, politieke instanties en inlichtingendiensten, de academische wereld, ngo's, de media en individuele internetactivisten. Hij heeft meer dan 60 vergaderingen gehouden met belangrijke actoren aan beide kanten van de Atlantische Oceaan en heeft voor nuttige contacten in Amerikaanse universiteiten, onderzoekscentra en belangrijke ondernemingen gezorgd.

([5]) http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/security/fp7-calls-trustworthy_en.html
([6]) http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/fire/calls/studies/2012/0046-internet-traffic/ted-smart-2012-0046_en.html
([7]) http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/fire/home_en.html
([8]) http://www.ict-fire.eu/.
([9]) http://confine-project.eu/open-call-1/.
([10]) http://www.ict-openlab.eu/open-calls.html
([11]) http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/collective-awareness-platforms.
([12]) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/131181.pdf
([13]) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:016:0001:0032:nl:PDF.
([14]) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:068:0009:0013:nl:PDF.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001772/13
to the Commission
Marietje Schaake (ALDE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Progress of the 'No Disconnect Strategy' and Mr Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg

The 'No Disconnect Strategy' (the 'NDS') was announced by Commissioner Kroes on 9 December 2011. On 12 December 2011, Mr Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg ([1]) was invited by the Commissioner to 'promote Internet freedom' globally. On 4 June 2012, a call for proposals was published entitled 'Enhancing respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms where they are most at risk and supporting Human Rights Defenders' ([2]) (reference 'EuropeAid/132760/C/ACT/Multi') with a total budget of EUR 20 000 000, of which EUR 3 000 000 was allocated to ICT-related projects. The call was closed on 20 July 2012. The 'indicative calendar' states that applicants will be notified of the result of their application and grants awarded by May 2013. The NDS consists of 4 pillars: i) providing tools, ii) providing guidance, iii) building situational awareness, and iv) cooperation.

1. What progress has been made, including concrete results and projects, in all 4 pillars of the NDS, and what has been the role of Mr Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, either within the EU or externally (e.g. in the United States)?

2. Since the launch of the NDS on 9 December 2011, how many grants, if any, have been allocated to how many projects, other than those under reference 'EuropeAid/132760/C/ACT/Multi', and what is their total value? If none, how will the Commissioner speed up this process? How much funding is (expected to be) available for the NDS for the rest of the current Commission mandate?

3. How does the NDS relate to the new EU cybersecurity strategy?

4. Will there be a formal evaluation of both the NDS and Mr Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg's performance after grants are awarded in May 2013? If not, why not?

5. In what ways has the Commissioner successfully cooperated with other members of the Commission in developing and implementing the NDS, particularly with Vice-President/High Representative Ashton and Trade Commissioner De Gucht?

6. When does the Commission expect to adopt and implement the human rights guidance for the ICT sectors and a directive on the disclosure of non-financial information by companies?

Answer given by Ms Kroes on behalf of the Commission
(12 April 2013)

The Commission has launched open calls (EUR 5 million): 'Trustworthy ICT' ([3]); Study on 'Internet Monitoring tools and methodologies' ([4]); FIRE ([5])([6]); CONFINE ([7]); OpenLab ([8]) and CAPS ([9]). Calls are under evaluation and the European Capability for Situational Awareness platform tendering process under preparation. Other No-Disconnect Strategy actions are channelled through broader EU human rights instruments such as the 'Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy' ([10]) via Action 24 including cooperation in the development of 'Public Guidelines on Freedom of Expression online and offline'. The NDS contributes to the drafting of Restrictive measures (Syria ([11]), Iran ([12])) and supports the updating of EU Regulation on of dual-use ICT exports. Human rights and ICT guidelines for European Internet/ICT companies should be published very soon. EU Member States are already implementing Corporate Social Responsibility actions plans at national level. The NDS provides support to ensure human rights are present in the development of policies and programmes relating to cyber-security.

([1]) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl-Theodor_zu_Guttenberg
([2]) https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/europeaid/online-services/index.cfm?ADSSChck=1337616216735&do=publi.detPUB&searchtype=AS&Pgm=7573843&zgeo=38220&aoet=36539&debpub=&orderby=upd&orderbyad=Desc&nbPubliList=15&page=1&aoref=132760
([3]) http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/security/fp7-calls-trustworthy_en.html
([4]) http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/fire/calls/studies/2012/0046-Internet-traffic/ted-smart-2012-0046_en.html
([5]) http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/fire/home_en.html
([6]) http://www.ict-fire.eu/
([7]) http://confine-project.eu/open-call-1/
([8]) http://www.ict-openlab.eu/open-calls.html
([9]) http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/collective-awareness-platforms
([10]) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/131181.pdf
([11]) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:016:0001:0032:EN:PDF
([12]) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:068:0009:0013:EN:PDF

The NDS is in its early stages and it is too early for a formal review. The Commission does not 'formally review' the work of unpaid advisors. However, Mr zu Guttenberg has provided useful advice concerning cooperation with EU Member States, ICT sector, political and intelligence establishments, academia, NGOs, the media, as well individual Internet activists. He has had well in excess of 60 meetings with key players on both sides of the Atlantic and has provided useful contacts in US universities, research centres and key companies.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001773/13
alla Commissione
Fiorello Provera (EFD) e Charles Tannock (ECR)
(20 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: Crescente attivismo di Hezbollah

L'8 febbraio 2013, il quotidiano del Regno Unito Times ha riferito che, secondo le varie agenzie di intelligence occidentali, la milizia Hezbollah sostenuta dall'Iran era «ora più attiva all'estero che in qualsiasi momento dall'inizio degli anni '90». I suoi bersagli sono i turisti israeliani e statunitensi. Hezbollah ha legami con la criminalità internazionale della droga sia in Messico che in Africa Occidentale. Il giornale sottolinea che gli agenti di Hezbollah e iraniani sono stati implicati in trame recenti a Cipro, in India, Thailandia, Kenya, Azerbaigian, Egitto e Sud Africa. Tutti i tentativi sono stati sventati e sono falliti ma il Dipartimento di Stato USA ha rilevato che: «il gruppo ha avuto una presenza internazionale per molto tempo, ma ora ha quasi portata globale». Il Times sostiene che la recrudescenza degli attacchi è motivata dal desiderio di vendetta, per le uccisioni di fisici nucleari iraniani negli ultimi due anni. Hezbollah è pronta anche a rispondere in caso di attacchi contro gli impianti nucleari iraniani.

1. Alla luce di quanto sopra, quali passi sta effettuando la Commissione per valutare la possibilità di futuri complotti terroristici di Hezbollah, che abbiano luogo in Europa?

2. Quali passi sta effettuando la Commissione per individuare le potenziali minacce da parte di qualsiasi gruppo noto per aver collegamenti con Hezbollah e che abbia sede negli Stati membri?

Risposta di Cecilia Malmström a nome della Commissione
(2 maggio 2013)

La Commissione europea non ha un ruolo nell'investigazione dei complotti di terrorismo, che compete alle autorità nazionali preposte.

La Commissione europea non ha nessun mandato di effettuare valutazioni relative alla minaccia di terrorismo.

Nell'ambito della strategia di sicurezza interna adottata nel novembre 2010, la Commissione sta sviluppando una capacità di valutazione dei rischi a sostegno del processo decisionale, basata principalmente, per quanto concerne i rischi correlati alla sicurezza, sulle valutazioni delle minacce elaborate dal Centro di analisi dell'intelligence dell'UE (in seno al SEAE).

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001773/13
to the Commission
Fiorello Provera (EFD) and Charles Tannock (ECR)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Growing activism of Hezbollah

On 8 February 2013, the UK's *Times* newspaper reported that, according to various Western intelligence agencies, the Iran-backed militia group Hezbollah was 'now more active overseas than at any time since the early 1990s'. Its planned targets include both Israeli and US tourists. Hezbollah has links with international drug and crime syndicates in both Mexico and West Africa. The newspaper points out that Hezbollah and Iranian agents have been implicated in recent plots in Cyprus, India, Thailand, Kenya, Azerbaijan, Egypt and South Africa. All the attempts were foiled and were unsuccessful, but the US State Department has noted that 'the group has had an international presence for a long time, but now it has near-global reach.'. *The Times* claims that the resurgence in attacks is motivated by revenge, following the assassinations of Iranian nuclear physicists over the past two years. Hezbollah is also prepared to respond if there are attacks on Iran's nuclear facilities.

1. In light of the above, what steps is the Commission taking to investigate the likelihood of future Hezbollah-backed terror plots taking place in Europe?

2. What steps is the Commission taking to identify potential threats from any known groups that have links to Hezbollah and are based in Member States?

Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission
(2 May 2013)

The European Commission has no role in the investigation of terrorist plots. This remains within the remit of the appropriate national authorities.

The European Commission has no mandate to conduct terrorism threat assessments.

Under the Internal Security Strategy adopted in November 2010, the Commission is developing a risk assessment capability as a support to the decision making process, principally based, as far as security related risks are concerned, on threat assessments inputs from the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (within the EEAS).

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001775/13
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)
Fiorello Provera (EFD) e Charles Tannock (ECR)
(20 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Poligamia in Libia

Il 7 febbraio 2013, diverse fonti di informazione hanno riferito che la Camera costituzionale della Corte Suprema della Libia ha abolito un vecchio emendamento grazie al quale gli uomini dovevano necessariamente ottenere il consenso della prima moglie prima di poter sposare una seconda donna. Durante il regime di Gheddafi, perché un uomo potesse prendere una seconda moglie, la prima moglie doveva fornire il consenso scritto e il marito doveva dimostrare di poter mantenere finanziariamente entrambe le mogli.

La Corte Suprema ha rimosso queste restrizioni dalla legge sul matrimonio, e si teme che questo sia solo una di una serie di decisioni che dimostrano che la legge libica è sempre più influenzata dall'Islam. Si presume che la nuova costituzione del paese conterrà molti riferimenti alla legge islamica. Nel gennaio del 2013, molti islamisti libici hanno invaso le strade di Tripoli e Bengasi, al fine di chiedere che la futura legislazione si ispiri alla sharia musulmana.

1. Qual è la posizione della Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante quanto alla maggiore islamizzazione della legge libica?

2. La Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante è disposta a discutere la questione con il governo libico?

3. Come vedono i funzionari dell'UE in Libia il ruolo crescente dell'Islam nel sistema giuridico del paese?

Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione
(12 aprile 2013)

La Libia sta vivendo un difficile processo di transizione durante il quale è necessario affrontare questioni complesse come la riorganizzazione dello Stato, il ruolo della religione e la distribuzione delle risorse e del potere. Il risultato di questo processo si rifletterà nella Costituzione.

Non è ancora cominciato il processo di stesura della Costituzione. Il congresso generale nazionale ha deciso di indire elezioni nazionali per scegliere i 60 membri dell'assemblea costituente (20 dalla Tripolitania, 20 dalla Cirenaica e 20 dalla provincia di Fezzan). Una volta eletta, l'assemblea redigerà la costituzione. Le elezioni dell'assemblea costituente si terranno probabilmente verso la fine di quest'anno e già nel secondo trimestre del 2014 si potrebbe quindi tenere un referendum sulla nuova Costituzione.

Il governo libico ha dichiarato il suo impegno a rispettare pienamente i diritti dell'uomo e ha annunciato la creazione di una commissione per i diritti umani e l'abrogazione delle leggi del precedente regime che limitavano il godimento di tali diritti. Nel dialogo politico con le autorità libiche l'Unione europea esprime il proprio sostegno a questi impegni.

Inoltre, senza interferire con gli affari interni libici e nel pieno rispetto della sovranità nazionale, l'Unione europea è pronta a sostenere la Libia nel processo di stesura della nuova Costituzione.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001775/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Fiorello Provera (EFD) and Charles Tannock (ECR)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Polygamy in Libya

On 7 February 2013, various news sources reported that Libya's Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court had abolished an old amendment that required men to obtain their first wife's consent before they could marry a second woman. During the Gaddafi regime, in order for a man to take a second wife, the first wife had to provide written consent and the husband had to prove that he could financially support both wives.

The Supreme Court has removed these restrictions from the Marriage Act, and there are concerns that this is just one in a number of decisions which show that Libyan law is being increasingly influenced by Islam. The country's new constitution is expected to contain many references to Islamic law. In January 2013, many Libyan Islamists took to the streets in Tripoli and Benghazi in order to demand that Muslim sharia law be used to inspire future legislation.

1. What is the position of the Vice-President/High Representative regarding the increased Islamisation of Libyan law?

2. Is the Vice-President/High Representative prepared to discuss this issue with the Libyan Government?

3. How do EU officials inside Libya regard the growing role of Islam in the country's legal system?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(12 April 2013)

Libya is undergoing a difficult transition process during which complex matters have to be addressed such as the organisation of the State, the role of religion and the distribution of resources and power. The outcome of this process will be reflected in the Constitution.

The drafting process of the Constitution has not yet started. The General National Congress has decided to endorse national elections as the process by which the 60 members of the Constitutional Commission will be chosen (20 from Tripolitania, 20 from Cyrenaica and 20 from the Fezzan regions). Once formed, the Commission will draft the constitution. The elections of this Commission will likely take place towards the end of this year. A referendum on the new Constitution could then take place earliest in the second quarter of 2014.

The Libyan government has affirmed its commitment to fully respect human rights, has announced the creation of a Human Rights Commission and the repeal of laws of the previous regime that restrict the enjoyment of human rights. In its political dialogue with the Libyan authorities, the EU is expressing its support to these commitments.

Morevover, without interfering with Libyan internal affairs and in full respect of Libyan sovereignty, the EU stands ready to support Libya in the process of drafting this new Constitution.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001776/13
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)
Fiorello Provera (EFD) e Charles Tannock (ECR)
(20 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Azioni penali nei confronti dei bambini vittime di violenze sessuali in Afghanistan

All'inizio del mese di febbraio 2013, Human Rights Watch (HRW) ha riferito che in Afghanistan, a seguito di casi di stupro e abusi sessuali, vengono spesso mosse accuse sia nei confronti della vittima, sia in quelli dell'autore della violenza. Nell'ottobre del 2012, nella provincia di Herat, un ragazzo di 13 anni è stato condannato per capi d'accusa di crimine morale a scontare una pena di un anno presso un centro di detenzione minorile, con l'accusa di avere intrattenuto rapporti sessuali con due uomini adulti. Secondo il direttore di HRW Asia «il governo afghano non avrebbe dovuto in alcun modo vittimizzare il ragazzo una seconda volta, ma al contrario avrebbe dovuto procedere immediatamente al suo rilascio, fornendogli subito protezione e assistenza».

La legge afghana non prevede un'età per il consenso ai rapporti sessuali. L'HRW ha documentato casi in cui i magistrati hanno intrapreso azioni legali nei confronti delle presunte vittime di stupro per avere intrattenuto relazioni extraconiugali, con la motivazione che la vittima avesse «una cattiva condotta». Nel 2009 l'Afghanistan ha varato una legge sull'eliminazione della violenza contro le donne, che ha introdotto per la prima volta il termine «stupro» per indicare un reato previsto dal diritto afghano. Tale legge viene però applicata solo alle donne e alle ragazze, mentre non esistono ancora disposizioni legislative contro la violenza nei confronti di uomini e ragazzi. In Afghanistan è diffuso il problema dei «bacha bazi» o «ragazzi giocattolo», una pratica secondo la quale i giovani vengono istruiti per diventare intrattenitori e ballerini, subendo in molti casi abusi e violenze. Ciononostante, i giovani vengono spesso considerati criminali poiché la legge afghana proibisce la «pederastia», con cui si indica l'attività sessuale tra un uomo e un ragazzo. Il direttore di HRW Asia afferma che «trattare i ragazzi vittime di violenza come criminali pregiudica tutti gli sforzi del governo per tutelare i minori dagli abusi sessuali».

1. È il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante al corrente dei casi in cui i giovani vittime di stupro da parte di uomini sono stati trattati come criminali?

2. Quali azioni è il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante disposto a intraprendere per collaborare con organismi internazionali come le Nazioni Unite al fine di invitare il governo afghano a introdurre un'età legale per il consenso ai rapporti sessuali e ad adottare provvedimenti legislativi allo scopo di proteggere i minori dagli abusi?

3. Quali azioni stanno adottando i funzionari dell'UE stanziati a Kabul per affrontare le questioni legate agli abusi contro i minori, e quali tentativi sono stati compiuti per collaborare con il sistema legislativo afghano al fine di riesaminare le leggi in materia di «crimini morali»?

Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione
(12 aprile 2013)

L'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente è a conoscenza di questi casi. «*Child Protection Action Network*», una rete afgana di organizzazioni governative e non governative, ha rilevato, nel 2012, un totale di 52 casi di abusi sessuali su ragazzi di sesso maschile in 28 province.

L'Unione europea ha finanziato con 7,95 milioni di EUR il «*Child Rights Consortium*», costituito da tre ONG, per offrire forme di sostegno ai minori vulnerabili, tra cui alloggi di emergenza per minori di sesso maschile e supporto tecnico al ministero, anche sull'elaborazione di linee guida di riferimento per minori di ambo i sessi vittime di abusi.

L'Unione europea incoraggia il governo afgano a tutelare e promuovere i diritti dei minori e a sviluppare ulteriormente il quadro giuridico in materia, rispettando gli impegni assunti a livello nazionale e internazionale, tra cui l'adesione alla convenzione delle Nazioni Unite sui diritti del fanciullo. L'accordo di cooperazione, attualmente oggetto di negoziazione, includerà norme dettagliate sui diritti umani.

L'Unione europea sostiene gli sforzi dell'UNICEF, impegnato a elaborare una legge generale sui minori; è auspicabile che essa includa delle norme dirette a tutelare le vittime di abusi sessuali e ad evitare ulteriori soprusi o persino la criminalizzazione dei minori abusati. Sarà importante armonizzare le leggi nazionali afgane con le norme internazionali, tenendo conto del fatto che, attualmente, l'età legale per una relazione sessuale consensuale è assimilata all'età legale per contrarre matrimonio (16 anni per una ragazza, 18 anni per un ragazzo).

Per sostenere e attuare efficacemente tali riforme è necessaria una trasformazione culturale di lungo termine, unitamente al ricambio generazionale. L'Unione europea ha invitato le autorità afgane e i principali soggetti interessati a utilizzare tutti i mezzi disponibili per eliminare le consuetudini e le prassi lesive dei minori.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001776/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Fiorello Provera (EFD) and Charles Tannock (ECR)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Prosecution of sexually assaulted children in Afghanistan

In early February 2013, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that in Afghanistan cases of rape and sexual abuse of children often lead to charges against both the victim and the abuser. In October 2012, in Herat Province, a 13-year-old boy was convicted on charges of moral crime and sentenced to one year in a juvenile detention centre, after he was accused of having sex with two adult men. According to HRW's Asia director, 'the Afghan Government should never have victimised this boy a second time, but instead should have released him immediately with urgent protection and assistance'.

Under Afghan law, there is no age of consent for sex. HRW has documented cases in which prosecutors pursued criminal charges against alleged rape victims for engaging in extramarital affairs, on the grounds that the victim was of 'bad character'. In 2009, Afghanistan enacted a law on the elimination of violence against women, which, for the first time, introduced the term 'rape' to refer to a criminal offence under Afghan law, but it only applies to women or girls. There are still no legal provisions against the rape of men and boys. In Afghanistan, there is a widespread problem of 'bacha bazi' or 'boy play', a practice in which young boys are groomed to be entertainers and dancers, in many cases suffering abuse and assault. Yet the boys are often considered to be criminals because Afghan law prohibits 'pederasty', which means sexual activity between a man and a boy. HRW's Asia director says that 'treating boys who have been raped as criminals undermines all government efforts to protect children from abuse'.

1. Is the Vice-President/High Representative aware of cases in which young male rape victims have been treated like criminals?

2. What steps is the Vice-President/High Representative prepared to take to work with international bodies such as the United Nations to call on the Afghan Government to introduce a legal age of consent and enact legislation to protect all children from abuse?

3. What steps are EU officials taking in Kabul to tackle issues related to child abuse, and have attempts been made to work with Afghanistan's legal establishment to address the laws relating to 'moral crimes'?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(12 April 2013)

The HR/VP is aware of such cases. The Child Protection Action Network, which is an Afghan Network of government and non-government organisations, reported a total of 52 cases of sexual abuse involving young males in 28 provinces during 2012.

The EU has provided funding to the Child Rights Consortium of three NGOs to provide support to vulnerable children (EUR 7.95 million). This includes an emergency shelter for boys and technical support to the Ministry including on the development of referral guidelines for abused boys and girls.

The EU is encouraging the Government of Afghanistan to protect and promote children's rights and to further develop its legal framework, in line with implementing its national and international commitments, including the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Cooperation Agreement which is currently being negotiated will include detailed provisions on human rights.

The EU is supportive to the efforts of Unicef, which is working on the development of a comprehensive Child Act; it is hoped that this would include provisions to protect victims of sexual abuse and to avoid their further victimisation, or even criminalisation. It will be important to harmonise Afghan national laws with international standards, taking into account that currently the legal age for consensual sexual relations is linked to the legal age for marriage (16 for a girl, 18 for a boy).

Long-term cultural transformation and generational change are needed to sustain and implement effectively such reforms. The EU has urged the Afghan authorities and the main stakeholders to use all available means to eliminate customs and practices that harm children.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001777/13
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)
Fiorello Provera (EFD) e Charles Tannock (ECR)
(20 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: VP/HR — La Corea del Nord realizza il suo terzo test nucleare

Il 12 febbraio 2013 la Corea del Nord ha confermato di aver fatto esplodere un ordigno nucleare di sette chilotoni nella zona nordorientale del paese, nonostante gli appelli del governo cinese ad astenervisi. Il politburo della Corea del Nord ha annunciato che continuerà a effettuare lanci di prova di «potenti razzi a lungo raggio». Secondo il giornale britannico The Times la Commissione nazionale di difesa della Corea del Nord, che sta sviluppando armi nucleari e tecnologie per razzi a lungo raggio, ha affermato il mese scorso che gli Stati Uniti restano il suo principale obiettivo. Il test in questione è il terzo effettuato dalla Corea del Nord. Test analoghi sono stati infatti realizzati anche nel 2006 e nel 2009.

L'amministrazione Obama e il Segretario generale delle Nazioni Unite Ban Ki-moon, che ha definito il test «profondamente destabilizzante», hanno condannato l'attacco. In seguito all'accaduto è stata convocata una riunione d'urgenza del Consiglio di sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite. Il presidente Obama ha dichiarato che è necessaria una risposta «rapida» e «credibile». Il leader nordcoreano Kim Jong-un ha effettuato il test nonostante le minacce del Consiglio di sicurezza.

1. Alla luce di questo terzo test nucleare, quali misure ha adottato o intende adottare il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante, unitamente ad altri soggetti chiave a livello internazionale, al fine di persuadere la Corea del Nord ad avviare un dialogo volto a migliorare la stabilità nella regione?

2. È il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante disposto a collaborare con il governo cinese per esercitare forti pressioni su Pyongyang affinché desista da ulteriori azioni provocatorie?

3. Qual è la valutazione dei funzionari dell'UE presenti a Pechino e a Seul in merito alle implicazioni dell'ultimo test nucleare realizzato dalla Corea del Nord?

Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione
(8 maggio 2013)

L'ultimo test nucleare realizzato dalla Repubblica popolare democratica di Corea (RPDC) rappresenta una sfida al regime globale di non proliferazione e costituisce un'ulteriore tappa nell'ambito di un programma a lungo termine volto a sviluppare una capacità di armamento nucleare. Si tratta di una grave minaccia per la pace e la stabilità nella penisola coreana e nella regione.

L'UE sostiene con convinzione le Nazioni Unite e il sistema multilaterale basato su norme. Sulla questione della RPDC, l'UE collabora con i principali partner strategici, inclusa la Cina. Il sostegno cinese alla recente risoluzione del Consiglio di sicurezza sulla RPDC, adottata all'unanimità, è stato fondamentale. L'UE incoraggia la Cina ad esercitare la sua importante influenza nei confronti della RPDC.

Attraverso l'adozione all'unanimità di due nuove risoluzioni (2087 e 2094) al Consiglio di sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite e il rafforzamento delle sanzioni da queste deciso, la comunità internazionale è stata in grado di inviare un messaggio forte e unitario alla RPDC, per dire che non tollererà le sue continue violazioni delle risoluzioni del Consiglio di sicurezza e che reagirà con un'azione determinata ad ulteriori provocazioni.

In seguito al lancio di missili balistici di dicembre e al test nucleare di febbraio, il 19 febbraio l'UE ha deciso di rafforzare le misure restrittive nei confronti della RPDC, applicando le sanzioni decise a gennaio dalle Nazioni Unite, ma anche adottando misure autonome che vietano l'esportazione e l'importazione verso e dalla RPDC di componenti chiave dei missili balistici, gli scambi di nuove obbligazioni pubbliche della RPDC e gli scambi di oro, metalli preziosi e diamanti, oltre ad ulteriori misure di carattere finanziario. I lavori interni all'UE e le consultazioni con i partner proseguono, al fine di seguire gli sviluppi della nuova risoluzione del Consiglio di sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite adottata il 7 marzo.

La comunità internazionale, incluse l'UE e la Cina, continua a segnalare alla RPDC la propria disponibilità a tenere aperti i canali di comunicazione nel caso in cui il paese decidesse di scegliere un percorso più costruttivo attraverso un rinnovato impegno nei suoi confronti.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001777/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Fiorello Provera (EFD) and Charles Tannock (ECR)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — North Korea carries out third nuclear test

On 12 February 2013, North Korea confirmed that it had detonated a seven-kiloton nuclear device in the north-east of the country. This was despite calls by the Chinese Government for restraint. North Korea's politburo announced that it would continue test-firing 'powerful long-range rockets'. According to the UK's *Times* newspaper, North Korea's National Defence Commission said last month that the United States remains its prime target as it develops nuclear weapons and long range-rocket technologies. This is the third test carried out by North Korea. It carried out similar tests in 2006 and 2009.

The Obama administration and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon have condemned the attack, and the Secretary-General called the test 'deeply destabilising'. In the wake of the incident, an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council was called. President Obama said there was a need for a 'swift' and 'credible' response. The North Korean leader, Kim Jong-un, went ahead with the test despite threats from the Security Council.

1. In the light of this third nuclear test, what steps is the Vice-President/High Representative adopting in conjunction with other key international actors to work to persuade North Korea to engage in a dialogue with a view to improving regional stability?

2. Is the Vice-President/High Representative prepared to work with the Chinese Government in order to put firm pressure on Pyongyang to desist from further provocative actions?

3. What is the assessment of EU officials in both Beijing and Seoul regarding the implications of North Korea's latest test?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(8 May 2013)

DPRK's latest nuclear test presents a challenge to the global non-proliferation regime and is a step in a long-running programme to develop a nuclear weapon capability. This is a threat to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the region.

The EU strongly supports the UN and the multilateral rules-based system. The EU is working with its key strategic partners on the issue of the DPRK, including China. China's support for the recently — and unanimously — adopted Security Council Resolutions on DPRK has been crucial. The EU encourages China to use its important influence on the DPRK.

The International Community, through the unanimous adoption of two new resolution (2087 and 2094) at the UN Security Council and the reinforced sanctions decided therein, has been able to send a unified, strong message to DPRK that it will not tolerate its continued violations of UNSC Resolutions and that further provocations will lead to determined action by the International Community.

In the wake of the December ballistic missile launch of the February nuclear test the EU decided to strengthen its restrictive measures against the DPRK on 19 February implementing sanctions approved by the UN in January, but also adopting autonomous EU measures such as the export and import ban of key components for ballistic missiles with the DPRK, prohibition of trade in new public bonds from the DPRK and of trade in gold, precious metals and diamonds as well as some additional financial measures. Internal work and consultations with partners are still ongoing in view of following up the new UNSC Resolution adopted on 7 March.

The International Community — including the EU and China — continues to signal to the DPRK their willingness to keep communication channels open if it were to choose a more constructive path through re-engagement with the International Community.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001778/13
alla Commissione (Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante)
Fiorello Provera (EFD) e Charles Tannock (ECR)
(20 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: VP/HR — Contrabbando da parte dell'Iran di materiale nucleare attraverso la Cina

Il 13 febbraio 2013, l'Istituto per la scienza e la sicurezza internazionale, con sede a Washington DC, ha pubblicato una relazione in cui si afferma che l'Iran avrebbe tentato di fare transitare attraverso la Cina magneti ad anello di contrabbando destinati a ciascuna delle sue 50 000 centrifughe di prima generazione, al fine di accelerare il processo di acquisizione di capacità di armi nucleari. Stando al contenuto della relazione, l'Iran si starebbe servendo di «società di copertura private cinesi che rilasciano ai fornitori dichiarazioni di uso finale false».

Secondo l'American Enterprise Institute, la cooperazione del governo cinese con l'Iran in materia di attività nucleari risalirebbe agli anni ottanta. Nei primi anni novanta la Cina avrebbe fornito alla Repubblica islamica dell'Iran circa due tonnellate di uranio naturale, offrendo inoltre assistenza nello sviluppo missilistico.

Il 26 febbraio 2013, i cinque membri permanenti del Consiglio di sicurezza e rappresentanti della Germania si recheranno in Kazakhstan per conferire con i portavoce dell'Iran.

1. Qual è la posizione del Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante in merito alle relazioni secondo cui l'Iran si servirebbe della Cina come canale per fare transitare materiale nucleare soggetto a divieti?

2. Quali azioni intende adottare il Vicepresidente/Alto Rappresentante per incitare la Cina a cooperare al fine di migliorare l'osservanza delle risoluzioni delle Nazioni Unite sul contrabbando di materiali nucleari illeciti?

3. Quali azioni sono state intraprese in passato per persuadere la Cina ad adempiere ai propri obblighi internazionali?

Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione
(22 aprile 2013)

Gli obblighi contenuti nelle risoluzioni 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) e 1929 (2010) del Consiglio di sicurezza dell'ONU relative all'Iran comprendono anche un embargo sui programmi nucleari e balistici che presentano un rischio di proliferazione. La misura è vincolante per tutti gli Stati e il governo cinese è tenuto a prendere tutti i provvedimenti necessari per garantire l'effettiva applicazione del divieto.

La comunità internazionale deve inoltre collaborare per garantire che le misure siano attuate nel miglior modo possibile. Gli organi dell'ONU come il comitato del Consiglio di sicurezza istituito a norma della risoluzione 1737 (2006) annoverano fra le loro competenze gli aspetti connessi all'attuazione e tutte le relative questioni di portata internazionale vanno affrontate anzitutto in queste sedi.

Inoltre l'UE ribadisce regolarmente agli Stati terzi, compresa la Cina, l'importanza di continuare a esercitare pressioni sull'Iran per mezzo delle sanzioni.

Per quanto riguarda le segnalazioni dell'Istituto per la scienza e la sicurezza internazionale sui tentativi dell'Iran di contrabbandare magneti ad anello, dalla relazione non risulta chiaramente né se questi tentativi abbiano avuto successo né se la Cina vi abbia effettivamente partecipato.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001778/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Fiorello Provera (EFD) and Charles Tannock (ECR)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Iran smuggling nuclear material through China

On 13 February 2013, the Institute for Science and International Security, based in Washington DC, released a report in which it states that Iran has tried to smuggle ring-shaped magnets through China for each of its 50 000 first-generation centrifuges, in order to speed up the process of acquiring nuclear weapon capabilities. The report notes that Iranians are using 'private Chinese front companies which provide suppliers with false end-user statements'.

According to the American Enterprise Institute, Chinese Government cooperation with Iran in respect of nuclear activities goes back to the 1980s. During the early 1990s, China gave the Islamic Republic of Iran roughly two tonnes of natural uranium, and it has assisted with missile development.

On 26 February 2013, the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany will go to Kazakhstan to talk with Iranian representatives.

1. What is the position of the Vice-President/High Representative regarding the reports of Iran using China as a transit route for banned nuclear material?

2. What steps will the Vice-President/High Representative take to push for China's cooperation in improving its compliance with UN resolutions on the smuggling of illicit nuclear materials?

3. What steps have been taken in the past to persuade China to fulfil its international obligations?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(22 April 2013)

The obligations enshrined in UN Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1929 (2010) on Iran provide *inter alia* for a proliferation-sensitive nuclear and ballistic missile programmes-related embargo. The measure is binding on all States and the Chinese Government is under an obligation to take all necessary steps to ensure effective implementation of the ban.

In addition, the international community should cooperate to ensure the best possible implementation of the measures. UN fora such as the Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1737 (2006) have been founded to *inter alia* address issues of implementation and any international concerns to that effect should be addressed first within that framework.

Furthermore, the EU regularly calls upon third states including China on the importance of maintaining effective pressure on Iran through sanctions.

Regarding the observations of the Institute for Science and International Study on Iran's attempts at smuggling ring-shaped magnets, it is noted that it is not clear from the report whether or not these attempts in fact succeeded; any possible Chinese involvement in this case is not established by the report.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001779/13
to the Commission
David Martin (S&D)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Effect of salmon farming on sea lice infestation of wild salmon

As I am sure the Commission is aware, large numbers of free-ranging wild salmon are being killed by parasitic sea lice in European waters every year.

Does the Commission plan to investigate the growing evidence that suggests that sea lice from farmed fish and aquaculture cages are having a significant impact on wild salmon infestation?

Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission
(11 April 2013)

The results of different national studies carried out over several years have provided information on the impacts of sea lice on the mortality of wild salmon populations. The Commission carefully monitors the evolution of existing knowledge on this important issue.

Existing projects funded under the Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Development have examined sea lice from salmon farms within a broader context (e.g. project 'Coexist', about competing activities and interactions in EU coastal zones).

Future research projects — including in the field of aquaculture — are expected to be funded under the proposed Horizon2020 framework programme, which is currently under negotiation in Council and Parliament. In this context, the impacts of sea lice might also be considered as a topic for future research projects.

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-001780/13
à la Commission
Christine De Veyrac (PPE)
(20 février 2013)

Objet: Conflits d'intérêts et pantouflage au sein des institutions européennes

Le 14 février dernier, le Médiateur européen annonçait l'ouverture d'une enquête préliminaire sur le pantouflage au sein de la Commission européenne menée à la suite d'une plainte de plusieurs organisations non gouvernementales.

L'enquête ouverte par le Médiateur européen porte sur la façon dont la Commission européenne applique ses règles sur les conflits d'intérêts dans le cas de pantouflage.

Il est à noter que cette enquête survient après l'affaire Dalli, du nom de l'ancien commissaire européen à la santé, qui a démissionné en octobre dernier après la publication d'un rapport (controversé) de l'Office européen de lutte contre les fraudes, le soupçonnant d'avoir couvert une tentative d'extorsion.

Récemment, une polémique a éclaté après la reconduction, au sein du comite d'éthique de la Commission, sur le cas d'un ancien haut fonctionnaire européen devenu membre de l'un des plus importants cabinets de conseil à Bruxelles.

Sachant que la Commission dispose d'un registre des groupes d'intérêts actifs auprès des institutions européennes, et que les inscriptions se font sur une base volontaire, la Commission envisage-t-elle de rendre l'inscription au registre obligatoire afin de rendre plus transparentes ses relations avec le secteur privé?

Réponse donnée par M. Barroso au nom de la Commission
(11 avril 2013)

Comme convenu avec le Parlement, l'inscription au registre de transparence se fait actuellement sur une base volontaire.

À ce stade, la Commission ne peut préjuger de l'issue de l'examen à venir.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001780/13
to the Commission
Christine De Veyrac (PPE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Conflicts of interest and 'revolving doors' in EU institutions

On 14 February 2013, the European Ombudsman announced that he was opening a preliminary inquiry on 'revolving doors' cases within the Commission, after a complaint from several non-governmental organisations.

The European Ombudsman's inquiry concerns the way in which the Commission applies its rules on conflicts of interest in 'revolving doors' cases.

It is worth noting that this inquiry comes after the Dalli case, named after the former Commissioner for Health who resigned last October after the publication of a (controversial) report by the European Anti-Fraud Office, in which he was suspected of having covered up an extortion attempt.

Recently, a row erupted after the case of a former senior European civil servant who joined one of the leading consultancies in Brussels was raised again in the Commission's ethics committee.

Given that the Commission has a register of groups with active interests in the European institutions, and that registration is voluntary, does the Commission plan to make registration compulsory in order to make its relations with the private sector more transparent?

Answer given by Mr Barroso on behalf of the Commission
(11 April 2013)

As agreed with the Parliament, the transparency registry is currently voluntary.

The Commission cannot prejudge at this stage the outcome of the review exercise which is now due to take place.

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-001781/13
à la Commission
Christine De Veyrac (PPE)
(20 février 2013)

Objet: Farines animales

Le 14 février dernier, la Commission européenne autorisait, à partir de juin 2013, l'utilisation des farines animales à base de porc et de volaille pour les élevages de poissons et autres animaux de l'aquaculture.

L'utilisation des farines animales pour les ruminants avait été interdite en 1997, en raison des risques de contamination par l'encéphalopathie spongiforme bovine (ESB), aussi connue sous le nom de «maladie de la vache folle».

En 2001, cette mesure avait été étendue aux aliments destinés à tous les animaux de consommation.

La Commission a déclaré que cette nouvelle autorisation améliorerait la durabilité à long terme du secteur de l'aquaculture puisque «ces protéines animales transformées pourraient être un substitut précieux aux farines de poisson, qui sont une ressource rare».

La Commission estime également que l'autorisation ne présente pas de risques de contamination par l'ESB, dès lors que le cannibalisme est évité.

1. La Commission prévoit-elle une autorisation prochaine de l'utilisation de farines animales pour l'ensemble des élevages d'animaux?

2. Sachant qu'il existe toujours un faible risque quant à l'utilisation de ces farines animales, notamment en cas de cannibalisme, la Commission a-t-elle bien pris en compte l'impact possible sur la santé des consommateurs?

Réponse donnée par M. Borg au nom de la Commission
(12 avril 2013)

Le règlement (UE) n° 56/2013 ([1]), de la Commission, applicable à partir du 1er juin 2013, est conforme aux derniers avis scientifiques qui indiquent que le risque de transmission de l'encéphalopathie spongiforme bovine (ESB) entre non-ruminants est négligeable à condition d'empêcher la réutilisation au sein de l'espèce (cannibalisme).

1. La Commission a l'intention de proposer, sous réserve de la réalisation de tests analytiques spécifiques, une nouvelle mesure visant à réintroduire l'utilisation de PAT provenant de porcins et de volailles respectivement pour les volailles et les porcins. La Commission n'entend pas proposer que l'utilisation de PAT soit à nouveau autorisée pour l'alimentation des ruminants (à savoir, les bovins, les ovins ou les caprins) ni que les PAT provenant de ruminants soient à nouveau utilisées pour l'alimentation des non-ruminants destinés à la production de denrées alimentaires.

2. Le règlement (UE) n° 56/2013 de la Commission, qui est entré en vigueur le 13 février 2013, prévoit des exigences très strictes en matière de traçabilité et des contrôles analytiques que les États membres doivent effectuer tout au long de la chaîne alimentaire afin d'empêcher la contamination croisée et le cannibalisme subséquent. La Commission estime que la mise en œuvre et l'application correctes de ces exigences strictes permettront certainement d'éviter la contamination croisée et le cannibalisme subséquent; le haut niveau de protection des consommateurs étant ainsi garanti et maintenu.

([1]) JO L 21, du 24.1.2013, p. 3.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001781/13
to the Commission
Christine De Veyrac (PPE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Animal meal

On 14 February 2013, the Commission authorised the use of pig meal and poultry meal for farmed fish and other aquaculture animals from June 2013.

The feeding of animal meal to ruminants was banned in 1997 owing to the risks of contamination with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), otherwise known as 'mad cow disease'.

In 2001, that ban was extended to feedingstuffs for all animals for human consumption.

The Commission stated that this new authorisation would improve the long-term sustainability of the aquaculture sector since 'these processed animal proteins could be a valuable substitute for fishmeal, which is a scarce resource'.

The Commission also believes that the authorisation poses no risk of BSE contamination, since cannibalism is avoided.

1. Does the Commission plan subsequently to authorise the use of animal meal in all forms of animal husbandry?

2. Given that using this kind of animal meal still carries a slight risk, particularly where cannibalism occurs, has the Commission fully considered the potential impact on consumers' health?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission
(12 April 2013)

Commission Regulation (EU) No 56/2013 ([1]), applicable from 1 June 2013, is in line with the latest scientific opinions which indicate that the risk of transmission of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) between non-ruminant animals is negligible provided that intra-species recycling (cannibalism) is prevented.

1. The Commission intends to propose subject to specific analytical tests, a further measure to re-introduce the use of pig and poultry PAPs for poultry and pigs respectively. The Commission does not intend to propose the re-authorisation of PAPs for feeding ruminant animals (i.e. cattle, sheep or goats) or to propose to re-use PAPs from ruminants for feeding non-ruminant food producing animals.

2. Commission Regulation (EU) No 56/2013 entered into force on 13th February 2013 provides for very strict traceability requirements and analytical controls to be applied by the Member States all along the feed chain in order to prevent cross-contamination and subsequent cannibalism. The Commission believes that with the correct implementation and enforcement of these strict requirements, the cross-contamination and subsequent cannibalism would certainly be avoided ensuring and maintaining the high level of consumer protection.

([1]) OJ L 21, 24.1.2013, p. 3.

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001783/13
a la Comisión
Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)
(20 de febrero de 2013)

Asunto: Vertederos en España

Según la Comisión Europea, existen en España vertederos que no cumplen con la Directiva 1999/31/CE, relativa al vertido de residuos. Dicha Directiva establece un régimen concreto para la eliminación de los residuos mediante su depósito en vertederos y fue traspuesta por el Real Decreto 1481/2001, de 27 de diciembre, por el que se regula la eliminación de residuos mediante depósito en vertedero. En su art. 15, establece que:

«Las autoridades competentes tomarán las medidas necesarias para que, como muy tarde el 16 de julio de 2009, los vertederos a los que se haya concedido autorización o estén en funcionamiento a la entrada en vigor del presente Real Decreto, no continúen operando, a menos que cumplan los siguientes requisitos, sin perjuicio de lo establecido en la legislación sobre prevención y control integrado de la contaminación respecto de la adaptación de las instalaciones existentes incluidas en su ámbito de aplicación».

Al no aplicar estas medidas, en el mes de enero de 2013 la Comisión envió un Dictamen Motivado al Reino de España indicando que después de julio de 2009 siguieron operando vertederos en violación de la Directiva sobre vertederos.

La Ley 27/2006, por la que se regulan los derechos de acceso a la información, participación pública y acceso a la justicia en materia de medio ambiente, incorpora al ordenamiento jurídico español la Directiva 2003/4/CE, sobre el acceso del público a la información ambiental, y responde a los compromisos asumidos por España con la ratificación del Convenio sobre el acceso a la información, participación del público en la toma de decisiones y acceso a la justicia en materia de medio ambiente (Convenio de Aarhus). Sin embargo, no se ha publicado ninguna información sobre los vertederos que violan la Directiva mencionada y el Ministro de Medio Ambiente, Arias Cañete, no se ha pronunciado al respecto.

¿Conoce la Comisión cuántos vertedores existen en estas condiciones? ¿Cuáles son los nombres de esos vertederos y cuál es su ubicación exacta?

¿Cuál ha sido la respuesta de España al Dictamen Motivado?

¿Por qué España no hace pública esta información?

¿Qué medidas adoptará la Comisión ante la violación de la Directiva 1999/31/CE?

Respuesta del Sr. Potočnik en nombre de la Comisión
(11 de abril de 2013)

La información a que se refiere Su Señoría forma parte de un procedimiento de infracción que está actualmente en curso ([1]) y no puede darse a conocer sin perjudicar al diálogo entre la Comisión y el Estado miembro y al objetivo de resolver el litigio antes de que el asunto se presente al Tribunal de Justicia, de conformidad con el Reglamento (CE) n° 1049/2001 ([2]).

España tenía de plazo hasta el 25 de marzo para responder a las observaciones de la Comisión. Esta va a evaluar la respuesta a su debido tiempo, de conformidad con el Derecho de la UE, y decidirá, en consecuencia, sobre la forma más adecuada de proceder en este asunto.

([1]) 2011/2071. Para más información, véase el Memorándum publicado por la Comisión sobre las decisiones adoptadas en el paquete de procedimientos de infracción de enero http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-22_en.htm

([2]) Reglamento (CE) n° 1049/2001 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 30 de mayo de 2001, relativo al acceso del público a los documentos del Parlamento Europeo, del Consejo y de la Comisión, DO L 145 de 31.5.2001.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001783/13
to the Commission
Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Landfill sites in Spain

According to the European Commission, there are landfill sites in Spain which do not comply with Directive 1999/31/EC on the landfill of waste. This directive establishes a specific set of rules on landfilling of waste and was transposed by Royal Decree 1481/2001 of 27 December, setting down the rules on the landfilling of waste. Article 15 states:

'The competent authorities will take the necessary steps to ensure that, by 16 July 2009 at the latest, landfill sites which have been granted authorisation or which are in operation at the time of entry into force of this Royal Decree do not continue to operate unless they comply with the following requirements, without prejudice to the provisions of the legislation on integrated pollution prevention and control regarding the adaptation of existing installations included in its scope of application'.

Given that these steps were not taken, the Commission sent a reasoned opinion to the Kingdom of Spain in January 2013 pointing out that landfill sites in infringement of the directive on the landfill of waste continued to operate beyond July 2009.

Law 27/2006 on the rights of access to information, public participation and access to justice in environmental matters transposes Directive 2003/4/EC on public access to environmental information into Spanish law and responds to commitments made by Spain when ratifying the Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters (Aarhus Convention). However, no information has been published about the landfill sites which are not compliant with the abovementioned Directive, and the Environment Minister, Mr Arias Cañete, has not spoken about the matter.

Does the Commission know how many landfill sites are in this condition? What are the names of the sites and where are they located?

What response has Spain made to the reasoned opinion?

Why has Spain not published this information?

What steps does the Commission intend to take with regard to the infringement of Directive 1999/31/EC?

Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission
(11 April 2013)

The details referred to by the Honourable Member are part of an ongoing infringement procedure ([1]) and cannot be disclosed without undermining the dialogue between the Commission and the Member State and the objective of settling the dispute before the case is brought to the Court of Justice, in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 ([2]).

Spain had until 25 March to respond to the Commission's observations. The Commission will assess the response in due time compliance with EC law and will decide accordingly on the appropriate course of action.

([1]) 2011/2071. Further details can be consulted in the Memo issued by the Commission further to the decisions taken at the January infringement package http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-22_en.htm

([2]) Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, OJ L 145, 31.5.2001.

(České znění)

Otázka k písemnému zodpovězení E-001784/13
Komisi
Pavel Poc (S&D)
(20. února 2013)

Předmět: Přeshraniční dopady dolnorakouského vrtu „Rabensburg West 4“

Rabensburg West 4 je průzkumný šikmý vrt v Dolním Rakousku v těsné blízkosti českého pohraničí. Tento průzkumný vrt má podle oficiálních informací objasnit, zda se v hloubce 1400 – 2000 metrů nachází naleziště ropy a zemního plynu. Vzhledem k tomu, že jde o průzkum konvenčního plynu, není podle rakouských zákonů nutné hodnotit vliv na životní prostředí (EIA).

Existuje však důvodné podezření, že tento vrt zkoumá zásoby nekonvečního plynu (břidličný plyn) za využití metody hydraulického štěpení. Obavy vzbuzuje také možné použití chemických a radioaktivních látek, které by mohly mít negativní vliv na životní prostředí, podzemní vody a horninové prostředí.

Nivy při soutoku Dyje a Moravy jsou biosférickou rezervací Dolní Morava, územím chráněným v rámci systému NATURA 2000 a je zde vymezeno i několik přírodních rezervací v rámci Ramsarské dohody. Některé vrty se nacházejí přímo v těchto chráněných oblastech nebo mohou zasahovat do těchto oblastí dokonce na území jiného státu EU.

1. Má Komise informace o provádění vrtů v oblasti vídeňské pánve (Rabensburg West 4, Rabensburg RAB 12 a Hohenau an der March R 15) a je schopna tyto informace předat Evropskému parlamentu?

2. Je vrt Rabensburg West 4 pouze průzkumným vrtem na konvenční plyn nebo zde dochází i k průzkumu nekonvenčního plynu?

3. Používá se během průzkumů metoda hydraulického štěpení nebo počítá se při těžbě ve vídeňské pánvi s jejím využitím?

4. Má Komise informace o tom, do jaké hloubky a jakým směrem je vrt Rabensburg West 4 veden?

5. Je si Komise vědoma potenciálního ohrožení evropských chráněných oblastí touto činností?

6. Byla s Komisí projednána výjimka nutná k provádění činností zasahujících tyto oblasti se zvýšenou ochranou?

7. Jak vnímá Komise vzhledem ke své aktivitě týkající se ochrany obyvatel před radioaktivním zářením používání radioaktivních izotopů v této oblasti?

Odpověď pana Potočnika jménem Komise
(18. dubna 2013)

1. – 4. a 7.Komise nemá dostatek informací, aby mohla odpovědět na tyto otázky.

5. Komise si je vědoma rizik, jimiž vrtné činnosti mohou ohrozit chráněné oblasti. Směrnice 2009/147/ES ([1]) (směrnice o ochraně ptáků) ani směrnice 92/43/EHS ([2]) (směrnice o ochraně přírodních stanovišť) nezakazují umístění zařízení na těžbu ropy nebo plynu z konvenčních či nekonvenčních zdrojů ve vyhlášených lokalitách. Je na příslušných orgánech členských států, aby případ od případu posoudily, zda konkrétní projekt může mít významné negativní účinky na druhy nebo stanoviště, pro něž byla lokalita zřízena, a jestliže se ujistí, že projekt nepoškodí soudržnost lokality, povolily jeho realizaci. Pokud bude rozhodnuto, že projekt může mít na lokalitu nepříznivé účinky, lze v jeho realizaci pokračovat pouze tehdy, jsou-li splněny podmínky pro odchylný postup stanovené v čl. 6 odst. 4 směrnice o ochraně přírodních stanovišť.

6. Odpověď na otázku váženého pana poslance zní NE.

([1]) Úř. věst. L 20, 26.1.2010.
([2]) Úř. věst. L 206, 22.7.1992.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001784/13
to the Commission
Pavel Poc (S&D)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Cross-border impacts of the 'Rabensburg West 4' borehole in Lower Austria

Rabensburg West 4 is an oblique exploratory borehole in Lower Austria, close to the Czech border. According to official information, the purpose of the borehole is to establish the presence of an oil and gas deposit at a depth of 1 400 to 2 000 metres. As this involves exploration for conventional gas, Austrian law does not require an environmental impact assessment (EIA) to be carried out.

There are grounds for suspecting, however, that this borehole is testing for reserves of non-conventional gas (shale gas) using fracking. It is raising concerns about the possible use of chemical and radioactive substances that might have a negative impact on the environment, subsurface waters and the geology.

The floodplain at the confluence of the Dyje and the Morava constitutes the Lower Morava Biosphere Reservation, a protected area in the Natura 2000 network, and there are also several nature reserves here designated under the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands. Some of the boreholes are located directly inside these protected areas, or can affect these areas even from the territory of another EU Member State.

1. Does the Commission have information on the operation of boreholes in the Vienna basin (Rabensburg West 4, Rabensburg RAB 12 and Hohenau an der March R 15), and can it forward this information to the European Parliament?

2. Is the Rabensburg West 4 borehole only an exploratory borehole for conventional gas or will there be exploration for non-conventional gas here?

3. Will fracking be used during the exploration, or are there plans for it to be used in extraction in the Vienna basin?

4. Does the Commission have information on the depth and orientation of the Rabensburg West 4 borehole?

5. Is the Commission aware of the potential threat posed by this activity to European protected areas?

6. Was the necessary exemption for activities having an impact on these special protection areas discussed with the Commission?

7. How does the Commission view the use of radioactive isotopes in these areas in light of its actions relating to protecting people from radioactivity?

Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission
(18 April 2013)

1-4 and 7. The Commission does not have sufficient information to be able to answer the questions.

5. The Commission is aware of potential threats of drilling operations to protected areas. Directives 2009/147/EC ([1]) (Birds Directive) and 92/43/EEC ([2]) (Habitats Directive) do not prohibit the installation of (conventional or unconventional oil or gas extraction facilities inside designated sites. It is up to the competent national authorities to assess, on a case by case basis, whether a certain project could cause significant negative effects on the species and habitats for which the site has been established and to authorise it after having ascertained that it will not adversely affect the integrity of the site. If it is determined that the project will adversely affect the site then it may proceed only if the derogation conditions, set out in Article 6(4) of the Habitats Directive, are met.

6. The answer to the question of the Honourable Member is No.

([1]) OJ L 20, 26.1.2010.
([2]) OJ L 206, 22.7.1992.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-001786/13
aan de Commissie
Auke Zijlstra (NI)
(20 februari 2013)

Betreft: Zal Griekenland echt zijn verplichtingen nakomen?

Op 16 februari 2013 publiceerde een Griekse krant een artikel ([1]) waarin werd vermeld dat:

1. Griekenland te maken heeft gehad met tegenvallende inkomsten, die vorige maand 7 % lager waren dan de begrotingsdoelstelling;

2. er bij verschillende ministeries ernstige vertragingen zijn bij het uitvoeren van een aantal hervormingen;

3. de minister-president van Griekenland, de heer Antonis Samaras, een herschikking van de regering overweegt;

4. plannen voor privatisering op dit moment niet worden uitgevoerd uit angst voor de politieke prijs ervan;

5. de trojka waarschijnlijk de regering ertoe zal aanzetten om de belastinginkomsten te verhogen en door te gaan met ontslagen in de overheidssector, gezien het feit dat er geen concrete vooruitgang is geboekt op het gebied van investeringen en privatisering.

Zoals vermeld in schriftelijke vraag nr. E-010939/2012, heeft kredietbeoordelaar Moody's vorig jaar vermeld dat de Griekse schuld zo onhoudbaar hoog is, dat een deel ervan waarschijnlijk moet worden kwijtgescholden. In het antwoord op deze vraag, waar ik de Commissie voor bedank, is vermeld dat als Griekenland het aanpassingsprogramma volledig zou uitvoeren, de overheidsschuld verlaagd zou kunnen worden tot 124 % van het bbp in 2020.

Daarnaast heeft de Commissie op schriftelijke vraag nr. E-009920/2012 geen volledig antwoord gegeven, aangezien er geen rekening is gehouden met de berichten over een vermeend bedrag van 30-38 miljard euro dat betaald zal moeten worden indien Griekenland gebruik kan maken van een uitstel van twee jaar om te komen tot de eerder overeengekomen bezuinigingen en hervormingen. Kan de Commissie in het licht hiervan antwoorden op de volgende vragen:

1. Is de Commissie het eens met de feiten waar in het artikel naar verwezen wordt?

2. Zo ja, hoe gaat de Commissie ervoor zorgen dat Griekenland zijn financiële verplichtingen nakomt? Zal de Commissie een beroep doen op de regering om de belastinginkomsten te verhogen en door te gaan met ontslagen in de overheidssector?

3. Zo niet, wat is de reden hiervoor?

4. Als Griekenland de uitvoering van een aantal belangrijke herzieningen verder uitstelt, stemt de Commissie dan ermee in dat de overheidsschuld niet verlaagd kan worden tot 124 % van het bbp in 2020?

5. Aangezien elke vorm van vertraging bijkomende hoge kosten met zich mee kan brengen, wie gaat deze financiële last dan dragen?

Antwoord van de heer Rehn namens de Commissie
(2 april 2013)

De Commissie kan niet ingaan op ongefundeerde opmerkingen in de pers. Samen met collega's van de Europese Centrale Bank en het Internationaal Monetair Fonds voeren de diensten van de Commissie driemaandelijkse evaluaties uit om de vooruitgang van het economische aanpassingsprogramma te beoordelen en om het memorandum van overeenstemming, dat voor de programmavoorwaarden de basis vormt, te actualiseren. Er wordt op dit moment een evaluatie gemaakt van het Griekse aanpassingsprogramma. De evaluatie omvat een gedetailleerde beoordeling van onderliggende tendensen en maatregelen met betrekking tot overheidsinkomsten en -uitgaven, vooruitgang bij het privatiseringsprogramma, en de uitvoering van structurele en fiscale hervormingen. De gedetailleerde resultaten van het onderzoek worden voorgelegd aan de Eurogroep en vervolgens bekendgemaakt op de website van de Commissie.

([1]) http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1_1_16/02/2013_483416.

Het vorige onderzoek, dat in december 2012 werd gepubliceerd, bevat een analyse van de houdbaarheid van de schuld en geeft aan onder welke voorwaarden de Griekse schuld tegen 2020 zal afnemen tot minder dan 124 % van het bbp. Indien Griekenland slecht presteert op het gebied van begrotingsdoelstellingen en op dat moment niet ingrijpt, zal het uiteraard moeilijk worden om die doelstelling voor de staatsschuld te bereiken. Griekenland heeft de beleidsvoorwaarden als onderdeel van het economische aanpassingsprogramma aanvaard en verbindt zich ertoe onder meer een reeks begrotingsdoelstellingen te bereiken voor zijn primaire tekort. Die doelstellingen maken eveneens deel uit van de buitensporigtekortprocedure. In december 2012 heeft de Eurogroep overeenstemming bereikt over een reeks schuldverminderende maatregelen die ingaan mits Griekenland deze doelstellingen haalt.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001786/13
to the Commission
Auke Zijlstra (NI)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Will Greece really comply with its obligations?

On 16 February 2013, a Greek newspaper published an article ([1]) stating that:

1. Greece has experienced a shortfall in revenue, which last month was 7% below its budget target;

2. there have been serious delays by several ministries in implementing a number of reforms;

3. the Prime Minister, Antonis Samaras, has been considering a government reshuffle;

4. plans for privatisation are currently not being enforced owing to fears of the political cost;

5. the Troika will probably push the government to boost tax revenue and proceed with layoffs in the public sector, since no concrete progress has been made on the levels of investment and privatisation.

Having regard also to Written Question No E-010939/2012, last year CRA Moody's announced that the Greek debt is so unsustainably high that a part of it would probably have to be written off. The Commission stated in its answer, which I thank it for, that should Greece implement the adjustment programme in full its public debt could be reduced to 124% of GDP in 2020.

In the case of Written Question No E-009920/2012, the Commission has not given a proper answer, since it has failed to take account of the reports concerning an alleged sum of EUR 30-38 billion which will have to be paid if Greece is allowed to benefit from a two-year deferral in order to achieve the spending cuts and reforms previously agreed. In the light of the above:

1. Does the Commission agree with the statements made in the article cited?

2. If so, how would it ensure that Greece complies with its financial obligations? Would it call on the Greek Government to increase tax revenue and proceed to further layoffs in the public sector?

3. If not, could it explain why?

4. If Greece further delays the implementation of a number of key reforms, would the Commission agree that its public debt cannot be reduced to 124% of GDP by 2020?

5. Since any delay could entail huge additional costs, who will have to sustain this financial burden?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission
(2 April 2013)

The Commission cannot comment on unsubstantiated comments in the press. Quarterly reviews are undertaken by Commission staff, along with European Central Bank and International Monetary Fund colleagues, to assess the progress of the economic adjustment programme and update the memorandum of understanding that underpins programme conditionality. A quarterly review of the Greek adjustment programme is currently being undertaken. The scope of the review includes the detailed assessment of underlying trends and measures taken concerning government revenues and expenditures, progress made in the privatisation programme, and the implementation of structural and fiscal reforms. The detailed results of the review will be presented to the Eurogroup and subsequently published on the Commission website.

([1]) http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1_1_16/02/2013_483416.

The previous review, published in December 2012, contains an analysis of debt sustainability, showing the basis on which Greek debt will fall below 124% of GDP by 2020. Substantial and uncorrected under-performance on fiscal targets would of course make such a debt objective difficult to achieve. Greece has accepted policy conditionality as part of the Economic Adjustment Programme and has committed to achieve *inter alia* a set of fiscal targets for its primary deficit. These targets are also included in the Excessive Deficit Procedure. The Eurogroup in December 2012 agreed on a variety of debt reducing measures, conditional on the achievement of these targets.

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-001787/13
à la Commission
Marc Tarabella (S&D)
(20 février 2013)

Objet: Organisation internationale et approches multilatérales: Droits de l'homme et droits des entreprises

1. La Commission, en particulier sa direction générale de la justice, envisage-t-elle de présenter des propositions pour une meilleure facilitation de l'accès aux cours et tribunaux de l'UE pour les cas flagrants les plus extrêmes de violations des Droits de l'homme ou du droit du travail commises par des entreprises basées en Europe ou leurs filiales, sous traitants ou partenaires commerciaux, et ce comme le recommande le représentant spécial du Secrétaire général des Nations unies chargé de la question des Droits de l'homme et des entreprises?

2. La Commission va-t-elle suivre la demande du Parlement européen d'abandonner son approche jugée «passive» en faveur d'une approche «active» des principes directeurs de l'OCDE, notamment en adhérant à la déclaration de l'OCDE sur l'investissement international et les entreprises multinationales, qui inclut ces mêmes principes directeurs de l'OCDE, en encourageant et en soutenant ceux-ci de manière continue au travers des délégations de l'Union dans les pays tiers, en finançant des initiatives de renforcement des capacités avec les entreprises, les syndicats et la société civile dans les pays tiers en vue de la mise en œuvre de ces principes directeurs?

Réponse donnée par M. Tajani au nom de la Commission
(8 mai 2013)

1. La Commission estime que la question posée va au-delà des recommandations des Principes directeurs des Nations unies relatifs aux entreprises et aux Droits de l'homme. Dans sa proposition de refonte du règlement (CE) nº 44/2001 concernant la compétence judiciaire, la reconnaissance et l'exécution des décisions en matière civile et commerciale, la Commission suggérait que les tribunaux des États membres puissent être saisis dans les cas où l'absence d'accès aux tribunaux en Europe poserait un risque de déni de justice. Cette proposition n'a pas reçu l'aval du Conseil et du Parlement et n'est donc pas prise en compte dans le règlement (UE) nº 1215/2012. L'accès à la justice pour les victimes de la criminalité est garanti par la directive 2012/29/UE, qui établit des normes minimales concernant les droits, le soutien et la protection des intéressés. Ceux-ci sont assurés d'avoir accès à la justice en vertu de cette directive, pour autant que les violations des Droits de l'homme constituent des infractions pénales dans un État membre. Les institutions européennes — et les États membres lorsqu'ils appliquent la législation de l'Union — doivent respecter le droit à un recours effectif et à l'accès à un tribunal impartial, tel qu'il est établi à l'article 47 de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l'Union européenne.

2. La Commission s'est mise en relation avec l'OCDE pour ce qui est de l'association de l'Union à la Déclaration sur l'investissement international et les entreprises multinationales, et elle évalue différentes options dans le contexte d'une éventuelle adhésion à un certain nombre d'organisations et d'instruments internationaux. Elle a renforcé son action de sensibilisation aux principes directeurs en se référant à leurs dispositions dans les dialogues avec les pays et régions partenaires, ainsi que dans les accords commerciaux et les accords d'investissements, en favorisant leur diffusion dans les pays tiers par l'intermédiaire des délégations de l'Union et en participant aux travaux du nouveau groupe de travail de l'OCDE sur le comportement responsable des entreprises.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001787/13
to the Commission
Marc Tarabella (S&D)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: International organisation and multilateral approaches: business and human rights

1. Does the Commission, and its Directorate-General for Justice in particular, plan to table proposals to improve access to EU courts and tribunals for the most flagrant cases of human rights or labour law violations committed by EU-based businesses or their subsidiaries, subcontractors or trading partners, as recommended by the United Nations Secretary-General's Special Representative on business and human rights?

2. Will the Commission act on Parliament's request to abandon its 'passive' approach in favour of the 'active' one established in the guidelines of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in particular by adhering to the OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, which includes those same OECD guidelines, by continuously promoting and supporting the guidelines through the Union's delegations in third countries, and by funding capacity-building initiatives with enterprises, unions and civil society in third countries with a view to implementing them?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission
(8 May 2013)

1. In the Commission's view, the question posed by the Honourable Member goes beyond the recommendations of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.

In its proposal to recast Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, the Commission proposed to allow claims to be brought before the courts of Member States in situations where there would be a risk of denial of justice if no access to court were foreseen in Europe. This proposal was not supported by the Council and the Parliament, and is therefore not reflected in Regulation 1215/2012. Access to justice for victims of crime is ensured by Directive 2012/29/EU, which establishes minimum standards on their rights, support and protection. Provided violations of human rights constitute criminal offences in a Member State, the victims are guaranteed access to justice under this directive. EU institutions, and Member States when implementing EC law, must respect the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial laid down in Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

2. The Commission has approached the OECD in respect of the EU's adherence to the Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises and is assessing options within the context of possible EU accession to a number of international organisations and instruments. The Commission has stepped up its advocacy on the Guidelines by: referring to them in dialogues with partner countries and regions, and in trade and investment agreements; supporting, through EU Delegations, the their dissemination in 3rd countries; and engaging in the work of the new OECD Working Party on Responsible Business Conduct.

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-001788/13
à la Commission
Marc Tarabella (S&D)
(20 février 2013)

Objet: Améliorer la transparence et l'efficacité des politiques en matière de responsabilité sociale des entreprises (RSE)

1. Quelles mesures spécifiques la Commission compte-t-elle proposer pour lutter contre l'information trompeuse ou erronée concernant les engagements des entreprises en matière de responsabilité sociale liés à l'impact environnemental et social de produits et services, au-delà de ce qui est prévu par la directive sur les pratiques commerciales déloyales? La question se pose notamment en ce qui concerne le dépôt et l'examen de plaintes sur la base d'une procédure ouverte et claire, ainsi que l'ouverture d'enquêtes.

2. La Commission entend-elle prendre de nouvelles initiatives en vue de libérer et de renforcer le potentiel de la RSE en matière de lutte contre le changement climatique (en l'associant à l'efficacité des ressources et à l'efficacité énergétique), notamment dans les systèmes utilisés par les entreprises pour l'achat de matières premières?

Réponse donnée par M. Tajani au nom de la Commission
(22 avril 2013)

La directive sur les pratiques commerciales déloyales ([1]) garantit déjà aux consommateurs un degré élevé de protection contre la tromperie dans de nombreux domaines, y compris celui de la responsabilité sociale des entreprises. En outre, les orientations sur l'application de la DPCD formulées en 2009 contiennent une section spécifiquement consacrée aux allégations environnementales. La Commission envisage de présenter sous peu une communication et un rapport sur l'application de cette directive. Elle estime que les problèmes évoqués par l'auteur de la question peuvent être traités dans le contexte des priorités clés définies dans ces deux documents, l'objectif étant de parvenir à une application cohérente de la directive dans les États membres. Parmi ces priorités figurent, notamment, la poursuite de l'élaboration du document d'orientation, l'enrichissement de la base de données relative à la directive sur les pratiques commerciales déloyales et l'organisation d'ateliers thématiques regroupant les autorités de contrôle nationales et consacrés à des questions essentielles.

La communication de la Commission sur la RSE ([2]) souligne que l'utilisation efficace des ressources et la lutte contre le changement climatique sont des aspects importants de la responsabilité sociale des entreprises. Les principes et lignes directrices internationalement reconnus qui y sont mentionnés contiennent également de nombreuses références à l'utilisation rationnelle des ressources et des énergies ([3]). En outre, la Commission a récemment adopté une communication sur la «mise en place du marché unique des produits verts»; ce document présente les méthodes employées par l'Union pour mesurer et indiquer la performance environnementale de produits et d'organisations au cours de leur cycle de vie; il est accompagné d'une recommandation de la Commission sur l'utilisation des méthodes dans les politiques volontaires, par le secteur privé, ainsi que dans l'élaboration de rapports. Les méthodes comportent aussi des aspects relatifs à l'utilisation rationnelle des ressources et au changement climatique.

([1]) DPCD.
([2]) COM(2011)681.
([3]) Par exemple, les principes directeurs de l'OCDE à l'intention des entreprises multinationales, ou encore, la norme d'orientation ISO 26000.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001788/13
to the Commission
Marc Tarabella (S&D)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Increasing the transparency and effectiveness of corporate social responsibility (CSR) policies

1. Which specific measures does the Commission intend to propose in order to prevent incorrect or misleading information on corporate social responsibility commitments linked to the environmental and social impact of goods and services, beyond what is provided for in the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive? The question is particularly relevant with regard to the submission and examination of complaints on the basis of an open and clear procedure, and with regard to the opening of investigations.

2. Will the Commission take new initiatives with a view to releasing and enhancing the potential of CSR in relation to the fight against climate change (by linking it to resource and energy efficiency), in particular in the systems used by companies to purchase raw materials?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission
(22 April 2013)

The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive ([1]) already ensures a high degree of consumer protection against misleading practices in a wide range of areas, including corporate social responsibility. Furthermore the 2009 Guidance on the implementation of the UCPD contains a specific section on environmental claims. The Commission intends to present shortly a communication and a Report on the application of the UCPD. The Commission believes that the concerns raised by the Honourable Member can be addressed in the context of the key priorities identified in the communication and the report, to reach a coherent implementation of the directive in Member States. Such priorities include further developing the Guidance document, expanding the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive database and organising thematic workshops between national enforcers on key issues.

The Commission's communication on CSR ([2]) points out that resource efficiency and combatting climate change are integral aspects of corporate social responsibility. The internationally recognised CSR guidelines and principles highlighted in the Commission's communication also contain numerous references to resource and energy efficiency ([3]). Furthermore, the Commission has recently adopted a communication on 'Building the Single Market for Green Products', which presents the implementation of EU methods for measuring and communicating the life cycle environmental performance of products and organisations. The communication is accompanied by a Commission Recommendation regarding the use of the methods in voluntary policy and by private actors, including in reporting. The methods also include resource efficiency and climate change related aspects.

([1]) UCPD.
([2]) COM(2011)681.
([3]) For example, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, and the ISO 26000 Guidance Standard.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001789/13
alla Commissione
Sonia Alfano (ALDE)
(20 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: Ultimi sviluppi nella procedura d'infrazione n. 2010/4227 contro l'Italia

Su denuncia del Sig. Marco Bazzoni in merito al mancato recepimento da parte dello Stato italiano della direttiva quadro 89/391/CEE e in misura minore della direttiva 2002/14/CE, la Commissione europea ha inviato il 30 settembre 2011 alla Repubblica Italiana la lettera di messa in mora C(2011)6692, del 29 settembre 2011, per la procedura d'infrazione n. 2010/4227. Il 21 novembre 2012 la Commissione europea ha deciso di inviare un parere motivato alle autorità italiane. Nonostante lo Stato italiano avesse inviato l'8 dicembre 2011 le sue spiegazioni, la Commissione europea ha confermato la lettera di costituzione in mora per i seguenti punti:

1. deresponsabilizzazione del datore di lavoro in caso di delega o subdelega (violazione dell'articolo 5 della direttiva 89/391/CEE);

2. proroga dei termini prescritti per la redazione di un documento di valutazione dei rischi per una nuova impresa o per le modifiche sostanziali apportate a un'impresa esistente (violazione dell'articolo 9 della direttiva 89/391/CEE).

Lo Stato italiano aveva tempo fino al 21 gennaio 2013 per adeguarsi alle disposizioni europee.

In data 30 marzo 2010 è stata dichiara ricevibile la petizione 1919/2009 presentata dal Sig. Marco Bazzoni e la Commissione europea è stata invitata a fornire informazioni in merito. Nonostante i ripetuti solleciti, la Commissione europea ha emesso parere motivato il 21 novembre 2012, per la petizione 1919/2009, e non l'ha ancora comunicato al Sig. Marco Bazzoni (che l'ha saputo dai mezzi d'informazione), né tantomeno al Parlamento europeo.

1. Può la Commissione dire se le autorità italiane hanno risposto al parere motivato per la procedura d'infrazione n. 2010/4227 e precisare la data esatta in cui la risposta è stata ricevuta dalla stessa autorità europea?

2. Può inoltre riferire con precisione gli ultimi sviluppi del caso?

Risposta di László Andor a nome della Commissione
(18 aprile 2013)

La Commissione desidera far presente che il sig. Bazzoni è stato informato con lettera datata 23 novembre 2012 che essa aveva emanato un parere motivato il 21 novembre 2012 e lo aveva inviato alle autorità italiane.

1. La Commissione conferma che le autorità italiane hanno risposto al parere motivato relativo alla procedura d'infrazione in questione e che il sig. Bazzoni è stato informato con lettere datate 5 febbraio 2013 e 15 marzo 2013.

2. La risposta delle autorità italiane, datata 24 gennaio 2013, ha dovuto essere tradotta ed è ora all'analisi dei servizi competenti. Non appena questi saranno giunti a una conclusione il sig. Bazzoni ne verrà informato.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001789/13
to the Commission
Sonia Alfano (ALDE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Latest developments in the infringement proceedings against Italy No 2010/4227

Further to a report submitted by Mr Marco Bazzoni, regarding a failure on the part of the Italian State to implement framework Directive 89/391/EEC, and to a lesser extent Directive 2002/14/EC, on 30 September 2011, the European Commission addressed formal notice C(2011)6692 dated 29 September 2011 to the Republic of Italy regarding infringement proceedings No 2010/4227. On 21 November 2012, the European Commission decided to send a reasoned opinion to the Italian authorities. Despite the Italian State having sent its explanations on 8 December 2011, the European Commission confirmed the formal notice for the following reasons:

1. The employer is discharged of his responsibilities if the work is delegated or sub-delegated (violation of Article 5 of Directive 89/391/EEC);

2. Extension of the deadline for drawing up a risk assessment document for a new business or for substantial changes made to an existing business (violation of Article 9, Directive 89/391/EEC).

Italy was given until 21 January 2013 to meet the European requirements.

On 30 March 2010, Petition 1919/2009, presented by Mr Marco Bazzoni, was declared admissible, and the European Commission was asked for information concerning the same. Despite repeated reminders, the European Commission issued its reasoned opinion on 21 November 2012 regarding Petition 1919/2009, and has not yet notified Mr Marco Bazzoni (who learned of it through the media) or the European Parliament.

1. Can the Commission state whether the Italian authorities have provided a response to the reasoned opinion issued for infringement procedure No 2010/4227 and specify the exact date on which a response was received by this European authority?

2. Can it furthermore provide an accurate report on the latest developments in the case?

Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission
(18 April 2013)

The Commission would point out that Mr Bazzoni was informed by letter dated 23 November 2012 that it had issued a reasoned opinion on 21 November 2012 and had sent it to the Italian authorities.

1. The Commission confirms that the Italian authorities have responded to the reasoned opinion on the infringement procedure concerned and Mr Bazzoni has been informed by letters dated05 February 2013 and 15 March 2013.

2. The Italian authorities' reply, which is dated 24 January 2013, has had to be translated and is currently being analysed by the competent departments. As soon as they reach a conclusion, Mr Bazzoni will be informed.

(Wersja polska)

Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-001790/13
do Komisji
Paweł Robert Kowal (ECR)
(20 lutego 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Zatrudnienie Polaków w instytucjach UE

Wielu Polaków bierze udział w konkursach otwartych na posady w komisjach UE, wygrywa je i po przejściu trudnych egzaminów, zostaje wpisanych na „listy rezerwowe". Problem polega na tym, że wielu z tych, którym udało się zdać testy egzaminacyjne, nie znajduje zatrudnienia i po czasie zostaje skreślonych z „list rezerwowych". „Lista rezerwowa" ma służyć, jako źródło naboru pracowników dla instytucji UE, w rzeczywistości jednak istniejące listy w przekonaniu wielu osób nie są efektywnym sposobem rekrutacji. Miejsca pracy zajmowane są często przez osoby, które nie przebrnęły, ani nawet nie przystąpiły do konkursu otwartego.

Wykaz Polaków zatrudnionych w UE przedstawia się zgodnie z tzw. parytetami, czyli na podstawie liczby osób zatrudnionych na różnego rodzaju umowy np. zlecenia, kontrakty, praca tymczasowa, oddelegowani przez instytucje krajowe, a nawet stażyści. Do opinii publicznej docierają mylne informacje, że w instytucjach unijnych pracuje bardzo wielu Polaków. Problem polega na tym, że większość osób zatrudnionych nie jest selekcjonowana z „list rezerwowych". W związku z tym chciałbym zapytać o to:

1. Jaki parytet zatrudnieniowy (urzędniczy i pomocniczy) w instytucjach posiada Polska (liczba osób i etatów)?

2. Ilu Polaków jest zatrudnionych w UE na innego rodzaju umowach niż zatrudnieni, którzy są wykazywani, jako „wykorzystanie parytetu"?

3. Jaki udział w tym zatrudnieniu mają osoby (Polacy) zatrudniani z „list rezerwowych"? Jaka jest ich liczba?

4. Ilu Polaków znajduje się jeszcze na tzw. „listach rezerwowych" i ilu z nich zostało już skreślonych z powodu upływu czasu i braku dla nich ofert pracy?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Maroša Šefčoviča w imieniu Komisji
(8 kwietnia 2013 r.)

1. Regulamin pracowniczy stanowi, iż urzędnicy są *„rekrutowani spośród obywateli Państw Członkowskich Wspólnot z uwzględnieniem możliwie szerokiego zasięgu geograficznego"* i żadne stanowiska nie mogą być rezerwowane dla określonego państwa członkowskiego (art. 27 ust. 1 i 3), nie istnieją żadne „kwoty" krajowe. Niemniej jednak w okresach przejściowych po rozszerzeniach Unii ustala się cele dla nowych państw członkowskich. W odniesieniu do polskich obywateli osiągnięto 93 % wartości docelowej w zakresie zatrudnienia wyznaczonej na lata 2004-2010 (1341).

2. Jak wspomniano w punkcie 1, nie istnieją żadne „kwoty" krajowe w zakresie zatrudnienia. Liczba polskich urzędników i pracowników tymczasowych zatrudnionych w Komisji wynosi 1182 osoby (1091 urzędników i 91 pracowników tymczasowych). W Komisji zatrudnionych jest 256 polskich pracowników kontraktowych (59 w grupie funkcyjnej IV) oraz 22 oddelegowanych ekspertów krajowych (na dzień 16 lutego 2013 r.).

3. Jak wskazano w punkcie 2, obecnie w Komisji zatrudnionych jest 1091 polskich urzędników i 256 polskich pracowników kontraktowych. Zostali oni wszyscy zatrudnieni z list rezerwowych sporządzonych po przeprowadzeniu zewnętrznych lub wewnętrznych konkursów/procedur naboru.

4. Obecnie na listach rezerwowych sporządzonych w wyniku zewnętrznych lub wewnętrznych konkursów znajduje się 241 polskich laureatów. Co roku instytucje europejskie podejmują decyzję, czy ważność list rezerwowych ma być przedłużona. W ostatnich dwóch latach zadecydowano o nieprzedłużaniu ważności wielu list rezerwowych, które sporządzone były kilka lat wcześniej i na których pozostawało niewielu laureatów. Na listach, których ważności nie przedłużono (listy z lat 2003-2005) znajdowało się 226 polskich laureatów. Należy jednak zauważyć, że z tych samych list zatrudniono 1321 polskich laureatów, co odpowiada bardzo dobremu poziomowi, czyli 85 % wszystkich polskich laureatów (1547).

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001790/13
to the Commission
Paweł Robert Kowal (ECR)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Employment of Poles in EU institutions

Many Poles take part in open competitions for EU positions, pass difficult exams to succeed and are then included on 'reserve lists'. The problem is that many of those who manage to pass the exams then fail to find employment and after some time are removed from the reserve lists. A reserve list is intended to serve as a source of recruitment for employees in the EU institutions. However, many people believe that these lists are not an effective recruitment method. Jobs are often taken by people who do not pass, or even take part in, an open competition.

The list of Poles employed in the EU is drawn up in accordance with quotas, based on the number of people employed under the various types of contract, such as freelance, contract work, temporary work, seconded by national institutions and even trainees. The Polish public are under the mistaken impression that a very large number of Poles work in the EU institutions. The problem is that the majority of people recruited are not selected from reserve lists. In this regard:

1. What is Poland's employment quota (officials and assistants) in EU institutions (number of people and posts)?

2. Other than employees, who are recognised as part of the quota, how many Poles work for the EU on other types of contract?

3. What proportion of that employment is accounted for by Poles recruited from reserve lists? How many of them are there?

4. How many Poles are still on such reserve lists and how many of them have already been removed from such lists due to the passage of time and the lack of jobs for them?

Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the Commission
(8 April 2013)

1. The Staff Regulations states that officials should be 'recruited on the broadest possible geographical basis from among nationals of Member States of the Communities' and no posts can be reserved for nationals from a given Member State (Article 27 (1) and (3)), no national 'quotas' exist. However, during transition periods after enlargements, targets for new Member States are set; 93% of the overall 2004-2010 recruitment target of 1 341 set for Polish nationals was reached.

2. As mentioned in point 1, there are no national 'quotas' for recruitment. The number of Polish officials and temporary agents in the Commission amounts to 1 182 (1 091 officials and 91 temporary staff). There are 256 Polish contract agents in the Commission (59 in function group IV) and 22 national seconded experts (on 16 February 2013).

3. As mentioned in point 2, there are currently 1 091 Polish officials in the Commission and 256 contractual agents. All have been recruited from reserve lists of external or internal competitions/selections.

4. There are currently 241 Polish laureates available on reserve lists of external or internal competitions. Each year, the European institutions decide whether or not to extend the validity of reserve lists. In the last two years, it has been decided not to extend the validity of a large number of reserve lists which were several years old and with few remaining laureates. In this exercise, 226 Polish laureates were on lists for which the validity was not extended (lists from 2003 to 2005). It is to be noted however that from those same lists, 1 321 Polish laureates had been recruited, which corresponds to a very good 85% of the available total (1 547 Polish laureates).

(English version)

Question for written answer P-001791/13
to the Commission
Martin Callanan (ECR)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Commission's communication budget — cost and tendering process for banners hung on the Berlaymont building; unacceptable delays in responding to MEPs' questions

I submitted Written Question P-009796/2012 as a priority question on 25 October 2012. Under Rule 117 of the Rules of Procedure, 'questions which require an immediate answer but not detailed research (priority questions) shall be answered within three weeks of being forwarded to the addressees'. I received an answer on 4 December 2012, five weeks later. I was disappointed by the delay, but accepted Commissioner Reding's apology given in her answer of 23 January 2013 to a follow-up question (P-011238/2012).

On 19 December 2012 I submitted another question (E-011658/2012). This was sent to your services and put up on Parliament's website on 20 December 2012. Under Rule 117(4) of the Rules of Procedure, non-priority questions are to be answered within six weeks of being forwarded to the addressees. Having previously expressed my disappointment at the Commission taking 60% longer than it should have to respond to a question about an issue of pressing concern to my constituents, I am at a loss as to why nine weeks have now passed with no sign of a response to my most recent question. It is a crucial function of the legislature to hold the executive to account. Such delays are unacceptable.

I suspect that my posing this question may prompt your services to produce an amswer to my Question E-011658/12 within days. I therefore take this opportunity to remind you that I requested very specific information in my last question. This included the exact numbers of bids received and costs incurred for the design, printing, delivery and installation of the last five banners hung on the side of the Commission's Berlaymont building, as well as information about the tendering process and the budget line under which they are funded.

I could not have been more explicit in my request for exact figures, and I underline the importance I attach to this element of my question. I expect to receive these figures and a complete answer to the other elements of my question. I do not expect you to insult me, the European citizens who asked me to obtain this information on their behalf, or Parliament as a legislature and institution, by seeking to appease me with platitudes and generalities. I expect numbers.

I posed a very clear question and expect a very clear response. I also look forward to your explanation as to why, again, your services have been unable to meet the very generous deadlines given to them to provide information concerning the spending of public money to a representative of the people.

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(15 March 2013)

The Commission sent its answer to Written Question E-011658/2012 on 22 February 2013. The Commission apologizes for the delay in its response.

Further to its answer, the Commission is sending the following additional information.

While there were 15 banners in 2008 and 16 banners in 2009, there were only 10 new banners in 2011 and four in 2012. This means a saving of nearly 75% compared to previous years. This expenditure over 2 years represents a drastic cut compared to the previous situation, as explained in my previous answer of 22 February.

The decoration of Commission buildings, including the design, printing, delivery and installation of the banners on the Berlaymont building is the subject of a framework contract with a single contractor, Creaset. This contract was signed on 22 June 2011 for an initial duration of 2 years following a competitive call for tender procedure.

The cost of the last five banners which all reflected political priorities of Parliament, Commission and Council was:

— 2013: European Year of Citizens: EUR 14,128

— 2012/2013: Nobel Peace Prize: EUR 13,428

— 2012: Economic and Monetary Union: EUR 14,902

— 2012: Europe Day: EUR 14,762

— 2011: Economic governance: EUR 14,762

The European Year of Citizens banner was funded from budget line 16.050701, the Nobel Peace Prize banner from budget line 26.012203 and the other banners were funded from budget line 16.0304.

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001792/13
a la Comisión
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)
(20 de febrero de 2013)

Asunto: Directivas 2007/46/CE, 2003/37/CE y 2002/24/CE

Aunque existen las Directivas 2007/46/CE, 2003/37/CE y 2002/24/CE en referencia a las homologaciones de remolques agrícolas y maquinaria remolcada, parece que es problemática la exportación de esta maquinaria en los distintos países de la UE, ya que existen distintas normativas particulares en cada Estado miembro para poder homologar esta maquinaria, como por ejemplo la capacidad de frenada, las dimensiones principales o las capacidades de carga. Esto trae problemas a las empresas que fabrican este tipo de maquinaria, ya que tienen que adaptar la maquinaria a la normativa de cada país.

Aunque ya existe una homologación común sobre este tema en la EU, las particularidades de cada Estado miembro hacen totalmente inviable la aplicación de esta homologación común existente.

1. ¿No cree la Comisión la armonización de la normativa sobre homologación de remolques agrícolas y maquinaria remolcada haría las empresas del sector más competitivas y el producto final más económico?

2. ¿Qué medidas piensa tomar la Comisión para facilitar la comercialización de la maquinaria agrícola en territorio europeo?

Respuesta del Sr. Tajani en nombre de la Comisión
(12 de abril de 2013)

Actualmente, la homologación de tipo de remolques agrícolas y forestales y su maquinaria intercambiable remolcada (vehículos de las categorías R y S, respectivamente) se concede con arreglo a las disposiciones de la Directiva 2003/37/CE. Sin embargo, aunque determinados requisitos técnicos han sido armonizados, de conformidad con el artículo 23, apartado 2, y el anexo II, de esta Directiva, la homologación de tipo del vehículo completo solo es posible en virtud del Derecho nacional.

En un futuro próximo, de conformidad con el Reglamento (UE) n° 167/2013 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 5 de febrero de 2013, relativo a la homologación de los vehículos agrícolas y forestales, y a la vigilancia del mercado de dichos vehículos, que derogará la Directiva 2003/37/CE y se aplicará a los nuevos tipos de vehículos a partir del 1 de enero de 2016, será posible conceder la homologación de tipo UE de los vehículos de las categrías R y S si estos cumplen los requisitos pertinentes establecidos por dicho Reglamento y sus medidas de aplicación.

La Comisión considera que esta armonización simplificará y reducirá el coste del procedimiento de homologación para los fabricantes que deseen introducir vehículos de categorías R y S en el mercado de la UE. Esto facilitará la libre circulación de sus productos en el mercado interior y reducirá su coste global, con la previsible consecuencia de un precio más bajo del producto final.

No obstante, la homologación de tipo UE no será obligatoria, ya que, de conformidad con el artículo 2, apartado 3, del Reglamento mencionado anteriormente, los fabricantes podrán elegir si solicitan una homologación de tipo UE de conformidad con ese Reglamento o si optan por cumplir los requisitos nacionales pertinentes.

Se ha incluido esta opción en apoyo de las pequeñas y medianas empresas, que, generalmente, fabrican vehículos de categorías R y S para su introducción únicamente en mercados nacionales limitados.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001792/13
to the Commission
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Directives 2007/46/EC, 2003/37/EC and 2002/24/EC

Although Directives 2007/46/EC, 2003/37/EC and 2002/24/EC cover approval of agricultural trailers and towed machinery, it seems that exporting machinery of this kind to the various EU countries is problematic, since there are differing specific rules in each Member State governing its approval, relating, for example, to braking capability, main dimensions and load capacities. This leads to problems for enterprises that manufacture machinery of this type, since they have to adapt it to the rules of each country.

Even though there is a common approval system on this issue in the EU, the individual features of each Member State make it completely impractical to apply the existing common approval system.

1. Does the Commission not believe that harmonising the rules on the approval of agricultural trailers and towed machinery would make enterprises in the sector more competitive, and the end product cheaper?

2. What measures does the Commission intend to take to facilitate the marketing of agricultural machinery in Europe?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission
(12 April 2013)

Type-approval of agricultural and forestry trailers and interchangeable towed machinery (vehicles of categories R and S, respectively) is currently granted according to the provisions of Directive 2003/37/EC. However, although certain technical requirements have been harmonised, according to Article 23 (2) and Annex II of this directive type-approval of the whole vehicle is only possible under national law.

In the near future, according to Regulation (EU) No 167/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 February 2013 on the approval and market surveillance of agricultural and forestry vehicles, which will repeal Directive 2003/37/EC and will apply to new types of vehicles as from 1 January 2016, it will be possible to grant EU type-approval of vehicles of types R and S if they comply with the relevant requirements established in that regulation and its implementing measures.

The Commission believes that this harmonisation will simplify and reduce the cost of the approval procedure for those manufacturers willing to place in the EU market R and S vehicles. This will facilitate the free movement of their products in the internal market and will reduce their overall cost, with the foreseeable consequence of a lower price of the end product.

However, EU type-approval will not be mandatory as, according to Article 2(3) of the abovementioned Regulation, manufacturers will be able to choose whether to apply for EU type-approval under that regulation or whether to comply with the relevant national requirements.

This option has been included with the objective of supporting small and medium-sized enterprises which usually manufacture R and S vehicles to be placed only in limited national markets.

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001793/13
a la Comisión
Dolores García-Hierro Caraballo (S&D)
(20 de febrero de 2013)

Asunto: Coste del Acuerdo Pesca UE-Marruecos

El anterior Acuerdo de Colaboración en el sector pesquero entre la UE y Marruecos entró en vigor en 2007 y establecía una contrapartida financiera de 36 100 000 euros anuales, 13 500 000 euros de los cuales se destinaban a apoyar la política pesquera marroquí. Dicha contribución se basaba en un máximo de 119 (20 cerqueros de pesca pelágica artesanal, 30 palangreros de fondo, 20 buques de pesca artesanal en el sur, 22 buques de pesca demersal y 27 buques atuneros) autorizaciones de pesca para los buques de la UE, mayoritariamente españoles, en las categorías de pesca artesanal, demersal y atunera, así como un tonelaje de capturas máximo de 60 000 toneladas en la categoría de pesca pelágica industrial.

Durante las negociaciones que se están llevando a cabo para un nuevo acuerdo pesquero, esta diputada ha tenido conocimiento de que Marruecos propone un aumento de la capacidad de pesca, no se conforma con los 36 100 000 euros anuales que percibía por el anterior acuerdo y pide aumentarlos al menos hasta 38 millones, mientras que los negociadores comunitarios ofrecen, según fuentes europeas, 25 000 000 euros.

En este sentido esta diputada pregunta a la Comisión Europea: ¿Es cierta la rebaja económica que se ofrece al Reino de Marruecos por el nuevo acuerdo, y de ser así, cuáles son las razones objetivas en que se sustenta?

Así mismo pide conocer al detalle las posibilidades de pesca que está ofreciendo el Reino de Marruecos en las negociaciones que se están llevando a cabo entre las partes.

Finalmente pide a la Comisión que le remita una copia del informe de evaluación realizado sobre el último Acuerdo firmado entre Marruecos y la UE.

Respuesta de la Sra. Damanaki en nombre de la Comisión
(25 de abril de 2013)

En las negociaciones que se están llevando a cabo, la Comisión está siguiendo estrictamente el mandato del Consejo y los objetivos generales consagrados en la reforma de la política pesquera común.

Con arreglo a esas pautas, uno de los objetivos de la Comisión, al negociar la contrapartida financiera por el acceso y las correspondientes posibilidades pesqueras que se otorguen a las flotas de la UE, es obtener resultados que merezcan el gasto que suponen, y más teniendo en cuenta que esa fue una de las críticas que planteó el Parlamento Europeo en diciembre de 2011 al anterior protocolo.

Dado que las negociaciones aún no han acabado, la Comisión no puede indicar de manera detallada las posibilidades de pesca que ofrece el Reino de Marruecos.

En junio de 2011, se envió al Parlamento una copia del informe de evaluación del último protocolo firmado entre Marruecos y la UE que sigue estando disponible en la secretaría de la Comisión de Pesca del Parlamento.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001793/13
to the Commission
Dolores García-Hierro Caraballo (S&D)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Cost of the EU-Morocco fisheries agreement

The previous EU-Morocco Fisheries Partnership Agreement came into force in 2007 and established an annual financial contribution of EUR 36.1 million, out of which EUR 13.5 million was destined for support to Morocco's fisheries policy. This contribution was based on a maximum of 119 fishing authorisations for EU vessels (20 small-scale pelagic seiners, 30 bottom longliners, 20 small scale fishing vessels in the south, 22 demersal vessels and 27 tuna fishing vessels), most of them Spanish, in the categories of small-scale, demersal and tuna fishing, with a maximum catch tonnage of 60 000 tonnes in the category of industrial pelagic fishing.

In the course of the current negotiations for a new fisheries agreement, this Member has learned that Morocco is proposing an increase in fishing capacity and that, not satisfied with the EUR 36.1 million a year which it received under the previous agreement, it has asked for the amount to be increased to at least EUR 38 million, whereas according to European sources, the EU negotiators have offered EUR 25 million.

This Member asks the Commission:

Is it true that the amount being offered to Morocco for the new agreement has been reduced? If so, what are the objective grounds for this reduction?

Can the Commission describe in detail the fishing opportunities being offered by the Kingdom of Morocco in the negotiations currently underway between the parties?

Lastly, would the Commission kindly provide this Member with a copy of the assessment report on the last Agreement signed between Morocco and the EU.

Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission
(25 April 2013)

During the ongoing negotiations the Commission is strictly following the Council mandate and the overarching principles enshrined in the reform of the common fisheries policy.

Along these lines, one of the aims of the Commission, when negotiating the financial counterpart for access and the related fishing possibilities which will be made available to the EU fleets, is to ensure good value for money also with the view of responding to one of the criticisms of the European Parliament on the previous protocol, in December 2011.

As the current negotiations are not finalised yet, the Commission cannot describe in detail the fishing opportunities being offered by the Kingdom of Morocco.

A copy of the assessment report on the last protocol signed between Morocco and the EU has been sent to the Parliament in June 2011 and is still available in the PECH secretariat.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-001795/13
an die Kommission
Angelika Werthmann (ALDE)
(20. Februar 2013)

Betrifft: Anstieg Suizidrate in Spanien

Laut jüngsten Meldungen begehen in Spanien zunehmend mehr Menschen Selbstmord. Diese Entwicklung war bereits in einer Anfrage (E-004338/2012) zur erhöhten Suizidrate in Griechenland zu beobachten. Generell wird berichtet (u. a. von Caritas Europa), dass sich die Armutssituation (besonders für Kinder und Jugendliche/Pensionisten) in den sogenannten „Krisenländern" durch rigide Sparmaßnahmen zunehmend verschlimmert.

1. Gibt es zu den Notständen in den südlichen Ländern, wie nun in Spanien, neue Erkenntnisse darüber, wie man jenen schwer betroffenen Menschen helfen könnte?

2. Sind bereits längerfristige Maßnahmen zur „sozialen Entschärfung" der Krise geplant, insbesondere im Hinblick auf ihr weiteres Andauern?

3. Falls nicht, hat die Kommission die Absicht, dieses Phänomen zu bekämpfen?

4. Gibt es bereits Überlegungen, die Strategie 2020 zur Armutsbekämpfung verstärkt umzusetzen?

Antwort von Herrn Borg im Namen der Kommission
(9. April 2013)

Die Kommission verfolgt diese Frage aufmerksam. In mehreren Zeitungsartikeln wurde zwar ein Anstieg der Selbstmordrate in Spanien gemeldet, die offiziellen Daten des spanischen Nationalen Statistischen Amts zeigen jedoch keine signifikante Veränderung der Selbstmordrate im Zeitraum von 2005 bis 2011. Dessen ungeachtet wird das spanische Gesundheitsministerium die Umstände verstärkt untersuchen und dabei auch die Auswirkungen der Krise auf die psychische Gesundheit der spanischen Bevölkerung berücksichtigen sowie wirkungsvolle Maßnahmen zur frühzeitigen Erkennung, Behandlung und Verhinderung eines Rückfalls nach einem Selbstmordversuch einbeziehen.

Um die sozialen Risiken der Krise und die Auswirkungen auf das Wohlergehen der Bürger Europas zu mildern, drängte die Kommission die Mitgliedstaaten kürzlich in ihrem Paket zu Sozialinvestitionen, mehr Wert auf soziale Investitionen zu legen. Mit Hilfe dieses Pakets sollen Fähigkeiten und Fertigkeiten der Menschen verbessert, die generationenübergreifende Benachteiligung bekämpft und Ungleichheiten abgebaut werden. Es zeigt, wie die soziale Mobilität durch Investitionen im Kindes- und Jugendalter und Investitionen in eine präventive Politik gesteigert werden kann. Ferner werden politische Rahmenbedingungen vorgeschlagen: Dazu gehört, in Kompetenzen und Fähigkeiten der Menschen zu investieren und dafür zu sorgen, dass die sozialen Schutzsysteme den Bedürfnissen der Menschen gerecht werden.

Außerdem beteiligen sich 25 Mitgliedstaaten an einer gemeinsamen Aktion für psychische Gesundheit und Wohlbefinden, die am 1. Februar 2013 anlief. Diese gemeinsame Aktion wird aus dem EU-Gesundheitsprogramm kofinanziert und wurde aufgrund von Schlussfolgerungen des Rates von 2011 ins Leben gerufen. In einem ihrer Arbeitspakete geht es um evidenzbasierte Maßnahmen gegen Depressionen und die Verringerung der Selbstmordrate.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001795/13
to the Commission
Angelika Werthmann (ALDE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Increase in suicide rate in Spain

According to recent reports, an increasing number of people are committing suicide in Spain. This trend was already apparent in a question (E-004338/2012) concerning the increased suicide rate in Greece. In general, reports (by Caritas Europa, for example) state that the poverty situation (particularly for children and young people/pensioners) in the countries in crisis is being increasingly exacerbated by rigid austerity measures.

1. With regard to the crisis situations in the southern Member States, like the one we are now seeing in Spain, is there any new information as to how we could help these people who are so badly affected?

2. Are any longer-term measures to bring about the 'social easing' of the crisis planned, in particular in view of its continued persistence?

3. If not, does the Commission intend to work to combat this phenomenon?

4. Is consideration already being given to stepping up the implementation of the Europe 2020 strategy to combat poverty?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission
(9 April 2013)

The Commission is following this aspect attentively. While several newspaper articles reported increases in suicides in Spain, the official data provided by the Spanish National Institute of Statistics do not show any significant change in suicide rate between 2005 and 2011. Nevertheless, the Ministry of Health of Spain will intensify its analysis of the situation, including the impact of the crisis on the mental health of the Spanish population, and effective measures for early detection, treatment, and prevention of recidivism in suicide attempts.

In order to reduce the social risks resulting from the crisis and its impact on the well-being of European citizens, the Commission itself urged Member States in its recent Social Investment Package to put more emphasis on social investment. The Package contributes to improving human capital, tackling intergenerational transmission of disadvantage, and reducing inequality. It shows how investing early in children and young people and investing in preventative policy can help improve social mobility. It also proposes a policy framework which includes investing in people's skills and capacities, and ensuring that social protection systems respond to people's needs.

Moreover, 25 Member States participate in a Joint Action on Mental Health and Well-being which started 1 February 2013. The Joint Action is co-funded from the EU-Health Programme and was initiated following Council Conclusions of 2011. One of its work packages will deal with taking evidence based action against depression and to reduce suicide.

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-001797/13
à la Commission
Robert Goebbels (S&D)
(20 février 2013)

Objet: Conclusions du projet de recherche «HighNoon»

À la suite d'un appel à propositions au titre du 7e programme-cadre, la Commission a contribué en 2008 à hauteur de plus de 3 300 000 euros au projet «HighNoon», qui a pris fin en mai 2012. L'objectif principal de ce projet de développement était d'évaluer les incidences du recul des glaciers de l'Himalaya et des éventuelles modifications de la mousson indienne d'été sur la répartition spatiale et temporelle des ressources en eau.

Sachant que le GIEC a dû reconnaître en 2010 qu'il s'était trompé en annonçant un rétrécissement de 500 000 à 100 000 km^2 de la surface occupée par les glaciers des massifs de l'Himalaya, quelles sont les principales conclusions de «HighNoon» en ce qui concerne l'éventuel recul de ces glaciers?

La Commission envisage-t-elle d'approfondir les recherches en la matière en lançant un nouvel appel à propositions au titre du prochain programme-cadre?

Enfin, dans sa réponse E-3005/2010 à ma question, la Commission se disait convaincue que le financement de «HighNoon» est *pleinement justifié* et déclarait qu'elle *prendra en considération les découvertes scientifiques de qualité dans ses politiques*.

Concrètement, quelles sont les recommandations issues du projet «HighNoon» qui vont être reprises dans les politiques de la Commission?

Réponse donnée par Mme Geoghegan-Quinn au nom de la Commission
(5 avril 2013)

Le projet «High Noon» a permis d'actualiser, grâce à des méthodes de télédétection, les estimations concernant la superficie et la masse des glaciers de l'Himalaya: on sait maintenant que la couverture glaciaire représente au total 23 000 x 10^3 km^2 environ et que 3 150 ± 190 km^3 de glace sont répartis le long de la chaîne himalayenne. Les pertes en superficie seraient de l'ordre 0,1 à 0,9 % par an, sur des périodes d'une quarantaine d'années. On observe, néanmoins, des augmentations de superficie dans l'ouest de l'Himalaya et le Karakoram. Toutes les modélisations climatiques à l'échelle régionale prévoient, au cours des prochaines décennies, des pertes de masse substantielles dans la plupart des massifs de l'Himalaya.

Les chercheurs relèvent également que les taux de fonte et d'accumulation des glaciers himalayens sont encore mal compris et soulignent la nécessité de travaux de recherche supplémentaires sur des glaciers témoins afin de mieux comprendre leur dynamique, leur évolution et leur réaction face au changement climatique. De nouvelles recherches ont été proposées dans le cadre du programme «Horizon 2020».

La Commission confirme que le financement de ce projet se justifiait pleinement, compte tenu notamment de la coopération renforcée avec l'Inde qui en a résulté. L'étude, qui est centrée sur la chaîne de l'Himalaya en tant qu'exemple d'une zone sensible, met également en lumière l'incidence probable d'un réchauffement supérieur à la moyenne sur la fonte des glaciers et ses répercussions sur le rendement des cultures, l'approvisionnement en eau et le risque d'inondation.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001797/13
to the Commission
Robert Goebbels (S&D)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Conclusions of the HighNoon research project

Following a call for proposals under the Seventh Framework Programme, in 2008 the Commission contributed more than EUR 3.3 million to the HighNoon project, which ended in May 2012. The principal aim of that development project was to assess the impact of Himalayan glaciers retreat and possible changes of the Indian summer monsoon on the spatial and temporal distribution of water resources.

Since the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was forced to admit in 2010 that it had made a mistake by announcing that the total area occupied by Himalayan glaciers had shrunk by 500 000 km^2 to 100 000 km^2, what are HighNoon's main conclusions with regard to the possible retreat of those glaciers?

Does the Commission plan to carry out further research on the matter by launching a new call for proposals under the next framework programme?

Lastly, in its answer E-3005/2010 to my question, the Commission declared itself convinced that the funding of HighNoon was 'fully justified' and stated that it would 'consider sound scientific findings for its policies'.

Which specific recommendations from the HighNoon project will be taken up in the Commission's policies?

Answer given by Ms Geoghegan-Quinn on behalf of the Commission
(5 April 2013)

The HighNoon project ([1]) has reassessed the estimates of glacier areas and volumes of ice in the Himalaya by remote-sensing methods, giving totals of about 23 000 × 10^3 km^2 of glacier cover, and 3150 ± 190 km^3 of ice along the Himalaya arc ([2]). Glacier area reductions appear to be in the range 0.1 to 0.9% per annum over periods of about 40 years. Increases in area are however noted in the western Himalaya and Karakoram. All regional climate models project mass losses in coming decades that are substantial for most parts of the Himalaya.

The researchers also note that the rates of melt and accumulation of Himalayan glaciers are still not well understood and recommend that more research is needed on benchmark glaciers so as to better understand their dynamics, evolution and response to climate change. Further research has been proposed under Horizon 2020.

The Commission confirms that the funding of this project was fully justified, particularly given the strengthened cooperation with India it provided. The study also highlights the likely effect of above-average warming on glacier melt and the implications for crop yields, water supply and flooding, with a focus on the Himalayas as an example of a vulnerable area.

([1]) Highnoon project, Grant Agreement 227087 — www.eu-highnoon.org
([2]) http://dendrolab.ch/dendrolab/download/articles/Bolch_etal_Science_2012.pdf

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-001798/13
à la Commission
Franck Proust (PPE)
(20 février 2013)

Objet: Aide de l'Europe en faveur de la réhabilitation des cimetières occidentaux en Algérie

À l'indépendance des pays du Maghreb, des centaines de milliers de personnes d'origine occidentale, principalement des Français, ont été rapatriés en Europe, laissant derrière eux ce qu'ils avaient de plus précieux: tout leur passé.

Depuis, de nombreuses associations de rapatriés tentent de préserver les lieux de mémoire de ce passé, notamment les cimetières de leurs ancêtres en Algérie. Ce type de démarche témoigne de la vitalité et de la force des liens humains, sociaux et politiques qui ont toujours existé entre le Sud et le Nord de la Méditerranée. Mais ces projets se heurtent souvent à des besoins criants en liquidités.

Nous avons tout à gagner à participer à la préservation de ces liens indéfectibles. Car agir ainsi, c'est encourager la compréhension, le dialogue et l'entente mutuelle des peuples méditerranéens, et se souvenir de ce passé entremêlé pour construire un avenir ensemble.

C'est d'ailleurs l'une des missions que s'est confiée l'Union européenne dans le cadre de sa politique de voisinage.

1. La Commission a-t-elle déjà participé, de quelque manière que ce soit, à la réhabilitation de ces cimetières et d'autres lieux de mémoire?

2. Peut-elle préciser s'il existe des sources de financement de l'Union européenne (programmes, Fonds structurels, Union pour la Méditerranée) dédiées à ce type de démarches?

Réponse donnée par M. Füle au nom de la Commission
(18 avril 2013)

Jusqu'à présent, l'Union européenne n'a encore jamais soutenu spécifiquement la préservation et la restauration des cimetières algériens dans lesquels sont enterrés les ancêtres et les proches des rapatriés (ni au titre de programmes bilatéraux, ni dans le cadre de programmes régionaux ou de l'Union pour la Méditerranée).

Néanmoins, la promotion de la compréhension et du dialogue entre les populations méditerranéennes et la préservation du patrimoine culturel sont des éléments essentiels du soutien apporté par l'UE à cette région dans le cadre de la politique européenne de voisinage. En Algérie, un programme en faveur de la préservation et de la valorisation du patrimoine culturel a été signé en novembre 2012. Les actions à mener au titre de ce programme ont été définies par des experts de différentes nationalités et validées à plusieurs niveaux par la Commission et par les États membres avant d'être finalement approuvées par les autorités algériennes. Cependant, la restauration des cimetières n'en fait malheureusement pas partie.

En outre, dans le contexte de la coopération régionale, le programme Euromed Heritage de l'UE soutient également la préservation du patrimoine culturel dans la région méditerranéenne, y compris en Algérie. Il est axé sur le renforcement des capacités des organismes publics chargés de la préservation et de la gestion du patrimoine culturel et sur la sensibilisation de la société civile à l'importance de protéger le patrimoine culturel en tant que témoignage de l'histoire d'un pays et vecteur de développement économique.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001798/13
to the Commission
Franck Proust (PPE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: EU aid for the restoration of Western cemeteries in Algeria

When the Maghreb countries gained their independence, hundreds of thousands of people of Western origin, mostly French people, were repatriated to Europe, leaving behind them their most treasured possession: all of their past.

Since then, many repatriates' associations have been seeking to preserve the places in which to remember that past, in particular the cemeteries where their ancestors are buried in Algeria. That kind of effort testifies to the strength and vitality of the human, social and political bonds that have always existed between the south and the north of the Mediterranean. However, these projects often suffer from an acute lack of funding.

We have everything to gain from helping to preserve those unbreakable bonds, because this kind of action fosters understanding, dialogue and agreement among the peoples of the Mediterranean, and remembering that shared past is instrumental in building a future together.

This is also one of the tasks that the European Union has set itself as part of its Neighbourhood Policy.

1. Has the Commission already contributed in any way to the restoration of those cemeteries and of other places of remembrance?

2. Can it say whether any sources of EU funding (programmes, Structural Funds, the Union for the Mediterranean) exist for these kinds of efforts?

Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission
(18 April 2013)

So far, the specific issue of maintaining and restoring cemeteries of repatriates' ancestors and relatives in Algeria did not benefit from EU support (neither under bilateral programmes, nor under regional programmes or through the Union for the Mediterranean).

Nevertheless, fostering understanding and dialogue among the Mediterranean people as well as preserving cultural heritage are crucial elements of EU support to the region in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy. In Algeria, a programme for the preservation and promotion of the cultural heritage was signed in November 2012. Activities under this programme were defined by experts of various nationalities and validated at several levels by the Commission and by the Member States before being ultimately approved by the Algerian side. However, these agreed activities do unfortunately not include support to the restoration of cemeteries.

Furthermore, in the context of regional cooperation, the EU Euromed Heritage programme has also been supporting the preservation of cultural heritage in the Mediterranean, including in Algeria. It focused on strengthening the capacities of the public organisations responsible for preserving and managing the cultural heritage and raising awareness at the level of civil society on the importance of protecting the cultural heritage as part of the history of a country and a vector for economic development.

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-001800/13
à la Commission (Vice-Présidente/Haute Représentante)
Nora Berra (PPE)
(20 février 2013)

Objet: VP/HR — Défèrement de la Syrie devant la Cour pénale internationale

Le rapport dénonce les «crimes contre l'humanité» et les «crimes de guerre» qui sont encore perpétrés en Syrie et assure que le défèrement de la Syrie devant la Cour pénale internationale pourrait avoir un effet dissuasif et assurerait un «début de justice» pour les victimes. Cependant, pour qu'une telle mesure soit prise, il faudrait exercer une pression beaucoup plus forte sur la Russie et sur la Chine, qui restent des alliés indéfectibles du régime syrien.

Le Service européen pour l'action extérieure soutient-il la proposition de Human Rights Watch concernant le défèrement de la Syrie devant la Cour pénale internationale?

Le cas échéant, est-il envisagé d'exercer une pression plus forte sur la Russie et sur la Chine, qui bloquent le processus?

Réponse donnée par M^me^ Ashton, Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante au nom de la Commission
(30 mai 2013)

L'UE a fait part à plusieurs reprises de ses préoccupations devant les violations généralisées et systématiques des Droits de l'homme et du droit humanitaire international, lesquelles, selon la commission d'enquête internationale indépendante, sont susceptibles de constituer des crimes contre l'humanité et des crimes de guerre au sens de la définition donnée par le Statut de Rome de la Cour pénale internationale (CPI).

L'UE a demandé au Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies de se pencher d'urgence sur la situation en Syrie à cet égard, et notamment d'envisager une saisine de la CPI, comme cela est demandé dans la lettre datée du 14 janvier 2013 adressée par la Suisse au Conseil de sécurité. Elle a appelé à plusieurs reprises tous les membres du Conseil de sécurité à assumer leurs responsabilités en ce qui concerne la crise syrienne.

L'UE a rappelé, depuis le début de la crise, que tous les responsables de crimes contre l'humanité et de crimes de guerre doivent rendre compte de leurs actes. Elle continue de soutenir les travaux de la commission indépendante d'enquête sur la situation en Syrie et a accueilli avec satisfaction le dernier rapport mis à jour à ce sujet.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001800/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Nora Berra (PPE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Bringing Syria before the International Criminal Court

In its World Report 2013, Human Rights Watch condemns the 'crimes against humanity' and 'war crimes' that continue to be perpetrated in Syria and declares that bringing Syria before the International Criminal Court (ICC) could have a deterrent effect and provide a 'measure of justice' for the victims of the regime. However, if Syria is to be brought before the ICC, much more intense pressure will have to be put on Russia and China, as their support for the Syrian regime at present seems unshakeable.

Does the European External Action Service agree with Human Rights Watch's proposal that Syria be brought before the ICC?

If necessary, does it intend to put increased pressure on Russia and China, which are standing in the way of progress on this matter?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(30 May 2013)

The EU has stated several times its concern about the widespread and systematic violation of human rights and international humanitarian law which, according to the Independent International Commission of Inquiry, may amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes under the Rome Statute of the ICC.

The EU has called on the UNSC to urgently address the situation in Syria in these aspects, including on a possible referral to the ICC as requested in the Swiss letter to the UNSC of 14 January 2013. The EU has repeatedly called on all members of the UNSC to uphold their responsibilities regarding the crisis in Syria.

The EU has recalled since the beginning of the crisis that all those responsible for crimes against humanity and war crimes must be held accountable. The EU continues to support the work of the Independent Commission of Inquiry on the situation in Syria and has welcomed its latest updated report.

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-001801/13
à la Commission (Vice-Présidente / Haute Représentante)
Nora Berra (PPE)
(20 février 2013)

Objet: VP/HR — Rapport de l'ONG Human Rights Watch sur la situation dans le sud de la Méditerranée

Après avoir donné de grands espoirs, les révolutions arabes inquiètent les défenseurs des Droits de l'homme. Dans son rapport 2013, présenté jeudi 31 janvier à Londres, l'ONG Human Rights Watch demande aux pays observateurs de ne pas fermer les yeux devant les exactions commises par les nouvelles démocraties du Printemps arabe.

La transition démocratique ne se fait pas exactement dans le sens du respect des droits fondamentaux et tend à réduire les droits des femmes, des dissidents et des minorités sous prétexte qu'ils sont, comme nous le présente le rapport, «imposés par l'Occident» et «incompatibles avec l'islam ou la culture arabe».

Le rapport dénonce particulièrement les cas libyen et égyptien qui illustrent parfaitement les faits révélés. Rappelons que, selon ce rapport, des «milliers de personnes» sont encore détenues de façon arbitraire et sans perspectives de jugement par le gouvernement.

Il s'agit donc, comme nous le demande l'ONG, de ne pas fermer les yeux sur les exactions toujours commises dans cette région et de prendre nos responsabilités politiques afin de conduire effectivement ces pays vers la transition démocratique.

Comment le Service européen pour l'action extérieure souhaite-t-il agir pour aider ces pays à poursuivre cette transition sans déroger à ses valeurs démocratiques ni cautionner toute réforme attentatoire aux droits fondamentaux?

Réponse donnée par M^me^ Ashton, Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante, au nom de la Commission
(6 juin 2013)

Le soutien apporté par l'Union européenne au changement et aux réformes dans le sud de la Méditerranée reste une priorité politique majeure. Cet engagement a été confirmé lors de la réunion du Conseil européen de février 2013. Dans certains pays, les transitions ne cessent de fluctuer et passent par des phases délicates qui exigent de la vigilance et un soutien fort et visible afin d'éviter tout blocage ou toute dégradation de la situation.

L'Union européenne continue d'exprimer ses inquiétudes quant aux violations des Droits de l'homme et elle en fait part à chaque réunion bilatérale et multilatérale. Alors que l'évolution des transitions demeure complexe et instable, des avancées démocratiques majeures ont été observées, telles que la tenue, dans de nombreux pays partenaires, d'élections dans l'ensemble libres et équitables, ainsi que l'émergence d'une société civile dynamique qui sait se faire entendre.

De nombreux pays partenaires arabes n'ont pas pris de décision claire quant aux réformes politiques et économiques à mener et c'est une situation qui demande à la fois de la patience sur le plan stratégique et un engagement permanent de la part de l'UE afin d'aider ces pays à effectuer leur transition et à répondre aux aspirations légitimes de leur population. L'UE veillera à maintenir son soutien sans faille au processus démocratique et à la transition économique, tout en demandant des comptes aux autorités arabes dont les actions sont incompatibles avec les principes démocratiques, les droits universels de l'homme et les libertés fondamentales.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001801/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Nora Berra (PPE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Report on the situation in the southern Mediterranean by the NGO Human Rights Watch

After raising hopes for the future, the Arab revolutions are now giving human rights defenders cause for concern. In its World Report 2013, which it presented on 31 January 2013 in London, the NGO Human Rights Watch calls on the international community not to turn a blind eye to human rights abuses being committed by the new democracies emerging from the Arab Spring.

The transition to democracy is not proving to be synonymous with respect for fundamental human rights, in that the new governments are curtailing the rights of women, political opponents and minority groups on the pretext that such rights are 'Western impositions' and 'at odds with Islam or Arab culture'.

The report is particularly critical of the situation in Libya and Egypt, where 'thousands of people' are still being detained arbitrarily with no prospect of being brought to trial.

As Human Rights Watch has urged us, we must not stand back while human rights violations continue in the region, but instead face up to our political responsibilities, in order to guide these countries effectively towards democracy.

How does the European External Action Service intend to help these countries to continue their transition without undermining the democratic values which underpin its work or endorsing reforms which violate fundamental rights?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(6 June 2013)

The European Union's support for change and reform in the Southern Mediterranean remains a top policial priority. This commitment was confirmed by the European Council meeting of February 2013. Transitions in certain countries are constantly mutating and undergoing delicate phases which require vigilance and strong and visible support to avoid deadlock or deterioration.

The European Union continues to highlight and convey its concerns about human rights abuses on all occasions at bilateral and multilateral meetings. While the evolutions of the transitions remain complex and fluid, important democratic gains have been registered, notably in the holding of broadly free and fair elections in many partner countries and the emergence of a vocal and vibrant civil society.

Many Arab partners have not taken clear decisions on political and economic reforms, a situation which demands both strategic patience and continuous engagement by the EU to help those countries in their transitions and in the realisation of their peoples' legitimate aspirations. The EU will ensure that its strong support for democratic process and economic transition is maintained, while also calling to account those Arab authorities whose actions are inconsistent with democratic principles and universal human rights and fundamental freedoms.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001802/13
alla Commissione
Claudio Morganti (EFD), Roberta Angelilli (PPE) e Matteo Salvini (EFD)
(20 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: Denominazioni delle professioni turistiche e utilizzo della «Tour Guide ID Card»

Con l'entrata in vigore del Trattato di Lisbona il turismo è parte delle competenze condivise dell'Unione, ma vi sono alcune iniziative europee che rischiano di indebolire la conoscenza, la tutela e la valorizzazione dei patrimoni storici, artistici, culturali e geografici dei nostri territori.

Un'associazione europea, che raggruppa e rappresenta tour operator di diversi Paesi, con sedi anche al di fuori della UE, propone da alcuni anni la possibilità di ottenere a pagamento una cosiddetta «Tour Guide ID Card», ovvero un tesserino di riconoscimento con il logo dell'UE che dovrebbe permettere ai suoi possessori di identificarsi come «Tour Guide» e poter così svolgere al di fuori del Paese di stabilimento alcune delle attività che sono, invece, proprie della professione di guida turistica: questo potrebbe consentire di aggirare i controlli ex-post da parte delle autorità dei Paesi dove questa attività è regolamentata, con il risultato di confondere anche il consumatore.

Il nocciolo della questione risiede, infatti, proprio nell'utilizzo intenzionale del termine ibrido e improprio di «Tour Guide», che induce a confondere le due differenti professioni di «Tourist Guide» e «Tour Manager», così come distintamente identificate dalle definizioni stabilite dalla norma CEN 13809 del 2003 (Definizioni servizi del Turismo).

Ciò premesso, può la Commissione:

1. esprimere una valutazione circa l'emissione di questa «Tour Guide ID Card» europea?

2. fornire un chiarimento circa la definizione di guida turistica e di accompagnatore turistico,sulla base di quanto già stabilito dal Comitato Europeo di Normazione (CEN)?

3. fornire un quadro circa le misure che intende adottare, anche in funzione della recente proposta di modifica alla Direttiva 2005/36/CE sul riconoscimento delle qualifiche professionali, per preservare il ruolo che svolgono le guide turistiche, data la loro specificità d'area, nel descrivere e far scoprire al meglio le realtà che conoscono in maniera approfondita, diversamente invece dalle caratteristiche di accompagnatore turistico?

Risposta di Michel Barnier a nome della Commissione
(22 aprile 2013)

Pur avendo quale obiettivo quello di assicurare la tutela dei consumatori e un'efficace vigilanza da parte delle autorità competenti, la proposta di modernizzazione della direttiva sulle qualifiche professionali non intende fissare definizioni delle varie professioni o delimitarne l'ambito di attività. La proposta si propone piuttosto di agevolare in generale il riconoscimento reciproco delle qualifiche professionali tra gli Stati membri e di rafforzare la fiducia dei cittadini in questo settore.

La proposta mira a introdurre il concetto di tessera professionale europea, un progetto che si baserebbe sulle autorità competenti preposte al rilascio di detta tessera, la cui trasmissione avverrebbe attraverso il sistema di informazione del mercato interno (IMI). Tale meccanismo dovrebbe agevolare la mobilità dei professionisti e rafforzare la fiducia tra le autorità competenti. Gli onorevoli parlamentari fanno riferimento a una tessera rilasciata da un'organizzazione professionale: la tessera dell'associazione europea degli operatori turistici (ETOA) che, tuttavia, non soddisfa nessuno dei criteri di rilascio della tessera professionale ai sensi della proposta di nuova direttiva.

Gli onorevoli parlamentari fanno riferimento anche a norme riguardanti la definizione di «guida turistica» e di «accompagnatore turistico». Diversamente dalla legislazione, le norme volontarie e le definizioni che vi si rinvengono non hanno effetti giuridicamente vincolanti. La Commissione non ha finora dato mandato al Comitato europeo di normazione (CEN) di elaborare norme in materia.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001802/13
to the Commission
Claudio Morganti (EFD), Roberta Angelilli (PPE) and Matteo Salvini (EFD)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Designations of tourism professions and the use of the 'Tour Guide ID Card'

Under the Treaty of Lisbon, tourism has become one of the shared responsibilities of the Union, but some European initiatives risk weakening the knowledge, protection and promotion of the historic, artistic, cultural and geographical assets of our countries.

Over the past several years, a European association that brings together and represents tour operators from different countries, including some with headquarters outside the EU, has been selling a so-called 'Tour Guide ID Card': an ID card with the EU logo that allows its holders to identify themselves as 'Tour Guides' and therefore perform activities outside their own country which are specific to the tourist guide profession. This could lead to the circumvention of controls put in place by authorities in countries where this activity is regulated, with the additional consequence of confusing consumers.

The crux of the matter is the intentional use of the hybrid and incorrect term 'Tour Guide', which creates confusion between the two very different professions of 'Tourist Guide' and 'Tour Manager', such as they are separately indentified by the definitions established by CEN regulation 13809 of 2003 (Definition of Tourism services).

In view of the above, can the Commission:

1. State its opinion regarding the issuance of this European 'Tour Guide ID Card'?

2. Clarify the definitions of tourist guide and tour manager, based on what has already been established by the European Committee for Standardisation (CEN)?

3. Provide a framework for the measures it intends to adopt, particularly in view of the recent proposal to amend Directive 2005/36/EC on the recognition of professional qualifications, in order to protect the role performed by tourist guides, who, given their specialisation in a particular area, in describing and revealing the attractions they know in depth, perform a very different role to that of a tour manager?

Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission
(22 April 2013)

While aiming to ensure consumer protection and efficient supervision by competent authorities, the proposal for modernising the Professional Qualifications Directive is not intended to set out definitions of the various professions or to delimit their respective scopes of activity. The objective of the modernisation Proposal is rather to facilitate in general the mutual recognition of professional qualifications across Member States and to strengthen citizens' confidence in this policy area.

The proposal seeks to introduce the concept of a European Professional Card (EPC). This project would build upon the role of competent authorities entrusted with issuing the EPC which would be transmitted via the internal market Information system (IMI). This mechanism should facilitate mobility for professionals and enhance trust between authorities. The Honourable Members refer to a card delivered by a professional organisation — the European Tour Operators Association (ETOA) card. However, such a card would not correspond to any of the requirements for issuing a professional card under the proposed new Directive.

The Honourable Members also refer to standards relating to the definitions of 'tourist guide' and 'tour manager'. As opposed to legislation, voluntary standards and the definitions contained therein have no legally binding effect. The Commission has not previously given a mandate to the European Committee for Standardisation (CEN) to draw up standards in this area.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001803/13
alla Commissione
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)
(20 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: Misure cautelari e sicurezza dei cittadini — il caso di Tezze sul Brenta (VI)

Il 22 novembre 2012 un'ordinanza della Corte d'Appello di Venezia ha deciso il trasferimento nel Comune di Tezze sul Brenta, in provincia di Vicenza, di un pregiudicato sottoposto alla misura cautelare di obbligo di dimora ex art. 283 del Codice di procedura penale italiano. Di questo provvedimento non è stata data al Comune nessuna comunicazione preventiva. Il sindaco e la giunta comunale ne sono venuti a conoscenza solo a trasferimento concluso, grazie a un fax spedito dal Comune di Fontaniva, in provincia di Padova, dove il soggetto era domiciliato in precedenza. Il pregiudicato non ha legami parentali o lavorativi con il territorio e vive in una roulotte che il Tribunale ha stabilito fosse collocata in una zona industriale già degradata. La scelta del luogo di stazionamento della roulotte è stata presa senza consultare il Comune, né fornire spiegazioni sulla scelta di Tezze quale nuovo domicilio coatto del pregiudicato.

Considerato che il Libro Verde COM(2011)0327 in tema di giustizia penale nel settore della detenzione decreta che «Le questioni relative alla detenzione rientrano nell'ambito dell'Unione europea […] in quanto sono un aspetto rilevante dei diritti che devono essere salvaguardati per promuovere una fiducia reciproca e […], poiché l'Unione europea deve difendere alcuni valori», può la Commissione far sapere:

— Quali conclusioni sono state tratte a fronte delle consultazioni avviate dopo la presentazione e il lancio del Libro Verde sulle problematiche che coinvolgono le pratiche detentive in Europa?

— In ambito europeo vi saranno, a suo avviso, evoluzioni in materia di misure detentive e cautelari personali coercitive?

— Non ritiene, anche in considerazione dei fatti sopra descritti, che la costruzione di una cultura della giustizia europea debba fondarsi sul dialogo tra i cittadini, la società civile organizzata e le autorità locali?

— Lo strumento dell'obbligo di dimora come misura cautelare è previsto anche negli ordinamenti degli altri Stati membri? In quali Stati membri?

— In caso affermativo, in quanti di tali paesi è previsto un confronto fra l'autorità giudiziaria e le autorità locali prima di autorizzare tali dispositivi, considerando che saranno proprio queste ultime quelle che dovranno rendere conto della presenza di pregiudicati sul proprio territorio alla cittadinanza e garantire che sia fatta salva la sicurezza dei cittadini?

Risposta di Viviane Reding a nome della Commissione
(17 aprile 2013)

La Commissione attribuisce grande importanza al rispetto dei diritti fondamentali delle persone in stato di detenzione nell'Unione Europea. Le condizioni di detenzione e i programmi di riabilitazione sociale rientrano nelle competenze degli Stati membri, i quali sono tenuti a rispettare le norme esistenti del Consiglio d'Europa. Nel 2011 la Commissione ha pubblicato un Libro verde volto a rafforzare la fiducia reciproca nel settore della detenzione ([1]), di cui è disponibile online ([2]) una sintesi dei contributi offerti.

Sulla scorta dell'esito delle consultazioni del Libro verde, la Commissione intende concentrarsi sulla corretta attuazione degli attuali strumenti di riconoscimento reciproco nel settore della detenzione ([3]) e pubblicherà una relazione sulle tre decisioni quadro entro la metà del 2013.

([1]) «Rafforzare la fiducia reciproca nello spazio giudiziario europeo — Libro verde sull'applicazione della normativa dell'UE sulla giustizia penale nel settore della detenzione» (COM(2011)327 def.).

([2]) http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/criminal/opinion/110614_en.htm

([3]) Decisione quadro 2008/909/GAI del Consiglio, del 27 novembre 2008, relativa all'applicazione del principio del reciproco riconoscimento alle sentenze penali che irrogano pene detentive o misure privative della libertà personale, ai fini della loro esecuzione nell'Unione europea (GU L 327 del 5.12.2008, pag. 27); decisione quadro 2008/947/GAI del Consiglio, del 27 novembre 2008, relativa all'applicazione del principio del reciproco riconoscimento alle sentenze e alle decisioni di sospensione condizionale in vista della sorveglianza delle misure di sospensione condizionale e delle sanzioni sostitutive (GU L 337 del 16.12.2008, pag. 102); e decisione quadro 2009/829/GAI del Consiglio, del 23 ottobre 2009, sull'applicazione tra gli Stati membri dell'Unione europea del principio del reciproco riconoscimento alle decisioni sulle misure alternative alla detenzione cautelare (GU L 294 dell'11.11.2009, pag. 20).

In materia di sospensione condizionale e sanzioni sostitutive, quale la misura dell'obbligo di dimora, la decisione quadro 2008/947/GAI consente il trasferimento di queste sanzioni allo Stato membro di residenza della persona condannata allo scopo di favorire la riabilitazione sociale della stessa. L'obbligo per gli Stati membri di farsi carico almeno della sospensione condizionale e delle misure sostitutive, come indicato in questa decisione quadro, avrà ricadute positive sulla promozione e il ravvicinamento delle misure alternative alla detenzione nei vari Stati membri.

Nell'ambito della citata decisione quadro è stato condotto uno studio di diritto comparato sui regimi giuridici nazionali in materia di sospensione condizionale e misure sostitutive i cui risultati sono stati pubblicati nel 2012. Se ne può consultare una panoramica e una sintesi alla pagina web: www.euprobationproject.eu.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001803/13
to the Commission
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Precautionary measures and public safety — the case of Tezze sul Brenta (VI)

On 22 November 2012, an order issued by the Venice Court of Appeal determined the transfer to the Municipality of Tezze sul Brenta, in the province of Venice, of an offender who was subject to a precautionary mandatory residence order pursuant to Article 283 of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure. The Municipality received no prior notice of this decision. The mayor and the city council were informed of the transfer, after it had been completed, in a fax sent by the Municipality of Fontaniva, in the province of Padua, where the subject had been held. The offender has no family or professional ties with the area and lives in a caravan, which the Court required to be placed in a run-down industrial area. The decision regarding the sitting of the trailer was taken without consulting the Municipality and no explanation was given regarding the choice of Tezze as the offender's new mandatory residence.

Given that, with regard to detention in the field of criminal justice, Green Paper COM(2011)0327 provides that 'Detention issues come within the purview of the European Union as … they are a relevant aspect of the rights that must be safeguarded in order to promote mutual trust and … the European Union has certain values to uphold', can the Commission state:

— What conclusions have been reached following the consultations that followed the presentation and launch of the Green Paper on the issues surrounding detention practices in Europe?

— Whether, in its opinion, there will be any developments regarding detention and mandatory personal precautionary measures at the European level?

— Does it not believe, particularly in view of the above events, that building a culture of justice at European level must be founded on dialogue among citizens, organised civil society and local authorities?

— Are mandatory residence orders a precautionary measure for which the legal systems of other Member States also provide? Which Member States are these?

— If so, how many of these countries require dialogue between the judicial authorities and the local authorities to take place before such measures can be authorised, since it will be the latter's responsibility to inform its residents of the presence of offenders in their territory and ensure public safety?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(17 April 2013)

The Commission attaches great importance to the respect of the fundamental rights of those in detention in the EU. Detention conditions and social rehabilitation programmes come under the competence of Member States, who are bound by the existing Council of Europe standards. In 2011 the Commission published a Green Paper on strengthening mutual trust in the field of detention ([1]). A summary of the repliesis available online ([2]).

Based on the outcome of the Green Paper, the Commission intends to focus on the proper implementation of the existing mutual recognition instruments adopted in the field of detention ([3]) and will publish a report on the three Framework Decisions by mid-2013.

([1]) Green Paper Strengthening mutual trust in the European judicial area — A Green Paper on the application of EU criminal justice legislation in the field of detention, COM/2011/0327 final.

([2]) http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/criminal/opinion/110614_en.htm

([3]) The framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the European Union, OJ 5.12.2008, L 327/27, the framework Decision 2008/947/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments and probation decisions with a view to the supervision of probation measures and alternative sanctions, OJ 16.12.2008, L 337/102, and the framework Decision 2009/829/JHA of 23 October 2009 on the application, between Member States of the European Union, of the principle of mutual recognition to decisions on supervision measures as an alternative to provisional detention, OJ 11.11.2009, L 294/20.

Regarding probation and alternative sanctions, eg mandatory residence order, Framework Decision 2008/947/JHA allows the transfer of these sanctions to the Member State of residence of the sentenced person in order to enhance his social rehabilitation. As Member States have to provide for at least the probation and alternative measures as mentioned in this framework Decision, a positive side effect will be the promotion and approximation of alternatives to detention in the different Member States.

In the context of this framework Decision, a comparative law study has been carried out on the national probation and alternative law systems. The results of this study were published in 2012 and an overview and a short description can be found on the website www.euprobationproject.eu.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-001804/13
aan de Commissie
Ivo Belet (PPE)
(20 februari 2013)

Betreft: Codering van noodcontactnummers in mobiele telefoons

In haar antwoord op vraag E-011142/2012 bevestigt de Commissie dat interventies van ambulancediensten nog sneller en efficiënter kunnen verlopen: „Als de hulpdiensten de familie van de patiënt snel kunnen bereiken, zou hun interventie inderdaad efficiënter kunnen verlopen. De uitvoering van aanbeveling E.123 van de Internationale Telecommunicatie-unie is echter een bevoegdheid van de lidstaten."

Naast aanbeveling E.123 circuleren in verschillende lidstaten alternatieve coderingen van noodcontactnummers, zoals de ICE-code (In Case of Emergency), die ook via een aantal mobiele applicaties gebruikt wordt. Een veelheid aan coderingswijzen werkt verwarrend en kan de hulpverlening vertragen.

Kan de Commissie een voorstel voor een Europees geüniformiseerd systeem van codering van noodcontactnummers in mobiele telefoons uitwerken?

Antwoord van mevrouw Kroes namens de Commissie
(12 april 2013)

Zoals reeds vermeld in het vorige antwoord E-0011142/2012, is het op dit moment niet duidelijk in hoeverre het ontbreken aan een uniform coderingssysteem een efficiënte noodhulpverlening in de Europese Unie hindert. Aangezien de interventies gewoonlijk binnen de lidstaten gebeuren, hebben de lidstaten en hun noodhulpdiensten in hun contacten met de diensten van de Commissie tot op heden nog niet te kennen gegeven dat een optreden op EU-niveau noodzakelijk is. Bijgevolg is de Commissie niet onmiddellijk van plan om daartoe voorstellen in te dienen.

De Commissie zal echter wel de Deskundigengroep voor noodtoegang, een werkgroep van het Comité voor communicatie, raadplegen om informatie te vergaren over de werkelijke behoefte aan een uniform Europees ICE-coderingssysteem en zal het Parlement op de hoogte houden van de ontwikkelingen.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001804/13
to the Commission
Ivo Belet (PPE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Coding of emergency contact numbers in mobile telephones

In its answer to Question E-011142/2012, the Commission confirms that intervention by ambulance services can become even quicker and more efficient: 'The possibility for emergency services to contact the patient's family quickly may indeed improve the efficiency of emergency intervention. However, the implementation of ITU Recommendation E.123 falls within the competence of Member States.'

In addition to Recommendation E.123, alternative codings of emergency contact numbers are circulating in various Member States, such as the ICE code (*In Case of Emergency*), which is also used in a number of mobile applications. The existence of multiple coding systems is confusing and could delay emergency intervention.

Can the Commission draw up a proposal for a uniform European system of coding of emergency contact numbers in mobile telephones?

Answer given by Ms Kroes on behalf of the Commission
(12 April 2013)

As mentioned in the previous answer E-0011142/2012, it is not clear at this point to what extent the lack of a unitary coding system is hampering the efficient provision of emergency relief throughout the European Union. In fact, Member States and their emergency services have so far not signalled in their contacts with Commission services that action is required at EU level given that interventions typically occur within Member States. Consequently, the Commission does not have immediate plans to make proposals to this effect.

However, the Commission will consult the Expert Group on Emergency Access, which is a working group of the communications Committee, to gather evidence on the real need of such uniform European ICE coding system, and will keep the Parliament informed of developments.

(Wersja polska)

Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-001805/13
do Komisji
Filip Kaczmarek (PPE)
(20 lutego 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Śmiertelne ofiary ataku na obóz uchodźców w Iraku

W ostatnim ataku rakietowym i moździerzowym przeprowadzonym w kierunku Camp Liberty, obozu dla irańskich uchodźców w Iraku, zginęło sześć osób a kilkadziesiąt zostało rannych. Według agencji Associated Press ok. 40 rakiet i pocisków moździerzowych uderzyło w obóz zamieszkiwany przez ponad 3 tys. uchodźców z Iranu. Rzecznik obozu poinformował, iż irackie władze odmówiły przyjęcia rannych do szpitali. Na razie nikt nie przyznał się do ataku.

Obóz, powstały na początku ubiegłego roku na obrzeżach Bagdadu, mieści się w dawnej amerykańskiej bazie wojskowej Camp Liberty. Uchodźcy zostali przeniesieni do niego z innego obozu – Camp Ashraf, uznawanego za dużo większy i bardziej przystosowany pod względem swojej infrastruktury.

Zwracam się z zapytaniem:

1. Czy Komisja zamierza podjąć kroki w celu udzielenia niezbędnej pomocy humanitarnej potrzebującym uchodźcom z Camp Liberty?

2. Czy Komisja planuje wspierać działania mające na celu przeniesienie uchodźców do lepiej przystosowanego Camp Ashraf?

3. Jaka jest strategia Komisji w celu złagodzenia konfliktu pomiędzy władzami irackimi a uchodźcami?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez Wysoką Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodniczącą Catherine Ashton w imieniu Komisji
(12 kwietnia 2013 r.)

Unia Europejska śledzi z uwagą kwestię przesiedlania byłych mieszkańców obozu Ashraf. Sprawa ta jako objęta zakresem praw człowieka wymaga od społeczności międzynarodowej podjęcia wszystkich możliwych działań wspomagających rząd Iraku w dążeniu do znalezienia pokojowego i systematycznego rozwiązania sytuacji.

Dlatego też Wysoka Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodnicząca wielokrotnie podkreślała swoje pełne poparcie dla obecnego procesu wspomaganego przez Organizację Narodów Zjednoczonych (ONZ) oraz dla Martina Koblera, specjalnego przedstawiciela Sekretarza Generalnego. Urząd Wysokiego Komisarza ONZ ds. Uchodźców podejmuje zaplanowane wcześniej działania obejmujące weryfikacje oraz „określanie statusu uchodźcy" mieszkańców, którzy przebywają w tymczasowym obozie przejściowym, czyli obozie Hurriya (wcześniej znanym jako Camp Liberty). Należy zauważyć, że według oceny dokonanej przez obserwatorów ONZ podstawowe środki do życia, takie jak woda, energia elektryczna i żywność, są dostarczane cały czas zgodnie z podstawowymi normami humanitarnymi i standardami praw człowieka.

Zasadnicze znaczenie ma wspieranie aktualnych działań w zakresie przesiedleń w celu znalezienia rozwiązania dla tej złożonej kwestii. Ataki z dnia 9 lutego 2013 r. na obóz Hurriya, potępione publicznie przez UE, przypominają nam o pilnej potrzebie przyspieszenia wspomaganego przez ONZ przesiedlania, we współpracy zarówno z mieszkańcami, jak i państwami trzecimi, które są gotowe do przyjęcia przesiedleńców. Jedynym możliwym rozwiązaniem są przesiedlenia do państw trzecich.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001805/13
to the Commission
Filip Kaczmarek (PPE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Deadly attack on a refugee camp in Iraq

Six people were killed and dozens injured in the latest rocket and mortar attack on Camp Liberty, a camp for Iranian refugees in Iraq. Associated Press reported that around 40 rockets and mortars hit the camp, which is populated by over 3 000 Iranian refugees. A spokesman for the camp said that the Iraqi authorities had refused to allow the injured to be taken to hospital. No one has yet claimed responsibility for the attack.

The camp on the outskirts of Baghdad was set up last year on the site of the former US military base known as Camp Liberty. The refugees were transferred there from another camp, Camp Ashraf, which is acknowledged to be much bigger and better equipped than Camp Liberty from an infrastructure point of view.

In the light of the above:

1. Is the Commission intending to take action with a view to providing vital humanitarian assistance to the refugees at Camp Liberty?

2. Is the Commission planning to back efforts to have the refugees transferred to the better-equipped Camp Ashraf?

3. What is the Commission's strategy as regards alleviating the conflict between the Iraqi authorities and the refugees?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(12 April 2013)

The EU follows the issue of resettlement of the former residents of Camp Ashraf closely. As a human rights issue, it requires that the international community do what it can to help the Government of Iraq to pursue a peaceful and orderly solution.

This is why the HR/VP has repeatedly stressed her full support to the ongoing process facilitated by the United Nations (UN) and to Martin Kobler, the Special Representative of the Secretary General. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees is proceeding as foreseen with the verification and 'refugee status determination' of the residents who are staying at the temporary transit location — Camp Hurriya (formerly known as Camp Liberty). It has to be noted that according to the assessment made by the UN monitors, the provision of life support systems, such as water, electricity and food supply continues to meet basic humanitarian and human right standards.

It is crucial to support the ongoing resettlement efforts to find a solution to this complex issue. The attacks of 9 February 2013 on Camp Hurriya, condemned publicly by the EU, remind us of the urgency to accelerate the UN-facilitated resettlement process, with the cooperation of both the residents and third countries that are ready to receive them. Resettlement to third countries is the only viable solution.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-001806/13
à Comissão
Inês Cristina Zuber (GUE/NGL)
(20 de fevereiro de 2013)

Assunto: Desemprego em Portugal e implicações a nível do género, do abandono escolar e da taxa de natalidade

Os dados divulgados no passado dia 13 de fevereiro pelo INE (Instituto Nacional de Estatística — Portugal) referentes ao Inquérito ao Emprego do 4.° trimestre de 2012 confirmam a tendência de agravamento do desemprego e de destruição do emprego dos últimos anos e, em especial, após a assinatura do «memorando de entendimento» entre o Governo de Portugal e o FMI, o BCE e a Comissão Europeia. Só nos últimos 18 meses foram destruídos em Portugal 361 200 postos de trabalho. No 4.° trimestre de 2012, o desemprego em sentido restrito atingiu os 923 200 trabalhadores (16,9 %) e, em sentido lato, 1 443 900 trabalhadores (25,3 %).

Outros dados impressionantes destes resultados agora divulgados são: o facto de a taxa de desemprego dos jovens ter atingido os 40 %, o facto de 56,3 % dos desempregados (519 900) estarem no desemprego há mais de um ano e de 148 600 desempregados serem licenciados (mais 37,6 % do que no 4.° trimestre de 2011). Por outro lado, aumentou em 150 mil o números de trabalhadores cujo salário líquido mensal é inferior a 310 euros, o que representa um aumento de 2,3 % relativamente ao final do ano de 2011.

Perante este desastre social, consequência da aplicação das políticas acordadas entre o FMI, o BCE, a CE e o Governo de Portugal, pergunto à Comissão:

— Como avalia estes dados?

— Tem informações sobre o impacto do desemprego ao nível das diferenciações de género em Portugal?

— Tem informações sobre o impacto do desemprego nos níveis do abandono escolar em Portugal?

— Tem informações sobre o impacto do desemprego na evolução das taxas de natalidade em Portugal?

Resposta dada por László Andor em nome da Comissão
(18 de abril de 2013)

A Comissão partilha a preocupação do Senhor Deputado em relação ao aumento do desemprego em Portugal, o que claramente é um sinal de que são necessários mais esforços para melhorar a situação.

Os serviços da Comissão estão a cooperar de perto com as autoridades portuguesas e encorajam-nas a utilizarem da melhor forma os recursos disponíveis no âmbito dos programas em curso no combate ao desemprego. O «Pacote do Emprego» para 2012 adotado pela Comissão apela a que o financiamento da UE seja orientado para a criação do emprego.

A Comissão salienta ainda que o programa estratégico «Impulso Jovem» para a promoção da empregabilidade entre os jovens é cofinanciado pelos fundos estruturais europeus, conjuntamente com a iniciativa «Oportunidades para a Juventude», que lançaram as «Equipas de Ação».

A taxa de abandono escolar ([1]) aumentou significativamente durante os últimos cinco anos em Portugal, onde o Fundo Social Europeu contribuiu significativamente para o apoio a atividades de combate ao abandono escolar precoce. Tendencialmente, parece que mais jovens ficam na educação também para evitar a falta de atividade.

Embora a taxa de desemprego entre os homens tenha aumentado de forma mais acentuada do que a das mulheres ([2]), as estatísticas não sustentam a afirmação de que há uma disparidade de género significativa na taxa de desemprego.

Por último, a Comissão não tem conhecimento de que o desemprego tenha tido algum impacto na taxa de natalidade em Portugal.

([1]) O Eurostat informa que caiu de 35,4 % em 2008 para 21,3 % em 2012.
([2]) O Eurostat informa que a taxa de desemprego dos homens aumentou 3,3 % de 2011 a 2012, enquanto a das mulheres aumentou 2,6 %.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001806/13
to the Commission
Inês Cristina Zuber (GUE/NGL)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Unemployment in Portugal and its implications for genders, school drop-out rates and the birth rate

Details released on 13 February by the INE (Portuguese Office for National Statistics) from the Employment Survey for the last quarter of 2012 confirm the trend of worsening unemployment and job cuts over recent years, and in particular following the signing of the memorandum of understanding between the Portuguese Government and the IMF, the ECB and the European Commission. In the last 18 months alone, 361 200 jobs have been cut in Portugal. In the last quarter of 2012, the number of people unemployed in the strictest sense of the word reached 923 200 (16.9%), which in real terms affected 1 443 900 (25.3%).

Other facts that stand out from these findings are: that the youth unemployment rate has now reached 40%, that 56.3% of the unemployed (519 900) have been out of work for over a year and that 148 600 are graduates (a 37.6% increase on the last quarter of 2011). On the other hand, the number of workers whose monthly net wage is less than EUR 310 rose by 150 000, which represents an increase of 2.3% on the end of 2011.

In the face of this social disaster, a consequence of the implementation of the policies agreed between the IMF, the ECB, the EC and the Portuguese Government, I ask the Commission:

— What is its view of this data?

— Does it have any information on the impact of gender-specific unemployment in Portugal?

— Does it have any information on the impact of unemployment on school drop-out rates in Portugal?

— Does it have any information on the impact of unemployment on changes in birth rates in Portugal?

Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission
(18 April 2013)

The Commission shares the Honourable Member's concern at the rise in unemployment in Portugal, which sends a clear signal that more effort is needed to improve the situation.

The Commission services are cooperating closely with the Portuguese authorities and encourage them to make the best use of the resources available under the current programmes to fight against unemployment. The Commission's 2012 Employment Package calls for EU funding to be mobilised for job creation.

The Commission also points out that the *Impulso Jovem* strategic programme to foster employability among young people is co-financed by the EU Structural Funds in connection with the Youth Opportunities Initiative, which launched the Action Teams.

The school drop-out rate ([1]) has improved significantly over the last five years in Portugal, where the European Social Fund has provided significant support for activities to combat early school-leaving. There seems to be a tendency that more young people stay in education also to avoid inactivity.

Although the unemployment rate for men has risen more steeply than that for women ([2]), the statistics do not support the claim that there is a significant gender disparity in the unemployment rate.

Lastly, the Commission is not aware that unemployment has had any impact on the birth rate in Portugal.

([1]) Eurostat reports that it fell from 35.4% in 2008 to 21.3% in 2012.
([2]) Eurostat reports that the male unemployment rate increased by 3.3% from 2011 to 2012, while that for women rose by 2.6%.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-001807/13
à Comissão
Inês Cristina Zuber (GUE/NGL)
(20 de fevereiro de 2013)

Assunto: Despedimento coletivo no Grupo Sumol+Compal Marcas, S.A.

O Grupo Sumol+Compal é um grupo empresarial português que opera predominante no setor das denominadas bebidas de alta rotação. O Grupo emprega aproximadamente 1 350 trabalhadores, dos quais alguns residentes no estrangeiro, e é o maior empregador privado em três dos concelhos em que tem instalações.

Tendo como argumento as medidas de austeridade impostas pelo Memorando de Entendimento que estão a provocar uma diminuição substancial do poder de compra dos consumidores e o seu empobrecimento, a empresa considerou que, como as perspetivas de evolução de negócio no mercado português são negativas, o mais lucrativo para a empresa seria investir no mercado estrangeiro. Esta nova perspetiva empresarial levou ao início de um processo de reestruturação que implica o despedimento coletivo de 70 trabalhadores.

Assim, solicito à Comissão que me informe do seguinte:

1. A referida empresa recebeu quaisquer apoios comunitários? Com que fins foram concedidos e que compromissos assumiu aquando da concessão dos apoios? Considera que, a existirem compromissos, estes estão a ser postos em causa pela administração da empresa?

2. Que medidas pensa tomar, tendo em conta os graves problemas sociais e económicos existentes em Portugal, onde o desemprego não cessa de aumentar?

3. Que tipo de apoios pode esta empresa ou o governo português solicitar para evitar que estes trabalhadores fiquem desempregados?

Resposta dada por László Andor em nome da Comissão
(18 de abril de 2013)

De acordo com informações recebidas das autoridades portuguesas, o grupo Sumol+Compal recebeu apoio financeiro no montante total de 665 116,40 euros do Fundo Social Europeu (FSE) e 6 960 756 euros do Fundo Europeu de Desenvolvimento Regional (FEDER) nos períodos de programação anteriores. As operações selecionadas para financiamento cumpriram as regras da UE e nacionais durante o período de implementação.

A política de emprego, incluindo as medidas de combate ao desemprego, é essencialmente uma competência do Estado-Membro. Contudo, os fundos estruturais da UE são importantes fontes de investimento que estimulam o crescimento sustentável e o emprego. A iniciativa «Pacote do Emprego» proposta pela Comissão no fim do ano passado inclui um conjunto de medidas destinadas a ajudar os Estados-Membros a combater o desemprego jovem e a exclusão social. O pacote «Investimentos Sociais» apresentado pela Comissão em fevereiro de 2013 presta orientações aos Estados-Membros sobre políticas sociais mais efetivas e eficientes.

A Comissão também salienta que os trabalhadores suscetíveis de serem afetados pela reestruturação podem candidatar-se ao apoio do FSE e, se reunirem as condições necessárias para tal, do Fundo Europeu de Ajustamento à Globalização.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001807/13
to the Commission
Inês Cristina Zuber (GUE/NGL)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Collective redundancies at the SUMOL+COMPAL group

SUMOL+COMPAL is a Portuguese business group operating predominantly in what is known as the high-rotation beverage sector. It employs approximately 1 350 staff, some of whom live overseas, and is the largest private employer in three of the municipalities where it has factories.

Based on the argument that the austerity measures imposed by the memorandum of understanding are causing a substantial reduction in consumers' purchasing power and leading to their impoverishment, the company decided that, in view of the unfavourable business prospects in the Portuguese market, it would be more profitable to invest in the foreign market. This new approach for the company has led to the start of a restructuring process that will involve the collective redundancies of 70 staff.

I ask the Commission:

1. Has the company received any Community support? If so, what was it for and what commitments did it take on when it was awarded the support? Does the Commission consider that if there are any commitments, they may be put at risk by the company's management?

2. What measures does the Commission intend to take, in view of the serious social and economic problems in Portugal, where unemployment continues to rise?

3. What type of support could this company or the Portuguese Government request in order to prevent these workers from losing their jobs?

Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission
(18 April 2013)

According to information received from the Portuguese authorities, SUMOL+COMPAL group has received a total financial support amounting to EUR 665.116,40 from the European Social Fund (ESF) and EUR 6 960 756 from European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) in the previous programming periods. The operations selected for funding complied with EU and national rules throughout the implementation period.

Employment policy, including measures to combat unemployment, is primarily a Member State competence. However, the EU structural funds are important sources of investment stimulating sustainable growth and employment. The Youth employment package proposed by the Commission end of last year includes a set of measures aiming at helping Member States to tackle youth unemployment and social exclusion. The Social Investment Package, presented by the Commission in February 2013, gives guidance to Member States on more efficient and effective social policies.

The Commission would also point out that workers likely to be affected by restructuring may qualify for support from the ESF and, provided that the necessary conditions are met, from the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-001808/13
à Comissão
Inês Cristina Zuber (GUE/NGL)
(20 de fevereiro de 2013)

Assunto: Reestruturações

As reestruturações são, evidentemente, necessárias para aumentar a produtividade e promover a inovação tecnológica, tendo como pressuposto a manutenção dos postos de trabalho.

No entanto, na realidade atual, os inúmeros processos de reestruturação têm somente um objetivo: o despedimento. E esses despedimentos têm, sobretudo, duas causas — a busca do lucro e de acumulação do capital por parte dos empresários ou a falta de liquidez das empresas que se deve às políticas recessivas promovidas pela UE e pelos governos nacionais, que provocam a retração do consumo.

Segundo o relatório Cercas sobre as reestruturações, estas são necessárias no quadro do conceito abstrato de «mudança económica», partindo-se do princípio de que não existe alternativa e que os despedimentos são inevitáveis, ainda que, como diz o relatório, com impactos minimizados.

Tendo em conta que este relatório contém recomendações à Comissão sobre a informação e a consulta dos trabalhadores e a antecipação e gestão da reestruturação, solicito à Comissão Europeia que me informe do seguinte:

1. Pensa a Comissão apresentar alguma proposta legislativa com base nas recomendações expressas no relatório Cercas?

2. Considera que as denominadas reestruturações de empresas, cuja medida única que implementam é o despedimento de trabalhadores, configuram verdadeiramente casos de reestruturações, no conceito da Comissão?

Resposta dada por László Andor em nome da Comissão
(10 de abril de 2013)

1. Na sequência do Livro Verde ([1]) e da adoção do Relatório Cercas, a Comissão está a considerar qual a melhor forma de encorajar e assegurar a observância das melhores práticas no domínio da reestruturação e antecipação da mudança. Irá informar o Parlamento sobre as medidas que tenciona tomar em resposta ao seu pedido em conformidade com o artigo 290.° do TFUE.

2. A Comissão Europeia usa a palavra «reestruturação» num sentido lato, englobando ambos os eventos de reorganização empresarial e adaptação às mudanças económicas na sua generalidade ([2]). Em ambos os casos, a reestruturação envolve o ajustamento qualitativo da força de trabalho de uma empresa (competências e qualificações necessárias) e quantitativa (número de empregos) à estrutura e organização da empresa ou aos processos de produção. O impacto da reestruturação nas partes envolvidas tanto pode ser positivo como negativo. A Comissão incentiva os envolvidos a participar na preparação e discussão atempadas, com vista a reduzir, tanto quanto possível, as consequências sociais e económicas negativas da reestruturação.

([1]) COM(2012) 7 final de 17 de janeiro de 2012.
([2]) SEC(2012) 59 final de 17 de janeiro de 2012.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001808/13
to the Commission
Inês Cristina Zuber (GUE/NGL)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Restructuring

Restructuring is clearly necessary to increase productivity and promote technological innovation, and is based on the premise of preserving jobs.

However, in the current climate, the countless restructuring processes appear to have one purpose alone: to make redundancies. These redundancies have two main causes: profit-making and capital accumulation by business owners, and companies' lack of liquidity, owing to the recessionary policies implemented by the EU and national governments, which lead to a decline in consumption.

According to the Cercas report, restructuring is only necessary in the context of the abstract concept of 'economic change', based on the principle that there is no alternative and that redundancies are unavoidable, albeit, as the report says, with minimised impact.

Bearing in mind that the Cercas report contains recommendations to the Commission on workers' information and consultation, and on anticipating and managing restructuring, I ask the Commission:

1. Does it intend to present any draft legislation based on the recommendations in the Cercas report?

2. In the Commission's view, can processes where the only measure taken is that of making redundancies really be called restructuring?

Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission
(10 April 2013)

1. Following the Green Paper ([1]) and the adoption of the Cercas Report, the Commission is considering how best to encourage and achieve wide observance of best practice in the field of restructuring and anticipation of change. It will inform Parliament of the action it intends taking in response to its request in accordance with Article 225 TFEU.

2. The European Commission uses the word 'restructuring' in a broad sense, encompassing both events of business reorganisation and adaptation to economic change in general ([2]). In both cases, restructuring involves adjusting a company's workforce qualitatively (skills and qualifications required) and quantitatively (number of jobs) to the company structure, organisation or production processes. The impact of restructuring on the stakeholders may be both positive and negative. The Commission encourages the stakeholders to engage in early preparation and discussion with a view to reducing as much as possible negative social and economic consequences of restructuring.

([1]) COM(2012) 7 final of 17 January 2012.
([2]) SEC(2012) 59 final of 17 January 2012.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-001809/13
à Comissão
Inês Cristina Zuber (GUE/NGL)
(20 de fevereiro de 2013)

Assunto: Aumento de pobreza em Portugal e na Europa

Portugal está confrontado com uma dramática situação social e económica, consequência direta das medidas contidas no memorando de entendimento com a troika (FMI e UE) assinado pelo governo português, as quais têm tido impactos brutais na vida de milhares de famílias, e, de forma particularmente grave, na vida de crianças e jovens. As medidas de cortes no investimento público, nos salários e pensões, de cortes nos apoios sociais (subsídio de desemprego, abono de família, rendimento social de inserção) têm levado a uma espiral de recessão, que aumentou exponencialmente as falências e o encerramento de empresas, a taxa de desemprego (23 % de taxa de desemprego real), a diminuição do acesso aos cuidados de saúde e à educação.

O governo português estima que, em 2013, sejam destruídos mais 55 mil postos de trabalho, enquanto o Banco de Portugal avalia esse número em 90 mil. Os dados do «Inquérito às Condições de Vida e Rendimento», realizado pelo INE, referiam que, já em 2010, o risco de pobreza em Portugal estaria na ordem dos 42,5 %. É neste cenário que, segundo um estudo da TNS, baseado nos dados do Eurobarómetro para a Comissão Europeia, se conclui que 72 % dos cidadãos portugueses sentem dificuldades em pagar as suas contas no final do mês.

Assim, pergunto à Comissão:

— Qual a análise que faz dos referidos estudos?

— Considera que o aumento da pobreza está relacionado com as medidas incluídas no memorando da Troika e que incluem os cortes no investimento público?

— Como pensa consagrar, com medidas concretas, os princípios inscritos no Ano Europeu dos Cidadãos, uma vez que as taxas de pobreza estão a aumentar exponencialmente, nomeadamente nos países intervencionados pela troika?

Resposta dada por Olli Rehn em nome da Comissão
(17 de abril de 2013)

O Programa de Ajustamento Económico para Portugal tem como objetivo colocar de novo as finanças públicas de Portugal numa trajetória sustentável e tornar a economia portuguesa mais flexível e competitiva de modo a abrir caminho para um crescimento sustentável e equilibrado a médio e longo prazo. O programa tem sido muito bem-sucedido na realização destes objetivos: entre 2010 e 2012 o saldo orçamental diminuiu para metade, de cerca de 10 % para menos de 6 % do PIB (sem ter em conta as medidas extraordinárias) e o défice da balança de transações correntes desceu de cerca de 10 % para menos de 2 % do PIB.

Ao mesmo tempo a ajuda financeira prestada pela União, pelos Estados-Membros da área do euro e pelo FMI deram ao Estado português a margem de manobra necessária para a implementação do programa de reformas sem que lhe tenha sido vedado o acesso ao financiamento a longo prazo. O programa contém medidas específicas que protegem os grupos mais vulneráveis da sociedade, tais como a aplicação de cortes mais baixos ou a não aplicação de cortes nos salários ou direitos de pensão, ou subidas mais baixas ou não subidas dos impostos sobre o rendimento das pessoas singulares para grupos com baixos rendimentos, ou ainda a redução do período de serviço necessário para ter direito ao subsídio de desemprego.

Relativamente ao Ano Europeu dos Cidadãos, este foi criado em torno de uma campanha de comunicação a nível europeu complementada por ações dos Estados-Membros, envolvendo a sociedade civil e outras partes interessadas, de modo a informar os cidadãos sobre os seus direitos na UE e identificar os obstáculos remanescentes que impedem os cidadãos europeus de exercer plenamente os seus direitos de cidadania da União. Em tempos de crise, é ainda mais importante que os cidadãos da União possam tomar decisões informadas em matéria de direitos nas comunidades em que vivem e na vida democrática a todos os níveis.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001809/13
to the Commission
Inês Cristina Zuber (GUE/NGL)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Rising poverty in Portugal and Europe

Portugal is facing a dramatic social and economic downturn as a direct consequence of the measures laid down in the memorandum of understanding between the Portuguese Government and the Troika (IMF and EU). These measures have had a brutal impact on the lives of thousands of families, and have particularly affected children and young people. Cuts to public investment, wages and pensions, cuts to social services (unemployment benefit, family allowance and income support) have led to a spiralling recession, with an exponential increase in company closures and bankruptcies, unemployment (23% actual unemployment) and reduced access to healthcare and education.

The Portuguese Government estimates that in 2013 more than 55 000 jobs will be lost, while the Bank of Portugal puts that figure at 90 000. Data from the National Institute of Statistics' (INE) 'Survey of Living Conditions and Income' in 2010 showed a 42.5% risk of poverty in Portugal. Against this backdrop, a study for the Commission by TNS, based on data from the Eurobarometer, has concluded that 72% of Portuguese citizens are having difficulty paying their bills at the end of the month.

I ask the Commission:

— What does it make of these surveys?

— Does it consider the increase in poverty to be linked to the measures set out in the Troika memorandum, which include cuts in public investment?

— With what specific measures does it plan to enshrine the principles of the European Year of Citizens, when poverty levels are increasing exponentially, especially in countries where there has been intervention by the Troika?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission
(17 April 2013)

The Economic Adjustment Programme for Portugal has the objective to put the public finances of Portugal back on a sustainable path and to make the Portuguese economy more flexible and competitive so as to pave the way for sutainable and balanced growth in the medium to longer term. The programme has been quite successful in achieving these objectives: between 2010 and 2012, the government balance has halved from close to 10% to below 6% of GDP (disregarding one-offs) and the current account deficit has declined from some 10% to less than 2% of GDP.

At the same time the financial assistance provided by the Union, euro area Member States and the IMF has provided the Portuguese state with the necessary breathing space to implemement the reform programme without being cut off from long-term funding. Specific measures of the programme protect the more vulnerable groups of the society such as the application of smaller or no cuts in wage and pension entitlements and lower or no increases in personal income taxes for low income groups, or a shortening of the period of service necessary to qualify for unemployment benefits.

With regard to the European Year of Citizens, it is built around a Union-wide communication campaign complemented by actions of the Member States, involving civil society and other stakeholders, to inform citizens about their EU rights and to identify the remaining obstacles preventing Union citizens from fully exercising their Union citizenship rights. In times of crisis, it is all the more important that EU citizens can make informed choices on their rights in the communities in which they live and democratic life at all levels.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-001811/13
à Comissão
Inês Cristina Zuber (GUE/NGL)
(20 de fevereiro de 2013)

Assunto: Exportações de armas na UE

As exportações de armas dos Estados-Membros da União Europeia atingiram um novo recorde em 2011, ascendendo a um total de 37,5 mil milhões de euros, ou seja, tiveram um aumento de 18,3 por cento em relação ao ano anterior. A informação disponibilizada mostra que a França, a Grã-Bretanha, a Alemanha, a Itália e a Espanha foram responsáveis por 80 por cento das exportações de armas na UE. Só a França exportou material bélico no valor de 10 mil milhões de euros, seguindo-se a Grã-Bretanha (7 mil milhões de euros), a Alemanha (5,4 mil milhões de euros), a Itália (5,2 mil milhões de euros) e a Espanha (2,8 mil milhões de euros). Entre os principais clientes destacam-se a Arábia Saudita (4,2 mil milhões euros) e os Emirados Árabes Unidos (1,9 mil milhões de euros).

As exportações para a Ásia subiram de 4,7 mil milhões para 5,5 mil milhões de euros e para o Médio Oriente subiram de 6,6 mil milhões para oito mil milhões de euros.

Na lista dos importadores, e no que respeita ao Norte de África, estão países como a Tunísia, o Egito, a Líbia, Argélia e Marrocos. Na Ásia, a Índia foi o principal cliente, seguindo-se o Paquistão e o Afeganistão.

Assim, pergunto à Comissão:

Não considera que estes dados são profundamente contraditórios com a atribuição do «Nobel da Paz» à União Europeia no ano passado?

Resposta dada pela Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente Catherine Ashton em nome da Comissão
(24 de abril de 2013)

De acordo com a Posição Comum 2008/944/PESC do Conselho, de 8 de dezembro de 2008, que define regras comuns aplicáveis ao controlo das exportações de tecnologia e equipamento militares ([1]), as decisões de autorizar ou proibir as exportações de armas são da responsabilidade dos Estados-Membros. Os Estados-Membros avaliam as licenças de exportação de armas com base em oito critérios fixados na Posição Comum e devem ter em consideração as recusas de licenças de exportação eventualmente emitidas por outros Estados-Membros relativamente a transações idênticas.

A transparência é assegurada pelo quadro da UE instituído pela Posição Comum 2008/944/PESC do Conselho. Além dos dados públicos sobre o valor financeiro das exportações de armas, os relatórios anuais da União Europeia sobre esta matéria também incluem informação sobre o número de recusas de licenças de exportação em que os Estados-Membros não autorizaram uma exportação de armas em virtude do seu impacto negativo sobre a paz, a estabilidade e a segurança.

As questões suscitadas pela aplicação da Posição Comum são debatidas nas reuniões periódicas do Grupo «Exportações de armas convencionais» do Conselho (COARM). Da mesma forma, no âmbito do COARM, os Estados-Membros trocam opiniões e informações sobre destinos concretos, tendo em vista uma maior coerência das suas políticas de exportação de armas para os destinos em causa.

([1]) JO L 335 de 13.12.2008.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001811/13
to the Commission
Inês Cristina Zuber (GUE/NGL)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: EU arms exports

EU Member States' arms exports hit a new record high in 2011, amounting to a total of EUR 37.5 billion, an increase of 18.3% from the previous year. According to available figures, France, the UK, Germany, Italy and Spain accounted for 80% of EU arms exports. Only France exported arms worth EUR 10 billion, followed by the UK (EUR 7 billion), Germany (EUR 5.4 billion), Italy (EUR 5.2 billion) and Spain (EUR 2.8 billion). Major customers include Saudi Arabia (EUR 4.2 billion) and the United Arab Emirates (EUR 1.9 billion).

Exports to Asia increased from EUR 4.7 billion to EUR 5.5 billion, and exports to the Middle East increased from EUR 6.6 billion to EUR 8 billion.

As for North Africa, importing countries include Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Algeria and Morocco. In Asia, India was the biggest customer, followed by Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Does the Commission not believe that these figures are profoundly at odds with the EU's status as recipient of the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(24 April 2013)

Under Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment ([1]), decisions on whether to authorise or deny arms exports remain a national responsibility of Member States. Arms export licences reviewed by Member States have however to be assessed against the eight criteria laid out in the Common Position and Member States have to take into account denials possibly issued by other Member States for similar transactions.

Transparency is very much supported by the EU framework set up by Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP. In addition to the public data on the financial value of arms exports, the EU annual reports on arms exports also inform on the number of export denials where Member States have refused to authorise an arms export because of its negative impact on peace, stability and security.

Issues raised by implementation of the Common Position are discussed in regular meetings of the Council Working Group on conventional arms exports (COARM). Likewise, Member States exchange in COARM views and information on specific destinations with a view to achieving greater consistency of their arms export policy towards the destinations in question.

([1]) OJ L 335, 13.12.2008.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-001813/13
à Comissão
Inês Cristina Zuber (GUE/NGL)
(20 de fevereiro de 2013)

Assunto: Medidas da Análise Anual do Crescimento 2013

Na Comunicação da Comissão sobre a Análise Anual do Crescimento 2013 é referido, entre várias recomendações, que se «deve assegurar o alinhamento da idade de reforma com a esperança de vida» (p. 6), desenvolver «regimes de trabalho flexíveis» (p. 12) e «acompanhar os efeitos dos sistemas de fixação de salários (…) no intuito de melhor refletir a evolução da produtividade». Portugal, um dos países intervencionados pela Troika (UE, FMI) tem hoje uma taxa de desemprego juvenil de mais de 35 %. Um estudo da OIT, publicado em 2012, demonstrou que entre o segundo trimestre de 2008 e 2011, a taxa de emprego jovem em regime de tempo parcial aumentou cerca de 3,6 pontos percentuais, enquanto na Espanha e na Irlanda a subida chegou a 11,8 % e 20,7 % pontos percentuais, respetivamente.

Esse mesmo estudo demonstra ainda que, em Portugal, o aumento do trabalho temporário entre os jovens foi de dez pontos percentuais. Por outro lado, tem aumentado a pobreza em Portugal e, como referiram recentemente representantes de organizações de apoio social, está a aumentar a pobreza entre trabalhadores empregados, o que não se pode dissociar dos contratos precários e dos baixos níveis salariais — em Portugal, o salário mínimo nacional (depois dos descontos feitos) situa-se abaixo do limiar da pobreza.

Tendo em conta a Comunicação da Comissão sobre a Análise Anual do Crescimento 2013, e referindo-me ao exemplo concreto de Portugal, pergunto:

— Considera que seria positivo para Portugal aumentar a idade de reforma?

— Considera que seria positivo para Portugal massificar e alargar o número de trabalhadores com contratos precários?

— Considera que seria positivo para Portugal baixar os seus níveis salariais?

Resposta dada por László Andor em nome da Comissão
(18 de abril de 2013)

A Análise Anual do Crescimento 2013 convida os Estados-Membros a reformar os sistemas de pensões e a alinhar a idade de reforma com a esperança de vida, de modo a garantir a sustentabilidade do sistema. Para ter em conta o aumento da esperança de vida, foi introduzido em Portugal, em 2007, um «fator de sustentabilidade» para ajustar as pensões do regime geral.

No que respeita à fixação de salários, a Comissão recomendou a Portugal que promovesse uma evolução salarial coerente com os objetivos de fomentar a criação de emprego e melhorar a competitividade das empresas, no intuito de corrigir os desequilíbrios macroeconómicos.

Ao mesmo tempo, a Comissão recomendou aos Estados-Membros que procedessem a reformas da legislação laboral, de forma a dar resposta à segmentação do mercado de trabalho, promover a criação de emprego e facilitar disposições de tempo de trabalho que limitem as flutuações de emprego ao longo de todo o ciclo, adequem as diferentes modalidades de organização do tempo de trabalho aos vários setores e empresas, reponham a competitividade e facilitem o acesso ao mercado de trabalho.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001813/13
to the Commission
Inês Cristina Zuber (GUE/NGL)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Annual Growth Survey 2013 measures

Among other recommendations, the communication from the Commission on the Annual Growth Survey 2013 states that 'retirement age' should be aligned 'with life expectancy' (p. 5), 'flexible working arrangements' should be developed (p. 10) and 'the effect of wage-setting systems' should be monitored 'in order to better reflect productivity developments'. The youth unemployment rate in Portugal, one of the countries bailed out by the Troika (EU, IMF), currently stands at over 35%. An International Labour Organisation study published in 2012 showed that between the second quarter of 2008 and 2011, the youth part-time employment rate went up by around 3.6%, while in Spain and Ireland the increase was 11.8% and 20.7%, respectively.

The same study also shows that there was a 10% increase in temporary work among young people in Portugal. Moreover, poverty has increased in Portugal and, according to recent reports by representatives of welfare organisations, there is rising poverty among employees, who cannot escape precarious contracts and low wages. In Portugal, the national minimum wage (after deductions) falls below the poverty line.

In view of the communication from the Commission on the Annual Growth Survey 2013, and with regard to the specific example of Portugal:

— Does the Commission believe that it would be a good idea for Portugal to increase the retirement age?

— Does it believe that it would be a good idea for Portugal to increase the number of workers on precarious contracts and to make such contracts commonplace?

— Does it believe that it would be a good idea for Portugal to lower its wage levels?

Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission
(18 April 2013)

The Annual Growth Survey 2013 invites the Member States to reform the pension systems and to align retirement age with life expectancy in order to ensure the sustainability of the system. To account for the increase of life expectation, the adjustment of the statutory pension by a 'sustainability factor' was introduced in Portugal in 2007.

In respect to wage setting the Commission recommended Portugal to promote wage developments consistent with the objectives of fostering job creation and improving firms' competitiveness with a view to correcting macroeconomic imbalances.

At the same time, the Commission recommended the Member State to reform employment protection legislation to tackle labour market segmentation, foster job creation, and to facilitate working time arrangements to contain employment fluctuations over the cycle, better accommodate differences in work patterns across sectors and firms, to restore competitiveness and to ease access to the labour market.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-001814/13
à Comissão
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(20 de fevereiro de 2013)

Assunto: Parceria Transatlântica de Comércio e Investimento — crescimento económico e criação de emprego

Tendo em conta que:

— Em 1990 surgiu a ideia de se criar uma Parceria Transatlântica de Comércio livre, mas que a liberalização do comércio mundial, impulsionada pela Organização Mundial do Comércio, acabou por ocupar a maior parte das atenções de ambos blocos económicos;

— Ao longo dos últimos anos, europeus e americanos têm vindo a estabelecer acordos bilaterais com diversos países e que se regista a tendência de serem celebrados outros acordos globais, nomeadamente com o Mercosul;

— O Presidente dos EUA, Barack Obama, e o Presidente da Comissão Europeia, José Manuel Barroso, anunciaram o aprofundamento das negociações sobre a criação de uma Parceria Transatlântica de Comércio e Investimento abrangente entre ambos blocos geoestratégicos;

— A UE e os EUA asseguram quase metade do PIB mundial e um terço do comércio, ou seja, cerca de 700 mil milhões de Euros anuais de bens e serviços e que o investimento em ambas as economias é da ordem dos 2,4 milhões de euros, compreendendo-se, assim, a importância da futura parceria a estabelecer;

— Ambos os blocos económicos possuem mais de 800 milhões de consumidores, sendo inferior aos 1,3 mil milhões da China e aos 1,1 mil milhões da Índia, embora os cidadãos europeus e americanos possuam um maior poder de compra, o que permitirá alavancar a atividade económica mundial.

— De acordo com a Comissão Europeia, o acordo a alcançar poderá resultar num crescimento anual do PIB de 0,5 % na UE e de 0,4 % nos EUA.

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Qual o impacto que espera alcançar a nível de dinamização da atividade económica com a futura parceria a estabelecer com os EUA?

2. Qual o número de empregos que espera vir a criar nos próximos anos?

3. Entende necessário aprofundar os investimentos europeus na área da investigação e inovação, à semelhança do que irão fazer os EUA, para se tornarem mais competitivos à escala global?

Resposta dada por Karel De Gucht em nome da Comissão

(15 de abril de 2013)

As estimativas mais recentes mostram que um acordo abrangente e ambicioso entre a UE e os EUA poderá trazer ganhos anuais globais equivalentes a um aumento de 0,5 % do PIB para a UE e a um aumento de 0,4 % do PIB para os EUA, até 2027. Seria o equivalente a 86 mil milhões de euros de receitas anuais adicionais para a economia da UE e 65 mil milhões de euros de receitas anuais adicionais para a economia americana.

Milhões de postos de trabalho são gerados direta e indiretamente pelo comércio bilateral entre a UE e os EUA. Uma iniciativa comercial abrangente e ambiciosa entre a UE e os EUA poderá criar novas oportunidades de negócio no valor de dezenas de milhares de milhões de euros, que irão gerar centenas de milhares de novos postos de trabalho em ambos os lados do Atlântico. Dado o aumento do fluo de bens e serviços gerado pelo estreitar das relações económicas transatlânticas, as exportações irão contribuir para a criação de um grande número de postos de trabalho em cada uma das economias. Tal contribuirá para uma base de empregabilidade mais sustentável, já que estes postos de trabalho poderão ser encontrados em empresas que estão direta ou indiretamente expostas à forte pressão da concorrência dos mercados globais.

O aumento do investimento europeu em investigação e inovação vai acelerar o desenvolvimento e a comercialização de novos produtos e serviços que criam empregos e crescimento a médio e longo prazo. Uma maior cooperação tecnológica e científica entre a UE e os EUA pode também ajudar a estabelecer regras partilhadas e normas e regulamentos técnicos comuns, assim estimulando o investimento e o comércio transatlântico e ajudando as empresas a aceder aos mercados globais. Consequentemente, mercados transatlânticos mais abrangentes e coerentes irão incentivar o investimento privado na investigação e inovação, que irá contribuir para um círculo virtuoso de investimento e crescimento.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001814/13
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership — economic growth and job creation

The idea of creating a transatlantic free trade partnership emerged in 1990, although both economic blocs were more focused on the liberalisation of world trade as promoted by the World Trade Organisation.

Over recent years, the EU and the US have established bilateral agreements with a number of countries and there has been a trend towards concluding other global agreements, particularly with Mercosur.

The US President, Barack Obama, and the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, have announced that in-depth talks will be held on the establishment of a comprehensive Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the two geostrategic blocs.

The EU and the US account for almost half of world GDP and one third of trade, amounting to approximately EUR 700 billion per year in goods and services. Investment in both economies is in the order of EUR 2.4 trillion, which helps to understand why the future partnership is important.

Together, the two economic blocs account for more than 800 million consumers, which is less than the 1.3 billion in China and the 1.1 billion in India, but EU and US citizens have greater purchasing power, which will make it possible to leverage global economic activity.

According to the European Commission, the agreement to be reached will lead to annual GDP growth of 0.5% for the EU and 0.4% for the US.

1. What impact does the Commission expect the future partnership with the US will have in terms of stimulating economic activity?

2. How many jobs does it expect will be created in the years ahead?

3. Does it think it is necessary to increase European investment in research and innovation, as the US will do, to become more competitive on the world stage?

Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission
(15 April 2013)

Latest estimates show that a comprehensive and ambitious agreement between the EU and the US could bring overall annual gains of 0.5% increase in gross domestic product (GDP) for the EU and a 0.4% increase in GDP for the US by 2027. This would be equivalent to EUR 86 billion of added annual income to the EU economy and EUR 65 billion of added annual income for the US economy.

Millions of jobs are supported directly and indirectly by US-EU bilateral trade. A comprehensive and ambitious trade initiative between the US and the EU could create new business opportunities worth tens of billions of euros, which will in turn support hundreds of thousands of new jobs on both sides of the Atlantic. Given the increased flow of goods and services generated by closer transatlantic economic relations, a greater number of jobs in each economy will be supported by exports. This will contribute to a more sustainable employment base as these jobs will be found in firms that are either directly or indirectly successfully exposed to the strong competition pressure of the global markets.

Increased European investment in research and innovation will accelerate the development and commercialisation of new goods and services that create jobs and growth over the medium to long term. Greater EU-US science and technology cooperation can also help to establish shared norms and compatible technical standards and regulations thereby stimulating transatlantic trade and investment and helping enterprises to access global markets. As a result, wider and more coherent transatlantic markets will incentivise increased private investment in research and innovation that will help to drive a virtuous circle of investment and growth.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-001815/13
à Comissão
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(20 de fevereiro de 2013)

Assunto: Parceria Transatlântica de Comércio e Investimento — setores de atividade económica

Tendo em conta que:

— Em 1990 surgiu a ideia de se criar uma Parceria Transatlântica de Comércio livre, mas que a liberalização do comércio mundial, impulsionada pela Organização Mundial do Comércio, acabou por ocupar a maior parte das atenções de ambos blocos económicos;

— Ao longo dos últimos anos, europeus e americanos têm vindo a estabelecer acordos bilaterais com diversos países e que se regista a tendência de serem celebrados outros acordos globais, nomeadamente com o Mercosul;

— O Presidente dos EUA, Barack Obama, referiu no discurso do Estado da União que «[A]nuncio que vamos lançar as negociações sobre uma Parceria Transatlântica de Comércio e Investimento abrangente com a União Europeia», demonstrando que pretende dar um novo impulso às relações comerciais;

— Segundo o Presidente da Comissão Europeu, José Manuel Barroso, «[A]s relações económicas transatlânticas já são as maiores do mundo. Representam metade da produção global e um terço do comércio mundial de bens e serviços, no valor de 750 mil milhões de euros. Com esta negociação, podemos estabelecer um padrão, não apenas para o comércio e investimento bilaterais, incluindo a regulação, mas também para o desenvolvimento de regras comerciais globais»;

— Existem vários problemas de liberalização de comércio entre os dois blocos económicos, destacando-se os problemas com as companhias de aviação, as regras básicas em matéria de hormonas de crescimento utilizadas no tratamento de carnes ou a agricultura.

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Quais os setores de atividade económica em que já existem acordos entre a UE e os EUA?

2. No decorrer das negociações que têm vindo a ser realizadas, quais os setores de atividade económica que se afiguraram mais complicados em termos negociais para a UE e para os EUA?

3. Quais os setores de atividade económica a nível europeu que serão mais beneficiados e os que irão ter maiores perdas?

4. Que Estados-Membros têm levantado maiores restrições ao avanço deste acordo bilateral?

Resposta dada por Karel De Gucht em nome da Comissão
(18 de abril de 2013)

A cooperação económica UE/EUA remonta aos anos 60, com a assinatura dos primeiros acordos com a Comunidade Europeia da Energia Atómica e com a Comunidade Económica Europeia, na sequência da reforma da pauta aduaneira dos EUA. Desde então, os acordos de cooperação económica UE/EUA têm incluído domínios como as questões ambientais, o comércio de tubos de aço, os contratos públicos, o comércio de carne fresca de bovinos e suínos, o ensino superior, a cooperação em matéria aduaneira, as bebidas espirituosas, as medidas sanitárias de proteção da saúde pública e animal no âmbito do comércio de animais vivos e de produtos de origem animal, os transportes aéreos ou a cooperação científica e tecnológica. A agricultura e os contratos públicos constituem domínios importantes e sensíveis para a UE e os EUA.

A UE e os EUA visam um acordo de comércio e de investimento exaustivo, com um nível adequado de ambição em termos gerais. São de esperar grandes vantagens de um acesso privilegiado ao mercado em termos de direitos aduaneiros, serviços e investimento, de compatibilidade a nível da regulamentação e de supressão das barreiras não-aduaneiras, assim como de uma abordagem partilhada dos desafios e das oportunidades globais em matéria comercial para o século XXI. Prevê-se que os maiores benefícios provenham da acentuação da compatibilidade regulamentar. A Comissão efetuou uma análise pormenorizada do impacto do acordo potencial, que é disponibilizado ao público ([1]).

Os Estados-Membros têm-se mostrado muito favoráveis a um acordo bilateral, tal como foi demonstrado pelas conclusões do Conselho Europeu de junho/outubro de 2012 e de fevereiro de 2013.

([1]) http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/united-states/#sia

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001815/13
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership — sectors of economic activity

The idea of creating a Transatlantic Free Trade Partnership first emerged in 1990, but both economic blocs found their attention largely taken up with the liberalisation of world trade promoted by the World Trade Organisation.

— In recent years, both Europe and the United States have signed bilateral agreements with a number of countries and the current trend is towards other global agreements, such as that with Mercosur.

— The President of the United States, Barack Obama, announced in his State of the Union speech that 'we will launch talks on a comprehensive Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with the European Union'.

— The President of the Commission, José Manuel Barroso said that transatlantic economic relations are already the strongest in the world and represent half of global production and a third of world trade in goods and services, with a value of EUR 750 billion and that 'this negotiation will set the standard — not only for our future bilateral trade and investment, including regulatory issues, but also for the development of global trade rules'.

— There are a number of problems in relation to trade liberalisation between the two economic blocs, notably including problems with aviation companies, basic rules on the use of growth hormones in meat production, and agriculture.

Can the Commission say:

1. In which areas of economic activity do agreements already exist between the United States and the EU?

2. In negotiations held so far, which areas of economic activity have proved most complicated to negotiate for each party?

3. At European level, which areas of economic activity will benefit most from the agreement and which will be most adversely affected by it?

4. Which Member States have introduced the most restrictions in advance of this bilateral agreement?

Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission
(18 April 2013)

EU/ US economic cooperation dates back to the 1960s, with the signing of first agreements with the European Atomic Energy Community and with the European Economic Community following the reform of the US Customs Tariff. Since then, EU/US economic cooperation agreements have included areas such as environmental matters, trade in steel pipes, government procurement, trade in fresh bovine and porcine meat, higher education, cooperation in customs matters, spirituous beverages, sanitary measures to protect public and animal health in trade in live animals and animal products, air transport or scientific and technological cooperation. Agriculture and public procurement are both important and sensitive areas for the EU and the US.

The EU and the US aim at a comprehensive trade and investment agreement with an adequate level of ambition across the board. Main benefits are expected from enhanced market access in terms of tariffs, services and investment; regulatory compatibility and removal of non-tariff barriers; and addressing shared global trade challenges and opportunities in the 21st century. The biggest bulk of benefits are expected to derive from enhanced regulatory compatibility. The Commission undertook a detailed analysis of the impact of the potential agreement which is publicly available ([1]).

Member States have been highly supportive of a bilateral agreement as demonstrated by the European Council conclusions of June/ October 2012 and February 2013.

([1]) http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/united-states/#sia.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-001816/13
à Comissão
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(20 de fevereiro de 2013)

Assunto: Parceria Transatlântica de Comércio e Investimento — principais barreiras à negociação

Tendo em conta que:

— Em 1990 surgiu a ideia de se criar uma Parceria Transatlântica de Comércio livre, mas que a liberalização do comércio mundial, impulsionada pela Organização Mundial do Comércio, acabou por ocupar a maior parte das atenções de ambos blocos económicos;

— Ao longo dos últimos anos, europeus e americanos têm vindo a estabelecer acordos bilaterais com diversos países e que se regista a tendência de serem celebrados outros acordos globais, nomeadamente com o Mercosul;

— O Presidente dos EUA, Barack Obama, referiu no discurso do Estado da União que «[A]nuncio que vamos lançar as negociações sobre uma Parceria Transatlântica de Comércio e Investimento abrangente com a União Europeia», demonstrando que pretende dar um novo impulso às relações comerciais;

— Segundo o Presidente da Comissão Europeu, José Manuel Barroso, «[A]s relações económicas transatlânticas já são as maiores do mundo. Representam metade da produção global e um terço do comércio mundial de bens e serviços, no valor de 750 mil milhões de euros. Com esta negociação, podemos estabelecer um padrão, não apenas para o comércio e investimento bilaterais, incluindo a regulação, mas também para o desenvolvimento de regras comerciais globais»;

— Existem informações diversas sobre a calendarização das negociações, sendo necessário esclarecer qual o procedimento a adotar a nível europeu.

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Existe algum roteiro para a celebração da Parceria Transatlântica, nomeadamente para as negociações e o acordo alcançado entre os 27 Estados-Membros e as futuras negociações com os EUA?

2. Quando pensa que deveria entrar em vigor a presente Parceria?

3. Tem conhecimento das principais barreiras que deverá encontrar ao longo do processo de negociação e como as pretende resolver?

Resposta dada por Karel De Gucht em nome da Comissão
(10 de abril de 2013)

A 12 de março, a Comissão adotou uma proposta de decisão do Conselho que autoriza a abertura de negociações. A Comissão apresentará regularmente um balanço e procurará os pontos de vista dos Estados-Membros no âmbito do Comité da Política Comercial e do Conselho dos Negócios Estrangeiros — vertente comércio.

Há uma expectativa comum com os EUA de que as negociações prossigam rapidamente. A data de entrada em vigor irá depender de vários fatores: data de lançamento e duração das negociações, finalização jurídica e tradução do texto do acordo de investimento e comércio, procedimentos de tomada de decisão dentro das instituições da UE relativos à implementação, bem como os procedimentos de ratificação do lado dos EUA.

Os potenciais desafios e oportunidades subjacentes a estas negociações foram exaustivamente discutidos com os EUA no âmbito do Grupo de Trabalho de Alto Nível sobre o Crescimento e o Emprego (GTAN). No relatório final do GTAN, ambas as partes chegaram à conclusão de que um acordo abrangente que aborde uma ampla gama de questões bilaterais de investimento e comércio seria o melhor rumo a seguir. A duração prevista das negociações é de cerca de 2 anos. Para as áreas cujos resultados não podem ser plenamente alcançados nesse período, como a compatibilidade regulamentar, a Comissão tenciona ter um «acordo de coabitação» que permita aumentar gradualmente a convergência regulamentar ao longo do tempo e em função de objetivos e princípios definidos.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001816/13
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership — main negotiation hurdles

The idea of creating a Transatlantic Free Trade Partnership first emerged in 1990, but both economic blocs found their attention largely taken up with the liberalisation of world trade promoted by the World Trade Organisation.

In recent years, both Europe and the United States have signed bilateral agreements with a number of countries and the current trend is towards other global agreements, such as that with Mercosur.

The President of the United States, Barack Obama, announced in his State of the Union speech that 'we will launch talks on a comprehensive Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with the European Union'.

The President of the Commission, José Manuel Barroso said that transatlantic economic relations are already the strongest in the world and represent half of global production and a third of world trade in goods and services, with a value of EUR 750 billion and that 'this negotiation will set the standard — not only for our future bilateral trade and investment, including regulatory issues, but also for the development of global trade rules'.

As different versions have been offered concerning the timetable for the negotiations, it is important to clarify what procedure will be adopted at European level.

Can the Commission answer the following:

1. Does a road map exist for the conclusion of the Transatlantic Partnership, specifically in terms of negotiating and reaching an agreement among the 27 Member States and the future negotiations with the United States?

2. When does the Commission expect the Partnership to come into force?

3. Has the Commission identified the main hurdles which it is likely to encounter during the lengthy negotiation process? How does it intend to overcome them?

Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission
(10 April 2013)

The Commission, on 12 March, adopted a proposal for a Council Decision to authorise the opening of negotiations. The Commission will regularly debrief and seek the views of Member States in the framework of the Trade Policy Committee and within the Foreign Affairs Council — Trade formation.

There is a common expectation with the US that negotiations should proceed swiftly. The date of entry into force will depend on a number of factors: launch date and duration of the negotiations, legal scrubbing and translation of the text of the trade and investment agreement, decision-making procedures within EU institutions relating to implementation, as well as ratification procedures on the US side.

Potential challenges and opportunities to the negotiations have been extensively discussed with the US within the High-Level Working Group on Growth and Jobs (HLWG). In the final report of the HLWG, both sides have reached the conclusion that a comprehensive agreement that addresses a broad range of bilateral trade and investment issues would be the best way forward. The expected timeline for negotiations is around two years. For areas where outcomes cannot be fully achieved within this period, such as regulatory compatibility, the Commission envisages having a 'living agreement' that allows for progressively greater regulatory convergence over time against defined objectives and principles.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-001817/13
à Comissão
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(20 de fevereiro de 2013)

Assunto: Parceria Transatlântica de Comércio e Investimento — Influência económica e política

Tendo em conta que:

— Em 1990 surgiu a ideia da criação de uma Parceria Transatlântica de Comércio livre, tendo, porém, a liberalização do comércio mundial impulsionado pela OMC acabado por ocupar a maior parte das atenções de ambos os blocos económicos;

— Ao longo dos últimos anos, europeus e americanos têm vindo a estabelecer acordos bilaterais com diversos países, verificando-se uma tendência para a conclusão de outros acordos globais, nomeadamente com o Mercosul;

— O Presidente dos EUA, Barack Obama, referiu no discurso do Estado da União que «Anuncio que lançaremos as negociações sobre uma Parceria Transatlântica de Comércio e Investimento abrangente com a União Europeia», demonstrando que pretende dar um novo impulso às relações comerciais;

— Segundo o Presidente da Comissão Europeia, José Manuel Barroso: «As relações económicas transatlânticas já são as maiores do mundo. Representam metade da produção global e um terço do comércio mundial de bens e serviços, no valor de 750 mil milhões de euros. Com esta negociação, podemos estabelecer um padrão, não apenas para o comércio e investimento bilaterais, incluindo a sua regulação, mas também para o desenvolvimento de regras comerciais globais»;

— Este acordo implicará um enorme esforço económico e diplomático do continente europeu, devendo ser criadas equipas especificamente para o efeito;

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Como pretende organizar os trabalhos, a nível interno, que levarão ao estabelecimento da nova Parceria Transatlântica?

2. Vai criar equipas de trabalho especificamente focalizadas nas relações comerciais que serão estabelecidas?

3. Não considera útil que a UE tenha uma real representação económica e diplomática nos EUA, por forma a influenciar de forma presencial e defender os interesses do velho continente no futuro acordo?

Resposta dada por Karel De Gucht em nome da Comissão
(10 de abril de 2013)

Em 12 de março de 2013, a Comissão adotou uma proposta de decisão do Conselho para autorizar a abertura das negociações. Partilhamos com os Estados Unidos (EUA) a esperança de que as negociações avancem rapidamente.

Em conformidade com a abordagem da UE fixada para a negociação de acordos de comércio livre, a equipa de negociação da UE será formada por funcionários da Comissão. Caberá aos negociadores da Comissão o papel de liderança e coordenação. Trabalharão com os especialistas de diferentes Direções-Gerais pertinentes, sob a coordenação geral do Comissário do Comércio, que é o responsável por este acordo de comércio e investimento.

A UE encontra-se representada nos Estados Unidos pela sua delegação em Washington DC. A delegação, que é formada por funcionários experientes da UE, incluindo nos domínios relativos ao comércio, há muito que presta aconselhamento sobre as formas de cooperação entre a UE e os seus homólogos dos EUA, a vários níveis, em complementaridade dos contactos bilaterais que Bruxelas tem tido nas suas diversas reuniões com Washington. A delegação continuará a prestar aconselhamento e promover os interesses da UE junto dos seus homólogos dos EUA, em ligação com as embaixadas dos Estados-Membros em Washington DC.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001817/13
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Economic and political influence

Given that:

— The idea for a Transatlantic Free Trade Partnership first arose in 1990, though at the time both economic blocks were more focused on world trade liberalisation through the WTO;

— Over the past few years, Europeans and North Americans have established bilateral agreements with several countries, and there has been a trend towards concluding other global agreements, particularly with Mercosur;

— In his State of the Union address, the US President Barack Obama said 'I am announcing that we will launch talks on a comprehensive Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with the European Union', showing that he intends to give new stimulus to trade relations;

— According to José Manuel Barroso, President of the EU Commission: 'Transatlantic economic relations are the greatest in the world. They represent half of global production and one third of the world trade in goods and services, to the value of EUR 750 billion. With this deal, we can set a benchmark, not only for bilateral trade and investment and its regulation, but also for the development of global trade regulations';

— This agreement will entail considerable economic and diplomatic efforts by Europe as it will be necessary to put together special teams to work on it;

I ask the Commission:

1. How does it plan to internally plan the work that will lead to establishing the new Transatlantic Partnership?

2. Will it set up work teams to focus specifically on the trade relations that will be established?

3. Does it think it would be useful for the EU to have a genuine economic and diplomatic representation in the US so as to effectively influence and advocate for the interests of Europe in the future agreement?

Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission
(10 April 2013)

The Commission, on 12 March 2013, adopted a proposal for a Council Decision to authorise the opening of negotiations. There is a common expectation with the United States (US) that negotiations should proceed swiftly

In accordance with the EU's established approach for negotiating Free Trade Agreements, the EU negotiation team will be formed of Commission officials. Negotiators from the Commission will have the overall lead and coordination role. They will work, as the case may be, with thematic experts from various Directorates-General working under the overall coordination of the Trade Commissioner, who is responsible for this trade and investment agreement.

The EU is represented in the US through its Delegation in Washington DC. The Delegation, which is formed of experienced EU officials, including in the trade section, has for a long time been providing advice on how the EU could engage with US counterparts at various levels. This has complemented the bilateral contacts Brussels has had in its various meetings with Washington. The Delegation will continue to provide advice and engage in promoting EU interests vis-à-vis US counterparts, in liaison with the embassies of the Member States in Washington DC.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-001818/13
à Comissão
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(20 de fevereiro de 2013)

Assunto: Centro Internacional de Negócios da Madeira (CINM) e a Competitividade Fiscal

Considerando os seguinte pontos:

— O estudo da Universidade de Starthclyde (2009), apresentado à Comissão pelas entidades portuguesas, mostra que a nova fase do regime de benefícios fiscais a aplicar à Zona Franca da Madeira (ZFM) levou à deslocação (para as Ilhas do Canal, Malta, Chipre, Luxemburgo, Holanda, Suíça, Irlanda e Áustria) de um número significativo de empresas com operações substanciais na ZFM.

— A Associação Comercial e Industrial do Funchal/Câmara de Comércio e Indústria da Madeira (ACIF-CCIM) alertou a Comissão Europeia para as práticas concorrenciais entres diferentes praças no seio da União Europeia.

— Os benefícios fiscais concedidos no âmbito da ZFM/CINM atraíram empresas com operações internacionais e que à data consideraram o regime como satisfatório em termos das suas necessidades de negócio.

— Os agentes económicos consideram a estabilidade/segurança fiscal como um dos aspetos mais importantes para a fixação da sua atividade num território. A cada revisão do regime do CINM verifica-se elevado grau de incerteza que acaba por afetar negativamente as expectativas dos investidores.

— As expectativas negativas dos investidores acabam, normalmente, por se traduzir em deslocações para jurisdições mais favoráveis.

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Se possui dados sobre os motivos da deslocalização das empresas anteriormente fixadas no âmbito do CINM?

2. Se tem em conta o fator da estabilidade fiscal do regime nas presentes negociações do CINM?

3. Como pretende garantir uma concorrência leal entre as diferentes praças existentes na UE, que não estão dependentes de processos de revisão por parte da Comissão, e o CINM, cujo regime é estanque em termos temporais e em termos de envolvente socioeconómica depois da sua aprovação pela Comissão?

Resposta dada por Joaquín Almunia em nome da Comissão
(30 de abril de 2013)

O Regime ZFM III de 2007 assegura que as vantagens fiscais de que gozam as sociedades estabelecidas na ZFM são proporcionais às insuficiências que a região enfrenta e que o auxílio contribui para o desenvolvimento regional. No âmbito da ZFM, uma microempresa pode receber até 400 000 euros/ano/posto de trabalho criado, sob a forma de isenções fiscais. A recente deslocalização de empresas parece relacionar-se com o termo do Regime I, que não impunha quaisquer condições ao usufruto destas isenções fiscais, cujo termo no final de 2011 era conhecido por todos os seus beneficiários. Esta opção de deslocalizar, juntamente com a possibilidade de ficar e beneficiar de montantes importantes de ajuda atualmente disponíveis, prova que os investimentos destas empresas são móveis e não podem, portanto, assegurar o crescimento e o emprego sustentáveis.

No âmbito do Regime ZFM III, as empresas registadas e autorizadas na ZFM até ao final de 2013 podem beneficiar das vantagens fiscais autorizadas de acordo com as suas condições, até ao final de 2020. Desta forma, a Comissão assegurou um regime fiscal estável que permite às empresas desenvolverem-se a longo prazo.

As regras em matéria de auxílios estatais aplicam-se equitativamente a situações semelhantes, a fim de garantir a igualdade de condições de concorrência no mercado único. O facto de outras jurisdições poderem ter regimes fiscais diferentes não significa que as regras relativas aos auxílios estatais não se apliquem da mesma forma a todas as regiões da UE. A Comissão analisou o regime da ZFM com base nas mesmas regras em matéria de auxílios estatais aplicáveis a qualquer outro regime de auxílios estatais da UE. Assim, o princípio da igualdade de tratamento é respeitado. A duração do regime da ZFM garante a estabilidade do regime fiscal, o que permite às empresas desenvolverem-se até 2020.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001818/13
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Madeira International Business Centre (MIBC) and Fiscal Competitiveness

Whereas:

— The 2009 study by the University of Strathclyde, presented to the Commission by the Portuguese authorities, shows that the new phase of the tax regime applicable to the ZFM (the Free Trade Zone of Madeira) led to a significant number of companies which had had substantial operations in the ZFM moving away to the Channel Islands, Malta, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Holland, Switzerland, Ireland and Austria.

— The Funchal Trade and Industry Association/Madeira Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ACIF-CCIM) alerted the European Commission to the competitive practices between the different markets in the European Union.

— The tax benefits given to the ZFM/MIBC had attracted companies with international operations, which until the changes had considered the regime to be adequate in terms of their business needs.

— Economic operators consider tax stability/security to be one of the most important aspects that attract them to a territory. Every change made to the MIBC regime led to considerable uncertainty, and this had a negative effect on investors' expectations.

— Negative expectations on the part of investors tend to result in their moving to more favourable locations.

I ask the Commission:

1. Does it have any data on the reasons for relocation of the companies that were previously located in the MIBC?

2. Is it aware of the importance of a stable tax regime in the current MIBC negotiations?

3. How does it plan to ensure a level playing field between the several EU markets that are not reliant on revisionary procedures by the Commission, and the CINM, which has a regime that is temporally and socioeconomically inflexible once it is approved by the Commission?

Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission
(30 April 2013)

The 2007 ZFM Regime III ensures that the fiscal advantages enjoyed by the companies established in ZFM are proportional to the handicaps this region faces and that the aid contributes to its regional development. Under ZFM, a micro-company can be granted up to EUR 400 000/year/job created in the form of tax exemptions. The recent relocation of companies seems related to the end of Regime I that set no conditions for these tax exemptions, as the expiry of Regime I at the end of 2011 was known to all its beneficiaries. This relocation combined with the alternative to stay and benefit from the substantial aid amounts currently allowable proves that these companies' investments appear mobile and so they cannot ensure sustainable growth and employment.

Under the ZFM Regime III companies registered and authorised in the ZFM until the end of 2013 can benefit from the fiscal advantages allowed according to its conditions, until the end of 2020. Thus the Commission has ensured a stable tax regime that allows companies to develop over an extended period.

State aid rules apply equally to similar situations, to ensure a level playing field in the Single market. The fact that other jurisdictions may have different tax rules does not mean that state aid rules do not apply in the same way to all regions in the EU. The Commission assessed the ZFM scheme on the basis of the same state aid rules that apply to any other state aid scheme in the EU. So the principle of equal treatment is respected. The duration of the ZFM scheme ensures a stable tax regime that enables the companies to develop up to 2020.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-001819/13
à Comissão
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(20 de fevereiro de 2013)

Assunto: Cooperação no setor empresarial entre a UE e o Brasil

Considerando que:

A reunião de cúpula entre a Comunidade de Estados Latino-Americanos e Caribenhos (CELAC) e a União Europeia (UE) realizada em Santiago do Chile, nos dias 26 e 27 de janeiro, marca um importante avanço no diálogo entre as duas organizações regionais, que, em conjunto, representam 60 países, oferecendo igualmente uma oportunidade de refletir sobre a cooperação entre as duas partes ao nível empresarial;

A importância do mercado da América do Sul não se reflete só ao nível da produção de alimentos e de matérias-primas, sendo responsável pelo abastecimento de diversas regiões no mundo, nomeadamente de gás, petróleo, cobre, ferro, urânio, lítio, mas também no facto de os produtos industrializados adquirirem uma importância crescente no mercado internacional, com destaque para os setores aeronáutico, automobilístico, petroquímico e eletroeletrónico;

A União Europeia mantém-se como o principal parceiro comercial do Brasil e o maior investidor do País, verificando-se uma expansão constante dos investimentos brasileiros na UE, o que faz do Brasil o quinto maior investidor na União Europeia; e que a Declaração conjunta aprovada por ocasião da cúpula entre a CELAC e a UE destaca, «por um lado, o crescente interesse de empresas europeias em estabelecer ou ampliar a sua presença no Brasil — por meio, inclusive, de parcerias público-privadas — e a crescente competitividade das empresas brasileiras no mercado europeu» e «a importância de reforçar ainda mais os contactos entre as respetivas comunidades de negócios, com vista a promover o comércio e os investimentos bilaterais»;

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Como podem a União Europeia e o Brasil apoiar o setor empresarial de ambos os lados com vista a promover o comércio e os investimentos bilaterais?

2. Não podem os esforços desenvolvidos no setor comercial pela própria comunidade empresarial contribuir para a constatação da necessidade do reforço das relações entre a UE e o Mercosul?

3. Quais as iniciativas de cooperação que podem ser levadas a cabo para efetivar ou melhorar o apoio às micro, pequenas e médias empresas na União Europeia? E como incentivar as parcerias público-privadas e coordenar os respetivos regimes entre os dois lados do Atlântico?

Resposta dada por Karel De Gucht em nome da Comissão
(8 de abril de 2013)

Na última Cimeira UE-Brasil, realizada no dia 24 de janeiro, em Brasília, os líderes acordaram na criação de um grupo bilateral *ad hoc* para analisar de forma mais sistemática a possibilidade de reforçar os laços económicos, incluindo nos domínios do investimento e da competitividade.

Paralelamente, as comunidades empresariais das duas regiões acordaram, na última Cimeira Empresarial, na instituição de um grupo de trabalho conjunto para explorar opções que permitam desenvolver a agenda bilateral do comércio e do investimento. Este grupo de trabalho apresentará as suas conclusões na próxima Cimeira Empresarial UE-Brasil. As conclusões servirão de base para os trabalhos do grupo bilateral *ad hoc* instituído pelos líderes.

As comunidades empresariais da UE e do Brasil têm apoiado sistematicamente o reforço das relações entre a UE e o Mercosul. A Comissão considera que o trabalho conjunto desenvolvido pelas comunidades empresariais constitui uma ajuda preciosa para compreender os domínios em que é necessário reforçar essas relações.

No que se refere às pequenas e médias empresas (PME), a Comissão está a analisar a possibilidade de criar um serviço de assistência (Helpdesk) destinado às PME sobre os direitos de propriedade intelectual na região do Mercosul e procede atualmente à identificação de dois projetos para a América Latina no âmbito do Instrumento dos Países Industrializados (IPI+). Um dos projetos pretende apoiar a criação de um centro de informações (Knowledge Centre) e o outro tem como objetivo prestar serviços de apoio às empresas, em particular às PME.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001819/13
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: EU-Brazil business sector cooperation

Given that:

The EU-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) Summit, held in Santiago de Chile on 26 and 27 January, is a major step forward in the dialogue between the two regional organisations, which together represent 60 countries. It also provides an opportunity to reflect on cooperation between the companies of both sides.

The South American market is important because it supplies various regions of the world with large amounts of food and commodities, such as gas, oil, copper, iron, uranium and lithium. That is not all, however: its manufactured products are becoming increasingly important in the international market, especially in the aeronautical, motor vehicle, petrochemical, and electrical and electronic goods industries.

The EU remains Brazil's main trading partner and the largest investor in the country, and Brazilian investments in the EU are steadily increasing, making Brazil the fifth largest investor in the EU. The Joint Statement adopted at the EU-CELAC Summit highlights 'on the one hand, the growing interest of European companies to establish or expand their presence in Brazil, including through public-private partnerships — and, on the other hand, the increasing competitiveness of Brazilian companies in the European market', and 'the importance of further strengthening contacts between their business communities, with a view to promoting bilateral trade and investment'.

1. How can the EU and Brazil support the business sector on both sides in order to promote bilateral trade and investment?

2. Can the efforts made in the commercial sector by the business community itself not contribute to understanding the need to strengthen EU-Mercosur relations?

3. What cooperation initiatives can be undertaken to effect or enhance support for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises in the EU? How can we encourage public-private partnerships and coordinate related systems between the two sides of the Atlantic?

Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission
(8 April 2013)

At the last EU-Brazil Summit that took place on 24 January in Brasilia, leaders agreed to create an ad-hoc bilateral working group to analyse more systematically the potential for further strengthening economic ties, including in the areas of investment and competitiveness.

In parallel, the business communities of the two sides agreed at their last Business Summit to launch a joint working group to explore options to advance the bilateral trade and investment agenda. This working group will present its findings at the next EU-Brazil Business Summit. This should feed into the work of the ad-hoc bilateral working group established by the leaders.

The business communities of the EU and Brazil have consistently supported the strengthening of EU-Mercosur relations. The Commission believes that the joint work carried out by the business communities certainly contributes to understanding the areas where EU-Mercosur relations need to be strengthened.

As regards support to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), the Commission is exploring the possibility of setting up a Helpdesk for SMEs on Intellectual Property Rights in the Mercosur region, and is in the process of identifying two projects for Latin America under the Industrialised Countries Instrument (ICI+). One project would support the creation of a Knowledge Centre and the other would provide business support services, particularly to SMEs.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-001820/13
à Comissão (Vice-Presidente/Alta Representante)
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(20 de fevereiro de 2013)

Assunto: VP/HR — Parceria Transatlântica de Comércio e Investimento — Orientação política europeia

Tendo em conta que:

— Em 1990, surgiu a ideia de se criar uma Parceria Transatlântica de Comércio livre, tendo, porém, a liberalização do comércio mundial impulsionado pela OMC acabado por ocupar a maior parte das atenções de ambos os blocos económicos;

— Ao longo dos últimos anos, europeus e americanos têm vindo a estabelecer acordos bilaterais com diversos países, verificando-se uma tendência para a conclusão de outros acordos globais, nomeadamente com o Mercosul;

— A antiga Secretária de Estado dos EUA, Hillary Clinton, esteve reunida em Bruxelas com a Vice-Presidente da Comissão Europeia, Catherine Ashton, no intuito de analisar as relações transatlânticas e os futuros acordos a estabelecer. Nesse mesmo encontro, foi referido que os dois continentes tinham algumas dúvidas mas consideraram que continuava a ser muito importante celebrar um acordo bilateral no século XXI;

— Quer a Europa, quer os EUA têm colocado uma grande ênfase nas relações comerciais com os países em desenvolvimento, nomeadamente com os BRIC, desenvolvendo acordos nos mais diversos sectores de atividade económica;

— A União Europeia tem vindo a desenvolver significativos esforços para melhorar as relações políticas com várias potências globais, sendo importante que as relações com os EUA sejam melhoradas nos vários domínios de interesse de cada região.

Pergunta-se à Vice-Presidente/Alta Representante:

1. Entende que a possível Parceria Transatlântica a estabelecer com os EUA irá representar um novo impulso político nas relações bilaterais com o velho aliado?

2. Existe alguma nova orientação estratégica na política externa europeia para reforçar as relações com os EUA, mantendo simultaneamente as boas relações com os restantes países?

3. Sem ser na área económica, como pretende cooperar de forma mais estreita com os EUA para garantir uma maior segurança, liberdade e democracia no mundo?

Resposta dada pela Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente Catherine Ashton em nome da Comissão
(17 de junho de 2013)

A União Europeia e os Estados Unidos da América estão empenhados em aprofundar as relações transatlânticas mediante o lançamento de negociações para uma Parceria Transatlântica de Comércio e Investimento. Um acordo ambicioso e abrangente entre as duas maiores potências económicas do mundo tem potencial para ser um ponto de viragem. A sua importância vai muito além dos meros benefícios económicos. Seria uma afirmação forte dos nossos valores comuns e um claro compromisso para reforçar mais ainda os laços profundos que ligam a UE e os EUA. A referida parceria teria também uma dimensão estratégica importante e serviria de plataforma para projetar em todo o mundo os valores partilhados pela UE e os EUA, no que se refere à abertura dos mercados e ao Estado de direito, bem como para promover a definição de normas a nível mundial.

A parceria estratégica com os EUA, baseada em valores partilhados e numa visão do mundo altamente convergente, não tem paralelo. A AR/VP está em contacto permanente com o Secretário de Estado John Kerry relativamente aos maiores desafios de política externa e segurança, nenhum dos quais pode ser resolvido por qualquer dos parceiros isoladamente. Os esforços para dar novo impulso ao processo de paz no Médio Oriente e a situação na Síria são exemplos óbvios, assim como o caso do Irão, em que a UE e os EUA vêm trabalhando em conjunto para procurar uma solução para as aspirações nucleares deste país através de negociações sérias, em conformidade com as suas obrigações internacionais, e para deixar bem claro, mediante sanções específicas, quais as consequências de não negociar de forma séria.

Com o passar dos anos, as relações entre a UE e os EUA têm-se centrado muito mais na forma de projetar conjuntamente os nossos valores e interesses no mundo e bastante menos nos nossos países. Estamos cada vez mais a alargar as fronteiras da relação transatlântica e a enfrentar desafios transversais como a cibersegurança, as alterações climáticas, a energia e o ambiente.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001820/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: EU policy guidance

Given that:

— The idea for a transatlantic free trade partnership first arose in 1990, although both economic blocks ended up being more focused on world trade liberalisation driven by the WTO;

— Over recent years, Europeans and North Americans have been establishing bilateral agreements with several countries, and there has been a noticeable trend towards concluding other global agreements, particularly with Mercosur;

— The former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton met the Vice-President of the European Commission Catherine Ashton in Brussels to analyse transatlantic relations and discuss future agreements. At this same meeting, it was mentioned that although both continents had some misgivings, they considered that it was still extremely important to conclude a bilateral agreement in the 21st century;

— Both Europe and the United States have placed great emphasis on trade relations with developing countries, particularly with the BRIC economies, and have thus formed agreements in the most diverse areas of economic activity.

— The European Union has been making significant efforts to improve political relations with various global powers, and it is important that relations with the United States be improved in each region's various areas of interest.

I ask the Vice-President/High Representative:

1. Does she think that the projected Transatlantic Partnership with the US will give fresh political impetus to bilateral relations with its long-standing ally?

2. Are there any new strategic guidelines in European foreign policy to strengthen relations with the US, while also maintaining healthy relations with other countries?

3. Other than in the economic field, how does she plan to cooperate more closely with the US in order to ensure greater security, freedom and democracy throughout the world?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(17 June 2013)

The European Union and the United States are committed to deepening transatlantic relations by launching negotiations on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). An ambitious and comprehensive agreement between the world's two biggest economic powers has the potential to be a game-changer. Its importance would go far beyond its pure economic benefit. It would be a strong statement about our shared values and a clear commitment to reinforce further the deep ties that bind the EU and the US. A TTIP would also have an important strategic dimension and should serve as a platform to project shared EU-US values worldwide with regard to open markets and the rule of law, as well as promoting global standard-setting.

The strategic partnership with the US, based on shared values and a highly convergent world view, is unparalleled. The HR/VP is in constant touch with Secretary of State Kerry on the major foreign policy and security challenges, none of which can be solved by any one player acting alone. Efforts to reinvigorate the Middle East Peace Process, and Syria, are obvious examples, as is Iran, where the EU and the US have worked together both to seek a solution via meaningful negotiations for Iran's nuclear aspirations, in accordance with its international obligations, and to make clear to Iran via targeted sanctions the consequences of not negotiating seriously.

Over the years, EU-US relations have become much more about how we project our values and interests together in the world and rather less about just ourselves. Increasingly, we are pushing the boundaries and tackling new frontiers in the transatlantic relationship and tackling cross-cutting challenges such as cyber-security, climate change, energy and the environment.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-001821/13
à Comissão (Vice-Presidente/Alta Representante)
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(20 de fevereiro de 2013)

Assunto: VP/HR — Fornecimento de energia à UE: restauração das relações comerciais entre a Rússia e a Geórgia

Considerando que:

A Rússia é o terceiro maior parceiro comercial da União Europeia, constituindo o fornecimento de gás e petróleo uma grande percentagem das exportações russas para a UE; e que a cooperação bilateral entre a UE e a Rússia deve passar pelos seus desafios comuns, nomeadamente a nível internacional, bem como regional, com os seus vizinhos comuns, tendo estas Partes já concluído um Acordo de Parceria e Cooperação em 1994 e iniciado as negociações para uma revisão e atualização dos termos atuais;

As relações entre a UE e a Geórgia começaram em 1992 e são regidas pelo Acordo de Cooperação e Parceria assinado em 1999. A Geórgia faz parte dos países visados pela Política Europeia de Vizinhança e que neste quadro se prevê uma intensificação do nível de integração económica e do aprofundamento da cooperação política; a Geórgia é um importante país de trânsito para petróleo e gás oriundos das bacias do Mar Cáspio, aspeto que também favorece a União Europeia, podendo assim tal cooperação levar a que novos corredores de energia alternativos permitam o abastecimento da União Europeia, de acordo com o Strategic Paper do SEAE para este país;

Recentemente, a Rússia levantou a interdição das importações de vinho e de água mineral oriundos da Geórgia, que tinha sido decretada em 2006, no rescaldo da crise que se instalou entre estes dois países e que o novo Primeiro Ministro da Geórgia considera a restauração das relações comerciais com a Rússia uma prioridade;

Pergunta-se à Vice-Presidente/Alta Representante:

1. Como vê estes indícios de abertura mútua da Rússia e da Geórgia a um restabelecimento das relações comerciais ao fim destes anos, nomeadamente ao abrigo dos objetivos da Política Europeia de Vizinhança da União Europeia?

2. Pode uma restauração das relações comerciais entre a Rússia e a Geórgia ser benéfica para a União Europeia, nomeadamente no que diz respeito ao fornecimento de energia e à segurança energética futura da União Europeia? No caso afirmativo, qual a ação que a União Europeia pode tentar empreender para melhorar as relações neste domínio?

Resposta dada pela Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente Catherine Ashton em nome da Comissão
(18 de abril de 2013)

As boas relações de vizinhança entre a Geórgia e a Federação da Rússia estão em plena consonância com os objetivos da Política Europeia de Vizinhança, que procura construir e consolidar democracias sãs, alcançar um crescimento económico sustentável e gerir as relações transfronteiras. O restabelecimento das relações comerciais entre a Geórgia e a Federação da Rússia pode contribuir para a estabilidade, segurança e prosperidade da região, sendo que todos estes elementos são do interesse da União Europeia. A Rússia tem sido um parceiro comercial muito importante da Geórgia e o restabelecimento das relações comerciais só pode ajudar a Geórgia a dinamizar o seu desempenho comercial e, desta forma, o seu crescimento económico.

A União Europeia está a negociar um Acordo de Associação (AA) que inclui uma Zona de comércio livre, abrangente e aprofundado (ZCLAA) com a Geórgia. Este país está ciente de que a participação noutras estruturas regionais com um grau de envolvimento semelhante pode não ser compatível com as suas obrigações futuras no âmbito do AA e da ZCLAA. Contudo, o restabelecimento das relações comerciais *per se* entre a Geórgia e a Federação da Rússia não é incompatível com o AA e uma ZCLAA. De facto, podem trabalhar em sinergia de modo a estimular o crescimento económico em benefício de todas as partes. A União Europeia está a trabalhar de perto com as autoridades georgianas de modo a aconselhá-las sobre a melhor forma de garantir a futura observância das normas do AA e da ZCLAA, incluindo no domínio da política energética.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001821/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Energy supply to the EU: restoration of trade relations between Russia and Georgia

Whereas:

Russia is the European Union's third largest trading partner, gas and oil supply counts for a considerable percentage of Russian exports to the EU; bilateral cooperation between the EU and Russia will always face joint challenges with their shared neighbours at both international and regional levels; both parties concluded a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in 1994 and have begun negotiations to revise and update its current terms;

Relations between the EU and Georgia started in 1992 and are governed by the partnership and cooperation agreement signed in 1999. Georgia is one of the countries included in the European Neighbourhood Policy and within this framework the level of economic integration and the deepening of political cooperation are likely to increase; Georgia is an important transit country for oil and gas originating from the Caspian Sea basin, and this is advantageous for the EU as such cooperation may lead to new alternative pipelines supplying the EU, in accordance with the EEAS Strategy Paper for the country;

Russia has recently lifted the ban on imports of wine and mineral water from Georgia, which had been imposed in 2006, in the aftermath of the crisis between the two countries, and the new Prime Minister of Georgia considers the restoration of trade relations with Russia to be a priority;

I ask the Vice-President/High Representative:

1. What is her view of these indications of both Russia and Georgia opening up to the re-establishment of trade relations after these past few years, particularly in terms of the aims of the EU European Neighbourhood Policy?

2. Could the restoration of trade relations between Russia and Georgia be beneficial for the European Union, particularly with regard to energy supply and to its future energy security? If so, what action can the European Union try to take to improve relations in this area?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(18 April 2013)

Good neighbourly relations between Georgia and the Russian Federation are fully in line with the aims of the European Neighbourhood Policy, which seeks to build and consolidate healthy democracies, pursue sustainable economic growth, and manage cross-border links. Re-established trade relations between Georgia and the Russian Federation can contribute to regional stability, security and prosperity, all of which are strongly in the interests of the European Union. Russia has been a very important trade partner of Georgia and restitution of trade can only help Georgia in boosting its trade performance and thereby economic growth.

The European Union is negotiating an Association Agreement (AA), comprising a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), with Georgia. Georgia is aware that participation in other regional structures with a similar depth of engagement may not be compatible with its future obligations under the AA and DCFTA. However, restoration of trade relations per se between Georgia and the Russian Federation is not incompatible with the AA and DCFTA; indeed, it can work in synergy to stimulate economic growth to the benefit of all parties. The EU is working closely with the Georgian authorities to advise them on how to assure future compliance with the AA and DCFTA, including in the field of energy policy.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-001822/13
à Comissão (Vice-Presidente/Alta Representante)
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(20 de fevereiro de 2013)

Assunto: VP/HR — Evolução das relações entre a União Europeia e Israel

Considerando que:

A União Europeia e Israel se comprometeram a estabelecer uma parceria com vista a uma aproximação política e a benefícios mútuos na área do comércio internacional, bem como do investimento conjunto em cooperação económica, social, financeira, científica, tecnológica e cultural;

O Plano de Ação concluído entre a União Europeia e Israel contribui para dar um novo alento a esta relação bilateral, através da integração gradual de Israel nas políticas e programas da UE;

Pela primeira vez existe um elemento de assistência financeira à cooperação entre a União Europeia e Israel, sendo Israel elegível para um apoio financeiro na ordem dos 14 milhões de euros no período financeiro plurianual que atualmente decorre;

As relações entre a União Europeia e Israel foram renovadas em 2007, nomeadamente através de esforços da comunidade internacional, aquando da revitalização do quarteto e do apoio conjunto de parceiros regionais para a paz e a estabilidade no Médio Oriente;

Os Estados Unidos, parceiros transatlânticos da União Europeia na ação conjunta no Médio Oriente em várias ocasiões, listaram o Hezbollah como grupo terrorista, tendo recentemente Israel apelado à União Europeia para seguir o exemplo dos Estados Unidos e incluir esta organização como grupo terrorista;

Pergunta-se à Vice-Presidente/Alta Representante:

1. Como interpreta este apelo de Israel à inclusão do Hezbollah nas listas de grupos terroristas?

2. Como vê a evolução da ação da União Europeia no Médio Oriente, nomeadamente no âmbito do conflito israelo-palestiniano?

3. Qual a principal aposta futura da União Europeia no âmbito das suas relações bilaterais?

Resposta dada pela Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente Catherine Ashton em nome da Comissão
(12 de abril de 2013)

A possibilidade de incluir o Hezbollah na lista da UE de organizações terroristas tem sido debatida pelos Estados-Membros em diversas ocasiões. Até à data, não foi obtido consenso sobre a questão entre os Estados-Membros da UE. Qualquer decisão de alteração da lista exige unanimidade.

No que respeita à evolução do processo de paz no Médio Oriente, a UE considera necessário reatar urgentemente negociações de fundo com vista a uma solução global para o conflito israelo-palestiniano. O termo do conflito é do máximo interesse para a UE e pode ser conseguido através de um acordo de paz global. A UE apela a ambas as Partes para que apliquem o mais rapidamente possível medidas de reforço da confiança, a fim de criarem um clima propício ao relançamento dos esforços de paz.

A UE e Israel gozam de uma relação bilateral forte e duradoura. Ambos se empenharam na execução de atividades no âmbito do plano de ação em curso, conforme mencionado nas reuniões do Comité de Associação de 2 de maio de 2012 e do Conselho de Associação de 24 de julho de 2012. Israel continua a beneficiar também de uma dotação anual através do Instrumento Europeu de Vizinhança e Parceria (IEVP), sob a forma de cooperação institucional (projetos de geminação). A UE comprometeu-se igualmente, conforme referido por ocasião da reunião do Conselho de Associação UE-Israel de junho de 2009 e confirmado por ocasião da reunião do Conselho de Associação de julho de 2012, a melhorar as relações bilaterais, desde que sejam preenchidas determinadas condições relacionadas com valores comuns e com o processo de paz.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001822/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Developments in EU-Israeli relations

Whereas:

The European Union and Israel have committed to establishing a partnership that aims to strengthen political ties and offer mutual international trade benefits, in addition to joint investment in economic, social, financial, scientific, technological and cultural cooperation;

The action plan concluded between the EU and Israel has given a new lease of life to this bilateral relationship through the gradual integration of Israel into EU policies and programmes;

For the first time there is an element of financial aid in the cooperation between the EU and Israel, as Israel is eligible for financial support in the order of EUR 14 million in the current multiannual financial framework;

Relations between the EU and Israel were renewed in 2007, in particular through the efforts of the international community, over the revitalisation of the quartet and the joint support of regional partners for peace and stability in the Middle East;

The United States, which has been the EU's transatlantic partner in joint action in the Middle East on several occasions, has listed Hezbollah as a terrorist group, and Israel has recently called on the EU to follow the example of the United States and also include the organisation as a terrorist group;

I ask the Vice-President/High Representative:

1. What is her interpretation of Israel's call to include Hezbollah in the lists of terrorist groups?

2. How does she view developments in the EU's activity in the Middle East, particularly in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?

3. What are the EU's principal plans for the future of its bilateral relationships?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(12 April 2013)

The possibility of including Hezbollah in the EU list of terrorist organisations has been discussed by Member States on a number of occasions. So far there has been no consensus among EU Member States. Any decision to amend the list requires unanimity.

Concerning developments in the Middle East Peace Process, the EU believes that an urgent resumption of substantive negotiations is needed aiming at a comprehensive solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Ending the conflict is a fundamental interest of the EU and it can be achieved through a comprehensive peace agreement. The EU calls on both parties to implement as soon as possible confidence-building measures so as to create an atmosphere conducive to the re-launching of peace efforts.

The EU and Israel enjoy a strong and enduring bilateral relationship. The EU and Israel are committed to implementing activities under the current Action Plan, as set out in the 2 May 2012 Association Committee and 24 July 2012 Association Council. Israel also continues to benefit from a yearly allocation through the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) in the form of institutional cooperation (twinning projects). The EU has also committed, as stated on the occasion of the June 2009 EU-Israel Association Council and confirmed on the occasion of the July 2012 Association Council, the intention to upgrading bilateral relations when certain conditions related to shared values and the peace process are met.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-001823/13
an die Kommission
Paul Rübig (PPE)
(20. Februar 2013)

Betrifft: Grenzüberschreitende Paketdienstleistungen

Im Jahr 1997 wurde die erste Postrichtlinie (RL 97/67/EG ABl. L 15 vom 21.1.1998, S. 14-25) beschlossen. In deren Art. 12 findet sich die Vorgabe, dass die Preise für Paketdienstleistungen insbesondere kostenorientiert gestaltet sein müssen. Im darauf folgenden Art. 13 der Richtlinie wird für grenzüberschreitende Universaldienstleistungen festgelegt, dass die Endvergütungen entsprechend den Kosten für Bearbeitung sowie Zustellung der eingehenden grenzüberschreitenden Postsendungen festzulegen sind.

Eine von uns Mitte Jänner 2013 überblicksartig durchgeführte Erhebung ergab, dass unverhältnismäßig hohe Preise für grenzüberschreitende Paketsendungen von der großen Mehrheit der Universaldienstleister verrechnet werden. Im Schnitt liegen die Preise für grenzüberschreitende Paketsendungen um das Drei- bis Vierfache über jenen für eine inländische Paketsendung, in Extremfällen beträgt dieser Faktor bis zum Zehnfachen. So kostet beispielsweise ein Brief in Österreich von Linz nach Wien 62 Cent und ein Brief von Wien nach Brüssel 70 Cent (Steigerung um 12,9 %). Demgegenüber kostet ein Paket (bis zu 8 kg) auf derselben Strecke im Inland 6,37 EUR, wohingegen dasselbe Paket von Wien nach Brüssel bereits 18,37 EUR (Steigerung um 188,3 %) kostet.

1. Sind die oben genannten Preisunterschiede zwischen inländischen und grenzüberschreitenden Paketsendungen auf eine kostenorientierte Preiskalkulation im Sinne der Richtlinie 97/67/EG zurückzuführen?

2. Sind nach Überzeugung der Europäischen Kommission die oben genannten Preisunterschiede gerechtfertigt? Wenn ja, wie wird dies begründet?

3. Sind die unterschiedlichen Preisniveaus für inländische und grenzüberschreitende Paketsendungen ein den Roaminggebühren vergleichbares Binnenmarkthindernis?

4. Welche Schritte werden vonseiten der Europäischen Kommission unternommen, um die unterschiedlichen Preisniveaus zu beseitigen und damit den Binnenmarkt zu stärken?

Antwort von Herrn Barnier im Namen der Kommission
(15. April 2013)

Preise für grenzüberschreitende Paketzustelldienste werden im Grünbuch „Ein integrierter Paketzustellungsmarkt für das Wachstum des elektronischen Handels in der EU“ ([1]) behandelt. Darin werden die Interessenträger aufgefordert, ihre Positionen bezüglich der Schaffung nachhaltiger grenzüberschreitender Paketzustelldienste, die der wachsenden Branche des elektronischen Handels gerecht werden, darzulegen. Dieses Thema wurde auch in der Mitteilung über den elektronischen Geschäftsverkehr ([2]) aufgegriffen. Vor diesem Hintergrund möchte die Kommission folgende Klarstellungen vornehmen:

Die Artikel 12 und 13 der Postrichtlinie gelten nur für postalische Universaldienstleistungen. Gegenwärtig fallen nur ca. 10 % der gesamten Paketzustelldienste unter die Anforderungen dieser beiden Artikel. Die verbleibenden 90 % unterliegen somit den Gesetzen des Marktes.

Jegliche Rechtfertigungen von Preisunterschieden müssten daher im Rahmen des geltenden EU-Rechts beurteilt werden: Postalische Universaldienstleistungen müssen den Artikeln 12 und 13 der Postrichtlinie entsprechen. Paketdienste, die nicht unter die Universaldienstverpflichtungen fallen, unterliegen Wettbewerbsregeln, und zwar insbesondere dem Artikel 102 AEUV.

Die öffentliche Konsultation zum Grünbuch wurde kürzlich geschlossen und die Antworten werden gegenwärtig von den Kommissionsdienststellen analysiert. Die Kommission analysiert mit Interessenträgern verschiedene Möglichkeiten, um die Leistungsfähigkeit der Paketzustelldienste insgesamt zu stärken und einer größeren Zahl von Online-Einzelhändlern den Eintritt in die Branche des elektronischen Handels zu ermöglichen.

([1]) KOM(2012)698 endg.
([2]) KOM(2011)942 endg.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001823/13
to the Commission
Paul Rübig (PPE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Cross-border parcel postal services

The first directive on postal services (Directive 97/67/EC, OJ L15, 21.1.1998, p. 14) was adopted in 1997. Article 12 of that directive stipulates that prices for parcel services in particular must be geared to costs, and Article 13, which deals with cross-border universal services, stipulates that terminal dues must be fixed in relation to the costs of processing and delivering incoming cross-border mail.

A brief survey carried out in mid-January 2013 revealed that most universal service providers levy disproportionately high charges for cross-border parcel deliveries (three or four times, and in extreme cases up to 10 times, the cost of domestic parcel deliveries). For example, posting a letter from Linz to Vienna in Austria costs 62 eurocents, whereas posting one from Vienna to Brussels costs 70 eurocents (12.9% more). The corresponding figures for parcels weighing up to 8 kg are EUR 6.37 and EUR 18.37 (188.3% more).

1. Can the price disparities between domestic and cross-border deliveries outlined above be traced back to the requirement laid down in Directive 97/67/EC to gear prices to costs?

2. Are the price disparities referred to above justified? If so, on what basis?

3. Are disparities in charges for domestic and cross-border parcel deliveries an obstacle to the development of the internal market in the same way as disproportionate roaming charges?

4. What steps is the Commission taking to eliminate these price disparities and thus strengthen the internal market?

Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission
(15 April 2013)

Tariffs for cross-border parcel delivery services are an issue addressed in the Green Paper 'An integrated parcel delivery market for the growth of e-commerce in the EU' ([1]) which invites stakeholders to give their views on how to best create a sustainable cross-border parcel delivery service to meet the growing e-commerce sector. This issue was also reported in the E-Commerce Communication ([2]). Against this background, the Commission would like to provide the following clarifications:

Articles 12 and 13 of the Postal Services Directive only apply to universal postal services. Currently only ca. 10% of the overall parcel delivery services actually fall under the requirements set out in these two articles. In effect, the remaining 90% are subject to market forces.

Any justification of the price disparities would therefore need to be assessed in the context of the applicable EC law: universal postal services have to comply with Articles 12 and 13 of the Postal Services Directive. Parcel services falling outside the scope of the universal service obligations are subject to competition rules, notably Article 102 of the TFEU.

The public consultation linked to the Green Paper has just been closed and the replies are currently being analysed by the Commission services. Together with stakeholders, the Commission is now looking into a range of possible options to enhance the overall performance of parcel delivery services and to enable more e-retailers to enter the e-commerce sector.

([1]) COM(2012) 698 final.
([2]) COM(2011) 942 final.

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001824/13
a la Comisión
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)
(20 de febrero de 2013)

Asunto: Acceso nulo al vestíbulo para las personas con movilidad reducida en la estación ferroviaria Sabadell-Centre

Según denuncia el *Síndic de Greuges*, la estación ferroviaria Sabadell-Centre, operada por Renfe-Rodalies y cuyo propietario es Adif (Administrador de Infraestructuras Ferroviarias), no tiene adaptados los accesos para personas con movilidad reducida. Cabe resaltar que la citada estación es usada diariamente por más de 11 000 personas.

En el año 2011, Adif comunicó al *Departament de Territori i Sostenibilitat* del Gobierno catalán que había finalizado la redacción del proyecto de construcción para remodelar y adaptar de manera integral todos los accesos en la estación y poder así ser utilizada sin discriminación alguna.

Teniendo en cuenta el *European Accesibility Act* ([1]), la Estrategia 2010-2020 ([2]), y la lucha contra la discriminación:

1. ¿Piensa la Comisión que actuaciones como la remodelación y adaptación de las estaciones de tren para las personas con movilidad reducida, como la de Sabadell-Centre, con más de 11 000 usuarios diarios, deberían ser una prioridad en materia de inversiones ferroviarias?

2. Teniendo en cuenta el Semestre Europeo y el Marco Financiero Plurianual, ¿piensa recomendar la Comisión, siempre respetando el principio de subsidiariedad, al Reino de España que haga cuanto pueda para solucionar este grave perjuicio para las personas con movilidad reducida?

3. ¿Piensa la Comisión que los Fondos de Cohesión europeos deberían revertir de manera primordial en la lucha contra la discriminación y en la mejora de la cohesión social?

Respuesta de la Sra. Reding en nombre de la Comisión
(15 de abril de 2013)

1. y 2. La eliminación de los obstáculos a la accesibilidad de las personas con discapacidad, inclusive en el transporte, es una obligación en virtud de la Convención sobre los derechos de las personas con discapacidad, en la que España es parte.

Esta obligación es de carácter evolutivo y está relacionada con la disponibilidad de recursos. La fijación de prioridades incumbe a España.

La Comisión presentó en 2008 una propuesta de Directiva sobre la igualdad de trato relativa, entre otras cosas, a las personas con discapacidad y que aborda también en concreto la cuestión del transporte. Esta propuesta se está debatiendo en el Consejo. Hasta su adopción, la discriminación de las personas con discapacidad a la hora de acceder al transporte ferroviario compete a los Estados.

3. La política de cohesión puede desempeñar un papel en la lucha contra la discriminación y el fomento de la integración social, tal como se refleja en la propuesta de nuevo Reglamento sobre la política de cohesión 2014-2020, especialmente su artículo 7. La accesibilidad para las personas con discapacidad se contempla en los artículos sobre la programación, la ejecución y el seguimiento.

En el marco de las prioridades de inversión del FEDER dentro del objetivo temático 9 «Promover la inclusión social y luchar contra la pobreza» se pueden formular varias medidas a fin de mejorar la integración de las personas con discapacidad, tales como la mejora de la accesibilidad al entorno edificado.

([1]) http://www.euractiv.com/socialeurope/eu-disability-strategy-help-80-c-news-499775
([2]) http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-10-578_en.htm?locale=en

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001824/13
to the Commission
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Lack of access to the Sabadell-Centre train station waiting area for persons with reduced mobility

According to the *Síndic de Greuges*, the Sabadell-Centre train station, operated by Renfe-Rodalies and owned by Adif (Spanish railway infrastructure manager), is not adapted for use by persons with reduced mobility. It should be noted that this train station is used by more than 11 000 people on a daily basis.

In 2011, Adif informed the *Departament de Territori i Sostenibilitat* of the Government of Catalonia that it had finalised the construction plans to fully remodel and adapt all station access routes to enable the station to be used by everyone, without discrimination.

Bearing in mind the European Accessibility Act ([1]), the European Disability Strategy 2010-2020 ([2]), and the fight against discrimination:

1. Does the Commission believe that action like the remodelling and adaptation for use by persons with reduced mobility of train stations such as the Sabadell-Centre, used by over 11 000 passengers a day, should constitute a priority when investing in the railways?

2. Bearing in mind the European Semester and the multiannual financial framework, does the Commission intend to recommend, while respecting the principle of subsidiarity, that the Kingdom of Spain do everything in its power to rectify this serious discrimination against persons with reduced mobility?

3. Does the Commission believe that European cohesion funds should be used essentially to combat discrimination and to improve social cohesion?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(15 April 2013)

1 and 2. The removal of barriers for accessibility for person with disabilities *inter alia* on transport is an obligation under the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to which Spain is a party.

This obligation is of progressive nature and relates to availability of resources. Priority setting is a matter for Spain.

The Commission issued in 2008 a proposal for a directive on the equal treatment *inter alia* of persons with Disabilities *inter alia* in transport. This proposal is under discussion in Council. Until the adoption, discrimination of persons with disabilities in accessing rail transport is a matter of national competences.

3. Cohesion Policy can play a role in combating discrimination and promoting social inclusion as reflected in the proposal for the new regulation on Cohesion policy 2014-2020, especially in Article 7. Accessibility for disabled persons is embedded in the articles on programming, implementation and monitoring.

In the investment priorities for the ERDF under Thematic objective 9 'promoting social inclusion and combating poverty' several measures can be designed in order to improve the inclusion of disabled persons, such as improving the accessibility of built environment.

([1]) http://www.euractiv.com/socialeurope/eu-disability-strategy-help-80-c-news-499775
([2]) http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-10-578_en.htm?locale=en

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001825/13
a la Comisión
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)
(20 de febrero de 2013)

Asunto: Accidentes mortales cada semana y peligrosidad de la carretera N-II (España). Prohibición de la circulación de camiones por esta vía. Directiva 2008/96/CE de 2008

En el mes de febrero de 2013 se han producido 3 muertos por accidentes de tráfico en la carretera N-II a la altura del pueblo de La Jonquera, cerca de la frontera francesa. En 2012, el Consejo Comarcal de La Selva (Girona, España) denunció al Ministerio de Fomento ante la Fiscalía por la vía penal como responsable de las muertes producidas en la carretera N-II, a su paso por las comarcas gerundenses, al considerar que existe una relación causa-efecto por el mal estado y los múltiples accidentes de tráfico que acumula esta vía ([1]).

A pesar de ser una de las más transitadas del Estado, con 30 000 vehículos diarios, y con más víctimas mortales, el Ministerio de Fomento de los diferentes gobiernos españoles no ha desdoblado la carretera en las comarcas de Girona, a excepción de ocho kilómetros entre Caldes de Malavella y Riudellots de La Selva ([2]). En esta carretera, a su paso por la provincia de Girona, mueren una media de 19 personas al año en accidentes de tráfico. Se tiene constancia de que más de 70 personas han muerto en los últimos cuatro años en esta vía ([3]) ([4]).

La Directiva 2008/96/CE, de 19 de noviembre de 2008, pretendía introducir un sistema integral de gestión de la seguridad de las infraestructuras viarias. En particular, los Estados miembros tienen que hacer una «clasificación de las secciones de alta concentración de accidentes: un método para identificar, analizar y clasificar los tramos de la red de carreteras que han estado en funcionamiento durante más de tres años y en el que un gran número de accidentes mortales en proporción con el flujo de tráfico se han producido…».

Esa Directiva impone a los Estados miembros que «la seguridad debe integrarse en todas las fases de planificación, diseño y operación de la infraestructura vial. Debe considerarse por derecho…» Los Estados miembros también tienen que «aplicar las disposiciones de la Directiva a la infraestructura nacional de transporte por carretera que no se incluye en la red transeuropea de carreteras…». A la luz de lo anterior:

1. ¿Está la Comisión al corriente de la existencia de este tramo peligroso de carretera? ¿Ha comunicado España estos datos a la UE?

2. ¿Piensa la Comisión que la prohibición de la circulación de camiones por esta carretera puede ser una solución a estos accidentes y muertes continuas?

3. ¿Piensa la Comisión que España y el Ministerio de Fomento están cumpliendo con las disposiciones de la Directiva 2008/96/CE de 2008?

Respuesta del Sr. Kallas en nombre de la Comisión
(2 de abril de 2013)

1) La Comisión desea señalar que el artículo 5 de la Directiva 2008/96/CE, sobre gestión de la seguridad de las infraestructuras viarias ([5]), no obliga a los Estados miembros a comunicar datos sobre las carreteras más peligrosas de su sección de la Red Transeuropea de Transporte. La Comisión no dispone de esos datos sobre España.

2) La UE no tiene atribuciones en materia de código de la circulación, por lo que la prohibición de la circulación de camiones por ciertas carreteras compete exclusivamente a los Estados miembros.

3) España ha incorporado íntegramente la Directiva 2008/96/CE en el ordenamiento jurídico nacional e implantado todos los procedimientos previstos por la Directiva.

([1]) http://www.lavanguardia.com/local/girona/20121001/54351426883/girona-selva-consell-comarcal-denuncia-fomento-muertes-n-ii.html
([2]) http://www.elperiodico.com/es/noticias/sociedad/veto-camiones-n-2-empieza-por-aragon-2307844
([3]) http://www.lavanguardia.com/local/girona/20130204/54365066654/bascara-vecinos-cortaran-n-ii-mientras-pasen-camiones.html
([4]) http://www.lavanguardia.com/local/girona/20130213/54366676449/girona-estado-anuncia-desdoblar-tramo-n-ii-medinya-orriols.html
([5]) Directiva 2008/96/CE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 19 de noviembre de 2008, sobre gestión de la seguridad de las infraestructuras viarias (DO L 319 de 29.11.2008).

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001825/13
to the Commission
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Fatal accidents every week and hazardous nature of road N-II (Spain) — Ban on lorries travelling on the road — Directive 2008/96/EC of 2008

In February 2013 there were three deaths in traffic accidents on road N-II at the town of La Jonquera, near the French border. In 2012, the regional council of La Selva (in Girona, Spain) referred the Ministry for Public Works to the Public Prosecutor's Office, alleging criminal responsibility for deaths on road N-II where it passes through the regions of Girona, taking the view that there is a causal relationship between the bad condition of the road and the many traffic accidents occurring on it ([1]).

Although the road is one of the most heavily used in the State, with 30 000 vehicles a day, and has the most fatalities, the Ministry for Public Works under various Spanish Governments has not widened the road in the Girona regions, except for eight kilometres between Caldes de Malavella and Riudellots de La Selva ([2]). As it passes through the province of Girona, on average 19 people die on the road every year in traffic accidents. Reports state that over 70 people have died in the last 4 years on this road ([3])([4]).

Directive 2008/96/EC of 19 November 2008 set out to introduce an integrated system for road infrastructure safety management. Specifically, Member States must carry out a 'ranking of high accident concentration sections: a method to identify, analyse and rank sections of the road network which have been in operation for more than three years and upon which a large number of fatal accidents in proportion to the traffic flow have occurred …'.

The directive requires Member States to take safety into account at all stages of the planning, design and operation of road infrastructure. It must automatically be taken into account. Member States must also 'apply the provisions of the directive to national road transport infrastructure, not included in the trans-European road network …'. In view of this:

1. Is the Commission aware of the existence of this dangerous section of road? Has Spain notified these data to the EU?

2. Does the Commission think that banning lorry traffic on this road could be a solution to the constant accidents and deaths?

3. Does the Commission think that Spain and the Ministry for Public Works are complying with the provisions of Directive 2008/96/EC of 2008?

Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission
(2 April 2013)

1. The Commission wishes to point out that Article 5 of Directive 2008/96/EC on road safety infrastructure management ([5]), does not establish an obligation for Member States to transmit data on the most dangerous roads in their section of the TEN-T. The Commission does not have such data for Spain.

2. The EU has no competence on traffic rules, including banning lorries from certain routes, which is an issue of exclusive national competence.

3. Spain fully transposed Directive 2008/96/EC and set up all the procedures established by Directive.

([1]) http://www.lavanguardia.com/local/girona/20121001/54351426883/girona-selva-consell-comarcal-denuncia-fomento-muertes-n-ii.html
([2]) http://www.elperiodico.com/es/noticias/sociedad/veto-camiones-n-2-empieza-por-aragon-2307844.
([3]) http://www.lavanguardia.com/local/girona/20130204/54365066654/bascara-vecinos-cortaran-n-ii-mientras-pasen-camiones.html
([4]) http://www.lavanguardia.com/local/girona/20130213/54366676449/girona-estado-anuncia-desdoblar-tramo-n-ii-medinya-orriols.html
([5]) Directive 2008/96/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on road infrastructure safety management, OJ L 319, 29.11.2008.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-001827/13
an die Kommission
Jorgo Chatzimarkakis (ALDE) und Frank Engel (PPE)
(20. Februar 2013)

Betrifft: Ausfuhrverbot für Arzneimittel in Griechenland

Nach den kürzlichen Preissenkungen in Griechenland weigern sich internationale Pharmaunternehmen, griechische Großhändler mit Arzneimitteln zu beliefern. Die betreffenden Unternehmen liefern derzeit lediglich ein Fünftel der Arzneimittel, die sie den Großhändlern vor drei Jahren geliefert haben. Darüber hinaus haben die griechischen Arzneimittelbehörden und das Gesundheitsministerium vier Ausfuhrverbote für Arzneimittel verhängt, und noch immer weigern sich die Pharmaunternehmen, selbst diejenigen Arzneimittel zu liefern, die mit einem Ausfuhrverbot belegt worden sind.

Dieser Ansatz verstößt gegen die Entscheidung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs, nach der Pharmaunternehmen verpflichtet sind, „regelmäßige Mengen" an Arzneimitteln zu liefern. Darüber hinaus haben die staatlichen Behörden die griechischen Großhändler im Januar 2012 verpflichtet, die Etiketten von sämtlichen Arzneimittelkartons zu entfernen und sie den staatlichen Behörden auszuhändigen. Gemäß der Richtlinie 2011/62/EU betreffend gefälschte Arzneimittel stellt diese Praxis einen weiteren Verstoß gegen EU-Rechtsvorschriften dar.

Der Wert der parallelen Ausfuhren in Griechenland beläuft sich auf 500 Mio. EUR. Die laufenden Praktiken in Griechenland zerstören die Branche. Die Verhinderung paralleler Ausfuhren aus Griechenland würde bedeuten, dass 120 Arzneimittel-Großhändler ihre Tätigkeit einstellen müssten, und hierbei würden 8 000 Personen ihre Arbeit verlieren.

Hat die Kommission von diesen Praktiken in Griechenland, die gegen die EU-Rechtsvorschriften über den freien Warenverkehr verstößen, Kenntnis?

Die Entfernung der Etiketten von Arzneimittelkartons verstößt gegen die Richtlinie 2011/62/EU, da Großhändler verpflichtet werden, gefälschte Arzneimittel auszuführen. Welche Maßnahmen gedenkt die Kommission zu ergreifen, um die EU-Rechtsvorschriften in Griechenland durchzusetzen und sicherzustellen, dass durch parallelen Handel bei Arzneimitteln eine starke Marktbeteiligung bestehen bleibt?

Antwort von Herrn Tajani im Namen der Kommission
(24. April 2013)

Nach Eingang einer Beschwerde zu diesem Thema prüft die Kommission derzeit die damit zusammenhängenden Rechtsfragen, insbesondere einen möglichen Verstoß gegen Artikel 34 bis 36 AEUV über den freien Warenverkehr und die Richtlinie 2001/83/EG ([1]), einschließlich der mit der Richtlinie 2011/62/EU ([2]) eingeführten Änderungen.

Vor Abschluss der Bewertung wird die Kommission auch den Mitgliedstaat um zusätzliche Erläuterungen bitten. Sollte sich der Verstoß gegen die obengenannten Vorschriften bestätigen, kann die Kommission beschließen, ein Vertragsverletzungsverfahren zu eröffnen.

Was den angeblichen Verstoß gegen das Urteil des Gerichtshofs angeht, dem zufolge Pharmaunternehmen verpflichtet sind, „regelmäßige Mengen" an Arzneimitteln zu liefern (Rechtssache *Lelos* ([3])), sowie den möglichen Verstoß internationaler Pharmaunternehmen gegen Artikel 102, so wird im Rahmen der Untersuchung geprüft werden, ob die Weigerung, regelmäßige Mengen zu liefern, auf einer einseitigen und unabhängigen Entscheidung dieser Unternehmen beruht. In diesem Zusammenhang fordert die Kommission Marktteilnehmer mit legitimem Interesse auf, bei der zuständigen Behörde Beschwerde einzulegen.

([1]) ABl. L 311 vom 28.11.2001, S. 67.
([2]) ABl. L 174 vom 1.7.2011, S. 74.
([3]) Urteil des Gerichtshofs der EU vom 16. September 2008, verbundene Rechtssachen C-468/06 bis 478/06.

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-001827/13
à la Commission
Jorgo Chatzimarkakis (ALDE) et Frank Engel (PPE)
(20 février 2013)

Objet: Interdiction de l'exportation de certains médicaments en Grèce

À la suite des récentes baisses de prix décidées en Grèce, des entreprises pharmaceutiques internationales refusent de fournir les grossistes grecs en médicaments. Ces entreprises ne fournissent désormais plus qu'un cinquième des produits qu'ils vendaient habituellement à ces grossistes, il y a trois ans. Parallèlement, les autorités nationales grecques compétentes en matière de médicaments et le ministère de la santé ont édicté quatre interdictions d'exportation, et malgré tout, les entreprises pharmaceutiques persistent dans leur refus de fournir même les produits qui ont été interdits d'exportation.

Cette approche est contraire à la décision de la Cour européenne de justice selon laquelle les entreprises pharmaceutiques sont obligées de fournir des «quantités normales» de médicaments. En outre, en janvier 2012, les autorités publiques ont obligé les grossistes grecs à retirer les étiquettes de toutes les boîtes de médicaments et à les leur remettre. Selon la directive 2011/62/EU portant sur les médicaments falsifiés, cette pratique constitue une nouvelle infraction au droit européen.

Les exportations parallèles sont de l'ordre de 500 millions d'euros en Grèce. Les pratiques en cours en Grèce détruisent le secteur. Empêcher les exportations parallèles à partir de la Grèce se solderait pas la fermeture de 120 grossistes en produits pharmaceutiques, et par la même occasion, par la perte de 8 000 emplois.

La Commission est-elle au courant de ces pratiques qui sont en cours en Grèce, qui enfreignent la législation européenne relative à la libre circulation des marchandises?

Imposer le retrait des étiquettes des boîtes de médicaments revient à enfreindre la directive 2011/62/EU en obligeant les grossistes à exporter des médicaments falsifiés. Quelles actions la Commission compte-elle entreprendre afin de garantir le respect du droit européen en Grèce et assurer que le commerce parallèle de médicaments permet de préserver une forte participation au marché?

Réponse donnée par M. Tajani au nom de la Commission
(24 avril 2013)

À la suite de l'enregistrement d'une plainte concernant l'affaire en objet, la Commission est en train d'évaluer les problèmes juridiques qui se posent, dont d'éventuelles violations des articles 34 à 36 du TFUE sur la libre circulation des marchandises et des dispositions de la directive 2001/83/CE ([1]), parmi lesquelles les modifications introduites par la directive 2011/62/UE ([2]).

Avant d'achever cette évaluation, la Commission prendra aussi contact avec l'État membre pour obtenir des explications supplémentaires. S'il était avéré que les dispositions susmentionnées ont été violées, la Commission pourrait décider d'engager une procédure d'infraction.

Pour ce qui est de la violation alléguée, la décision de la Cour européenne de justice selon laquelle les compagnies pharmaceutiques sont obligées de fournir des «quantités normales» de médicaments (affaire Lelos ([3])), d'une part, et de l'éventuelle contravention à l'article 102 par des entreprises pharmaceutiques internationales, d'autre part, il s'agira également de savoir, dans le cadre de l'enquête, si le refus de fournir des quantités normales est une décision unilatérale prise en toute indépendance par ces compagnies. À cet égard, la Commission invite les acteurs du marché justifiant d'un intérêt légitime à porter plainte auprès de l'autorité compétente.

([1]) JO L311 du 28.11.2001, p. 67.
([2]) JO L174 du 1.7.2011, p. 74.
([3]) Arrêt de la CJUE du 16 septembre 2008 et affaires jointes C-468/06 à C-478/06.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001827/13
to the Commission
Jorgo Chatzimarkakis (ALDE) and Frank Engel (PPE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Export bans on medicinal products in Greece

Following the recent price cuts in Greece, international pharmaceutical companies are refusing to supply medicinal products to Greek wholesalers. These companies now supply only one fifth of the products that they used to sell to wholesalers three years ago. Also, the Greek drug authorities and the Ministry of Health have issued four export bans on medicinal products, yet the pharmaceutical companies still refuse to supply even the products that have been placed under an export ban.

This approach infringes the decision of the European Court of Justice according to which the pharmaceutical companies are obliged to supply 'regular quantities' of medicinal products. Moreover, in January 2012 the public authorities obliged Greek wholesalers to remove the labels from all medicinal product boxes and hand them over to the public authorities. According to Directive 2011/62/EU regarding falsified medicinal products, this practice constitutes another infringement of EC law.

Parallel exports in Greece amount to EUR 500 million. The ongoing practices in Greece are destroying this sector. Preventing parallel exports from Greece would mean that 120 pharmaceutical wholesalers will have to close down, thereby leaving 8 000 people unemployed.

Is the Commission aware of these practices in Greece, which infringe European legislation regarding the free movement of goods?

Removing the labels from medicine boxes breaches Directive 2011/62/EU by obliging wholesalers to export falsified medicines. What action does the Commission intend to take in order to enforce EC law in Greece and ensure that parallel trade in medicinal products maintains strong market participation?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission
(24 April 2013)

Following registration of a complaint on the subject matter, the Commission is currently assessing the legal issues raised, notably of potential violations of Articles 34-36 TFEU on free movement of goods and of Directive 2001/83/EC ([1]), including the amendments carried out by Directive 2011/62/EU ([2]).

Before concluding its assessment, the Commission will also contact the Member State for further clarifications. Should the violation of the mentioned provisions be confirmed, the Commission may decide to start infringement proceedings.

With regards to the alleged infringement of the Court ruling according to which the pharmaceutical companies are obliged to supply 'regular quantities' of medicinal products (Lelos case law ([3])) and the possible infringement of Article 102 by international pharmaceutical companies, it will also be examined in the course of the investigation whether the refusal to supply regular quantities is a unilateral and autonomous decisions of those companies. In this respect, the Commission invites market players having a legitimate interest to submit a complaint to the competent authority.

([1]) OJ L311, 28.11.2001, p. 67.
([2]) OJ L174, 01.07.2011, p. 74.
([3]) CJEU judgment of 16 September 2008, and related cases C-468/06 to C-478/06.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-001828/13
aan de Commissie
Marietje Schaake (ALDE)
(20 februari 2013)

Betreft: Zelfregulering van online en digitale diensten

Op 19 februari 2013 werd bericht dat Google en een aantal online betaaldiensten samenwerkten om betalingen te blokkeren aan sites die „door piraterij verkregen" materiaal aanbieden ([1]).

Google en de online betaaldiensten in kwestie hebben een beduidend marktaandeel in de EU.

Er kan een trend richting grotere zelfregulering worden waargenomen in de informatiegemeenschap en met betrekking tot online en digitale diensten. Daarnaast moedigt de Commissie zelf bepaalde „zelfregulerende" oplossingen aan.

Heeft de Commissie zulke zelfreguleringsovereenkomsten gezien of is zij daarvan in kennis gesteld?

Is zij van mening dat zelfregulering van deze of vergelijkbare aard verstrekkende, en ook ongewenste, gevolgen kan hebben? Zo niet, waarom niet?

Kan de Commissie een overzicht geven van EU-beleid en -praktijken inzake de digitale agenda, waarin sprake is van zelfregulering? Zo niet, waarom niet?

Is zij bereid een (scenario)studie uit te voeren naar de voordelen, risico's en mogelijke gevolgen van meer zelfregulering? Zo niet, waarom niet?

Heeft de Commissie een plan om de grenzen van zelfregulering duidelijk af te bakenen waarbij tegelijkertijd het democratisch toezicht gewaarborgd blijft en de privatisering van politie en justitie voorkomen wordt, met betrekking tot de handhaving van intellectuele eigendomsrechten en andere online diensten? Zo niet, waarom niet?

Antwoord van mevrouw Kroes namens de Commissie
(15 april 2013)

De Commissie is op de hoogte van verschillende vrijwillige overeenkomsten met betrekking tot digitale diensten tussen belanghebbenden, zowel binnen de Unie als in derde landen. In dit verband moet een onderscheid worden gemaakt tussen zelfregulering en de praktijk in de sector.

Wanneer zelfreguleringsinitiatieven door de belanghebbenden worden opgestart, zijn de overheidsinstanties van de betrokken lidstaten daar tot op zekere hoogte bij betrokken. Op EU-niveau hebben zowel het Europees Parlement als de Raad hun steun uitgesproken voor dergelijke samenwerkingsinitiatieven ([2]). De Commissie wil zelfreguleringsinitiatieven actief aanmoedigen en bevorderen, onder meer op gebieden die verband houden met de Digitale Agenda voor Europa, zoals de onlineverkoop van namaakgoederen of de bescherming van minderjarigen.

In 2012 is de Commissie een overlegproces ([3]) met de belanghebbenden begonnen om een gedragscode voor zelf- en mederegulering op te stellen. Dit heeft geleid tot een lijst van beginselen voor betere zelf- en mederegulering ([4]).

([1]) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-21505060.
([2]) Resolutie van de Raad van 1 maart 2010 over versterkte handhaving van intellectuele-eigendomsrechten in de interne markt, PB C 56 van 6.3.2010, blz. 1.
Resolutie van het Europees Parlement van 22 september 2010 over versterkte handhaving van intellectuele-eigendomsrechten in de interne markt.
([3]) Mededeling van de Commissie aan het Europees Parlement, de Raad, het Europees Economisch en Sociaal Comité en het Comité van de Regio's, Een vernieuwde EU-strategie 2011-2014 ter bevordering van maatschappelijk verantwoord ondernemen, COM(2011) 681 definitief, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0681:FIN:nl:PDF.
([4]) https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/news/principles-better-self-and-co-regulation-and-establishment-community-practice.

Meer in het algemeen is zelfregulering een van de opties die de Commissie in haar effectbeoordelingen bij wetgevingsvoorstellen. Deze beoordelingen verschaffen de Commissie tijdens haar besluitvormingsproces informatie over de voor- en nadelen van verschillende beleidsmaatregelen. Zelf- of medereguleringsinitiatieven doen geen afbreuk aan het initiatiefrecht van de Commissie.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001828/13
to the Commission
Marietje Schaake (ALDE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Self-regulation of online and digital services

On 19 February 2013, it was reported that Google and some online payment services were cooperating to stop payments to sites offering 'pirated' material ([1]).

Google and the online payment services in question have a significant market share in the EU.

A trend to increased self-regulation can be observed in the information society and with regard to online and digital services. Additionally, the Commission itself encourages certain 'self-regulated' solutions.

Has the Commission observed or been notified of any such self-regulation agreements?

Does it believe that self-regulation of this or a similar nature can have far-reaching consequences, including undesirable ones? If not, why not?

Can the Commission provide an overview of EU policies and practices related to the digital agenda that include self-regulation? If not, why not?

Is it willing to do a (scenario) study of the benefits, risks and possible consequences of increased self-regulation? If not, why not?

Does the Commission have a plan to clearly identify the boundaries of self-regulation, while ensuring democratic oversight and preventing the privatisation of policing and law enforcement, with regard to intellectual property rights enforcement and other online services? If not, why not?

Answer given by Ms Kroes on behalf of the Commission
(15 April 2013)

The Commission is aware of several voluntary agreements made by stakeholders, both within the Union and within third countries concerning digital services. Self-regulation and industry practice should, in this view, be distinguished.

In cases where self-regulatory initiatives are undertaken by stakeholders themselves, the public authorities of the Member States concerned are to a certain extent involved. At EU level, both the European Parliament and the Council expressed support for such cooperative approaches ([2]). The Commission is actively encouraging and facilitating self-regulatory initiatives, including in fields related to the Digital Agenda for Europe such as the online sale of counterfeits or the protection of minors.

In 2012, the Commission launched a consultation process ([3]) with stakeholders to develop a code of good practice for self- and co-regulation exercises. This has led to the drafting of principles for better self- and co-regulation ([4]).

More generally, self-regulation is one of the options the Commission considers when preparing its impact assessments for legislative proposals. The latter serve to inform the Commission in its decision making process on the advantages and disadvantages of alternative policies. Self- or co-regulation initiatives do not prejudice the Commission's right of initiative.

([1]) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-21505060.
([2]) Council Resolution of 1 March 2010 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights in the internal market, OJ C 56, 6.3.2010, p.1 European Parliament Resolution of 22 September 2010 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights in the internal market.
([3]) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A renewed EU strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social Responsibility, COM(2011) 681 final, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0681:FIN:EN:PDF
([4]) https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/news/principles-better-self-and-co-regulation-and-establishment-community-practice

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001829/13
alla Commissione
Mario Borghezio (EFD)
(20 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: Intervento dell'UE sul contrabbando di tabacchi nella regione di Kaliningrad

Da fonti convergenti risulta ancora molto consistente e preoccupante il flusso di contrabbando di tabacchi lavorati nella regione di Kaliningrad (enclave russa situata tra Polonia e Lituania) dove, grazie a stratagemmi di trasporto sofisticati e ai bambini che fanno da «pali», i contrabbandieri sono in grado di dileguarsi nel giro di pochi minuti e farla franca. Gli insegnanti della zona, inoltre, hanno riferito che alcuni alunni ricevono chiamate addirittura in classe, si alzano dal banco e vanno a fare da palo.

Gli adolescenti ingaggiati sorvegliano le strade e tengono d'occhio i movimenti delle guardie di frontiera, segnalandone gli spostamenti ai contrabbandieri grazie a cellulari procurati da questi ultimi. In seguito, un'automobile raccoglie tutti i ragazzi e li accompagna a casa.

Il lavoro di «palo» è retribuito fino a 100 litas (28 euro). Portare una cassa piena di sigarette dalla riva del fiume a un'automobile rende ancora di più. Anche se i benefici devono essere spartiti tra tante persone, i trafficanti possono permettersi queste spese perché a Kaliningrad un pacchetto di sigarette costa 2,5 litas circa (70 centesimi di euro), mentre in Lituania costa quasi il triplo (6,5 litas, pari a 1,90 euro).

Intende la Commissione intervenire contro il contrabbando in questa regione che potrebbe poi presumibilmente estendersi al resto dell'UE?

Come intende intervenire anche a tutela dei minori ingaggiati dai contrabbandieri?

Risposta di Algirdas Šemeta a nome della Commissione
(26 aprile 2013)

La lotta contro le forme gravi di criminalità organizzata viene affrontata nell'ambito del programma di Stoccolma, del relativo piano d'azione ([1]) e della strategia di sicurezza interna dell'UE ([2]), che ha definito azioni mirate riguardanti il potenziamento della sicurezza attraverso la gestione delle frontiere.

Uno dei fenomeni criminali più diffusi al confine orientale consiste nel contrabbando di merci fortemente tassate, soprattutto sigarette, che comporta significative perdite di entrate per l'UE e i suoi Stati membri. Il problema viene affrontato attraverso il piano d'azione contro il contrabbando del 2011 ([3]). La Commissione intende altresì pubblicare una nuova strategia globale dell'UE volta a intensificare gli sforzi per contrastare il contrabbando di sigarette, questione che sarà trattata come fenomeno generale. La relativa comunicazione dovrebbe essere adottata nel giugno 2013.

Nel corso degli ultimi anni l'UE ha messo a punto diversi meccanismi per garantire un'applicazione armonizzata dei controlli doganali alle frontiere esterne degli Stati membri, come le modifiche del codice doganale ([4]) che introducono un obbligo generale di legge in particolare per basare i controlli doganali sull'analisi dei rischi ([5]).

Per quanto riguarda la circolazione delle persone attraverso le frontiere, nel luglio 2012 sono entrate in vigore nuove norme intese ad agevolare il traffico frontaliero locale fra Kaliningrad e la Polonia. La Commissione intende pubblicare quest'anno una relazione sull'applicazione e sull'impatto di tali nuove norme.

I problemi della criminalità transnazionale sono trattati anche nella sezione 3 delle misure comuni verso l'abolizione del visto per i viaggi di breve durata dei cittadini russi e dell'UE ([6]).

([1]) http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/documents/preventing-fraud-documents/eastern_border_action_plan_en.pdf
([2]) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0673:FIN:EN:PDF#page=2.
([3]) http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/documents/preventing-fraud-documents/eastern_border_action_plan_en.pdf
([4]) Regolamento (CE) n. 648/2005 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio che modifica il regolamento (CEE) n. 2913/92 del Consiglio che istituisce un codice doganale comunitario, e regolamento (CE) n. 1875/2006 della Commissione che fissa talune disposizioni d'applicazione del regolamento (CEE) n. 2913/92 del Consiglio che istituisce il codice doganale comunitario.
([5]) Decisione della Commissione C(2009)2601.
([6]) Approvate nel dicembre 2011 e pubblicate l'11.3.2013, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/russia/docs/common_steps_towards_visa_free_short_term_travel_en.pdf

Tutti gli Stati membri hanno ratificato la convenzione delle Nazioni Unite sui diritti dell'infanzia. Nell'attuazione del diritto dell'UE, tutti gli Stati membri devono rispettare la Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell'Unione europea, compreso l'articolo 24 sui diritti del bambino.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001829/13
to the Commission
Mario Borghezio (EFD)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: EU action on tobacco smuggling in the Kaliningrad region

Many sources concur in reporting that the flow of smuggled tobacco products manufactured in the Kaliningrad region (a Russian enclave between Poland and Lithuania) is becoming increasingly large-scale and worrying. There, thanks to sophisticated transport stratagems and children who act as lookouts, the smugglers can disperse within a few minutes and get away scot-free. In addition, teachers in the area have reported that some students even get calls during lessons, leave their seats and go off to act as lookouts.

The adolescents paid by the smugglers watch the streets and keep an eye on the movements of the border guards, letting the smugglers know about their movements using mobile phones which the latter have bought. Then a car collects all the children and takes them home.

Lookout work is paid at up to LTL 100 (EUR 28). Carrying a crate full of cigarettes from the riverbank to a car brings in even more. Even though the profits have to be shared between several people, the traffickers can afford this expenditure because in Kaliningrad a pack of cigarettes costs approximately LTL 2.5 (EUR 0.70), while in Lithuania it costs nearly three times as much (LTL 6.5, equal to EUR 1.90).

Does the Commission intend to take action against smuggling in this region, which could presumably spread subsequently to the rest of the EU?

What action does it intend to take to protect the minors employed by the smugglers?

Answer given by Mr Šemeta on behalf of the Commission
(26 April 2013)

The overall fight against serious and organised crime is addressed within the Stockholm programme, the associated action plan ([1]) and the EU internal security strategy ([2]). The EU internal security strategy set out targeted measures concerning the strengthening of security through border management.

One of the prevailing criminal phenomena at the Eastern Border is smuggling of highly taxed goods, especially cigarettes, which causes significant losses of revenue for the EU and its Member States. This problem is addressed through the action plan to fight against smuggling of 2011 ([3]). The Commission is also planning to publish a new comprehensive EU strategy on stepping up efforts to fight against cigarette smuggling which will tackle it as general phenomenon. This communication is scheduled to be adopted in June 2013.

EU developed several mechanisms in recent years in order to ensure harmonised application of customs controls at the external borders in the Member States:amendments to the Customs code ([4]) introducing a general legal requirement for notably basing customs controls on risk analysis ([5]).

As regards the movement of people across the borders, new rules to facilitate local border traffic between Kaliningrad and Poland entered into force in July 2012. The Commission intends publishing a report on the application and impacts of these new rules this year.

The issues of transnational crimes are also addressed by the Block 3 of the Common Steps towards visa free short — term travel of Russian and EU citizens ([6]).

All Member States have ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. In the implementation of EC law, all Member States shall respect the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, including its Article 24, related to the rights of the child.

([1]) http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/documents/preventing-fraud-documents/eastern_border_action_plan_en.pdf
([2]) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0673:FIN:EN:PDF#page=2.
([3]) http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/documents/preventing-fraud-documents/eastern_border_action_plan_en.pdf
([4]) Regulation (EC) No 648/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code and Commission Regulation (EC) No 1875/2006 laying down provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code.
([5]) Commission Decision C (2009) 2601.
([6]) Agreed in December 2011and published on 11/03/2013: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/russia/docs/common_steps_towards_visa_free_short_term_travel_en.pdf

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001830/13
alla Commissione
Salvatore Iacolino (PPE)
(20 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: Possibilità per gli studenti all'estero di esprimere il proprio diritto di voto

La legislazione italiana prevede che possano accedere al voto per posta gli italiani temporaneamente residenti all`estero appartenenti alle forze armate e di polizia in missioni internazionali, i dipendenti di amministrazioni dello Stato fuori per servizio, i professori e ricercatori universitari. In Italia, anche per le predette categorie di cittadini temporaneamente residenti all'estero non esiste ancora un sistema di e-voting che risponda alle crescenti esigenze di mobilità e al sempre più consolidato utilizzo di sistemi informatici.

In occasione delle elezioni per il rinnovo della Camera dei deputati e del Senato della Repubblica nell'anno 2013, che si terranno nei giorni 24-25 febbraio p.v., nonostante i tentativi del governo italiano, saranno circa 25 mila gli studenti Erasmus italiani che non potranno esprimere il proprio diritto di voto, senza contare le decine di migliaia di studenti italiani regolarmente iscritti nelle università di altri Stati membri.

Fermo restando che ogni anno sono più di 230 mila gli studenti europei che prendono parte a programmi internazionali coordinati tra università, e in previsione dei prossimi impegni elettorali quali le Europee del 2014 può la Commissione chiarire:

— qual è la situazione per gli studenti provenienti da altri Stati membri impegnati in programmi di studio all'estero;

— se esistono delle buone pratiche nazionali che potrebbero essere estese ad altri Stati membri per le prossime competizioni elettorali, compresi sistemi di e-voting;

— se in futuro sarà possibile definire a livello europeo modalità coerenti per consentire a tutti gli studenti all'estero di esprimere il proprio diritto di voto?

Risposta di Viviane Reding a nome della Commissione
(17 aprile 2013)

Rimandiamo l'onorevole deputato alla risposta alle interrogazioni E-00548/2013, E-000559/2013 e E-000652/2013.

La partecipazione democratica è un valore fondamentale dell'Unione europea. I cittadini dell'Unione hanno il diritto di voto e di eleggibilità alle elezioni amministrative ed europee nello Stato membro in cui risiedono, in ottemperanza ai trattati dell'Unione europea e alla Carta dei diritti fondamentali.

Le modalità di voto alle elezioni nazionali sono di esclusiva competenza degli Stati membri. In base alle informazioni di cui dispone la Commissione, i cittadini italiani residenti all'estero possono votare alle elezioni nazionali per posta o ritornando in Italia ([1]).

Per quanto riguarda la domanda sulle buone pratiche condivisibili tra Stati membri, alla Commissione consta che in diversi sia possibile votare per corrispondenza, per procura o in via anticipata, mentre il voto elettronico è consentito da un solo Stato membro.

([1]) Ai sensi della normativa italiana, i cittadini italiani che risiedono all'estero per un periodo superiore ai 12 mesi devono iscriversi all'AIRE (anagrafe degli italiani residenti all'estero). Una volta iscritti, hanno il diritto di votare alle elezioni politiche nazionali per corrispondenza. Non sono iscritti all'AIRE i cittadini che si recano all'estero per cause di durata limitata non superiore a 12 mesi, come gli studenti Erasmus, che possono quindi votare alle elezioni politiche nazionali solo ritornando in Italia.

Per quanto riguarda possibili soluzioni future a livello europeo che permettano agli studenti temporaneamente all'estero di votare senza ritornare nel luogo di residenza, la Commissione ribadisce che le procedure di voto sono competenza degli Stati membri. Tuttavia, nella relazione sulle elezioni amministrative del 2012 ([2]) la Commissione ha osservato che procedure di votazione alternative (votazione anticipata, voto per corrispondenza) costituirebbero un incentivo a partecipare alle elezioni. Nella relazione sulle elezioni europee del 2010, pur non avendo alcun potere di iniziativa, la Commissione osservava che l'introduzione di sistemi di elezione all'estero per i cittadini espatriati potrebbe essere un principio comune da prendere in considerazione nel contesto della riforma delle procedure elettorali per le elezioni del Parlamento europeo ([3]).

([2]) COM(2012)99 final.
([3]) COM(2010)605 definitivo, pag. 12.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001830/13
to the Commission
Salvatore Iacolino (PPE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Opportunity for students living abroad to exercise their right to vote

Italian law provides that Italians temporarily resident abroad belonging to the armed forces and international police missions, employees of State departments located outside Italy for work-related reasons and university professors and researchers may vote by post. Even for the abovementioned categories of citizens temporarily resident abroad Italy does not yet have an electronic voting system to meet growing mobility needs and to respond to the increasingly established use of IT systems.

Despite the Italian Government's efforts, when the elections are held on 24 and 25 February 2013 to elect a new Chamber of Deputies and Senate of the Italian Republic, there will be approximately 25 000 Italian Erasmus students who will not be able to exercise their right to vote, in addition to the tens of thousands of Italian students who are enrolled as ordinary students at universities of other Member States.

Since over 230 000 European students take part every year in international programmes coordinated between universities, and in view of forthcoming electoral responsibilities such as the European elections in 2014:

— Could the Commission clarify the situation for students from other Member States enrolled on courses abroad?

— Can the Commission say whether there are good national practices that could be rolled out to other Member States for the forthcoming electoral contests, including e-voting systems?

— Will it be possible in the future to lay down at European level consistent procedures to allow all students resident abroad to exercise their right to vote?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(17 April 2013)

We would like to refer the Honorable Member to our reply on questions E-00548/2013, E-000559/2013 and E-000652/2013.

Democratic participation is a fundamental value for the European Union. Union citizens have the right to vote and stand as candidates in local and European elections in their Member State of residence under the Union Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

The modalities for voting in national elections are a matter falling exclusively within the competences of the Member States. According to the information available to the Commission, Italian citizens who reside abroad are entitled to vote at national elections, by mail or by returning to Italy ([1]).

As regards the question of the Honourable Member on best practices, the Commission is aware that several Member States allow for postal voting, voting by proxy and voting in advance. E-voting is permitted by one Member State.

As regards possible future solutions at European level to allow students residing temporarily abroad to vote without returning to their place of residence, the Commission reiterates that voting procedures fall within the competence of the Member States. However, the Commission noted in the 2012 report on local elections ([2]) that alternative voting procedures (e.g. advance voting, postal voting) would encourage participation at the elections. In the 2010 report on European elections, even though the Commission has no power of initiative, it was noted that introducing out-of-country voting facilities for expatriate voters could be a common principle to be taken into account in the context of the reform of the electoral procedures for the elections to the European Parliament ([3]).

([1]) Under the Italian law, Italian citizens residing abroad and who are supposed to stay there for at least 12 months must register in AIRE (registry of Italians residing abroad). Once enrolled in AIRE, they are entitled to vote at national political elections by mail. Italians who reside abroad temporarily and for less than 12 months, like Erasmus students, do not register in AIRE as residents abroad and are entitled to vote at national political elections by returning to Italy.

([2]) COM(2012) 99 final.

([3]) COM(2010) 605 final, page 12.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001831/13
alla Commissione
Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)
(20 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: Derivati su materie prime agricole

L'attualità in agricoltura è contrassegnata dal dibattito sulla crescente attività finanziaria relativa alle materie prime agricole. In particolare è stata criticata l'iniziativa della Deutsche Bank di proporre nuovamente prodotti finanziari sulle materie prime agricole, malgrado le riforme dell'Unione sulla speculazione alimentare.

1. Qual è l'opinione della Commissione su questa iniziativa?

2. È in grado di valutare se l'attuale processo legislativo dell'Unione, volto a fronteggiare la speculazione sulle derrate alimentari, ha ottenuto risultati? In caso affermativo, quali sono detti risultati?

3. Non ritiene che uno degli effetti funesti di questo fenomeno sia una deriva speculativa sulle derrate, responsabile dell'eccessiva volatilità dei prezzi?

4. Considerati questi rischi, non crede che sia giunto il momento di bloccare i «derivati» e di impedire che siano creati almeno per le materie prime agricole?

Risposta di Michel Barnier a nome della Commissione
(18 aprile 2013)

La crescente attività finanziaria relativa ai mercati dei derivati sulle materie prime è un fenomeno indiscutibile che si ritiene abbia avuto un impatto sulle dinamiche dei prezzi nel breve termine. L'eccessiva volatilità dei prezzi delle materie prime può danneggiare sia i produttori che i consumatori. È essenziale che questi mercati continuino ad essere al servizio dell'economia reale e a svolgere il loro ruolo originario, ossia quello di strumenti di copertura e di determinazione dei prezzi.

In linea con gli impegni assunti in sede di G20, la Commissione si sta attivando per rafforzare il controllo e la trasparenza dei mercati dei derivati sulle materie prime. L'ambiziosa riforma dei mercati dei derivati sulle materie prime, che ha già al suo attivo diversi atti legislativi, risponde pienamente ai più recenti principi elaborati — nel quadro di un mandato G20 — dall'Organizzazione internazionale delle commissioni sui valori mobiliari (IOSCO), pubblicati nel settembre 2011.

Più specificamente, la proposta di riesame della direttiva sui mercati degli strumenti finanziari (MiFID) ([1]) dispone che i derivati sulle materie prime sufficientemente liquidi vengano negoziati in sedi di negoziazione trasparenti e introduce un regime ambizioso in termini di limiti di posizione. Inoltre, la proposta della Commissione relativa ai prodotti d'investimento al dettaglio preassemblati (PRIPS) ([2]) impone ulteriori regole e migliora la qualità delle informazioni da dare agli investitori al dettaglio quando vengono offerti loro prodotti strutturati d'investimento in materie prime.

([1]) COM(2011)656 definitivo e COM(2011)652 definitivo.
([2]) COM(2012)352 definitivo.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001831/13
to the Commission
Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Agricultural commodity derivatives

The increasing trade in agricultural commodity derivatives is a major issue in agriculture today. Deutsche Bank's decision once again to offer financial products linked to agricultural commodities, despite EU reforms on food speculation, has been particularly criticised.

1. What does Commission think of this decision?

2. Can it determine whether the current EU legislative process for dealing with food speculation has achieved any results? If so, what are these results?

3. Does it not believe that one of the negative effects of this phenomenon could be a drift towards speculating on food, leading to excessive price volatility?

4. Given these risks, does it not believe the time has come to block these 'derivatives' and stop them being created, at least for agricultural commodities?

Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission
(18 April 2013)

The increasing financialisation of the commodity derivatives markets is an undisputable phenomenon and it is argued that this has affected price dynamics over short time horizons. Excessive volatility of commodity prices can harm producers and consumers alike. It is crucial that these markets continue to serve the real economy and to fulfill their initial role as hedging and price discovery tools.

The Commission is taking steps to reinforce the oversight and transparency of the commodity derivatives markets in line with G20 commitments. The reform of the EU commodity derivatives markets rolled out via several pieces of legislations is ambitious and fully corresponds with the latest principles of the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) — published in September 2011 — which has been working under a G20 mandate.

More specifically, the proposal for a revised Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) ([1]) requires sufficiently liquid commodity derivatives to be traded on transparent trading venues and introduces an ambitious regime of position limits. Moreover, the Commission's proposal for rules on Packaged Retail Investment Products (PRIPS) ([2]) imposes additional rules and enhanced quality of information when retail investors are offered structured commodity investment products.

([1]) COM(2011) 656 final and COM(2011) 652 final.
([2]) COM(2012) 352 final.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001832/13
alla Commissione
Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)
(20 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: Etichettatura d'origine per prodotti alimentari

Lo scandalo della carne equina non etichettata, ritrovata in confezioni di carne bovina, propone ancora una volta, e con urgenza, il problema dell'etichettatura d'origine di tutti i tipi di carne. L'etichetta d'origine, infatti, rappresenta una garanzia di informazione per i consumatori e, grazie alla tracciabilità, costituisce anche una protezione da frodi e truffe, che si moltiplicano in tempi di crisi. Nell'Unione europea è obbligatorio indicare in etichetta la provenienza della carne bovina, dopo l'emergenza della mucca pazza, ma non quella della carne di maiale, di coniglio o di cavallo. L'Italia è in anticipo rispetto al resto d'Europa, grazie a un provvedimento che ha reso obbligatoria l'indicazione dell'origine in etichetta anche per la carne di pollo, il latte fresco e la passata di pomodoro, ma non per la carne equina e per quella di coniglio.

1. Quali motivi adduce la Commissione per non etichettare la carne equina?

2. Non ritiene urgente applicare la tracciabilità di tutte le carni, cavallo e coniglio compresi, data la quantità di queste carni che viene commercializzata, magari congelata, negli Stati membri dell'Unione?

3. Non considera necessario etichettare anche l'origine di altri prodotti alimentari, non solo per informare il consumatore, ma pure per prevenire truffe e brogli commerciali vari?

4. Ritiene che possa esistere un mercato unico funzionante e trasparente con 27 regolamentazioni diverse in materia di etichettatura d'origine per diversi prodotti alimentari?

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta P-002369/13
alla Commissione
Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)
(28 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: Etichettatura d'origine per i prodotti alimentari

Lo scandalo della carne equina non etichettata ritrovata in confezioni di carne bovina propone ancora una volta e con urgenza il problema dell'etichettatura d'origine di tutte le carni. L'etichetta d'origine, infatti, rappresenta una garanzia di informazione per i consumatori e, grazie alla tracciabilità, anche una protezione nei confronti di frodi e truffe che si moltiplicano in tempi di crisi. Nell'Unione europea dopo l'emergenza della mucca pazza è obbligatorio indicare in etichetta la provenienza della carne bovina, ma non quella della carne di maiale di coniglio o di cavallo. L'Italia è in anticipo rispetto al resto d'Europa grazie a un provvedimento che ha reso obbligatoria l'indicazione dell'origine in etichetta anche per la carne di pollo, il latte fresco e la passata di pomodoro, ma non per la carne equina e quella di coniglio.

Può la Commissione dire:

1. quali motivi adduce per non etichettare la carne equina;

2. se ritiene urgente applicare la tracciabilità di tutte le carni, cavallo e coniglio compresi, dato il quantitativo di queste carni commercializzate, magari congelate, negli Stati membri dell'Unione europea;

3. se ritiene necessaria l'etichettatura d'origine anche di altri prodotti alimentari non solo per l'informazione del consumatore, ma pure per prevenire truffe e frodi commerciali varie;

4. se ritiene che possa esistere un mercato unico funzionante e trasparente con 27 regolamentazioni diverse in ordine alla etichettatura d'origine di diversi prodotti alimentari?

Risposta congiunta di Tonio Borg a nome della Commissione
(12 aprile 2013)

1. Come stabilito nel regolamento (UE) n. 169/2011 ([1]), l'etichettatura d'origine sarà obbligatoria a partire dal 13 dicembre 2014 per le carni ovine, caprine, di pollame e suine non trasformate. Considerato che queste carni sono ampiamente commercializzate e consumate nell'Unione, i co-legislatori hanno ritenuto che la loro origine rivestisse un interesse particolare per i consumatori. Per quanto concerne altri tipi di carni non trasformate, il regolamento fa obbligo alla Commissione di preparare entro il 13 dicembre 2014una relazione che analizzi l'eventuale necessità di estendere l'indicazione obbligatoria d'origine a tali alimenti. Una relazione analoga deve essere presentata entro il 13 dicembre 2013 in relazione alle carni di tutti i tipi che figurano quali ingredienti in preparazioni alimentari. Sulla base delle conclusioni di dette relazioni la Commissione potrà presentare una proposta per modificare le pertinenti disposizioni unionali o adottare nuove iniziative, se del caso, su base settoriale.

2.-3. Per quanto concerne la questione della tracciabilità e dell'etichettatura d'origine intese quale strumento per prevenire le frodi, rinviamo l'onorevole deputata alla risposta della Commissione all'interrogazione scritta P-001731/2013 ([2]).

4. Le attuali regole unionali in tema di etichettatura ([3]) consentono agli Stati membri, in assenza di disposizioni unionali che disciplinino l'etichettatura di alimenti specifici, di fornire indicazioni addizionali. Se uno Stato membro ritiene necessario adottare tali disposizioni esso notifica alla Commissione e agli Stati membri le misure previste e la loro giustificazione. La Commissione procede a valutare tali misure. In tutti i casi, i requisiti addizionali in tema di etichettatura devono tener conto del buon funzionamento del mercato interno per non creare ostacoli sproporzionati alla libera circolazione delle merci. Essi devono inoltre essere debitamente giustificati alla luce delle motivazioni elencate nella direttiva 2000/13/CE.

([1]) Regolamento (UE) n. 1169/2011 relativo alla fornitura di informazioni sugli alimenti ai consumatori, che modifica o regolamenti (CE) n. 1924/2006 e (CE) n. 1925/2006 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio e abroga la direttiva 87/250/CEE della Commissione, la direttiva 90/496/CEE del Consiglio, la direttiva 1999/10/CE della Commissione, la direttiva 2000/13/CE del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, le direttive 2002/67/CE e 2008/5/CE della Commissione e il regolamento (CE) n. 608/2004 della Commissione, GU L 304 del 22.11.2011, pag. 18. Questo regolamento diverrà applicabile il 13 dicembre 2014.

([2]) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html

([3]) Direttiva 2000/13/CE del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 20 marzo 2000, relativa al ravvicinamento delle legislazioni degli Stati membri concernenti l'etichettatura e la presentazione dei prodotti alimentati, nonché la relativa pubblicità, GU L 109 del 6.5.2000, pag. 29.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001832/13
to the Commission
Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Origin labelling for foodstuffs

The scandal involving unlabelled horse meat found in packs of beef once again brings into sharp focus the issue of origin labelling for all kinds of meat. A label of origin guarantees information for consumers and, because it ensures traceability, also protects against fraud and scams, which occur more often in times of crisis. In the EU, since the outbreak of mad cow disease, the origin of beef now has to be shown on a label, but not the origin of pork, rabbit meat or horse meat. Italy is ahead of the rest of Europe, as it has adopted a measure requiring the origin to be shown on labels for chicken, fresh milk and tomato purée, though not for horse or rabbit meat.

1. What reasons can the Commission give for not labelling horse meat?

2. Does it not believe that there is an urgent need to ensure the traceability of all meat, including horse and rabbit meat, given the quantities of these meats that are sold, even frozen, in the EU Member States?

3. Does it not believe that there should be origin labelling for other foodstuffs, not just to inform the consumer, but also to prevent various types of scams and fraud?

4. Does it believe that there can be a single, functioning and transparent market when there are 27 different sets of regulations on origin labelling for different foodstuffs?

Question for written answer P-002369/13
to the Commission
Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)
(28 February 2013)

Subject: Origin labelling for food products

The scandal caused by the discovery of horsemeat in products that were supposed to contain only beef has once again raised urgent questions about origin labelling for meat generally. Origin labels are a guaranteed source of accurate information for consumers and, thanks to the food traceability system, a safeguard against fraud and swindles, which become more widespread in times of crisis. Following the BSE crisis, it became mandatory in the EU to indicate on product labels the origin of the beef contained in those products. However, this requirement does not extend to pork, rabbit or horsemeat. Italy is ahead of the rest of Europe, having also introduced origin labelling requirements for chicken, fresh milk and passata (but not for horse and rabbit meat).

1. Why do origin labelling requirements not apply to horsemeat?

2. Should the food traceability system not be extended immediately to cover all types of meat, including horse and rabbit meat, particularly as the latter are widely available (also in frozen form) in EU Member States?

3. Does the Commission think that other food products should carry origin labels, not only for the purposes of informing consumers, but also as a way to prevent fraud and swindles?

4. Is a functioning and transparent single market possible when each of the 27 Member States has its own set of rules on origin labelling for a range of food products?

Joint answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission
(12 April 2013)

1. As laid down in Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 ([1]), origin labelling shall be mandatory for unprocessed sheep, goat, poultry and pig meat as from 13 December 2014. Given that these meats are widely commercialised and consumed within the Union, the co-legislators considered that their origin was of particular interest for consumers. As regards other types of unprocessed meat, the regulation requires the Commission to prepare a report, by 13 December 2014, on the need to extend the mandatory indication of origin for such foods. A similar report has to be submitted with respect to meat of all types used as an ingredient by 13 December 2013. Based on the conclusions of the said reports, the Commission may submit a proposal to modify the relevant Union provisions or may take new initiatives, where appropriate, on a sectorial basis.

2-3. As regards the issue of traceability and the issue of origin labelling as a tool to prevent fraud, we refer the Honourable Member to the reply of the Commission to Written Question P-001731/2013 ([2]).

4. Current EU labelling rules ([3]) allow Member States, in the absence of Union provisions regulating the labelling of specified foodstuffs, to provide for additional particulars. If a Member State deems it necessary to adopt such provisions, it shall notify the Commission and the Member States of the measures envisaged and their justification. The assessment of such measures is carried out by the Commission. In all cases, additional labelling requirements must take into account the good functioning of the internal market in order not create disproportionate barriers to the free movement of goods. They must also be duly justified on one of the grounds listed in Directive 2000/13/EC.

([1]) Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 on the provision of food information to consumers, amending Regulations (EC) No 1924/2006 and (EC) No 1925/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Commission Directive 87/250/EEC, Council Directive 90/496/EEC, Commission Directive 1999/10/EC, Directive 2000/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, Commission Directives 2002/67/EC and 2008/5/EC and Commission Regulation (EC) No 608/2004, OJ L 304, 22.11.2011, p. 18. This regulation will enter into application on 13 December 2014.

([2]) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html

([3]) Directive 2000/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 March 2000 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the labelling, presentation and advertising of foodstuffs, OJ L 109, 6.5.2000, p. 29.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001833/13
alla Commissione
Alfredo Antoniozzi (PPE)
(20 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: Il Patto di stabilità interno e il blocco dei fondi degli enti locali italiani

Analizzando la situazione degli ultimi anni è emerso che il Patto di stabilità interno blocca una considerevole quantità di fondi presenti nelle casse di comuni, provincie e regioni italiane. Svariati miliardi di euro stanziati per le opere pubbliche sono vincolati dal Patto di stabilità interno; ciò ha causato una battuta d'arresto sia dei nuovi progetti sia delle opere già avviate. La mancata possibilità di utilizzare questi fondi ha anche causato l'impossibilità di pagamenti puntuali da parte delle amministrazioni pubbliche, ostacolando il rilancio dell'economia. Ad aggravare la situazione, soprattutto nel meridione, è lo stato in cui versano le casse, messe in difficoltà dalle spese ingenti e dai tagli agli introiti.

Nonostante il Patto di stabilità interno fissi i confini in termini di programmazione all'interno dei quali i Paesi membri possano muoversi autonomamente è opinione comune in Italia che una deroga debba essere trovata a livello comunitario.

Può la Commissione rispondere al seguente quesito:

è possibile introdurre deroghe al Patto di stabilità interno che permettano l'utilizzo di suddetti fondi in modo da poter rilanciare l'economia e promuovere la crescita economica?

Risposta di Olli Rehn a nome della Commissione
(4 aprile 2013)

L'interrogazione dell'onorevole parlamentare si riferisce all'applicazione del patto di stabilità interno dell'Italia, che disciplina i rapporti di bilancio tra i diversi livelli dell'amministrazione pubblica, di cui è responsabile il governo italiano. Nell'ambito del Piano d'Azione Coesione concordato con la Commissione, il decreto legge 4 dicembre 2011, n. 201 prevede già per il triennio 2012-2014 una deroga al patto di stabilità interno fino a 1 miliardo di EUR all'anno per gli investimenti del Fondo europeo di sviluppo regionale.

Per rilanciare la crescita senza ostacolare il conseguimento degli obiettivi di bilancio, i governi nazionali possono adottare diversi provvedimenti: possono rendere prioritari gli investimenti favorevoli alla crescita e possono trasferire gli oneri fiscali dai fattori di produzione ai consumi e ai beni immobili. Le specifiche modalità di controllo della spesa pubblica sono, in ogni caso, responsabilità dei governi nazionali, nel rispetto degli obblighi derivanti dalla normativa dell'Unione europea e, nello specifico, dal patto di stabilità e crescita.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001833/13
to the Commission
Alfredo Antoniozzi (PPE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: The Internal Stability Pact and the freezing of funds belonging to Italian local authorities.

An examination of the situation over the past several years reveals that the Internal Stability Pact has the effect of freezing a considerable amount of funds held in the coffers of Italian municipalities, provinces and regions. Several billion euros for public works are bound by the Internal Stability Pact. This has resulted in a standstill both in new projects and those already underway. The unavailability of these funds has also meant that public bodies are prevented from making payments on time, which in turn has impeded economic recovery. The situation is made worse, particularly in southern Italy, by the state of these coffers, which have been tested by significant expenditure requirements and lower earnings.

Even though the Internal Stability Pact establishes planning parameters within which the Member States can move autonomously, the prevailing opinion in Italy is that an exemption to this must be found at European level.

Can the Commission answer the following:

Can exemptions be introduced in the Internal Stability Pact to allow the aforementioned funds to be used to boost the economy and promote economic growth?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission
(4 April 2013)

The Honourable Member's question refers to the implementation of the 'Italian internal stability pact', which disciplines the fiscal relations across levels of government and is a prerogative of the Italian Government. Within the framework of the Cohesion Action Plan agreed with the Commission, decree-law 201 of 4 December 2011 already introduced an exemption from the internal stability pact for European Regional Development Fund investments up to EUR 1 billion per year over 2012-2014.

To revive growth without hampering the achievement of fiscal targets, national governments can put in place several measures, such as prioritising growth-friendly investment and shifting the tax burden from productive factors towards consumption and immovable property. The specific arrangements through which they control expenditure, however, fall under their own responsibility, within the constraint of respecting the obligations derived from EC law and, specifically, the Stability and Growth Pact.

(Wersja polska)

Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej P-001834/13
do Komisji
Janusz Władysław Zemke (S&D)
(20 lutego 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Określenia stolicy obszarów metropolitalnych

Obszary metropolitalne wytwarzają większość PKB w znacznej części państw członkowskich Unii. Słusznie zatem, Komisja Europejska zwraca uwagę na konieczność projektowania i wdrażania wspólnej polityki miejskiej oraz zintegrowanego podejścia do zarządzania miastami i obszarami zurbanizowanymi. Z dostępnych informacji wynika, że w planach budżetowych na lata 2014-2020 przewiduje się w budżecie UE zwiększenie środków na realizację tych celów. Moje pytanie do Komisji nie dotyczy zatem istoty sprawy, czyli potrzeby zrównoważonego rozwoju obszarów metropolitalnych, lecz określenia stolicy poszczególnych metropolii.

Czy Komisja zakłada, że stolicą metropolii, może być wyłącznie jedno miasto, największe w danej aglomeracji, czy też dopuszcza się możliwość, by stolicę stanowiło kilka miast na zasadzie rotacji?

Czy kwestia ta jest regulowana na poziomie całej Unii i przestrzegane są w tym zakresie jednolite standardy, czy też wyznaczenie stolicy (stolic) metropolii, Komisja pozostawia do wyłącznej kompetencji państw członkowskich?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Johannesa Hahna w imieniu Komisji
(26 marca 2013 r.)

Komisja nie reguluje sposobu określania stolicy obszaru metropolitalnego lub aglomeracji, ani nie stosuje w tym celu żadnych jednolitych norm. Kwestia ta leży w gestii państw członkowskich.

(English version)

Question for written answer P-001834/13
to the Commission
Janusz Władysław Zemke (S&D)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Defining the capital of an urban area

Urban areas generate the majority of GDP in a large number of EU Member States. The Commission therefore rightly draws attention to the need to design and implement a common urban policy and an integrated approach to the management of cities and urban areas. According to the information available, the budget plans for the period 2014-2020 provide for an increase in EU budget funds for achieving these aims. My question to the Commission does not concern the merits of the matter, i.e. the need for sustainable development of urban areas, but the determination of the capital city of an urban area.

Does the Commission assume that the capital may be only a single city, the biggest in a given agglomeration, or does it also allow for the possibility of a capital being several cities on a rotating basis?

Is this question regulated at EU level and are uniform standards applied, or does the Commission leave the determination of the capital(s) of an urban area to the exclusive competence of the Member States?

Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission
(26 March 2013)

The Commission does not regulate or use uniform standards to identify the capital of a metropolis or agglomeration. This is a matter for Member States.

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001835/13
a la Comisión
Antolín Sánchez Presedo (S&D)
(20 de febrero de 2013)

Asunto: Sostenibilidad del comercio internacional de conservas de atún

El pasado 21 de enero Argentina decidía incrementar el arancel para las importaciones de conservas de atún procedentes de la UE desde el 16 % al 35 %. En la actualidad, el nivel máximo fijado por la UE para las conservas de atún procedentes del mercado argentino es del 24 %.

Desde hace años los Estados Unidos aplican un arancel del 35 % a las importaciones de conservas de atún procedentes de la UE mientras que sus exportaciones a la UE están sometidas a un arancel del 0 %.

¿Qué medidas tiene previsto adoptar la Comisión para asegurar el equilibrio arancelario en estos mercados y evitar que las condiciones para el comercio internacional de conservas de atún sean lesivas para el sector europeo?

Respuesta del Sr. De Gucht en nombre de la Comisión
(2 de abril de 2013)

Las conservas de atún son un producto sensible para todos los países productores y todos ellos son sabedores del equilibrio económico necesario para salvaguardar sus intereses nacionales. La UE intenta hacerlo mediante un equilibrio entre las necesidades de sus suministradores de materia prima, sus productores, sus consumidores y sus mercados de importación y exportación.

En la actualidad, la UE no tiene acuerdos comerciales con Argentina o los Estados Unidos de América (EE.UU.) que ayuden a encontrar ese equilibrio, si bien está negociando con el Mercosur y es posible que comience pronto conversaciones con los EE.UU. Con todo, los aranceles que se indican a continuación, aplicados por las tres Partes, cumplen las normas de la Organización Mundial del Comercio (OMC) (tipos consolidados de derechos que los miembros de la OMC están autorizados a aplicar).

El arancel de nación más favorecida que aplica Argentina en la actualidad a las importaciones de conservas de atún es del 35 %; de 2009 a 2012, el promedio de importaciones desde la UE supuso menos del 4 % de las exportaciones totales de la UE. Argentina goza de una reducción del 3,5 % del arancel de nación más favorecida (24 % para las conservas de atún) en virtud del régimen de preferencias generalizadas de la UE. Sin embargo, sus exportaciones a la UE representaron el 1,3 % de las importaciones totales de la UE en el período 2009-2012.

Los EE.UU. aplican un derecho de importación del 35 % al atún en aceite de oliva y un derecho que se sitúa entre 1,1 cent/kg y el 12,5 % a las demás conservas de atún. El arancel del 0 % de la UE se aplica en realidad a un contingente *erga omnes* de 22 000 toneladas de lomos de atún destinado al sector de la transformación de la UE. El arancel que aplica la UE a las conservas de atún importadas de los EE.UU. es del 24 %. En el período 2009-2012, esas importaciones representaron el 1,61 % de las importaciones totales de la UE mientras que las exportaciones de esta a los EE.UU. supusieron el 2,79 % del total.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001835/13
to the Commission
Antolín Sánchez Presedo (S&D)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Sustainability of international trade in tinned tuna

On 21 January 2013 Argentina decided to increase the tariff for imports of tinned tuna from the EU from 16% to 35%. Currently, the ceiling set by the EU for tinned tuna from the Argentinian market is 24%.

For many years the United States has been applying a tariff of 35% to imports of tinned tuna from the EU, while its exports to the EU are subject to a tariff of 0%.

What measures does the Commission plan to take to guarantee tariff balance on these markets, and to prevent international trade conditions relating to tinned tuna being detrimental to the European sector?

Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission
(2 April 2013)

Canned tuna is a sensitive product for all producing countries and each is aware of the economic balance needed to safeguard its domestic interests. The EU seeks to do this by finding a balance between the needs of its suppliers of raw material, its producers, its consumers and its import/export markets.

Currently, the EU does not have trade agreements with Argentina or the United States of America (USA) to assist in finding this balance although talks on a trade agreement with the USA might be opened soon and negotiations with Mercosur are ongoing. However, the tariff rates mentioned in this reply and applied by all three Parties are World Trade Organisation (WTO) compliant (bound rates which the WTO Members are permitted to apply).

Argentina's current most-favoured-nation (MFN) rate for imports of canned tuna is 35%; from 2009 to 2012, average imports from the EU were less than 4% of the EU's total exports. Argentina benefits from a reduction of 3.5% of MFN (24% for canned tuna) under the EU's Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) regime. However, its exports to the EU were 1.3% of EU total imports (2009-12).

The USA applies 35% import duty to tuna in olive oil while other categories range from 1.1 cent/kg to 12.5%. The EU's zero per cent (0%) duty is in fact applied to an erga omnes quota of 22 000 tonnes of tuna loins destined for the EU processing industry, the EU charging 24% on imports of canned tuna from the USA which amounted to 1.61% of total imports during the period 2009-2012 while EU exports to the USA were 2.79%.

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001836/13
a la Comisión
Antolín Sánchez Presedo (S&D)
(20 de febrero de 2013)

Asunto: Control en la comercialización de productos pesqueros

Los medios de comunicación europeos se hacen eco en estos días del escándalo suscitado por la existencia de trazas de carne de caballo en diversos compuestos de carne picada, como hamburguesas o salsas boloñesas, que se vendían como de origen vacuno y/o porcino.

Desde hace años, sin que haya suscitado la misma atención, se vienen denunciando otros fraudes en el ámbito alimentario.

Estudios académicos realizados en la Universidad de Oviedo entre 2006 y 2010 a partir de muestras de ADN de merluzas comercializadas en fresco, congelado o como componente de productos preparados señalaron que se vendía como merluza europea o importada de América lo que era pescadilla africana (con un precio en torno a la mitad del anterior). Según diversas informaciones no se trataría de una práctica aislada porque se comercializaría abadejo, carbonero o merlán por bacalao, panga vietnamita por mero. Siempre pescado barato en lugar del caro y en porcentajes que podrían aumentar de año en año.

¿Tiene conocimiento la Comisión de estas informaciones?, ¿qué medidas está adoptando o tiene previsto adoptar para velar por el cumplimiento de la normativa sobre etiquetado?

¿Prevé la Comisión un aumento de los controles en el ámbito de los productos pesqueros?

Respuesta de la Sra. Damanaki en nombre de la Comisión
(15 de abril de 2013)

La Comisión es consciente de la magnitud del problema del etiquetado fraudulento, sobre el que se han realizado estudios y controles en la EU y, recientemente, en los EE.UU.

La Comisión está apoyando activamente la realización de mejores controles en este campo y, en particular, está estudiando cómo responder de manera clara a preguntas como ¿a qué especie de pescado corresponde este producto?, ¿dónde se ha capturado este pescado?, ¿se trata de pescado silvestre o de acuicultura? ([1]).

Los productos de la pesca se caracterizan por una enorme variedad de especies. Los controles pueden mejorarse mediante requisitos de trazabilidad. Las pruebas de ADN son una posibilidad prometedora, especialmente para los productos que ya han sido transformados.

Los consumidores de la UE exigen cada vez más información sobre el pescado y los productos de la pesca. Por ello, en el contexto de la reforma de la política pesquera común, la Comisión propone que se indiquen de forma clara y visible la denominación comercial de la especie, la zona de captura o cría y el método de producción también para los productos de la pesca en conserva y preparados. Además, para cerciorarse de que se aplica la legislación, la Comisión ha incluido en su propuesta de nuevo Fondo Europeo Marítimo y de Pesca una línea de ayuda específica para reforzar los controles de la cadena de comercialización y de las obligaciones de etiquetado. Los controles corren a cargo de las administraciones nacionales pertinentes.

([1]) What fish is on your plate? (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-649_en.htm).

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001836/13
to the Commission
Antolín Sánchez Presedo (S&D)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Monitoring of trade in fisheries products

The European media have recently given coverage to the scandal caused by the discovery of traces of horsemeat in various minced meat products, such as hamburgers and bolognaise sauce, which were sold as being made from beef and/or pork.

For years, concerns have been raised about other types of fraud in the food sector, without the same attention having been focused on them.

Academic research carried out by the University of Oviedo between 2006 and 2010 on the DNA of hake sold either fresh or frozen or as an ingredient in prepared meals found that what was being sold as hake of European or American origin was in fact African hake, costing around half the price. According to several reports, this is not an isolated practice, as haddock, saithe or whiting are sold as cod and Vietnamese panga is passed off as grouper. Cheap fish is always substituted for more expensive fish and in amounts which may be increasing annually.

Is the Commission aware of this information? What steps is it taking or does it intend to take to ensure compliance with labelling laws?

Does the Commission plan to increase checks on fisheries products?

Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission
(15 April 2013)

The Commission is aware of the magnitude of the problem of labelling fraud. Studies and controls have been conducted in the EU and recently in the US.

The Commission is actively supporting improved controls in this field and is in particular exploring how molecular technologies can provide clear answers to questions such as 'what species does this fish product come from….where was this fish caught….is it wild or farmed?' ([1]).

Fish products are characterised by a very large number of species. Traceability requirements can help to improve controls. DNA testing is a promising development in particular for products that have already been processed.

EU consumers are more and more demanding in terms of information on fish and fish products. For this reason, in the context of the reform of the common fisheries policy, the Commission proposes to display in a clear and distinct manner the commercial designation of the species, the catch or harvest area and the production method also for the preserved and prepared fish product. In addition, to make sure that the legislation is enforced, the Commission has included in its proposal for a new European Maritime and Fisheries Fund specific support to strengthen controls of the marketing chain and labelling obligations. Controls are conducted by relevant national administrations.

([1]) 'What fish is on your plate?', http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-649_en.htm

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-001837/13
an die Kommission
Hans-Peter Martin (NI)
(20. Februar 2013)

Betrifft: „Microsoft Case“ — Beurteilung von „Windows 8“

Seit 2004 läuft ein Verfahren gegen das amerikanische Unternehmen Microsoft, da das Unternehmen durch die Bündelung des Browsers „Internet Explorer“ mit dem „Windows“-Betriebssystem seine Marktposition widerrechtlich ausnutzt. Am 26. Oktober 2012 wurde die neue Betriebssystemversion „Windows 8“ veröffentlicht. In dieser nimmt der „Internet Explorer“ erneut eine bedeutende Rolle ein. Bei dieser Version wird dem Nutzer kein Browserauswahlfenster angeboten.

1. Brechen die in der EU veröffentlichten Versionen von „Windows 8“ nach Ansicht der Kommission die zwischen Microsoft und der EU getroffenen Vereinbarungen?

2. Welche Maßnahmen wird die Kommission betreffend „Windows 8“ ergreifen?

Antwort von Herrn Almunia im Namen der Kommission
(8. Mai 2013)

Mit dem Verpflichtungsbeschluss der Kommission vom 16. Dezember 2009 in der Sache COMP/C-39.530 — Microsoft (Tying) wurden bestimmte Verpflichtungen für Microsoft bis zum Dezember 2014 für bindend erklärt. Nach diesem Beschluss müssen alle neuen Windows-Betriebssysteme von Microsoft für Client-PCs einen Browserauswahlbildschirm beinhalten, wie es bereits bei Windows 7 erforderlich war. Somit ist Microsoft dazu verpflichtet, den Windows 8-Nutzern im EWR, auf deren PC der Internet Explorer als Default eingestellt ist, einen Browserauswahlbildschirm zur Verfügung zu stellen.

Die Kommission hat die Markteinführung von Windows 8 sehr aufmerksam verfolgt, um sicherzustellen, dass Microsoft seinen Verpflichtungen in vollem Umfang genügt. In diesem Zusammenhang schlug die Kommission Änderungen am Windows 8-Betriebssystem von Microsoft vor, die das Unternehmen daraufhin umgesetzt hat.

Der Kommission liegen keine Hinweise darauf vor, dass der Browserauswahlbildschirm Windows 8-Nutzern im EWR, die den Internet Explorer als Default-Browser verwenden, nicht angezeigt wird.

Die Kommission wird jedoch noch strenger überwachen, dass Microsoft allen Verpflichtungen vollumfänglich nachkommt.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001837/13
to the Commission
Hans-Peter Martin (NI)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Microsoft case — assessment of Windows 8

Proceedings against the US company Microsoft have been ongoing since 2004, as the company has been unlawfully exploiting its position in the market by bundling the Internet Explorer browser with the Windows operating system. On 26 October 2012, a new operating system, Windows 8, was released. Once again, Internet Explorer assumes a significant role in this operating system. In this version, no browser selection window is offered to the user.

1. In the opinion of the Commission, do the versions of Windows 8 released in the EU violate the agreements entered into between Microsoft and the EU?

2. What steps does the Commission intend to take with regard to Windows 8?

Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission
(8 May 2013)

The Commission's Commitment Decision of 16 December 2009 in Case Comp/C-39.530 — Microsoft (Tying) made commitments binding on Microsoft until December 2014. According to that Decision, all new Microsoft Windows client PC operating systems have to include a Browser Choice Screen, as was required for Windows 7. Microsoft has an obligation therefore to provide a Browser Choice Screen to Windows 8 users within the EEA who have Internet Explorer as their default browser.

The Commission monitored the launch of Windows 8 closely to ensure that Microsoft complies fully with its obligations. In this context, the Commission suggested changes to Microsoft's Windows 8 operating system which the company has implemented.

The Commission has received no indication that the Browser Choice Screen is not being displayed to users of Windows 8 in the EEA who have Internet Explorer as their default browser.

However, the Commission will intensify its monitoring of all aspects of Microsoft's compliance with its commitments.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-001838/13
an die Kommission
Hans-Peter Martin (NI)
(20. Februar 2013)

Betrifft: Nutzung von Algen als Nahrungsmittel

Wissenschaftler sehen essbare Algen, insbesondere Seetang, als eine Möglichkeit umweltfreundlich und günstig nährstoffreiche Nahrungsmittel zu produzieren. In der EU nimmt Medienberichten zufolge vor allem der Anbau von Braunalgen zu.

1. Verfügt die Kommission über Daten darüber, wie viele Tonnen Algen zur Nutzung als Nahrungs- oder Nahrungsergänzungsmittel jedes Jahr (a) in der EU produziert oder (b) in die EU importiert werden?

2. Besteht derzeit auf EU-Ebene eine Regulierung die (a) den Anbau, (b) den Import und (c) den Verkauf von Algen beziehungsweise Algenprodukten als Nahrungsmittel reguliert?

3. In welcher Form, wenn dies der Fall sein sollte, unterstützt die Kommission Forschung und Entwicklung im Bereich des Anbaus oder der Verarbeitung von Algen?

4. In welcher Form, wenn dies der Fall sein sollte, fördert die Kommission den Anbau oder den Vertrieb von Algen als Nahrungsmittel?

5. In welcher Form, wenn dies der Fall sein sollte, fördert die Kommission Kampagnen, um die Bevölkerung über die Nutzung von Algen als Nahrungsmittel aufzuklären oder den Konsum zu fördern?

Antwort von Frau Damanaki im Namen der Kommission
(16. Mai 2013)

Es liegen Statistiken für Ein- und Ausfuhren von Algen und Tangen ([1]) vor. Diese lassen jedoch keinen Schluss über die in Nahrungsmitteln verwendeten Algen ([2]) zu. Der Kommission sind die traditionelle Sammlung entlang der Küste und das jüngste Interesse am Anbau von Algen in der Aquakultur bekannt. Im Jahr 2011 beliefen sich die Einfuhren auf 73,4 Mio. t im Wert von 60,7 Mio. EUR und die Ausfuhren entsprachen einem Wert von 15,6 Mio. EUR. Die meisten Einfuhren stammen aus Island, den höchsten Einfuhrwert decken jedoch die Philippinen, China, Chile und Japan ab. Die wichtigsten Ausführer waren das Vereinigte Königreich und Deutschland.

Für die Algenerzeugung gelten die EU-Vorschriften für den ökologischen/biologischen Landbau ([3]), und die Kommission hat der Gruppe *Codex Alimentarius* vorgeschlagen, Algen in die Leitlinien des Codex für Lebensmittel aus ökologischem Landbau ([4]) aufzunehmen. Der EFRE ([5]) fördert die Schaffung eines europäischen Netzes für Interessenvertreter im Bereich Algen ([6]), um ein „Best-Practice-Modell" für die nachhaltige kommerzielle Nutzung von Algen in Europa zu entwickeln.

Die Erforschung von Algen erfolgt bereits im Rahmen des 7. Forschungsrahmenprogramms, insbesondere Forschung und Innovation im Bereich der Bioraffinerien für Mikro- und Makroalgen als vielversprechende Quelle für hochwertige Erzeugnisse ([7]). Ein großes Thema der letzten Aufforderung zur Einreichung von Vorschlägen unter RP7 — Thema 2: Lebensmittel, Landwirtschaft, Fischerei und Aquakultur — ist mit einem EU-Beitrag in Höhe von insgesamt 20 Mio. EUR (Bewertung läuft) speziell diesem Themenbereich gewidmet.

Die Reform der Gemeinsamen Fischereipolitik beinhaltet auch die Förderung der Aquakultur durch strategische Leitlinien, nationale Mehrjahrespläne und gemeinsame Ziele.

([1]) KN-Code 1212 20 00.
([2]) Neuartige Lebensmittel oder neuartige Lebensmittelzutaten aus Algenarten, die vor dem 15. Mai 1997 (Inkrafttreten der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 258/97) noch nicht auf dem Markt waren, bedürfen einer Sicherheitsprüfung und schließlich einer Zulassung gemäß der Verordnung, bevor sie in Verkehr gebracht werden dürfen.
([3]) Verordnung Nr. 834/2007 des Rates und Verordnung Nr. 888/2008 der Kommission.
([4]) GL 32-1999.
([5]) Europäischer Fonds für regionale Entwicklung.
([6]) www.netalgae.eu
([7]) Eiweißhaltige Futtermittel, Polymere, Arzneimittel, hochwertige Öle und Chemikalien, bioaktive Stoffe, Farbstoffe und Biokraftstoffe.

Die Kommission führt keine europaweiten Informations- und Werbekampagnen für Algen als Lebensmittel durch. Die Mitgliedstaaten können jedoch im Rahmen des Europäischen Fischereifonds ([8]) Werbemaßnahmen und die Entwicklung einer nachhaltigen Aquakultur, einschließlich essbarer Meerespflanzen, fördern.

([8]) Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1198/2006 des Rates und Verordnung (EG) Nr. 498/2007 der Kommission.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001838/13
to the Commission
Hans-Peter Martin (NI)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Use of seaweeds as food

Scientists see edible seaweeds, in particular wracks, as a potential environmentally friendly and cost-effective option for producing nutritious food. According to media reports, the cultivation of brown seaweeds in particular is increasing in the EU.

1. Does the Commission have any data on how many tonnes of seaweed are (a) produced in the EU, or (b) imported into the EU each year for use as food or food supplements?

2. Is there currently any regulation at EU level of (a) the cultivation, (b) the import, and (c) the sale of seaweeds or seaweed products as food?

3. In what way, if any, does the Commission support research and development in the area of the cultivation or processing of seaweed?

4. In what way, if any, does the Commission promote the cultivation or marketing of seaweed as food?

5. In what way, if any, does the Commission promote campaigns to inform citizens of the use of seaweed as food or to promote its consumption?

Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission
(16 May 2013)

Statistics are available for imports and exports of seaweed and other algae ([1]) but this does not allow to distinguish those seaweeds used for food ([2]). The Commission is aware of traditional collection along the coastline and the more recent interest in seaweed aquaculture. In 2011, total imports amounted to 73.4 million tonnes with a value of EUR 60.7 million and exports were valued at EUR 15.6 million. The biggest imports come from Iceland, but the highest value imports come from Philippines, China, Chile and Japan. The main exporters were UK and Germany.

Seaweed production is covered by the EU organic legislation ([3]) and the Commission has proposed to the *Codex Alimentarius* to include them in Codex Guideline for organically produced foods ([4]). The ERDF ([5]) is funding the creation of a European network of seaweed ([6]) stakeholders to produce a best practice model of sustainable commercial utilization of seaweed in Europe.

Research on algae is well covered under the 7th Research Framework Programme in particular research and innovation on micro and macro algae biorefineries as promising sources of high added-value products ([7]). One large topic of the last call of FP7 — Theme 2 Food, Agriculture and Fisheries and Aquaculture addresses particularly this subject with a total EU contribution of EUR 20 million (evaluation ongoing).

The reform of the common fisheries policy includes the promotion of aquaculture through strategic guidelines, multiannual national plans and common objectives.

The Commission does not carry out European-wide communication and promotion campaigns on seaweed as food. However, Member States may support promotion activities under the European Fisheries Fund ([8]) and the development of sustainable aquaculture including edible seaweeds.

([1]) Under CN code 1212 20 00.
([2]) Novel foods or novel food ingredients from species of algae that were not on the market (before 15 May 1997, entry into force of Regulation (EC) No 258/97) require a safety assessment and eventually authorisation under the regulation before they may be placed on the market.
([3]) Council Regulation 834/2007 and Commission Regulation 888/2008.
([4]) GL 32 1999.
([5]) European Regional Development Fund.
([6]) www.netalgae.eu
([7]) Feed proteins, polymers, pharmaceuticals, high value oils and chemicals, bioactive compounds, colorants and biofuels.
([8]) Council Regulation (EC) No1198/2006 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 498/2007.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-001839/13
an den Rat
Hans-Peter Martin (NI)
(20. Februar 2013)

Betrifft: Teilnahme von Ministern an Tagungen des Rates

Minister der Mitgliedstaaten lassen sich bei Tagungen des Rates gelegentlich vertreten.

1. Bei wie vielen der Tagungen des Rates in den Jahren 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 und 2012 nahmen alle zuständigen Minister der Mitgliedstaaten an den Tagungen teil?

2. Bei wie vielen der Tagungen des Rates in den Jahren 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 und 2012 wurde mindestens die Hälfte aller zuständigen Minister vertreten?

Antwort
(2. Mai 2013)

Artikel 16 Absatz 2 des Vertrags über die Europäische Union sieht Folgendes vor: „Der Rat besteht aus je einem Vertreter jedes Mitgliedstaats auf Ministerebene, der befugt ist, für die Regierung des von ihm vertretenen Mitgliedstaats verbindlich zu handeln und das Stimmrecht auszuüben." Jeder Mitgliedstaat kann seinen Vertreter selbst bestimmen.

Nach Artikel 4 der Geschäftsordnung des Rates kann ein Ratsmitglied sich vertreten lassen, wenn es verhindert ist, an einer Tagung teilzunehmen, vorbehaltlich der Bestimmungen über die Übertragung des Stimmrechts gemäß Artikel 11 der Geschäftsordnung des Rates. Gemäß Artikel 11 der Geschäftsordnung des Rates kann sich ein Mitglied das Stimmrecht höchstens eines anderen Mitglieds übertragen lassen. Daher ist für eine Abstimmung im Rat die Anwesenheit der Mehrheit der gemäß den Verträgen stimmberechtigten Ratsmitglieder erforderlich.

Nach jeder Tagung des Rates veröffentlicht das Generalsekretariat des Rates eine Pressemitteilung auf der Website des Rates, die neben den wichtigsten Ergebnissen der Tagung auch eine Teilnehmerliste enthält. Diese Liste wird während der Tagung von den anwesenden Bediensteten des Generalsekretariats des Rates erstellt.

Eine statistischen Auswertung dieser Daten liegt jedoch nicht vor und kann auch nicht entsprechend der Fragen des Herrn Abgeordneten elektronisch erstellt werden. Eine manuelle Zählung der Anwesenheit und Abwesenheit für die mehreren hundert Tagungen des Rates im genannten Zeitraum würde dem Sekretariat einen unverhältnismäßig hohen Kostenaufwand verursachen.

Die Pressemitteilungen für alle Tagungen des Rates seit 2006 einschließlich der Teilnehmerlisten sind in jedem Fall online unter http://www.consilium.europa.eu/Newsroom abrufbar. Alternativ können die Pressemitteilungen direkt im Büro des Protokolldiensts des Generalsekretariats des Rates eingesehen werden.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001839/13
to the Council
Hans-Peter Martin (NI)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Participation of ministers in Council meetings

Ministers of the Member States occasionally allow someone else to represent them at Council meetings.

1. In how many of the Council meetings in 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 did all of the competent ministers of the Member States take part?

2. At how many of the Council meetings in 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 were at least half of all the competent ministers represented by someone else?

Reply
(2 May 2013)

Article 16(2) of the Treaty on European Union provides that 'the Council shall consist of a representative of each Member State at ministerial level, who may commit the government of Member State in question and cast its vote'. It is for each Member State to choose by whom it will be represented.

Under Article 4 of the Council's Rules of Procedure (RoP), a member of the Council who is prevented from attending a meeting may arrange to be represented, subject to the provisions of Article 11 RoP on the delegation of voting rights. Pursuant to Article 11 of RoP, where a vote is taken, a member of the Council may also act on behalf of not more than one other member. Therefore, the presence of a majority of the members of the Council who are, under the Treaties, entitled to vote is required to enable the Council to vote.

After each Council meeting, the General Secretariat of the Council (GSC) publishes a press release on the Council's website which contains the main results of the meeting, as well as a list of participants. This list is drawn up during the course of the meeting by the members of the GSC staff present.

However, no statistical evaluation of these data exists, nor can it be electronically prepared along the lines of the Honourable Member's questions. A manual count of presences and absences for the several hundreds of Council meetings concerned would create a disproportionately costly workload for the Secretariat.

In any case, press releases for all Council meetings since 2006 including the list of participants are available online under the address http://www.consilium.europa.eu/Newsroom. Alternatively, the press releases can be consulted directly in the office of the GSC's Protocol Service.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-001840/13
an den Rat
Hans-Peter Martin (NI)
(20. Februar 2013)

Betrifft: Reisekosten für Tagungen des Rates und Vorbereitungsgremien

Wie hoch waren die Gesamtkosten für Reisen (Beförderungskosten und Unterbringung und Verpflegung vor Ort) der Teilnehmer von (1) Tagungen des Rates und (2) Sitzungen von Vorbereitungsgremien des Rates jeweils in den Jahren 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 und 2012?

Antwort
(22. April 2013)

Die Erstattung der Reisekosten der Delegierten ist in der Verfügung Nr. 32/2011 des Generalsekretärs des Rates geregelt; sie enthält in Anhang I das Verzeichnis der Tagungen bzw. Sitzungen, für die eine Reisekostenerstattung gewährt werden kann. Für eine Erstattung kommen ausschließlich Beförderungskosten in Frage; Kosten für Unterkunft oder Verpflegung werden nicht vergütet.

Die Mitgliedstaaten übermitteln dem Generalsekretatiat des Rates eine Abrechnung über die Verwendung des ihnen zur Erstattung der Reisekosten der Delegierten überwiesenen Gesamtbetrags. Diese Abrechnungen betreffen sowohl die Tagungen des Rates als auch die Sitzungen seiner Vorbereitungsgremien.

Folgende Gesamtkosten sind angefallen:

2008: 24 436 119 EUR

2009: 22 510 480 EUR

2010: 17 760 430 EUR

2011: 19 860 980 EUR.

2012: Einige Mitgliedstaaten haben ihre Abrechnungen noch nicht übermittelt, weshalb sich die Gesamtkosten für dieses Jahr noch nicht beziffern lassen (nach noch zu überprüfenden Haushaltsschätzungen vom Januar 2013 beliefen sie sich auf 19 620 000 EUR).

Die Abrechnungen der Mitgliedstaaten werden von den zuständigen Dienststellen des Generalsekretariats des Rates vollständig geprüft.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001840/13
to the Council
Hans-Peter Martin (NI)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Travel costs for Council meetings and meetings of preparatory bodies

What were the total travel costs (transport costs and local accommodation and food) for participants of (1) Council meetings, and (2) meetings of the Council preparatory bodies for each of the years 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012?

Reply
(22 April 2013)

The reimbursement of delegates' travel expenses is regulated by Decision 32/2011 of the Secretary-General of the Council, Annex I of which contains a list of meetings giving entitlement to reimbursement. Only transport expenses are eligible; there is no allowance for accommodation or meals.

Member States provide the General Secretariat of the Council with a statement showing how the envelope for delegates' travel expenses allocated to them has been used. These statements cover both Council meetings and meetings of Council preparatory bodies.

The overall figures are:

2008: EUR 24 436 119

2009: EUR 22 510 480

2010: EUR 17 760 430

2011: EUR 19 860 980.

2012: statements from some Member States are still missing, which means that the overall figure is not available for that year (according to budgetary enquiries in January 2013 the estimate before verification is EUR 19 620 000).

The Member States' statements are fully verified by the competent services of the General Secretariat of the Council.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-001841/13
an den Rat
Hans-Peter Martin (NI)
(20. Februar 2013)

Betrifft: Anzahl der Vorbereitungssitzungen

Wie viele Sitzungen von Vorbereitungsgremien des Rates gab es jeweils in den Jahren 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 und 2012?

Antwort
(22. April 2013)

Der nachstehenden Tabelle ist zu entnehmen, wie viele Sitzungen von Vorbereitungsgremien des Rates in den Jahren 2008 bis 2012 stattgefunden haben:

Jahr	AStV (1. Teil)	AStV (2. Teil)	Arbeitsgruppen	Insgesamt
2008	80	64	4.480	4.624
2009	75	65	4.272	4.412
2010	55	67	4.127	4.249
2011	60	75	4.373	4.508
2012	66	74	4.480	4.620

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001841/13
to the Council
Hans-Peter Martin (NI)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Number of preparatory meetings

How many meetings of the Council preparatory bodies took place in each of the years 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012?

Reply
(22 April 2013)

The following table shows the number of meetings of Council preparatory bodies from 2008 to 2012:

Year	Coreper 1	Coreper 2	Working Parties	Total
2008	80	64	4.480	4.624
2009	75	65	4.272	4.412
2010	55	67	4.127	4.249
2011	60	75	4.373	4.508
2012	66	74	4.480	4.620

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001842/13
alla Commissione
Roberta Angelilli (PPE)
(20 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: Tutela e salvaguardia dei piccoli commercianti storici presenti in Italia

Il piccolo commercio storico fa parte del patrimonio socio-culturale ed economico dell'intera Europa e ha giocato un ruolo fondamentale per il benessere e lo sviluppo del turismo di tanti comuni, soprattutto di quelli italiani. In effetti, numerose attività commerciali hanno più di 300 anni di vita e hanno alle spalle una lunga tradizione familiare.

Tuttavia, l'attuale crisi economica, che ha ridotto notevolmente il potere d'acquisto delle famiglie, e i prezzi concorrenziali della grande distribuzione hanno messo a rischio le attività di centinaia di migliaia di piccoli commercianti storici che non possono sostenere più i costi di gestione. Tale situazione si è aggravata ulteriormente da quando la grande distribuzione ha adottato formule di apertura anche domenicali con orari prolungati, mettendo di fatto fuori mercato i commercianti storici che non possono sostenere i costi di apertura durante le festività, provocandone di conseguenza il progressivo declino. Per questi motivi anche la Confcommercio, la confederazione generale italiana delle imprese, ha lanciato recentemente una campagna contro l'apertura domenicale, sostenendo l'inutilità delle aperture domenicali dal momento che non ha determinato né un aumento di occupazione stabile né un aumento di fatturato.

Alla luce di quanto suesposto, può la Commissione:

1. indicare come intende tutelare i piccoli commercianti storici dalla grande distribuzione;

2. far sapere se sono stati previsti finanziamenti per la rivalutazione e la salvaguardia dei piccoli commercianti storici nella nuova programmazione 2014-2020;

3. dare un quadro generale della situazione?

Risposta di Michel Barnier a nome della Commissione
(6 maggio 2013)

1. La Commissione è pienamente consapevole delle difficoltà affrontate dai piccoli commercianti nel settore. Il 31 gennaio 2013 la Commissione ha adottato un piano d'azione europeo per il commercio al dettaglio. Il piano d'azione costituisce una strategia europea coerente nel settore delle vendite al dettaglio e prevede undici azioni concrete intese a risolvere una serie di problemi del settore. Per quanto riguarda gli orari di apertura dei negozi, gli Stati membri hanno competenza legislativa in materia, nel rispetto del diritto dell'Unione.

2. Sono attualmente in corso negoziati sul quadro legislativo per la futura politica di coesione parallelamente al dialogo informale con gli Stati membri sulla preparazione di accordi di partenariato e di programmi operativi per il periodo 2014-2020. Inoltre, quest'anno la Commissione istituirà un gruppo permanente per la competitività al dettaglio incaricato di consigliare la Commissione su eventuali altre azioni nell'ambito del programma «Orizzonte 2020». In questo gruppo sono altresì rappresentate le opinioni dei piccoli commercianti.

3. Le azioni contenute nel piano d'azione europeo per il commercio al dettaglio dovrebbero essere attuate entro il 2014. La Commissione monitorerà gli sviluppi e riferirà sui progressi compiuti nell'attuazione di questo piano d'azione, elaborando una relazione nel 2015. Una delle azioni definite nel piano d'azione europeo per il commercio al dettaglio è stata l'adozione di un Libro verde della Commissione sulle pratiche commerciali sleali, sulla cui base il 31 gennaio 2013 è stata avviata una consultazione pubblica. In questo contesto, la Commissione sta lavorando anche a una valutazione d'impatto per decidere come affrontare adeguatamente la questione delle pratiche commerciali sleali. Questa valutazione d'impatto esaminerà attentamente gli effetti di tali pratiche sui piccoli commercianti.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001842/13
to the Commission
Roberta Angelilli (PPE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Protection and safeguarding of traditional shopkeepers in Italy

Traditional shopkeepers are part of the sociocultural and economic heritage of Europe as a whole; they have played a fundamental role in terms of increasing prosperity and developing tourism in many towns and cities, especially in Italy. Indeed, many businesses have been established for more than 300 years and are the product of a long family tradition.

However, the current economic crisis, which has significantly reduced families' purchasing power, and the competitive pricing of supermarkets have jeopardised the activities of hundreds of thousands of traditional shopkeepers, who can no longer cover their operating costs. This situation has been made even worse since supermarkets began trading on Sundays and extended their opening hours, effectively squeezing traditional shopkeepers, who cannot afford to open during holidays, out of the market and causing their gradual decline as a result. That is why Confcommercio, the Italian General Confederation of Enterprises, also recently launched a campaign against Sunday trading, maintaining that it is unnecessary since it has not led to an increase in permanent jobs or turnover.

In view of the above, can the Commission:

1. say how it plans to protect traditional shopkeepers from supermarkets;

2. say whether any funds have been set aside for enhancing and safeguarding traditional shopkeepers in the new programming for 2014-2020;

3. provide an overview of the situation?

Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission
(6 May 2013)

1. The Commission is fully aware of the difficulties smaller players in the sector face. On 31 January 2013, the Commission adopted a European Retail Action Plan. The action plan forms a coherent European strategy for the retail sector by putting forward eleven concrete actions addressing a number of challenges the sector faces. Regarding the opening hours of shops, it is for Member States to set rules in this area provided that they respect any applicable EC law.

2. The negotiations on the legislative framework for future cohesion policy and the parallel informal dialogue with Member States on the preparation of Partnership Agreements and operational programmes 2014-2020 are ongoing. In addition, the Commission will set up, this year, a permanent Group on Retail Competitiveness that will advise it on possible further actions under the 2020 horizon. The views of small retailers will also be represented in this group.

3. The actions set out in the European Retail Action Plan should be implemented by 2014. The Commission will monitor developments and report on the progress in implementing this Action Plan by issuing a report in 2015. One of the actions defined in the European Retail Action Plan was the adoption of a Commission Green Paper on Unfair Trading Practices, on which basis a public consultation was launched on 31 January 2013. In this context, the Commission staff is also working on an impact analysis assessing how the question of unfair trading practices could be best dealt with. This impact assessment will carefully consider the effects of such practices on smaller players.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001843/13
alla Commissione
Mario Borghezio (EFD)
(20 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: Impedire anomalie nell'etichettatura dei prodotti

Nel suo documento COM(2013)0078 del 13.2.2013 relativo alla «proposta di regolamento del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio sulla sicurezza dei prodotti di consumo e che abroga la direttiva 87/357/CEE del Consiglio e la direttiva 2001/95/CE», in particolare all'articolo 7, si fa riferimento all'applicazione del Codice doganale europeo riguardo all'indicazione di origine.

Sulla base di tale articolo, una merce alla cui produzione hanno contribuito due o più Paesi viene considerata originaria del Paese in cui è avvenuta l'ultima trasformazione o lavorazione sostanziale. Si può dedurre quindi che chi avesse delocalizzato la produzione di scarpe o abiti, può semplicemente etichettarle, ad esempio, come italiane, purché l'ultima lavorazione sia stata effettuata in Italia.

Praticamente, con il nuovo regolamento si potrà etichettare come italiano un prodotto che italiano, originariamente, assolutamente non è.

1. La Commissione non ritiene che, in forza di tale normativa, sia il produttore sia il consumatore finale non siano realmente tutelati dalle falsificazioni?

2. Quali iniziative intende attuare la Commissione in merito?

Risposta di Tonio Borg a nome della Commissione
(16 aprile 2013)

L'obiettivo della proposta della Commissione di regolamento del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio sulla sicurezza dei prodotti di consumo del 13 febbraio 2013 ([1]) è migliorare la sicurezza dei prodotti di consumo e la loro tracciabilità. L'obiettivo dell'articolo 7 della proposta è assicurare l'identificazione e la tracciabilità dei prodotti lungo la catena della fornitura e agevolare l'enforcement sul mercato interno. La prescritta identificazione e tracciabilità renderà più facile verificare se le indicazioni d'origine sono genuine.

La Commissione ha proposto di applicare le regole di origine non preferenziale di cui al regolamento (CEE) n. 2913/92 del Consiglio, che istituisce un codice doganale comunitario ([2]) ,le quali dovrebbero essere fatte rispettare dalla autorità nazionali competenti.

La lotta contro le contraffazioni alle frontiere esterne dell'Unione è l'oggetto del regolamento (CE) n. 1383/2003 del Consiglio, del 22 luglio 2003, relativo all'intervento dell'autorità doganale nei confronti di merci sospettate di violare taluni diritti di proprietà intellettuale e alle misure da adottare nei confronti di merci che violano tali diritti ([3]). La Commissione fa inoltre presente che sta per essere adottata dai colegislatori una proposta di regolamento del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio relativo alla tutela dei diritti di proprietà intellettuale da parte delle autorità doganali ([4]). La proposta intende rafforzare ulteriormente il quadro giuridico per l'intervento delle autorità doganali contro le contraffazioni e per affrontare il problema di piccole partite di beni contraffatti inviate per posta, visto che la stragrande maggioranza di questi prodotti è acquistata via internet.

([1]) COM(2013)78 def.
([2]) GU L 302 del 19.10.1992.
([3]) GU L 196 del 2.8.2003.
([4]) COM(2011)285 def.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001843/13
to the Commission
Mario Borghezio (EFD)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Preventing anomalies in product labelling

In its document COM(2013)0078 of 13 February 2013 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on consumer product safety and repealing Council Directive 87/357/EEC and Directive 2001/95/EC, in particular Article 7 thereof, the Commission refers to the application of the Community Customs Code to the indication of origin.

In accordance with that Article, goods whose production involved more than one country shall be deemed to originate in the country where they underwent their last, substantial processing or working. It follows, therefore, that anyone who relocates the production of footwear or clothing can simply label the goods, for example, as Italian, provided that they underwent their last working in Italy.

In practice, the new regulation will allow for products to be labelled as Italian when they most definitely did not originate in Italy.

1. Does the Commission not believe that, under this regulation, neither producers nor final consumers are actually protected from counterfeiting?

2. What action does the Commission intend to take in this regard?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission
(16 April 2013)

The objective of the Commission's proposal for a regulation of the Parliament and of the Council on consumer product safety of 13 February 2013 ([1]) is to improve the safety of consumer products and their traceability. The purpose of Article 7 of that proposal is to ensure the identification and traceability of products throughout the supply chain and facilitate the enforcement in the internal market. The intended, required identification and traceability would make it easier to verify whether the origin indications are genuine.

The Commission has proposed to apply the rules on non-preferential origin as laid down in Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing a Community Customs Code ([2]), which would have to be enforced by the competent national authorities.

Combating counterfeiting at the external borders of the Union is the subject matter of Council Regulation (EC) No 1383/2003 of 22 July 2003 concerning customs action against goods suspected of infringing certain intellectual property rights and the measures to be taken against goods found to have infringed such rights ([3]). The Commission also points out that a proposal for a regulation of the Parliament and of the Council concerning customs enforcement of intellectual property rights ([4]) is about to be adopted by the co-legislators. The proposal aims to further reinforce the legal framework for customs' actions against counterfeiting and to tackle the trade in small consignments of counterfeit goods sent by post as the overwhelming majority of these goods results from Internet sales.

([1]) COM(2013)78 final.
([2]) OJ L 302, 19.10.1992.
([3]) OJ L 196, 2.8.2003.
([4]) COM(2011)285 final.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-001844/13
aan de Commissie
Lucas Hartong (NI)
(20 februari 2013)

Betreft: EU-propagandafilm kost 700 000 euro

Vandaag werd bekend ([1]) dat de Commissie rechthebbend eigenaar is van een propagandafilm die momenteel in de Duitse bioscopen wordt gedraaid. De kosten van 700 000 euro worden betaald uit de EU-begroting. De film is bedoeld om in vele talen uitgegeven te worden, onder meer als strijdmiddel tegen het referendum dat in Engeland gepland is. In dat kader de volgende vragen:

1. Kan de Commissie aangeven uit welke begrotingslijn de 700 000 euro precies komt?

2. Kan de Commissie aangeven op wiens initiatief de film tot stand is gekomen?

3. De film is overduidelijk op jonge jeugd gericht. Is de Commissie het met de PVV eens dat dit erg dicht bij pure propaganda en indoctrinatie komt?

4. Volgens de film was het „vóór de EU" vreselijk: oorlog, nazisme, grenscontrole, vreemde munteenheden. „Nu" is echter een bijna paradijselijke situatie ontstaan met als hoogtepunt de Nobelprijs voor de heren Schulz, Barroso en Van Rompuy. Is de Commissie het met de PVV eens dat deze insteek op zijn minst een ernstige oversimplificatie is van de werkelijkheid en eigenlijk geschiedvervalsing van de bovenste plank?

5. Vindt de Commissie het verstandig en verantwoord om zoveel belastinggeld te verspillen aan zo'n film, middenin de economische crisis die momenteel Europa en haar lidstaten teistert?

6. Is de Commissie het met de PVV eens dat deze film niet een Oscar verdient, maar wel de „Golden Raspberry" voor slechtste film geproduceerd in het jaar 2013?

Antwoord van Mevrouw Reding namens de Commissie
(18 april 2013)

1.-2. De kosten voor deze film zijn gemaakt in het kader van begrotingslijn 16.03.04 — Communiceren over Europa in partnerschap. Per toeschouwer in de bioscoop bedroegen de kosten minder dan EUR 0,19. De bioscoopspot is een gezamenlijk initiatief van „Aktion Europa", het partnerschap tussen de Europese Commissie via haar vertegenwoordiging in Berlijn, het Europees Parlement via zijn informatiebureau in Berlijn en de Duitse federale overheid.

3. Nee.

4. Nee.

5. De Commissie is van mening dat de middelen goed zijn besteed als onderdeel van haar beleid ter vergroting van de bewustwording over de toegevoegde waarde van het EU-beleid, met name in tijden van crisis. Een kostprijs van EUR 0,19 per toeschouwer in de bioscoop, plus aanvullende kijkers online, is niet buitensporig.

6. Nee.

([1]) http://deutsche-wirtschafts-nachrichten.de/2013/02/20/mit-steuergeldern-finanziert-eu-propaganda-film-kostet-700-000-euro/.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001844/13
to the Commission
Lucas Hartong (NI)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: EU propaganda film costs EUR 700 000

It was announced today ([1]) that the Commission is the rights holder of a propaganda film currently being shown in German cinemas. The costs of making this film (EUR 700 000) were borne by the EU budget. The film is intended to be issued in several languages, partly to counteract the planned referendum in Britain. In the light of the above:

1. Can the Commission state from precisely which budget line the EUR 700 000 comes?

2. At whose initiative was the film made?

3. The film is clearly aimed at very young people. Does the Commission agree with the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV) that it comes very close to blatant propaganda and indoctrination?

4. According to the film, things were awful 'before the EU': war, Nazism, border controls, foreign currencies. 'Now', on the other hand, we have an idyllic situation, culminating in the Nobel Prize for Mr Schulz, Mr Barroso and Mr Van Rompuy. Does the Commission agree with the PVV that this approach is at the very least a massive oversimplification of the facts, and is really tantamount to a downright falsification of history?

5. Does the Commission consider it sensible or justifiable to spend so much taxpayers' money on a film like this in the midst of the economic crisis which is currently afflicting Europe and its Member States?

6. Does the Commission agree that this film does not deserve an Oscar but a Golden Raspberry for the worst film produced in 2013?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(18 April 2013)

1-2. The cost for the film in question is covered by budget line 16.03.04 — Communicating Europe in Partnership. The cost per viewer in the cinema was less than EUR 0,19. The cinema spot is a joint initiative of 'Aktion Europa', which is the partnership between the European Commission via its Representation in Berlin, the European Parliament via its Information Office in Berlin, and the German Federal Government.

3. No

4. No

5. The Commission considers the money well spent is part of its policy to raise awareness about the added value of EU policies, in particular in times of crisis. A price of EUR 0,19 per cinema viewer plus additional viewers online is not excessive.

6. No

([1]) http://deutsche-wirtschafts-nachrichten.de/2013/02/20/mit-steuergeldern-finanziert-eu-propaganda-film-kostet-700-000-euro/

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-002319/13
προς την Επιτροπή
Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)
(27 Φεβρουαρίου 2013)

Θέμα: Δήλωση του Ευρωπαίου Επιτρόπου για την Ενέργεια, Günther Oettinger

Όπως μεταδίδεται από την Άγκυρα, σε συνάντηση που οργάνωσε το Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, ο Ευρωπαίος Επίτροπος για την Ενέργεια Günther Oettinger, φέρεται να έχει δηλώσει: «Στοιχηματίζω ότι σε 10 ή 20 χρόνια ο Γερμανός Καγκελάριος και ο Γάλλος ομόλογός του θα παρακαλούν γονατιστοί την Τουρκία να εισέλθει στην ΕΕ». Δικαιολόγησε τη στάση του αυτή λόγω της καλής οικονομίας, η οποία «βελτιώνεται τάχιστα».

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

1. Είναι σε γνώση της η πιο πάνω δήλωση;

2. Εάν ναι, πώς σχολιάζει το περιεχόμενο και το ύφος της δήλωσης, ιδιαίτερα όταν αυτή προέρχεται από έναν Επίτροπο της ΕΕ;

Ειδικότερα όσον αφορά την αναφορά του Επιτρόπου Oettinger για την καλή οικονομία, η οποία «βελτιώνεται τάχιστα»:

3. Αποτελεί η καλή οικονομία μιας υποψήφιας για ένταξη χώρας αρκετό και μοναδικό κριτήριο για να γίνει μέλος της ΕΕ;

Κοινή απάντηση του κ. Oettinger εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(6 Μαΐου 2013)

Ο επίτροπος κ. Oettinger εξέφρασε την προσωπική του άποψη βασιζόμενος σε μια ευρέως διαδεδομένη εκτίμηση του ρόλου και των δυνατοτήτων της Τουρκίας. Η επίσημη θέση της Επιτροπής είναι αυτή που έχει εγκριθεί από το Σώμα των Επιτρόπων κατ' εφαρμογή των τυπικών διαδικασιών. Όσον αφορά συγκεκριμένα την Τουρκία, η Επιτροπή θα ήθελε να παραπέμψει το Αξιότιμο Μέλος του Κοινοβουλίου στην ανακοίνωσή της ([1]), στην οποία συμπεραίνεται, μεταξύ άλλων, ότι «*η Τουρκία αποτελεί ουσιαστικής σημασίας χώρα για την ΕΕ, δεδομένης της δυναμικής οικονομίας, της στρατηγικής θέσης και του σημαντικού περιφερειακού της ρόλου*». Και ότι «*… οι δυνατότητες της σχέσης ΕΕ-Τουρκίας μπορούν να αξιοποιηθούν πλήρως μόνο στο πλαίσιο ενεργού και αξιόπιστης διαδικασίας προσχώρησης που σέβεται τις δεσμεύσεις έναντι της ΕΕ και τις συμφωνηθείσες προϋποθέσεις. Είναι προς το συμφέρον αμφότερων των μερών να αναθερμανθούν οι διαπραγματεύσεις προσχώρησης, διασφαλίζοντας ότι η ΕΕ παραμένει βασικό σημείο αναφοράς για τις μεταρρυθμίσεις στην Τουρκία*». Τα εν λόγω συμπεράσματα και οι συστάσεις αντικατοπτρίστηκαν σε μεγάλο βαθμό στα συμπεράσματα του Ευρωπαϊκού Συμβουλίου του Δεκεμβρίου 2012.

Επί του παρόντος, οι διαπραγματεύσεις προσχώρησης με την Τουρκία βρίσκονται σε εξέλιξη, με βάση μια επίσημη εντολή, το διαπραγματευτικό πλαίσιο, που εγκρίθηκε ομόφωνα από το Συμβούλιο το 2005 και το οποίο περιλαμβάνει όλες τις διαστάσεις του «κεκτημένου της ΕΕ». Η ετοιμότητα των υποψήφιων χωρών για προσχώρηση στην ΕΕ αξιολογείται με βάση τα «κριτήρια της Κοπεγχάγης», ως εξής:

— πολιτικά: σταθερότητα των θεσμών που εγγυώνται τη δημοκρατία, το κράτος δικαίου, τα ανθρώπινα δικαιώματα και τον σεβασμό και την προστασία των μειονοτήτων,

— οικονομικά: ύπαρξη μιας λειτουργούσας οικονομίας της αγοράς και ικανότητα αντιμετώπισης των ανταγωνιστικών πιέσεων και των δυνάμεων της αγοράς στο εσωτερικό της Ένωσης,

— αποδοχή του κοινοτικού κεκτημένου.

([1]) Ανακοίνωση προς το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο και το Συμβούλιο σχετικά με την «Στρατηγική για τη διεύρυνση και κυριότερες προκλήσεις για την περίοδο 2012-2013», που εγκρίθηκε τον Οκτώβριο του 2012.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-001845/13
aan de Commissie
Laurence J. A. J. Stassen (NI)
(20 februari 2013)

Betreft: Commissaris Oettinger uit kritiek op „moeizame toetreding" Turkije

Europees commissaris Oettinger van Energie heeft tijdens een bijeenkomst van de Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Brussel kritiek geuit op de „moeizame en langdurige toetreding" van Turkije tot de EU. Hij zei: „Ik wed dat de Duitse bondskanselier komend decennium samen met zijn of haar Franse collega in Ankara op de knieën zal gaan en de Turken zal smeken: „Vrienden, kom bij ons"" ([1]).

1. Is de Commissie bekend met de uitspraken van de heer Oettinger?

2. In welke hoedanigheid heeft de heer Oettinger, Europees commissaris van Energie, zijn uitspraken gedaan? Op welke wijze vallen de toetredingsonderhandelingen tussen de EU en Turkije binnen zijn competentie?

3. Hoe interpreteert de Commissie de uitspraken van de heer Oettinger? Waarom zou de Turken gesmeekt moeten worden: „Vrienden, kom bij ons"?

4. Is de Commissie het eens met de uitspraken van de heer Oettinger? Zo neen, is de Commissie er derhalve toe bereid de heer Oettinger terecht te wijzen?

5. Welk gevolg hebben de uitspraken van de heer Oettinger voor de toetredingsonderhandelingen tussen de EU en Turkije? Deelt de Commissie de mening dat zijn uitspraken zeer ongepast zijn?

Antwoord van de heer Oettinger namens de Commissie
(6 mei 2013)

Commissaris Oettinger heeft zijn persoonlijke mening geuit op basis van een wijdverbreide beoordeling van de rol en het potentieel van Turkije. Het officiële standpunt van de Commissie is het standpunt dat via de formele procedures door het college van Commissieleden is aangenomen. Specifiek met betrekking tot Turkije wil de Commissie het geachte Parlementslid wijzen op haar mededeling ([2]), waarin onder meer wordt gesteld dat *„Turkije voor de EU een zeer belangrijk land is, door zijn dynamische economie, zijn strategische ligging en zijn grote rol in de regio"* en dat *„het potentieel van de betrekkingen van de EU met Turkije alleen volledig kan worden benut binnen het kader van een actief en geloofwaardig toetredingsproces dat in overeenstemming is met de verbintenissen van de EU en de gestelde voorwaarden. Het is in het belang van zowel de EU als Turkije dat de toetredingsonderhandelingen weer op tempo komen, niet in de laatste plaats om ervoor te zorgen dat de EU het ijkpunt blijft voor de hervormingen in Turkije"*. Deze conclusies en aanbevelingen zijn uitvoerig aan bod gekomen in de conclusies van de Europese Raad van december 2012.

De toetredingsonderhandelingen met Turkije zijn momenteel aan de gang en verlopen volgens een formeel mandaat, namelijk het onderhandelingskader dat in 2005 door de Raad unaniem is goedgekeurd. Het kader omvat alle dimensies van het acquis van de EU. Of een kandidaat-lidstaat klaar is voor toetreding, wordt beoordeeld op basis van de criteria van Kopenhagen:

— politieke criteria: het land moet stabiele instellingen hebben die de democratie, de rechtsstaat, de mensenrechten en het respect voor en de bescherming van minderheden garanderen;

— economische criteria: het land moet een functionerende markteconomie hebben en het hoofd kunnen bieden aan de concurrentiedruk en de marktkrachten binnen de EU;

— het land moet het acquis communautaire aanvaarden.

([1]) http://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/guenther-oettinger/eu-kommissar-kritisiert-eu-kurs-zur-tuerkei-29190992.bild.html
([2]) Mededeling van de Commissie aan de Raad en het Europees Parlement over de uitbreidingsstrategie en belangrijkste uitdagingen 2012-2012, die in oktober 2012 is aangenomen.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001845/13
to the Commission
Laurence J.A.J. Stassen (NI)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Commissioner Oettinger criticises slow progress of Turkish accession

At a meeting of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Brussels, Günther Oettinger, European Commissioner for Energy, criticised the slow and long drawn-out process of Turkish accession to the EU. He said 'I would like to bet that one day in the next decade a German chancellor and his or her counterpart in Paris will have to crawl to Ankara on their knees to beg the Turks, "Friends, come to us"' ([1]).

1. Is the Commission aware of Mr Oettinger's statement?

2. In what capacity did Mr Oettinger, the European Commissioner for Energy, make his statement? In what way do the accession negotiations between the EU and Turkey fall within his remit?

3. How does the Commission interpret Mr Oettinger's words? Why would we have to go and beg the Turks: 'Friends, come to us'?

4. Does the Commission agree with Mr Oettinger's words? If not, is it prepared to take Mr Oettinger to task for them?

5. What impact will Mr Oettinger's words have on the accession negotiations between the EU and Turkey? Does the Commission agree that these words were very ill-chosen?

Question for written answer E-002319/13
to the Commission
Antigoni Papadopoulou (S&D)
(27 February 2013)

Subject: Statement by Günther Oettinger, the European Energy Commissioner

It is reported from Ankara that, at a meeting organised by the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, the European Commissioner for Energy, Günther Oettinger, said the following: 'I wager that in 10 or 20 years' time, the German Chancellor and the President of France will go down on their knees begging Turkey to join the EU.' He justified his position with reference to the strong economy 'which was rapidly improving.'

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

1. Is it aware of the above statement?

2. If so, what comments would it like to make on the content and style of this statement, coming, as it does, from the mouth of an EU Commissioner?

Specifically as regards Commissioner Oettinger's reference to the strong economy 'which was rapidly improving':

3. Is the strong economy of a candidate country a sufficient criterion in itself for admission to the EU?

([1]) http://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/guenther-oettinger/eu-kommissar-kritisiert-eu-kurs-zur-tuerkei-29190992.bild.html

Joint answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission
(6 May 2013)

Commissioner Oettinger expressed his personal view based on a widely shared assessment of Turkey's role and potential. The Commission's official position is that adopted by the College of Commissioners through its formal procedures. As regards more specifically Turkey, the Commission would like to refer the Honourable Member to its communication ([2]) which concludes, *inter alia*, that 'Turkey is a key country for the EU, considering its dynamic economy, its strategic location and its important regional role'. And '… the potential of the EU-Turkey relationship can be fully tapped only within the framework of an active and credible accession process which respects the EU's commitments and the established conditionality. It is in the interest of both the EU and Turkey that accession negotiations regain their momentum, not the least to ensure that the EU remains the benchmark for reforms in Turkey'. These conclusions and recommendations have been widely reflected in the European Council conclusions of December 2012.

Accession negotiations are currently ongoing with Turkey, based on a formal mandate, the Negotiating Framework, unanimously adopted by the Council in 2005, which comprises all the dimensions of the EU *acquis*. Readiness for accession of candidate countries is assessed on the basis of the 'Copenhagen criteria' as follows:

— political: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;

— economic: existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union;

— acceptance of the Community *acquis*.

([2]) Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on the 'Enlargement strategy and main challenges 2012-2013', adopted in October 2012.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-001846/13
aan de Commissie
Laurence J. A. J. Stassen (NI)
(20 februari 2013)

Betreft: Turkse regering start „reddingsactie" voor Turkse kinderen in christelijke/homoseksuele gezinnen

De Turkse regering begint een „reddingsactie" voor Turkse kinderen die onder meer bij Nederlandse en Belgische pleeggezinnen zijn ondergebracht. De Turken vinden het maar niets dat de kinderen bij christelijke/homoseksuele gezinnen zijn geplaatst.

De voorzitter van de Turkse onderzoekscommissie voor de mensenrechten, Ayhan Üstün, vindt het kwalijk dat, bijvoorbeeld, de negenjarige Yunus door de Nederlandse rechter aan een lesbisch stel werd toevertrouwd. Volgens hem gebeurt dit met maar één doel: assimilatie.

Deze onderzoekscommissie gaat de komende maanden contact opnemen met ouders, politici, Jeugdzorg en Turkse organisaties om hen te overtuigen van de noodzaak om Turkse kinderen in een pleeggezin te plaatsen met dezelfde culturele en religieuze achtergrond.

1. Is de Commissie bekend met de berichten „Reddingsactie Turkse kinderen" ([1]) en „Turkije wil adoptie kids door holebi's (België) en christelijke koppels terug" ([2])?

2. Hoe beoordeelt de Commissie het dat de Turkse regering het kwalijk vindt dat Turkse kinderen in Nederland en België resp. in de EU in christelijke/homoseksuele gezinnen zijn geplaatst? Wat vindt de Commissie ervan dat Turkije zich überhaupt met de samenstelling van gezinnen in de EU bemoeit?

3. Deelt de Commissie de mening dat hieruit de anti-christelijke en anti-homoseksuele houding van Turkije blijkt? Deelt de Commissie de mening dat dit in strijd met de mensenrechten én de Kopenhagencriteria is? Heeft dit dan ook gevolgen voor de toetredingsonderhandelingen tussen de EU en Turkije? Zo ja, welke? Zo neen, waarom niet?

4. Deelt de Commissie de mening dat — in tegenstelling tot wat de heer Üstün zegt — assimilatie juist van groot belang is voor integratie en participatie in de samenleving?

Antwoord van de heer Füle namens de Commissie
(15 april 2013)

De Commissie is op de hoogte van de door het geachte Parlementslid gesignaleerde kwestie.

De Commissie wijst erop dat deze specifieke kwestie onder de bevoegdheid van de lidstaten valt en door het nationale recht wordt geregeld, met name door de wijze waarop in het nationale recht het begrip „het belang van het kind" wordt uitgelegd.

Om die reden vindt de Commissie het niet passend om uitspraken te doen over de concrete zaak die in de door het geachte Parlementslid aangehaalde persberichten wordt vermeld.

([1]) http://www.telegraaf.nl/binnenland/21307024/__Reddingsactie_Turkse_kinderen__.html
([2]) http://holebi.info/phpnews/kortnews.php?action=fullnews & id=10675.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001846/13
to the Commission
Laurence J.A.J. Stassen (NI)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Turkish Government launches 'rescue campaign' for Turkish children in Christian/homosexual families

The Turkish Government is launching a 'rescue campaign' for Turkish children who have been housed with foster families in countries such as Holland and Belgium. The Turks do not like these children being placed with Christian or homosexual families.

The Chair of the Turkish Parliament's Human Rights Commission, Ayhan Üstün, objects to cases such as that of nine-year-old Yunus, who was entrusted to a lesbian couple by a Dutch court. He considers that this is being done solely in the interest of assimilation.

In the next few months this human rights commission will be contacting parents, politicians, Youth Welfare Offices and Turkish organisations to try and persuade them of the need to place Turkish children in foster families with the same cultural and religious background.

1. Is the Commission aware of the press reports entitled 'Rescue campaign for Turkish children' ([1]) (Netherlands) and 'Turkey wants to retrieve kids adopted by LGB and Christian couples' ([2]) (Belgium) ?

2. What is the Commission's view of the fact that the Turkish Government objects to the placing of Turkish children with Christian or homosexual couples in Holland, Belgium or elsewhere in the EU? What does the Commission think of Turkey concerning itself with family structures in the EU at all?

3. Does the Commission agree that this case shows up Turkey's anti-Christian and anti-homosexual attitudes? Does the Commission agree that this conflicts with human rights and the Copenhagen Criteria? Will it then have consequences for the accession negotiations between the EU and Turkey? If so, what consequences? If not, why not?

4. Does the Commission agree that, contrary to what Mr Üstün says, assimilation is crucial to integration and participation in society?

Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission
(15 April 2013)

The Commission is aware of the matter raised by the Honourable Member.

The Commission would like to point out that this specific matter falls under Member States' competence and is governed by national law, in particular the way the latter interprets the notion of best interest of the child.

Therefore, the Commission considers it not appropriate to express views on the concrete case mentioned in the press reports the Honourable Member referred to

([1]) http://www.telegraaf.nl/binnenland/21307024/__Reddingsactie_Turkse_kinderen__.html
([2]) http://holebi.info/phpnews/kortnews.php?action=fullnews&id=10675

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-001848/13
aan de Commissie
Auke Zijlstra (NI)
(20 februari 2013)

Betreft: Schending van Oslo II

Hierbij wil ik de Commissie danken voor haar reactie op mijn vraag of de toekenning van de niet-lidstaatstatus van Palestina bij de Verenigde Naties (VN) in strijd is met de Oslo-akkoorden van 1993 (E-010924/2012). Tot mijn spijt moet ik echter constateren dat de Commissie mijn vragen niet beantwoordt.

Zoals ik in mijn eerdere vraag heb gesteld, is bij het sluiten van het Oslo II-akkoord afgesproken dat beide verdragspartners nader zouden onderhandelen over de status van Jeruzalem, het nederzettingenbeleid en het vaststellen van de landsgrenzen. De Europese Unie is getuige geweest van deze afspraken. Het verhogen van de status van Palestina in de VN veronderstelt dat deze nadere onderhandelingen tot tevredenheid van beide partijen zijn afgerond. Dat is echter niet het geval.

Het geven van de niet-lidstaatstatus aan Palestina veronderstelt dat Palestina een soeverein territorium kent dat door de VN is erkend. De grenzen van Palestina zijn echter niet vastgesteld en evenmin door de VN erkend. Bij het Oslo II-akkoord is immers afgesproken dat daarover nader wordt onderhandeld.

Mijn vragen zijn daarom:

1. Is de Commissie het eens met het hierboven door mij gestelde?

2. Zo niet, waarom niet?

3. Vindt de Commissie dat het verlenen van de niet-lidstaatstatus aan Palestina in overeenstemming is met het Oslo II-akkoord?

4. Zo ja, op welke grond?

Naar aanleiding van de reactie van de Commissie op mijn vraag E-010924/2012 stel ik u de volgende vervolgvraag:

5. De president van Palestina, de heer Mahmoud Abbas, blijkt te hebben beloofd dat hij, na verlening van de niet-lidstaatstatus door de VN, aan de onderhandelingstafel met Israël zal plaatsnemen. Tot op heden heeft hij dat niet gedaan. Op basis van welke informatie gaat de Commissie ervan uit dat het Palestijnse leiderschap op afzienbare termijn wel zal onderhandelen met Israël over de nadere uitwerking van de Oslo-akkoorden?

Antwoord van hoge vertegenwoordiger/vicevoorzitter Ashton namens de Commissie
(24 april 2013)

De Commissie is het niet eens met de stelling dat het verlenen aan Palestina van de status van niet-lidstaat met waarnemersstatus bij de VN, veronderstelt dat Palestina over soeverein grondgebied en vastgelegde grenzen beschikt, en dat de onderhandelingen tussen Israël en Palestina tot tevredenheid van beide partijen zijn afgerond. De meerderheid van de lidstaten van de EU heeft voor resolutie 67/19 van de Algemene Vergadering van de VN gestemd. Toch is de EU ook bereid om eventueel een Palestijnse staat te erkennen, zoals duidelijk wordt gesteld in de verklaring van de hoge vertegenwoordiger namens de Europese Unie van 29 november 2012.

De status van het desbetreffende grondgebied is niet gewijzigd. Het gebied is nog steeds bezet. De EU ziet geen tegenstrijdigheid tussen de resolutie die in een multilateraal VN-kader werd goedgekeurd, en de bilaterale overeenkomst tussen Israël en de PLO waarin bepaalde bevoegdheden van de bezettingsmacht naar de Palestijnse Autoriteit zijn overgedragen.

Zoals de secretaris-generaal van de VN op 8 maart heeft verklaard, staat de aanneming van resolutie 67/19 „symbool voor het toenemende internationale ongeduld tegenover de langdurige bezetting en ondersteunt ze de Palestijnse aspiraties om in een eigen, onafhankelijke staat te leven. Dit kan echter alleen worden bereikt door te onderhandelen over een oplossing voor de kwesties in verband met de definitieve status." De EU erkent dat de periode sinds 29 november in Israël werd gekenmerkt door de verkiezingscampagne en de regeringsonderhandelingen. Zodra de nieuwe regering is gevormd, zal de EU al het mogelijke doen om de partijen bij de hervatting van de onderhandelingen bij te staan.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001848/13
to the Commission
Auke Zijlstra (NI)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Breach of Oslo II

I should like to thank the Commission for its reply to my question as to whether the granting to Palestine of 'non-member observer state' status at the United Nations (UN) breaches the Oslo Accords of 1993 (E-010924/2012). Regrettably, however, I find that the Commission has not answered my questions.

As I stated in my previous question, when the Oslo II Accords were concluded it was agreed that the two contracting parties would negotiate further on the status of Jerusalem, the settlement policy and the demarcation of national borders. The European Union acted as a witness to these accords. Raising Palestine's status at the VN implies that these further negotiations have been completed to the satisfaction of both parties. However, that is not the case.

Granting Palestine non-member observer state status presupposes that Palestine possesses sovereign territory which is recognised by the UN. However, Palestine's borders have not been established, nor have they been recognised by the UN. Under the Oslo II Accords, it was agreed that this would be a subject for further negotiation.

1. Does the Commission agree with my above statements?

2. If not, why not?

3. Does the Commission consider that granting Palestine non-member observer state status is in accordance with the Oslo II Accords?

4. If so, on what grounds?

Further to the Commission's reply to my Question E-010924/2012, I would also like to put this follow-up question:

5. It has emerged that the President of Palestine, Mr Mahmoud Abbas, promised that, once the UN had granted Palestine the above status, he would come to the negotiating table with Israel. To date, he has not done so. On the basis of what information does the Commission assume that the Palestinian leadership will within the foreseeable future negotiate with Israel to decide further details connected with the Oslo Accords?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(24 April 2013)

The Commission does not agree with the statement that granting Palestine non-member observer State status at the UN presupposes that Palestine possesses sovereign territory, established borders, and that Israeli-Palestinian negotiations have been completed to the satisfaction of both parties. The majority of EU member states voted in favour of the UNGA resolution 67/19 yet, as the Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU of 29 November 2012 mades clear, the EU is willing to recognise a Palestinian state when appropriate.

The status of the territory concerned has not changed — it remains occupied. The EU sees no contradiction between the resolution agreed in a multilateral UN framework and the bilateral agreement between Israel and the PLO which conferred certain powers from the occupying power to the Palestinian Authority.

As the UN Secretary General stated on 8 March, the adoption of resolution 67/19 'symbolized the growing international impatience with the long-standing occupation and clearly endorsed Palestinian aspirations to live…in an independent State of their own…This can only be achieved, however, through negotiations to solve all final status issues.' The EU recognises that the period since 29 November has been characterised in Israel by an election campaign and negotiations to form a government. With the formation of a government, the EU will make every effort to assist the parties in resuming negotiations.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-001849/13
aan de Commissie
Auke Zijlstra (NI)
(20 februari 2013)

Betreft: Europees participatiecontract

De Nederlandse minister van Sociale Zaken heeft op woensdag 20 februari jl. in een interview gesteld dat iedere migrant die zich inschrijft in een Nederlandse gemeente, een participatiecontract moet ondertekenen ([1]). Dit contract is een aanvulling op de bestaande inburgeringexamens en geldt voor iedereen die zich (tijdelijk) in Nederland vestigt. Met het tekenen van het contract onderschrijven nieuwkomers de Nederlandse grondrechten en de rechtsstaat en binden ze zich aan de Nederlandse normen en waarden. Het gaat ook om migranten uit de EU, Turkije en de Nederlandse Antillen.

1. Kent de Commissie dit initiatief van de Nederlandse regering?

In haar antwoord op mijn vraag over de integratie van moslims (E-010154/2012) van 17 januari jl. heeft de Commissie het belang van integratie onderschreven. Zij heeft daarbij onder meer gesteld dat migranten en minderheden het rechtssysteem van het land waarin zij leven moeten aanvaarden.

2. Hoe beoordeelt de Commissie het door de Nederlandse regering voorgestelde participatiecontract dat erop is gericht de integratie van immigranten in de Nederlandse samenleving te bevorderen en het rechtssysteem van Nederland te aanvaarden?

3. Hoe verhoudt het participatiecontract zich met EU-wetgeving?

4. Hoe beoordeelt de Commissie het invoeren van een participatiecontract dat de Europese waarden en normen zou waarborgen bij immigranten van de EU?

5. Zou in haar visie elke inwoner van de EU een participatiecontract over waarden en normen moeten aangaan met Europese overheden?

Antwoord van mevrouw Malmström namens de Commissie
(11 april 2013)

De Commissie is op de hoogte van het voorstel van minister Lodewijk Asscher om alle buitenlanders die naar Nederland verhuizen, een participatiecontract te laten ondertekenen. De Commissie heeft aanwijzingen dat het nog maar om een voorstel gaat en dat de details nog niet bekend zijn.

Zoals beschreven in de gemeenschappelijke basisbeginselen ([2]), is integratie een dynamisch tweerichtingsproces van wederzijdse aanpassing door alle immigranten en ingezetenen van de lidstaten. Het is niet alleen belangrijk dat migranten de fundamentele waarden van het gastland kennen. Even belangrijk in dit verband is het dat zij beschikken over de nodige kennis en vaardigheden om in hun nieuwe verblijfplaats te gedijen. Dit betekent dat ook de barrières die hen daarvan zouden verhinderen, moeten worden weggenomen.

Aangezien de Commissie niet over gedetailleerde informatie beschikt over de bepalingen van het participatiecontract en de juridische gevolgen die zouden zijn verbonden aan het niet ondertekenen van het contract of het niet naleven van de erin vervatte verplichtingen, kan de Commissie niet nagaan of het contract met het EU-recht strookt.

Elke verplichte integratiemaatregel die EU-burgers wordt opgelegd als voorwaarde om in een andere lidstaat te mogen verblijven, vormt een obstakel voor de fundamentele vrijheid van verkeer die in artikel 21 VWEU is vastgelegd en die in Richtlijn 2004/38/EG verder is uitgewerkt, en is eveneens in strijd met het verbod van discriminatie op grond van nationaliteit dat in artikel 18 VWEU is neergelegd.

([1]) www.spitsnieuws.nl/archives/binnenland/3013/02/asscher-contract-met-alle-nieuwkomers.
([2]) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/nl/jha/82873.pdf

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001849/13
to the Commission
Auke Zijlstra (NI)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: European participation contract

On Wednesday, 20 February 2013, the Netherlands Minister for Social Affairs said in an interview that any migrant who registers in a Dutch municipality must sign a participation contract ([1]). This contract supplements the existing civic integration examinations and will apply to everyone who comes to live in the Netherlands (even temporarily). By signing the contract, newcomers will accept Dutch fundamental rights and the rule of law, and endorse Dutch norms and values. The same rules will apply to migrants from the EU, Turkey and the Netherlands Antilles.

1. Is the Commission aware of this initiative by the Netherlands Government?

In its answer to my question of 17 January 2013 concerning the integration of Muslims (E-010154/2012), the Commission endorsed the importance of integration. It stated, *inter alia*, that migrants and minorities must accept the legal system of the country in which they live.

2. What view does the Commission take of the participation contract proposed by the Netherlands Government, which is intended to promote the integration of immigrants into Dutch society and [encourage them?] to accept the Netherlands' legal system?

3. What is the status of the participation contract under EC law?

4. What view does the Commission take of the possibility of introducing a participation contract which would ensure that immigrants entering the EU subscribe to European values and norms?

5. Ought every resident of the EU to conclude a participation contract on values and norms with European authorities?

Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission
(11 April 2013)

The Commission is aware of Minister Lodewijk Asscher's proposal to ask all foreigners who move to the Netherlands to sign a Participation Contract. The Commission has indications that it is still a proposal and the details are not known yet.

As set out in the Common Basic Principles ([2]), integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States. In this context, if it is important to know the underlying values of the host country, it is equally important for a migrant to be equipped with the necessary skills and know-how that will enable to succeed in the new place of residence. This means also removing barriers that would prevent the migrant from doing so.

Since the Commission does not have detailed information on what the participation contract would stipulate and what the legal consequences would be of not signing the contract or breaking the commitments contained in it, the Commission cannot assess it under EC law.

Any compulsory integration measures imposed on EU citizens as a pre-condition for the right to reside in another Member State would be an obstacle to the fundamental freedom of movement laid down in Article 21 TFEU and further specified in Directive 2004/38, as well as contrary to the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality enshrined in Article 18 TFEU.

([1]) www.spitsnieuws.nl/archives/binnenland/3013/02/asscher-contract-met-alle-nieuwkomers.
([2]) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/82745.pdf

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-001850/13
aan de Commissie
Esther de Lange (PPE)
(20 februari 2013)

Betreft: Blauwtong in de Baltische regio

Volgens het referentielaboratorium van de EU en de OIE in Pirbright zijn er in november en december 2012 nieuwe vondsten van blauwtong gedaan in de Baltische regio (Estland, Letland, Litouwen en Polen).

Aangezien het gaat om serotype 14 dat daar van nature niet voorkomt, bestaat het vermoeden dat het serotype de EU is binnengekomen via vaccins met levende entstof, mogelijk vanuit Rusland. In de EU is het verboden levende vaccins te gebruiken. Bij eerdere meldingen van blauwtong in de Europese Unie werden er maatregelen genomen door de Commissie.

1. Is de Commissie door de lidstaten in kwestie op de hoogte gesteld van de blauwtongbesmettingen en wat was de strekking van de ontvangen informatie?

2. Waarom zijn de besmettingen niet aangemeld bij de OIE?

3. Indien de Commissie van mening is dat er geen meldingsplicht bij de OIE is omdat er geen sprake zou zijn van een daadwerkelijke ziekte-uitbraak, hoe verklaart zij dan de aanwezigheid van blauwtong van serotype 14?

4. Wat is de huidige stand van zaken met betrekking tot de geconstateerde besmettingen/aanwezigheid van blauwtong in de genoemde regio?

5. Welke maatregelen neemt de Commissie om de risico's van verdere besmetting en uitbreiding naar andere lidstaten te voorkomen en om inzicht te hebben in het gebruik van vaccins, bijvoorbeeld in derde landen van waaruit de EU importeert?

6. Is de Commissie voornemens op korte termijn een plan van aanpak te presenteren tegen de aanwezigheid van blauwtong in de genoemde regio? Zo nee, waarom niet? Zo ja, wanneer is dit plan beschikbaar?

Antwoord van de heer Borg namens de Commissie
(2 april 2013)

De Commissie is tijdig door de lidstaten geïnformeerd over de bevindingen die betrekking hebben op een vaccinincident als gevolg van de circulatie van een vaccinachtige stam van bluetonguevirus serotype 14. De door de Commissie ontvangen informatie bevatte surveillancegegevens en de resultaten van proeven en analyses die werden uitgevoerd door het EU-referentielaboratorium voor bluetongue (BT). Bovendien heeft de Commissie alle relevante informatie beschikbaar gesteld op haar website ([1]).

De Commissie heeft geen informatie tot haar beschikking over hoe, waar, en wanneer dit BT- vaccinincident, vermoedelijk veroorzaakt door het illegale gebruik van een levend verzwakt vaccin, zich voor het eerst heeft voorgedaan. Er zijn geen aanwijzingen gevonden dat de circulatie van het vaccinvirus verband hield met het verplaatsen of invoeren van levende dieren of van sperma of embryo's van die dieren.

Aangezien de bevindingen die verband houden met de circulatie van de vaccinstam niet wijzen op een BT-uitbraak, is de Wereldorganisatie voor diergezondheid (OIE) noch de Commissie van de ziekte op de hoogte gesteld.

EU-wetgeving inzake BT is gericht op de bestrijding van de ziekte veroorzaakt door BT „veld" virussen en bevat regels voor het juiste gebruik van de verschillende vaccins. Deze regels zijn doeltreffend gebleken, echter, vaccinincidenten zoals hierboven vermeld zijn geen BT-uitbraken en vallen niet onder het toepassingsgebied van de EU-wetgeving. Daarom is niet voorzien in een specifiek controleplan, afgezien van een passend toezicht, in de zone waar het bluetonguevaccin serotype 14 vaccin is ontdekt.

([1]) http://ec.europa.eu/food/animal/diseases/controlmeasures/bluetongue_en.htm

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001850/13
to the Commission
Esther de Lange (PPE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Bluetongue in the Baltic region

According to the reference laboratory of the EU and the OIE in Pirbright, in November and December 2012 new cases of bluetongue were diagnosed in the Baltic region (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland).

As they involved serotype 14, which does not naturally occur there, it is suspected that the serotype entered the EU via live vaccines, possibly from Russia. In the EU, the use of live vaccines is prohibited. The Commission took measures in response to previous notifications of bluetongue in the European Union.

1. Was the Commission informed by the Member States in question that bluetongue infections had occurred, and what particulars did the information received include?

2. Why were the infections not reported to the OIE?

3. If the Commission considers that there is no requirement to notify the OIE because there was no actual outbreak of disease, how does it explain the presence of bluetongue of serotype 14?

4. What is the state of play with regard to the infections discovered / the presence of bluetongue in the region in question?

5. What measures will the Commission take to prevent risks of further infection and of a spread to other Member States and to obtain information about the use of vaccines, for example in third countries from which the EU sources imports?

6. Does the Commission intend in the near future to present a plan for combating bluetongue in the region in question? If not, why not? If so, when will the plan be available?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission
(2 April 2013)

The Commission has been timely informed by the Member States concerned about the findings related to a vaccine incident due to the circulation of a vaccine-like strain of bluetongue (BT) virus serotype 14. The information received included surveillance data and results of tests and analysis carried out by the EU Reference laboratory for BT. Moreover, the Commission has made all the relevant information available on its website ([1]).

The Commission has no information about how, when and where this BT vaccine incident, likely due to illegal use of a live attenuated vaccine, first occurred. There is no indication that vaccine virus circulation was related to movements or imports of live animals or their semen or embryos.

Given that findings related to circulation of the vaccine strain do not constitute a BT outbreak, no notification of the disease was made to the World Organisation for Animal Health or to the Commission.

EU legislation on BT is aimed at the control of the disease caused by BT 'field' viruses and contains rules on how to properly use the different vaccines. These rules have proved to be effective, however, vaccine incidents like the one mentioned above are not BT outbreaks and do not fall under the scope of EU legislation. Consequently, no specific control plan, apart from appropriate surveillance, is envisaged for the zone where the BT serotype 14 vaccine has been detected.

([1]) http://ec.europa.eu/food/animal/diseases/controlmeasures/bluetongue_en.htm

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-001851/13
à la Commission
Claude Turmes (Verts/ALE)
(20 février 2013)

Objet: Mise en œuvre de l'initiative citoyenne européenne (ICE)

Presqu'un an après le lancement de l'initiative citoyenne européenne (ICE), les organisateurs d'initiatives dans ce contexte font état de nombreux problèmes techniques et juridiques qui empêchent les citoyens de souscrire à une ICE.

1. Comment la Commission s'efforce-t-elle de répondre en particulier aux plaintes des citoyens concernant des problèmes liés à l'utilisation du logiciel de collecte en ligne de l'ICE? Combien de conseillers techniques et de programmateurs sont actuellement chargés de répondre aux demandes concernant la plateforme «JoinUp»? Vu le grand nombre de plaintes, la Commission compte-t-elle redoubler d'efforts pour résoudre les difficultés rencontrées avec le logiciel de l'ICE?

2. La Commission entend-elle apporter une aide technique et financière aux organisateurs qui doivent développer leur propre logiciel de collecte en ligne en raison des nombreux problèmes signalés eu égard à la solution fournie par la Commission?

3. Quelles mesures la Commission prend-elle pour que certains groupes de citoyens européens ne soient plus exclus de la souscription à des ICE, par exemple les Irlandais et les Néerlandais qui vivent à l'extérieur de l'Union ou dans un État membre qui n'accepte que les signatures de ses propres citoyens, ou le personnel de l'Union européenne qui n'est pas enregistré au titre du système national de sécurité sociale (comme au Luxembourg)?

4. Que fait la Commission pour inclure les ONG et les militants dans le développement et l'amélioration du mécanisme de l'ICE?

5. Les citoyens du Luxembourg sont obligés d'inscrire leur numéro de sécurité sociale pour pouvoir souscrire à une ICE. Cependant, le logiciel de collecte en ligne ne spécifie pas le format dans lequel les utilisateurs doivent entrer le numéro dans ce champ obligatoire. De plus, le nom du champ («numéro d'identification national») est trompeur dans la mesure où, en général, les citoyens ne font pas automatiquement le lien avec le numéro de sécurité sociale. En fait, ce numéro est normalement appelé «numéro de matricule de la sécurité sociale nationale». En outre, la dénomination du champ ne figure qu'en français, quelle que soit la langue choisie. Quand pouvons-nous attendre de la Commission qu'elle remédie à ce défaut du logiciel de collecte en ligne, qui empêche de nombreux citoyens luxembourgeois de souscrire à des ICE?

6. Le système actuel empêche les organisateurs d'ajouter des traductions dans des langues autres que les langues officielles de l'Union européenne, par exemple le luxembourgeois. Quand la Commission compte-t-elle autoriser les traductions des ICE dans des langues autres que les langues officielles de l'Union?

Réponse donnée par M. Šefčovič au nom de la Commission
(10 avril 2013)

1 et 2. Le logiciel de collecte en ligne OCS développé par la Commission est pleinement opérationnel. Comme pour toute application logicielle, ses utilisateurs signalent parfois des problèmes techniques, auxquels la Commission s'efforce de remédier le plus rapidement possible. Pour ce faire, elle collabore étroitement avec les organisateurs. OCS étant un logiciel libre, la Commission est disposée à intégrer les contributions pertinentes émanant de parties prenantes externes pour autant qu'elles respectent le règlement ([1]). Les ressources techniques nécessaires à ces activités sont allouées en tant que de besoin. À l'heure actuelle, l'assistance aux utilisateurs occupe en moyenne 1 équivalent temps plein.

3. Les exigences en matière de données concernant les signataires fixées dans le règlement ont été demandées par les États membres (qui vérifient les déclarations de soutien) et approuvées par le Parlement européen et le Conseil des ministres. La Commission ne cesse d'inviter les autorités nationales à simplifier ces exigences dans toute la mesure du possible. Plusieurs États membres ont demandé des modifications de l'annexe III du règlement allant dans ce sens ([2]).

4. La Commission est en contact régulier avec des organisations et représentants de la société civile et elle est toujours ouverte aux idées constructives.

([1]) Règlement (UE) n° 211/2011 relatif à l'initiative citoyenne.
([2]) Les modifications apportées à l'annexe III du règlement devraient entrer en vigueur au cours des prochains mois.

5. Les autorités luxembourgeoises ont fourni l'intitulé du champ (dans la langue dans laquelle elles souhaitaient qu'il figure) et ont assuré la Commission qu'il n'était pas trompeur. En tout état de cause, le Luxembourg a demandé que l'annexe III du règlement soit modifiée afin de supprimer la nécessité de fournir un numéro d'identification national.

6. Le règlement indique clairement que les initiatives citoyennes proposées peuvent être publiées dans le registre en ligne dans les langues officielles de l'Union et ne prévoit pas la possibilité de les publier dans d'autres langues.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001851/13
to the Commission
Claude Turmes (Verts/ALE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Implementation of the European Citizens' Initiative (ECI)

Nearly one year after the launch of the European Citizens' Initiative (ECI), organisers of such initiatives are reporting numerous technical and legal problems that are preventing citizens from signing an ECI.

1. What specific efforts is the Commission making to respond to citizens' complaints about problems with the ECI online collection software? How many technical advisers and programmers are currently assigned to answer requests concerning the 'JoinUp platform'? In view of the large number of complaints, does the Commission plan to increase its efforts to resolve the problems encountered with the ECI software?

2. Will the Commission provide technical and financial aid to organisers who have to develop their own online collection software because of the numerous problems reported with the solution provided by the Commission?

3. What steps is the Commission taking to stop certain groups of EU citizens being excluded from signing ECIs, for example Irish and Dutch citizens living outside the EU or in a Member State that only accepts signatures from its own citizens, or EU personnel who are not registered with the national social security system (as in Luxembourg)?

4. What efforts is the Commission making to include NGOs and campaigners in the development and improvement of the ECI instrument?

5. Citizens of Luxembourg are obliged to enter their social security number in order to be able to sign an ECI. However, the online collection software does not specify in what format users should input the number into this compulsory field. In addition, the field name ('numéro d'identification national') is misleading, as citizens normally do not automatically make the connection with the social security number. Indeed, this number is normally referred to as 'numéro de matricule de la sécurité sociale nationale'. Furthermore, the text labelling this field is only displayed in French, regardless of what language is chosen. When can we expect the Commission to tackle this defect in the online collection software, which is preventing many Luxembourg citizens from signing ECIs?

6. The system currently prevents organisers from adding translations into languages other than the official EU languages, for example Luxembourgish. When will the Commission allow translations of ECIs into languages other than the official languages of the EU?

Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the Commission
(10 April 2013)

1 and 2. The Online Collection Software (OCS) developed by the Commission is fully effective. As with all software applications, users sometimes report technical issues, which the Commission does its utmost to resolve as quickly as possible. It cooperates closely with organisers to that end. Given that the OCS is open-source, the Commission is willing to integrate relevant contributions from external stakeholders provided that they comply with the regulation ([1]). Technical resources for these activities are allocated as needed. At present, support is provided on average by 1 Full-Time Equivalent.

3. The data requirements for signatories set out in the regulation were requested by the Member States — which verify the statements of support — and agreed by the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. The Commission has consistently called on national authorities to simplify these requirements to the extent possible. Several Member States have asked for modifications to Annex III of the regulation which go in this direction ([2]).

4. The Commission is in regular contact with civil society organisations and representatives, and it is always open to constructive ideas.

([1]) Regulation (EU) No 211/2011 on the citizens' initiative.
([2]) The changes to Annex III of the regulation should come into force over the coming months.

5. The Luxembourgish authorities provided the text labelling (and the language it is in) and have assured the Commission that it is not misleading. Luxembourg has, in any case, requested a modification to Annex III of the regulation which will remove the need to provide a national identification number.

6. The regulation clearly states that proposed citizens' initiatives may be published in the online register in the official languages of the Union and does not foresee the possibility of publishing them in other languages.

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita P-001852/13
a la Comisión (Vicepresidenta/Alta Representante)
Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)
(20 de febrero de 2013)

Asunto: VP/HR — Juicio relativo a Agdaym Izik

El pasado 17 de febrero, el Tribunal Militar de Rabat dictó nueve sentencias de cadena perpetua y condenó a catorce acusados a entre veinte y treinta años de cárcel cada uno. Los otros dos acusados fueron liberados, tras haber cumplido sentencias de dos años de prisión preventiva. Las condenas están relacionadas con actos de violencia ocurridos durante y tras el desmantelamiento del campamento de protesta de Agdaym Izik en noviembre de 2010, operación en la que perdieron la vida once miembros de las fuerzas de seguridad y dos saharauis. El 8 de noviembre de 2010, se desató la violencia cuando las fuerzas de seguridad marroquíes trataron de forzar el desalojo y desmantelamiento del campamento de protesta de Agdaym Izik, cerca de El Aaiún, en el Sáhara Occidental.

Saharauis que protestaban contra lo que ellos describen como su propia marginación y que solicitaban empleo y una vivienda digna establecieron el campamento a comienzos de octubre de ese mismo año. Durante los actos de violencia y tras su finalización, las fuerzas de seguridad detuvieron a unos doscientos saharauis. Hasta ahora, y a pesar de los llamamientos de Amnistía Internacional y de otras organizaciones, las autoridades marroquíes no han tomado medidas para llevar a cabo una investigación independiente e imparcial sobre las violaciones de los derechos humanos perpetradas en relación con los acontecimientos de 2010. Han ignorado las peticiones de que sea un tribunal civil, independiente e imparcial, quien juzgue a los acusados. Al contrario, han optado por un tribunal militar, que nunca ofrece a los civiles un juicio justo. Es alarmante que las autoridades hayan ignorado también las alegaciones de tortura y confesiones forzadas de los acusados saharauis. El recurso a tribunales militares y la negativa a investigar las alegaciones de tortura arrojan serias dudas acerca de las intenciones de las autoridades marroquíes.

1.¿Formulará la Vicepresidenta/Alta Representante una declaración en la que condene estas sentencias dictadas a civiles por tribunales militares, en los que los civiles no pueden nunca recibir un juicio justo?

2. ¿Solicitará la Vicepresidenta/Alta Representante a las autoridades marroquíes que se valgan de tribunales civiles para conceder un nuevo juicio, esta vez justo, a los veinticinco saharauis, y que investiguen exhaustivamente las alegaciones de tortura?

Respuesta de la Alta Representante y Vicepresidenta Ashton en nombre de la Comisión
(9 de abril de 2013)

La Alta Representante y Vicepresidenta lamenta la violencia provocada por el desmantelamiento del campamento de Gdeim Izik. Por otra parte, la UE ha instado reiteradamente a todas las partes a que se abstengan de actitudes violentas.

La Alta Representante y Vicepresidenta de la Comisión está muy atenta a la situación del Sáhara Occidental y a la cuestión de los 25 los presos saharauis. Reitera también su pleno apoyo a los esfuerzos del Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas, elogia el trabajo de su Enviado Personal, el Embajador Christopher Ross, y alienta a las partes a trabajar en pro de una solución política justa, duradera y aceptable para las partes que contemple la autodeterminación de la población del Sáhara Occidental, de acuerdo con las Resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas.

En el marco del diálogo político UE-Marruecos, los derechos humanos se tratan periódicamente en las reuniones de los organismos conjuntos establecidos en virtud del Acuerdo de Asociación. En este foro, la UE se ha interesado en repetidas ocasiones por los procedimientos previstos para juzgar a las 25 personas detenidas y ha expresado recientemente su preocupación por las condiciones de detención de esos 25 presos. La Delegación de la UE en Rabat también ha tenido la oportunidad de reunirse con organizaciones de la sociedad civil y familiares de los detenidos antes del juicio.

Hemos seguido con atención el curso y el resultado de este juicio. Es esencial un acceso fácil para numerosos observadores de distintos ámbitos y, en particular, de las organizaciones de la sociedad civil, porque garantizará un análisis objetivo de las condiciones no solo durante el juicio, sino también durante la investigación. La Unión Europea seguirá observando de cerca la evolución de este asunto.

(English version)

Question for written answer P-001852/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Gdim Izik trial

On 17 February 2013 the Military Court of Rabat handed down nine life sentences, and also sentenced 14 defendants to between 20 and 30 years' imprisonment each. Two other defendants were released after serving two-year sentences in pre-trial detention. The convictions relate to violence during and after the Moroccan security forces' dismantling of the Gdim Izik protest camp in November 2010, during which operation 11 members of the security forces and two Sahrawis were killed. On 8 November 2010, violence broke out when Moroccan security forces tried to force expulsions and dismantling at the Gdim Izik protest camp near Laayoune in the Western Sahara.

The camp was set up in early October that year by Sahrawis protesting against what they describe as their marginalisation and demanding jobs and adequate housing. During and after the violence, the security forces arrested some 200 Sahrawis. Up till now and despite persistent calls by Amnesty International and others, the Moroccan authorities have taken no action to conduct an independent and impartial investigation into the human rights abuses committed in connection with the 2010 events. They have ignored calls to try the defendants in an independent and impartial civilian court. Instead, they have opted for a military court from which civilians can never receive a fair trial. It is disturbing that the authorities have also ignored the Sahrawi defendants' allegations of torture and forced confessions. The use of military courts and the failure to investigate the allegations of torture cast serious doubt on the Moroccan authorities' intentions.

A press briefing on the trial, prepared by the spokesperson for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, expresses concern over the use of a military court to try civilians. It also indicates that, as noted by the UN Human Rights Committee, the use of military or special courts to try civilians raises serious problems as far as the equitable, impartial and independent administration of justice is concerned.

1. Will the Vice-President/High Representative issue a declaration condemning these sentences handed down to civilians by a military court where civilians can never receive a fair trial?

2. Will the Vice-President/High Representative request that the Moroccan authorities use civilian courts to give fair retrials to the 25 Sahrawis and that they fully investigate the allegations of torture?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(9 April 2013)

The HR/VP deplores the violence caused by the dismantling of Gdeim Izik. Also, the EU has repeatedly called on all parties to refrain from violence.

The HR/VP is following closely the situation in Western Sahara and the issue of the 25 Sahrawi prisoners. She reaffirms her full support for the UN Secretary-General's efforts, commends the work of his Personal Envoy Ambassador Christopher Ross and encourages the parties to work towards achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara, in agreement with relevant UN Security Council resolutions.

In the framework of EU-Morocco political dialogue, human rights are regularly discussed at meetings of the joint bodies established under the Association Agreement. In this context, the EU repeatedly asked about the proceedings scheduled to judge the 25 people detained and recently expressed concern about the conditions of detention of the 25 detainees. EU Delegation in Rabat also had the opportunity to meet with civil society organisations and relatives of the detainees before the trial.

We have been closely following the progress and outcome of this trial. Easy access to many observers of all stripes and in particular civil society organisations is essential, as it will ensure that an objective analysis of the conditions not only of the trial, but also the process of investigation is available. The European Union will continue to follow this case.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-001855/13
aan de Commissie
Sophia in 't Veld (ALDE)
(20 februari 2013)

Betreft: Terugvordering van onverenigbare staatssteun

Op 19 december 2012 heeft de Commissie verklaard dat zij tot de vaststelling was gekomen dat het vorige Italiaanse systeem voor de vrijstelling van gemeentebelasting op onroerende goederen (ICI) die door niet-commerciële entiteiten voor specifieke doeleinden worden gebruikt, onverenigbaar is met de EU-regels inzake staatssteun ([1]). Toch heeft zij Italië niet verzocht de steun van de begunstigden terug te vorderen omdat „de Italiaanse instanties hebben aangetoond dat het objectief onmogelijk is te bepalen welk deel van de onroerende goederen die niet-commerciële entiteiten bezitten uitsluitend voor niet-economische activiteiten werd gebruikt en dus voor de vrijstelling in aanmerking komt, en welk deel werd aangewend voor activiteiten die worden beschouwd als „niet uitsluitend van commerciële aard" en waarbij de vrijstelling van de ICI volgens de EU-regels als staatssteun kan worden beschouwd".

Kan de Commissie antwoord geven op de volgende vragen:

— Wie was de begunstigde van de steun, de nationale katholieke kerk of de Heilige Stoel?

— Hoe vaak probeert de Commissie de staatssteun waarvan werd vastgesteld dat deze onverenigbaar is met de EU-regels inzake staatssteun niet terug te vorderen?

— Hebben zich al soortgelijke zaken voorgedaan in andere EU-lidstaten of schept deze zaak een precedent?

— Acht de Commissie het gerechtvaardigd dat in tijden van bezuinigingen en begrotingstekorten religieuze instellingen de facto worden vrijgesteld van de regels inzake staatssteun?

— Als de Commissie over voldoende informatie beschikt om te kunnen besluiten dat de staatssteun onverenigbaar was, waarom gebruikt ze deze informatie dan niet om te kunnen bepalen welke bedragen moet worden teruggevorderd?

Antwoord van de heer Almunia namens de Commissie
(3 mei 2013)

In het besluit van de Commissie van 19 december 2012 betreffende de vrijstelling van gemeentebelasting op onroerende goederen (ICI) wordt duidelijk gesteld dat noch de Katholieke Kerk, noch de Heilige Stoel de begunstigde van de steun was. De ICI-vrijstelling was van toepassing op onroerend goed dat door niet-commerciële entiteiten uitsluitend voor de uitvoering van specifieke activiteiten werd gebruikt. Onder meer verenigingen, stichtingen, comités, ngo's en ecclesiastische instanties van verschillende geloofsgemeenschappen kunnen als niet-commerciële entiteiten worden beschouwd.

Volgens vaste rechtspraak is een onderneming elke entiteit die een economische activiteit uitoefent, ongeacht haar rechtsvorm en de wijze waarop zij wordt gefinancierd. De regels inzake staatssteun zijn dus van toepassing op elke entiteit die als een onderneming kan worden aangemerkt.

Als de Commissie oordeelt dat steun op onwettige wijze is toegekend, draagt zij de betreffende lidstaat in principe op om de onwettige en onverenigbare steun terug te vorderen, tenzij dit in strijd is met een algemeen beginsel van het EU-recht.

Informatie over het aantal gevallen en de aard van de gevallen waarbij de steun volgens de Commissie onverenigbaar was met de eengemaakte markt maar zij de steun niet heeft teruggevorderd, is te vinden in het Staatssteunregister ([2]). Statistieken over staatssteunmaatregelen worden bekendgemaakt onder „Scoreboard, reports and studies" ([3]) op de website van het directoraat-generaal Concurrentie.

De redenen waarom de Commissie Italië niet heeft bevolen om de onwettige steun terug te vorderen van de begunstigden van de ICI-vrijstellingen, zijn vastgesteld in het besluit, dat nu voor iedereen toegankelijk is op de website van het directoraat-generaal Concurrentie ([4]).

([1]) http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1412_en.htm?locale=en.
([2]) http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/register/.
([3]) http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/studies_reports.html
([4]) Zie zaak SA 20829 in het Staatssteunregister.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001855/13
to the Commission
Sophia in 't Veld (ALDE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Recovery of incompatible state aid

On 19 December 2012, the Commission stated that it had found that the former Italian system of exemptions from municipal real estate tax (ICI) for non-commercial entities for specific purposes was incompatible with EU state aid rules ([1]). Nevertheless, it did not order Italy to recover the aid from the beneficiaries, on the grounds that 'the Italian authorities demonstrated that it would be objectively impossible to determine which part of the real estate belonging to non-commercial entities was used exclusively for non-economic activities and could therefore legitimately be exempted, and which part was used for activities that were considered as "not exclusively of a commercial nature" and whose exemption from the ICI could therefore entail state aid in the meaning of EU rules'.

Can the Commission clarify the following:

— Who was the beneficiary of the aid, the national Catholic Church or the Holy See?

— How frequently does the Commission decide not to try to recover state aid which has been found to be incompatible with EU state aid rules?

— Have there been any similar cases in other EU Member States, or will this case set a precedent?

— Does the Commission consider that in times of austerity and budget cuts it is justifiable that religious institutions are effectively exempt from state aid rules?

— If the Commission had enough information to determine that the state aid granted was incompatible, why can it not use that information to determine which aid should be recovered?

Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission
(3 May 2013)

The Commission decision of 19 December 2012 on the municipal real estate tax (ICI) exemption makes clear that the beneficiary of the aid was neither the Catholic Church nor the Holy See. The ICI exemption was applied to real estate used by non-commercial entities exclusively for the performance of specific activities. Non-commercial entities include associations, foundations, committees, NGOs and ecclesiastic bodies belonging to different religious denominations.

According to settled case law, an 'undertaking' is any entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of its legal status and the way it is financed. Therefore, any entity which can be classified as an undertaking is subject to state aid rules.

In principle, where the Commission decides that aid has been given unlawfully, it will instruct the Member State concerned to recover the unlawful and incompatible aid, unless this is contrary to a general principle of EC law.

Information on the number and type of cases where the Commission has found aid to be incompatible with the internal market, without ordering its recovery, can be found in the State Aid Register ([2]). Statistics on state aid measures are published on DG Competition's website, under the section 'Scoreboard, reports and studies' ([3]).

Reasons why the Commission did not order Italy to recover the aid from the beneficiaries of the ICI exemption are stated in the decision, now publicly available on DG Competition's website ([4]).

([1]) http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1412_en.htm?locale=en.
([2]) http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/register/.
([3]) http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/studies_reports.html
([4]) See State Aid Register case SA 20829.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-001856/13
aan de Commissie
Auke Zijlstra (NI)
(20 februari 2013)

Betreft: Nieuwe Franse boetes

Een jaar geleden heb ik een vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord (E-002110/2012) ingediend bij de Commissie betreffende de onlangs in Frankrijk ingevoerde boetes voor automobilisten die gebruikmaken van navigatieapparatuur waarmee de locatie van verkeerscamera's wordt weergegeven en die ook worden opgelegd wanneer de apparatuur niet is ingeschakeld.

In haar antwoord heeft de Commissie toegezegd mij op de hoogte te houden van de bevindingen van haar onderzoek naar de zaak.

1. Denkt de Commissie haar toezegging na te komen om mij te informeren over de stand van zaken?

2. Wat voor onderzoek heeft de Commissie ingesteld naar deze zaak?

3. Is de Commissie van zins de resultaten van haar onderzoek te publiceren?

4. Heeft Frankrijk artikel 28 VWEU inzake het vrij verkeer van goederen geschonden met de invoering van deze nieuwe wet? Zo ja, wat zijn de gevolgen van deze schending?

Antwoord van de heer Tajani namens de Commissie
(22 april 2013)

De Commissie bevestigt dat de zaak wordt onderzocht en dat er lopende contacten zijn met de Franse autoriteiten.

In antwoord op de Commissie verklaarden de Franse autoriteiten dat alle navigatieapparatuur die de locatie van snelheidscontrolesystemen weergeeft verboden is. Volgens de Franse autoriteiten is het de lidstaten in de niet-geharmoniseerde gebieden toegestaan om het niveau van verkeersveiligheid te bepalen om verzekerd te zijn in eigen gebied en daarom zouden de maatregelen evenredig zijn. De Commissie beoordeelt momenteel de reactie van de lidstaten, in het licht van artikel 34 VWEU.

Aangezien de procedure nog gaande is, is er op dit moment geen publicatie voorhanden van de conclusies van het onderzoek.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001856/13
to the Commission
Auke Zijlstra (NI)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: New French fines (follow-up question)

A year ago I submitted a question for written answer (E-002110/2012) to the Commission regarding the fines recently introduced in France affecting motorists using navigation devices that show the location of speed cameras, even when the devices have been switched off.

In its answer, the Commission undertook to inform me of the outcome of its investigation of the matter.

1. Will the Commission comply with its undertaking to inform me about the current situation?

2. What kind of investigation did the Commission undertake on the matter?

3. Will the Commission publish the conclusions of its investigation?

4. Was France in breach of Article 28 TFEU on the free movement of goods in introducing this new regulation? If so, what are the consequences of this breach?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission
(22 April 2013)

The Commission confirms that the matter is being investigated and that there are ongoing contacts with the French authorities.

In their reply to the Commission, the French authorities stated that all navigation devices that show the location of speed detection systems are prohibited. According to the French authorities, in the non-harmonised area Member States are allowed to determine the level of road safety to be assured in their territory and therefore the measures would be proportionate. The Commission is currently assessing the Member State reply, in the light of Article 34 TFEU.

As the procedure is on going, no publication of the conclusions is foreesen at this stage.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-001857/13
aan de Commissie
Auke Zijlstra (NI)
(20 februari 2013)

Betreft: Beperking van het recht op vrije meningsuiting en gegevensverzameling (vervolgvraag)

Een jaar geleden heb ik een schriftelijke vraag (E-001105/2012) aan de Commissie ingediend over de beperking van het recht op vrije meningsuiting en gegevensverzameling door een Duitse particuliere auteursrechtenorganisatie voor opvoeringen, GEMA. In haar antwoord heeft de Commissie beloofd de situatie te onderzoeken.

1. Kan de Commissie mij informatie verschaffen over de stand van het onderzoek?

2. Kan de Commissie specificeren met welke landen en organisaties zij contact heeft opgenomen tijdens het onderzoek?

3. Kan de Commissie de onderzoeksconclusies publiceren? Vormden de handelingen van GEMA een inbreuk op het recht op vrije meningsuiting en gegevensverzameling zoals gewaarborgd in het Handvest van de grondrechten van de Europese Unie? Zo ja, welke juridische stappen kan de Commissie ondernemen tegen een particuliere organisatie?

Antwoord van de heer Barnier namens de Commissie
(2 mei 2013)

In haar antwoord op schriftelijke vraag E-1105/2012 heeft de Commissie aangekondigd dat zij de meldings- en actieprocedures in het algemeen alsook de handhaving van intellectuele-eigendomsrechten zou onderzoeken.

1 en 2. De Commissie heeft geen onderzoek naar de door het geachte Parlementslid vermelde feiten aangekondigd of opgestart. Zoals zij in haar antwoord heeft aangegeven, kunnen de partijen die betrokken zijn bij een in het kader van een meldings- en verwijderingsprocedure genomen besluit in voorkomend geval beroep instellen bij de nationale rechterlijke instanties.

3. Elke Europese of nationale wetgeving die het recht van de Unie ter zake ten uitvoer brengt, moet in overeenstemming zijn met de rechten die in het Handvest van de grondrechten van de EU zijn vastgesteld.

De diensten van de Commissie zijn eind vorig jaar gestart met een raadpleging over de civiele procedures voor de handhaving van intellectuele-eigendomsrechten. Deze raadpleging wordt eind maart 2013 afgesloten. De Commissie hecht veel belang aan iedere vorm van misbruik van de procedures en schenkt er dan ook bijzonder veel aandacht aan.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001857/13
to the Commission
Auke Zijlstra (NI)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Restriction of right to freedom of expression and information gathering (follow-up question)

A year ago I submitted a Written Question (E-001105/2012) to the Commission regarding the restriction of the right to freedom of expression and information gathering by a German private performance rights organisation, GEMA. In its answer, the Commission committed itself to investigate the situation.

1. Could the Commission inform me about the status of the investigation?

2. Could the Commission specify which countries and organisations it contacted during the investigation?

3. Could the Commission publish the conclusions of the investigations? Did GEMA's actions constitute a violation of the right to freedom of expression and information gathering as established by the European Charter of Fundamental Rights? If so, what kind of legal action can the Commission take against a private organisation?

(Version française)

Réponse donnée par M. Barnier au nom de la Commission
(2 mai 2013)

Dans sa réponse donnée à la question écrite E-1105/2012, la Commission avait annoncé qu'elle examinait les procédures de notification et action de manière générale, ainsi que la question du respect de droits de propriété intellectuelle.

1 et 2. La Commission n'a ni annoncé ni entrepris d'enquête relative aux faits mentionnées par l'Honorable parlementaire. Comme elle l'avait indiqué dans sa réponse, les parties concernées par une décision prise dans le cadre d'une procédure de notification et retrait peuvent le cas échéant former un recours devant les juridictions nationales.

3. En toute hypothèse, toute législation européenne ou nationale mettant en œuvre le droit de l'Union sur ce sujet doit respecter les droits consacrés par la Charte européenne des droits fondamentaux.

Les services de la Commission ont lancé à la fin de l'année dernière une consultation sur les procédures civiles visant à faire respecter les droits de propriété intellectuelle qui sera clôturée fin mars 2013. La question de l'utilisation abusive des procédures quelles qu'elles soient est d'une grande importance et fait l'objet d'une attention particulière de la part de la Commission.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001858/13
alla Commissione
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)
(20 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: «Made in»: nuovo regolamento della Commissione europea, perplessità rispetto all'articolo 7

Il nuovo regolamento sulla sicurezza dei prodotti (COM(2013)0078 final — 2013/0049 (COD)), all'articolo 7, paragrafo 2, dispone che: «Al fine di determinare il paese d'origine di cui al paragrafo 1, si applicano le regole d'origine non preferenziali di cui agli articoli da 23 a 25 del regolamento (CEE) n. 2913/92 del Consiglio che istituisce un codice doganale comunitario».

L'articolo 24 del codice doganale comunitario (Regolamento (CEE) n. 2913/92) dispone che: «Una merce alla cui produzione hanno contribuito due o più paesi è originaria del paese in cui è avvenuta l'ultima trasformazione o lavorazione sostanziale, economicamente giustificata ed effettuata in un'impresa attrezzata a tale scopo, che si sia conclusa con la fabbricazione di un prodotto nuovo od abbia rappresentato una fase importante del processo di fabbricazione».

Considerando quanto sopra:

— Ritiene la Commissione che l'articolo 24 del Regolamento (CEE) n. 2913/92 sia adeguato a tutelarci da un uso distorto del marchio «*Made in*»?

— Può la Commissione spiegare secondo quali parametri quantitativi e qualitativi si configura «l'ultima trasformazione o lavorazione sostanziale» di un prodotto alla cui creazione hanno contribuito due o più paesi, tale da giustificare l'apposizione del marchio «*Made in*»?

— La Commissione non reputa che, stanti così le disposizioni in materia, sarebbe possibile per alcune aziende continuare ad abusare del marchio «*Made in*» facendo realizzare gran parte dei prodotti in paesi terzi, dove il costo di materie prime e manodopera è nettamente inferiore, e limitarsi poi ad assemblarli o semplicemente rifinirli nel proprio Stato membro?

Risposta di Antonio Tajani a nome della Commissione
(26 aprile 2013)

La Commissione ritiene che fare riferimento alle prescrizioni sull'origine non preferenziale di cui agli articoli da 23 a 25 del regolamento (CEE) n. 2913/92 del Consiglio che istituisce un codice doganale comunitario, disciplinando la corretta indicazione del Paese di origine nell'ambito della proposta di un nuovo regolamento sulla sicurezza dei prodotti di consumo, costituisca un approccio atto a garantire coerenza con i principi dell'Organizzazione mondiale del commercio (OMS). Ciò tuttavia non impedisce agli operatori economici di usare in modo improprio il marchio di origine. Occorre pertanto rafforzare la vigilanza sui prodotti sul mercato dell'Unione e ai confini UE così da rintracciare gli eventuali impieghi scorretti e sanzionarli adeguatamente.

I parametri quantitativi e qualitativi usati per determinare «l'ultima trasformazione o lavorazione sostanziale» di un prodotto fabbricato in più di uno Stato sono enumerati negli articoli da 35 a 46 e agli allegati da 9 a 11 del regolamento (CEE) n. 2454/93 della Commissione. Le autorità doganali degli Stati membri dell'Unione possono consultare le apposite linee guida pubblicate sul sito internet ([1]) della Commissione.

La Commissione ritiene che tali prescrizioni e il rafforzamento della vigilanza sul mercato scoraggeranno i commercianti senza scrupoli dall'impiegare in modo improprio il marchio d'origine di cui alla proposta di un nuovo regolamento sulla sicurezza dei prodotti di consumo.

([1]) http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/customs_duties/rules_origin/non-preferential/article_1621_it.htm

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001858/13
to the Commission
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: 'Made in': new Commission regulation and concerns regarding Article 7

Article 7(2) of the new Regulation on product safety (COM(2013)0078 final — 2013/0049 (COD)) stipulates that: 'For the purpose of determination of the country of origin within the meaning of paragraph 1, non-preferential origin rules set out in Articles 23 to 25 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing a Community Customs Code shall apply.'

Article 24 of the Community Customs Code (Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92) stipulates that: 'Goods whose production involved more than one country shall be deemed to originate in the country where they underwent their last, substantial, economically justified processing or working in an undertaking equipped for that purpose and resulting in the manufacture of a new product or representing an important stage of manufacture.'

Does the Commission believe that Article 24 of Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 is sufficient to protect us from misuse of 'made in' origin marking?

Can the Commission explain which quantitative and qualitative parameters are used to establish 'the last, substantial processing or working' of a product whose creation involved more than one country, such that it justifies having the 'made in' mark?

Does the Commission not believe that, as the provisions on this matter stand, it would be possible for some companies to carry on misusing the 'made in' mark by producing the majority of their goods in third countries, where raw-material and labour costs are clearly lower, and thus merely to assemble or finish off the goods in their own Member State?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission
(26 April 2013)

The Commission is of the opinion that referring to the non-preferential origin rules set out in Articles 23 to 25 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code as the basis for determining the country of origin in an instrument such as the proposal for a new Regulation on Consumer Product Safety is an approach ensuring consistency with the principles of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). However, this does not necessarily prevent any misuse by economic operators. Therefore, it is important to strengthen market surveillance for products in the EU and at its external borders so that possible misuse can be traced and sanctioned accordingly.

The quantitative and qualitative parameters that will be used to establish 'the last, substantial processing or working' of a product whose manufacture involved more than one country, are laid down in Articles 35 to 46 and Annexes 9 to 11 of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93. In addition, the customs services of the EU Member States use the guidelines published on Commission website for this purpose ([1]).

Consequently, the Commission takes the view that these rules and strengthened market surveillance will discourage unscrupulous traders from misusing the origin marking laid down in the proposal for a new Regulation on Consumer Product Safety.

([1]) http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/customs_duties/rules_origin/non-preferential/article_1621_en.htm

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001859/13
alla Commissione
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)
(20 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: «Made in» — Ritiro della proposta di regolamento sull'indicazione del paese di origine di taluni prodotti importati da paesi terzi: chiarimenti in merito alle nuove dichiarazioni ufficiali

In risposta alla mia interrogazione E-010341/2012 dal titolo «Ritiro proposta di regolamento sull'indicazione del paese di origine di taluni prodotti importati da paesi terzi», il Commissario Karel De Gucht affermava che «al momento di adottare il suo programma di lavoro per il 2013 la Commissione ha incluso una proposta di regolamento sull'indicazione del paese d'origine di certi prodotti importati da paesi terzi (la cosiddetta proposta "made in") nell'elenco delle proposte che intende ritirare» e che «in questa fase la Commissione non intende presentare una proposta riveduta».

Le dichiarazioni ufficiali rilasciate dal Commissario Tajani lo scorso 13 febbraio lasciano invece intendere che la posizione della Commissione sulla questione «*Made in*» sia mutata, tanto che sarebbero state presentate nuove proposte di regolamento relative all'indicazione del paese d'origine dei prodotti.

Alla luce di quanto sopra, può la Commissione:

— fornire spiegazioni in merito a queste dichiarazioni contrastanti e a breve distanza, chiarendo se ha rivisto la propria posizione sulla questione «*Made in*»;

— indicare in modo dettagliato ed esaustivo il contenuto di questa proposta di regolamento e in quali parti differisce dalla precedente;

— far sapere se corrisponde al vero la previsione di un'etichettatura a livello di Unione da apporsi in via alternativa alla dichiarazione del paese di origine, e in caso affermativo secondo quali criteri?

Risposta di Antonio Tajani a nome della Commissione
(23 aprile 2013)

La Commissione non ha presentato una proposta riveduta di regolamento sull'indicazione del paese d'origine di taluni prodotti importati da paesi terzi, ma ha inserito una disposizione in merito all'indicazione d'origine dei prodotti di consumo nella proposta di regolamento sulla sicurezza dei prodotti di consumo ([1]).

Per assicurare l'identificazione e la tracciabilità dei prodotti lungo l'intera catena della fornitura e per imporre il rispetto delle regole di vigilanza del mercato sul mercato interno, quest'ultima proposta comprende una disposizione relativa all'indicazione d'origine. Tale disposizione non si applicherebbe soltanto ai prodotti importati, come era previsto nella proposta COM(2005)661, ma anche ai prodotti fabbricati nell'Unione poiché la finalità e la base giuridica della proposta COM(2013)78 sono diverse da quelle della proposta che è in via di ritiro. La pertinente disposizione contenuta nella proposta COM(2013)78 specifica che i fabbricanti e gli importatori devono assicurare che tutti i prodotti di consumo immessi o resi disponibili sul mercato dell'Unione rechino l'indicazione del paese d'origine del prodotto o che, se le dimensioni e la natura del prodotto non lo consentissero, tale indicazione va fornita sulla confezione o in un documento che accompagna il prodotto. Se il paese d'origine è uno Stato membro dell'Unione, i fabbricanti e gli importatori possono fare riferimento all'Unione o a un particolare Stato membro.

Per circa il 10 % dei prodotti pericolosi notificati su RAPEX, le autorità preposte alla sorveglianza del mercato non dispongono di informazioni sull'origine. Interventi correttivi possono essere adottati per quanto concerne i prodotti intercettati, ma non è possibile tracciare e ritirare i prodotti della stessa linea di produzione/partita/che presentano lo stesso problema. L'indicazione d'origine aiuterà a determinare quali autorità nazionali contattare per assistenza.

([1]) COM(2013)78.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001859/13
to the Commission
Mara Bizzotto (EFD)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: 'Made in' — Withdrawal of the proposal for a regulation on the indication of the country of origin of certain products imported from third countries: clarifications regarding the new official statements

In reply to my Question E-010341/2012 entitled 'Withdrawal of proposal for a regulation on the indication of the country of origin of certain products imported from third countries', Commissioner Karel De Gucht stated that 'When adopting its work programme for 2013, the Commission included the proposal for a regulation on the indication of the country of origin of certain products imported from third countries (so-called "made in" proposal) in the list of proposals that it intends to withdraw' and that 'At this stage, the Commission does not intend to table a revised proposal'.

The official statements made by Commissioner Tajani on 13 February, however, imply that the Commission's position on the 'made in' issue has changed, and that new proposals for a regulation on the indication of the country of origin of products are to be tabled.

In light of the above, can the Commission:

— Provide explanations on these conflicting statements made within a short time of each other, and clarify whether it has changed its position on the 'made in' issue?

— Indicate in a detailed and comprehensive way the content of this proposal for a regulation, and how it differs from the previous proposal?

— State whether it is true that there is a plan for EU-wide labelling as an alternative to the declaration of the country of origin, and, if so, say what criteria will apply?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission
(23 April 2013)

The Commission did not table a revised proposal for a regulation on the indication of the country of origin of certain products imported from third countries, but included a requirement regarding the indication of the origin of consumer products in the proposal for a regulation on Consumer Product Safety ([1]).

For the purpose of ensuring the identification and traceability of products throughout the entire supply chain and the enforcement of market surveillance in the internal market, the latter proposal includes a requirement for the indication of the origin. This requirement would apply not only to imported goods — as was foreseen in the proposal COM(2005)661 — but also to products manufactured in the Union, as the purpose and the legal basis of proposal COM(2013)78 are different from those of the proposal which is being withdrawn. The relevant provision in the proposal COM(2013)78 specifies that manufacturers and importers must ensure that all consumer products placed or made available on the Union market bear an indication of the country of origin of the product or, where the size or nature of the product does not allow it, that indication is to be provided on the packaging or in a document accompanying the product. Where the country of origin is a Member State of the Union, manufacturers and importers may refer to the Union or to a particular Member State.

For around 10% of dangerous products notified in RAPEX market surveillance authorities have no information on the origin. Corrective action can be taken for the captured product, but products of the same production line/batch/with the same problem cannot be traced and withdrawn. The indication of the origin will help determine which country authorities can be contacted for assistance.

([1]) COM(2013)78.

(Magyar változat)

Írásbeli választ igénylő kérdés E-001860/13
a Bizottság számára
Gál Kinga (PPE) és Schöpflin György (PPE)
(2013. február 20.)

Tárgy: Etnikai incidensek a Vajdaságban

Szerbia etnikailag vegyesen lakott régiójában, a Vajdasági Autonóm Tartományban az elmúlt hónapokban megromlott a közbiztonság. A polgárok személyi és vagyoni biztonságának veszélyeztetése mellett elszaporodtak az etnikai jellegű incidensek is, amelyek a tartományban veszélybe sodorják az etnikai közösségek egymás iránti bizalmát és békés együttélésük lehetőségét. Történik mindez egy olyan tagjelölt országban, amely az uniós csatlakozási tárgyalások megkezdésére vár.

Az etnikai indíttatású incidensek hatóságok általi kivizsgálására sajnálatos módon jellemző, hogy az incidenseket nem bűncselekményként, hanem egyszerű szabálysértésként kezelik, számos esetben nincsenek tekintettel az elkövetett cselekmények etnikai jellegére, és a rendőrség által felvett jegyzőkönyvek gyakran hiányosak és ellentmondásosak. A bírósági gyakorlatban pedig a beérkezett panaszok alapján kimutatható a kettős mérce alkalmazása.

1. Mit szándékozik tenni a Bizottság, hogy elkerülhetőek legyenek az elmúlt hetekben újra gyakorivá váló incidensek, amelyeknek sok esetben magyar nemzetiségű fiatalok esnek áldozatul?

2. Mit tud tenni a Bizottság annak érdekében, hogy a szerb rendőrség etnikai, nemzeti hovatartozástól függetlenül biztosítsa a lakosság körében a közrend érvényesítését és megfelelő intézkedéseket foganatosítson a polgárok biztonságának megőrzése, az etnikai közösségek közötti viszony kiéleződésének megakadályozása és a kisebbségek védelme érdekében?

3. Tervez-e kitérni az etnikai alapú incidensek tárgyalására a Bizottság a Szerbiáról szóló, ősszel elkészítendő újabb országjelentésben?

Štefan Füle válasza a Bizottság nevében
(2013. április 16.)

Az Európai Bizottság szoros figyelemmel kíséri a szerbiai, és így a vajdasági etnikumok közötti viszonyokat. A Bizottságnak tudomása van az olyan incidensekről, mint például az idén januárban és februárban a szerbiai Temerin városában történt fizikai erőszak és bántalmazások. A Bizottság értesülései szerint az ügyeket a rendőrség megfelelően kivizsgálta és a gyanúsítottakat őrizetbe vette. A Bizottság üdvözli a szerb belügyminisztériumnak a vajdasági tartományi hatóságokkal és a helyi hatóságokkal folytatott megbeszéléseket követő kötelezettségvállalását a temerini rendőri jelenlét megerősítésére.

A Bizottság hangsúlyozza, hogy a hatóságoknak, ideértve a rendőrséget és az igazságszolgáltatást, azonnal és eredményesen kezelniük kell az ilyen incidenseket. Örvendetes fejleménynek minősül a szerb büntetőjog azon közelmúltbeli változása, amelynek alapján a bíróság súlyosbító körülménynek veszi, ha egy bűncselekményt valamely személy rasszhoz és valláshoz való tartozása, nemzeti vagy etnikai származása, neme, szexuális orientációja vagy nemi identitása miatti gyűlöletből követnek el, amennyiben ez nem eleve a bűncselekmény alapjellemzője.

A Bizottság a helyi érdekeltekkel – köztük hatóságokkal, a szerb ombudsmannal és civil szervezetekkel – szorosan együttműködve a továbbiakban is szoros figyelemmel fogja kísérni a vajdasági helyzet alakulását, amelyről a 2013 októberében esedékes következő szerbiai országjelentés keretében fog beszámolni.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001860/13
to the Commission
Kinga Gál (PPE) and György Schöpflin (PPE)
(20 February 2013)

Subject: Ethnic incidents in Vojvodina

In recent months the security situation in the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina, an ethnically mixed region of Serbia, has deteriorated. In addition to risks to the safety of individuals and their property, ethnic incidents have also multiplied which endanger mutual trust and the possibility of peaceful coexistence in the province. All this is happening in a candidate country which is awaiting the start of EU accession negotiations.

It is sadly characteristic of the investigation of these ethnic incidents by the authorities that they are treated not as criminal offences but simply as regulatory infringements. In many cases no reference is made to the ethnic nature of the acts committed, and the police reports are often incomplete and contradictory. In judicial practice instances also occur of the application of double standards regarding complaints received.

1. What measures does the Commission propose to take to prevent the recurrence of the incidents that have become frequent in recent weeks, in which young Hungarians are in many cases the victims?

2. What can the Commission do to ensure that the Serbian police enforce public order without regard to ethnic or national identity and take appropriate measures to safeguard the security of citizens, prevent strain on inter-community relations and protect minorities?

3. Does the Commission plan to mention these ethnic incidents in the country report on Serbia it is due to issue in the autumn?

Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission
(16 April 2013)

The European Commission closely monitors the inter-ethnic situation in Serbia, including in Vojvodina. The Commission has taken note of some incidents such as physical assaults and beatings that happened during January and February this year in the Serbian town of Temerin. The Commission understands that appropriate follow up was ensured by the police, with suspects being arrested. The Commission welcomes the commitment by the Serbian Interior Ministry to strengthen police presence in the town of Temerin following discussions with Vojvodina provincial authorities as well as local authorities.

The Commission stresses that such incidents have to be promptly and effectively addressed by the authorities, including the police and the judiciary. The recent changes in the Serbian Criminal Code whereby if an offense is committed out of hatred because of race and religion, national or ethnic origin, gender, sexual orientation or gender identity of another person, this circumstance will be assessed as aggravating by the court, unless it is described as a characteristic of the offense, is a welcome development in this respect.

The Commission will continue to closely monitor the situation in Vojvodina, in close cooperation with the local stakeholders, including the authorities, Serbian Ombudsman and Civil society organisations and further report on the situation in Vojvodina in the framework of its next Progress report on Serbia, due for October 2013.

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-001861/13
à la Commission
Marc Tarabella (S&D)
(21 février 2013)

Objet: Farine animale comme nourriture pour les poissons d'élevage

Alors que l'actualité était focalisée sur le dossier des lasagnes qui ébranle la confiance du citoyen quant à la sécurité alimentaire en Europe, la Commission a confirmé que l'autorisation d'utiliser des farines de porcs et de volailles pour nourrir les poissons d'élevage serait en vigueur dès le 1er juin.

Le texte européen précise qu'il s'agit de protéines animales transformées (PAT), définies comme «des protéines animales qui dérivent en totalité de coproduits d'abattage propres à la consommation humaine excluant les animaux malades et n'incluant aucun produit à partir de sang, lait, colostrum, gélatine, (…) œufs, collagène». De plus, les ruminants (moutons, vaches et chèvres), qui sont le plus susceptibles de développer une encéphalopathie spongiforme, restent exclus de la liste des animaux destinés à l'alimentation des poissons carnivores. Seuls les porcs et les volailles, relativement à l'abri du prion, l'agent responsable de l'ESB, pourraient finir en granules pour saumons.

La Commission a enfin précisé que la décision était «conforme aux avis scientifiques les plus récents selon lesquels le risque de transmission d'ESB entre animaux non-ruminants est négligeable».

1. Concernant ce dernier point, nous pouvons abonder dans ce sens; encore faut-il que les farines soient traçables et que les filières soient régulièrement contrôlées. La Commission peut-elle garantir une traçabilité sans faille de ces farines? Quid des contrôles?

2. Selon la Commission, le coût relativement peu onéreux de la farine ne pourrait-il pas entraîner une multiplication de cette pratique et forcément des dérapages?

3. D'après certains chiffres nationaux, les farines de porcs ou de volailles pourraient permettre d'économiser jusqu'à 5 % du coût de production des poissons d'élevage en remplaçant seulement 7 à 15 % des ingrédients contenus dans les aliments. Quels sont les chiffres de la Commission à ce sujet?

4. Certaines voix se sont élevées pour proposer un label «sans farine animale» qui puisse apparaître sur les étalages pour indiquer aux consommateurs français: «le poisson que vous achetez n'a pas été nourri avec de la viande». Comment la Commission réagit-elle à cette proposition?

Réponse donnée par M. Borg au nom de la Commission
(16 avril 2013)

Le règlement (UE) nº 56/2013 de la Commission ([1]) est destiné à autoriser à nouveau l'utilisation de protéines animales transformées (PAT) provenant d'animaux d'élevage non ruminants (essentiellement les porcs et les volailles) dans l'alimentation des poissons d'élevage et autres animaux d'aquaculture. Il s'applique à compter du 1er juin 2013 et il est conforme aux avis scientifiques les plus récents, selon lesquels le risque de transmission d'encéphalopathie spongiforme bovine (ESB) entre animaux non ruminants est négligeable, à condition d'éviter le recyclage intraspécifique ou le cannibalisme.

1. Le règlement (UE) nº 56/2013 fixe des exigences très rigoureuses en matière de traçabilité et d'analyses à effectuer par les États membres tout au long de la chaîne alimentaire afin de prévenir les contaminations croisées et le cannibalisme qui en résulte. La Commission est convaincue que l'application correcte et le respect de ces exigences devraient garantir et maintenir un niveau élevé de protection du consommateur.

2. Les PAT étant pleinement traçables et ne provenant que d'animaux propres à la consommation humaine au point d'abattage, leur coût n'est pas bon marché. Pour cette raison, la Commission ne pense pas qu'il y aura des pratiques abusives.

3. La Commission ne dispose pas d'informations chiffrées sur les économies que les aquaculteurs pourraient réaliser du fait de l'autorisation d'utiliser à nouveau des PAT.

([1]) JO L 21 du 24.1.2013.

4. Les exploitants du secteur alimentaire sont autorisés à fournir des informations aux consommateurs sur une base volontaire tant que celles-ci sont conformes aux règles d'étiquetage de l'Union européenne ([2]). La Commission n'envisage pas de proposer un instrument législatif exigeant d'indiquer sur l'étiquetage si le poisson a été nourri ou non avec des PAT.

([2]) Règlement (UE) nº 1169/2011 du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 25 octobre 2011 concernant l'information des consommateurs sur les denrées alimentaires, JO L 304 du 22.11.2011.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001861/13
to the Commission
Marc Tarabella (S&D)
(21 February 2013)

Subject: Animal meal as feed for farmed fish

While the news has been focused on the lasagne issue, which has shaken public confidence in food safety across Europe, the Commission has confirmed that the use of pig and poultry meal to feed farmed fish will be authorised from 1 June 2013.

The EU text specifies that the authorisation concerns processed animal protein (PAP), defined as animal protein derived entirely from animal by-products fit for human consumption excluding sick animals and not including blood products, milk, colostrum, gelatine, eggs or collagen. Furthermore, ruminants (sheep, cows and goats), which have the greatest chance of developing spongiform encephalopathy, are still excluded from the list of animals intended for use in carnivorous-fish feed. Only pigs and poultry, which are relatively safe from prions, the agent responsible for BSE, could end up in salmon feed.

Finally, the Commission has made it clear that the decision was in accordance with the most recent scientific opinions indicating that the BSE transmission risk among non-ruminants is negligible.

1. As regards the last point, we are in full agreement, but the meal has to be traceable and the chains have to be regularly checked. Can the Commission guarantee the full traceability of that meal? What about the checks?

2. Does the Commission believe that the relatively low cost of the meal could result in this practice becoming widespread and in inevitable abuse?

3. According to certain national figures, pig or poultry meal could allow for savings of up to 5% of the cost of farmed-fish production by replacing a mere 7% to 15% of the ingredients contained in feed. What figures does the Commission have in this regard?

4. Some people have proposed a 'no animal meal' label that could appear on displays to indicate to French consumers that the fish they are buying has not been fed meat. What is the Commission's response to that proposal?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission
(16 April 2013)

Commission Regulation (EU) No 56/2013 ([1]) aims to reauthorise the use of processed animal proteins (PAPs) derived from non-ruminant farmed animals (i.e. mainly from pigs and poultry) in feed for farmed fish and other aquaculture animals. It is applicable from 1 June 2013 and is in line with latest scientific opinions which indicate that the risk of transmission of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) between non-ruminant animals is negligible provided that intra-species recycling (cannibalism) is prevented.

1. Regulation (EU) No 56/2013 provides for very strict traceability requirements and analytical controls to be applied by the Member States all along the feed chain in order to prevent cross-contamination and subsequent cannibalism. The Commission believes that the correct implementation and enforcement of these requirements should ensure and maintain the high level of consumer protection.

2. As PAPs are fully traceable and only produced from animals which are fit for human consumption at the point of slaughter, their value is not low. The Commission does not believe that there will be abuses as regards their use because of their value.

3. The Commission has no figures concerning the potential savings for the fish producers due to the reauthorisation of PAPs.

4. Food business operators are entitled to provide consumers with information on a voluntary basis, as long as it complies with the EU food labelling rules ([2]). The Commission does not intend to propose any legislation to require labelling indicating that fish has been fed or not with PAPs.

([1]) OJ L 21, 24.1.2013.
([2]) Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 of the Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on the provision of food information to consumers, OJ L 304, 22.11.2011.

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-001862/13
à la Commission
Marc Tarabella (S&D)
(21 février 2013)

Objet: Pantouflage au sein des institutions européennes

Plusieurs ONG viennent de porter plainte, tant concernant les fonctionnaires européens qui passent dans le privé que sur les mouvements en sens inverse. Les ONG ne demandent pas l'interdiction totale de tels recrutements, mais un renforcement des règles existantes.

Le «Dalligate» a montré que les contacts personnels au sein de la Commission étaient extrêmement utiles pour les lobbyistes qui veulent promouvoir leurs intérêts. Beaucoup de consultants et de lobbyistes joueraient les chasseurs de tête au sein de la Commission, parce que cela leur apporte une connaissance et des contacts d'une grande valeur, une «stratégie que la Commission ne peut pas ignorer».

1. La Commission compte-t-elle ordonner une enquête?

2. Dans l'affirmative, quel en sera le modus operandi?

3. Quel est l'attirail de sanctions/réactions qui s'offre à la Commission en cas de manquements systématiques avérés?

Réponse donnée par M. Šefčovič au nom de la Commission
(5 juin 2013)

La Commission dispose de garanties solides pour protéger ses procédures décisionnelles internes.

Outre les règles de procédure, plusieurs dispositions du statut des fonctionnaires s'appliquent au personnel en activité pour protéger l'indépendance et l'intégrité de la fonction publique européenne. L'article 16 du statut prévoit clairement les obligations que doivent respecter les anciens fonctionnaires de l'UE après la cessation de leurs fonctions. En cas de violation des règles, des mesures disciplinaires peuvent être prises en vertu du Statut.

La fonction publique de l'Union européenne se défend très bien à cet égard par rapport aux administrations nationales, et la Commission réfute la critique évoquée par l'Honorable Parlementaire.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001862/13
to the Commission
Marc Tarabella (S&D)
(21 February 2013)

Subject: Civil servants leaving the EU institutions to work in the private sector

Several NGOs have recently complained both about European civil servants who move into the private sector and about movements in the opposite direction. They are not calling for a blanket ban on such recruitment, but they want the existing rules to be strengthened.

'Dalligate' showed that personal contacts within the Commission are extremely useful for lobbyists who want to promote their interests. Many consultants and lobbyists are said to act as headhunters within the Commission, because in doing so they gain very valuable knowledge and contacts, a strategy that the Commission cannot ignore.

1. Will the Commission order an investigation?

2. If so, what will be its *modus operandi*?

3. What kinds of penalties/responses are available to the Commission should there be evidence of systematic violations?

Answer given by Mr Šefčovič on behalf of the Commission
(5 June 2013)

The Commission has strong safeguards in place to protect its internal decision-making procedures.

Besides the procedural rules, a whole set of provisions in the Staff Regulations apply to staff in active service to protect the independence and integrity of the EU civil service. Article 16 of the Staff Regulations provides for clear post-service obligations of former EU civil servants. In case of breaches of the rules, disciplinary measures can be taken under the Staff Regulations.

The EU civil service stands up very well in this regard, when compared with national civil services, and the Commission does not agree with the criticism which the Honourable Member refers to.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-001863/13
à Comissão
Inês Cristina Zuber (GUE/NGL)
(21 de fevereiro de 2013)

Assunto: Situação do Polo de Portimão da Universidade do Algarve

O Polo de Portimão da Universidade do Algarve é uma instituição altamente prestigiada e valorizada, nomeadamente ao nível do ensino das áreas ligadas ao turismo e hotelaria, setores fundamentais para o desenvolvimento económico desta região. Como consequência dos inúmeros cortes realizados no setor do ensino superior, agravados depois da assinatura do memorando de entendimento entre o governo português e a troika (UE, FMI), este polo tem vindo a sentir inúmeras dificuldades. Nos últimos dois anos os cortes chegaram a 20 % e a escola não tem capacidade para reduzir mais despesas, sob pena de não cumprir serviços básicos. Por sua vez, devido ao grassar do desemprego, os alunos sentem cada vez mais dificuldades no pagamento das propinas, tendo neste ano letivo (2012/2013) acontecido uma situação inédita — o número de vagas superou o número de candidatos a alunos. Dos alunos colocados, cerca de metade não se chegou a matricular. Por outro lado, existe o registo de cerca de 20 alunos que desistiram de frequentar a escola, por motivo de desemprego próprio ou de familiares. Esta situação está, em última instância, a perspetivar o fim do ensino nesta escola tão importante para o desenvolvimento da região algarvia.

Assim, solicito à Comissão que me informe do seguinte:

1. Tem conhecimento desta situação? Tem conhecimento de evoluções semelhantes em outros países da UE? Como avalia esta situação no quadro das políticas de cortes no investimento público, que tem vindo a defender no âmbito da troika?

2. Não considera que estes cortes são contrários ao objetivo da Estratégia 2020: «aumentar para, pelo menos, 40 % a percentagem da população na faixa etária dos 30-34 anos que possui um diploma do ensino superior»**?**

3. Tem informação acerca dos montantes dos fundos comunitários que foram transferidos para a região do Algarve? Que fundos — no âmbito da coesão social — poderiam ser ainda mobilizados para ajudar a resolver os problemas mencionados?

Resposta dada por Olli Rehn em nome da Comissão
(15 de abril de 2013)

Apesar dos desafios da crise económica as despesas com a educação em Portugal, até 2009, não diminuíram, mas, a partir daí, os cortes foram visíveis. Apesar disso, a despesa pública com a educação em Portugal foi significativamente mais elevada (6,3 % do PIB) do que a média da UE (5,3 %). As novas alterações demográficas e as limitações orçamentais são suscetíveis de aumentar a necessidade de melhorar a eficácia das despesas com a educação. É da responsabilidade dos Estados-Membros, aquando da elaboração do orçamento nacional, decidir da afetação mais eficiente dos recursos.

Na sua última atualização dos objetivos da Estratégia Europa 2020, apresentados em maio de 2012, o Governo português confirmou o objetivo de, até 2020, aumentar para, pelo menos, 40 % a percentagem da população na faixa etária dos 30-34 anos que possui um diploma do ensino superior. Os Fundos Estruturais do novo período de programação 2014-2020 constituem um eventual instrumento financeiro suscetível de dar um precioso contributo para atingir este objetivo.

Foram atribuídos cerca de 175 milhões de euros à região do Algarve para o período de 2007-2013 no âmbito do seu programa operacional regional financiado pelo Fundo Europeu de Desenvolvimento Regional (FEDER). Até agora, foram efetivamente pagos um pouco menos de 100 milhões euros. Além disso, a região do Algarve é elegível para os programas multirregionais operacionais de capital humano, dotados com cerca de 6,5 mil milhões de euros e o programa multirregional para a competitividade, ao qual foi atribuído mais de 3,1 mil milhões de euros.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001863/13
to the Commission
Inês Cristina Zuber (GUE/NGL)
(21 February 2013)

Subject: Situation of the Portimão Centre of the University of the Algarve

The Portimão Centre of the University of the Algarve is a highly prestigious institution that has garnered much acclaim for its teaching in areas relating to tourism and the hotel industry, sectors which are essential to the economic development of this region. As a result of the countless cuts that have been made in the higher education sector, which have become more severe following the signing of the memorandum of understanding between the Portuguese Government and the Troika (EU, IMF), the centre has been experiencing numerous difficulties. In the last two years, the cuts have reached 20% and the school cannot reduce its spending any further without failing to provide basic services. Students are finding it increasingly difficult to pay their fees due to increased unemployment, giving rise to an unprecedented situation in this academic year (2012/2013): the number of free places has exceeded the number of applications by prospective students. Of the students who were awarded a place, around half did not manage to enrol. Moreover, around 20 students are known to have stopped attending the school after they or one of their family members became unemployed. Ultimately, this situation will lead to the end of teaching at this school, which is so important for the development of the Algarve region.

1. Is the Commission aware of this situation? Is it aware of any similar developments in other EU countries? What view does it take of the situation in the context of public spending cuts, which it has been advocating as part of the Troika?

2. Does it not consider these cuts to be at odds with the 2020 Strategy target of having 'at least 40% of 30-34-year-olds completing third level education'?

3. Does it have any information about the amounts of Community funds that have been allocated to the Algarve region? What other social cohesion funds could be mobilised to help resolve these problems?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission
(15 April 2013)

Despite the challenges of the economic crisis education spending in Portugal up until 2009 did not decrease, but cutbacks have been apparent since. Even then, public spending in education in Portugal was still significantly higher, at 6.3% of GDP, than the EU average (5.3%). Further demographic changes and budgetary constraints are likely to increase the need to improve efficiency of education expenditures. It is the responsibility of Member States, when drawing up their national budgets, to decide on the most efficient allocation of resources.

In its latest update of the Europe 2020 targets presented in May 2012 the Portuguese Government has confirmed the target of reaching a share of at least 40% of 30-34 years old people having a tertiary education attainment by 2020. The Structural Funds of the new programming period 2014-2020 are a possible financial instrument that may provide a valuable contribution to achieve this target.

The region Algarve has been allocated about EUR 175 under its Regional Operational Programme funded by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) for the period 2007-2013. Until now, a bit less than EUR 100 million have been actually paid. In addition, Algarve is eligible to the multirregional Operational Programmes of Human Capital, endowed with almost EUR 6.5 billion and to the multirregional programme of Competitiveness, which has been allocated more than EUR 3.1 billion.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-001864/13
à Comissão
Inês Cristina Zuber (GUE/NGL)
(21 de fevereiro de 2013)

Assunto: Pobreza infantil em Portugal

Os impactos das políticas ditas de austeridade e de controlo orçamental têm tido consequências sociais dramáticas em Portugal, entre as quais, o aumento da pobreza infantil. O aumento da pobreza infantil em Portugal tem, como uma das suas faces mais duras, a generalização das situações de fome. Estima-se que o número de crianças com fome e carências alimentares nas escolas portuguesas ronde as 13 000. Nas escolas da Área Metropolitana de Lisboa, no final de 2012, existiam mais 50 000 crianças do que em 2007 oriundas de famílias com rendimentos mensais de referência até 419 euros. A Sociedade Portuguesa de Pediatria tem denunciado o surgimento de casos nos hospitais que não eram registados há mais de 20 anos — casos de mães que acrescentam água ao leite ou dão leite de vaca a bebés de meses, por não terem dinheiro para comprar leite para bebés. Cada vez há mais relatos de crianças que fazem a única refeição diária na escola. As consequências desta situação, ao nível dos problemas de instabilidade emocional e psicológica, de aprendizagem, inserção social e discriminações, são hoje ainda impossíveis de mensurar.

Assim, solicito à Comissão que me informe do seguinte:

1. Tem conhecimento desta situação? Tem conhecimento de evoluções semelhantes em outros países da UE?

2. Que tipo de apoios pode a UE dar para combater esta situação em Portugal, nomeadamente ao nível do Fundo Comunitário de Ajuda Alimentar a Carenciados, para além daqueles que estão já em execução?

3. Considera que o futuro Fundo de Auxílio Europeu às Pessoas mais Carenciadas deve diminuir, manter ou aumentar os montantes destinados à ajuda alimentar, tendo por referência os montantes alocados no período 2007-2013?

Resposta dada por László Andor em nome da Comissão
(18 de abril de 2013)

De acordo com as últimas estatísticas do rendimento e das condições de vida na UE ([1]), que dizem respeito a 2011, a pobreza, medida em termos de privações materiais graves ([2]), aumentou mais do que um ponto percentual na Grécia, Itália, Letónia e Hungria. Em especial, nestes países, e na Bulgária, República Checa e Eslovénia, aumentou o número de pessoas que respondeu negativamente à pergunta sobre se podiam comer carne, peixe ou proteínas equivalentes de dois em dois dias ([3]). Em Portugal, no entanto, verificou-se que as privações materiais tinham melhorado ligeiramente no mesmo período, embora seja muito provável que a situação se tenha deteriorado após 2011 em resultado das medidas de austeridade ([4]).

Em complemento do atual programa da UE a favor das pessoas mais carenciadas, existem dois outros regimes da UE que podem contribuir para dar apoio, a saber, o regime de distribuição de fruta nas escolas ([5]), que distribui às crianças nas escolas frutas e produtos hortícolas, e o regime de ajuda para a distribuição de leite e de determinados produtos lácteos aos alunos, nos estabelecimentos de ensino ([6]).

O Conselho Europeu de fevereiro confirmou a proposta da Comissão com um orçamento de 2,5 mil milhões de euros para o FEAD ([7]), para o período de 2014 a 2020. A Comissão propôs uma taxa de cofinanciamento da UE de 85 %, e mesmo de 95 % para os Estados-Membros que atravessam dificuldades orçamentais temporárias. Assim, a contribuição dos Estados-Membros de 15 % (ou 5 % neste último caso) prevê um efeito multiplicador dos recursos da União. Graças às suas ligações com iniciativas nacionais existentes, o Fundo não é independente.

([1]) http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/income_social_inclusion_living_conditions/introduction#
([2]) Dataset ilc_mddd11, http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=ilc_mddd11&lang=en
([3]) Dataset ilc_mdes03, http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=ilc_mdes03&lang=en
([4]) See Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2012 em: http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=738&langId=en&pubId=7315
([5]) Regulamento (CE) n.° 288/2009 da Comissão, JO L 94 de 8.4.2009: http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sfs/index_en.htm
([6]) Regulamento (UE) n.° 657/2008 da Comissão, JO L 183 de 11.7.2008: http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/milk/school-milk-scheme/index_en.htm
([7]) Fundo de Auxílio Europeu às Pessoas mais Carenciadas.

Uma comparação exata com o período de 2007 a 2013 não é possível, na medida em que o FEAD não foi aprovado pelo Parlamento Europeu e a Comissão Europeia. Não obstante, o montante proposto pela Comissão é mais ou menos comparável ao que a UE consagra atualmente ao Programa para os mais desfavorecidos, com a ajuda do orçamento da UE para a agricultura.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001864/13
to the Commission
Inês Cristina Zuber (GUE/NGL)
(21 February 2013)

Subject: Child poverty in Portugal

So-called austerity and budgetary control policies in Portugal have had dramatic social consequences, including a rise in child poverty. One of the harshest aspects of increased child poverty in Portugal is widespread malnutrition. It has been estimated that around 13 000 Portuguese schoolchildren are going hungry or are malnourished. In schools in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area, there were 50 000 more children from families with a monthly income below the reference level of EUR 419 in 2012 than in 2007. The Portuguese Society of Paediatrics has reported cases in hospitals that have not been seen for more than 20 years, such as instances of mothers diluting milk with water or feeding very young babies with cow's milk because they do not have enough money to buy infant formula. Increasingly, there are reports of children whose only meal of the day is at school. It is not yet possible to determine what consequences this situation will have, in terms of emotional and psychological problems, and on learning, social inclusion and discrimination.

1. Is the Commission aware of this situation? Does it know of similar developments in other EU countries?

2. What support can the EU give to combat this situation in Portugal, in addition to that already being provided, particularly under the Food Distribution Programme for the Most Deprived Persons?

3. Does the Commission believe that the sums earmarked for food aid should be reduced, maintained or increased in the future Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived, taking the sums allocated for the period 2007-2013 as a reference?

Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission
(18 April 2013)

According to the latest EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions ([1]), which relate to 2011, poverty as measured in terms of severe material deprivation ([2]) has increased by more than one percentage point in Greece, Italy, Latvia and Hungary. In particular, in those countries, as well as in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Slovenia, more people answered no when asked whether they could afford to eat meat, fish or an equivalent protein every second day ([3]). It turns out, however, that material deprivation actually improved slightly in Portugal in the same period, although it is very likely that the situation deteriorated after 2011 as a result of austerity measures ([4]).

In addition to the current EU programme for deprived persons, two other EU schemes can contribute to offer support, namely the School Fruit Scheme ([5]), which provides children in schools with fruit and vegetables, and the School Milk Scheme ([6]), which provides them with dairy products.

The February European Council confirmed the Commission's proposal on a budget of EUR 2.5 billion for the FEAD ([7]) for the period 2014 to 2020. The Commission has proposed an EU co-financing rate at 85%, rising to 95% for Member States facing temporary budget difficulties. The Member State contribution of 15% (or 5% in the latter case) thus provides for a multiplier effect of Union resources. Thanks to its links with existing national initiatives, the FEAD is not a stand-alone fund.

An exact comparison with the period 2007 to 2013 is not possible, because the FEAD has not been approved by the European Parliament and the European Commission. Nevertheless, the amount proposed by the Commission is more or less comparable to what the EU is currently spending on the programme for deprived persons with the help of the EU budget for agriculture.

([1]) http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/income_social_inclusion_living_conditions/introduction#
([2]) Dataset ilc_mddd11 http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=ilc_mddd11&lang=en
([3]) Dataset ilc_mdes03 http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=ilc_mdes03&lang=en
([4]) See Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2012 at: http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=738&langId=en&pubId=7315
([5]) Commission Regulation (EC) No 288/2009, OJ L 94, 8.4.2009, http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sfs/index_en.htm
([6]) Commission Regulation (EC) No 657/2008, OJ L 183, 11.7.2008, http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/milk/school-milk-scheme/index_en.htm
([7]) Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-001865/13
à Comissão
Inês Cristina Zuber (GUE/NGL)
(21 de fevereiro de 2013)

Assunto: Plano de insolvência Cerâmica Valadares, Vila Nova de Gaia

Foi recentemente tornado público o novo plano de insolvência da Cerâmica de Valadares, em Vila Nova de Gaia, empresa que está sedeada neste concelho há mais de 90 anos. Na prática, este plano não é mais do que uma proposta de liquidação controlada da empresa. Esta empresa continua a laborar e com uma carteira de encomendas considerável, embora sejam invocadas diversas dívidas como razão para a apresentação da situação da insolvência. O plano mencionado salvaguarda os interesses da banca — o BCP, principal credor da empresa, recebe imediatamente 25 % dos créditos e previsivelmente receberá o restante. Por outro lado, os trabalhadores são prejudicados — a proposta prevê que estes cessem os seus contratos de trabalho e que abdiquem de pelo menos 50 % dos seus créditos, ou seja, de direitos adquiridos. O plano contempla ainda a criação de uma nova empresa, livre de compromissos e deveres, que fará a colocação de mão-de-obra por um valor 50 % abaixo do praticado atualmente.

Assim, solicito à Comissão que me informe do seguinte:

1. A referida empresa recebeu quaisquer apoios comunitários? Com que fins foram concedidos e que compromissos assumiu aquando da concessão dos apoios? Considera que, a existirem compromissos, estes estão a ser postos em causa pela administração da empresa?

2. Que tipo de apoios pode esta empresa ou o governo português solicitar para evitar que estes trabalhadores fiquem desempregados ou que vejam os seus direitos sociais e laborais drasticamente diminuídos?

Resposta dada por László Andor em nome da Comissão
(18 de abril de 2013)

1. Segundo as informações recebidas das autoridades portuguesas, a empresa Cerâmica de Valadares, localizada em Vila Nova de Gaia, recebeu no passado o montante total de 690 000 euros do Fundo Social Europeu (FSE). Os projetos selecionados para financiamento cumpriram as regras nacionais e da UE durante o período de execução.

A empresa não recebeu qualquer financiamento do Fundo Europeu de Desenvolvimento Regional (FEDER).

2. O FEDER e o FSE constituem fontes de investimento que estimulam o crescimento sustentável e o emprego. As autoridades nacionais, regionais e locais devem utilizar o máximo dos recursos disponíveis para aumentar o emprego.

A Comissão gostaria igualmente de salientar que os trabalhadores que provavelmente sejam afetados pela restruturação poderão qualificar-se para apoio no âmbito do Fundo Europeu de Ajustamento à Globalização (FEG), desde que estejam preenchidas as condições relevantes ([1]). A Senhora Deputada poderá questionar a pessoa de contacto do FEG em Portugal para saber se tal candidatura está a ser planeada ([2]).

O FEDER não cofinancia empresas com dificuldades financeiras.

([1]) Regulamento (CE) n.° 1927/2006 do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, de 20 de dezembro de 2006, que institui o Fundo Europeu de Ajustamento à Globalização, JO L 406 de 30.12.2006.

([2]) Informações de contacto: http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=581&langId=pt

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001865/13
to the Commission
Inês Cristina Zuber (GUE/NGL)
(21 February 2013)

Subject: The insolvency plan for the Vila Nova de Gaia-based company, Cerâmica de Valadares

The new insolvency plan for the Vila Nova de Gaia-based company, Cerâmica de Valadares, has recently been announced. The company has been based in the municipality of Vila Nova de Gaia for over 90 years. In reality, this plan is nothing more than a proposal for the controlled winding-up of the company. Although the company continues to operate and has a substantial order book, a number of debts have been cited as the reason for claiming insolvency. The aforementioned plan safeguards the interests of the bank BCP, which is the company's main creditor. The bank will immediately receive 25% of the money owed to it and is expected to receive the remainder. Meanwhile, the employees are in a difficult situation: the proposal stipulates that their work contracts are to be cancelled and they are to give up at least 50% of their entitlements, which is to say their acquired rights. The plan also involves creating a new company, free of commitments and liabilities, which will cut the current workforce by 50%.

1. Has this company received any kind of EU aid? For what purpose was aid granted and what undertakings were given when it was received? If undertakings have been given, does the Commission believe these are being broken by the company management?

2. What type of support can this company or the Portuguese Government request to prevent these workers losing their jobs or seeing their social and employment rights drastically curtailed?

Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission
(18 April 2013)

1. According to information received from the Portuguese authorities, Cerâmica de Valadares Company, located in Vila Nova de Gaia, has received a total of EUR 690 000 from the European Social Fund (ESF) in the past. The projects selected for funding complied with EU and national rules throughout the implementation period.

The company has not received any funding from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF).

2. The ERDF and the ESF area source of investment stimulating sustainable growth and employment. National, regional and local authorities should use the available resources fully to increase employment.

The Commission would also like to point out that workers likely to be affected by restructuring may qualify for support from the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF), provided that the relevant conditions are met ([1]). The Honourable Member may wish to ask the EGF contact person for Portugal whether such an application is being planned ([2]).

The ERDF does not co-finance companies in financial difficulties.

([1]) Regulation (EC) No 1927/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on establishing the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund, OJ L 406, 30.12.2006.
([2]) Contact details http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=581&langId=pt.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-001866/13
à Comissão
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(21 de fevereiro de 2013)

Assunto: Novas ações para o desenvolvimento do turismo na União — 3

Tendo em conta que:

— A indústria europeia do turismo gera cerca de 5 % do PIB da União contando, aproximadamente, com 5,2 % da mão-de-obra total; se tivermos em conta os serviços indiretamente associados à atividade turística, estes representam mais de 10 % do PIB da União e 12 % do total da força de trabalho;

— Na Comunicação intitulada «Europa, primeiro destino turístico do mundo — novo quadro político para o turismo europeu», é apontada a necessidade de combater a sazonalidade deste setor, o que torna imperativo desenvolver mais iniciativas como o Calypso;

— A União, de acordo com as competências partilhadas estabelecidas no Tratado de Lisboa, deve conceber ações e instrumentos que criem valor acrescentado europeu, nomeadamente no que diz respeito à disponibilização de dados e análises, ao desenvolvimento de estratégias transnacionais de promoção e ao intercâmbio das melhores práticas;

— Foi criada pela primeira vez uma «Task Force» do Turismo no Parlamento Europeu, com o objetivo de conferir prioridade às ações com vista à criação de uma verdadeira política de turismo na União Europeia;

— A crise económica e monetária que a União enfrenta está a levar à estagnação e, em alguns casos, a uma recessão da atividade turística em certas regiões europeias;

— O programa COSME, que incide especialmente nas PME do setor do turismo, apresenta um orçamento para 2014-2020 de 2,5 mil milhões de euros;

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Considera importante desenvolver ações no domínio do turismo científico, uma vez que este tem um potencial de crescimento sublinhado pela Organização Mundial do Turismo e pela Fundação Ulysses?

2. Tem conhecimento de programas desenvolvidos no âmbito do turismo científico na União?

Resposta dada por Antonio Tajani em nome da Comissão
(30 de abril de 2013)

1. Tal como sublinhado na sua Comunicação de 2010 sobre o turismo ([1]), a Comissão considera que a diversificação da oferta turística à escala europeia, bem como nacional, regional ou local, é uma condição *sine qua non* para a competitividade do setor do turismo. Propor uma gama diversificada de tipos de turismo permite aos fornecedores do setor adaptar as suas ofertas à evolução dos padrões de comportamento turístico e chegar a uma maior massa de turistas. O turismo científico representa um tipo de nicho turístico que responde às necessidades de um grupo particular de turistas, suscetível de contribuir para a diversificação da oferta do turismo temático europeu. Ao misturar ciência e turismo, o turismo científico pode oferecer experiências de valor acrescentado único ao visitante. Por conseguinte, a Comissão considera que se deve favorecer e fomentar as ações no domínio do turismo científico, no contexto geral das estratégias para a diversificação da oferta turística.

2. A Comissão não tem conhecimento nem recebeu qualquer informação até agora da parte das administrações nacionais dos Estados-Membros sobre quaisquer programas específicos em matéria de turismo científico.

([1]) COM(2010) 352 final de 31.6.2010.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001866/13
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(21 February 2013)

Subject: New actions to develop EU tourism — 3

The European tourism industry generates around 5% of the EU's GDP, employing approximately 5.2% of the total workforce, while services indirectly linked to the tourism sector account for over 10% of the EU's GDP and 12% of the total workforce.

The communication 'Europe, the world's No 1 tourist destination — a new political framework for tourism in Europe' highlights the need to tackle the seasonal nature of tourism, making it vital to develop more initiatives like Calypso.

The EU, in accordance with its shared competences enshrined in the Treaty of Lisbon, must devise actions and instruments to generate added value for Europe, particularly in terms of providing data and analyses and developing transnational strategies to promote and exchange best practices.

For the first time, a tourism task force has been created within the European Parliament, with the aim of prioritising actions to create a genuine EU tourism policy.

The economic and monetary crisis that the EU is facing is causing the tourism sector to stagnate and, in some cases, collapse in some European regions.

The Programme for the Competitiveness of Enterprises and SMEs (COSME), which places a particular focus on small and medium-sized enterprises in the tourism sector, has a budget of EUR 2.5 billion for 2014-2020.

1. Does the Commission think it is important to undertake actions in the field of scientific tourism, since this is a potential growth area, as highlighted by the World Tourism Organisation and by the Ulysses Foundation?

2. Is the Commission aware of programmes being carried out in the field of scientific tourism in the EU?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission
(30 April 2013)

1. As underlined in its 2010 Communication on tourism ([1]), the Commission considers that the diversification of the tourism offer at European level, as well as at national or regional and local level, is a sine qua non-condition for the competitiveness of the tourism sector. Proposing a diversified range of tourism types allows the tourism suppliers to adapt their offer to the changing tourist behavioural patterns and to reach out to a larger mass of tourists. Scientific tourism represents one type of niche tourism responding to the needs of a particular set of tourists which can contribute to the diversification of the European thematic tourism offer. By blending science with tourism, scientific tourism can offer added-value unique visitor experiences. Therefore, the Commission is in favour of encouraging and facilitating actions in the field of scientific tourism in the general context of the strategies for tourism supply diversification.

2. The Commission is not aware of and has not been reported so far by the national tourism administrations in the Member States about any specific programmes in the field of scientific tourism.

([1]) COM(2010) 352 final of 31.6.2010.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-001867/13
à Comissão
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(21 de fevereiro de 2013)

Assunto: Turismo náutico na União

Tendo em conta que:

— A indústria europeia do turismo gera cerca de 5 % do PIB da União contando, aproximadamente, com 5,2 % da mão-de-obra total; e se tivermos em conta os serviços indiretamente associados à atividade turística, estes representam mais de 10 % do PIB da União e 12 % do total da força de trabalho;

— Segundo a Comunicação da Comissão, o *Blue Growth* é a dimensão marítima da Estratégia UE 2020, em complementaridade com outras políticas, como a Política Marítima Integrada;

— Atualmente a economia azul representa 5,4 milhões de empregos e um valor acrescentado bruto (VAB) de cerca de 500 milhões de euros por ano, com previsões para 2020 de 7 milhões de empregos e um VAB de 600 milhões de euros;

— As várias estratégias macrorregionais, em especial a Estratégia para a Região do Atlântico, pretendem congregar os diversos atores, desde as entidades públicas e instituições privadas, com o efeito de alavanca da União para a identificação das prioridades e dos investimentos;

— O turismo náutico, costeiro e de cruzeiros é uma das áreas prioritárias referidas na Comunicação *Blue Growth*;

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Se tem conhecimento do conceito de estações náuticas, já implementadas em França e em Espanha e em implementação em Portugal, e das suas potencialidades para o desenvolvimento sustentável das regiões marítimas e regiões com águas interiores?

2. Se pretende utilizar este conceito como um exemplo de boas práticas e apoiar a sua difusão pelo resto dos Estados-Membros, como um verdadeiro potencial de valor acrescentado europeu?

3. Se pretende apresentar ações para o desenvolvimento deste conceito noutros Estados-Membros, para além dos supramencionados?

Resposta dada por Maria Damanaki em nome da Comissão
(25 de abril de 2013)

A Comissão tem conhecimento do conceito de estações náuticas e da sua importância para a promoção do turismo náutico sustentável e da «economia azul». Está neste momento a preparar uma comunicação sobre o turismo costeiro e marítimo, que deverá ser adotada até finais de 2013. A comunicação terá por objetivo promover uma estratégia de crescimento e emprego sustentáveis no turismo costeiro e marítimo na Europa, realçando ao mesmo tempo a competitividade do setor pela garantia de serviços de alta qualidade.

A Comissão está em contacto com agentes europeus do domínio costeiro e marítimo, incluindo a *European Federation of Nautical Resorts Associations* (federação europeia de associações de estações náuticas), promotora do conceito de estações náuticas na Espanha, na França e, atualmente, também em Portugal (por exemplo, na ilha da Madeira). Esta federação foi convidada a participar, como oradora, no Dia Europeu do Turismo de 2012 e vai promover uma sessão de trabalho no Dia Marítimo Europeu de 2013. O conceito de estações náuticas foi citado como exemplo de boas práticas na consulta pública «Desafios e Oportunidades para o Turismo Costeiro e Marítimo na Europa». No devido respeito do princípio da subsidiariedade, a Comissão continuará a prestar assistência aos Estados-Membros e às partes interessadas com vista ao reforço da competitividade do setor do turismo, mediante a promoção de um intercâmbio das melhores práticas a nível nacional, marítimo e europeu.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001867/13
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(21 February 2013)

Subject: Maritime tourism in the European Union

The European tourism industry generates around 5% of the EU's GDP, employing approximately 5.2% of the total workforce, while services indirectly linked to the tourism sector account for over 10% of the EU's GDP and 12% of the total workforce.

According to the Commission's Communication, Blue Growth is the maritime aspect of the EU 2020 strategy, in conjunction with other policies, such as the Integrated Maritime Policy.

The blue economy currently accounts for 5.4 million jobs and a gross value added (GVA) of around EUR 500 million per year. By 2020, these figures are expected to have risen to 7 million jobs and a GVA of EUR 600 million.

The various macro-regional strategies, particularly the strategy for the Atlantic Region, aim to use the lever effect of the EU to bring together the various stakeholders, including public bodies and private institutions, in order to identify priorities and investments.

Maritime, coastal and cruise tourism form one of the priority areas mentioned in the Blue Growth Communication.

1. Is the Commission aware of the concept of maritime resorts, which have already been rolled out in France and Spain and are being rolled out in Portugal? If so, is it aware of their potential for bringing sustainable development to maritime regions and regions with inland waters?

2. Does it intend to use this concept as an example of good practice and to support the introduction of such resorts in other Member States as a potential means of creating European added value?

3. Will it put forward actions to develop this concept in other Member States, besides those mentioned above?

Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission
(25 April 2013)

The Commission is aware of the concept of marine resorts, and of their importance in the promotion of sustainable nautical tourism and Blue Growth. The Commission is currently working towards a communication on Coastal and Maritime Tourism, to be adopted by the end of 2013. It will aim at promoting a strategy for sustainable growth and employment in coastal and maritime tourism in Europe while enhancing the sector's competitiveness by guaranteeing high quality services.

The Commission is in contact with European coastal and maritime stakeholders, including the European Federation of Nautical Resorts Associations, a promoter of the marine resorts concept in Spain and France, and now also in Portugal (e.g. in the Madeira island). This Federation was invited to participate as a speaker at the European Tourism Day 2012 and will promote a workshop during the European Maritime Day 2013. The concept of nautical resorts has been cited as a best practice example in the public consultation 'Challenges and Opportunities for Coastal and Maritime Tourism in Europe'. In due respect of the principle of subsidiarity, the Commission will continue to assist Member States and stakeholders in enhancing the competitiveness of the tourism sector, by promoting best-practice exchange at national, sea-basin and European level.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-001868/13
à Comissão
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(21 de fevereiro de 2013)

Assunto: Suspeita da concessão de auxílios estatais aos Estaleiros Navais de Viana do Castelo

A Comissão terá aberto uma investigação para averiguar se as várias medidas de apoio público da parte do Estado português aos Estaleiros Navais de Viana do Castelo cumprem as regras relativas aos auxílios concedidos pelo Estado, devendo estes ser compatíveis com o mercado interno, nos termos do artigo 107.°, n.° 2, do Tratado sobre o Funcionamento da União Europeia.

No âmbito desta investigação, a Comissão terá, alegadamente, levantado um conjunto de questões junto do Estado português, em matéria de concorrência e de auxílios estatais, devido a suspeitas de que os Estaleiros Navais tenham beneficiado de um montante superior a 180 milhões de euros, atribuído entre 2006 e 2010, sem que o Estado-Membro tenha notificado a Comissão na altura.

Além disso, a Comissão terá sido recentemente informada da intenção de Portugal de conceder novos apoios aos Estaleiros de Viana, no âmbito do projeto de privatização dos Estaleiros, pretendendo, todavia, ser notificada da natureza e dos montantes exatos dos mesmos, e alegando existirem dúvidas de que as medidas concedidas até ao presente tenham sido tomadas em condições de livre concorrência ao abrigo do Tratado.

1. Confirma a Comissão a abertura de uma investigação junto do Estado português para averiguar se as várias medidas de apoio público da parte do Estado português aos Estaleiros de Viana do Castelo cumprem as regras da União Europeia relativas aos auxílios concedidos pelo Estado?

2. Em caso afirmativo, já chegou a Comissão Europeia a alguma conclusão?

3. No caso de ter considerado que os apoios aos Estaleiros são incompatíveis com as regras da União Europeia relativas aos auxílios de Estado, qual a sanção que a Comissão Europeia prevê aplicar ao Estado português?

4. Tenciona a Comissão recorrer ao Tribunal de Justiça da União Europeia e instaurar uma ação por incumprimento caso se verifique que o Estado português não respeitou as regras da União Europeia relativas aos auxílios de Estado?

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-001870/13
à Comissão
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(21 de fevereiro de 2013)

Assunto: Reprivatização dos Estaleiros Navais de Viana de Castelo e ajudas de Estado

A Comissão terá aberto uma investigação para averiguar se as várias medidas de apoio público da parte do Estado português aos Estaleiros Navais de Viana do Castelo cumprem as regras relativas aos auxílios concedidos pelo Estado, devendo estes ser compatíveis com o mercado interno, nos termos do artigo 107.°, n.° 2, do Tratado sobre o Funcionamento da União Europeia.

No âmbito desta investigação, a Comissão terá, alegadamente, levantado um conjunto de questões junto do Estado português, em matéria de concorrência e de auxílios estatais, devido a suspeitas de que os Estaleiros Navais tenham beneficiado de um montante superior a 180 milhões de euros, atribuído entre 2006 e 2010, sem que o Estado-Membro tenha notificado a Comissão na altura.

Além disso, a Comissão terá sido recentemente informada da intenção de Portugal de conceder novos apoios aos Estaleiros de Viana, no âmbito do projeto de privatização dos Estaleiros, pretendendo, todavia, ser notificada da natureza e dos montantes exatos dos mesmos, e alegando existirem dúvidas de que as medidas concedidas até ao presente tenham sido tomadas em condições de livre concorrência ao abrigo do Tratado.

1. Caso a Comissão conclua que as ajudas de Estado não são compatíveis com o mercado interno ou que são aplicadas de forma abusiva, quais as opções que propõe em alternativa à privatização dos Estaleiros, cujo processo, em razão da investigação aberta pela Comissão, está atualmente suspenso?

2. Para quando prevê a Comissão uma decisão relativa à investigação referida sobre eventuais ajudas de Estado?

3. Tendo em conta que vários candidatos à reprivatização terão já manifestado a sua intenção de desistir do processo devido ao bloqueio referido, haverá alguma possibilidade de o processo ser célere e de caráter urgente, de forma a que a situação fique suspensa o menor tempo possível?

4. Caso se venha a confirmar que, no passado, o Estado português não respeitou as regras da União Europeia relativas aos auxílios de Estado aos Estaleiros, terá essa confirmação consequências sobre uma notificação para futuras ajudas de Estado aos mesmos Estaleiros?

Resposta conjunta dada por Joaquín Almunia em nome da Comissão
(16 de abril de 2013)

1. Em 23 de janeiro de 2013, a Comissão decidiu investigar formalmente o apoio concedido por Portugal a favor dos ENVC a fim de verificar a sua compatibilidade com as regras em matéria de auxílios estatais da UE ([1]).

2. A Comissão ainda não concluiu se este apoio constitui um auxílio estatal, ou se é compatível com o mercado interno. Antes de tomar uma decisão final, a versão não confidencial da decisão de dar início a uma investigação formal deve ser publicada no *Jornal Oficial da União Europeia*, convidando as partes interessadas a apresentarem observações, a que Portugal pode dar resposta ([2]). A Comissão pode igualmente solicitar a Portugal informações complementares. Por conseguinte, a Comissão não pode, neste momento, confirmar quando tomará uma decisão definitiva.

3. Há uma série de etapas processuais obrigatórias antes de tomar uma decisão final. A Comissão considera que, com a plena cooperação das autoridades portuguesas, será rapidamente alcançada uma decisão sobre o assunto.

4. Se a Comissão vier a constatar que este apoio equivale a auxílios estatais incompatíveis, Portugal será obrigado a recuperá-los junto do beneficiário.

5. Nessas circunstâncias, a jurisprudência Deggendorf ([3]) impediria Portugal de conceder auxílios estatais adicionais aos ENVC até o auxílio incompatível anteriormente concedido ter sido integralmente recuperado.

6. Por força dos Tratados da UE, a Comissão tem o dever de assegurar a observância das regras em matéria de auxílios estatais. Nesta base, qualquer decisão que exija a Portugal a recuperação de auxílios estatais incompatíveis junto dos ENVC não proibiria a sua privatização por si só, que é uma decisão do foro das autoridades portuguesas.

7. Sem que tenha sido tomada uma decisão relativamente aos ENVC, a Comissão não pode intentar uma ação contra Portugal junto do Tribunal de Justiça da UE por incumprimento do artigo 258.° do TFUE.

([1]) Ver comunicado de imprensa da Comissão IP/13/33 de 23 de janeiro de 2013, disponível em http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-33_en.htm

([2]) Todas as observações apresentadas pelas partes interessadas e qualquer resposta das autoridades portuguesas devem ser apresentadas dentro de um prazo não superior a um mês.

([3]) Acórdãos do Tribunal de Primeira Instância nos processos T-244/93 e T-486/93, TWD/Comissão, de 1995, Rec., p. II-2265 e do Tribunal de Justiça no processo C-355/95 P TWD/Comissão, de 1997, Col. I-2549.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001868/13
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(21 February 2013)

Subject: Suspected granting of state aid to ENVC shipyard (Estaleiros Navais de Viana do Castelo)

The Commission has opened an investigation to verify whether various public support measures granted by Portugal in favour of the shipyard 'Estaleiros Navais de Viana do Castelo' (ENVC) comply with state aid rules, under which any such aid must be compatible with the single market in accordance with Article 107(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

As part of this investigation, it appears that the Commission has sent the Portuguese Government a series of questions relating to competition and state aid, since it is suspected that the ENVC shipyard may have been granted over EUR 180 million between 2006 and 2010, and that Portugal did not notify the Commission at the time.

Furthermore, the Commission has recently been informed that Portugal plans to grant fresh support to the ENVC shipyard as part of a privatisation plan. The Commission now wishes to be notified of the nature and exact amounts of this aid, and has expressed doubts as to whether the support granted up to now complied with conditions of free competition as stipulated in the Treaty.

1. Can the Commission confirm that it has opened an investigation concerning Portugal in order to verify whether various public support measures granted by Portugal in favour of the ENVC shipyard comply with EU state aid rules?

2. If so, has the Commission already reached any conclusions?

3. If it concludes that support for the shipyard is incompatible with EU state aid rules, what sanction will the Commission impose on Portugal?

4. Is the Commission planning to bring a case before the EU Court of Justice for failure to comply, if it is established that Portugal did not respect EU rules on state aid?

Question for written answer E-001870/13
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(21 February 2013)

Subject: Reprivatisation of ENVC shipyard (Estaleiros Navais de Viana do Castelo) and state aid

The Commission has opened an investigation to verify whether various public support measures granted by Portugal in favour of the shipyard 'Estaleiros Navais de Viana do Castelo' (ENVC) comply with state aid rules, under which any such aid must be compatible with the single market in accordance with Article 107(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

As part of this investigation, it appears that the Commission has sent the Portuguese Government a series of questions relating to competition and state aid, since it is suspected that the ENVC shipyard may have been granted over EUR 180 million between 2006 and 2010, and that Portugal did not notify the Commission at the time.

Furthermore, the Commission has recently been informed that Portugal plans to grant fresh support to the ENVC shipyard as part of a privatisation plan. The Commission now wishes to be notified of the nature and exact amounts of this aid, and has expressed doubts as to whether the support granted up to now complied with conditions of free competition as stipulated in the Treaty.

1. If the Commission concludes that this state aid is not compatible with the internal market or has been granted unlawfully, what options is it proposing as an alternative to the shipyard's privatisation, the process for which has been suspended owing to the Commission investigation?

2. When is the Commission expecting to reach a decision on the above investigation into possible state aid?

3. Bearing in mind that a number of reprivatisation bidders have already said that they intend to drop out because the process is currently suspended, will it be possible for the investigation to be accelerated and treated as urgent so that the privatisation process will be suspended for as short a time as possible?

4. If it is confirmed that Portugal did not comply with European rules on state aid for the shipyard in the past, will this have consequences for the notification of future state aid for the same shipyard?

Joint answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission
(16 April 2013)

1. On 23 January 2013 the Commission decided to formally investigate support granted by Portugal in favour of ENVC to determine its compatibility with EU State aid rules ([1]).

2. The Commission has not yet concluded whether this support constitutes state aid, or about its compatibility with the internal market. Before reaching a final decision, the non-confidential version of the decision to open a formal investigation must be published in the *Official Journal of the European Union*, inviting interested parties to submit comments, to which Portugal may issue replies ([2]). The Commission may also request additional information from Portugal. Therefore, the Commission cannot at this time confirm when it will reach a final decision.

3. There are a number of compulsory procedural steps that must be taken before reaching a final decision. The Commission believes that with the full cooperation of the Portuguese authorities, a decision on the matter will be reached swiftly.

4. If the Commission was to find that this support amounts to incompatible state aid, Portugal would be required to recover it from the beneficiary.

5. In the event of such an outcome, the Deggendorf case-law ([3]) would prevent Portugal from providing additional state aid to ENVC until the incompatible aid previously granted had been fully recovered.

6. Under the EU Treaties, the Commission must ensure that state aid rules are respected. On this basis, any decision requiring Portugal to recover incompatible state aid from ENVC would not prohibit its privatisation per se, which is a decision for the Portuguese authorities to make.

7. Without a decision in the ENVC case, the Commission cannot bring an action against Portugal before the EU Court of Justice for failure to comply with Article 258 TFEU.

([1]) See press release of the Commission IP/13/33 of 23 January 2013, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-33_en.htm

([2]) All comments by interested parties and any reply from the Portuguese authorities must be submitted within a period not exceeding one month respectively.

([3]) Judgments of the Court of First Instance in cases T-244/93 and T-486/93, TWD v Commission [1995] Rec. II-2265, and of the Court of Justice in Case C-355/95 P, TWD v Commission [1997] Rec. I-2549.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-001869/13
à Comissão
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(21 de fevereiro de 2013)

Assunto: Notificação à Comissão Europeia e autorização de auxílios estatais aos Estaleiros Navais de Viana do Castelo

A Comissão terá aberto uma investigação para averiguar se as várias medidas de apoio público da parte do Estado português aos Estaleiros de Viana do Castelo cumprem as regras relativas aos auxílios concedidos pelo Estado, devendo estes ser compatíveis com o mercado interno, nos termos do artigo 107.°, n.° 2, do Tratado sobre o Funcionamento da União Europeia.

No âmbito desta investigação, a Comissão terá, alegadamente, levantado um conjunto de questões junto do Estado português, em matéria de concorrência e de auxílios estatais, devido a suspeitas de que os Estaleiros Navais tenham beneficiado de um montante superior a 180 milhões de euros, atribuído entre 2006 e 2010, sem que o Estado-Membro tenha notificado a Comissão na altura.

Além disso, a Comissão terá sido recentemente informada da intenção de Portugal de conceder novos apoios aos Estaleiros de Viana, no âmbito do projeto de privatização dos Estaleiros, pretendendo, todavia, ser notificada da natureza e dos montantes exatos da mesma, e alegando existirem dúvidas de que as medidas concedidas até ao presente tenham sido tomadas em condições de livre concorrência ao abrigo do Tratado.

1. Já foi a Comissão notificada pelo Estado português da natureza e dos montantes dos auxílios estatais que este tenciona atribuir aos Estaleiros Navais de Viana do Castelo?

2. Em caso afirmativo, são estas ajudas de Estado compatíveis com o mercado interno nos termos do artigo 107.°, n.° 2, do Tratado sobre o Funcionamento da União Europeia? Para quando prevê a Comissão tal decisão?

3. Caso a Comissão conclua que as ajudas de Estado não são compatíveis com o mercado interno ou que são aplicadas de forma abusiva, qual o procedimento que pretende adotar para alterar a situação, isto é, a supressão ou a modificação das mesmas?

4. Qual o fundamento possível para concluir que, neste caso concreto, existe compatibilidade com o regime das ajudas de Estado e com as exceções legais ao abrigo das regras de concorrência?

Resposta dada por Joaquín Almunia em nome da Comissão
(24 de abril de 2013)

A Comissão pode informar o Senhor Deputado de que o Governo português não notificou oficialmente à Comissão qualquer auxílio estatal que tencione conceder aos estaleiros navais de Viana de Castelo (ENVC).

Como indicado na resposta às perguntas E-001868/2013 e E-001870/2013, a Comissão decidiu, em 23 de janeiro de 2013 iniciar uma investigação formal sobre os ENVC, a fim de determinar a conformidade da ajuda financeira que os ENVC receberam de Portugal no passado com as regras da UE em matéria de auxílios estatais ([1]). Contudo, a privatização prevista dos ENVC não faz parte da referida investigação.

A Comissão tem conhecimento dos planos de privatização dos ENVC. No considerando 71 da sua decisão de 23 de janeiro de 2013, a Comissão indicou que, tendo em conta as dificuldades económicas dos ENVC e a natureza das medidas previstas, seria provável que essas medidas se traduzissem num auxílio estatal se fossem implementadas na forma antecipada no momento da decisão. No entanto, na ausência de uma notificação, e à luz das informações disponíveis, a Comissão não pode nesta fase especular se as medidas que possam ou não vir a fazer parte de um plano de privatização — caso venham a consistir num auxílio estatal — serão ou não compatíveis com o mercado interno e qual o fundamento dessa conformidade.

([1]) Ver comunicado de imprensa da Comissão IP/13/33, de 23 de janeiro de 2013, disponível em: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-33_en.htm

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001869/13
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(21 February 2013)

Subject: Notification to the Commission and authorisation of state aid for ENVC shipyard (Estaleiros Navais de Viana do Castelo)

The Commission has opened an investigation to verify whether various public support measures granted by Portugal in favour of the shipyard 'Estaleiros Navais de Viana do Castelo' (ENVC) comply with state aid rules, under which any such aid must be compatible with the single market in accordance with Article 107(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

As part of this investigation, it appears that the Commission has sent the Portuguese Government a series of questions relating to competition and state aid, since it is suspected that the ENVC shipyard may have been granted over EUR 180 million between 2006 and 2010, and that Portugal did not notify the Commission at the time.

Furthermore, the Commission has recently been informed that Portugal plans to grant fresh support to the ENVC shipyard as part of a privatisation plan. The Commission now wishes to be notified of the nature and exact amounts of this aid, and has expressed doubts as to whether the support granted up to now complied with conditions of free competition as stipulated in the Treaty.

1. Has the Portuguese Government already notified the Commission of the nature and amounts of the state aid which it plans to grant to the ENVC shipyard?

2. If so, is this state aid compatible with the internal market within the terms of Article 107(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union? When is the Commission expecting to reach a decision?

3. If the Commission concludes that this state aid is not compatible with the internal market or has been granted unlawfully, what procedure does it plan to adopt to alter the situation, i.e. will this aid be abolished or modified?

4. On what possible basis might it be concluded that this specific case is compatible with state aid rules and the legal exemptions provided for by competition rules?

Answer given by Mr Almunia on behalf of the Commission
(24 April 2013)

The Commission can inform the Honourable Member that the Portuguese Government has not formally notified the Commission of any state aid that it plans to grant to the ENVC shipyard.

As indicated in its reply to Questions E-001868/2013 and E-001870/2013, the Commission decided on 23 January 2013 to open a formal investigation concerning ENVC, in order to ascertain whether the financial assistance ENVC received from Portugal in the past is in line with EU State aid rules ([1]). The planned privatisation of ENVC is not, however, part of this investigation.

The Commission was aware of plans to privatise ENVC. In Recital 71 of its decision of 23 January 2013, the Commission indicated that, in view of the economic predicament of ENVC and the nature of the planned measures, it appeared likely that those measures would amount to state aid if implemented in the form anticipated at the time of the decision. However, in the absence of a notification and in view of the information available, the Commission at this stage cannot speculate as to whether measures that may or may not be part of a planned privatisation — were they to amount to state aid — would be compatible with the internal market and on what basis.

([1]) See press release of the Commission IP/13/33 of 23 January 2013, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-33_en.htm

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-001871/13
προς την Επιτροπή
Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE)
(21 Φεβρουαρίου 2013)

Θέμα: Διαρθρωτικά ταμεία και μείωση των εισοδηματικών διαφορών μεταξύ Ελλάδας και ευρωπαϊκού μέσου όρου

Σύμφωνα με έκθεση του αυστριακού οικονομικού Ινστιτούτου WiFo, το κατά κεφαλήν εισόδημα στην Ελλάδα ήταν το 2012 κατά 28% χαμηλότερο από τον μέσο όρο στην ΕΕ των 15 (δηλαδή 2008: 84%), οπότε η εισοδηματική υστέρηση της Ελλάδας έναντι των άλλων χωρών έχει εμφανώς αυξηθεί. Το ινστιτούτο υπολογίζει πως το 2013 το ελληνικό ΑΕΠ θα είναι κατά 23% χαμηλότερο από το 2008 — όταν είχε φτάσει στην υψηλότερη τιμή του. Επομένως, όχι μόνο έχει επέλθει στασιμότητα στη διαδικασία σύγκλισης της Ελλάδας, αλλά η ίδια η σύγκλιση έχει αναστραφεί.

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

— Λαμβάνοντας υπόψη την κατανομή των πόρων από τα διαρθρωτικά ταμεία για την περίοδο 2014-2020, ποια είναι η εκτίμηση της Επιτροπής σχετικά με τη προσπάθεια σύγκλισης της Ελλάδας με το μέσο κατά κεφαλήν ΑΕΠ της ΕΕ τα επόμενα χρόνια;

— Διαθέτει στοιχεία σχετικά με το αν στο τέλος της νέας δημοσιονομικής περιόδου θα έχει παρατηρηθεί σύγκλιση των εισοδηματικών διαφορών των κρατών μελών;

Απάντηση του κ. Rehn εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(27 Μαΐου 2013)

Η Ελλάδα βρίσκεται σήμερα σε στάδιο σημαντικής οικονομικής προσαρμογής. Οι εαρινές προβλέψεις 2013 των υπηρεσιών της Επιτροπής αναφέρονται σε συρρίκνωση της ελληνικής οικονομίας κατά -4,2 % για το 2013. Η επίδοση αυτή συγκρίνεται με τις προβλέψεις για -0,3% του ΑΕΠ στη ζώνη του ευρώ και 0% στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση. Ως εκ τούτου, η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή δεν αναμένει πρόοδο για την Ελλάδα όσον αφορά τη σύγκλιση των επιπέδων των εισοδημάτων κατά τη διάρκεια του 2013.

Ωστόσο, η πρόοδος όσον αφορά τη σύγκλιση μετράται καλύτερα σε μεσοπρόθεσμη προοπτική, χωρίς να λαμβάνονται υπόψη οι διακυμάνσεις της οικονομικής συγκυρίας. Το ευρύ φάσμα διαρθρωτικών μεταρρυθμίσεων που αναλαμβάνονται στην Ελλάδα, στο πλαίσιο του προγράμματος οικονομικής προσαρμογής, αναμένεται να συμβάλει σύντομα στην ανάκαμψη, δεδομένου του βασικού ρόλου που διαδραματίζουν στο πλαίσιο αυτό τα διαρθρωτικά ταμεία της ΕΕ. Με βάση αυτά τα δεδομένα, η Επιτροπή ενθαρρύνει την ταχεία ολοκλήρωση των διεξαγόμενων διαπραγματεύσεων για το επόμενο πολυετές δημοσιονομικό πλαίσιο (ΠΔΠ), ώστε να διευκολυνθεί η έγκαιρη χρηματοδότηση της Ελλάδας από τα διαρθρωτικά ταμεία της ΕΕ για την προγραμματική περίοδο 2014-2020.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001871/13
to the Commission
Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE)
(21 February 2013)

Subject: Structural Funds and reducing income disparities between Greece and the EU average

According to a report by the Austrian Institute of Economic Research, WiFo, per capita income in Greece in 2012 was 28% below the average of EU-15 (i.e. 2008: 84%), which means that the income gap between Greece and other Member States has clearly increased. The Institute estimates that in 2013 Greek GDP will be 23% lower than in 2008 — when it peaked. Thus, not only has the convergence process in Greece stagnated, but convergence has actually been reversed.

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

— Taking into account the distribution of resources from the Structural Funds for the period 2014-2020, does the Commission consider that attempts to bring about a convergence between per capita GDP in Greece and the EU average over the next few years will prove successful?

— Can it provide information about whether the end of the new fiscal year will see the convergence of income levels in the Member States?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission
(27 May 2013)

Greece is undergoing a significant economic adjustment. The Commission Services 2013 Spring Forecast projects a contraction of the Greek economy by -4.2% for 2013. This performance compares with the — 0.3% GDP forecast for the Euro Area and the 0% forecast for the European Union. For Greece, the European Commission therefore does not expect progress on convergence in income levels during 2013.

However, progress on convergence is best measured in a medium-term perspective, abstracting from business cycle fluctuations. The wide-ranging structural reforms which are being undertaken in Greece in the context of the economic adjustment programme are expected to contribute soon to a recovery with the EU structural funds playing a key role in this respect. Given that the Commission encourages an early conclusion of the ongoing negotiations for the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) in order to facilitate the timely allocation of EU structural funds to Greece for the 2014-2020 programming period.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-001872/13
προς την Επιτροπή
Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE)
(21 Φεβρουαρίου 2013)

Θέμα: Μεταφορά της νομοθεσίας της ΕΕ στο εθνικό δίκαιο των κρατών μελών

Είναι σε θέση να με ενημερώσει η Επιτροπή για το κατά πόσο βελτιώνονται οι επιδόσεις των κρατών μελών όσον αφορά την ορθή μεταφορά της κοινοτικής νομοθεσίας στο εσωτερικό;

Ποιος είναι ο αριθμός των διαδικασιών επί παραβάσει για σχετικά θέματα που ακολουθεί σήμερα η Επιτροπή για την Ελλάδα; Είναι υψηλός σε σχέση με τα υπόλοιπα κράτη μέλη;

Απάντηση του κ. Barroso εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(3 Απριλίου 2013)

Το Αξιότιμο Μέλος του Κοινοβουλίου καλείται να ανατρέξει στην ανάλυση που πραγματοποίησε η Επιτροπή σχετικά με τη μεταφορά στο εθνικό δίκαιο των οδηγιών, σε διάφορες ετήσιες εκθέσεις της «για τον έλεγχο της εφαρμογής του δικαίου της ΕΕ», οι οποίες είναι διαθέσιμες στον δικτυακό τόπο EUROPA της Επιτροπής, στην ακόλουθη διεύθυνση:
http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/infringements/infringements_annual_report_el.htm

Όσον αφορά το θέμα της μεταφοράς στο εθνικό δίκαιο, η Επιτροπή επιθυμεί να τονίσει ότι απαιτείται ιδιαίτερη προσοχή ώστε να μην συνάγονται βιαστικά συμπεράσματα σχετικά με τις διαχρονικές επιδόσεις των κρατών μελών σ' έναν τομέα στον οποίο τα δεδομένα (ο αριθμός και το είδος των οδηγιών προς μεταφορά) ποικίλλουν σημαντικά από το ένα έτος στο άλλο. Ωστόσο, όπως ανέφερε η Επιτροπή στην τελευταία έκθεσή της «για τον έλεγχο της εφαρμογής του δικαίου της ΕΕ» (2011), είναι σαφές ότι ο αριθμός των διαδικασιών επί παραβάσει κατά των κρατών μελών μειώνεται από χρόνο σε χρόνο, όπως και ο αριθμός των προσφυγών στο Δικαστήριο.

Όσον αφορά την Ελλάδα, η Επιτροπή καλεί το Αξιότιμο Μέλος του Κοινοβουλίου να ανατρέξει στον πίνακα με τον αριθμό των παραβάσεων ανά κράτος μέλος, ο οποίος παρατίθεται στο σημείο 2.2 της 29ης ετήσιας έκθεσης της Επιτροπής «για τον έλεγχο της εφαρμογής του δικαίου της ΕΕ» (2011)[1] και στο παράρτημα 1 της ίδιας έκθεσης, για τα διάφορα κράτη μέλη, τα οποία είναι διαθέσιμα στην ακόλουθη διεύθυνση:
http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/docs/docs_infringements/annual_report_29/sg_annual_report_monitoring_eu_law_121130.pdf

Στο πλαίσιο αυτό, το Αξιότιμο Μέλος θα μπορούσε επίσης να συμβουλευθεί τα δεδομένα στους πίνακες επιδόσεων της εσωτερικής αγοράς, οι οποίοι είναι διαθέσιμοι στην ακόλουθη διεύθυνση στο Διαδίκτυο:
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/score/index_fr.htm

([1]) COM(2012) 714 τελικό

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001872/13
to the Commission
Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE)
(21 February 2013)

Subject: Transposition of EU legislation into Member States' national law

Can the Commission say whether there has been any improvement in Member States' performance as regards the proper transposition of EU legislation into national law?

How many infringement proceedings concerning issues of this kind is the Commission pursuing in respect of Greece? Is the number high compared for other Member States?

(Version française)

Réponse donnée par M Barroso au nom de la Commission
(3 avril 2013)

L'Honorable Parlementaire est invité à se référer à l'analyse faite par la Commission au sujet de la transposition des directives dans ses différents rapports annuels «sur le contrôle de l'application du droit de l'UE», lesquels sont accessibles sur le site Europa de la Commission à l'adresse suivante:
(http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/infringements/infringements_annual_report_fr.htm).

Pour ce qui a trait à la problématique de la transposition, la Commission attire l'attention sur la prudence dont il convient de faire preuve avant de tirer des conclusions hâtives au sujet de la performance des États membres au cours du temps dans un domaine où les situations (nombre et type de directives à transposer) varient grandement d'une année à l'autre. Cependant, comme la Commission l'indique dans son dernier rapport «sur le contrôle de l'application du droit de l'UE» (2011) ([1]), force est de constater que le nombre d'infraction ouvertes à l'encontre des États membres diminuent d'année en année tout comme le nombre de saisine de la Cour.

En ce qui concerne la Grèce, la Commission invite l'Honorable Parlementaire à se référer au tableau relatif aux nombre d'infractions par État membre figurant au point 2.2 du 29e rapport annuel de la Commission «sur le contrôle de l'application du droit de l'UE» (2011) et à son annexe 1 relative aux différents États membres, lesquels sont accessibles à l'adresse suivante:
(http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/docs/docs_infringements/annual_report_29/sg_annual_report_monitoring_eu_law_121130.pdf).

Dans ce contexte, il peut être utile aussi de compulser les données figurant les différents tableaux d'affichage du Marché intérieur, visualisables à l'adresse:
(http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/score/index_fr.htm).

([1]) COM(2012)714 final.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-001873/13
προς την Επιτροπή
Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE)
(21 Φεβρουαρίου 2013)

Θέμα: Παράνομη διακίνηση κρέατος αλόγου

Στο σύνολο των κρατών μελών διαπιστώνεται σοβαρή ανησυχία σχετικά με την παραγωγή μπιφτεκιών από κρέας αλόγου. Μάλιστα, πρόσφατα εταιρεία η οποία αναφέρει ότι έχει πελάτες στη Βρετανία, την Ελλάδα, την Κύπρο, την Ισπανία, την Ολλανδία και τη Σουηδία βρέθηκε να κατασκευάζει σχετικές τροφές αν και, κατά την ίδια, η ποσότητα του κρέατος παραλήφθηκε στις αρχές Ιανουαρίου αλλά δεν χρησιμοποιήθηκε.

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

— Σε ποιες ενέργειες έχει προβεί για την προστασία των καταναλωτών της ΕΕ από το συγκεκριμένο τύπο κρέατος;

— Σε ποια κράτη μέλη έχει αναφερθεί διάθεση του εν λόγω τύπου κρέατος;

Απάντηση του κ. Borg εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(3 Απριλίου 2013)

Μέχρι στιγμής, δεν έχει υπάρξει καμία ένδειξη που να εγείρει ζήτημα ασφάλειας επί του θέματος, καθώς το κρέας αλόγου μπορεί να καταναλώνεται από τον άνθρωπο. Επομένως, δεν διακυβεύεται η ασφάλεια των τροφίμων στην αγορά της Ένωσης.

Ωστόσο, οι παραποιημένες ετικέτες παραπλανούν τους καταναλωτές ως προς το περιεχόμενο των τροφίμων γεγονός που, σύμφωνα με τους υφιστάμενους κανόνες της ΕΕ, συνιστά απάτη όσον αφορά τη σήμανση των τροφίμων.

Η Επιτροπή έχει δραστηριοποιηθεί τόσο σε πολιτικό όσο και σε τεχνικό επίπεδο για τον συντονισμό των εκκρεμουσών ερευνών στα αντίστοιχα κράτη μέλη. Προς αυτή την κατεύθυνση, η Επιτροπή εξέδωσε σύσταση ([1]), με την οποία απευθύνει έκκληση για ενδοενωσιακούς ελέγχους σε επίπεδο λιανικού εμπορίου, ώστε να διαπιστωθεί η έκταση των παραπλανητικών πρακτικών σήμανσης ως προς την παρουσία βοδινού κρέατος, καθώς και για επίσημους ελέγχους, ώστε να εντοπιστούν τυχόν κατάλοιπα φαινυλοβουταζόνης· πρόκειται για κτηνιατρικό φάρμακο, του οποίου η χρήση επιτρέπεται μόνο σε ζώα από τα οποία δεν παράγονται τρόφιμα. Η σύνοψη όλων των πορισμάτων θα είναι διαθέσιμη έως τον Απρίλιο του 2013. Η Europol συμμετέχει επίσης στις τρέχουσες έρευνες με την αμέριστη στήριξη των κρατών μελών.

Σύμφωνα με δεδομένα που κοινοποιήθηκαν στην Επιτροπή μέσω του συστήματος έγκαιρης προειδοποίησης για τα τρόφιμα και τις ζωοτροφές (έκθεση προόδου της 20.3.2013), σε όλα τα κράτη μέλη, εξαιρουμένης της Λετονίας και της Ρουμανίας, έχουν αναφερθεί περιπτώσεις εμπορίας προϊόντων που περιέχουν κρέας αλόγου και φέρουν παραποιημένες ετικέτες.

([1]) Σύσταση της Επιτροπής της 19ης Φεβρουαρίου 2013 για την εφαρμογή συντονισμένου προγράμματος με σκοπό να διαγνωστεί η συχνότητα δόλιων πρακτικών στην εμπορία ορισμένων τροφίμων (2013/99/ΕΕ), ΕΕ L 48 της 21.2.2013, σ. 28.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001873/13
to the Commission
Georgios Papanikolaou (PPE)
(21 February 2013)

Subject: Trafficking in horsemeat

In all Member States consumers are seriously worried about the production of horsemeat burgers. Indeed, recently a company claiming it had customers in Britain, Greece, Cyprus, Spain, the Netherlands and Sweden was found to be producing this kind of food; according to the company, however, the meat delivered in early January has not been used.

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

— What measures has it taken to protect EU consumers from this particular type of meat?

— In which Member States has the marketing of this type of meat been reported?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission
(3 April 2013)

To date, there is no indication on the subject which raises a safety issue as horse meat can be destined for human consumption. As such, the safety of foods placed on the Union market is not at stake.

However, the falsification of labels misleads the consumers as regards the content of foods and therefore, it constitutes fraud in food labelling under existing EU rules.

The Commission has been active both on political and technical levels in coordinating the pending investigations in the Member States concerned. To this end, the Commission adopted a recommendation ([1]) which calls for EU-wide controls at retail level in order to identify the scale of any misleading labelling practices as to the presence of beef as well as official controls to detect possible residues of phenylbutazone, a veterinary drug whose use is allowed only in non-food producing animals A summary of all findings will be available by April 2013. Europol is also involved in the ongoing investigations with a strong support by the Member States.

According to data communicated to the Commission through the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (state of play 20.3.2013), marketing of mislabelled products containing horsemeat has been reported in all EU Member States except Latvia and Romania.

([1]) Commission Recommendation of 19 February 2013 on a coordinated control plan with a view to establish the prevalence of fraudulent practices (2013/99/EU), OJ L 48, 21.2.2013, p. 28.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001874/13
to the Commission
Liam Aylward (ALDE)
(21 February 2013)

Subject: Falun Gong practitioners and organ harvesting

Further to Vice-President/High Representative Ashton's response to Written Question E-011073/2012, and in light of the recent conference entitled 'Religious Persecution by China: A Horror Story' which was held in the European Parliament on 29 January 2013 and highlighted the mass infringement of the human rights of Falun Gong practitioners, could the Commission provide information as to its stance on Chinese medical doctors who have knowingly participated in organ harvesting?

Furthermore, could the Commission detail what future measures it intends to implement as regards preventing the persecution of Falun Gong practitioners and outlawing this barbaric practice of organ harvesting?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(15 April 2013)

As stated in our previous reply, the EU is concerned about the secrecy which surrounds both death penalty and organ transplant statistics, which makes it impossible to gain an accurate picture of the source of transplanted organs, the possible involvement of medical doctors and allegations that many organs are harvested from prisoners in Re-Education through Labour camps.

The EU is currently discussing the dates and agenda of the next Human Rights Dialogue with China when issues, such as the right to freedom of religion or belief, the death penalty, the treatment of religious and ethnic minorities and the Re-Education through Labour system will be discussed.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-001875/13
aan de Commissie
Judith A. Merkies (S&D)
(21 februari 2013)

Betreft: Antimicrobiële resistentie

Op 19 februari 2013 berichtte de Nederlandse Omroep Stichting (NOS) over de potentiële bedreiging voor de volksgezondheid van het intensieve gebruik van antibiotica op Chinese varkensboerderijen. China is de grootste producent van antibiotica ter wereld. Het Chinese vee krijgt bijna de helft van de antibiotica die wereldwijd aan vee wordt toegediend. Amerikaanse en Chinese wetenschappers vonden in Chinese varkensmest grote hoeveelheden genen die resistent zijn tegen antibiotica.

Op 27 oktober 2011 keurde het Europees Parlement een resolutie goed over het gevaar van antimicrobiële resistentie voor de volksgezondheid ([1]). Daarin benadrukte het Parlement het belang voor de menselijke gezondheid van maatregelen ter bestrijding van resistentie tegen antimicrobiële stoffen die worden gebruikt in diergeneesmiddelen en diervoeding en bij de teelt van gewassen. Ook drong het bij de Commissie aan op nauwere samenwerking met de Wereldgezondheidsorganisatie, de Wereldorganisatie voor diergezondheid (OIE) en andere internationaal relevante partijen en organisaties om op mondiaal niveau efficiënter te kunnen optreden tegen antimicrobiële resistentie.

Op 15 november 2011 stelde de Commissie een actieplan tegen het toenemend gevaar van antimicrobiële resistentie voor. Daarin erkende de Commissie het belang van internationale samenwerking en maakte zij van multilaterale en bilaterale verbintenissen voor de preventie en bestrijding van antimicrobiële resistente een van de speerpunten.

1. Kan het gebruik van varkensmest met genen die resistent zijn tegen antibiotica een bedreiging zijn voor de volksgezondheid?

2. Heeft de Commissie correcte cijfers over de invoer van dierlijke producten vanuit China?

3. Werkt de Commissie samen met China voor de preventie van antimicrobiële resistentie? Zo niet, is de Commissie van plan op korte termijn samenwerkingsverbanden aan te gaan?

4. Zal de Commissie actie ondernemen in verband met de invoer van dierlijke producten vanuit China?

Antwoord van de heer Borg namens de Commissie
(11 april 2013)

1. Antimicrobiële resistentie wordt beschouwd als een „ecologisch" verschijnsel waarbij vele factoren een rol spelen. Het is waarschijnlijk dat zowel het antibioticagebruik bij mensen als dat bij dieren tot deze problematiek bijdraagt.

De verontreiniging van mest met antimicrobieel resistente micro-organismen kan ertoe bijdragen dat mensen aan deze organismen worden blootgesteld, bijvoorbeeld door het eten van besmette verse producten. Een grotere verontreiniging van het milieu in het algemeen kan bovendien tot gevolg hebben dat mensen meer risico lopen aan micro-organismen/genen met antimicrobiële resistentie te worden blootgesteld.

2. De cijfers hierover zijn correct en afkomstig uit Comext, de databank over de internationale handel van Eurostat (Commissie) ([2]).

3. De Commissie en China werken nauw samen op het gebied van antimicrobiële resistentie. Onlangs, op 6 en 7 maart 2013, vond in China het eerste seminar tussen de EU en China over dit onderwerp plaats. Het was de eerste concrete actie na de formele start van de samenwerking tussen China en de EU over antimicrobiële resistentie op 21 maart 2012.

4. Alle relevante acties in verband met de invoer van dierlijke producten uit China zijn al door de Commissie ondernomen.

([1]) P7_TA(2011)0473.
([2]) http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/international_trade/data/database.

De invoerregels van de EU garanderen dat alle ingevoerde producten aan dezelfde hoge normen voldoen als producten uit de EU-lidstaten, met name ten aanzien van de hygiëne bij de productie, de gezondheid van dieren en planten en alle aspecten van de consumentenveiligheid.

Wat China betreft, heeft de Commissie nog een extra specifieke maatregel getroffen met betrekking tot de aanwezigheid van residuen van diergeneesmiddelen in dierlijke producten (Beschikking 2002/994/EG van de Commissie, zoals gewijzigd). Deze maatregel legt aanvullende controles op om de EU-consumenten te beschermen.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001875/13
to the Commission
Judith A. Merkies (S&D)
(21 February 2013)

Subject: Antimicrobial resistance

On 19 February 2013, the Netherlands Broadcasting Foundation (NOS) reported on the potential threat to public health from the extensive use of antibiotics at Chinese pig farms. China is the world's biggest producer of antibiotics. Chinese cattle get almost half of all the antibiotics administered to livestock worldwide. American and Chinese scientists have found large quantities of antibiotic-resistant genes in Chinese pig manure.

On 27 October 2011, the European Parliament approved a resolution on the public health threat of antimicrobial resistance ([1]). In the resolution, Parliament stressed the importance for human health of measures to combat resistance to antimicrobial agents in veterinary medicines, animal feeding stuffs and crop-growing. It also called on the Commission to strengthen its close operation with the World Health Organisation (WHO), the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and other relevant parties and organisations at international level in order to deal more effectively at a global level with antimicrobial resistance.

On 15 November 2011, the Commission adopted an action plan against the rising threats from antimicrobial resistance. In it, the Commission emphasised the importance of international cooperation and declared multilateral and bilateral commitments for the prevention and control of antimicrobial resistance among the plan's priorities.

1. Could the use of pig manure with antibiotic-resistant genes represent a threat to public health?

2. Does the Commission have accurate figures on the import of animal products from China?

3. Is the Commission cooperating with China in the prevention of antimicrobial resistance? If not, does the Commission intend to establish such a partnership soon?

4. Will the Commission take action with regard to the import of animal products from China?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission
(11 April 2013)

1. Antimicrobial resistance is considered as an 'ecological' multi-factorial phenomenon. Both human and non-human uses of antibiotics substances are likely to play a role in the overall problem.

Contamination of manure with antimicrobial resistance microorganisms may contribute to the exposure of humans via, for example, the consumption of contaminated fresh-produce. Furthermore, by adding contamination to the general environmental it may increase the chances for humans to be exposed to antimicrobial resistance microorganisms/genes.

2. These accurate figures are given by the Commission's Eurostat in its International Trade Database (ComExt) ([2]).

3. There is a close cooperation between the Commission and China as regards antimicrobial resistance. The first EU-China Seminar on antimicrobial resistance was recently held on 6 and 7 March 2013 in China. This Seminar was the first concrete action following the formal launch of the cooperation on antimicrobial resistance between China and the EU on 21 March 2012.

4. All relevant actions with regard to the import of animal products from China were already taken by the Commission.

The EU import rules guarantee that all imported products fulfil the same high standards as products from EU Member States, in particular in respect of their hygiene of production, animal and plant health and all aspects of consumer safety.

([1]) P7_TA(2011)0473.
([2]) http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/international_trade/data/database.

For China, the Commission adopted a specific additional safeguard measure on the presence of residues of veterinary drugs in products of animal origin (Commission Decision 2002/994/EC as amended), imposing additional controls to protect the EU consumers.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-001876/13
aan de Commissie
Corien Wortmann-Kool (PPE)
(21 februari 2013)

Betreft: Verhoging prijs autowegenvignet personenauto's Zwitserland

De Zwitserse overheid beslist begin maart (4 maart beslist de nationale regering, en 19 maart de kantons) over een verhoging van de prijs voor het Autobahnvignet voor personenauto's. Deze verhoging betreft een verhoging van ongeveer 100 %. Dit wil zeggen dat de prijs van het vignet fors omhoog gaat.

Niet-ingezetenen (EU-burgers) zijn aangewezen op een tweemaandenvignet voor 40,- CHF. Reist men één keer in de zomer en één keer in de winter naar of door Zwitserland dan heeft men twee tweemaandenvignetten nodig die de prijs van het jaarvignet van CHF 70,- overstijgen. Deze maatregel treft voornamelijk de vakantiegangers die door Zwitserland moeten reizen. In Europees verband zijn er eerder afspraken over wegenvignetten gemaakt.

1. Vindt de Commissie dat het voornemen van de Zwitserse overheid om een tweemaandenvignet te introduceren in overeenstemming met de uitgangspunten, zoals door de Commissie uiteengezet in de mededeling over wegenvignetten COM(2012)0199 van 14 mei 5.2012?

COM(2012)0199: „Om te garanderen dat de vignetsystemen voor lichte particuliere voertuigen niet-discriminerend zijn, stelt de Commissie voor dat de lidstaten naast de jaar- en maandvignetten ook een vignet voor een kortere periode (weekvignet) aanbieden."

2. Vindt de Commissie het wenselijk dat de Zwitserse overheid ook deze uitgangspunten volgt, mede gezien de toepassing ervan in alle omringende lidstaten?

3. Is er overleg tussen de Commissie en de Zwitserse overheid over de geplande verhoging?

4. Is de Commissie van plan om bij de Zwitserse overheid erop aan te dringen om bij de voorgenomen verhoging een vignet voor kortere duur met een proportionele prijs voor incidenteel gebruik van de snelwegen in te voeren (referentie: Oostenrijk tiendagenvignet EUR 8,30 of een 24-uursvignet)?

Antwoord van de heer Kallas namens de Commissie
(4 april 2013)

1. De Commissie heeft onlangs in een mededeling (COM(2012) 199) verklaard dat evenredig geprijsde kortetermijnvignetten een cruciaal onderdeel vormen van niet-discriminerende vignetsystemen voor lichte particuliere voertuigen. Met kortetermijnvignetten worden in dit verband vignetten bedoeld die 7 tot 10 dagen geldig zijn.

2. De Commissie is van mening dat Zwitserland het basisbeginsel van non-discriminatie van buitenlandse bestuurders moet respecteren. Voor ingezetenen van Zwitserland geldt in de EU een niet-discriminerend vignetstelsel.

3. De Commissie bespreekt met de Zwitserse autoriteiten de mogelijkheid om een vignet voor kortere duur in te voeren.

4. De Commissie blijft pleiten voor evenredig geprijsde vignetten voor kortere duur in overeenstemming met de aanbevelingen in COM(2012) 199.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001876/13
to the Commission
Corien Wortmann-Kool (PPE)
(21 February 2013)

Subject: Switzerland raises motorway vignette price for passenger cars

The Swiss government is due to decide at the beginning of March (the national government on 4 March and the cantons on 19 March) whether or not to raise the price of the motorway vignette for passenger cars. The increase in question would be one of approximately 100%, which would, in other words, represent a dramatic increase in the vignette price.

Non-residents (EU citizens) will have to buy a two-month vignette for CHF 40. If you were to travel to or through Switzerland once in summer and once in winter you would need two two-month vignettes, which would exceed the CHF 70 price of the annual vignette. This measure will mainly affect tourists travelling through Switzerland. There are existing agreements at the European level on road vignettes.

1. Does the Commission believe that the Swiss government's intention to introduce a two-month vignette is in line with the basic principles as set out by the Commission in the communication on road vignettes COM(2012)0199 of 14 May 2012?

COM(2012) 0199: 'In order to provide for a non-discriminatory vignette system for light private vehicles, the Commission suggests that Member States establish vignette systems that offer, in addition to annual and monthly vignettes, a weekly (or shorter period) vignette.'

2. Does the Commission consider it desirable that the Swiss government should follow these basic principles too, given that they are being applied in all the surrounding countries?

3. Are the Commission and the Swiss government involved in a consultation process with regard to the planned price rise?

4. Does the Commission intend to urge the Swiss government to introduce, as part of the proposed price increase, a vignette for a shorter period with a proportional price for the occasional use of motorways (reference: Austrian 10-day vignette for EUR 8.30 or a 24-hour vignette)?

Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission
(4 April 2013)

1. The Commission recently stated in its communication COM(2012)199 that proportionately priced short-term vignettes are a key element in ensuring a non-discriminatory vignette system for light private vehicles. Short-term vignettes, in this context, refer to vignettes with a duration of 7-10 days.

2. The Commission is of the opinion that the basic principle of non-discrimination of foreign drivers should be respected by Switzerland. Swiss residents driving in the EU benefit from non-discriminatory vignettes.

3. Discussions between the Commission and the Swiss authorities are ongoing on the possibility of introducing a shorter-term vignette.

4. The Commission will continue arguing for the necessity of shorter term and proportionately priced vignettes in line with the recommendations of COM(2012)199.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-001877/13
à Comissão
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(21 de fevereiro de 2013)

Assunto: Novas ações para o desenvolvimento do turismo na União

Tendo em conta que:

— A indústria europeia do turismo gera cerca de 5 % do PIB da União, contando, aproximadamente, com 5.2 % da mão-de-obra total; se tivermos em conta os serviços indiretamente associados à atividade turística, estes representam mais de 10 % do PIB da União e 12 % do total da força de trabalho;

— Na Comunicação «Europa, primeiro destino turístico do mundo — novo quadro político para o turismo europeu», é apontada a necessidade de combater a sazonalidade deste setor, o que torna imperativo desenvolver mais iniciativas como o Calypso;

— A União, de acordo com as suas competências partilhadas estabelecidas no Tratado de Lisboa, deve conceber ações e instrumentos que criem valor acrescentado europeu, nomeadamente no que diz respeito à disponibilização de dados e análises, desenvolvimento de estratégias transnacionais de promoção e intercâmbio das melhores práticas;

— Foi criada pela primeira vez uma Task Force do Turismo no Parlamento Europeu, com o objetivo de conferir prioridade às ações com vista à criação de uma verdadeira política de turismo na União Europeia;

— A crise económica e monetária que a União enfrenta está a levar à estagnação e, nalguns casos, a uma recessão da atividade turística em certas regiões europeias;

— O programa COSME, que incide especialmente nas PME do setor do turismo, apresenta um orçamento para 2014-2020 de 2,5 mil milhões de euros;

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Tem a intenção de apresentar um conjunto de iniciativas, no mesmo âmbito do programa Calypso, que tenham como objetivo combater a sazonalidade e, simultaneamente, atrair mais turistas à Europa?

2. Após a atribuição do Nobel da Paz à União Europeia, tem conhecimento da rota *«Places of Peace»*, desenvolvida pela Rede Europeia de Sítios de Paz, e das potencialidades da mesma na transmissão dos valores da paz?

3. Considera pertinente lançar ações para o desenvolvimento desta rota?

Resposta dada por António Tajani em nome da Comissão
(10 de abril de 2013)

1. A ação preparatória Calypso foi lançada em 2009 para promover o turismo de época baixa e, assim, contribuir para combater a sazonalidade. Durante os três anos de existência da ação preparatória ([1]), a Comissão implementou com sucesso uma série de ações para ajudar os Estados-Membros no desenvolvimento do turismo de época baixa ([2]). Estas ações incluem o apoio à instalação de uma plataforma web Calypso para promover o turismo social em toda a UE ([3]). Os esforços da Comissão neste campo não pararam no fim do período da ação preparatória. Foram garantidos recursos financeiros adequados para as ações Calypso ao abrigo dos programas de trabalho da EIP de 2012 e 2013 ([4]). Por exemplo, no âmbito do programa de trabalho do PEEI para 2013, está previsto um convite à apresentação de propostas centradas nos intercâmbios de seniores para criar de parcerias público-privadas, facilitando o desenvolvimento de pacotes transnacionais específicos e incentivando os seniores a viajar pela Europa fora de época, incluindo os provenientes de países terceiros.

([1]) 2009-2011.
([2]) Para mais informações sobre a implementação da iniciativa Calypso: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/tourism/calypso/index_en.htm
([3]) Esta plataforma (www.ecalypso.eu) será lançada em junho de 2013 com o objetivo de conjugar melhor a procura e a oferta do turismo fora de época e aumentar os fluxos turísticos fronteiriços na época baixa.
([4]) Para mais informações sobre o Programa Empreendedorismo e Inovação: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/tourism/calypso/index_en.htm

2. A Comissão está ciente de que o desenvolvimento do roteiro «Sítios de Paz» é um dos objetivos da Rede Europeia de Sítios da Paz. A ideia de ligar os lugares onde tratados europeus de paz e convenções foram assinados, pode de facto, contribuir para diversificar a oferta de turismo cultural e reforçar a identidade europeia, capitalizando a cultura e a história da UE.

3. Como salientado na sua comunicação de 2010 sobre o turismo ([5]), a Comissão incentiva, apoia e facilita ativamente as iniciativas destinadas a diversificar a oferta turística de temática transnacional europeia ([6]). Nesta perspetiva, a Comissão acolhe e incentiva o desenvolvimento de qualquer valor acrescentado às rotas ou aos roteiros turísticos transnacionais, incluindo a rota «Sítios de Paz».

([5]) COM(2010) 352 final de 30.06.10.

([6]) Desde 2010, a Comissão publicou vários convites à apresentação de propostas para projetos de roteiros culturais e estabeleceu uma cooperação bem-sucedida com o Conselho da Europa sobre os itinerários culturais europeus através de vários programas de gestão conjunta. Além disso, a Comissão começou a organizar o evento «Encruzilhadas da Europa» por forma a promover os itinerários culturais europeus e aumentar a sensibilização para o seu potencial turístico junto das partes interessadas e as empresas, os gestores de destinos turísticos, e as autoridades nacionais e locais. Para mais informação:
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/tourism/calypso/index_en.htm

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001877/13
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(21 February 2013)

Subject: New actions to develop EU tourism

The European tourism industry generates around 5% of the EU's GDP, employing approximately 5.2% of the total workforce, while services indirectly linked to the tourism sector account for over 10% of the EU's GDP and 12% of the total workforce.

The communication 'Europe, the world's No 1 tourist destination — a new political framework for tourism in Europe' highlights the need to tackle the seasonal nature of tourism, making it vital to develop more initiatives like Calypso.

The EU, in accordance with its shared competences enshrined in the Treaty of Lisbon, must devise actions and instruments to generate added value for Europe, particularly in terms of providing data and analyses and developing transnational strategies to promote and exchange best practices.

For the first time, a tourism task force has been created within the European Parliament, with the aim of prioritising actions to create a genuine EU tourism policy.

The economic and monetary crisis that the EU is facing is causing the tourism sector to stagnate and, in some cases, collapse in some European regions.

The Programme for the Competitiveness of Enterprises and SMEs (COSME), which places a particular focus on small and medium-sized enterprises in the tourism sector, has a budget of EUR 2.5 billion for 2014-2020.

1. Does the Commission intend to present a set of initiatives, as part of the Calypso programme, with the aim of tackling the seasonal nature of tourism and, at the same time, attracting more tourists to Europe?

2. Following the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to the EU, is the Commission aware of the 'Places of Peace' route, developed by the European Network of Places of Peace, and the potential of the route to disseminate the values of peace?

3. Does it think that action should be taken to develop this route?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission
(10 April 2013)

1. The CALYPSO preparatory action was launched in 2009 to promote tourism in the low season and thereby contribute to combating seasonality. Throughout the three-year life span of the preparatory action ([1]), the Commission successfully implemented a series of actions to assist Member States in developing low season tourism ([2]). This includes support for the setup of a Calypso web platform to promote social tourism across the EU ([3]). The Commission's endeavours within this field did not stop however with the end of the preparatory action period. Appropriate financial resources were secured for CALYPSO actions under the 2012 and 2013 Work Programmes of the EIP ([4]). For example, under the EIP Work Programme 2013, a call for proposals focusing on senior exchanges is foreseen aiming at building public-private partnerships, facilitating the development of specific transnational packages and thereby encouraging senior citizens to travel in Europe off-season, including those coming from third countries.

2. The Commission is aware that the development of the 'Places for Peace' route is one of the objectives of the European Network of Places of Peace. The idea of linking the places where European Peace Treaties and Conventions were signed can indeed contribute to diversifying cultural tourism supply and enhance European identity by capitalising on the EU's culture and history.

([1]) 2009-2011.
([2]) For more information on the implementation of the CALYPSO initiative: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/tourism/calypso/index_en.htm
([3]) This platform (www.ecalypso.eu) will be launched in June 2013 with the aim to facilitate the connection between the off-season tourism demand and offer and to increase cross-border tourism flows in the low season.
([4]) For more information on the Entrepreneurship and Innovation Programme: http://ec.europa.eu/cip/documents/work-programmes/index_en.htm

3. As emphasised in its 2010 Communication on tourism ([5]), the Commission encourages, actively supports and facilitates initiatives aimed at diversifying the European transnational thematic tourism offer ([6]). In light of this, the Commission welcomes and encourages the development of any added-value transnational tourist itineraries or routes, the 'Places of Peace' route included.

([5]) COM(2010) 352 final of 30.6.2010.

([6]) Since 2010, the Commission has published several calls for proposals for projects on Cultural Itineraries and has established a successful cooperation with the Council of Europe on European Cultural Routes via several Joint Management programmes. Furthermore, the Commission has started organising the 'Crossroads of Europe' event to promote the European Cultural Routes and raise awareness about their potential for tourism among stakeholders and businesses, destination managers, national and local authorities. For more information: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/tourism/cultural-routes/index_en.htm

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-001878/13
à Comissão
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(21 de fevereiro de 2013)

Assunto: Novas ações para o desenvolvimento do turismo na União — 2

Tendo em conta que:

— A indústria Europeia do turismo gera cerca de 5 % do PIB da União contando, aproximadamente, com 5.2 % da mão-de-obra total; se tivermos em conta os serviços indiretamente associados à atividade turística, estes representam mais de 10 % do PIB da União e 12 % do total da força de trabalho;

— Na Comunicação «Europa, primeiro destino turístico do mundo — novo quadro político para o turismo europeu», é apontada a necessidade de combater a sazonalidade deste setor, o que torna imperativo desenvolver mais iniciativas como o Calypso;

— A União, de acordo com as suas competências partilhadas estabelecidas no Tratado de Lisboa, deve conceber ações e instrumentos que criem valor acrescentado europeu, nomeadamente no que diz respeito à disponibilização de dados e análises, desenvolvimento de estratégias transnacionais de promoção e intercâmbio das melhores práticas;

— Foi criada pela primeira vez uma *Task Force* do Turismo no Parlamento Europeu com o objetivo de conferir prioridade às ações com vista à criação de uma verdadeira política de turismo na União Europeia;

— A crise económica e monetária que a União enfrenta está a levar à estagnação e, nalguns casos, a uma recessão da atividade turística em certas regiões europeias;

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Tem conhecimento do conceito Nostalgia em Turismo, desenvolvido em Portugal com primeira aplicação ao mercado dos Estados Unidos da América, que pretende combater, entre outros, os obstáculos físicos e linguísticos sentidos em especial nos destinos rurais?

2. Considera pertinente lançar ações para o desenvolvimento do Programa Nostalgia em Turismo?

3. Para a promoção da marca «Europa», não considera importante lançar, através do conceito de nostalgia virtual, campanhas de marketing ou criar concursos de promoção de jovens talentos, por exemplo, que levem à produção de filmes, documentários, livros, videoclips que indiretamente vendam a «Europa» como um espaço único, atrativo e singular?

Resposta dada por António Tajani em nome da Comissão
(8 de abril de 2013)

1. A Comissão está ciente do aparecimento, nos últimos anos, de um novo tipo de «turistas da nostalgia» que regressam aos destinos dos quais possuem memórias gratas. Esta nova tendência segundo a qual os viajantes aproveitam as suas férias para revisitar um país ou cidade específicos, com uma associação sentimental às suas vidas, representa uma extraordinária oportunidade para atrair um potencial inexplorado de visitantes para destinos europeus. A iniciativa piloto «50 000 turistas», ([1]) lançada pela Comissão em 2011 para captar fluxos de turismo na época baixa para a Europa a partir de mercados de longa distância, explora, nomeadamente, a possibilidade de tirar proveito dos laços familiares, linguísticos e históricos como motivação para atrair potenciais turistas para a Europa.

2. O «turismo da nostalgia» representa um tipo de nicho turístico que responde às necessidades de um grupo particular de turistas, suscetível de contribuir para a diversificação da oferta do turismo temático europeu. Por conseguinte, a Comissão considera que é mais adequado desenvolver o «turismo da nostalgia» no contexto de uma maior diversificação da oferta turística em vez de num único programa específico, criando assim mais sinergias e economias de escala.

([1]) Para mais informações: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/tourism/50k/index_en.htm

3. O «turismo da nostalgia» pode, sem dúvida, constituir um trunfo importante das campanhas de comunicação e comercialização para os turistas, tanto da UE como de países terceiros. A campanha de comunicação de turismo da Comissão «Europa — Em todos os momentos» ([2]), já integra todos esses trunfos e destaca a diversidade do património cultural e natural que a Europa tem para oferecer em qualquer época do ano, incentivando os turistas a descobrir o velho continente e a desfrutar de uma experiência de viagem marcante para a vida.

([2]) Para mais informações: http://europa.eu/readyforeurope/index_pt.htm

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001878/13
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(21 February 2013)

Subject: New actions to develop EU tourism — 2

The European tourism industry generates around 5% of the EU's GDP, employing approximately 5.2% of the total workforce, while services indirectly linked to the tourism sector account for over 10% of the EU's GDP and 12% of the total workforce.

The communication 'Europe, the world's No 1 tourist destination — a new political framework for tourism in Europe' highlights the need to tackle the seasonal nature of tourism, making it vital to develop more initiatives like Calypso.

The EU, in accordance with its shared competences enshrined in the Treaty of Lisbon, must devise actions and instruments to generate added value for Europe, particularly in terms of providing data and analyses and developing transnational strategies to promote and exchange best practices.

For the first time, a tourism task force has been created within the European Parliament, with the aim of prioritising actions to create a genuine EU tourism policy.

The economic and monetary crisis that the EU is facing is causing the tourism sector to stagnate and, in some cases, collapse in some European regions.

1. Is the Commission familiar with the concept of nostalgia tourism, which was developed in Portugal and first deployed in the US market, with the intention of overcoming perceived physical, linguistic and other obstacles, particularly with regard to rural destinations?

2. Does it think that action should be taken to develop a nostalgia tourism programme?

3. Does it agree that to promote the 'Europe' brand it is important to use the concept of virtual nostalgia to launch marketing campaigns or to create competitions to encourage talented young people, for example, to produce films, documentaries, books and video clips that indirectly sell Europe as a special, attractive and unique destination?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission
(8 April 2013)

1. The Commission is aware of the emergence, in recent years, of a new breed of 'nostalgia tourists' who return to destinations of which they have fond memories. This new trend of travellers using their holidays to re-visit a specific country or city with a sentimental association to their lives offers a tremendous opportunity to attract an untapped group of visitors to European destinations. The pilot initiative '50 000 tourists' ([1]) launched by the Commission in 2011 to promote low season tourism flows to Europe from long-haul international markets explores, amongst others, the possibility of capitalising on family, linguistic and historical ties as a driver to attract potential tourists to Europe.

2. 'Nostalgia tourism' represents one type of niche tourism responding to the needs of a particular set of tourists which can contribute to the diversification of the European thematic tourism offer. Therefore, the Commission considers that it is better suited to develop 'nostalgia tourism' in the context of the broader diversification of tourism supply rather than in the form of a single specific programme, thereby better using synergies and economies of scale.

3. 'Nostalgia tourism' can without doubt feature as one important asset for communication and marketing campaigns for tourists, both from the EU and from third countries. The Commission's tourism communication campaign 'Europe — whenever you're ready' ([2]) capitalises already on all these assets, amongst others, and highlights the diverse cultural and natural heritage Europe has to offer at any time of the year, encouraging tourists to discover the old continent and to enjoy a travel experience of a lifetime.

([1]) For further information: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/tourism/50k/index_en.htm
([2]) For further information: http://europa.eu/readyforeurope/

(Slovenska različica)

Vprašanje za pisni odgovor E-001879/13
za Komisijo
Ivo Vajgl (ALDE)
(21. februar 2013)

Zadeva: Uresničevanje Konvencije Združenih narodov o pravicah invalidov na ravni EU

Konvencija Združenih narodov o pravicah invalidov, ki jo je leta 2006 sprejela Generalna skupščina Združenih narodov, je prvi mednarodni akt s področja varstva človekovih pravic, h kateremu je EU leta 2010 pristopila kot celota, še vedno pa EU ni ratificirala *Izbirnega protokola h Konvenciji Združenih narodov o pravicah invalidov*, v katerem je med drugim opredeljena možnost pritožbe zaradi kršenja določil te konvencije. Konvencija je krovni mednarodni dokument o pravicah in načinih varstva pravic oseb z invalidnostjo.

V *Listini EU o temeljnih pravicah* smo se med drugim zavezali spoštovanju pravic „*invalidov do ukrepov za zagotavljanje njihove samostojnosti, socialne in poklicne vključenosti ter sodelovanja v življenju skupnosti*“, ([1]) v *strategiji EU o invalidnosti 2010–2020* ([2]) pa odpravi različnih vrst ovir, s katerimi se soočajo invalidi. 3. evropski parlament invalidov je decembra 2012 sprejel resolucijo „*Vizija za naslednje desetletje: implementacija MKPI v času krize*“, v kateri je opozoril, da je treba nujno sprejeti *evropski akt o dostopnosti*, ki bo določil ukrepe za boljšo dostopnost dobrin in storitev na evropskem trgu za osebe z invalidnostjo.

Viviane Reding, podpredsednica Evropske komisije in komisarka, pristojna za pravosodje, človekove pravice in državljanstvo, je evropskim poslancem že v začetku leta 2011 obljubila, da bo evropski akt o dostopnosti sprejet do konca leta 2012. Kdaj ga namerava torej Komisija pripraviti in predložiti v sprejemanje?

Kako se namerava Komisija odzvati na predloge iz resolucije 3. evropskega parlamenta invalidov, da naj pripravi direktivo o zagotavljanju dostopnosti javnih spletnih mest in spletnih mest, ki ponujajo javne storitve za invalide, in da naj revidira Direktivo 2000/78/EC tako, da bo zagotovljen okvir za enako obravnavo oseb z invalidnostjo pri zaposlitvi in na delovnem mestu?

Odgovor Viviane Reding v imenu Komisije
(11. april 2013)

Pripravljalno delo Komisije za napovedani Evropski akt o dostopnosti dobro napreduje. Akt želi izboljšati delovanje notranjega trga za proizvodnjo blaga in nudenje storitev, dostopnih invalidom. Z združevanjem zakonodajnih in drugih instrumentov, kot je standardizacija, namerava Komisija optimizirati dostopnost grajenega okolja, prometa ter informacijskih in komunikacijskih tehnologij.

Komisija je konec lanskega leta predstavila tudi predlog direktive o dostopnosti spletišč organov javnega sektorja ([3]).

S tema dvema pobudama želimo izboljšati dostopnost v Evropski uniji ter olajšati življenje invalidnim osebam v družbi.

Vključno z drugimi pobudami bosta ti dve dejavnosti na seznamu poročila Komisije o prvih letih izvajanja Evropske strategije o invalidnosti 2010–2020, ki je že v pripravi in bo izdano pozneje v tem letu. To leto Komisija načrtuje tudi objavo poročila o izvajanju direktive 2000/78/ES.

([1]) 26. člen Listine EU o temeljnih pravicah, Uradni list EU, C 83/397 (30.3.2010), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0389:0403:sl:PDF

([2]) European Disability Strategy 2010-2020: A Renewed Commitment to a Barrier-Free Europe, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0636:FIN:EN:PDF

([3]) COM(2012) 721 final.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001879/13
to the Commission
Ivo Vajgl (ALDE)
(21 February 2013)

Subject: Implementation at EU level of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities

The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, is the first international act in the field of human rights to which the EU itself has acceded (in 2010), but the EU has not yet ratified the Optional Protocol to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which defines, inter alia, the possibilities for appeal in the event of a violation of the provisions of the CRPD. The convention is the umbrella document at international level on the rights of persons with disabilities and the means of safeguarding those rights.

In the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights we committed to respecting the rights 'of persons with disabilities to benefit from measures designed to ensure their independence, social and occupational integration and participation in the life of the community' ([1]), and in the European Disability Strategy 2010-2020 ([2]) to eliminating the various barriers facing persons with disabilities. In December 2012 the 3rd European Parliament of Persons with Disabilities adopted a resolution on 'A vision for the next decade: Implementing the UN CRPD in times of crisis', in which it drew attention to the urgent need to adopt a European Accessibility Act laying down measures to improve access to goods and services in the European market for people with disabilities.

Commission Vice-President Viviane Reding, who is responsible for justice, fundamental rights and citizenship, promised MEPs at the start of 2011 that a European Accessibility Act would be adopted by the end of 2012. When does the Commission intend to prepare this act and submit it for adoption?

How does the Commission intend to respond to the proposal set out in the resolution adopted by the 3rd European Parliament of Persons with Disabilities that it should draw up a directive on the accessibility for persons with disabilities of public websites and websites providing services to the public, and that it should revise Directive 2000/78/EC so as to guarantee a framework for equal treatment of persons with disabilities in employment and occupation?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(11 April 2013)

The preparatory work of the Commission for the announced European Accessibility Act is progressing well. The Act aims at improving the proper functioning of the internal market for accessible goods and services. By combining legislative and other instruments, such as standardisation, the Commission intends to optimise the accessibility of the built environment, transport and ICT.

In addition, at the end of last year, the Commission has presented a proposal for a directive on the accessibility of public sector bodies' websites ([3]).

These two initiatives aim at improving accessibility in the EU, facilitating the life of persons with disabilities among others.

These actions will be listed among other initiatives in the Commission's report on the first years of the implementation of the European Disability Strategy 2010-2020, that is under preparation for publication later this year. Furthermore, a Commission report on the implementation of Directive 2000/78/EC is also planned to be published this year.

([1]) Article 26 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, *Official Journal of the EU*, C 83/397 (30.3.2010), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0389:0403:en:PDF

([2]) European Disability Strategy 2010-2020: A Renewed Commitment to a Barrier-Free Europe, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0636:FIN:EN:PDF

([3]) COM(2012) 721 final.

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001880/13
a la Comisión
Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE)
(21 de febrero de 2013)

Asunto: Participaciones preferentes

Durante los últimos cinco años miles de ciudadanos españoles se han visto afectados por la colocación masiva de participaciones preferentes, deuda subordinada y otros productos financieros sofisticados que ha utilizado la banca española para su recapitalización y que podrían alcanzar 40 000 millones de euros.

Muchos de estos ciudadanos han planteado quejas ante la Justicia ya que no fueron informados debidamente sobre los productos financieros que se les ofertaba, por lo que ha habido alguna sentencia judicial que ha avalado este hecho.

A tenor de lo expuesto, ¿puede informar la Comisión si tiene previsto regular sobre la transparencia en la contratación de servicios bancarios y, en concreto, sobre la situación de los ahorradores españoles mencionados en el párrafo anterior?

Respuesta del Sr. Barnier en nombre de la Comisión
(15 de abril de 2013)

La Directiva 2004/39/CE (DMIF) ([1]) regula la prestación de servicios de inversión por parte de las empresas de inversión y las entidades de crédito en lo que respecta a los instrumentos financieros, incluidas las acciones preferentes y otros instrumentos de deuda subordinada. De conformidad con su artículo 19, los bancos y las empresas de inversión deben actuar con honestidad, imparcialidad y profesionalidad, en el mejor interés de sus clientes, y proporcionar información sobre los instrumentos financieros que proponen, lo que deberá incluir orientaciones y advertencias apropiadas acerca de los riesgos asociados a las inversiones en esos instrumentos ([2]).

En cuanto a la venta de los productos financieros mencionados, corresponde a las autoridades y órganos jurisdiccionales españoles competentes cerciorarse de que se respetó toda la legislación de protección de los consumidores pertinente al efectuarse tales ventas.

Estas normas se han reforzado en la propuesta de revisión de la DMIF, adoptada por la Comisión el 20 de octubre de 2011 ([3]) y en la que se aclaraba la aplicabilidad de la DMIF en los casos en que las empresas de inversión o las entidades de crédito emitan y vendan sus propios valores. Además, la Comisión adoptó el 3 de julio de 2012 una propuesta de Reglamento sobre un nuevo documento de datos fundamentales ([4]). Las entidades originadoras de los productos de inversión tendrán que presentar ese documento a fin de ayudar a los inversores ordinarios a entender y comparar los riesgos de las diversas inversiones que se les propongan. Las dos propuestas se están negociando en el Parlamento Europeo y el Consejo.

([1]) DO L 145 de 30.4.2004, p. 1.
([2]) Artículo 19, apartado 3.
([3]) COM(2011) 656 final.
([4]) COM(2012) 352 final.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001880/13
to the Commission
Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE)
(21 February 2013)

Subject: Preferred shares

Over the last five years thousands of Spanish citizens have been adversely affected by the placement on a very large scale of preferred shares, subordinated debt and other sophisticated financial products used by Spanish banks for their recapitalisation; the amounts involved could total as much as EUR 40 billion.

Many of these citizens have brought complaints before the courts, alleging that they were not given proper information about the financial products they were being offered, and there have been some court decisions confirming this fact.

In view of this, could the Commission say whether it plans to regulate transparency in dealings in banking services and, specifically, the situation of the Spanish savers referred to in the paragraph above?

Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission
(15 April 2013)

Directive 2004/39/EC (MiFID) ([1]) regulates the provision of investment services by investment firms and credit institutions in relation to financial instruments, including preference shares and other subordinated debt instruments. In accordance with Article 19, banks and investment firms should act honestly, fairly and professionally in relation to their clients and provide information about the financial instruments they provide, including appropriate guidance and warnings on the risks associated with investments in those instruments ([2]).

As far as the sale of the above financial products is concerned, it is for the competent Spanish authorities and courts to ensure that all the relevant consumer protection legislation was adhered to when these sales were carried out.

These rules have been reinforced in the MiFID review proposal adopted by the Commission on 20 October 2011 ([3]) which clarified the applicability of MiFID when investment firms or credit institutions issue and sell their own securities. In addition, on 3 July 2012 the Commission adopted a proposal for a regulation (PRIPS) for a new Key Information Document (KID) ([4]). This document will have to be produced by investment product originators in order to aid ordinary investors in understanding and comparing the risks of different investments being offered to them. The two proposals are under negotiation in the European Parliament and the Council.

([1]) OJ L 145, 30.4.2004, p. 1.
([2]) Article 19(3).
([3]) COM(2011) 656 final.
([4]) COM(2012) 352 final.

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001881/13
a la Comisión
Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE)
(21 de febrero de 2013)

Asunto: Inversión en las agrupaciones europeas de cooperación territorial

En la agrupación europea de cooperación territorial denominada «Pirineos Mediterráneo» participan por las comunidades autónomas españolas de Cataluña e Islas Baleares así como los departamentos franceses de Languedoc-Rosillon y Midi-Pyrénées.

Con el fin de incentivar la puesta en marcha de actividades económicas interregionales, la Comunidad Autónoma Balear ha desarrollado diversos viveros de empresas y de seguimiento al emprendimiento laboral y profesional, todo ello en el marco de la Red Creamed.

¿Cuál es la inversión prevista dentro del marco financiero plurianual para los años 2013 y 2014 por la Comisión para los proyectos de las agrupaciones europeas de cooperación territorial?

Respuesta del Sr. Hahn en nombre de la Comisión
(4 de abril de 2013)

La Agrupación Europea de Cooperación Territorial (AECT) es un instrumento de cooperación que tiene por objetivo reducir las dificultades experimentadas por los Estados miembros y, en concreto, por las autoridades regionales y locales al realizar y gestionar actividades de cooperación territorial. Las AECT pueden realizar estas acciones con o sin contribución financiera de la Unión Europea. Independientemente del tipo de acciones realizadas por las AECT, la decisión de crear uno de estos instrumentos de cooperación es siempre voluntaria.

Para la gestión de los proyectos por parte de las AECT no hay ningún presupuesto específico en el marco financiero actual ni en el marco financiero plurianual para el período 2014-2020. Sin embargo, es probable que se pueda disponer de financiación en el marco de futuros programas de cooperación territorial europea.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001881/13
to the Commission
Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE)
(21 February 2013)

Subject: Investment in European groupings of territorial cooperation

The Spanish Autonomous Communities of Catalonia and the Balearic Islands, as well as the French departments of Languedoc-Rousillon and Midi-Pyrénées, are part of the Pyrenees-Mediterranean European grouping of territorial cooperation.

With the aim of incentivising the setting up of inter-regional economic activities, the Autonomous Community of the Balearic Islands has developed various business incubators and mechanisms for monitoring occupational and professional entrepreneurship, all within the framework of the CreaMed network.

What investment is planned within the multiannual financial framework for 2013 and 2014 by the Commission for projects by European groupings of territorial cooperation?

Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission
(4 April 2013)

The European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC) is a cooperation instrument aiming to reduce the difficulties encountered by Member States and, in particular, by regional and local authorities in implementing and managing actions of territorial cooperation. EGTCs may carry out these actions with or without a financial contribution from the European Union. Regardless of the type of actions implemented by an EGTC, the decision to set up one of these cooperation instruments is always voluntary.

There is no specific budget in the current financial framework or in the multiannual financial framework for 2014-2020 for the management of projects by EGTCs. However, it is likely that some funding will be made available within the framework of future European Territorial Cooperation programmes.

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001882/13
a la Comisión
Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE)
(21 de febrero de 2013)

Asunto: Investigación científica

El Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas es la entidad pública española líder en la investigación y desarrollo de programas científicos. En la actualidad y debido a la crisis que sufre gran parte de la UE, este organismo se ha visto obligado a presentar un duro plan de ajuste que sin duda llevará aparejadas medidas de austeridad que pueden impedir el normal funcionamiento de la investigación científica española.

¿Tiene previsto la Comisión incentivar más los proyectos europeos para la investigación científica pública de manera que se pueda compensar los duros ajustes que los Estados miembros se están viendo obligados a aplicar?

Respuesta de la Sra. Geoghegan-Quinn en nombre de la Comisión
(25 de marzo de 2013)

La Comisión ha elaborado su propuesta relativa al programa marco de investigación e innovación Horizonte 2020 en respuesta a la actual crisis económica. Dicha propuesta se basa en la idea, puesta de relieve por el ejemplo de numerosos países que han intentado aplicar este enfoque, según la cual, en época de dificultades económicas, es necesario realizar grandes inversiones en investigación e innovación. Este es el argumento presentado por la Comisión al Consejo Europeo durante las recientes negociaciones del marco financiero plurianual; los Estados miembros entendieron claramente y aceptaron dicho argumento, al acordarse que, pese a la necesidad global de austeridad presupuestaria, la financiación de Horizonte 2020 experimentaría un incremento real en comparación con el nivel de 2013.

Sin embargo, es preciso recordar también que Horizonte 2020 no sustituye a las inversiones nacionales en materia de investigación e innovación. Los mismos argumentos relativos a la necesidad de prestar apoyo a estas actividades a escala europea se aplican asimismo a los programas nacionales. El éxito de Horizonte 2020 se fundamenta en una estrecha colaboración entre las actividades de investigación e innovación a escala nacional y de la UE.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001882/13
to the Commission
Antonio López-Istúriz White (PPE)
(21 February 2013)

Subject: Scientific research

The Spanish Council for Scientific Research is the leading Spanish public body for the research and development of scientific programmes. At the moment, because of the crisis from which most of the EU is suffering, this body has been forced to submit a harsh plan of adjustments that will doubtless be accompanied by austerity measures which may impede the usual functioning of Spanish scientific research.

Is the Commission planning to give greater incentives to European projects for public scientific research in such a way as to offset the severe adjustments that the Member States are being forced to make?

Answer given by Ms Geoghegan-Quinn on behalf of the Commission
(25 March 2013)

The Commission's proposal for the Horizon 2020 research and innovation framework programme was developed as a response to the current economic crisis. It is based on the idea, shown by the example of many countries which have tried this approach, that during difficult economic times there is a need to invest strongly in research and innovation. This was the argument put by the Commission to the European Council duing the recent negotations on the Multi Annual Financial Framework, and clearly the point was understood and accepted by the Member States when it was agreed that despite the overall need for budgetary austerity, Horizon 2020 funding would represent a real growth compared to the 2013 level.

It is however also important to remember that Horizon 2020 is not a substitute for national investments in research and innovation. The same arguments about the need to support these activities at the European level are equally valid for national programmes. The success of Horizon 2020 is underpinned by a strong partnership between national and EU level research and innovation activities.

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001883/13
a la Comisión
Pablo Zalba Bidegain (PPE)
(21 de febrero de 2013)

Asunto: Acuerdo de Libre Comercio entre Corea del Sur y la Unión Europea

El Acuerdo de Libre Comercio entre Corea del Sur y la Unión Europea entró en vigor en julio de 2011. Hasta ahora, los beneficios del Acuerdo para los productores de automóviles no son los esperados ya que deben hacer frente a un alto número de barreras no arancelarias en lo relativo a los patrones de emisión y de seguridad, así como en la aceptación de la certificación de UNECE (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe).

En cuanto a los patrones de emisión, Corea del Sur sigue los establecidos por la UE para vehículos diésel y los de EE.UU. para los de gasolina, punto que no fue discutido durante las negociaciones. El resultado es que automóviles europeos no desarrollados para el mercado estadounidense se encuentran con grandes dificultades para entrar en Corea del Sur, debiendo realizar grandes ajustes o incluso readaptaciones.

En lo que respecta a los patrones de seguridad, Corea del Sur acordó aceptar los patrones establecidos por la UNECE. Sin embargo, el país asiático aún mantiene varias normas propias o de origen japonés y estadounidense que exigen a los fabricantes de la UE más desarrollos y ajustes. Finalmente, los vehículos de la UE que cumplen rigurosamente con los patrones de la UNECE deben tener más certificados para poder ser vendidos en Corea del Sur, cuando este país y la UE son ambos firmantes del Acuerdo de 1958. Este es el caso, dado que Corea del Sur aplica las normas de la UNECE de forma diferente según la categoría de los automóviles al no estar armonizados los dos mercados. Por ello,

1. ¿Está la Comisión al tanto de que Corea del Sur y la Unión Europea parecen interpretar el Acuerdo UNECE de forma diferente?

2. ¿Cómo trata de obtener la Comisión la estricta aplicación de la letra y el espíritu previstos por el Acuerdo de Libre Comercio?

3. ¿Cómo se asegurarán de que se eliminen sin mayor dilación las barreras comerciales existentes en Corea del Sur para el sector del automóvil y de que el mecanismo previsto en el acuerdo para prevenir la introducción de nuevas barreras dé resultados en la práctica?

4. ¿Ha tenido en cuenta o está planteándose establecer la Comisión algún tipo de protocolo para mantener informados a los principales inversores como, por ejemplo, los fabricantes de automóviles europeos sobre el resultado de las conversaciones periódicas con Corea del Sur?

Respuesta del Sr. De Gucht en nombre de la Comisión
(22 de marzo de 2013)

La Comisión no tiene conocimiento de que existan diferencias significativas de interpretación entre Corea del Sur y la Unión Europea en lo que respecta al Acuerdo de la Comisión Económica de las Naciones Unidas para Europa (CEPE). Ambos son signatarios del Acuerdo de la CEPE y se reúnen periódicamente en el Foro Mundial para la Armonización de la Reglamentación sobre Vehículos (WP.29). En caso de constatarse diferencias significativas, este sería el Foro apropiado para reunirse y debatirlas.

El Acuerdo de Libre Comercio (ALC) entre la UE y Corea del Sur se refiere a la creación de un número significativo de comités especializados y grupos de trabajo para supervisar la aplicación del ALC. El Comité de Comercio desempeña un papel de supervisión y tiene por objeto garantizar el correcto funcionamiento del ALC.

Si se detectan cuestiones que inducen a pensar que Corea del Sur pueda infringir el ALC, o en caso de detectarse problemas que podrían dificultar el acceso al mercado para las empresas europeas, la Comisión los examina detenidamente. En casos justificados, la Comisión plantea las cuestiones directamente a sus homólogos de Corea del Sur.

Con arreglo al artículo 9 del anexo 2-C, para facilitar el comercio de vehículos de motor y abordar los problemas de acceso al mercado antes de que se planteen, las Partes están de acuerdo en consultarse rápidamente sobre cualquier asunto y en estar preparadas para entablar consultas a fin de hallar una solución beneficiosa para ambas Partes.

La Comisión tiene contactos periódicos y detallados con la industria del automóvil de la UE sobre los problemas de acceso al mercado en el mercado de Corea del Sur. La Comisión mantiene informada a la industria, tanto a través de reuniones estructuradas como de reuniones *ad hoc*. Se intercambia información periódicamente, tanto en el Grupo de Trabajo de Vehículos de Motor y Componentes en relación con su acceso al mercado, como en reuniones bilaterales.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001883/13
to the Commission
Pablo Zalba Bidegain (PPE)
(21 February 2013)

Subject: Free Trade Agreement between South Korea and the European Union

The Free Trade Agreement between South Korea and the European Union entered into force in July 2011. To date, the benefits of the agreement for car manufacturers have not been as expected since they have to deal with a high number of non-tariff barriers relating to emissions standards and safety standards, as well as acceptance of UNECE (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe) certification.

With regard to emissions standards, South Korea complies with the standards established by the EU for diesel vehicles and those set by the USA for petrol vehicles; this point was not discussed during the negotiations. The outcome is that it is very difficult for European vehicles not developed for the US market to enter South Korea, and major adjustments or even changes need to be made.

With regard to safety standards, South Korea agreed to accept the standards set by UNECE. However, the Asian country still maintains various standards of its own or standards of Japanese or US origin which require EU manufacturers to carry out more developments and adjustments. Finally, EU vehicles which rigorously comply with the UNECE standards have to have more certificates in order to be sold in South Korea, whereas that country and the EU are both signatories of the 1958 agreement. This is because South Korea applies the UNECE standards in different ways according to the category of vehicles, since the two markets are not harmonised. Therefore:

1. Is the Commission aware that South Korea and the European Union seem to interpret the UNECE agreement in differing ways?

2. How does the Commission attempt to ensure that the letter and the spirit of the Free Trade Agreement are strictly applied?

3. How will it ensure that the trade barriers in South Korea for the motor vehicle sector are removed without further delay and that the mechanism laid down in the agreement to prevent new barriers from being introduced actually produces results?

4. Has the Commission taken into account or is it planning to establish any type of procedure for keeping the main investors, such as European motor vehicle manufacturers, informed of the outcome of regular conversations with South Korea?

Answer given by Mr De Gucht on behalf of the Commission
(22 March 2013)

The Commission is not aware of significant differences in interpretation of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN ECE) agreement by South Korea and the European Union. Both are signatories to the UN ECE Agreement and meet regularly in the World Forum for Harmonisation of Vehicle Regulations (WP.29). If significant differences are identified this would be the appropriate forum in which to raise and discuss them.

The Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the EU and South Korea envisages the establishment of a significant number of specialised committees and working groups to monitor the implementation of the FTA. The Trade Committee plays a supervisory role and is designed to ensure that the FTA operates properly.

Where issues are identified which give reason to consider that South Korea may be in breach of the FTA or where there are problems identified which may result in market access difficulties for European firms, the Commission is examining the issues closely. Wherever warranted, the Commission raises the issues directly with the relevant South Korean counterparts.

Under Article 9 of Annex 2-C, to facilitate trade in motor vehicles and to address market access problems before they arise, the parties agree to consult promptly on any relevant matters arising and to be ready to enter into consultations with a view to seeking a mutually satisfactory outcome.

The Commission has regular and detailed contacts with the EU automobile industry concerning market access problems in the South Korean market. The Commission keeps the industry informed through both structured and ad hoc meetings. Feedback is regularly given during the Market Access Working Group for Motor Vehicles and Parts as well as on bilateral meetings.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-001884/13
προς την Επιτροπή
Theodoros Skylakakis (ALDE)
(21 Φεβρουαρίου 2013)

Θέμα: Λειτουργία αυτοτελούς υπηρεσίας ασύλου στην Ελλάδα

Με το νόμο 3907/2011, ιδρύθηκε νέα αυτοτελής υπηρεσία ασύλου στην Ελλάδα, υπό την εποπτεία του υπουργείου Προστασίας του Πολίτη, η οποία θα ήταν αρμόδια για την παραλαβή και εξέταση των αιτήσεων διεθνούς προστασίας, δηλαδή αιτήσεων ασύλου, επικουρικής προστασίας και ανθρωπιστικών λόγων, που μέχρι σήμερα υπάγονταν στην αρμοδιότητα της ελληνικής αστυνομίας (άρθρο 2 ΠΔ 114/2010, ΦΕΚ (Α 195/ 22.11.2010)).

Μέχρι τώρα, και ενώ έχει παρέλθει ένα έτος από την ψήφιση του νόμου αυτού και έχουν διατεθεί προς τούτο κονδύλια από την ΕΕ, η υπηρεσία δεν λειτουργεί. Σύμφωνα με το υπουργείο, αυτό οφείλεται στην υποστελέχωση της υπηρεσίας. Συνέπεια τούτου είναι, αφενός οι αιτήσεις διεθνούς προστασίας να μην παραλαμβάνονται από τις υπηρεσίες της ΕΛΑΣ, με αποτέλεσμα να συνωθούνται αρκετοί παράνομοι αλλοδαποί, ειδικά στην Αθήνα και στα άλλα μεγάλα αστικά κέντρα, αφετέρου η εξέταση των αιτήσεων αυτών να καθυστερεί μέχρι και 7 χρόνια, λόγω του μικρού αριθμού των επιτροπών εξέτασης των αιτήσεων που έχουν υποβληθεί. Σήμερα υπάρχουν 70 επιτροπές σε πρώτο βαθμό και 6 σε δεύτερο βαθμό.

Με δεδομένα τα ανωτέρω, ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

— Γνωρίζει την κατάσταση που έχει διαμορφωθεί στην Ελλάδα και τις δυσλειτουργίες που έχουν προκύψει εξαιτίας της αδυναμίας εφαρμογής του νέου θεσμικού πλαισίου;

— Τι προτίθεται να πράξει για να αντιμετωπισθεί το πρόβλημα, δεδομένου μάλιστα ότι η χρηματοδότηση για τη σύσταση της νέας υπηρεσίας προέρχεται από κονδύλια της ΕΕ;

Απάντηση της κ. Malmström εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(14 Μαΐου 2013)

Η Επιτροπή έχει πλήρη επίγνωση των αδυναμιών του ελληνικού συστήματος παροχής ασύλου μεταξύ άλλων, όσον αφορά την πρόσβαση και την ποιότητα της διαδικασίας παροχής ασύλου.

Η έκδοση νέων ελληνικών νομοθετικών πράξεων όσον αφορά το άσυλο (Ν. 3907/2011) και η επακόλουθη σύσταση μιας ανεξάρτητης υπηρεσίας στην οποία ανατέθηκε η εξέταση των αιτήσεων ασύλου αποτέλεσαν σημαντικό βήμα προς την αντιμετώπιση των συσσωρευμένων αιτήσεων ασύλου με συστηματικό και ανεξάρτητο τρόπο. Η νεοσυσταθείσα ανεξάρτητη υπηρεσία ασύλου πρέπει να καταστεί πλήρως λειτουργική μέσα στο πρώτο εξάμηνο του τρέχοντος έτους.

Εν τω μεταξύ, έχει σημειωθεί πρόοδος. Οι συσσωρευμένες αιτήσεις ασύλου σε πρώτο βαθμό έχουν μειωθεί σε περίπου 4 000 υποθέσεις. Οι συσσωρευμένες υποθέσεις σε δεύτερο βαθμό έχουν επίσης μειωθεί από 45 000 τον Ιούλιο του 2012 σε περίπου 35 000 υποθέσεις επί του παρόντος. Ωστόσο, πρέπει να ενταθούν οι προσπάθειες για την περαιτέρω αντιμετώπιση των συσσωρευμένων σε δεύτερο βαθμό υποθέσεων.

Η Επιτροπή στηρίζει την Ελλάδα αφ' ενός στην εφαρμογή μεταρρυθμίσεων σχετικά με τις πολιτικές της στον τομέα του ασύλου και της μετανάστευσης, παρέχοντας στήριξη και τεχνογνωσία όσον αφορά τα εν λόγω θέματα, ιδίως μέσω της συμμετοχής της ομάδας δράσης της Επιτροπής για την Ελλάδα, η οποία συντονίζει την τεχνική βοήθεια στο πλαίσιο των διαρθρωτικών μεταρρυθμίσεων, και αφ' ετέρου στη βελτιστοποίηση της απορρόφησης των κονδυλίων των διαρθρωτικών ταμείων. Αυτό περιλαμβάνει σχέδιο για την περαιτέρω μείωση των συσσωρευμένων υποθέσεων σε δεύτερο βαθμό που υλοποιήθηκε με τη στήριξη από την ΕΥΥΑ για τη διεκπεραίωση των συσσωρευμένων υποθέσεων της πρώτης φάσης, καθώς και σχέδιο που στοχεύει στην παροχή στήριξης της λειτουργίας της νέας υπηρεσίας ασύλου και της νέας αρχής προσφύγων, που συγχρηματοδοτήθηκε από το Ευρωπαϊκό Ταμείο για τους Πρόσφυγες.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001884/13
to the Commission
Theodoros Skylakakis (ALDE)
(21 February 2013)

Subject: Operation of an independent asylum service in Greece

Law No 3907/2011 established a new independent asylum service in Greece, under the supervision of the Ministry of Citizen Protection, which will be responsible for receiving and processing claims for international protection, i.e. claims for asylum, for subsidiary protection and for humanitarian asylum, which hitherto had fallen within the remit of the Greek police (Article 2, Presidential Decree 114/2010, Government Official Journal (A 195/22.11.2010)).

Even though a year has now elapsed since this Law was adopted and EU funds have been made available for this purpose, the service is still not operational. According to the ministry in question, this is because the service is understaffed. That means, firstly, that claims for international protection are not being received by the ELAS services (authority for granting asylum), leading to large concentrations of 'illegal' aliens, especially in Athens and other major urban centres; and, secondly, that the examination of these claims will be delayed by up to seven years, due the small number of committees examining the claims that have been submitted. Today there are seventy first-instance committees and six appeals committees.

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

— Is it aware of the situation that has developed in Greece and the problems that have occurred due to the failure to implement the new institutional framework?

— What will it do to address the problem, especially given that the funding for setting up the new service comes from the EU?

Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission
(14 May 2013)

The Commission is fully aware of the deficiencies of the Greek asylum system including regarding access to and the quality of the asylum procedure.

The adoption of new Greek legislative instruments on asylum (Law No 3907/2011) and the subsequent establishment of an independent service mandated to examine asylum applications were a significant step to address the backlog of asylum applications in a systematic and independent way. The newly established independent asylum service should become fully operational in the first half of this year.

In the meantime progress has been made. The backlog of asylum applications in first instance has been reduced to approximately 4 000 cases. The backlog in second instance has also been reduced from 45 000 in July 2012 to around 35 000 cases currently. However efforts need to be intensified to further address the backlog at second instance.

The Commission is supporting Greece to implement reforms in its asylum and migration policies, by providing financial support and expertise on the ground, notably through the involvement of the Commission's Task Force for Greece, which coordinates technical assistance in the context of structural reforms and to optimise absorption of structural funds. This includes a project to further reduce the backlog at second instance, implemented under financial support by the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) for the first phase of clearing the backlog, as well as a project aimed at providing support on the functioning of the new asylum service and the new appeals authority, co-financed under the European Refugee Fund.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-001885/13
προς την Επιτροπή
Theodoros Skylakakis (ALDE)
(21 Φεβρουαρίου 2013)

Θέμα: Επιτροπές εξέτασης αιτήσεων διεθνούς προστασίας

Στην Ελλάδα λειτουργούν αυτή τη στιγμή 70 επιτροπές εξέτασης αιτήσεων διεθνούς προστασίας σε πρώτο βαθμό και 6 σε δεύτερο βαθμό (είναι οι επιτροπές προσφυγών στις οποίες καταφεύγει ο αλλοδαπός του οποίου απορρίπτεται η αίτηση σε πρώτο βαθμό). Οι επιτροπές, και στους δυο βαθμούς, είναι διοικητικές και παρότι έχουν γίνει πολλές παραστάσεις προς το Υπουργείο Προστασίας του Πολίτη για την αύξηση του αριθμού τους, αυτές δεν αυξήθηκαν (το υπουργείο επικαλείται έλλειψη διερμηνέων, ανάγκη δακτυλοσκόπησης κ.λπ.). Προσφάτως, το Υπουργείο Προστασίας του Πολίτη ανακοίνωσε την αύξηση του αριθμού των επιτροπών σε δεύτερο βαθμό σε 25. Είναι αμφίβολο, ωστόσο, αν αυτές θα λύσουν το πρόβλημα, αφού οι αιτήσεις είναι χιλιάδες και η κάθε επιτροπή δεν μπορεί να εξετάζει παρά μόνο δυο αιτήσεις την ημέρα.

Με δεδομένα τα ανωτέρω, ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

— Θεωρεί ότι η υπάρχουσα δομή είναι επαρκής για τη διαχείριση ενός τόσο σημαντικού ζητήματος;

— Προτίθεται να συνεργαστεί με την ελληνική κυβέρνηση προς την κατεύθυνση μιας πιο αποκεντρωμένης δομής της σχετικής υπηρεσίας, δεδομένου μάλιστα ότι η χρηματοδότηση για τη σύστασή της προέρχεται από κονδύλια της ΕΕ;

Απάντηση της κ. Malmström εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(12 Απριλίου 2013)

Η Επιτροπή έχει πλήρη επίγνωση των αδυναμιών του ελληνικού συστήματος παροχής ασύλου μεταξύ άλλων, όσον αφορά την πρόσβαση και την ποιότητα της διαδικασίας παροχής ασύλου.

Η έκδοση νέων ελληνικών νομοθετικών πράξεων όσον αφορά το άσυλο (Ν. 3907/2011) και η επακόλουθη σύσταση μιας ανεξάρτητης υπηρεσίας στην οποία ανατέθηκε η εξέταση των αιτήσεων ασύλου αποτελούν σημαντικό βήμα προς την αντιμετώπιση των συσσωρευμένων αιτήσεων με συστηματικό και ανεξάρτητο τρόπο.

Εν τω μεταξύ, έχει σημειωθεί πρόοδος. Οι συσσωρευμένες αιτήσεις ασύλου σε πρώτο βαθμό έχουν μειωθεί σε περίπου 4 000 υποθέσεις. Οι συσσωρευμένες υποθέσεις σε δεύτερο βαθμό έχουν επίσης μειωθεί από 45 000 τον Ιούλιο του 2012 σε περίπου 35 000 υποθέσεις επί του παρόντος. Ωστόσο πρέπει να ενταθούν οι προσπάθειες για την περαιτέρω αντιμετώπιση των συσσωρευμένων υποθέσεων σε δεύτερο βαθμό.

Σε συνεργασία με τους αντίστοιχους οργανισμούς (ΕΥΥΑ, Frontex), η Επιτροπή στηρίζει την Ελλάδα στην εφαρμογή μεταρρυθμίσεων σχετικά με τις πολιτικές της στον τομέα του ασύλου και της μετανάστευσης, παρέχοντας χρηματοδοτική στήριξη και εμπειρογνωμοσύνη όσον αφορά τα εν λόγω θέματα. Αυτό περιλαμβάνει ένα σχέδιο για την περαιτέρω μείωση των συσσωρευμένων υποθέσεων σε δεύτερο βαθμό που υλοποιήθηκε με τη χρηματοδοτική στήριξη από την ΕΥΥΑ για την διεκπεραίωση των συσσωρευμένων υποθέσεων της πρώτης φάσης, καθώς και ένα σχέδιο που στοχεύει στην παροχή στήριξης της λειτουργίας της νέας υπηρεσίας ασύλου και της νέας αρχής προσφύγων, που συγχρηματοδοτήθηκε από το Ευρωπαϊκό Ταμείο για τους Πρόσφυγες.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001885/13
to the Commission
Theodoros Skylakakis (ALDE)
(21 February 2013)

Subject: Committees examining international protection claims

In Greece there are currently seventy committees examining claims for international protection in the first instance and six examining claims on appeal (these are appeals committees to which aliens whose claims have been rejected in the first instance can appeal). Both the first-instance and appeals committees are administrative bodies, and although many representations have been made to the Ministry of Citizen Protection to increase the number of these committees, nothing has been done (the Ministry in questions invokes a shortage of interpreters, the need for fingerprinting, etc.). Recently, the Ministry for Citizen Protection announced an increase in the number of appeals committees to twenty-five. It is doubtful, however, whether this will solve the problem, as thousands of claims are being made and each committee can only examine two a day.

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

— Does it consider that the existing structure is adequate to manage such an important issue?

— Will it work with the Greek Government to make the service more decentralised, especially since funding for the establishment of this service comes from the EU?

Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission
(12 April 2013)

The Commission is fully aware of the deficiencies of the Greek asylum system including regarding access to and the quality of the asylum procedure.

The adoption of new Greek legislative instruments on asylum (Law No 3907/2011) and the subsequent establishment of an independent service mandated to examine asylum applications constitute a significant step to address the backlog of asylum applications in a systematic and independent way.

In the meantime progress has been made. The backlog of asylum applications in first instance has been reduced to approximately 4 000 cases. The backlog in second instance has also been decreased from 45 000 in July 2012 to around 35 000 cases at present. However efforts need to be intensified to further address the backlog at second instance.

Together with the respective agencies (EASO, Frontex) the Commission is supporting Greece to implement reforms in its asylum and migration policies, by providing financial support and expertise on the ground. This includes a project to further reduce the backlog at second instance, implemented with financial support by EASO for the first phase of clearing the backlog, as well as a project aimed at providing support on the functioning of the new asylum service and the new appeals authority, co-financed by the European Refugee Fund.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-001886/13
an die Kommission
Sabine Wils (GUE/NGL)
(21. Februar 2013)

Betrifft: Kosten für Pestizidvergiftungen in Armutsregionen

Nach Aussage eines UN-Berichts ([1]) können zwischen 2015 und 2020 90 Milliarden Dollar an Kosten allein in Subsahara-Afrika durch Krankheiten entstehen, die durch Pestizide verursacht wurden.

Der Bericht des UNEP geht davon aus, dass die durch Pestizide verursachten Kosten infolge von Vergiftungen jenen Betrag übersteigen, der in der Region über internationale Hilfe für gesundheitliche Basisversorgung gezahlt wird (unter Ausschluss von HIV/ADS).

Besonders dramatisch ist die Lage in den Armutsregionen der Welt. Nach Angaben der NRO „Pestizid Aktions-Netzwerk" können gefährliche Pestizide entgegen früherer Annahmen nicht sicher eingesetzt werden — auch wenn Millionenbeträge für Schulungsprogramme ausgegeben werden.

1. Hat die Kommission Kenntnis von dem oben angeführten Bericht des UNEP? Wenn ja, welche Maßnahmen beabsichtigt die Kommission zu ergreifen, um den erwarteten Pestizidvergiftungen vorzubeugen?

2. Inwieweit fühlt sich die Kommission berufen, die Nutzung hochgefährlicher Pestizide zu beenden?

Antwort von Herrn Piebalgs im Namen der Kommission
(12. April 2013)

Der von UNEP ([2]) veröffentlichte Bericht „Global Chemicals Outlook" ist der Kommission bekannt, da sie in der internationalen Chemikalienpolitik äußerst engagiert ist und unter anderem das Strategische Konzept für das internationale Chemikalien-Management (SAICM) unterstützt, bei dem es sich um einen Politikrahmen zur Förderung des umweltverträglichen Umgangs mit Chemikalien handelt. Darüber hinaus unterstützt die Kommission aktiv die internationalen Übereinkommen über Chemikalien, d. h. die Übereinkommen von Basel, Rotterdam und Stockholm sowie das neue Übereinkommen über Quecksilber.

Das SAICM und die multilateralen Umweltübereinkommen bieten eine breite Grundlage für die Förderung des umweltverträglichen Umgangs mit Chemikalien, einschließlich der Verhütung der Umweltverschmutzung und der Einführung sichererer Alternativen. Viele Länder haben bereits Instrumente und Konzepte für den Umgang mit Chemikalien entwickelt. Das Ziel der internationalen Bemühungen zur Förderung des umweltverträglichen Umgangs mit Chemikalien besteht darin, vor allem Entwicklungsländer in die Lage zu versetzen, innerstaatliche Entscheidungen über den Einsatz gefährlicher Chemikalien zu treffen, darunter über die Beschränkung ihrer Verwendung und den sicheren Umgang damit. In diesem Zusammenhang dürften die im Rahmen des SAICM vorgeschlagenen Maßnahmen den Schutz der menschlichen Gesundheit und der Umwelt in den Entwicklungsländern erhöhen, indem dort mehr Sachwissen und Informationen verfügbar gemacht werden, die Regierungsführung verbessert und der Kapazitätsaufbau verstärkt wird.

Die Kommission unterstützt außerdem den internationalen Informationsaustausch über gefährliche Chemikalien, z. B. durch die im Rotterdamer Übereinkommen vorgesehenen Mechanismen. Dieser Informationsaustausch liefert insbesondere den Entwicklungsländern die Informationen, die sie für innerstaatliche Entscheidungen über die Verwendung dieser Chemikalien sowie für den sicheren Umgang damit benötigen.

([1]) UNEP [2012]: Global Chemicals Outlook — Towards Sound Management of Chemicals — Synthesis Report for Decision-Makers, United Nations Environment Programme.
([2]) Umweltprogramm der Vereinten Nationen.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001886/13
to the Commission
Sabine Wils (GUE/NGL)
(21 February 2013)

Subject: Cost of pesticide poisoning in the world's poorest regions

According to a UN report ([1]), costs of USD 90 billion could be incurred between 2015 and 2020 in sub-Saharan Africa alone by illnesses caused by pesticides.

The UNEP report estimates that the cost incurred by pesticides as a result of poisoning exceeds the amount paid in this region through international aid for basic healthcare (excluding HIV/AIDS).

The situation is particularly alarming in the poorest regions of the world. According to the NGO Pesticide Action Network, contrary to what used to be thought, hazardous pesticides cannot be used safely, even when millions are spent on education programmes.

1. Is the Commission aware of the abovementioned UNEP report? If so, what measures does it propose to take to prevent the predicted cases of pesticide poisoning?

2. Does the Commission feel it should halt the use of highly dangerous pesticides?

Answer given by Mr Piebalgs on behalf of the Commission
(12 April 2013)

The Commission is aware of the report on the 'Global Chemicals Outlook' published by UNEP ([2]) since it is very active in international chemicals policy and supports, *inter alia*, the Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management (SAICM), which is a policy framework to foster the sound management of chemicals. In addition, the Commission actively supports the international conventions on chemicals, i.e. the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions as well as the very recent convention on mercury.

The SAICM and the multilateral environmental agreements provide a broad framework for promoting the sound management of chemicals, including pollution prevention and the adoption of safer alternatives, and many countries have already developed a range of instruments and approaches for managing chemicals. The objective of international efforts to foster the sound management of chemicals is to enable developing countries in particular to take national decisions on the use of hazardous chemicals, including restrictions on their use, and to manage chemicals safely. In this respect, the implementation of measures proposed under SAICM is expected to improve the protection of human health and the environment in developing countries by strengthening the knowledge and information available in those countries, improving governance and enhancing capacity building.

The Commission actively supports international information exchange on hazardous chemicals e.g. through the mechanisms provided for by the Rotterdam Convention. This exchange of information provides developing countries in particular with information needed for their national decision-making on the use of those chemicals and for their safe handling.

([1]) UNEP [2012]: Global Chemicals Outlook — Towards Sound Management of Chemicals — Synthesis Report for Decision-Makers, United Nations Environment Programme.
([2]) United Nations Environment Programme.

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-001887/13
à la Commission
Brice Hortefeux (PPE)
(21 février 2013)

Objet: Gestion du marché du sucre et organisation commune du marché du sucre pour l'après 2015

1. La Commission pourrait-elle détailler les quantités finales d'importations exceptionnelles et les quantités finales de sucre hors-quota remises sur le marché de l'Union européenne depuis les campagnes 2010/2011 et 2011/2012? Pourrait-elle expliquer pourquoi les quantités exceptionnelles importées ont été plus élevées que les quantités de sucre hors-quota remises sur le marché de l'Union? Peut-elle garantir que ceci n'est pas au désavantage du secteur betterave-sucre de l'Union?

2. Eu égard aux mesures exceptionnelles de marché votées en comité de gestion pour ce qui concerne la gestion de la campagne sucrière 2012/2013, la Commission pourrait-elle expliquer l'importance de la remise sur le marché de l'Union européenne de sucre hors-quota comme outil temporaire pour gérer les situations de pénurie du marché du sucre de l'Union?

3. Eu égard à la position retenue par la commission de l'agriculture le 23 janvier 2013, la Commission estime-t-elle que l'introduction de la remise sur le marché de sucre hors-quota pourrait être un outil efficace à l'avenir pour gérer une situation exceptionnelle de pénurie du marché du sucre de l'Union?

4. À la lumière des récents accords bilatéraux conclus et des augmentations des importations à droit nul d'origine préférentielles prévues par le groupe ACP/PMA de Londres, la Commission estime-t-elle réaliste le risque d'une pénurie d'importations de sucre dans l'Union dans les années à venir?

5. Les raffineries de sucre de canne dans l'Union européenne peuvent-elles utiliser le régime de perfectionnement actif (RPA) afin d'importer du sucre de canne brut en franchise de droits et d'exporter du sucre blanc raffiné? Si oui, pourquoi les raffineurs de sucre de canne brut ne l'utilisent-ils pas afin de fonctionner à pleine capacité?

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-002381/13
à la Commission
Philippe Boulland (PPE)
(28 février 2013)

Objet: Gestion du marché du sucre et OCM sucre post-2015

La Commission pourrait-elle détailler les quantités finales d'importations exceptionnelles et les quantités finales de sucre hors quota remises sur le marché de l'Union européenne depuis les campagnes 2010/2011 et 2011/2012? Pourrait-elle également expliquer pourquoi les quantités exceptionnelles importées ont été plus élevées que les quantités hors quota remises sur le marché de l'Union et indiquer si ceci n'est pas au désavantage du secteur betteravier et sucrier de l'Union?

Réponse commune donnée par M. Cioloş au nom de la Commission
(3 avril 2013)

La Commission renvoie les Honorables Parlementaires à ses réponses aux questions écrites E-001096/2013, E-001234/2013 et E-001301/2013 ([1]).

([1]) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/fr/parliamentary-questions.html

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001887/13
to the Commission
Brice Hortefeux (PPE)
(21 February 2013)

Subject: Sugar market management and the common organisation of the sugar market after 2015

1. Could the Commission provide details, from the marketing years 2010/2011 and 2011/2012 onwards, of the total quantities under exceptional import quotas and the total out-of-quota quantities placed on the EU sugar market? Could it explain why quantities under exceptional import quotas exceeded out-of-quota quantities, and can it provide assurances that this has not been detrimental to the EU sugar beet sector?

2. In the light of the exceptional market measures adopted by the Management Committee for the management of sugar marketing year 2012/2013, could the Commission explain exactly why it is important that out-of-quota quantities should be placed on the market to manage shortages on the EU sugar market?

3. Given the position adopted by the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on 23 January 2013, does the Commission think that putting out-of-quota quantities back on the market could be an efficient way of managing serious shortages on the EU sugar market in the future?

4. In the light of the recent bilateral agreements and of the increase in duty-free imports of preferential origin envisaged by the ACP/LDC London sugar group, does the Commission think that there is likely to be a shortfall in sugar imports into the EU in the coming years?

5. Can EU cane sugar refiners avail themselves of inward processing arrangements to import raw cane sugar free of duty and export refined white sugar? If they can, why are raw cane sugar refiners not taking advantage of this opportunity to work at full capacity?

Question for written answer E-002381/13
to the Commission
Philippe Boulland (PPE)
(28 February 2013)

Subject: Managing the sugar market and the common market organisation (CMO) for sugar after 2015

Can the Commission provide figures for the total volume of exceptional imports and out-of-quota sugar sold on the EU market since the 2010/2011 and 2011/2012 sugar marketing years? Can the Commission also explain why the volume of exceptional imports exceeds the quantity of out-of-quota sugar sold on the EU market? Does this not go against the interests of the EU sugar beet and sugar industry?

Joint answer given by Mr Cioloş on behalf of the Commission
(3 April 2013)

The Commission would refer the Honourable Members to its answer to Written Questions E-001096/2013 and E-001234/2013 and E-001301/2013 ([1]).

([1]) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html

(Magyar változat)

Írásbeli választ igénylő kérdés E-001888/13
a Bizottság számára
Gáll-Pelcz Ildikó (PPE), Bauer Edit (PPE), Tőkés László (PPE), Mészáros Alajos (PPE) és Sógor Csaba (PPE)
(2013. február 21.)

Tárgy: A belső piacon belüli mobilitás és az uniós betegállátás összefüggéseiről

Az egységes belső piac erősítésének, a gazdasági növekedés elősegítésének egyik legfontosabb eszköze az uniós polgárok mobilitásának támogatása, a szakképesítések kölcsönös elismerésének megkönnyítése. A Tanács, közösen az Európai Parlamenttel jelenleg is dolgozik a szakképesítések kölcsönös elismerésének modernizációján.

Ugyanakkor az Európai Unió egyik legnagyobb értéke a polgárairól való gondoskodás. Az Európai Unió tagállamaiban senki sem maradhat betegellátás nélkül. A szociális biztonsághoz és a betegellátáshoz való jog minden jogszerűen lakóhellyel rendelkező, és tartózkodási helyét jogszerűen megválasztó személy alapvető joga, melyet az Alapjogi Charta 34. cikke is garantál.

Az egyik legmobilisabb szakma az Európai Unióban az orvosoké, az utóbbi években több tízezer orvos telepedett le és gyakorolja szakmáját más tagállamban. Az Egészségügyi Rendszerek és Politikák Európai Megfigyelőközpontja (European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies) és a WHO Európai Regionális Irodájának munkatársai 17 európai országra vonatkozóan vizsgálták az egészségügyi szakemberek migrációjának hatásait 2011-ben ([1]). A vizsgálat megállapította, hogy az orvosok elvándorlása több tagállamot érintő, az alapvető betegellátást veszélyeztető jelenség.

A tanulmány arra a következtetésre jut, hogy a politikai döntéshozóknak meg kell érteniük a mobilitási trendeket ahhoz, hogy megfelelően tudjanak reagálni azokra. Ehhez nélkülözhetetlen, hogy releváns és megbízható adatok álljanak rendelkezésre az egészségügyi dolgozók ki- és beáramlásáról.

1. Mit tesz a Bizottság, hogy feltérképezze az egészségügyi dolgozók, ezen belül is az orvosok Unión belüli mobilitásával kapcsolatos trendeket?

2. Mit tesz a Bizottság azért, hogy az egészségügyi dolgozók, ezen belül is az orvosok elvándorlásának következtében ne alakuljon ki feszültség az egyes tagállamok betegellátásában?

Tonio Borg válasza a Bizottság nevében
(2013. április 9.)

A Bizottság az Európai Unió egészségügyi dolgozóira vonatkozó cselekvési terv ([2]) részeként társfinanszírozást biztosít egy 2013 áprilisában induló, három évre szóló, az egészségügyi dolgozókkal kapcsolatos előrejelzésre és tervezésre irányuló együttes fellépés számára ([3]). Ez az összesen hatmillió euró összköltségvetésű, 27 európai ország és 16 érdekelt szervezet összefogásával megvalósuló fellépés lehetőséget nyújt a bevált módszerek cseréjére az egészségügyi dolgozókra vonatkozó adatok – ideértve a mobilitással kapcsolatos adatokat is – rendelkezésre állásának, minőségének és összehasonlíthatóságának javítása érdekében. Az együttes fellépés emellett a szabályozott szakmák adatbázisában ([4]) hozzáférhető, a tagállamok által szolgáltatott mobilitási statisztikák meglévő adataira is épít.

A Bizottság a 2013-ra szóló egészségügyi program ([5]) keretében tanulmányt készít a munkaerő-felvétel és -megtartás innovatív és hatékony stratégiáiról, hogy támogassa a tagállamokat az egészségügyi munkaerő fenntarthatóságának biztosítására irányuló célzott szakpolitikai intézkedések kialakításában.

([1]) http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/145158/EuroObserver-Summer-2011_web.pdf
([2]) Az Európai Unió egészségügyi dolgozóira vonatkozó cselekvési terv, COM(2012) 93 final, 2012. április 18.
([3]) A Bizottság 2011. december 2-i végrehajtási határozata, HL C 353., 2011.12.3., 8. o.
([4]) http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/qualifications/regprof/index.cfm?action=homepage
([5]) A Bizottság 2012. december 8-i végrehajtási határozata, HL C 378., 2012.12.8., 19. o.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001888/13
to the Commission
Ildikó Gáll-Pelcz (PPE), Edit Bauer (PPE), László Tőkés (PPE), Alajos Mészáros (PPE) and Csaba Sógor (PPE)
(21 February 2013)

Subject: Relationship between mobility in the internal market and medical care in the EU

One of the most important ways of strengthening the single internal market and promoting economic growth is by supporting the mobility of EU citizens and facilitating mutual recognition of professional qualifications. Together with Parliament, the Council is currently working on modernising the mutual recognition of professional qualifications.

At the same time, one of the EU's greatest values is care of its citizens. No one in the Member States should be excluded from medical care. The right to social security and medical care is a fundamental right of every citizen who has a lawful place of residence and has lawfully chosen their place of stay, one which is guaranteed by Article 34 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

One of the most mobile professions in the EU is that of doctors, and in recent years over 10 000 doctors have settled and started practising in another Member State. Staff of the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies and the WHO's regional office in Europe conducted a study of the effects of the migration of medical specialists in 17 European countries in 2011 ([1]). The study found that the migration of doctors was a phenomenon affecting a number of Member States and was jeopardising basic medical care.

It concluded that political decision-makers must understand mobility patterns in order to be able to react to them accordingly. For this to happen, the availability of relevant, reliable data on the movement of healthcare workers into and out of countries is essential.

1. What action is the Commission taking to identify the mobility patterns of healthcare workers, including those of doctors, within the EU?

2. What action is the Commission taking to ensure that the migration of healthcare workers, including doctors, does not put a strain on medical care in the individual Member States?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission
(9 April 2013)

As part of its Action Plan for the EU health workforce ([2]), the Commission is co-funding a three year Joint Action on health workforce forecasting and planning which will be launched in April 2013 ([3]). This EUR 6 million action brings together 27 European countries and 16 stakeholder organisations to share best practice to improve the availability, quality and comparability of data on health professionals, including data on the mobility of health professionals. This Joint Action also builds on existing data on mobility statistics, as provided by the Member States, available in the Regulated Professions Database ([4]).

In addition, the Commission will carry out a study of innovative and effective recruitment and retention strategies under the 2013 Health Programme ([5]) with a view to assisting Member States to develop specific policy measures that ensure a sustainable health workforce.

([1]) http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/145158/EuroObserver-Summer-2011_web.pdf
([2]) Action Plan for the EU health workforce, COM(2012) 93 final of 18 April 2012.
([3]) Commission Implementing Decision of 2December 2011, C 353/3 of 3 December 2012.
([4]) http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/qualifications/regprof/index.cfm?action=homepage.
([5]) Commission Implementing Decision of 28 November, C 378/19 of 8 December 2012.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-001890/13
aan de Commissie
Wim van de Camp (PPE)
(21 februari 2013)

Betreft: Cyberaanval op Nederlandse computers

Uit Nederlandse mediaberichten, waaronder een artikel in NRC Handelsblad ([1]), blijkt dat Oost-Europese criminelen via een botnet massaal hebben ingebroken in Nederlandse computers.

1. Heeft de Commissie kennisgenomen van het feit dat Oost-Europese criminelen massaal hebben ingebroken in Nederlandse computers?

2. In hoeverre heeft de Commissie kennis van botnetten?

3. Kan de Commissie aangeven in hoeverre andere landen worden getroffen door computeraanvallen van criminelen?

4. Ziet de Commissie mogelijkheden voor Europol in de bestrijding van dit soort cybercriminaliteit?

5. Hoe ziet de Commissie de rol in deze van het nieuwe Europees cybercriminaliteitscentrum van Europol?

6. Kan de Commissie aangeven hoeveel schade per jaar wordt aangericht door cybercriminaliteit?

Antwoord van mevrouw Malmström namens de Commissie
(16 april 2013)

De Commissie is op de hoogte van de recente aanval op Nederlandse computers en de toenemende dreiging van botnetten. Er is onlangs een door de EU gefinancierd proefproject ([2]) opgestart dat moet leiden tot een geïntegreerde strategie voor de bestrijding van botnetten.

Hoewel de waarde van de gehele cybercriminele economie vooralsnog onbekend is, kan worden gesteld dat het verlies verschillende miljarden euro's per jaar bedraagt. De schaal waarop het probleem zich voordoet, vormt op zich een dreiging voor het reactievermogen van de rechtshandhaving — met meer dan 150 000 virussen en andere soorten kwaadaardige code in omloop en meer dan een miljoen mensen die dagelijks het slachtoffer van cybercriminaliteit worden.

Op 11 januari 2013 is binnen Europol een Europees Centrum voor de bestrijding van cybercriminaliteit (EC3) opgericht. Het centrum is het Europese contactpunt voor de bestrijding van cybercriminaliteit. Het doet eveneens dienst als Europees aanspreekpunt voor informatie en deskundigheid inzake cybercriminaliteit en biedt ondersteuning aan het onderzoek naar cybercriminaliteit in de lidstaten. Daarnaast werkt het samen met instanties voor netwerk- en informatiebeveiliging die belast zijn met het bevorderen van de paraatheid voor en reactie op cyberincidenten. EC3 zal geleidelijk de collectieve spreekbuis worden voor de onderzoekers die in Europa in wetshandhavings- en gerechtelijke instanties actief zijn op het gebied van cybercriminaliteit.

EC3 zal een belangrijke stap vooruit betekenen in de inspanningen van de EU om cybercriminaliteit te bestrijden en de veiligheid van EU-burgers en EU-ondernemingen in de digitale wereld te verbeteren. Het vormt een essentieel onderdeel van de algemene strategie van de EU om de veiligheid op het internet te verbeteren en om ervoor te zorgen dat cyberspace een vrije en veilige ruimte blijft waar de rechten van de mens en de fundamentele vrijheden worden gewaarborgd en beschermd.

([1]) http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2013/02/14/geen-actie-overheid-op-cyberaanval-die-nederland-kan-platleggen.
([2]) http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/apps/projects/factsheet/index.cfm?project_ref=325188.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001890/13
to the Commission
Wim van de Camp (PPE)
(21 February 2013)

Subject: Cyber attack on Dutch computers

According to Dutch media reports, including an article in NRC Handelsblad ([1]), Eastern European criminals have carried out a large-scale botnet attack on Dutch computers.

1. Is the Commission aware of this large-scale attack by Eastern European criminals on Dutch computers?

2. How much does the Commission know about botnets?

3. Can the Commission indicate the extent to which other countries are affected by cyber attacks by criminals?

4. Does the Commission see a role for Europol in combating this type of cybercrime?

5. What role, in the Commission's view, should Europol's new European Cybercrime Centre play in this?

6. Can the Commission indicate how much damage is caused each year by cybercrime?

Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission
(16 April 2013)

The Commission is aware of the recent attack on Dutch computers and of the increasing threat from botnets. An EU-funded pilot project has recently been launched, entailing an integrated strategy to fight botnets ([2]).

While the value of the cybercriminal economy as a whole is not precisely known, the losses represent billions of euros per year. The scale of the problem is itself a threat to law enforcement response capability — with more than 150 000 viruses and other types of malicious code in circulation and over a million people victims of cybercrime every day.

The European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) within Europol was launched on 11 January 2013. The Centre will be the European focal point in the fight against cybercrime. It will serve as the European cybercrime information and expertise focal point and provide support to Member States' cybercrime investigations as well as work with network and information security authorities in charge of enhancing preparedness and reaction to cyber incidents. EC3 should gradually become the collective voice of European Cybercrime investigators across law enforcement and the judiciary and it should also promote public-private cooperation against cybercrime.

EC3 will mark a significant step forward in the EU's endeavour to fight cybercrime and increase the security of EU citizens and EU businesses in the digital world. It is an essential part of the EU's overall strategy to improve cyber-security and to maintain cyberspace as an open and secure area where human rights and fundamental freedoms are guaranteed and protected.

([1]) http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2013/02/14/geen-actie-overheid-op-cyberaanval-die-nederland-kan-platleggen.
([2]) http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/apps/projects/factsheet/index.cfm?project_ref=325188

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001891/13
a la Comisión
Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)
(21 de febrero de 2013)

Asunto: VP/HR — Defensores de los derechos humanos en Colombia

La Plataforma por la Paz y los Derechos Humanos en Colombia ha alertado sobre la crisis humanitaria y la guerra a pesar del proceso de paz celebrado en La Habana. Es el caso del padre Alberto Franco, de la Comisión Intereclesial de Justicia y Paz y de «Colombianas y Colombianos por la Paz», cuyo vehículo fue blanco de disparos el pasado 13 de febrero. Y también el de Yolanda Becerra y Gloria Amparo Suárez, dirigentes de la Organización Femenina Popular que han recibido amenazas de muerte recientemente.

A estos ataques se suman asesinatos y ejecuciones extrajudiciales como en los casos de Alba Mery Chilito, abuela de la Asociación de Víctimas de Trujillo, y de dirigentes sindicales, como Elizabeth Gutiérrez y Juan Carlos Pérez, o campesinos, como Jon Favver Díaz. Solo en el mes de enero, se registraron 474 desapariciones forzadas que confirmó el Instituto de Medicina Legal de Colombia. El parlamentario Iván Cepeda sufre amenazas constantes. Lo mismo ocurre con líderes de la CUT y Sintracarbón, sindicato minero que acaba de iniciar una huelga en la empresa minera El Cerrejón, una multinacional denunciada por violaciones de los derechos humanos, cuyo carbón se exporta a España y forma parte de los activos financieros del banco Goldman Sachs.

La Plataforma ha denunciado que «ninguna negociación de paz puede eximir al Estado colombiano (…) de hacer respetar el Derecho Internacional en materia de derechos humanos, especialmente cuando son las Fuerzas Armadas del Estado colombiano las que violan esos derechos», por lo que la comunidad internacional debe reaccionar ante tales agresiones a los derechos humanos y exigir a Colombia que establezca todos los medios para poner fin a estos crímenes y proteger a la población civil. La Plataforma denuncia, además, las condiciones inhumanas que sufre la población penitenciaria, especialmente aquellas personas encarceladas por motivos políticos.

¿Escucha la Vicepresidenta/Alta Representante el posicionamiento de la Plataforma? ¿Está al corriente de esta realidad?

¿Qué medidas adoptará la Vicepresidenta/Alta Representante para presionan al Gobierno colombiano a fin de que este garantice los derechos humanos y acabe con la persecución de defensores y defensoras?

¿Cree la Vicepresidenta/Alta Representante que se deberían aplicar las cláusulas de derechos humanos contempladas en el Acuerdo bilateral UE-Colombia?

Respuesta de la Alta Representante y Vicepresidenta Ashton en nombre de la Comisión
(15 de abril de 2013)

La Alta Representante y Vicepresidenta está muy atenta a la situación de los defensores de los derechos humanos en Colombia, inclusive a través de su Delegación en Bogotá. Se ha creado recientemente un grupo de trabajo de la UE especializado en derechos humanos, compuesto por representantes de la Delegación y diversas misiones de la UE, una de cuyas tareas es abordar los casos de los defensores de los derechos humanos que han sido objeto de amenazas o ataques. Los casos emblemáticos suelen tratarse en el diálogo entre la UE y Colombia sobre los derechos humanos.

De conformidad con las directrices de la UE sobre los defensores de los derechos humanos y la estrategia en materia de derechos humanos de la UE para Colombia, las misiones de la UE también están ampliando el apoyo y el reconocimiento a los defensores que se encuentran en situación de riesgo. Entre otras cosas, diplomáticos europeos se han reunido hace poco con el padre Alberto Franco, quien les comunicó que había solicitado que la Unidad Nacional de Protección (UNP) tomara las medidas adecuadas para protegerlo. También han intercedido ante la UNP para garantizar la protección de Yolanda Becerra y Gloria Amparo Suárez. Además, los representantes de la UE van a participar pronto en un acto coorganizado por la Organización Popular de Mujeres a fin de mostrar el apoyo de la UE. Por último, el Grupo de Derechos Humanos de la UE está atento a las investigaciones de las autoridades colombianas para esclarecer el asesinato de Alba Mery Chilito.

La UE continuará instando al Gobierno colombiano a intensificar y consolidar sus esfuerzos de cara a la protección de los defensores de los derechos humanos en situación de riesgo y sancionar cualquier infracción cometida contra ellos. La Comisión velará por que todos los elementos del acuerdo comercial sean plenamente respetados y se toma muy en serio su responsabilidad a este respecto.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001891/13
to the Commission
Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)
(21 February 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Human rights defenders in Colombia

The Platform for Peace and Human Rights in Colombia has warned of a humanitarian crisis and war, despite the peace process taking place in La Habana. One example is Father Alberto Franco, a member of the Inter-Church Justice and Peace Commission and of 'Colombian Men and Women for Peace', whose car was fired at on 13 February 2013. Another example is Yolanda Becerra and Gloria Amparo Suárez, leaders of the Women's Popular Organisation, who recently received death threats.

In addition to these attacks there are assassinations and extra-judicial executions such as Alba Mery Chilito, one of the grandmothers from the Trujillo Victims Association, and trade union leaders, such as Elizabeth Gutiérrez and Juan Carlos Pérez, or farmers such as Jon Favver Díaz. In the month of January alone, 474 forced disappearances were recorded, as confirmed by the Colombian Institute of Legal Medicine. Parliamentary representative Iván Cepeda receives constant threats. The same applies to the leaders of the Central Union of Workers (CUT) and Sintracarbón, a mining union which has just started a strike at the mining company El Cerrejón. This multinational, accused of breaches of human rights, exports its coal to Spain and forms part of the financial assets of the Goldman Sachs bank.

The Platform has stated that 'no peace negotiation can exempt the Colombian State … from abiding by international human rights law, particularly when it is the armed forces of the Colombian State who are breaching these rights'. Therefore, the international community ought to respond to these attacks on human rights and demand that Colombia take all the steps necessary to put an end to these crimes and protect the civilian population. The Platform also laments the inhumane conditions in which the prison population is kept, particularly persons jailed for political reasons.

Has the Vice-President/High Representative listened to the Platform's position? Is she aware of the situation?

What measures will the Vice-President/High Representative take to put pressure on the Colombian Government to guarantee human rights and put an end to the persecution of human rights defenders?

Does the Vice-President/High Representative believe that the human rights clauses studied in the bilateral agreement between the EU and Colombia ought to be applied?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(15 April 2013)

The HR/VP is following the situation of human rights defenders in Colombia very closely, not least through its Delegation in Bogotá. A dedicated EU working group on human rights, composed of representatives of the Delegation and various EU missions has been established recently, *inter alia* to discuss the cases of human rights defenders that have been threatened or attacked. Emblematic cases are often taken up in the EU-Colombia human rights dialogue.

In line with the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders and the local EU human rights strategy for Colombia, EU missions are also extending support and recognition to defenders that are at risk. Inter alia, European diplomats recently met with Father Alberto Franco, who informed them that he had requested the National Unit of Protection (NUP) to put in place adequate protection measures for him. They have also interceded with the NUP to ensure the protection of Yolanda Becerra and Gloria Amparo Suárez. EU representatives will moreover soon participate in an event co-organised by the Women's Popular Organisation, in order to show EU support. Finally, the EU Human Rights Working Group is following the investigations by the Colombian authorities into the assassination of Alba Mery Chilito.

The EU will continue to urge the Colombian Government to step up and consolidate its efforts to protect human rights defenders at risk and sanction violations against them. The Commission will ensure all the elements of the Trade Agreement are fully enforced and takes its responsibility in this regard very seriously.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-001892/13
an die Kommission
Hubert Pirker (PPE)
(21. Februar 2013)

Betrifft: EU-weite Harmonisierung der Umweltplaketten in urbanen Umweltzonen

Zahlreiche Mitgliedstaaten (MS) haben seit dem Inkrafttreten der Richtlinie 2008/50/EG über Luftqualität (AQD) urbane Umweltzonen zur Minderung der Feinstaubbelastung eingerichtet. Solche Umweltzonen können nur mit Fahrzeugen befahren werden, die entsprechende Umweltstandards erfüllen.

Die Zugangsvoraussetzungen und Plakettengestaltung werden jedoch in den verschiedenen Mitgliedstaaten, teilweise auch von Stadt zu Stadt sehr unterschiedlich geregelt. Mangelnde Harmonisierung führt zu Unübersichtlichkeit und Hürden im Verkehrsbinnenmarkt, und die Bürger sind in ihrer Reisefreiheit eingeschränkt.

Die Initiative Nr. 32 des Weißbuchs „Fahrplan zu einem einheitlichen europäischen Verkehrsraum“ (4) sieht die Entwicklung von EU-Rahmenbedingungen für Zufahrtsbeschränkungen für Innenstädte und deren Anwendung vor, einschließlich eines Rechtsrahmens und eines validierten operationellen und technischen Rahmens für Fahrzeug- und Infrastrukturanwendungen.

Diese Problematik wurde bereits in vormaligen Anfragen mehrmals thematisiert, unter anderen in der Anfrage E-004085/2012 vom 19.04.2012. Der entsprechenden Antwort der Kommission E-004085/2012 vom 4. Juni 2012 lässt sich entnehmen, dass die Kommission die Details, Kosten und Vorteile eines solchen EU-Rahmens der von den Kommissionsdienststellen bewerten lässt, wobei die Grundsätze der Verhältnismäßigkeit und der Subsidiarität beachtet werden. Die Verwendung unterschiedlicher Standards, wie etwa unterschiedlicher Plaketten, ist einer der untersuchten Gesichtspunkte.

Kann die Kommission in diesem Zusammenhang folgende Fragen beantworten:

1. Seit der Veröffentlichung des „Weißbuch Verkehr“ am 28.3.2011 sind beinahe 2 Jahre vergangen! Wie begründet die Kommission ihre Untätigkeit hinsichtlich Initiative Nr. 32 des Weißbuches und das Fehlen konkreter Harmonisierungsvorschläge?

2. Im Interesse der Bürgerinnen und Bürger muss eine Flut von verschiedensten Umweltplaketten schon vorzeitig verhindert werden: Wie sieht der konkrete Fahrplan der Kommission aus? Wann werden die Ergebnisse der Bewertung der zuständigen Kommissionsdienststellen präsentiert? Wann wird eine Folgenabschätzung eingeleitet und wann kann mit einem konkreten Vorschlag gerechnet werden?

3. Welche weiteren konkreten Maßnahmen plant die Kommission in den nächsten zwei Jahren im Bereich der städtischen Mobilität? Wird es eine Informationsoffensive für Bürgerinnen und Bürger geben?

Antwort von Herrn Kallas im Namen der Kommission
(22. April 2013)

1. Nachdem die Frage der Zufahrtsbeschränkungen im Rahmen des Aktionsplans urbane Mobilität (2009-2012) ([1]) gründlich analysiert und eine umfangreiche Konsultation der verschiedenen Interessenträger durchgeführt wurde, liegen der Kommission nun die erforderlichen Informationen vor, um mit der Umsetzung der Initiative Nr. 32 des Weißbuchs „Fahrplan zu einem einheitlichen europäischen Verkehrsraum“ ([2]) in Bezug auf einen EU-Rahmen für die Innenstadt-Maut fortzufahren.

2. Derzeit wird anhand einer Überprüfung des Aktionsplans urbane Mobilität eine Folgenabschätzung fertiggestellt. Auf dieser Grundlage wird die Kommission in der zweiten Jahreshälfte 2013 ein Paket zur städtischen Mobilität vorlegen, in dem auch Zufahrtsbeschränkungen für Innenstädte behandelt werden sollen. Zudem wird gegenwärtig eine Studie zu den sozioökonomischen Folgen des bestehenden fragmentierten Ansatzes erstellt, deren Abschlussbericht Mitte 2013 vorliegen soll.

([1]) KOM(2009)490 endg.
([2]) http://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/strategies/2011_white_paper_en.htm

3. Die Kommission wird auch weiterhin die Europäische Woche für Mobilität unterstützen, die dieses Jahr vom 16. bis zum 22. September unter dem Motto „Clean air — it's your move" stattfinden wird. Ergänzend dazu wurde im Juli 2012 eine Kampagne zur nachhaltigen städtischen Mobilität mit dem Slogan „Do the right mix" eingeleitet, die noch bis 2015 andauern wird. Zudem wird auch das Programm CIVITAS zur Unterstützung von Forschung und Demonstration innovativer Maßnahmenpakete im Bereich der urbanen Mobilität fortgesetzt, in dessen Rahmen voraussichtlich auch Informationskampagnen zur Mobilität stattfinden werden.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001892/13
to the Commission
Hubert Pirker (PPE)
(21 February 2013)

Subject: EU-wide harmonisation of eco-stickers for cars using low-emission zones in urban areas

Since the entry into force of Directive 2008/50/EC on air quality many Member States have established low-emission zones in urban areas in an effort to reduce fine-particulate pollution. Only vehicles which meet certain environmental standards are permitted in these zones.

Access criteria and sticker design vary very substantially between Member States, and sometimes even between town and cities in individual Member States, however. This lack of harmonisation is giving rise to confusion and obstacles to the development of the internal transport market and restricting people's freedom of movement.

Initiative No 32 included in the White Paper, entitled 'Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area', provides for the development of an EU framework for urban access restriction schemes and their application, including a legal framework and a validated operational and technical framework covering vehicle and infrastructure applications.

This issue has already been highlighted in previous questions, for example E-004085/2012 of 19 April 2012. In its answer of 4 July 2012 the Commission stated that it is now assessment the details, costs and benefits of such a framework, while taking into account the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity. The use of different standards, including different stickers, is one of the elements under consideration.

1. Almost two years have passed since the White Paper on transport was published on 28 March 2011. Can the Commission explain why it has not delivered on Initiative No 32, as referred to above, and why it has not made any specific harmonisation proposals?

2. Prompt action is needed to ensure that people are not confronted with a bewildering array of stickers. What timetable has the Commission set itself? When will the Commission release the results of its assessment of the proposed EU framework? When will an impact assessment be conducted and when can we expect to see concrete proposals put forward?

3. What other urban mobility measures does the Commission intend to take in the next two years? Will there be an accompanying information campaign?

Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission
(22 April 2013)

1. After the topic of access restriction schemes was studied in great depth within the framework of the action plan on Urban Mobility (2009-2012) ([1]) and after proper stakeholder consultation, the Commission has gathered the preparatory information necessary to move forward with the implementation of Initiative n° 32 of the White Paper Roadmap to a Single European transport Area ([2]) concerning an EU framework for urban road user charging.

2. Building on a review of the action plan on Urban Mobility, an Impact Assessment is being finalised. On this basis, the Commission prepares an Urban Mobility Package for the second half of 2013, which will address issues of urban access restrictions. In addition, a study to explore the socioeconomic impacts of the present, fragmented approach is currently ongoing and will deliver its report mid-2013.

3. The Commission continues to support the European mobility week that this year will run from 16th — 22nd September with the theme 'Clean air — it's your move'. This initiative is complemented by the 'Do the right mix' sustainable urban mobility campaign, which was launched in July 2012 and will continue until 2015. The CIVITAS programme of support for Research and Demonstration of innovative packages of urban mobility measures will continue and can be expected to include mobility information campaigns.

([1]) COM(2009)490 final.
([2]) http://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/strategies/2011_white_paper_en.htm

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-001893/13
an die Kommission (Vizepräsidentin / Hohe Vertreterin)
Ingeborg Gräßle (PPE)
(21. Februar 2013)

Betrifft: VP/HR — Auszahlung von Urlaubstagen

1. Wie viele nicht in Anspruch genommene Urlaubstage bzw. freie Tage von aus dem Dienst scheidenden EU-Delegationschefs hat der Auswärtige Dienst in 2012 ausbezahlt? Wie hoch war der Gesamtbetrag?

2. Wie viele Tage wurden jeweils pro betroffenem Botschafter vergütet? Welchen Betrag bekamen sie jeweils ausbezahlt?

3. Wie viele nicht in Anspruch genommene Urlaubstage bzw. freie Tage von aus dem Dienst scheidenden sonstigen Mitarbeiter hat der Auswärtige Dienst in 2012 ausbezahlt? Wie hoch war der Gesamtbetrag?

4. Wie viele Tage wurden jeweils pro Betroffenem vergütet? Welchen Betrag bekamen sie jeweils ausbezahlt?

Antwort von Frau Ashton — Hohe Vertreterin/Vizepräsidentin im Namen der Kommission
(12. April 2013)

Bei den Bediensteten des EAD, die 2012 in den Ruhestand gingen, handelte es sich um Beamte, die vorher bei der Kommission oder dem Generalsekretariat des Rates beschäftigt waren und noch über nicht in Anspruch genommene Urlaubstage verfügten. Die Vergütung von nicht in Anspruch genommenen Urlaubstagen für Beamte beim Eintritt in den Ruhestand erfolgte im Einklang mit den Bestimmungen des Personalstatuts und den Rechten der jeweils Betroffenen. Der EAD fordert seine Mitarbeiter in der Regel dazu auf, ihre Urlaubstage zu gegebener Zeit in Anspruch zu nehmen. Das Übertragen von mehr als den erlaubten zwölf Urlaubstagen darf nur in beschränktem Maße genehmigt werden.

Zu den Fragen 1 & 2:

2012 wurden den vier aus dem Dienst scheidenden Delegationsleitern insgesamt 204 nicht in Anspruch genommene Urlaubstage vom EAD ausbezahlt. Der Gesamtbetrag belief sich auf 139 704,13 EUR.

Zu den Fragen 3 & 4:

2012 wurden den übrigen 38 aus dem Dienst scheidenden Beamten und Vertragsbediensteten insgesamt 731 nicht in Anspruch genommene Urlaubstage vom EAD ausbezahlt. Der Gesamtbetrag belief sich auf 317 095,69 EUR.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001893/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Ingeborg Gräßle (PPE)
(21 February 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Reimbursement in respect of leave not taken

1. How many days of holiday or leave not taken by retiring heads of delegation were reimbursed by the External Action Service in 2012? What was the total amount?

2. How many days of holiday or leave not taken by each ambassador were reimbursed? What amounts were paid in each case?

3. How many days of holiday or leave not taken by other retiring members of staff were reimbursed by the External Action Service in 2012? What was the total amount?

4. How many days of holiday or leave were reimbursed for each individual? What amounts were paid in each case?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(12 April 2013)

In 2012, EEAS staff who retired were originally officials from the Commission or the Council General Secretariat who had accumulated leave days. Reimbursements of days of leave not taken by officials when they retire were done in conformity with the Staff Regulations and the rights of the individuals. It is the EEAS policy to encourage staff to take their entitled leave in due course. Carry overs exceeding the authorised twelve days should be limited.

1 and 2.

In 2012, a total of 204 days of leave not taken by the retiring 4 heads of delegation were reimbursed by the EEAS for a total amount of EUR 139.704,13.

3 and 4.

In 2012, a total of 731 days of leave not taken by the other 38 retiring officials or contract agents were reimbursed by the EEAS for a total amount of EUR 317.095,69

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001894/13
a la Comisión
Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)
(21 de febrero de 2013)

Asunto: Responsabilidad de las empresas en relación con desastres nucleares

Amnistía Internacional ha lanzado una campaña en la que denuncia que tres conocidas empresas (General Electric, Hitachi y Toshiba) estuvieron estrechamente vinculadas con el diseño, la construcción y la revisión de los reactores nucleares de Fukushima, que tuvieron múltiples fallos y en los que se produjeron tres fusiones totales hace casi dos años.

A pesar de haber proporcionado muchos componentes fundamentales para la central nuclear, estas empresas se han desentendido del desastre ocurrido por los fallos de los reactores y no han asumido responsabilidad alguna ni se han hecho cargo de ningún coste, que se estima ascienden a 250 000 millones de dólares estadounidenses. Esta situación es injusta y debe rectificarse. Para la mayoría de las 160 000 personas que fueron evacuadas de sus hogares en las cercanías de Fukushima, nunca será del todo seguro regresar.

General Electric, Hitachi y Toshiba, empresas de suministros nucleares, han dejado que la carga de este desastre nuclear recaiga sobre los hombros del pueblo japonés, en especial de las víctimas de Fukushima. Mientras que ellas no han abonado ni un solo dólar, la población nipona ha desembolsado ya 43 700 millones de dólares de su erario público.

La industria nuclear se beneficia de la creación de riesgos nucleares, pero es la población la que paga por ello. En parte, esto se debe a una legislación deficiente en materia de responsabilidad, que exime a las empresas de suministros nucleares de pagar por los desastres nucleares.

— ¿Conoce la Comisión el nivel de implicación de estas empresas en las centrales nucleares de la UE?

— ¿Ha considerado la Comisión los gastos de los que tendrían que hacerse cargo estas empresas si ocurriera un desastre nuclear en la EU?

— ¿Se calculan estos gastos al realizar las pruebas de tensión que lleva a cabo la Comisión?

— En caso de que se produzca una avería en los reactores, u otro tipo de problema, ¿propondrá la Comisión normas claras sobre la responsabilidad económica y social de las empresas privadas involucradas en centrales nucleares?

Respuesta del Sr. Oettingeron en nombre de la Comisión
(9 de abril de 2013)

1.De conformidad con el artículo 41 del Tratado Euratom, los proyectos de inversión relativos a instalaciones nuevas así como a las sustituciones o transformaciones deben comunicarse a la Comisión. Esta notificación también contiene información sobre los aspectos técnicos de los proyectos de que se trate. Sobre la base del procedimiento de notificación del artículo 41, la Comisión ha sido informada de que GE-Hitachi está ofreciendo un ABWR de tercera generación ([1]) llave en mano a la central nuclear de Visaginas en Lituania ([2]).

2 y 4.Sobre responsabilidad nuclear de terceros, coexisten varias situaciones jurídicas en la EU. La mayoría de los Estados miembros de la UE se han adherido al Convenio de París o al de Viena sobre responsabilidad civil en materia de energía nuclear. Estos convenios reconocen la responsabilidad del operador por los daños causados por accidentes nucleares hasta los importes previstos en el Derecho nacional ([3]). Otros Estados miembros no reconocen ninguno de estos regímenes, sino que basan su posición sobre la responsabilidad de dichos daños y perjuicios en su propia legislación y principios generales de responsabilidad civil.

Actualmente, la Comisión está examinando la cuestión de la responsabilidad nuclear de terceros y analizando en una evaluación de impacto la forma de mejorar la situación en este ámbito.

([1]) Reactor avanzado de agua hirviendo (ABWR: Advanced Boiling Water Reactor).
([2]) Se observa que, con arreglo a la información disponible, los reactores suministrados por Hitachi y Toshiba para la central nuclear de Fukushima eran reactores de segunda generación.
([3]) Los convenios establecen los importes mínimos de tal responsabilidad. Cabe señalar que los convenios no reconocen la responsabilidad del proveedor.

3.No. Las pruebas de tensión se dirigieron a evaluar la resistencia de las centrales nucleares ante las consecuencias de diversos tipos de sucesos imprevistos, incluidos los fenómenos naturales extremos ([4]). Así pues, el ámbito técnico de las pruebas de tensión no incluyó la evaluación de los costes.

([4]) Terremotos, inundaciones, condiciones meteorológicas extremas.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001894/13
to the Commission
Raül Romeva i Rueda (Verts/ALE)
(21 February 2013)

Subject: Companies' responsibility for nuclear disasters

Amnesty International has started a campaign in which it denounces the fact that three famous companies (General Electric, Hitachi and Toshiba) were closely involved in the design, construction and servicing of the Fukushima nuclear reactors, in Japan, which experienced multiple failures and three full meltdowns almost two years ago.

Despite providing many key components to the nuclear power plant, these companies have walked away from the disaster brought on by the failure of their reactors without assuming any responsibility, including without paying any of the costs, which are estimated at USD 250 billion. This situation is unjust and must be redressed. For most of the 160 000 people who were evacuated from their homes near Fukushima, it will never be completely safe to return.

General Electric, Hitachi and Toshiba, the nuclear supplier companies, have left it to the people of Japan, especially the victims of Fukushima, to bear the burden of this nuclear disaster. While these companies have not paid a single dollar, the Japanese people have already paid USD 43.7 billion out of the public purse.

The nuclear industry profits from creating a nuclear risk, but it is the people that pay the price for it. This is partly because of flawed liability laws which exempt nuclear supplier companies from paying for nuclear disasters.

— Does the Commission know the level of involvement of these companies in EU nuclear power plants?

— Has the Commission considered what costs these companies should be required to bear in the event of a nuclear disaster in the EU?

— Are these costs estimated as part of the stress tests carried out by the Commission?

— Will the Commission propose clear rules on the economic and social responsibilities of private companies involved in nuclear power plants in the event of reactor failure or other problems?

Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission
(9 April 2013)

1. Under Article 41 of the Euratom Treaty, investment projects relating to new installations and also to replacements or conversions have to be communicated to the Commission. This notification also involves information on technical aspects of the projects concerned. Based on Article 41 notification procedure, the Commission has been informed that GE-Hitachi is offering a turnkey Generation-III ABWR ([1]) reactor for the Visaginas nuclear power plant project in Lithuania ([2]).

2 and 4. Regarding nuclear third party liability, several legal situations co-exist in the EU. The majority of EU Member States adhere either to the Paris or the Vienna Conventions on nuclear liability. These Conventions recognise liability of the operator for damages caused by nuclear accidents up to the amounts provided for under national law ([3]). Other Member States do not recognise either of these regimes, but base their position regarding liability for such damages on their own legislation and general liability principles.

The Commission is currently looking into the area of nuclear third party liability and analysing in an impact assessment how the situation in this area can be improved.

3. No. Stress tests aimed at assessing how nuclear power plants can withstand the consequences of various unexpected events, including extreme natural events ([4]). Thus, the technical scope of stress tests did not include the assessment of the costs.

([1]) Advanced Boiling Water Reactor.
([2]) It is noted that, according to available information, the reactors supplied by Hitachi and Toshiba for the Fukushima nuclear power plant were Generation II type of reactors.
([3]) The Conventions lay down minimum amounts of such liability. It is noted that the Conventions do not recognise liability of the supplier.
([4]) Earthquake, flooding, extreme weather conditions.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-001895/13
an die Kommission
Reinhard Bütikofer (Verts/ALE)
(21. Februar 2013)

Betrifft: Die Europäische Bank für Wiederaufbau und Entwicklung

Am 17. Oktober 2012 wurde die Bergbau-Strategie der Europäischen Bank für Wiederaufbau und Entwicklung (EBWE) genehmigt. Der Entwurf dieser neuen Strategie der Bank war zu dem Zeitpunkt, als der EBWE-Vorstand seine Zustimmung gab, nicht veröffentlicht, und in dem Bericht über die Anmerkungen, die von der Öffentlichkeit eingeholt wurden, werden viele der vorgebrachten und im Rahmen der Konsultationen erörterten Argumente nicht richtig dargestellt, das heißt, es wird gegen Artikel 6 Absätze 4 und 8 des Übereinkommens von Aarhus verstoßen. Damit schneidet die EBWE im Vergleich zur Praxis der Europäischen Investitionsbank, einer weiteren EU-Bank, schlecht ab.

Gemäß Artikel 15, 175, 208 und 209 des Vertrags über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union (AEUV) ist für Transparenz und Kohärenz zu sorgen, wenn die Union Maßnahmen trifft, die über die EBWE abgewickelt werden. Vor diesem Hintergrund wird die Kommission um die Beantwortung der folgenden Fragen ersucht:

1. Hat die Kommission Anmerkungen zum Entwurf der neuen Bergbaustrategie der EBWE eingereicht? Wenn das der Fall ist: Um welche Sachverhalte ging es in diesen Anmerkungen im Wesentlichen? Hat die Kommission verlangt, dass die neue Bergbaustrategie mit den einschlägigen Bestimmungen des Übereinkommens von Aarhus im Einklang stehen und diese, nicht zuletzt in Bezug auf Konsultationen, umsetzen muss?

2. Wie bewertet die Kommission die EBWE im Hinblick auf die Berücksichtigung von Anmerkungen der Öffentlichkeit zu Fragen des Artenschutzes, des Klimaschutzes und der Ressourceneffizienz?

3. Die Kommission sollte die Grundsätze Transparenz und verantwortungsvolle Verwaltung bei Tätigkeiten der EBWE fördern und für die Einhaltung ihrer Verpflichtungen nach Artikel 15 AEUV und Artikel 6 des Übereinkommens von Aarhus sorgen. Beabsichtigt die Kommission angesichts dessen, dazu überzugehen, ihren Standpunkt zu Vorhaben und Strategien der EBWE künftig zu veröffentlichen, bevor der Vorstand der EBWE seine Zustimmung zu dem betreffenden Sachverhalt gegeben hat? Warum legt die EU nicht offen, wie sich ihr Vertreter bei der Abstimmung des Vorstands der EBWE verhalten hat, wie das bei vergleichbaren institutionellen Regelungen in den Vereinigten Staaten der Fall ist?

Antwort von Herrn Rehn im Namen der Kommission
(6. Mai 2013)

Bereits im Vorfeld der Beratungen des EBWE-Direktoriums über die Bergbaustrategie hat der EU-Vertreter informelle Konsultationen mit der Kommission geführt, um sicherzustellen, dass die einschlägigen EU-Richtlinien, -Maßnahmen und -Standards gebührende Beachtung erfahren. Nach Mitteilung der EBWE erfolgten die Vorarbeiten zur Bergbaustrategie in voller Übereinstimmung mit der Politik der Bank zur Information der Öffentlichkeit; danach werden Strategieentwürfe veröffentlicht und die Öffentlichkeit zur Stellungnahme aufgefordert, bevor im Direktorium darüber beraten wird. Auch die Grundprinzipen des Übereinkommens von Aarhus seien eingehalten und die Bergbaustrategie nach der Genehmigung durch das Direktorium auf die EBWE-Website zusammen mit einem Bericht über die öffentliche Konsultation gestellt worden, der darüber Aufschluss gibt, wie die Bemerkungen der Beteiligten berücksichtigt wurden.

Die Umwelt- und Sozialpolitik der EBWE ist auf die Förderung der EU-Umweltstandards ausgerichtet und erfasst alle Politikbereiche der EBWE. Außerdem zählt die EBWE zu den Unterzeichnern der Europäischen Umweltschutzprinzipien. Damit dürfte sichergestellt sein, dass die EU-Standards in Bezug auf Artenvielfalt, Klimawandel und Ressourceneffizienz bei allen EBWE-Vorhaben in vollem Umfang berücksichtigt werden. Die Kommission erwartet, dass die EBWE diese Verpflichtungen einhält.

Da die EBWE kein EU-Organ ist, gibt es kein förmliches Konsultationsverfahren mit der Kommission. Die Kommission berät den EU-Vertreter bei der EBWE informell dazu, welche Position bei den Beratungen im Direktorium einzunehmen ist. Er vertritt jedoch nicht nur die Kommission, sondern muss auch den Standpunkten der Mitgliedstaaten Rechnung tragen, die ebenfalls Mitglieder der EBWE sind. Die Beratungen sind aus Sicht der EBWE vertraulich und werden in Einklang mit ihrer Politik zur Information der Öffentlichkeit nicht allgemein zugänglich gemacht. Nach Kenntnis der Kommission besteht zurzeit keine Absicht, Unterlagen zu veröffentlichen, die sich auf die Beratungen des EBWE-Direktoriums beziehen oder Aufschluss geben über das Abstimmungsverhalten des EU-Vertreters.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001895/13
to the Commission
Reinhard Bütikofer (Verts/ALE)
(21 February 2013)

Subject: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

The Mining Operations Policy of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) was approved on 17 October 2012. The new draft policy for the bank had not been published when the EBRD Board gave its approval, and the report on the public comments solicited fails to reflect in a correct manner many of the points made and discussed at the consultation meetings, in contravention of Articles 6.4 and 6.8 of the Aarhus Convention. This compares poorly with the practice of the European Investment Bank, another EU bank.

With reference to Articles 15, 175, 208 and 209 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), with regard to the requirement for transparency and the need to ensure consistency of the Union's actions when it works through the EBRD, the Commission is asked the following:

1. Has it submitted comments on the EBRD's draft mining strategy, and, if so, what are the main issues it has raised? Has it requested that the new mining policy should be in compliance with and implement the relevant provisions of the Aarhus Convention, not least with regard to consultation?

2. How does the Commission evaluate the EBRD's consideration of public comments regarding the protection of biodiversity, climate change and resource efficiency?

3. Does the Commission plan to start publishing its positions on the EBRD's project and policies before the EBRD Board has given its approval on the matter, in order to promote the principles of transparency and good governance in EBRD operations and ensure that the Commission meets its obligations under Article 15 of the TFEU and Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention? Why does the EU not disclose how its representative on the EBRD Board voted, as is the case with the corresponding institutional arrangements in the United States?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission
(6 May 2013)

Prior its consideration by the EBRD Board, the EU Director provided input to the Mining Operations Policy (MOP), having informally consulted the Commission, seeking to ensure due reference to relevant EU Directives, policies and standards. The EBRD informs the Commission that the MOP preparatory process was in full compliance with the Bank's Public Information Policy (PIP), which foresees the publication of draft policies and an invitation to the public to comment prior to Board consideration. The EBRD states that it followed the principles of the Aarhus Convention, publishing the MOP on its website following Board approval along with a Public Consultation report to show how stakeholder comments were taken into account.

The EBRD Environmental & Social Policy states that it is committed to promoting EU environmental standards and the policy is applicable to all EBRD sector policies. The EBRD is also a signatory to the European Principles of the Environment. This policy framework should ensure that EU standards for biodiversity, climate change and resource efficiency are fully reflected in all EBRD projects. The Commission expects the EBRD to respect these commitments.

The EBRD is not a European institution and there is no formal consultation procedure with the Commission. The Commission informally provides the EU Board Director with advice on the position to take in Board deliberations. The Director must represent both the Commission and the views of EU Member States (as individual shareholders). The EBRD considers the discussions confidential, not for disclosure and in line with their PIP. The Commission understands that the EBRD has no plans to publish documents related to EBRD Board deliberations or to disclose the votes of the EU Director.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-001896/13
an die Kommission
Reinhard Bütikofer (Verts/ALE)
(21. Februar 2013)

Betrifft: Europäische Bank für Wiederaufbau und Entwicklung

Die Europäische Bank für Wiederaufbau und Entwicklung (EBWE) prüft derzeit die Finanzierung des Kupfer- und Goldminenprojekts Oyu Tolgoi in der südlichen Mongolei. Internationale NRO und Sachverständige haben die Abschätzung der ökologischen und sozialen Folgen dieses Projekts überprüft und festgestellt, dass diese Folgenabschätzung äußerst mangelhaft und nicht brauchbar ist. Sie entspricht aus folgenden Gründen nicht komplett den grundlegenden Qualitätsanforderungen der EBWE im Hinblick auf die Umwelt- und Sozialpolitik: Sie ist unvollständig und wurde im Nachhinein erstellt, enthält keine aussagekräftige Risikobewertung, lässt die Auswirkungen auf Gesundheit, allgemeine Sicherheit und Existenzsicherheit der betroffenen Bevölkerungsgruppen unberücksichtigt, es wird nicht aufgezeigt, wie die knappen Wasserressourcen und die Biodiversität der südlichen Gobi-Wüste geschützt werden, und es fehlt eine kritische Abschätzung kumulativer Folgen sowie der Folgen von Einrichtungen, die mit der Mine in Verbindung stehen (z. B. Infrastruktur, der internationale Flughafen und das geplante Kohlekraftwerk).

In seiner Entschließung vom 13. September 2011 fordert das Parlament die EIB und die Kommission auf, vor der Entscheidung über die Förderung der mineralgewinnenden Industrie in Entwicklungsländern ([1]) stärker zu überprüfen, ob Projekte zur Armutsbeseitigung, zu einer nachhaltigen Entwicklung und einem Wachstum beitragen, das allen zugute kommt. Ferner fordert es eine Aussetzung der öffentlichen EU-Finanzhilfen für Bergbauvorhaben, bis Rechtsvorschriften über die Bekämpfung von Steuerhinterziehung bzw. über die Förderung der Transparenz, der gebührenden Sorgfalt und der Achtung von Sozial- und Umweltschutznormen angenommen worden sind.

In Anbetracht dessen ergeben sich folgende Fragen an die Kommission:

1. Hat die Kommission angesichts dieses Sachverhalts bereits einen Standpunkt zum Projekt Oyu Tolgoi für den Vertreter der EU im Direktorium der Bank entwickelt? Welche Kommissionsdienststellen werden — angesichts der Komplexität des Projekts und seiner erheblichen Auswirkungen auf Umwelt, Klima, soziale Belange und Entwicklung — an der Ausarbeitung der Stellungnahme des Vertreters der EU im Direktorium beteiligt sein, so dass die Übereinstimmung mit den politischen Zielen der EU gewährleistet ist?

2. Hält sie die vom Management der EBWE erteilten Informationen für ausreichend (und ausreichend zutreffend), so dass eine Beurteilung, ob das Projekt den politischen Zielen der EU entspricht, möglich ist?

Antwort von Herrn Piebalgs im Namen der Kommission
(6. Mai 2013)

Das EU-Konzept für die Mongolei konzentriert sich auf: 1) Ausweitung der bilateralen Beziehungen und Ausbau des politischen Dialogs, 2) Unterstützung und Förderung von Demokratie, Rechtsstaatlichkeit und nachhaltiger Entwicklung, 3) Intensivierung des Handels und der wirtschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit, um die Chancen für EU-Unternehmen zu verbessern und die Anwendung von EU-Normen und -Standards zu fördern.

Kürzlich (26. Februar 2013) erklärte die mongolische Regierung, sie habe eine dem börsennotierten kanadischen Unternehmen Entrée Gold für ein Kupfer-Goldminen-Projekt erteilte Bergbaukonzession annulliert. Dieser Schritt hat Besorgnis unter den internationalen Investoren ausgelöst.

Die Europäische Bank für Wiederaufbau und Entwicklung (EBWE) ist kein EU-Organ, doch ihre strategischen Leitlinien passen gut zum allgemeinen Konzept der EU. EU-Vorschriften und -Grundsätze sind häufig maßgebend für die Interventionen der EBWE und viele Strategien nehmen unmittelbar Bezug auf den politischen Rahmen der EU und den EU-Besitzstand. Die EBWE setzt sich dafür ein, dass Projekte in Drittländern den Anforderungen der EU genügen oder sich diesen annähern, doch ist dies nicht immer von Anfang an der Fall, wofür in erster Linie Finanzierungsengpässe und die von der EBWE festgestellte, häufig noch erhebliche „Übergangslücke“ ausschlaggebend sind.

Die Finanzierung des Oyu-Tolgoi-Bergbauprojekts wurde vom Direktorium der EBWE am 26. Februar 2013 gebilligt. Der Vertreter der EU im Direktorium stützte sich bei der Formulierung seiner Stellungnahme auf die Ansichten aller relevanten Dienststellen der Kommission zu diesem Projekt. Der Vertreter der EU im Direktorium vertritt jedoch nicht nur die Kommission, sondern auch die Meinungen der einzelnen EU-Mitgliedstaaten, bei denen es sich um gesonderte Anteilseigner handelt.

([1]) Angenommene Texte P7_TA(2011)0364.

Die von der EBWE erteilten Informationen zu ihren Investitionsvorhaben sind im Allgemeinen qualitativ gut und ermöglichen eine umfassende Bewertung ihrer Übereinstimmung mit den politischen Zielen der EU.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001896/13
to the Commission
Reinhard Bütikofer (Verts/ALE)
(21 February 2013)

Subject: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) is currently considering financing the Oyu Tolgoi copper/gold mine project in southern Mongolia. International NGOs and experts have reviewed the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) for the Oyu Tolgoi project, and have determined that it is a non-starter and deeply flawed. The ESIA does not comply fully with the fundamental provisions of the EBRD's performance requirements with regard to environmental and social policies for the following reasons: it is incomplete and retroactive, it lacks a robust risk assessment, it ignores the health, safety and livelihood security of the affected communities, it fails to establish the protection of the scant water resources and biodiversity of the South Gobi Desert, and it omits critical assessments of cumulative impacts and of the impacts of associated facilities such as infrastructure, the international airport and the planned coal-powered plant.

Parliament's resolution of 13 September 2011 on an effective raw materials strategy for Europe ([1]) calls on the EIB and the Commission to consider more rigorously whether projects contribute to poverty eradication, sustainable development and inclusive growth before deciding on supporting the extractive industries sector in developing countries. It also calls for a moratorium on EU public financing of mining projects until regulations are adopted against tax evasion and in favour of transparency, due diligence and respect for social and environmental standards.

In light of this, the Commission is asked the following:

1. Has it already prepared a position for the EU Director at the Bank regarding the Oyu Tolgoi project? Given the complexity of the project, and given its significant environmental, climatological, social and developmental impact, what Commission services will be involved in preparaing the EU Director's opinion to ensure consistency with EU policy objectives?

2. Does it consider that the information provided by the EBRD Management is sufficient, and sufficiently accurate, to make an assessment of the project's compliance with EU policy objectives?

Answer given by Mr Piebalgs on behalf of the Commission
(6 May 2013)

The EU approach towards Mongolia focuses on: 1) broadening the scope of bilateral relations and enhancing political dialogue; 2) assisting and supporting democracy, the rule of law and sustainable development; 3) increasing trade and economic cooperation to improve opportunities for EU business and to promote EU norms and standards.

Recently (26 February 2013), the Mongolian Government announced that it had annulled a mining licence held by a Canadian-listed company, Entrée Gold, for a copper-gold mine project. This step has raised concerns among international investors.

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) is not an EU institution, but its strategic orientations fit well with the EU's general approach. EU rules and principles often set the standard for EBRD interventions, and many policies make direct reference to the EU policy framework and *acquis*. In non-EU countries, the EBRD endeavours to get their projects to meet or approximate to EU requirements, but not all do so from the outset, mainly due to affordability constraints and the often significant transition gap identified by the EBRD.

Financing for the Oyu Tolgoi mining project was approved by the EBRD Board of Directors on 26 February 2013. The EU Board Director drew on the views of all relevant Commission services in formulating his position on this project. However, the EU Board Director does not only represent the Commission, but also has to take into account the views of individual EU Member States, which are separate shareholders.

Information provided by the EBRD on its investment projects is generally of good quality and allows for a broad assessment of their compliance with EU policy objectives.

([1]) Text adopted P7_TA(2011)0364.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001897/13
alla Commissione
Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)
(21 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: Attacchi informatici cinesi

Il *New York Times* rivela in un articolo che l'Esercito popolare di liberazione cinese sta attaccando dal 2006, tramite un'apposita unità di hacker denominata «Unità 61398», i siti e le basi di dati delle istituzioni, degli organismi di sicurezza e delle imprese americane e canadesi con interessi in Oriente. Gli hacker cinesi rimangono all'interno delle reti informatiche protette per 10-12 mesi, cercando di ottenere le password per accedere ai dati più sensibili. Questi dati vengono poi utilizzati dal governo e dalle imprese cinesi per portare avanti una campagna di spionaggio industriale, favorendo la contraffazione.

Può la Commissione dire se:

1. è a conoscenza dell'esistenza dell'Unità 61398;

2. ha avuto notizia di attacchi subiti da aziende o Istituzioni dei paesi membri;

3. sarebbe in grado di respingere un attacco di questo tipo ai siti e alle basi di dati delle Istituzioni europee;

4. ritiene, nel caso fosse verificata l'esistenza e l'attività dell'Unità 61398, di agire tramite l'Alto Rappresentante per gli Affari esteri?

Risposta dell'Alta Rappresentante/Vicepresidente Catherine Ashton a nome della Commissione
(6 maggio 2013)

L'articolo del New York Times sull'unità di hacker cinesi che attaccano i siti web e le banche dati delle istituzioni degli USA è uno di tanti articoli analoghi pubblicati dai media statunitensi. La Commissione e l'AR/VP sono a conoscenza del rapporto Mandiant e seguono gli sviluppi in questo settore.

La Commissione e l'AR/VP si interessano attivamente delle questioni riguardanti la sicurezza informatica e si consultanto regolarmente con gli Stati membri in merito all'impatto degli attacchi informatici. Le imprese e le istutioni degli Stati membri subiscono questo tipo di attacchi e a febbraio 2013 la Commissione e l'AR/VP hanno elaborato una strategia europea per la cibersicurezza per rafforzare la resistenza dell'UE di fronte a questo fenomeno.

Le istituzioni dell'UE sono protette da squadre competenti di esperti di sicurezza informatica per scongiurare attacchi contro i propri siti web e le banche dati. Tali squadre sono affiancate dalla squadra interistituzionale UE di pronto intervento informatico (CERT-UE), che funge anche da interfaccia tra le diverse istituzioni con le controparti degli Stati membri per rafforzare la collaborazione contro gli attacchi informatici. Da quando è stata creata nel 2011, la squadra CERT-UE opera sotto l'autorità di un comitato direttivo composto da alti rappresentanti delle principali istituzioni.

Nell'ambito del proprio mandato, l'AR/VP adotterà le misure necessarie riguardo alla sicurezza generale delle reti informatiche.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001897/13
to the Commission
Cristiana Muscardini (ECR)
(21 February 2013)

Subject: Chinese cyber attacks

According to a *New York Times* article, since 2006 the Chinese People's Liberation Army, through a special hacker unit known as 'Unit 61398', has been attacking the websites and databases of US and Canadian institutions, security bodies and corporations with interests in the East. The Chinese hackers stay inside the protected computer networks for 10 to 12 months, seeking to obtain passwords so as to access highly sensitive information. That information is then used by the Chinese Government and Chinese companies to carry out an industrial-espionage campaign, which facilitates counterfeiting.

Can the Commission say whether:

1. it is aware of the existence of Unit 61398;

2. it has been informed of any attacks on companies or institutions in the Member States;

3. it would be able to fend off an attack of this kind on the EU institutions' websites and databases;

4. it would take action via the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy if Unit 61398's existence and activity were confirmed?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(6 May 2013)

The New York Times article on a Chinese hacker unit attacking the websites and databases of United States (US) institutions is one among many similar articles in the US media. The Commission and the HR/VP are aware of the Mandiant report, and are following developments in this field.

The Commission and the HR/VP have been closely involved in cyber security issues and have been consulting on the impact of cyber attacks with the Member States. Cyber attacks on companies or institutions in the Member States occur, and the Commission and the HR/VP drew up a European Cybersecurity Strategy in February 2013 in order to strengthen the EU's resilience to cyber attacks.

The EU institutions are protected by competent Information Technology (IT) security teams to fend off cyber attacks on their websites and databases. These teams benefit from the expert services of the interinstitutional EU Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-EU). CERT-EU also serves as the interface between the different institutions and with the Member States' CERTs to reinforce collaboration against cyber attacks. CERT-EU operates, since its creation in 2011, under the authority of a Steering Board with senior representatives of the major institutions.

The HR/VP will take the necessary steps within her mandate in the field of global cyber security.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-001898/13
aan de Commissie
Laurence J. A. J. Stassen (NI)
(21 februari 2013)

Betreft: Freedom House: „Slecht gesteld met vrijheid van meningsuiting in Turkije"

In de recente studie „Freedom in the World 2013" van Freedom House ([1]) wordt wereldwijd de vrijheid van meningsuiting, van pers, e.d. onder de loep genomen ([2]). Turkije komt er bijzonder slecht vanaf: terwijl premier Erdoğan op dit vlak juist hervormingen had aangekondigd, is hier weinig van terecht gekomen. Volgens Freedom House zijn onder de huidige Turkse regering in korte tijd honderden kritische journalisten, academici en politieke opponenten gearresteerd: een treurig „record".

1. Is de Commissie bekend met de studie „Freedom in the World 2013" van Freedom House? Hoe beoordeelt de Commissie deze? Onderschrijft de Commissie de bevindingen daarin m.b.t. Turkije? Zo neen, waarom niet?

2. Hoe ervaart de Commissie de zoveelste bevestiging, in dit geval door Freedom House, dat het in Turkije nog altijd bijzonder slecht gesteld is met de vrijheid van meningsuiting, van pers e.d.?

3. Wat vindt de Commissie ervan dat de door premier Erdoğan aangekondigde hervormingen níet zijn doorgevoerd? Heeft dit gevolgen voor de toetredingsonderhandelingen tussen de EU en Turkije? Zo neen, waarop baseert de Commissie dan de impliciete verwachting dat de situatie in Turkije wat betreft de vrijheid van meningsuiting, van pers, e.d. zal verbeteren?

Antwoord van de heer Füle namens de Commissie
(17 april 2013)

De Commissie is op de hoogte van de door het geachte Parlementslid genoemde studie.

De Commissie is van mening dat Turkije in zijn wetgeving en praktijk de fundamentele rechten en vrijheden nog beter moet naleven, meer bepaald op het gebied van de vrijheid van meningsuiting, overeenkomstig het Verdrag tot bescherming van de rechten van de mens en de jurisprudentie van het Europees Hof voor de rechten van de mens. De Commissie heeft in haar voortgangsverslag van 2012 ook gewezen op de voornaamste tekortkomingen in Turkije met betrekking tot de eerbiediging van de fundamentele rechten ([3]).

Het Turkse parlement hechtte in juli 2012 zijn goedkeuring aan een derde pakket voor de hervorming van het rechtswezen en de regering heeft onlangs een vierde pakket goedgekeurd en bij het parlement ingediend. De Commissie verwacht een spoedige goedkeuring van het vierde pakket en de uitvoering van beide pakketten en zal het effect ervan te zijner tijd evalueren.

([1]) http://www.freedomhouse.org/
([2]) http://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article113791435/Die-Meinungsfreiheit-ist-weltweit-unter-Beschuss.html
([3]) http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/strategy-and-progress-report/index_en.htm

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001898/13
to the Commission
Laurence J.A.J. Stassen (NI)
(21 February 2013)

Subject: Freedom House: 'Turkey has a poor record with regard to freedom of expression'

The recent study, 'Freedom in the World 2013', by Freedom House ([1]) examines the situation worldwide with regard to freedom of expression, of the press, etc. ([2]). Turkey does particularly badly in the study: even though Prime Minister Erdoğan has announced reforms in this area, very little headway has been made. According to Freedom House, hundreds of dissident journalists, academics and political opponents were jailed under the current Turkish government — a dismal record.

1. Is the Commission familiar with the study, 'Freedom in the World 2013', by Freedom House? What is the Commission's view of this study? Does the Commission agree with its findings regarding Turkey? If not, why not?

2. What does the Commission think of yet another confirmation, in this case by Freedom House, that Turkey is still doing very badly with regard to freedom of expression, of the press, etc.?

3. What is the Commission's view of the fact that the reforms announced by Prime Minister Erdoğan have not been implemented? Will this affect the accession negotiations between the EU and Turkey? If not, what is the basis for the Commission's implicit expectation that the situation in Turkey with regard to freedom of expression, of the press, etc., will improve?

Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission
(17 April 2013)

The Commission is aware of the report the Honourable Member refers to.

The Commission is of the opinion that Turkey needs to further improve the observance of fundamental rights and freedoms in law and in practice, in particular in the area of freedom of expression, in line with the European Convention on Human Rights and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. It has also outlined the main deficiencies in Turkey regarding the respect for fundamental rights in its 2012 Progress Report ([3]).

The Turkish Parliament adopted a 3rd judicial reform package in July 2012 and the government has very recently adopted and submitted to Parliament a 4th judicial reform package. The Commission is looking forward to a swift adoption of the 4th package and to the implementation of both packages and will assess their impact in due time.

([1]) http://www.freedomhouse.org/
([2]) http://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article113791435/Die-Meinungsfreiheit-ist-weltweit-unter-Beschuss.html
([3]) http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/strategy-and-progress-report/index_en.htm

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-001899/13
aan de Commissie
Laurence J. A. J. Stassen (NI)
(21 februari 2013)

Betreft: Schaliegas goedkoper dan „groene energie"

Terwijl de EU met miljarden euro's aan subsidies haar kaarten heeft gezet op „groene energie" (zoals wind- en zonne-energie), hebben ondernemers in de VS technieken ontwikkeld om schaliegas en -olie uit tot voorheen ondoordringbare gesteenten te winnen. Dit blijkt veel goedkoper.

Door deze goedkopere energie heeft de VS enorme concurrentievoordelen. Tevens hebben de Amerikanen forse ambities om binnen tien jaar tot 400 fabrieken te bouwen die biobenzine en -diesel moeten gaan fabriceren uit maïs, suikerriet en landbouwafval.

1. Is de Commissie bekend met de schaliegasrevolutie in de VS? Hoe ervaart de Commissie deze?

2. Hoe beoordeelt de Commissie het dat de winning van schaliegas en -olie veel goedkoper blijkt te zijn dan „groene energie" (zoals wind- en zonne-energie)? Hoe beoordeelt de Commissie in dit licht de concurrentievoordelen voor de VS en de concurrentienadelen voor de EU?

3. Deelt de Commissie de mening dat Europa, in navolging van de VS en ter versterking van de Europese concurrentiepositie, haar zinnen beter kan zetten op de winning van schaliegas en -olie dan op „groene energie"?

Antwoord van de heer Oettinger namens de Commissie
(15 april 2013)

De Commissie is zich zeer bewust van de ingrijpende veranderingen op de Amerikaanse gasmarkt ten gevolge van de verhoogde productie van onconventioneel gas als schaliegas. Zij is er zich eveneens van bewust dat het toenemende verschil in energieprijzen tussen de EU en de VS dat daaraan is verbonden, tot een concurrentienadeel voor de EU kan leiden. In een op 7 september 2012 verschenen studie van de Commissie ([1]) is een inschatting van de gevolgen van de verhoogde productie van onconventioneel gas in de VS voor de energiemarkt.

De Commissie acht het noodzakelijk om de toekomstige exploitatie van inheemse onconventionele gasbronnen in de EU te bekijken. In dit verband dient echter te worden opgemerkt dat het economisch rendabele potentieel van onconventioneel gas in Europa vooralsnog onduidelijk is. Hoewel het vervangen van steenkoolgas door natuurlijk gas zou bijdragen tot een lagere CO_2-uitstoot, zou het niet voldoende zijn om de doelstellingen voor 2050 te halen. Bovendien zijn er reeds belangrijke vorderingen gemaakt bij het verminderen van de kosten voor hernieuwbare energie en wordt verwacht dat die kosten zullen blijven dalen.

([1]) http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/jrc/downloads/jrc_report_2012_09_unconventional_gas.pdf

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001899/13
to the Commission
Laurence J.A.J. Stassen (NI)
(21 February 2013)

Subject: Shale gas is cheaper than 'green energy'

While the EU has spent billions of euros on subsidising 'green energy' (such as wind and solar energy), entrepreneurs in the US have developed technologies to extract shale gas and oil from previously impenetrable rocks formations. This appears to be much cheaper.

This cheaper energy gives the USA enormous competitive advantages. Furthermore, the Americans have strong ambitions to build, within 10 years, up to 400 factories to produce biopetrol and biodiesel from corn, sugar cane and agricultural waste.

1. Is the Commission aware of the shale gas revolution in the US? What is the Commission's position on it?

2. What is the Commission's view of the fact that the extraction of shale gas and oil appears to be much cheaper than 'green energy' (such as wind and solar energy)? How does the Commission assess in this light the USA's competitive advantages and the EU's competitive disadvantages?

3. Does the Commission agree that Europe, following the USA's lead and in order to strengthen Europe's competitiveness, should set its sights on the extraction of shale gas and oil rather than on 'green energy'?

Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission
(15 April 2013)

The Commission is well aware of the significant changes on the US gas market due to the increased production of unconventional gas like shale gas and that the related increasing divergence of energy prices in the EU and the US can result in a competitive disadvantage for the EU. An assessment of energy market impacts of increased unconventional gas production in the US was included in a study published by the Commission on 7 September 2012 ([1]).

The Commission sees a need to address the future exploitation of indigenous unconventional sources of gas within the EU. However, in this context it should be noted that the economically recoverable potential of unconventional gas in Europe is currently unclear, and that while replacing coal by natural gas could contribute to less CO_2 emissions, it will not be sufficient to meet 2050 objectives, and that significant progress has already been achieved in reducing the costs of renewable energies, a process which is expected to continue.

([1]) http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/jrc/downloads/jrc_report_2012_09_unconventional_gas.pdf

(Wersja polska)

Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-001900/13
do Komisji
Filip Kaczmarek (PPE)
(21 lutego 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Wykonywanie kary śmierci w Indiach

Rząd indyjski twierdzi, że karę śmierci wykonuje się tylko w najrzadszych przypadkach.

W więzieniu pozostaje co najmniej 13 więźniów z wyrokiem śmierci, a od listopada 2012 r., jak podaje Amnesty International, w Indiach wykonano śmiertelne wyroki na większej ilości skazańców niż w ciągu ostatnich 10 lat. Od listopada 2012 indyjskie władze konsekwentnie nie udostępniają opinii publicznej przed wykonaniem wyroków informacji na temat odrzucania próśb o ułaskawienie. Nie informują także o planowanych datach egzekucji. W jednym przypadku rodzina otrzymała powiadomienie o zbliżającej się egzekucji już po jej wykonaniu.

W tym roku, czterem mężczyznom, skazanym w 1993 r. za podłożenie miny lądowej, grozi egzekucja. Terroryści początkowo zostali skazani na karę dożywotniego pozbawienia wolności, jednak w roku 2004 karę tę zmieniono na wyrok śmierci. Skazańcy złożyli prośbę o ułaskawienie do prezydenta Pranaba Mukherjee, jednak została ona odrzucona.

Zwracam się z zapytaniem:

— Czy Komisja Europejska rozważa interwencję i mediację z indyjskimi władzami w sprawie zmiany wyroku śmierci?

— Czy Komisja Europejska bada przypadki wykonywania kar śmierci w Indiach w obliczu wzrastającej jej liczby w ostatnim roku?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez Wysoką Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodniczącą Catherine Ashton w imieniu Komisji
(15 maja 2013 r.)

UE niedawno wyrażała ubolewanie z powodu wznowienia stosowania kary śmierci w Indiach po ośmioletnim moratorium poprzez wykonanie wyroków na Ajmalu Kasabie i Afzalu Guru.

Wysoka Przedstawiciel/Wiceprzewodnicząca wystosowała w dniu 11 lutego oświadczenie dotyczące sprawy Afzala Guru, w którym przypomniała, że UE co do zasady sprzeciwia się karze śmierci we wszelkich okolicznościach, i wezwała Indie do ponownego wprowadzenia moratorium na wykonywanie wyroków śmierci zgodnie z ogólnoświatową tendencją do zniesienia kary śmierci.

Prośby UE o ogłoszenie przynajmniej moratorium na wykonywanie wyroków śmierci są kierowane do władz Indii regularnie z wykorzystaniem wszystkich dostępnych kanałów dyplomatycznych, w tym za pośrednictwem regularnego dialogu UE-Indie na temat praw człowieka. Prośby te dotyczą nie tylko czterech więźniów wymienionych przez Szanownego Pana Posła, ale wszystkich skazanych oczekujących obecnie na wykonanie wyroku.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001900/13
to the Commission
Filip Kaczmarek (PPE)
(21 February 2013)

Subject: Death penalty in India

The Indian Government insists that it only carries out the death penalty in very rare cases.

However, at least 13 prisoners remain on death row and since November 2012, according to Amnesty International, India has executed more prisoners than in the past 10 years. Since November 2012 the Indian authorities have consistently failed to make available to the public information about rejections of clemency appeals. They also do not provide information about planned execution dates. In one case a family received notification of an impending execution after it had been carried out.

This year, four men convicted in 1993 of planting land mines, are facing execution. The terrorists concerned were initially sentenced to life imprisonment, but in 2004 the penalty was changed to a death sentence. The prisoners submitted a plea for clemency to President Pranab Mukherjee, but it was rejected.

In the light of the above:

— Is the Commission considering interceding with the Indian authorities with a view to having the death sentence commuted?

— Is the Commission investigating the cases in which the death penalty was carried out in India in view of the increasing number in the last year?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(15 May 2013)

The EU recently expressed its regrets at the resumption of capital punishment in India with the executions of Messrs Ajmal Kasab and Afzal Guru, after an eight-year moratorium.

The HR/VP issued a statement on Mr Guru's case on 11 February, reiterating EU's principled opposition to the death penalty under all circumstances and calling on India to re-establish a moratorium on executions, in line with the global trend towards the abolition of capital punishment.

The EU request to declare at least a moratorium on capital sentences is regularly conveyed to the Indian authorities, using all the available diplomatic channels, including the regular EU-India dialogue on Human Rights. Such a request concerns all the detainees currently in the death row, not only the four mentioned by the Honourable Member.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-001901/13
à Comissão
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(21 de fevereiro de 2013)

Assunto: Desperdício de produtos alimentares

Uma notícia veiculada no *Euractiv.com* dá conta do desperdício de produtos alimentares na União Europeia em consequência dos elevados padrões estabelecidos. De acordo com o chefe do Programa Ambiental da ONU (UNEP), não existem argumentos económicos, ambientais ou éticos que justifiquem um tal desperdício de bens alimentares. O Comissário Potočnik afirmou que os bens alimentares são um bom exemplo de que o uso eficiente de recursos é a chave para uma produção e um consumo sustentáveis, evitando, assim, o desperdício de bens alimentares ao longo da cadeia de produção e de consumo. Tristam Stuart, fundador da *Feeding the 5000*, afirma que as cadeias de supermercados continuam a rejeitar fruta e vegetais de acordo com critérios «cosméticos», como a forma e a cor. A organização supramencionada dá conta de um caso no Reino Unido em que o agricultor é forçado a desperdiçar 40 % da sua produção todas as semanas.

Pergunta-se à Comissão:

1. Que medidas existem atualmente para combater o desperdício de bens alimentares por motivos «cosméticos»?

2. Está a Comissão disposta a apresentar medidas alternativas e/ou complementares às existentes que visem reduzir o desperdício de bens alimentares na União Europeia, nomeadamente no que diz respeito à venda desses mesmos bens aos cidadãos enquanto consumidores finais?

3. A Comissão dispõe de dados estatísticos relativos ao desperdício de bens agrícolas por motivos de cor, forma e tamanho?

4. A Comissão dispõe de dados estatísticos relativos a situações semelhantes à do caso do agricultor britânico acima referido?

Resposta dada por Joe Borg em nome da Comissão
(8 de abril de 2013)

Em 2008, a Comissão revogou 26 das 36 normas específicas de comercialização de produtos hortícolas e frutas. Por conseguinte, para muitos produtos hortícolas e frutas já não é obrigatório fazer referência ao tamanho, forma e classificação. Para 10 categorias principais de fruta e produtos hortícolas ([1]), continuam a existir normas de comercialização da UE. Porém, os Estados-Membros podem autorizar às lojas a vender produtos que não cumpram as normas (por ex., são deformados ou de tamanho inferior) com a condição de que sejam rotulados por forma a distingui-los dos outros.

Os retalhistas criaram normas voluntárias (privadas). No contexto do trabalho da Comissão na prevenção de desperdício de bens alimentares, os agricultores e os retalhistas concordaram em colaborar na interligação entre as normas e a prevenção do desperdício de bens alimentares.

A Comissão atualmente não dispõe dados sobre os desperdícios dos bens agrícolas por motivos de cor, forma e tamanho, ou sobre os agricultores serem obrigados a desperdiçar a sua produção de acordo com critérios «cosméticos».

([1]) Maçãs, citrinos, quivis, alfaces, pêssegos e nectarinas, peras, morangos, pimentos doces, uvas de mesa e tomates.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001901/13
to the Commission
Nuno Teixeira (PPE)
(21 February 2013)

Subject: Food waste

According to a report on Euractiv.com, food goes to waste in the European Union as a result of high standards. According to the head of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), there are no economic, environmental or ethical justifications for such food waste. Commissioner Potočnik has claimed that food products are a good example of how the efficient use of resources is key to sustainable production and consumption, thereby avoiding food waste along the production and consumption chain. Tristram Stuart, the founder of the Feeding the 5000 organisation, claims that supermarket chains continue to reject fruit and vegetables on the basis of 'cosmetic' criteria, such as shape and colour. His organisation cites a case in the UK where a farmer is forced to discard 40% of his produce every week.

1. What measures are currently in place to combat food waste on 'cosmetic' grounds?

2. Is the Commission willing to present alternative and/or complementary measures to those already in place in order to reduce food waste in the European Union, particularly with regard to the sale of food to the public as end consumers?

3. Does the Commission have any figures on agricultural produce being wasted on the grounds of colour, shape and size?

4. Does the Commission have any figures on cases like that of the British farmer referred to above?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission
(8 April 2013)

In 2008, the Commission repealed 26 of the 36 specific marketing standards for fruit and vegetables. As a result, for many fruits and vegetables there is no longer compulsory reference to size, shape and classification. For 10 main categories of fruit and vegetables ([1]) EU marketing standards remain in place. However, Member States can allow shops to sell products that do not comply with the standards (e.g. because they are misshapen or undersized) on the condition that they are labelled to distinguish them from the others.

Retailers have set up voluntary (private) standards. In the context of the Commission's work on food waste prevention, farmers and retailers have agreed to work on the links between standards and food waste prevention.

The Commission has currently no data on agricultural produce being wasted on the grounds of colour, shape and size, or on farmers being forced to discard their produce on the basis of cosmetic criteria.

([1]) Apples, citrus fruit, kiwi fruit, lettuces, peaches and nectarines, pears, strawberries, sweet peppers, table grapes and tomatoes.

(Suomenkielinen versio)

Kirjallisesti vastattava kysymys E-001902/13
komissiolle
Mitro Repo (S&D)
(21. helmikuuta 2013)

Aihe: Nuohous, kilpailupolitiikka ja sisämarkkinat

Euroopan unionin kilpailupolitiikan tavoitteena on, ettei kilpailua vääristetä sisämarkkina-alueella. Kilpailupolitiikka pyrkii takaamaan sen, että samat säännöt koskisivat kaikkia sisämarkkina-alueella toimivia yrityksiä ja yrittäjiä.

Suomessa nuohousalalla on yhä käytössä enimmäkseen piirinuohousjärjestelmä. Nuohous ei siten ole vapautettu kilpailulle.

Saksa purki vuoden 2013 vaihteessa 1930-luvulta voimassa olleen alueellisen nuohousmonopolijärjestelmänsä. Nykyään myös ulkomaalaisten nuohoojien ammatinharjoittaminen on sallittu.

Vaikka nuohousalasta ei ole säädetty Euroopan unionin tasolla, se ei tarkoita, etteivätkö yhteiset kilpailulainsäädännön periaatteet pätisi kaikkialla sisämarkkina-alueella.

Nuohousalan vapauttaminen kilpailulle olisi luonnollinen osa EU:n sisämarkkinoiden tavoitetta tavaroiden ja palveluiden vapaasta liikkumisesta.

Komissio on jo ottanut nuohousasiaan kantaa aiemmin kirjallisissa kysymyksissä (P-0966/04 ([1])) sekä (P-1377/99 ([2])).

1. Onko komissio aikeissa ehdottaa yhdenmukaistavaa lainsäädäntöä nuohousalalle?

2. Onko komissio tietoinen Suomen nuohousalan tilanteesta ja sääntelystä, ja täyttääkö se komission mukaan EU:n kilpailupolitiikan vaatimukset?

Komission jäsenen Michel Barnierin komission puolesta antama vastaus
(15. huhtikuuta 2013)

Komissio ei suunnittele mitään aloitetta nuohouspalveluja koskevan lainsäädännön yhdenmukaistamisesta.

Komissio aikoo tarvittaessa edelleen varmistaa, että asiaan liittyvää EU:n lainsäädäntöä eli palveludirektiiviä (2006/123/EY) ja ammattipätevyyttä koskevaa direktiiviä (2005/36/EY) sovelletaan oikein. Komissio aikoo toimia näin erityisesti silloin, kun jäsenvaltiot sääntelevät palvelutoiminnan harjoittamista tavalla, joka vaarantaa sisämarkkinaperiaatteet.

Mitä tulee Suomeen, komissio ei ole saanut ilmoitusta mistään rajoituksista, joita Suomen viranomaisilla olisi käytössä palveludirektiivin nojalla – tämä koskee direktiivin niin 39 kuin 15 artiklaa. Komissio ei myöskään ole saanut Suomen nuohousjärjestelmää käsitteleviä valituksia.

([1]) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+P-2004-0966+0+DOC+XML+V0//FI
([2]) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+P-1999-1377+0+DOC+XML+V0//FI

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001902/13
to the Commission
Mitro Repo (S&D)
(21 February 2013)

Subject: Chimney sweeping, competition policy and the internal market

The European Union's competition policy has the aim of preventing distortion of competition within the internal market. Competition policy seeks to ensure that the same rules apply to all businesses and entrepreneurs operating within the internal market.

In Finland, a regional system is still largely in force in the chimney-sweeping industry; thus free competition does not exist in this sector.

At the beginning of 2013, Germany abolished its regional monopoly system for chimney sweeping, which had operated since the 1930s. Now chimney sweeps from other countries are also permitted to pursue their trade.

Although there is no European legislation on chimney sweeping, that does not mean that the common principles of competition legislation do not apply throughout the internal market.

Liberalising competition in chimney sweeping would be a natural step in pursuit of the EU's internal-market objective of allowing the free movement of goods and services.

The Commission has already adopted a position on chimney sweeping in response to previous Written Questions P-0966/04 ([1]) and P-1377/99 ([2]).

1. Will the Commission propose harmonising legislation on chimney sweeping?

2. Is the Commission aware of the situation in Finland with regard to the chimney-sweeping sector and its regulation, and does the Commission believe that it complies with the requirements of the EU's competition policy?

Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission
(15 April 2013)

The Commission is not planning any legislative initiative harmonising laws on chimney sweeping services.

Where necessary, the Commission will continue to ensure application of relevant EU legislation — the Services Directive (2006/123/EC) and the Professional Qualifications Directive (2005/36/EC). The Commission intends to do this in particular where Member States regulate exercise of service activities in a manner which undermines internal market principles.

As regards Finland, the Commission has not been notified of any restrictions by the Finnish authorities under the Services Directive, neither under Article 39 nor Article 15, nor has the Commission received any complaints in relation to the Finnish system for chimney sweeps.

([1]) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+P-2004-0966+0+DOC+XML+V0//FI.
([2]) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+P-1999-1377+0+DOC+XML+V0//FI.

(České znění)

Otázka k písemnému zodpovězení P-001903/13
Komisi
Hynek Fajmon (ECR)
(22. února 2013)

Předmět: Neférový postup regulátora ve věci fungování společnosti ČEZ, a.s., v Bulharsku

V posledních dnech jsme byli svědky pouličních protestů v Bulharsku, které byly vyvolány údajně neobvyklým zvyšováním cen elektřiny. Pod tlakem těchto demonstrací zahájil bulharský regulátor proti společnosti ČEZ, a.s., řízení o odejmutí licence pro výrobu a distribuci elektřiny. Následně podala bulharská vláda demisi. V této souvislosti si dovoluji položit Evropské komisi následující otázky:

1. Považuje Komise postup bulharského regulátora za legální z hlediska evropského práva?

2. Jak bude Komise v této věci postupovat?

Otázka k písemnému zodpovězení P-001906/13
Komisi
Pavel Poc (S&D)
(22. února 2013)

Předmět: Možné porušení evropského energetického rámce

Nedostačující dodržování ustanovení týkajících se vnitřního trhu s energií je velmi rozšířený problém, který Komise prošetřuje v mnoha členských státech, včetně Bulharské republiky. Úterní vystoupení bulharského premiéra Bojka Borisova, po němž následovalo rozhodnutí Státní komise pro energetiku a vodárenství (DKEVR) o zahájení řízení o odebrání licence proti energetické distribuční společnosti ČEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria, by mohlo být dalším příkladem očividného nedodržení evropského energetického rámce, což by mohlo vážně poškodit zahraniční investice v Bulharsku.

1. Jaká opatření Komise navrhuje, aby zabránila bulharským úřadům nezákonně odebrat energetické distribuční společnosti ČEZ uvedenou licenci?

2. Jak bude Komise postupovat, pokud Bulharsko tuto licence nezákonně odebere, vzhledem k tomu, že stále ještě probíhají řízení o porušení předpisů z důvodu nezahrnutí ustanovení, která se týkají liberalizace energetického rámce EU, do bulharského energetického rámce?

Odpověď Günthera Oettingera jménem Komise
(27. března 2013)

Právní předpisy EU v oblasti vnitřního trhu stanoví, že vnitrostátní regulační orgány musí mít nezbytné pravomoci, aby mohly efektivně prosazovat vnitrostátní regulaci a regulaci na úrovni EU v odvětvích energetiky. Tyto pravomoci můžou zahrnovat pravomoc odebírat licence a ukládat účinné a odrazující pokuty. Vnitrostátní regulační orgány tyto pravomoci musí vykonávat nezávisle na jakýchkoliv vnějších vlivech a zároveň musí dbát na dodržování zásady přiměřenosti a procesních práv dotčených podniků.

Dne 24. ledna 2013 rozhodla Komise, že zažaluje Bulharsko u Soudního dvora Evropské unie, protože Bulharsko plně neprovedlo do svého práva pravidla EU pro vnitřní trh s energiemi. Současně také Komise právě posuzuje, zda jsou již provedená ustanovení v souladu s *acquis*, což je běžný postup, který se provádí u všech členských států.

(English version)

Question for written answer P-001903/13
to the Commission
Hynek Fajmon (ECR)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: Irregular procedure used by the regulator against energy firm ČEZ in Bulgaria

In recent days a number of demonstrations have taken place in Bulgaria, apparently triggered by an exceptional hike in electricity prices. Under pressure as a result of these demonstrations, the Bulgarian energy regulator has launched a procedure to revoke the licence granted to ČEZ to generate and supply electricity. The Bulgarian Government then resigned. With this in mind:

1. In the Commission's view, is the procedure used by the Bulgarian regulator legal under European law?

2. What action does the Commission intend to take on this matter?

Question for written answer P-001906/13
to the Commission
Pavel Poc (S&D)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: Possible breach of the European energy framework

Insufficient compliance with internal energy market provisions is a widespread problem that is being investigated by the Commission in many Member States, including the Republic of Bulgaria. Tuesday's appearance of Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko Borisov, followed by a decision of the State Commission for Energy and Water Regulation (DKEVR) to launch a licence revocation procedure against the power distributor CEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria could be another example of a patent lack of compliance with the European energy framework, which could severely damage foreign investment in Bulgaria.

1. What measure does the Commission propose to take in order to prevent the Bulgarian administration from illegally revoking the licence of electricity distribution company CEZ?

2. How will the Commission proceed should Bulgaria illegally revoke this licence, bearing in mind the fact that there are still ongoing infringement procedures for non-incorporation of the provisions of the EU energy liberalisation framework into the Bulgarian energy framework?

Joint answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission
(27 March 2013)

The EU internal market legislation stipulates that national regulatory authorities must have the necessary powers to effectively enforce EU and national regulation in the energy sectors. Such powers may include the power to revoke licenses in addition to the power to impose effective and dissuasive fines. National regulatory authorities must exercise such powers independently from any external influence, respecting the principle of proportionality and the procedural rights of the companies concerned.

On 24 January 2013 the Commission decided to refer Bulgaria to the Court of Justice of the European Union for failing to fully transpose the EU internal energy market rules. In parallel, the Commission is currently in the process of examining whether the already transposed provisions comply with the *acquis* — a regular exercise which is carried out for all Member States.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-001904/13
an die Kommission
Sabine Lösing (GUE/NGL)
(22. Februar 2013)

Betrifft: Forschungsprogramm AEROCEPTOR — Drohnen

Unter dem Namen AEROCEPTOR co-finanziert die EU ein Forschungsprogramm zur Nutzung von Drohnen, um flüchtende Fahrzeuge zu stoppen. Erstmals geht es bei der polizeilichen Nutzung von Drohnen nicht mehr nur um Aufklärung. Die Drohnen sollen gegen „organisierte Kriminalität" eingesetzt werden, und vor allem Fahrzeuge, in denen irreguläre Migranten oder Drogen geschmuggelt würden, stoppen. Laut der Projektbeschreibung seien derartige Maßnahmen gegen „nicht kooperative Fahrzeuge" immer mehr erforderlich. Zu den Partnern von AEROCEPTOR gehören der israelische Hersteller Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) und die paramilitärische spanische Guardia Civil. Beide testen in einem anderen Projekt zusammen mit der deutschen Bundespolizei „Heron"-Drohnen von IAI für den Einsatz gegen irreguläre Migration. Mit welcher Technik die Fahrzeuge gemäß AEROCEPTOR gestoppt werden sollen, wird nicht erläutert.

1. Wie kam das Projekt AEROCEPTOR nach Kenntnis der Kommission zustande, und wer hat dessen Unterstützung bei der Europäischen Union beantragt?

2. Welche Flugroboter (bitte den Typ angeben) sollen nach Kenntnis der Kommission für etwaige Tests genutzt werden, und was wurde von den Projektbeteiligten hierzu weiter mitgeteilt?

3. Welche Aufgaben sollen die spanische Guardia Civil und die Firma Etienne Lacroix aus Frankreich bei AEROCEPTOR übernehmen?

4. Welche Technik wurde von den Projektbeteiligten skizziert, um gegebenenfalls Fahrzeuge irregulärer Migranten oder vermeintlicher Drogenschmuggler im Projekt AEROCEPTOR zu stoppen?

5. Auf welche Weise kämen hierfür auch Wirkmittel aus der Luft zum Einsatz (z. B. Rauch, Soundgranaten, Blendschockgranaten)?

6. Wie beurteilt es die Kommission, dass mit dem Projekt AEROCEPTOR erstmals die Ausstattung polizeilicher genutzter Drohnen mit Wirkmitteln finanziert bzw. beforscht wird?

7. Inwiefern ist der Kommission bekannt, ob der Einsatz von Wirkmitteln durch polizeilich genutzte Drohnen in EU-Mitgliedstaaten überhaupt rechtlich möglich ist, bzw. inwiefern spielen diese Überlegungen bei der Finanzierung von AEROCEPTOR eine Rolle?

Antwort von Herrn Tajani im Namen der Kommission
(12. April 2013)

Das Aeroceptor-Projekt wurde gemäß den Regeln für die Teilnahme am RP7 ([1]) ausgewählt.

Das Konsortium erzielte Einigung darüber, zwei wichtige Funktionen des RPAS ([2]) zu untersuchen: Senkrechtstart und -landung sowie Schwebeflug. Nur unbemannte Hubschrauber und neue Kipprotoren oder Quadrocopter verfügen über diese Fähigkeiten.

Folgende Technologien, mit denen ein Fahrzeug auf sichere Weise zum Halten gebracht werden soll, werden in Betracht gezogen:

— elektromagnetische Störungen zur Blockierung der Motorelektronik

— Netze, in denen sich Räder von Fahrzeugen oder Propeller von Booten verwickeln

— Spezial-Polymerschaumstoff, der allmählich verhärtet und das Fahrzeug zum Halten bringt

([1]) Einzelheiten zu dieser Aufforderung zur Einreichung von Vorschlägen: http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/portal/page/call_FP7?callIdentifier=FP7-SEC-2011-1&specificProgram=COOPERATION#wlp_call_FP7

([2]) Ferngesteuertes Luftfahrtsystem (remotely piloted air system).

— Vorrichtungen zum Durchstechen der Reifen

— Farbmarkierungen und Lautsprecher.

Die spanische Guardia Civil ist im Rahmen der Entwicklung von Betriebsszenarien sowie der Festlegung der Anforderungen an Interoperabilität und Standardisierung an dem Projekt beteiligt. Etienne Lacroix trägt zur Bestimmung einiger RPAS-Nutzlasten bei.

Der Einsatz von Wirkmitteln im RPAS ist nicht geplant. Mit dem Aeroceptor-Projekt soll gerade gezeigt werden, dass es effektivere Mittel gibt, um ein nicht kooperierendes Fahrzeug unter Kontrolle zu bringen.

Die ethische und rechtliche Dimension dieses Projekts wird gebührend berücksichtigt, beispielsweise durch:

— ein spezielles Arbeitspaket für die ethischen und gesellschaftlichen Aspekte der geplanten Forschung

— ein weiteres Arbeitspaket für eine vergleichende Studie über die rechtlichen Implikationen der Verwendung neuer Mittel zum Abfangen von Fahrzeugen

— Checklisten für die projektinterne Prüfung auf Aspekte der Ethik-, Sozial- und Humanwissenschaften, die bereits erstellt worden sind und anhand deren die technologiebezogenen Arbeiten an dem Projekt von Anfang an kontrolliert werden

— die Einbeziehung der Spanischen Datenschutzbehörde zur externen Beratung.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001904/13
to the Commission
Sabine Lösing (GUE/NGL)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: Aeroceptor research project — drones

The EU is co-funding a research project entitled 'Aeroceptor' on the use of drones to stop fleeing vehicles. This would be the first time that the police would be using drones for something other than surveillance. The drones are intended to be deployed to combat 'organised crime', and in particular to stop vehicles that are being used to smuggle irregular migrants or drugs. According to the project overview, such action against 'non-cooperative vehicles' is becoming increasingly necessary. The Aeroceptor partners include the Israeli manufacturer Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) and the paramilitary Spanish Guardia Civil. Both of them are also involved in a different project, along with the German federal police, in which they are testing 'Heron' drones manufactured by IAI for use against irregular migration. The overview does not say what techniques Aeroceptor will use to stop vehicles.

1. According to the Commission's information, how did the Aeroceptor project come about and who applied for European Union funding?

2. According to the Commission's information, what specific type of unmanned drones are to be used for possible tests? What information have the project participants provided to date?

3. What tasks are to be performed by the Spanish Guardia Civil and the French firm Etienne Lacroix in the Aeroceptor project?

4. What techniques have the Aeroceptor project participants outlined for stopping vehicles that are being used by irregular migrants or suspected drugs smugglers?

5. What use might be made of non-lethal aerial weapons in this connection (e.g. smoke, sound grenades, flash grenades)?

6. How does the Commission view the fact that the Aeroceptor project means that for the first time funding is being provided and research conducted into equipping police drones with non-lethal aerial weapons?

7. Does the Commission know whether it would in fact be legally possible for police drones to use non-lethal weapons in EU Member States and to what extent these considerations have played a role in funding for the Aeroceptor project?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission
(12 April 2013)

The Aeroceptor project was selected according to the FP7 rules for participation ([1]).

The consortium agreed to look at two important RPAS ([2]) features: Vertical Take-Off & Landing and Hover capabilities. Only unmanned helicopters and new tilt rotors or quadricopters comply with these requirements.

The following technologies are being considered, with a view to ensuring the safe stopping of a vehicle:

— electromagnetic interference to jam engine electronics

— tangle meshes and nets to stop vehicle wheels and boat propellers

— special foam polymers that harden gradually, stopping the vehicle

— tyre puncturing devices

— paint markers and loudspeakers.

([1]) For details of this call, see: http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/portal/page/call_FP7?callIdentifier=FP7-SEC-2011-1&specificProgram=COOPERATION#wlp_call_FP7

([2]) Remotely piloted air system.

The Spanish Guardia Civil collaborates to set up operational scenarios and requirements on interoperability/standardisation. Etienne Lacroix contributes to the definition of some RPAS payloads.

There is no use of non-lethal weapons planned onboard the RPAS. On the contrary, Aeroceptor intends to show that there are more effective means to control a non-cooperative vehicle than to use non-lethal weapons.

The ethical and legal dimensions will be duly taken into account in this project, for example, through:

— a specific work package devoted to the ethical and societal aspects of the planned research

— another one devoted to a comparative study on the legal implications of the use of new means for interception

— check-lists for project-internal ethical and social sciences and humanities audits, which have already been completed and will be used to check the technology-related work of the project on these aspects from its very beginning and

— the addition of the Spanish Agency for Data Protection as an external advisor.

(Slovenské znenie)

Otázka na písomné zodpovedanie P-001905/13
Rade
Anna Záborská (PPE)
(22. februára 2013)

Vec: Európske iniciatívy občanov – výnimočné predĺženie lehoty – vykonávanie vnútroštátnymi orgánmi

Komisia podala pomocnú ruku organizátorom prvých deviatich európskych iniciatív občanov tým, že predĺžila jednoročnú lehotu na vyzbieranie jedného milióna vyhlásení o podpore, s cieľom zabezpečiť tak, aby všetci organizátori mali k dispozícii úplných 12 mesiacov od okamihu uvedenia platformy Komisie do prevádzky, a to bez ohľadu na to, či platformu využívajú alebo nevyužívajú.

Nová lehota uplynie 1. novembra 2013.

Toto rozhodnutie sa vzťahuje na deväť európskych iniciatív občanov.

Komisia prijala toto rozhodnutie, aby zabezpečila plnú účasť občanov vo všetkých členských štátoch.

Organizátori dotknutých európskych iniciatív občanov sa však stretávajú s tým, že príslušné vnútroštátne orgány niektorých členských štátov odmietajú uznať novú lehotu, ktorá uplynie 1. novembra 2013.

1. Aké je stanovisko Rady k výnimočnému a dočasnému predĺženiu lehoty v súvislosti s prvými deviatimi európskymi iniciatívami občanov?

2. Mohla by Rada dosiahnuť dohodu podporujúcu rozhodnutie Komisie o predĺžení lehoty do 1. novembra 2013 a zabezpečiť, aby príslušné orgány vykonávali toto rozhodnutie na vnútroštátnej úrovni?

Odpoveď
(7. mája 2013)

Poskytovať informácie a poradenstvo v rámci nariadenia Európskeho parlamentu a Rady (EÚ) č. 211/2011 zo 16. februára 2011 o iniciatíve občanov ([1]) je úlohou Komisie.

Rada nezaujala stanovisko k prístupu Komisie.

([1]) Ú. v. EÚ L 65, 11.3.2011, s. 7.

(English version)

Question for written answer P-001905/13
to the Council
Anna Záborská (PPE)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: European citizens' initiatives — exceptional extension of deadline — implementation by national authorities

The Commission has thrown a new lifeline to organisers of the first nine European citizens' initiatives (ECIs) by extending the one-year deadline for collecting one million statements of support, so as to ensure that all organisers have a full 12 months from the moment the Commission's platform is operational, irrespective of whether they use the platform or not.

The new deadline is 1 November 2013.

Nine ECIs are affected by this decision.

The Commission has taken this decision with the aim of securing full participation by citizens in all Member States.

However, organisers of the affected ECIs are experiencing refusals by the national competent authorities of some Member States to recognise the new deadline of 1 November 2013.

1. What is the Council's position with regard to the exceptional and temporary extension of the deadline for the first nine ECIs?

2. Could the Council reach an 'agreement of support' for the Commission's decision to postpone the deadline until 1 November 2013, and ensure that it is implemented at a national level by the competent authorities?

Reply
(7 May 2013)

It is for the Commission to provide information and advice in the frame of Regulation (EU) No 211/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 on the citizens' initiative ([1]).

The Council has not taken a position on the approach of the Commission.

([1]) OJ L 65, 11.3.2011, p. 7.

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite P-001907/13
à la Commission
Françoise Grossetête (PPE)
(22 février 2013)

Objet: Allégations relatives aux probiotiques

L'Autorité européenne de sécurité des aliments (EFSA) n'a à ce jour retenu aucune allégation de santé sur les produits enrichis en probiotiques, notamment les yaourts.

L'utilisation de la mention «contient des probiotiques» sans faire état d'un quelconque effet positif sur la santé pourrait elle aussi être désormais proscrite par la Commission. Les producteurs d'aliments comprenant des probiotiques ne seraient alors plus autorisés à informer les consommateurs à travers l'étiquetage des denrées qu'ils achètent, ni à différencier ces aliments des produits similaires sans probiotiques.

Dès lors, quelle solution la Commission propose-t-elle pour permettre un étiquetage des aliments comprenant des probiotiques qui fournisse aux consommateurs une information claire et pertinente?

Réponse donnée par M. Borg au nom de la Commission
(14 mars 2013)

Il convient de faire une distinction entre l'étiquetage facultatif et l'étiquetage obligatoire des denrées alimentaires. Les allégations nutritionnelles et de santé sont des indications facultatives. Les colégislateurs ont décidé que ces allégations devaient être réglementées, afin de garantir qu'elles sont véridiques et n'induisent pas le consommateur en erreur. En application des règles correspondantes, aucune allégation de santé soumise pour les micro-organismes n'a encore été autorisée.

La directive 2000/13/CE ([1]) et le règlement (UE) n° 1169/2011 ([2]) appelé à la remplacer prévoient les mentions obligatoires qui devraient apparaître sur l'étiquette des denrées alimentaires. La liste des ingrédients est l'une de ces mentions. Il est, en outre, précisé que les ingrédients d'une denrée alimentaire, c'est-à-dire «toute substance, y compris les additifs, utilisée dans la fabrication ou la préparation d'une denrée alimentaire et encore présente dans le produit fini, éventuellement sous une forme modifiée», doivent être désignés, dans cette liste, par leur nom spécifique. En conséquence, tous les micro-organismes, y compris les probiotiques, utilisés dans la fabrication de denrées alimentaires devraient apparaître dans ladite liste.

([1]) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2000:109:0029:0042:FR:PDF
([2]) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:304:0018:0063:FR:PDF

(English version)

Question for written answer P-001907/13
to the Commission
Françoise Grossetête (PPE)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: Claims about probiotics

The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) has not yet approved a single claim that products containing probiotics, including yoghurts, benefit people's health.

The Commission may also decide to ban manufacturers from even including the words 'contains probiotics' on product labels. In that case manufacturers of foods containing probiotics would no longer be authorised to inform consumers on the label that their purchases contain probiotics or to distinguish such foods from similar products which do not contain probiotics.

How does the Commission suggest that probiotic food products be labelled to ensure that consumers are provided with clear and relevant information?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission
(14 March 2013)

A distinction should be made between voluntary and mandatory labelling of foods. Nutrition and health claims are voluntary statements. The co-legislators have decided that nutrition and health claims should be regulated in order to ensure that they are truthful and they do not mislead the consumer. In application of the relevant rules, no submitted health claims on microorganisms have yet been authorised.

Directive 2000/13/EC ([1]) and Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 ([2]) that will replace it, foresee the mandatory particulars that should appear on the label of foods. One of those particulars is the list of ingredients. It is further specified that the ingredients of a food, meaning 'any substance, including additives, used in the manufacture or preparation of a foodstuff and still present in the finished product, even if in altered form' shall be designated in that list by their specific name. Accordingly, any microorganisms used in the manufacture of foods should appear therein. This includes probiotics.

([1]) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2000:109:0029:0042:EN:PDF
([2]) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:304:0018:0063:EN:PDF

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta P-001908/13
alla Commissione
Sonia Alfano (ALDE)
(22 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: Grandi opere e procedure di smaltimento delle «terre e rocce da scavo»: richiesta di immediata valutazione del regolamento ministeriale italiano

Richiamando:

— le circostanziate osservazioni dell'Associazione Idra Onlus, inviate lo scorso 16 luglio al Commissario Potočnik;

— la corrispondenza successiva tra la Direzione generale e la stessa Associazione;

— le interrogazioni dalla sottoscritta depositate (P-007683/2012 e P-008357/2012);

— la lettera del Commissario Potočnik del 5.9.2012 (Rif. Ares (2012) 1032015);

— le contro-osservazioni inviate a fine ottobre 2012 dall'Associazione Idra, tramite le quali viene esposta una quantità preoccupante di punti che mettono in serio dubbio il rispetto della normativa europea da parte del decreto del ministero dell'Ambiente e della Tutela del territorio e del mare, 10 agosto 2012, n. 161 «Regolamento recante la disciplina dell'utilizzazione delle terre e rocce da scavo» (pubblicato nella G.U. n. 221 del 21.9.2012), peraltro già entrato in vigore,

può la Commissione rispondere in maniera puntuale ed esaustiva a quanto sollevato dall'Associazione Idra, proprio in virtù delle approfondite osservazioni inviate e del fatto che le stesse poggiano non su mere valutazioni personali — che comunque meriterebbero le dovute attenzioni — ma su giurisprudenza della Corte di cassazione italiana e della Corte di giustizia dell'UE?

La rilevanza per la salute dei cittadini, l'ambiente e i possibili profitti della criminalità organizzata e del malaffare del provvedimento oggetto della presunta violazione desta estrema preoccupazione da parte dell'interrogante, che sostiene le valide argomentazioni presentate dall'Associazione Idra e che richiedono un intervento da parte della Commissione.

Risposta di Janez Potočnik a nome della Commissione
(25 marzo 2013)

Come già spiegato nelle risposte della Commissione alle precedenti interrogazioni presentate dall'onorevole parlamentare (P-007683/2012 e P-008357/2012) la Commissione è giunta alla conclusione che il decreto italiano sull'uso delle terre e rocce da scavo sia conforme alla normativa dell'Unione europea in materia ambientale.

La Commissione ha risposto ai denunzianti (inclusa l'associazione Idra citata dall'onorevole parlamentare) a marzo 2013, confermando l'archiviazione del caso. In particolare, la Commissione ha sottolineato che soltanto a determinate condizioni il decreto italiano permette di considerare le terre e rocce da scavo un sottoprodotto e non un rifiuto. Queste condizioni (enumerate all'articolo 4 del decreto) sono le medesime condizioni indicate all'articolo 5 della direttiva 2008/98, per le quali un rifiuto può essere considerato un sottoprodotto.

Quanto al rischio che il decreto italiano sia impropriamente applicato, favorendo così la criminalità organizzata, i denunzianti non hanno fornito alcun elemento atto a dimostrare un caso concreto di applicazione scorretta.

(English version)

Question for written answer P-001908/13
to the Commission
Sonia Alfano (ALDE)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: Major work and disposal procedures for 'excavated earth and rocks': request for an immediate assessment of Italian ministerial regulations

With reference to:

— the detailed observations of the Idra Onlus Association sent to Commissioner Potočnik on 16 July 2012;

— the subsequent correspondence between the Directorate-General and the Association;

— Written Questions P-007683/2012 and P-008357/2012 tabled by myself;

— the letter of 5 September 2012 from Commissioner Potočnik (Ref. Ares (2012) 1032015);

— the counter-observations sent at the end of October 2012 by the Idra Association, drawing attention to a worrying number of points which cast serious doubt on whether the decree issued by the Minister for the Environment, Land and Sea on 10 August 2012, entitled 'Regolamento recante la disciplina dell'utilizzazione delle terre e rocce da scavo' [Regulation on rules on the use of excavated land and rocks], published in Italian Official Journal No 221 of 21 September 2012, which incidentally has already entered into force, complies with European law,

can the Commission give a detailed and exhaustive reply to the questions raised by the Idra Association, particularly in the light of the detailed observations sent and the fact that they are based not merely on personal judgments — albeit ones which would be deserving of the requisite attention — but on the case-law of the Italian Court of Cassation and the Court of Justice of the EU?

The relevance of the issue to public health and the environment and the possible profits accruing to organised crime from the measure which is suspected of being in breach of European law are cause for the utmost concern to the tabler of this question, who supports the valid arguments of the Idra Association and considers that they call for action by the Commission.

Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission
(25 March 2013)

As already explained in the Commission's replies to the previous questions tabled by the Honourable Member (P-007683/2012 and P-008357/2012) the Commission has reached the conclusion that the Italian Decree on the use of excavated soils is in line with EU environmental law.

The Commission replied to the complainants (including the association Idra mentioned by the Honourable Member) in March 2013 confirming closure of the file. The Commission has in particular pointed out that the Italian Decree allows excavated soils to be considered as a by-product, and not as waste, only if certain conditions are met. These conditions (listed in Article 4 of the Decree) are the same as the conditions under which Article 5 of Directive 2008/98 allows waste to be considered as a by-product.

As for the risk that the Italian Decree might be incorrectly applied thus favouring organised crime, the complainants have provided no evidence of such a concrete case of bad application.

(Ελληνική έκδοση)

Ερώτηση με αίτημα γραπτής απάντησης E-001910/13
προς την Επιτροπή
Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)
(22 Φεβρουαρίου 2013)

Θέμα: Παραβίαση της οδηγίας 2000/43/ΕΚ για την ίση μεταχείριση στην Ελλάδα

Με το Νόμο 1296/12-10-1982 δημιουργήθηκε στον Οργανισμό Γεωργικών Ασφαλίσεων (ΟΓΑ) «Ειδικός Λογαριασμός Συνταξιοδότησης Ανασφάλιστων Υπερηλίκων» από τον οποίο λαμβάνουν σύνταξη, ως προνοιακό επίδομα, οι ανασφάλιστοι υπερήλικες.

Μεταξύ των υπερηλίκων που λαμβάνουν αυτή την ελάχιστη σύνταξη είναι και χιλιάδες ηλικιωμένοι ελληνικής καταγωγής από την πρώην ΕΣΣΔ και την Αλβανία και αλλού, που εγκαταστάθηκαν στην Ελλάδα και έλαβαν την ελληνική υπηκοότητα. Η σύνταξη που ενδεχομένως δικαιούνταν ή λάμβαναν τα άτομα αυτά από τις χώρες προέλευσής τους (που με τα σημερινά δεδομένα κυμαίνεται γύρω στα 80 ευρώ) δεν θεωρείτο κώλυμα στην είσπραξη του ανωτέρω επιδόματος.

Όμως με τον πρόσφατο νόμο 4093/2012 «Μεσοπρόθεσμο πλαίσιο Δημοσιονομικής Στρατηγικής 2013-16», ορίστηκαν νέες προϋποθέσεις για την καταβολή της ελάχιστης αυτής σύνταξης. Μεταξύ των προϋποθέσεων είναι όχι μόνο να μην λαμβάνουν αλλά και να μην δικαιούνται σύνταξη από τις χώρες προέλευσής τους. Αποτέλεσμα είναι χιλιάδες έλληνες πολίτες να στερηθούν της ελάχιστης σύνταξης που λαμβάνουν οι υπόλοιποι έλληνες πολίτες, αφού δεν δίνεται καν η δυνατότητα να συμψηφιστεί η σύνταξη που ενδεχόμενος δικαιούνται από τη χώρα προέλευσης.

Με δεδομένο ότι:

Παραβιάζονται οι διατάξεις της Οδηγίας 2000/43/ΕΚ για εφαρμογή της αρχής της ίσης μεταχείρισης προσώπων ασχέτως φυλετικής ή εθνοτικής καταγωγής που περιλαμβάνει στο πεδίο εφαρμογής την κοινωνική προστασία, συμπεριλαμβανόμενης της κοινωνικής ασφάλισης και της υγειονομικής περίθαλψης και τις κοινωνικές παροχές, όταν στην πράξη έλληνες πολίτες που έχουν γεννηθεί ή εργάστηκαν σε τρίτη χώρα αποκλείονται από τις κοινωνικές αυτές παροχές, και παραβιάζεται επίσης ο Χάρτης Θεμελιωδών Δικαιωμάτων και συγκεκριμένα τα άρθρα 1 (Αξιοπρέπεια), 25 (Δικαιώματα των ηλικιωμένων), 34 (Κοινωνική Ασφάλεια και Κοινωνική Αρωγή).

Ερωτάται η Επιτροπή:

Ποια μέτρα θα λάβει για να αρθούν οι απαράδεκτες αυτές ρυθμίσεις οι οποίες στο όνομα δημοσιονομικών στόχων, οδηγούν στην απόλυτη ένδεια ηλικιωμένους πολίτες και παραβιάζουν βάναυσα ευρωπαϊκή νομοθεσία εισάγοντας απαράδεκτες διακρίσεις;

Απάντηση της κ. Reding εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής
(10 Απριλίου 2013)

Η οδηγία 2000/43/ΕΚ για τη φυλετική ισότητα απαγορεύει τις άμεσες και έμμεσες διακρίσεις λόγω φυλετικής ή εθνοτικής καταγωγής σε διάφορους τομείς.

Φαίνεται ότι μία εκ των νέων προϋποθέσεων που καθορίζονται από τον Ν. 4093/2012 για την καταβολή ελάχιστης σύνταξης είναι ότι οι δυνητικοί δικαιούχοι δεν θα πρέπει να δικαιούνται να απολαύουν συνταξιοδοτικών δικαιωμάτων από άλλο καθεστώς, είτε στην Ελλάδα είτε σε άλλη χώρα. Φαίνεται ότι η εν λόγω προϋπόθεση, η οποία αποκλείει τα οφέλη αυτά για όλα τα πρόσωπα που δικαιούνται οποιαδήποτε χαμηλή σύνταξη στην Ελλάδα ή σε οποιαδήποτε άλλη χώρα, δεν βασίζεται στη φυλετική ή εθνοτική καταγωγή των δυνητικών δικαιούχων και η Επιτροπή δεν διαθέτει στοιχεία σχετικά με περιστατικά στα οποία διαφαίνεται η ύπαρξη έμμεσης διάκρισης για τους λόγους αυτούς. Κατά συνέπεια, η περιγραφόμενη κατάσταση δεν φαίνεται να εμπίπτει στο πεδίο εφαρμογής της οδηγίας.

Σε ότι αφορά τον Χάρτη των Θεμελιωδών Δικαιωμάτων της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, με βάση τις Συνθήκες της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, η Επιτροπή δεν διαθέτει γενικές εξουσίες παρέμβασης στα κράτη μέλη στον τομέα των θεμελιωδών δικαιωμάτων. Η Επιτροπή δύναται να παρέμβει μόνον εφόσον ανακύψει ζήτημα που σχετίζεται με τη νομοθεσία της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης. Σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 51 παράγραφος 1 του Χάρτη, οι διατάξεις του Χάρτη απευθύνονται στα κράτη μέλη *μόνο* όταν αυτά εφαρμόζουν το ενωσιακό δίκαιο, πράγμα το οποίο δεν φαίνεται να ισχύει όσον αφορά τον εν λόγω ελληνικό νόμο.

Ενόψει των ανωτέρω στοιχείων, η Επιτροπή δεν έχει αρμοδιότητα να παρέμβει στη συγκεκριμένη περίπτωση.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001910/13
to the Commission
Nikolaos Chountis (GUE/NGL)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: Violation in Greece of Directive 2000/43/EC on equal treatment

Law No 1296/ of 12 October 1982 established a 'Special Pension Account for Uninsured Elderly People' within the Agricultural Insurance Organisation (OGA) which pays uninsured elderly people a pension as a welfare benefit.

Among the elderly who receive this minimum pension are thousands of people of Greek descent from the former USSR, Albania and elsewhere, who have settled in Greece and obtained Greek citizenship. The pension to which they were entitled — or used to receive — from their countries of origin (equivalent to approximately EUR 80 today) was not considered an impediment to receiving this benefit.

However the recent Law No 4093/2012 on a 'Medium-Term Financial Framework Strategy 2013-16' set new conditions for receiving that minimum pension. One of these conditions is that they should not only not receive, but also not be entitled to receive, a pension from their countries of origin. As a result, thousands of Greek citizens are being deprived of the minimum pension received by other Greek citizens, since there is no provision even for the possibility of offsetting any pension to which they may be entitled from the country of origin.

The provisions of Directive 2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin which covers social protection, including social security and healthcare and social benefits, are being violated, given that in practice Greek citizens who were born or worked in a third country are excluded from these social benefits. This also constitutes a violation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, in particular Articles 1 (Dignity), 25 (The Rights of the Elderly) and 34 (Social Security and Social Assistance).

In view of the above, will the Commission say:

What steps will it take to ensure the withdrawal of these unacceptable rules which, in the name of achieving budgetary targets, are plunging elderly citizens into extreme poverty and constitute a flagrant violation of European law as they introduce unacceptable discrimination?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(10 April 2013)

Directive 2000/43/EC on Racial Equality prohibits direct and indirect discrimination on the basis of racial or ethnic origin in a number of fields.

It appears that one of the new conditions set by Law No 4093/2012 for receiving a minimum pension is that the potential beneficiaries should not be entitled to benefit from pension from another scheme, either in Greece or in another country. It seems that this condition, which excludes this benefits for all persons entitled to any small pension in Greece or any other country is not based on a racial or ethnic origin of the potential beneficiaries and the Commission has no information on circumstances that would suggest the existence of an indirect discrimination on those grounds. Consequently, the situation described does not appear to fall within the scope of the directive.

As regards the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, under the European Union treaties, the Commission has no general powers to intervene with the Member States in the area of fundamental rights. It can only do so if an issue of European Union law is involved. According to Article 51(1) of the Charter, the provisions of the Charter are addressed to the Member States *only* when they are implementing Union law, which does not seem to be the case with respect to the Greek Law in question.

In light of the above considerations, the Commission has no competence to intervene in this particular case.

(Svensk version)

Frågor för skriftligt besvarande E-001911/13
till kommissionen
Amelia Andersdotter (Verts/ALE)
(22 februari 2013)

Angående: Klargörande av kommissionens val av Deticastudien som statistiskt underlag för europeisk nät- och informationssäkerhetspolitik

På sidan 58 i sin konsekvensbedömning av förslaget till ett direktiv om nät- och informationssäkerhet (SWD(2013)0032) av den 7 februari 2013, uppger kommissionen oroväckande siffror för it-brottslighetens kostnader, vilka uppgår till totalt 23,2 miljarder pund sterling om året och har publicerats i den så kallade Deticarapporten ([1]) som beställts av Förenade kungarikets regering. Dessa oroväckande siffror ifrågasätts dock i den tekniska rapporten som gjorts av RAND på kommissionens vägnar våren 2012 ([2]) samt i en forskningsartikel som beställts av Förenade kungarikets försvarsministerium och som skrivits av ett antal framstående forskare på området systemsäkerhetsteknik ([3]). De har också ifrågasatts av tjänstemän i regeringskansliet ([4]).

Mot bakgrund av ovanstående, hur har kommissionen dragit slutsatsen att den kostnad för it-brottslighet som uppskattas i Deticastudien är tillräckligt exakt för att användas som underlag för EU:s politik?

Svar från Neelie Kroes på kommissionens vägnar
(4 april 2013)

I den konsekvensbedömning som åtföljer förslaget erkänner kommissionen att det är svårt att få fram tillförlitliga uppgifter och information om hot mot nät- och informationssäkerheten och om eventuella incidenter i samband därmed. När kommissionen utarbetade konsekvensbedömningen använde man sig av de bästa tillgängliga uppgifterna och man hänvisade även till den forskningsrapport som parlamentsledamoten nämner (punkt 4.2.1 s. 23 i konsekvensbedömningen). Kommissionen anser inte att beloppet 23,2 miljarder pund sterling är grovt överdrivet eller inexakt. Kommission vill också i detta sammanhang påpeka att det brittiska riksrevisionsverket i februari 2013 uppskattade kostnaderna för it-brottslighet till mellan 18 och 27 miljarder pund.

([1]) http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/resource-library/cost-of-cyber-crime
([2]) Se http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2012/RAND_TR1218.pdf, sidorna 45 och 49.
([3]) Se http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2012/06/18/debunking-cybercrime-myths/
([4]) http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/06/18/catch_more_cybercriminals_uk_gov/print.html

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001911/13
to the Commission
Amelia Andersdotter (Verts/ALE)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: Clarifying the Commission's choice of the Detica study as a statistical base for European network and information security policy

On page 58 of its impact assessment on the proposal for a directive on network and information security (NIS) (SWD(2013)0032 of 7 February 2013), the Commission quotes alarming figures on cybercrime costs, totalling GBP 23.2 billion per year, published in the 'Detica report' ([1]) commissioned by the UK Government. However, these figures have been called into question by the technical report produced by RAND on behalf of the Commission in the spring of 2012 ([2]) and by a research article commissioned by the UK Ministry of Defence and written by a number of distinguished researchers in the field of security engineering ([3]). They have also been questioned by officials in the Cabinet Office itself ([4]).

In the light of the above, how has the Commission come to the conclusion that the Detica study's estimate of the cost of cybercrime is accurate enough to be used as a basis for European policy-making?

Answer given by Ms Kroes on behalf of the Commission
(4 April 2013)

In the impact assessment accompanying the proposal the Commission acknowledged that reliable data and information on network and information security threats and incidents are difficult to obtain. The Commission used the best data available when the impact assessment was prepared and referred to the findings of the research paper referred to by the Honourable Member (point 4.2.1. page 23 of the impact assessment). The Commission does not believe that the GBP 23.2 billion is grossly exaggerated or outlandish. In this context, it would like to note that the UK National Audit Office in February 2013 estimated the cost of cybercrime to be between GBP 18-27 billion.

([1]) http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/resource-library/cost-of-cyber-crime.
([2]) See http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2012/RAND_TR1218.pdf, pages 45 and 49.
([3]) See http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2012/06/18/debunking-cybercrime-myths/.
([4]) http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/06/18/catch_more_cybercriminals_uk_gov/print.html

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-001912/13
à Comissão (Vice-Presidente/Alta Representante)
Ana Gomes (S&D)
(22 de fevereiro de 2013)

Assunto: VP/AR — Diálogo UE-Índia em matéria de Direitos Humanos

O Quadro Estratégico e o Plano de Ação da UE para os Direitos Humanos e a Democracia consagra que «A UE colocará os direitos humanos no cerne das suas relações com todos os países terceiros, nomeadamente os seus parceiros estratégicos.» Em 2004, a UE instaurou um diálogo anual local sobre os direitos humanos com a Índia. Constitui um elemento fundamental das relações da UE com a Índia, que permite a ambos os países ter uma discussão franca e aberta sobre as preocupações relativas aos direitos humanos e que torna a UE capaz de honrar o seu compromisso de inscrever os direitos humanos no centro das relações com a Índia.

O Parlamento manifestou sérias apreensões quanto à violência contra as mulheres e à discriminação em razão da casta (ver as suas resoluções de 17 de janeiro de 2013 sobre a violência contra as mulheres na Índia (P7_TA(2013)0031) e de 13 de dezembro de 2012 sobre a discriminação em razão da casta na Índia (P7_TA(2012)0512)), a que se juntam inúmeros domínios de apreensão, tais como o recente reatamento das execuções. Importa abordar estas questões no Diálogo UE-Índia em matéria de Direitos Humanos.

Por isso, é com apreensão que registo a ausência de qualquer Diálogo UE-Índia em matéria de Direitos Humanos desde março de 2011. O diálogo sobre esta matéria previsto para 2012 foi protelado duas vezes.

Solicito à Vice-Presidente/Alta Representante que esclareça o seguinte:

1. Por que razão o diálogo em matéria de direitos humanos foi protelado duas vezes? Pode confirmar quando terá lugar o próximo diálogo UE-Índia em matéria de direitos humanos?

2. Que medidas concretas tomou a UE para proteger e promover os direitos humanos na Índia?

Resposta dada pela Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente Catherine Ashton em nome da Comissão
(12 de abril de 2013)

O diálogo UE-Índia em matéria de direitos humanos tem vindo a realizar-se anualmente a nível local desde 2004. A reunião inicialmente prevista para março de 2012 foi adiada pela copresidência indiana, que invocou questões de coordenação de agenda entre os vários participantes do lado indiano. A Comissão exprimiu o seu desapontamento com esta situação, tanto a nível local como a nível da sede.

Esperando que seja fixada o mais rapidamente possível uma data para a próxima reunião do diálogo, a UE tem vindo a debruçar-se sobre questões relacionadas com os direitos humanos através dos seus canais regulares, nomeadamente intercâmbios com organismos de defesa dos direitos humanos, interações com a sociedade civil e coordenação intra-UE no âmbito do seu grupo de trabalho local sobre os direitos humanos. A UE também financia projetos no domínio dos direitos humanos no âmbito das rubricas orçamentais temáticas do ICD, nomeadamente o Instrumento Europeu para a Democracia e os Direitos Humanos (IEDDH).

Com efeito, o IEDDH tem vindo a consagrar dotações à Índia desde 2009, as quais perfazem um montante cumulado de 5,1 milhões de euros. Em 2012, foi publicado um convite à apresentação de propostas no âmbito do IEDDH, tendo a execução dos projetos selecionados tido início recentemente. Além disso, a violência contra as mulheres e a discriminação em razão da casta foram especificamente apresentadas como novas questões centrais na proposta da CE relativa a um IEDDH renovado para o período 2014-2020.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001912/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Ana Gomes (S&D)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — EU-India human rights dialogue

The EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy states that 'The EU will place human rights at the centre of its relations with all third countries, including its strategic partners'. In 2004, the EU established an annual local human rights dialogue with India. This is a fundamental element of the EU's relationship with India, allowing both countries to have frank and open discussions about human rights concerns and enabling the EU to fulfil its commitment to place human rights at the centre of relations with India.

Parliament has expressed serious concern about violence against women and caste discrimination (see its resolutions of 17 January 2013 on violence against women in India (P7_TA(2013)0031) and of 13 December 2012 on caste discrimination in India (P7_TA(2012)0512)) and there are numerous additional areas of concern, such as the recent resumption of executions. These issues must be addressed in the EU-India human rights dialogue.

I therefore note with concern that there has been no EU human rights dialogue with India since March 2011. The human rights dialogue scheduled for 2012 has now been postponed twice.

Could the Vice-President/High Representative:

1. Explain why the human rights dialogue has been twice postponed and confirm when the next EU-India human rights dialogue will take place?

2. Explain what concrete measures the EU has taken to protect and promote human rights in India?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(12 April 2013)

The EU-India Human Rights Dialogue has been taking place at the local level annually since 2004; the meeting originally foreseen in March 2012 has been postponed by the Indian co-chair mentioning agenda coordination issues between the various participants on the Indian side. The Commission has expressed its disappointment with this situation, both locally and at the level of Headquarters.

While hoping that a date for the next Dialogue meeting is set as rapidly as possible, the EU is working on Human Rights-related issues through its regular channels, *inter alia* exchanges with Human Rights institutions, interactions with civil society and intra-EU coordination in its local Human Rights Working Group. The EU is also funding human rights projects under the DCI thematic budget lines, notably the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR).

Indeed, the EIDHR has dedicated allocations in India since 2009 for an acumulative amount of EUR 5.1 million. A local EIDHR call for proposals was published in 2012 and the implementation of the projects retained started recently. Moreover, violence against women and discrimination based on castes have been specifically introduced as new additionnal focus for the EC propooal for a renewed EIDHR 2014-2020.

(Wersja polska)

Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-001914/13
do Komisji
Lena Kolarska-Bobińska (PPE)
(22 lutego 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Mechanizmy zdolności wytwórczych energii

W ostatnich kilku miesiącach okazało się, że zaistniały duże problemy strukturalne na europejskim rynku energii. Subsydiowanie na dużą skalę energii odnawialnej, zwłaszcza w Niemczech, zakłóciło rynkową cenę energii i sztucznie obniżyło cenę hurtową energii elektrycznej.

Rentowność wielu konwencjonalnych elektrowni w Europie, zwłaszcza elektrowni gazowych, spadła do tego stopnia, że już nie opłaca się im produkcja energii, a wiele z nich ogłosiło plany zamknięcia. Jednocześnie ich istnienie jest bardzo ważne dla bezpieczeństwa energetycznego szeregu państw członkowskich, ponieważ źródła odnawialne nie są w stanie zapewnić energii wystarczającej dla obciążenia podstawowego i szczytowego.

Dlatego niektóre państwa członkowskie dyskutują nad stworzeniem rynków zdolności wytwórczych dla energii elektrycznej, tak by zrównoważyć ww. skutek. Dotychczas Komisja Europejska sprzeciwiała się temu zamysłowi. W swoim komunikacie w sprawie wewnętrznego rynku energii stwierdziła: „Mechanizmy zdolności wytwórczych powodują zakłócenia sygnałów cenowych w całej UE i mają tendencję do przedkładania źródeł wytwarzania energii w postaci paliw kopalnych".

1. Jeżeli Komisja nadal będzie sprzeciwiała się takim mechanizmom, jakie środki proponuje dla podtrzymania produkcji energii na poziomie podstawowym i szczytowym, która w braku takich środków ustanie w obliczu obniżonych cen hurtowych?

2. Czy Komisja uważa, że subwencje na energię odnawialną zakłócają również sygnały cenowe?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Günthera Oettingera w imieniu Komisji
(19 kwietnia 2013 r.)

W dokumencie konsultacyjnym w sprawie wystarczalności mocy wytwórczych, mechanizmów zdolności wytwórczych i wewnętrznego rynku energii elektrycznej ([1]), który został opublikowany wraz z komunikatem „Uruchomienie wewnętrznego rynku energii" ([2]), Komisja określiła, w jaki sposób zakończenie tworzenia rynku wewnętrznego, inteligentne technologie i zarządzanie popytem mogą przyczynić się do zapewnienia bezpieczeństwa dostaw. Zamiarem Komisji jest zasięgnięcie opinii na temat tego, w jaki sposób można zapewnić bardziej skoordynowane podejście w zakresie oceny wystarczalności mocy wytwórczych na rynku wewnętrznym, oraz na temat szczegółowych kryteriów, opartych na zasadach konieczności i proporcjonalności, które można zastosować w odniesieniu do mechanizmów zdolności wytwórczych. Komisja będzie prowadzić dalsze działania w tym obszarze i zamierza opracować wytyczne dotyczące mechanizmów zdolności wytwórczych.

Panuje powszechna zgoda co do tego, że konieczne jest przekształcenie naszego systemu elektroenergetycznego, a w szczególności zwiększenie udziału odnawialnych źródeł energii. W związku z tym państwa członkowskie wprowadziły systemy wsparcia mające na celu promowanie energii wytwarzanej ze źródeł odnawialnych. Komisja przygotowuje obecnie wytyczne dotyczące systemów wsparcia, aby zagwarantować, że są one skuteczne, w minimalnym stopniu zakłócają konkurencję i umożliwiają integrację rynkową odnawialnych źródeł energii.

Komisja zamierza opublikować oba dokumenty zawierające wytyczne latem tego roku.

([1]) http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/consultations/doc/20130207_generation_adequacy_consultation_document.pdf
([2]) COM (2012)663.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001914/13
to the Commission
Lena Kolarska-Bobińska (PPE)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: Energy capacity mechanisms

Over the last few months, it has become clear that there are significant structural problems in the European energy market. The large-scale subsidisation of renewables, especially in Germany, has distorted the market price for energy, artificially pushing the electricity wholesale price lower.

The profitability of many conventional power plants in Europe, especially gas plants, has dropped so far that it is no longer profitable for them to produce energy, and many have announced that they are to close. At the same time, their existence is very important for the energy security of a number of Member States, because renewables are not able to provide adequate baseload and peak power.

Several Member States are therefore discussing the creation of electricity capacity markets to balance this effect. The European Commission has so far been against this. In its communication on the internal energy market, it states: 'Capacity mechanisms distort the EU-wide price signal and are also likely to favour fossil fuel generation sources.'

1. If the Commission continues to oppose such mechanisms, what measures does it propose to maintain baseload and peak energy production, which would not otherwise continue at suppressed wholesale prices?

2. Does the Commission believe that renewable subsidies also distort price signals?

Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission
(19 April 2013)

In the consultation paper on Generation adequacy, capacity mechanisms and the internal market in electricity ([1]), which has been launched together with the communication 'Making the internal energy market work' ([2]), the Commission set out how the completion of the internal market, smart technology and demand side management help ensure security of supply. The Commission consulted on how to ensure a more coordinated approach to generation adequacy assessment in the internal market and requested views on detailed criteria, based on the principles of necessity and proportionality, which could be applied to capacity mechanisms. The Commission is taking this work forward, and intends to set out guidance on capacity mechanisms.

The need to transform our electricity system, and in particular ensure an increased penetration of renewables, is widely recognised. As a result Member States have introduced support schemes designed to promote generation from renewable energy sources. The Commission is currently preparing guidance on support schemes to help ensure that they are effective, minimally distortive and integrate renewables into the market.

The Commission intends to publish both guidance documents together this summer.

([1]) http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/consultations/doc/20130207_generation_adequacy_consultation_document.pdf
([2]) COM(2012)663.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-001915/13
an die Kommission
Andrea Zanoni (ALDE) und Nadja Hirsch (ALDE)
(22. Februar 2013)

Betrifft: Transport von nicht als Schlachtvieh geeigneten Tieren in der Europäischen Union (Weiterbehandlung der schriftlichen Anfrage E-005205/2012)

Gemäß der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1/2005 des Rates über den Schutz von Tieren beim Transport und damit zusammenhängenden Vorgängen dürfen schwer kranke oder verletzte Tiere nicht zum Schlachthof verbracht werden. Die Tiere müssen entsprechend tiermedizinisch versorgt oder vor Ort, beispielsweise in dem betreffenden Landwirtschaftsbetrieb, getötet werden. Trotz verschiedener Initiativen zur Durchsetzung dieser Verordnung wird nach wie vor regelmäßig dagegen verstoßen ([1]). Nicht transportfähige Tiere werden oft zum Schlachthof verbracht und leiden dadurch zusätzlich.

Am 24. Februar 2010 wandte die Kommission sich mit einem Schreiben an die Mitgliedstaaten (SANCO D5 DS/eu D (2010) 450003), in dem sie darauf hinwies, dass Maßnahmen eingeführt werden müssen, die unter anderem mehr Inspektionen bei Schlachthöfen bewirken und dadurch der Verbringung nicht transportfähiger Tiere entgegen wirken. Der Antwort der Kommission auf die schriftliche Anfrage E-005205/2012 ist zu entnehmen, dass der Aufforderung der Kommission nur drei von 27 Mitgliedstaaten nachgekommen sind und entsprechende Informationen vorgelegt haben. Nach der Antwort der Kommission auf die schriftliche Anfrage E-005205/2012 zu urteilen wurden aber selbst im Falle dieser drei Mitgliedstaaten, was die Ergebnisse der getroffenen Maßnahmen betrifft, keine quantifizierten Angaben, beispielsweise zur Zahl der Inspektionen und der Anzahl der verhängten Strafen, vorgelegt. Auch nach den Gesprächsrunden mit den Mitgliedstaaten im Rahmen der Sitzung des Ständigen Ausschusses für die Lebensmittelkette und Tiergesundheit am 12. und 13. April 2010 haben die Mitgliedstaaten keine weiteren oder genaueren schriftlichen Angaben eingereicht.

Die Kommission ist selbst zu der Auffassung gelangt, dass die von den Mitgliedstaaten in diesem Bereich getroffenen Maßnahmen nicht ausreichen.

1. Wird die Kommission Maßnahmen ergreifen, um sicherzustellen, dass die übrigen 24 Mitgliedstaaten die angeforderten Informationen vorlegen, und zwar einschließlich quantifizierter Angaben zu den Maßnahmen, die sie getroffen haben, um den Transport von nicht als Schlachtvieh geeigneten Tieren zu unterbinden?

2. Wenn diese Informationen von den Mitgliedstaaten nicht eingereicht werden, oder wenn die eingereichten Informationen nicht darauf schließen lassen, dass wirksame Maßnahmen getroffen wurden (und die Mitgliedstaaten das EG-Recht demnach weiterhin missachten), ist die Kommission befugt, Vertragsverletzungsverfahren einzuleiten. Wird die Kommission solche Verfahren anstrengen?

3. Sind nach den Treffen mit Vertretern der nach der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1/2005 vorgesehenen Kontaktstellen vom 19.-21. Juni 2012 exakte schriftliche Informationen von den Mitgliedstaaten eingegangen, die erkennen lassen, wie die Mitgliedstaaten sich in Bezug auf die wiederholte Missachtung der in der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1/2005 festgelegten Bestimmungen für transportunfähige Tiere verhalten?

Antwort von Herrn Borg im Namen der Kommission
(18. April 2013)

1. Mit dem Schreiben an die Mitgliedstaaten vom 24. Februar 2010 beabsichtigte die Kommission, die Mitgliedstaaten darauf hinzuweisen, dass nach Artikel 3 Buchstabe b) und Anhang I Kapitel I Absatz 1 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1/2005 ([2]) nur transportfähige Tiere auf Transportmittel verladen werden dürfen. Die Mitgliedstaaten wurden in diesem Schreiben nicht dazu aufgefordert, über konkrete Umsetzungsmaßnahmen zu berichten, sondern die Kommission über etwaige Schwierigkeiten bei der Umsetzung dieser Anforderungen zu unterrichten.

([1]) Siehe beispielsweise Anfrage E-011393/2011 von Andrea Zanoni (MdEP) sowie zahlreiche Berichte des Lebensmittel- und Veterinäramts, wie DG(SANCO) 2010 8390 Frankreich; DG(SANCO) 2010 8388 Italien; DG(SANCO) 2011 6052 Portugal; DG(SANCO) 2009 8284 Spanien; DG(SANCO) 2009 8263 Bulgarien; DG(SANCO) 2009 8252 Litauen, und Forschungsarbeiten nichtstaatlicher Organisationen wie der Tierschutzorganisation „Animals' Angels".

([2]) ABl. L 3 vom 5.1.2005, S. 1.

2. Wenn ein Mitgliedstaat gegen das EU-Recht verstößt, kann die Kommission ein Vertragsverletzungsverfahren einleiten und erforderlichenfalls den Fall vor den Gerichtshof der Europäischen Union bringen. Derzeit zieht die Kommission das Einleiten eines solchen Verfahrens hinsichtlich des Transports nicht transportfähiger Tiere nicht in Erwägung, da keine Beweise vorliegen, dass ein bestimmter Mitgliedstaat diese Anforderung systematisch nicht durchsetzt.

3. Dieser Punkt wurde mit den Kontaktstellen ([3]) diskutiert, um den Dialog und den Austausch von bewährten Verfahren zwischen den zuständigen Behörden der Mitgliedstaaten zu erleichtern. Die Mitgliedstaaten wurden nicht dazu aufgefordert, schriftliche Informationen zu diesem Thema zu übermitteln.

([3]) Die Kommission wurde nach Artikel 24 Absatz 2 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1/2005 über die Einrichtung von Kontaktstellen für die Zwecke der Verordnung unterrichtet.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001915/13
alla Commissione
Andrea Zanoni (ALDE) e Nadja Hirsch (ALDE)
(22 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: Trasporto di animali non idonei alla macellazione nell'Unione europea (seguito all'interrogazione scritta E-005205/2012)

Il regolamento (CE) n. 1/2005 sulla protezione degli animali durante il trasporto e le relative operazioni stabilisce che gli animali gravemente malati o feriti non devono essere trasportati al macello. A tali animali vanno amministrate le necessarie cure veterinarie o vanno abbattuti sul posto, per esempio nell'azienda stessa. Nonostante le varie iniziative avviate per far rispettare il regolamento, le infrazioni sono ancora all'ordine del giorno ([1]). Gli animali non idonei sono spesso portati al macello, e devono così patire gravi sofferenze.

Il 24 febbraio 2010 la Commissione ha inviato una lettera agli Stati membri (SANCO D5 DS/ eu D (2010) 450003), richiamando la loro attenzione sull'importanza di introdurre politiche mirate, tra le altre cose, ad aumentare il numero di ispezioni nei macelli onde scoraggiare il trasporto di animali non idonei. Come indicato dalla Commissione nella sua risposta all'interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-005205/2012, dei 27 Stati membri, solo tre hanno risposto alla Commissione e hanno fornito informazioni. A giudicare dalla risposta della Commissione all'interrogazione scritta E-005205/2012 nemmeno questi tre Stati membri hanno fornito dati quantificati sui risultati delle azioni intraprese, come ad esempio il numero di controlli effettuati e il numero di sanzioni comminate. Inoltre, i colloqui con gli Stati membri nel corso di una riunione del Comitato permanente per la catena alimentare e la salute degli animali il 12 e 13 aprile 2010 non ha portato ad ulteriori o più precise informazioni scritte da parte degli Stati membri.

La stessa Commissione è del parere che le relative misure adottate dagli Stati membri non sono sufficienti.

1. La Commissione vorrà intraprendere azioni per ricevere informazioni anche dagli altri 24 Stati membri, comprese informazioni quantificate sulle azioni da loro avviate per scoraggiare il trasporto di animali non idonei alla macellazione?

2. Se queste informazioni non saranno fornite dagli Stati membri, o se non sarà dimostrato che sono state intraprese azioni efficaci (e che quindi gli Stati membri continuano a non ottemperare al diritto comunitario), la Commissione ha il potere di avviare procedure di infrazione. La Commissione vorrà avviare dette procedure?

3. La riunione con i punti di contatto di cui al regolamento (CE) n. 1/2005 del 19 e 21 giugno 2012 ha portato a qualche precisa informazione scritta dagli Stati membri sul modo in cui intendono gestire la ripetuta non ottemperanza al regolamento (CE) n. 1/ 2005 concernente il trasporto di animali non idonei?

Risposta di Tonio Borg a nome della Commissione
(18 aprile 2013)

1. La lettera della Commissione inviata agli Stati membri in data 24 febbraio 2010 insisteva sull'importanza di garantire che solamente gli animali idonei siano trasportati al macello, a norma dell'articolo 3, lettera b), e dell'allegato I, capitolo I, paragrafo 1 del regolamento (CE) n. 1/2005 ([2]) . Nella lettera non si chiedeva agli Stati membri di presentare un rapporto relativo ad eventuali problemi nel far rispettare disposizioni specifiche, ma solo di comunicare alla Commissione le eventuali difficoltà incontrate durante l'applicazione.

2. Se uno Stato membro non rispetta la normativa dell'Unione europea la Commissione può iniziare un procedimento per infrazione e all'occorrenza rinviare il caso alla Corte di Giustizia dell'Unione europea. La Commissione per il momento non intende iniziare alcun procedimento in merito al trasporto di animali non idonei poiché non sussistono prove di una violazione sistematica delle condizioni da parte di un determinato Stato membro.

([1]) Vedi, per esempio, l'interrogazione dell'europarlamentare Andrea Zanoni E-011393/2011, numerosi rapporti dell'Ufficio alimentare e veterinario — ad esempio: DG(SANCO) 2010 8390 Francia; DG(SANCO) 2010 8388 Italia; DG(SANCO) 2011 6052 Portogallo; DG(SANCO) 2009 8284 Spagna; DG(SANCO) 2009 8263 Bulgaria; DG(SANCO) 2009 8252 Lituania — e la ricerca svolta da ONG come Animals' Angels.

([2]) GU L 3 del 5.1.2005, pag. 1.

3. Tale argomento è stato discusso con i punti di contatto ([3]) al fine di favorire il dibattito e la condivisione delle prassi ottimali tra le autorità competenti degli Stati membri. Non è stato richiesto a questi ultimi di presentare rapporti scritti riguardo all'argomento in esame.

([3]) I punti di contatto per gli scopi stabiliti nel regolamento (CE) n. 1/2005 sono stati comunicati alla Commissione a norma dell'articolo 24, paragrafo 2, del regolamento.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001915/13
to the Commission
Andrea Zanoni (ALDE) and Nadja Hirsch (ALDE)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: Transport of animals unfit for slaughter in the European Union (follow-up to Written Question E-005205/2012)

Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 on the protection of animals during transport and related operations establishes that seriously ill or injured animals must not be taken to slaughter. Such animals must be given appropriate veterinary care or be put down on site, for example at the farm itself. Despite various initiatives taken to enforce the regulation, infringements are still commonplace ([1]). Unfit animals are often taken to slaughter, thus enduring serious suffering.

On 24 February 2010, the Commission sent a letter to the Member States (SANCO D5 DS/eu D (2010) 450003) drawing their attention to the importance of introducing policies aimed at, among other things, increasing the number of abattoir inspections in order to discourage the transport of unfit animals. As stated by the Commission in its answer to Written Question E-005205/2012, out of 27 Member States only three have responded to the Commission and provided information. Judging from the Commission answer to Written Question E-005205/2012, not even these three Member States have provided quantified data on the outcome of the action they have taken, such as the number of inspections carried out and the number of penalties imposed. Moreover, discussions with the Member States during a meeting of the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health on 12-13 April 2010 have not been followed by further or more precise written information from the Member States.

The Commission itself is of the opinion that the measures taken by the Member States in this regard are not sufficient.

1. Will the Commission take measures to ensure that the remaining 24 Member States provide the information requested, including quantified information on the action taken by them to discourage the transport of animals unfit for slaughter?

2. If this information is not provided by the Member States, or if it does not show that effective measures have been taken (and thus that the Member States are still failing to comply with EC law), the Commission has the authority to initiate infringement procedures. Will the Commission initiate such procedures?

3. Has the meeting with the contact points required by Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 of 19-21 June 2012 lead to any precise written information from the Member States on how they deal with repeated non-compliance with Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 concerning the transport of unfit animals?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission
(18 April 2013)

1. The purpose of the letter sent by the Commission to the Member States on 24 February 2010 was to draw their attention to the importance of ensuring that only animals that are fit for travelling should be loaded on to transports, as required in Article 3(b) and Annex I, Chapter I, paragraph 1 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 ([2]). The letter did not ask Member States to report on any specific enforcement issue but only to inform the Commission of difficulties (if any) encountered in implementing those requirements.

2. Where a Member State fails to comply with EC law, the Commission has powers to start an infringement procedure and, where necessary, may refer the case to the Court of Justice of the European Union. For the time being, the Commission is not considering initiating such procedures in the case of transport of unfit animals, as it does not possess evidence indicating that a particular Member State systematically fails to enforce this requirement.

3. The point was discussed with the contact points ([3]) to facilitate discussion and share best practices between competent authorities of the Member States. Member States were not asked to provide written information on this topic.

([1]) See, for example, MEP Andrea Zanoni's Question E-011393/2011, numerous reports from the Food and Veterinary Office — for example: DG(SANCO) 2010 8390 France; DG(SANCO) 2010 8388 Italy; DG(SANCO) 2011 6052 Portugal; DG(SANCO) 2009 8284 Spain; DG(SANCO) 2009 8263 Bulgaria; DG(SANCO) 2009 8252 Lithuania — and research carried out by NGOs such as Animals' Angels.

([2]) OJ L 3, 5.1.2005, p. 1.

([3]) Contact points for the purpose of Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 have been communicated to the Commission in accordance to Article 24(2) of the regulation.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001916/13
to the Commission
Diane Dodds (NI)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: Pension payments

In recent days in my constituency, fears have been voiced that, in relevant cases, elderly individuals residing in a care home in Northern Ireland for five or more years would have to return to their country of birth, the Republic of Ireland, in order to remain eligible for a pension from the Irish Government.

With these concerns in mind, and with due diligence given to the potential physical and emotional burdens that could be placed on residents having to return to the Republic of Ireland, I kindly request that the Commission respond to the following queries:

1. Can the Commission please detail all relevant EU legislation pertaining to Member state pensions and to the transferability of these entitlements in the event that a recipient retires to or resides in another EU country?

2. What legislative provision, if any, exists, linking the continuation of pension payments by a Member State to a recipient's residency in that Member State for the five previous years?

3. What legal basis, if any, exists to allow an Irish-born resident of a care home in Northern Ireland — a region of the UK — to avail of direct social services in Northern Ireland?

Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission
(15 April 2013)

1 and 2. Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 ([1]) on the coordination of social security systems provides that cash benefits, such as old-age pensions, payable under the legislation of one or more Member States must not be reduced, suspended or withdrawn because the beneficiary resides in a Member State other than that which is responsible for providing the benefits. Payment of the pension cannot therefore be subject to the person's return after a certain period to the Member State responsible for providing the pension.

3. According to the general rule set out in Article 18 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, citizens must not be discriminated against on grounds of nationality. As a result, citizens of another Member State must be treated on an equal footing with citizens of the State of residence. Where long-term care is treated as a sickness benefit in kind under Regulation (EC) No 883/2004, the general rule is that citizens are entitled to receive the care in the Member State of residence, at the expense of the Member State responsible for paying their pensions.

([1]) Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security systems, OJ L 166, 30.4.2004, p. 1.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001917/13
to the Commission
Diane Dodds (NI)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: Mortality in Irish Sea (VIIa) cod

In the light of ongoing problems with unaccounted mortality in Irish Sea (VIIa) cod and the inclusion of an item about cod stock audits in the memorandum of understanding signed by the Commission and the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), can the Commission update us on the discussions held with ICES in December 2012 and specifically detail what progress has been made in advancing an audit of Irish Sea cod?

Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission
(18 April 2013)

The North West Waters Regional Advisory Council (RAC) requested that an audit of Irish Sea Cod was included into the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for 2013. One intention of such an audit was to address the issue of unaccounted mortality within the current ICES' assessment and benchmark. Without a robust assessment a wider audit is difficult.

This stock was benchmarked in 2012, during which ICES reviewed the information available, the assessment methodology and undertook preliminary investigation into the source of unaccounted mortality. As the source of this mortality could not be resolved with the information available for the benchmark ICES will be requested to explore this issue further to improve the assessment. As this is non-recurring advice ICES will be tasked by way of a special request in 2013.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001918/13
to the Commission
Diane Dodds (NI)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF)

In its review of scientific advice for 2013 the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF) stated the following in respect of cod in the Irish Sea (ICES division VIIa):

'STECF also reiterates the considerable problems with the assessment for this stock. STECF believes that the bias and uncertainty in the assessment are being exacerbated by the deterioration in availability and reliability of catch and effort data …'

In light of the decision made at the December 2012 meeting of the EU Fisheries Council to reduce the total allowable catch (TAC) for Irish Sea cod by a further 25%, can the Commission explain how this will address the problems identified by STECF, specifically in respect of the deterioration in availability of catch data?

Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission
(15 April 2013)

For the stock of cod in the Irish Sea, the total allowable catch (TAC) and effort limits are set on the basis of Council Regulation (EC) No 1342/2008 ([1]). The process is informed by scientific advice.

This stock was benchmarked by the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) in 2012, identifying a number of current and historic data concerns. The Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF) in their review of the ICES advice for 2013 note that information has improved since 2006.

The North West Waters Regional Advisory Council is currently exploring a proposal to re-build historic data sets, to provide needed time series to improve ongoing assessments.

Catch data is only part of the overall assessment, which is also informed by a range of fishery dependent and independent data, including discard sampling programmes, landing statistics, Fisheries Science Partnerships and several scientific surveys. In 2012, the fishing industry collaborated with the Northern Ireland Agri-Food and Biosciences Institute on a sentinel fishery. This improved the scientific knowledge of this stock in lieu of a directed commercial fishery and the resultant stock profile is consistent with other assessments.

Future recovery of the stock is limited by the low biomass this reinforcing the need to continue cod avoidance measures, such as the further measures introduced in 2012.

([1]) Council Regulation (EU) No 1342/2008, establishing a long term plan for cod stocks and the fisheries exploiting those stocks, as amended by Council Regulation (EU) No 1243/2012.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001919/13
to the Commission
Vicky Ford (ECR)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: Appeals process for ECHA decisions

A small company in my region has contacted me because it is extremely concerned that a decision to place a certain substance on the European Chemicals Agency's Substances for Very High Concern candidates' list could ultimately lead to its closure. This would not only result in the loss of at least 150 jobs, but would also cause production to be relocated outside the EU where regulations on the use of chemicals are not as strict. The company claims that there is no appropriate substitute solvent that it could use in its processes.

What appeals process is available to companies or organisations to challenge such decisions? How will the Commission ensure that in the next stage of REACH implementation both risks and benefits are assessed on the basis of a risk-based rather than a hazard-led approach?

Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission
(11 April 2013)

The REACH Regulation ([1]) establishes in its Article 91 that an appeal may be brought against certain decisions of the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA). However, no appeal is foreseen for decisions taken on the identification of substances of very high concern (SVHC) and establishing a candidate list for eventual inclusion in Annex XIV (lists of substances subject to authorisation). Such decisions may be subject to direct action before the EU General Court, in view of the recent case law in cases T-93/10, T-94-10, T-95/10 and T-96/10.

Identification of substances as SVHC does not result in a ban of the use of those substances. It nevertheless imposes obligations on suppliers of such a substance on its own or in mixtures to provide their customers and recipients with safety data sheets as laid down in Article 31(1) of REACH. Suppliers of articles containing this substance are to provide recipients and consumers (the latter, upon request) with information about the presence of the substance in articles as laid down in Article 33 of REACH. Producers and importers of such articles have to notify its presence to the European Chemicals Agency in line with conditions of Article 7 of REACH.

The fact that there are no suitable alternatives available at the present time is not a relevant consideration for the purposes of including a substance in the candidate list or in Annex XIV. However it is a key factor when deciding whether to grant an authorisation and on the conditions thereof. Socioeconomic impacts, such as those relating to the potential closure or delocalisation of a business outside the EU, are considered when assessing the individual applications for authorisation, in accordance with Article 60 of REACH for the substances that have been included in Annex XIV.

([1]) 1907/2006, OJ L 396, 30.12.2006.

(Versiunea în limba română)

Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-001920/13
adresată Comisiei
Petru Constantin Luhan (PPE)
(22 februarie 2013)

Subiect: Drepturile artiștilor în Uniunea Europeană

Unul dintre cele mai mari obstacole la adresa mobilității artiștilor în interiorul Uniunii Europene este lipsa unui sistem de securitate socială care să ia în considerare mobilitatea acestora. Artiștii care își desfășoară activitatea pe perioade scurte de timp în diverse state membre se confruntă deseori cu probleme legate de accesul la indemnizațiile de șomaj și pensii.

Având în vedere caracterul specific al profesiilor artistice, ar fi pregătită Comisia să sprijine următoarele măsuri sugerate?

1. Elaborarea unui ghid practic pentru artiștii europeni.

2. Introducerea unei cărți electronice de asigurare europeană, a unui registru profesional european și a unui fond european pentru mobilitatea artiștilor;

3. Dezvoltarea unor linii orientative comune privind înființarea unor ligi ale artiștilor în UE, care să furnizeze informații cu privire la drepturile de autor și la drepturile de exploatare, precum și consiliere gratuită privind aspecte juridice, fiscale, asigurări sociale, granturi, competiții, evenimente etc.

Răspuns dat de dl Andor în numele Comisiei
(18 aprilie 2013)

Obstacolele specifice în calea mobilității lucrătorilor foarte mobili, ale căror activități profesionale sau cariere comportă o trăsătură inerentă, și anume mobilitatea frecventă, reprezintă un subiect de preocupare pentru Comisie. Anul trecut a fost instituit un grup operativ, implicând mai multe servicii ale Comisiei, în vederea identificării și analizării diferitelor obstacole cu care se confruntă lucrătorii foarte mobili, cum ar fi artiștii.

Modelele de ocupare a forței de muncă în sectorul artistic și cultural implică, de regulă, o mobilitate importantă. Persoanele care lucrează în profesii artistice și culturale vor constitui, prin urmare, unul dintre „grupurile subiect" ale grupului operativ.

Analiza și concluziile grupului operativ, a căror publicare este preconizată în cursul anului curent, vor stimula o dezbatere privind modul în care lucrătorii cu grad înalt de mobilitate ar putea să beneficieze pe deplin de libertatea de circulație.

Comisia nu dorește să se angajeze că va lua vreo măsură specifică pentru a evita compromiterea activității de analiză a grupului operativ sau anticiparea vreuneia dintre concluziile pe care aceasta le poate prezenta. Cu toate acestea, Comisia poate să confirme că identificarea corespunzătoare a nevoilor de informare ale persoanelor care lucrează în sectorul artistic și cultural și a oricăror instrumente și inițiative care le-ar putea oferi sprijin, informare și orientare cu privire la provocările cu care se confruntă în domeniul securității sociale constituie o parte importantă a activităților grupului operativ.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001920/13
to the Commission
Petru Constantin Luhan (PPE)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: Rights of artists in the European Union

One of the greatest obstacles to the mobility of artists within the European Union is the lack of a social security scheme that takes account of their mobility. Artists working for short periods in different Member States often face problems with regard to access to unemployment benefits and pensions.

Given the specific nature of artist professions, would the Commission be prepared to support the following suggested measures?

1. Draft a practical guide for European artists.

2. Introduce a European electronic social security card, a European professional register and a European mobility fund for artists.

3. Develop common guidelines for the setting up of artist leagues in the EU that could provide information on copyright and exploitation rights and offer free counselling on legal/tax/social insurance issues, grants, competitions and events, etc.

Answer given by Mr Andor on behalf of the Commission
(18 April 2013)

The specific obstacles to the mobility of highly mobile workers, an inherent feature of whose professional activity or careers is high, frequent mobility, are a matter of concern to the Commission. A Task Force involving several Commission departments was set up last year to identify and analyse the various obstacles that highly mobile workers such as artists face.

Employment patterns in the artistic and cultural sector typically involve high mobility. Persons working in artistic and cultural professions will therefore be one of Task Force's 'focus groups'.

The Task Force's analysis and conclusions, which are expected to be published in the course of the current year, will stimulate a debate on how highly mobile workers could make full use of freedom of movement.

The Commission is unwilling to commit itself to any specific measures in order to avoid pre-empting the Task Force in its work of analysis or anticipating any of the conclusions it may put forward. The Commission can, however, confirm that properly identifying the information needs of persons working in the artistic and cultural sector and any tools and initiatives that could provide them with support, information and guidance on the challenges that they face in the field of social security is an important part of the work of the Task Force.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-001922/13
an die Kommission (Vizepräsidentin/Hohe Vertreterin)
Ulrike Lunacek (Verts/ALE), Eva Joly (Verts/ALE) und Catherine Grèze (Verts/ALE)
(22. Februar 2013)

Betrifft: VP/HR — Staudammvorhaben Belo Monte in Brasilien

Der Bau des Staudamms Belo Monte wirft grundlegende Fragen auf, vor allem in Bezug auf die Wahrung der Rechte der indigenen Bevölkerung. Mit diesem Vorhaben soll — wie mit etwa dreißig anderen Wasserkraftwerksvorhaben auch — die zukünftige Versorgung einer wachsenden brasilianischen Bevölkerung und Wirtschaft mit Energie sichergestellt werden. Allerdings führen diese Großvorhaben auch zu einer Zerstörung des Regenwaldes und zur Vertreibung der Bevölkerung. Die internationale Gemeinschaft, insbesondere der Interamerikanische Ausschuss für Menschenrechte und der Menschenrechtsrat der Vereinten Nationen, hat diesen Sachverhalt scharf kritisiert. In einer am 27. September 2011 angenommenen Entschließung zur Finanzierung der Verstärkung von Dämmen in Entwicklungsländern wies das Europäische Parlament darauf hin, dass das Vorhaben Belo Monte der Umwelt und der indigenen Bevölkerung erheblich schaden wird. Catherine Ashton, Vizepräsidentin/Hohe Vertreterin, gab bekannt, dass die Situation im Rahmen des Dialogs EU/Brasilien bereits thematisiert wurde, dass die Europäische Union einen Beitrag zum Schutz des Waldes in einem an Belo Monte angrenzenden Gebiet vorbereitet hätte und dass Umwelt und Klimawandel Kernthemen der strategischen Partnerschaft EU/Brasilien seien.

Vor diesem Hintergrund und angesichts der Rolle der europäischen Industrie in diesem Staudammvorhaben und der Antwort auf die schriftliche Anfrage P-0982/10 wird die Vizepräsidentin/Hohe Vertreterin um folgende Auskünfte gebeten:

1. Wie werden das Vorhaben von Belo Monte und allgemeiner gefasst die Wasserkraftwerksvorhaben in Amazonien in den politischen Dialogen mit Brasilien behandelt? Wie reagiert Brasilien darauf?

2. Wie werden die Auswirkungen der enormen Infrastrukturentwicklungen in Amazonien auf die Umwelt weltweit bewertet?

3. Welche Möglichkeiten hat die Union, eine aktivere Rolle bei der Begrenzung der negativen Auswirkungen ähnlicher Vorhaben auf die Umwelt und die indigene Bevölkerung und bei der Förderung einer nachhaltigen Entwicklung einzunehmen?

4. Was unternimmt die Union in Bezug auf die Menschenrechte und die Rechte der indigenen Bevölkerung in diesem Raum?

Antwort von Frau Ashton — Hohe Vertreterin/Vizepräsidentin im Namen der Kommission
(12. April 2013)

Die Durchführung des Staudammvorhabens Belo Monte wird von der EU aufmerksam verfolgt. Hierbei handelt es sich allerdings um ein brasilianisches Projekt, dessen Durchführung unter die nationale Souveränität fällt. Die EU führt mit der Regierung der Föderativen Republik Brasilien einen regelmäßigen Dialog zu Umwelt- und Menschenrechtsfragen sowie zu Fragen, die mit diesem Projekt und mit der indigenen Bevölkerung im Zusammenhang stehen. Zudem stehen die EU-Delegation und die EU-Mitgliedstaaten in regelmäßigem Kontakt mit den einschlägigen brasilianischen zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen und Vertretern der indigenen Bevölkerung. Zu keinem Zeitpunkt hat die brasilianische Regierung die EU darum gebeten, Alternativvorschläge zum Staudammvorhaben Belo Monte vorzulegen, oder eine Stellungnahme hierzu abzugeben.

Die EU unterstützt durch verschiedene Maßnahmen im Rahmen der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit die Erhaltung und den Schutz der Wälder im Gebiet des Staudamms. Erst kürzlich hat die EU ein Projekt zur Konsolidierung von Schutzgebieten in der Region Terra do Meio im Bundesstaat Pará genehmigt, mit dem zur Verringerung der Entwaldung und zur Erhaltung der biologischen Vielfalt im Amazonasgebiet beigetragen werden soll. Das Thema Umwelt ist einer der beiden Schwerpunktbereiche des Länderstrategiepapiers 2007-2013 für Brasilien (im Rahmen des DCI). Gegenwärtig werden ferner drei Projekte zur Bekämpfung der Entwaldung im Bundesstaat Pará durchgeführt. Zusätzliche Mittel werden aus der thematischen Haushaltslinie für Umwelt und natürliche Ressourcen (ENRTP) bereitgestellt. Darüber hinaus werden zurzeit sechs von der EU mit insgesamt 15 Mio. EUR kofinanzierte Projekte durchgeführt, die im Zusammenhang mit der Bekämpfung der Entwaldung in Brasilien stehen.

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-001922/13
à la Commission (Vice-Présidente / Haute Représentante)
Ulrike Lunacek (Verts/ALE), Eva Joly (Verts/ALE) et Catherine Grèze (Verts/ALE)
(22 février 2013)

Objet: VP/HR — Projet de barrage de Belo Monte, au Brésil

La construction du barrage de Belo Monte soulève de graves questions, notamment quant au respect des droits des populations indigènes. Ce projet, comme les quelque trente autres projets hydroélectriques en Amazonie, devrait assurer à l'avenir l'approvisionnement énergétique d'une population et d'une économie brésiliennes en pleine croissance. Mais ces mégaprojets contribuent aussi à la déforestation et au déplacement de populations. La communauté internationale, notamment la Commission interaméricaine des Droits de l'homme et le Conseil des Droits de l'homme des Nations unies, s'est émue de cette situation. Dans une résolution sur le financement du renforcement des infrastructures de barrage dans les pays en développement, adoptée le 27 septembre 2011, le Parlement européen a relevé que le projet de Belo Monte causerait d'immenses torts à l'environnement et aux populations autochtones. M[me] Ashton, Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante, a déclaré que la situation était abordée dans le dialogue UE-Brésil, que l'Union européenne a préparé une contribution sur la protection des forêts dans une zone touchant Belo Monte et que l'environnement et le changement climatique se trouvaient au cœur du partenariat stratégique UE-Brésil.

Au vu de ce contexte, de l'implication de l'industrie européenne dans ce projet de barrage et de la réponse donnée à la question écrite P-0982/10, nous demandons à la Vice-Présidente/Haute Représentante:

1. de préciser comment le projet de Belo Monte et, plus largement, les projets hydroélectriques en Amazonie sont traités dans les dialogues politiques menés avec le Brésil. Quelles sont les réactions de ce dernier?

2. d'expliquer comment sont évalués, au niveau mondial, les impacts environnementaux du développement d'infrastructures gigantesques qui ont lieu en Amazonie?

3. d'indiquer quelles sont les possibilités pour l'Union de jouer un rôle plus actif dans la limitation des incidences négatives de pareils projets sur l'environnement et les populations indigènes ainsi que pour encourager le développement soutenable?

4. de préciser les projets liés aux Droits de l'homme et aux droits des populations autochtones que l'Union conduit dans la région?

Réponse donnée par la Vice-présidente/Haute Représentante Ashton au nom de la Commission
(12 avril 2013)

L'Union européenne suit avec attention l'état d'avancement du projet de barrage de Belo Monte. Cependant, la construction du barrage est une opération nationale et sa réalisation relève de la souveraineté nationale. L'UE entretient un dialogue régulier avec le gouvernement de la République fédérative du Brésil dans les domaines de l'environnement et des Droits de l'homme, et des questions concernant le projet et les populations indigènes sont soulevées dans ce contexte. En outre, la délégation de l'UE et les États membres de l'UE sont en contact régulier avec des organisations de la société civile au Brésil et des représentants des populations indigènes. Le gouvernement brésilien n'a jamais demandé ni enjoint à l'UE de proposer d'autres solutions ou de donner son avis sur le projet de barrage de Belo Monte.

L'UE soutient, au moyen d'activités de coopération, la conservation des forêts et la protection des zones dans lesquelles sont construits des barrages. Elle a récemment approuvé un projet visant la consolidation des zones protégées dans la région de la Terra do Meio, dans l'État du Pará (Altamira), dont l'objectif est de contribuer à réduire la déforestation et à préserver la biodiversité en Amazonie. L'environnement est l'un des deux domaines prioritaires du document de stratégie 2007-2013 pour le Brésil (ICD). Trois projets sont en cours pour lutter contre la déforestation dans l'État du Pará. Des fonds supplémentaires ont été octroyés via la ligne budgétaire thématique pour l'environnement et les ressources naturelles (ENRTP). Actuellement, six projets en lien avec la lutte contre la déforestation sont en cours, pour un cofinancement total de l'UE de 15 millions d'euros.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001922/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Ulrike Lunacek (Verts/ALE), Eva Joly (Verts/ALE) and Catherine Grèze (Verts/ALE)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Belo Monte dam project in Brazil

The construction of the Belo Monte dam raises serious questions, particularly in respect of the rights of indigenous peoples. This project, like the thirty or so other hydroelectric projects in the Amazon, should ensure future energy supply for Brazil's booming population and economy, but such vast projects also contribute to deforestation and population displacement. The international community, notably via the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the United Nations Council of Human Rights, has expressed concern at this situation. In its resolution on the financing of reinforcement of dam infrastructure in developing countries, adopted on 27 September 2011, Parliament stated that the Belo Monte project would cause severe damage to the ecosystem and greatly harm the indigenous people. Vice-President/High Representative Ashton has said that the situation has been addressed in dialogue between the EU and Brazil, that the EU has drafted a paper on the protection of forests in the area encompassing Belo Monte and that the environment and climate change are crucial issues underpinning the EU's strategic partnership with Brazil.

In view of the foregoing, of the involvement of European companies in this project and of the reply given to Written Question P-0982/10, we call on the Vice-President/High Representative to outline:

1. how Belo Monte and the wider issue of hydroelectric power projects in the Amazon region are being addressed in dialogue with Brazil, and what Brazil's response has been;

2. how the international and the environmental impact of these vast infrastructure projects in the Amazon is evaluated;

3. how the EU can play a more active role in minimising both the environmental damage caused and the harm done to indigenous peoples by such projects, and in encouraging sustainable development;

4. what EU-run projects in the field of human rights and the rights of indigenous peoples are ongoing in the region.

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(12 April 2013)

The EU follows attentively the developments in the implementation of the Belo Monte dam project. However, the construction of the dam is a national endeavour and its execution is a matter of national sovereignty. The EU holds regular dialogues with the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil on environmental matters as well as on human rights matters and issues related to the project as well as to indigenous peoples are raised in the context of the latter. Moreover, the EU Delegation and EU Member States are in regular contact with relevant Brazilian civil society organisations and indigenous peoples' representatives. The EU has never been asked nor requested by the Brazilian government to propose alternatives or give its opinion on the Belo Monte dam project.

The EU is supporting — through cooperation activities — forest conservation and protection in the area of the dams. The EU has recently approved a Project on the Consolidation of Protected Areas in the Terra do Meio region, Pará state (Altamira) whose objective is to contribute to reducing deforestation and maintaining the biodiversity in the Amazon region. Environment is one of the two focal areas of the 2007-2013 Country Strategy Paper for Brazil (DCI). Three projects are currently in execution to tackle deforestation in the State of Para. Additional funding has been provided through the thematic budget line for environment and natural resources (ENRTP). Currently, 6 projects with relevance for the combat against deforestation are being executed, for a total EU co-funding of EUR15 million.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001924/13
alla Commissione
Matteo Salvini (EFD)
(22 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: Inserimento dello storno (sturnus vulgaris) tra le specie cacciabili in Italia

La direttiva 147/2009/CE concernente la conservazione degli uccelli selvatici riconosce la legittimità dell'attività venatoria praticata in forma sostenibile.

Il testo normativo limita il prelievo a talune specie espressamente elencate nell'allegato II e lo differenzia per ciascun Stato Membro.

Lo storno (sturnus vulgaris) è una specie in buono stato di conservazione in Italia e la sua caccia è consentita in tutti i Paesi del bacino del Mediterraneo. Inoltre, sono noti a tutti i danni che la sua diffusione sta provocando all'agricoltura.

Alla luce delle numerose problematiche legate a questo testo normativo e ai contenziosi che in questi anni si sono prodotti con alcuni Stati Membri e Regioni, ha intenzione la Commissione di proporre modifiche al testo della direttiva 147/2009/CE?

In particolare, non ritiene opportuno modificare l'allegato II della direttiva in oggetto, relativamente alle specie cacciabili in Italia, con specifico riferimento all'inserimento della specie storno (sturnus vulgaris)?

Risposta di Janez Potočnik a nome della Commissione
(27 marzo 2013)

La Commissione rinvia l'onorevole parlamentare alla risposta data all'interrogazione scritta E-9815/10 ([1]).

([1]) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/it/parliamentary-questions.html

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001924/13
to the Commission
Matteo Salvini (EFD)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: Inclusion of the Common Starling (Sturnus vulgaris) in the list of huntable species in Italy

Directive 147/2009/EC on the conservation of wild birds recognises the legitimacy of sustainable hunting.

The regulatory text limits the taking of certain species specifically listed in Annex II and differentiates this for each Member State.

The conservation status of the Common Starling (Sturnus vulgaris) in Italy is good and hunting of the species is permitted in all the countries of the Mediterranean basin. Moreover, the damage being caused to agriculture by its spread is known to all.

In light of the many problems arising from this piece of legislation and from the legal disputes that have occurred in recent years with some Member States and regions, does the Commission intend to table amendments to the text of Directive 147/2009/EC?

In particular, does it not believe that Annex II of that directive should be amended in respect of huntable species in Italy, with specific reference to the inclusion of the Common Starling (Sturnus vulgaris)?

Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission
(27 March 2013)

The Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answer to Written Question E-9815/10 ([1]).

([1]) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001925/13
alla Commissione
Andrea Zanoni (ALDE)
(22 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: Informazioni in tempo reale sui pollini allergenici nell'Unione europea

La Federazione europea delle associazioni di pazienti affetti da allergie e malattie delle vie respiratorie stima che in Europa 80 milioni di adulti (oltre il 24 %) soffrano di allergie varie, mentre la diffusione di queste patologie fra i bambini è attualmente stimata intorno al 30-40 % e in aumento. I pollini allergenici dispersi nell'aria rappresentano uno dei più importanti agenti responsabili dei sintomi allergici ([1]).

In un'Europa sempre più integrata, dove la mobilità delle persone tra uno Stato e l'altro è in costante aumento, venire a conoscenza delle concentrazioni atmosferiche dei pollini presenti in diverse regioni dell'Unione è di grande interesse per i medici e i pazienti allergici al fine di prevedere una migliore gestione dei sintomi della pollinosi. Da un lato, le persone con malattie respiratorie che viaggiano per l'Europa hanno bisogno di avere informazioni precise sui livelli di concentrazione dei pollini ovunque vadano, per poter meglio pianificare il loro viaggio e adottare le opportune misure preventive. Dall'altro, una conoscenza esatta degli aeroallergeni prevalenti nell'aria in un dato momento potrebbe migliorare la diagnosi e il trattamento di pazienti allergici ai pollini, in quanto permetterebbe un avvio tempestivo dei trattamenti di prevenzione e sintomatici dei problemi allergici stagionali. Tale conclusione è stata riconosciuta dall'Agenzia Europea dei Medicinali (EMA), che ha sottolineato l'importanza di monitorare l'esposizione dei pazienti agli allergeni già dal 2004 ([2]).

Al momento, tuttavia, in molti Stati membri i servizi di monitoraggio e informazione sui livelli dei pollini si basano solo sul lavoro volontario di ricercatori o gruppi di pazienti. In alcuni Stati membri tali attività sono in parte finanziate dai governi, ma in altri Stati dell'Unione questo sostegno finanziario è stato annullato. A differenza degli inquinanti atmosferici, per il polline non esiste, infatti, un obbligo generale di monitorarne la situazione nell'Unione europea.

Quindi, considerando che il 2013 è l'Anno europeo dell'aria e che la revisione della legislazione UE in materia di aria è prevista per il prossimo autunno, può la Commissione rispondere ai seguenti quesiti:

1. Sarebbe possibile garantire la prosecuzione di questo lavoro di monitoraggio prevedendo l'obbligo di fornire informazioni sul polline nel programma quadro europeo sulla qualità dell'aria?

2. Che tipo di finanziamento potrebbe essere utilizzato a livello europeo e nazionale per garantire la prosecuzione del lavoro di questi centri, così importanti per la salute e la qualità di vita di un elevato numero di cittadini europei?

Risposta di Janez Potočnik a nome della Commissione
(10 aprile 2013)

Attualmente non esiste alcuna normativa UE che affronti direttamente la questione del monitoraggio del polline o della diffusione di informazioni a cittadini e operatori sanitari riguardo ai livelli di concentrazione del polline. La legislazione e le politiche europee per la tutela dell'ambiente basate sul programma «Aria pulita per l'Europa» escludono tale sostanza in quanto le emissioni di polline non sono causate da attività umane e non possono pertanto essere ridotte attraverso l'intervento degli Stati membri.

La Commissione non ha individuato altri programmi di finanziamento che si prestino al monitoraggio del polline e alla diffusione di informazioni ad esso relative.

La Commissione non ha in progetto di ampliare la politica UE in materia di qualità dell'aria per includere il monitoraggio del polline, la diffusione di informazioni e il finanziamento di tali attività.

([1]) Organizzazione mondiale della sanità (OMS) e Organizzazione meteorologica mondiale (OMM), Atlante della Salute e del Clima, ottobre 2012: http://www.wmo.int/ebooks/WHO/Atlas_EN_web.pdf

([2]) Organizzazione mondiale della sanità (OMS) e Organizzazione meteorologica mondiale (OMM), Atlante della Salute e del Clima, ottobre 2012: http://www.wmo.int/ebooks/WHO/Atlas_EN_web.pdf

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001925/13
to the Commission
Andrea Zanoni (ALDE)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: Real-time information on allergenic pollen in the European Union

The European Federation of Allergy and Airways Diseases Patients' Associations estimates that 80 million adults in Europe (24%) suffer from various allergies, while the prevalence of these diseases among children is currently estimated at 30-40% and rising. Airborne allergenic pollens are one of the main causative agents of allergic symptoms ([1]).

In an increasingly integrated Europe, where mobility of people between one Member State and another is constantly on the rise, knowledge of the atmospheric pollen concentrations present in different regions of the EU is of great interest to physicians and allergic patients, with a view to providing better management of pollinosis symptoms. On the one hand, people with respiratory diseases who travel around Europe need to have precise information on pollen concentration levels wherever they go, so as to better plan their trips and take appropriate preventive measures. On the other hand, exact knowledge of aeroallergens prevalent in the air at any given time could improve the diagnosis and treatment of patients who are allergic to pollen, as this would enable the preventive as well as symptomatic treatment of seasonal allergy problems to begin in good time. This conclusion is acknowledged by the European Medicines Agency (EMA), which has been highlighting the importance of monitoring patient exposure to allergens since 2004 ([2]).

At present, however, pollen level monitoring and reporting in many Member States is based solely on voluntary work by researchers or groups of patients. In some Member States, such activities are partly financed by the government, but in other States this financial support has been withdrawn. In contrast to air pollutants, there is in fact no general obligation to monitor the pollen situation in the European Union.

Considering that 2013 is the European Year of Air and that the revision of EU air legislation is scheduled for next autumn, can the Commission answer the following questions:

1. Would it be possible to ensure the continuation of such monitoring by making it mandatory to provide pollen information under the Clean Air for Europe Programme?

2. What kind of funding could be used at European and national levels to ensure the continuation of the work being carried out by these centres, which play such an important role with regard to the health and quality of life of a large number of European citizens?

Answer given by Mr Potočnik on behalf of the Commission
(10 April 2013)

Currently no EU legislation directly addresses the monitoring of pollen or the dissemination of information of pollen levels to the public and healthcare professionals. EU environmental protection legislation or policy covered by the Clean Air for Europe Programme excludes such components because pollen emissions are not from man-made activities and hence cannot be reduced by Member State action.

The Commission has not been able to identify any current funding programme that would fit the scope of pollen monitoring and information dissemination.

The Commission has no plans to widen EU air quality policy in order to account for pollen monitoring, information dissemination and financing of such activities.

([1]) World Health Organisation (WHO) and World Meteorological Organisation (WMO), Atlas of Health and Climate, October 2012: http://www.wmo.int/ebooks/WHO/Atlas_EN_web.pdf

([2]) World Health Organisation (WHO) and World Meteorological Organisation (WMO), Atlas of Health and Climate, October 2012: http://www.wmo.int/ebooks/WHO/Atlas_EN_web.pdf

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-001926/13
aan de Raad
Laurence J. A. J. Stassen (NI), Lucas Hartong (NI) en Auke Zijlstra (NI)
(22 februari 2013)

Betreft: Lid Hezbollah bekent terroristische activiteiten

In „The Israel Project" is op 20 februari jl. een bericht verschenen dat Hossam Taleb Yaacoub, een lid van Hezbollah, heeft meegewerkt aan het voorbereiden van terroristische aanslagen op Israëlische toeristen, zoals op de Bulgaarse bus in Burgas ([1]). Hij deed zijn uitspraak in een proces waarbij hij werd beschuldigd van het voorbereiden van dergelijke terroristische aanslagen.

Dit bericht ondersteunt de vragen die wij op 31 oktober 2012 en 6 februari 2013 aan de Raad hebben gesteld over het plaatsen van Hezbollah op de terreurlijst van de Europese Unie.

1. Is de Raad met ons van mening dat met de bekentenis van de heer Yaacoub geen misverstand kan bestaan over de terroristische activiteiten van leden van Hezbollah?

2. Is de Raad met ons van mening dat er daarom geen enkel excuus is om Hezbollah niet toe te voegen aan de lijst van de Europese Unie van terroristische organisaties?

3. Vindt de Raad dat terreuraanslagen op onschuldige burgers zo snel als mogelijk de kop moeten worden ingedrukt en dat Hezbollah daarom onmiddellijk op de terreurlijst moet worden geplaatst?

Antwoord
(24 juni 2013)

Om een organisatie te kunnen opnemen in de lijst uit hoofde van Gemeenschappelijk standpunt 2001/931/GBVB van de Raad (GS 931) betreffende de toepassing van specifieke maatregelen ter bestrijding van het terrorisme ([2]) moet er een beslissing zijn genomen door een bevoegde instantie. De Raad besluit of er door een bevoegde instantie een beslissing is genomen als in het kader van de regeling inzake beperkende maatregelen (GS 931) een opneming in de lijst wordt voorgesteld. Deze procedure is gevolgd met betrekking tot de plaatsing van Hamas op de lijst. Wat betreft de Hezbollah wordt na de aanslag in Burgas nog verder onderzoek verricht, en de mogelijke toevoeging van de Hezbollah aan de lijst van personen, groepen en entiteiten die betrokken zijn bij terroristische daden, wordt actief overwogen. De Raad zal alleen wanneer een opneming in de lijst wordt voorgesteld, nagaan of er door een bevoegde instantie een beslissing is genomen. Om de Hezbollah in de lijst van terroristische organisaties op te nemen, moet de Raad met eenparigheid van stemmen een besluit nemen.

([1]) www.theisraelproject.org.
([2]) PB L 344 van 28.12.2001, blz. 93-96.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001926/13
to the Council
Laurence J.A.J. Stassen (NI), Lucas Hartong (NI) and Auke Zijlstra (NI)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: Admission by Hezbollah member of terrorist activities

On 20 February 2013, the Israel Project reported that Hossam Taleb Yaacoub, a member of Hezbollah, had been involved in preparing terrorist attacks on Israeli tourists, including that on the Bulgarian bus in Burgas ([1]). He had stated this during a trial in which he was charged with preparing such terrorist attacks.

This report bears out the questions to the Council which we tabled on 31 October 2012 and 6 February 2013 concerning placing Hezbollah on the European Union's list of terrorist organisations.

1. Does the Council agree that, following the admission by Mr Yaacoub, no misunderstanding is possible regarding the terrorist activities of members of Hezbollah?

2. Does the Council agree that there is therefore absolutely no excuse not to place Hezbollah on the EU list of terrorist organisations?

3. Does the Council consider that terrorist attacks on innocent citizens should be halted as quickly as possible, and that Hezbollah should therefore immediately be placed on the list of terrorist organisations?

Reply
(24 June 2013)

For the designation of an organisation under Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP (CP931) on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism ([2]), a decision needs to be taken by a competent authority. The Council decides whether a decision has been taken by a competent authority if a listing is proposed under the CP931 restrictive measures regime. This was the procedure that was followed in relation to the listing of Hamas. Regarding Hezbollah, follow-up work is being undertaken following the Burgas attack, and the possible addition of Hezbollah to the terrorist listing remains under active consideration. The Council will consider whether a decision has been taken by a competent authority only when a listing is proposed. The addition of Hezbollah to the list of terrorist organisations will require a decision by the Council acting unanimously.

([1]) www.theisraelproject.org.
([2]) OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, pp. 93-96.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-001927/13
aan de Commissie
Patricia van der Kammen (NI)
(22 februari 2013)

Betreft: Commissie wil luchtvaartmaatschappijen laten betalen voor vertraging bij mankementen

In *De Telegraaf* van 20 februari staat een artikel over een vertrouwelijk voorstel van de Commissie dat binnenkort wordt geagendeerd voor het overleg van de Europese verkeersministers ([1]). De Commissie wil voorstellen om luchtreizigers beter te beschermen bij vertragingen. Een van de voorstellen omvat een vergoeding bij een vertraging van meer dan vijf uur (overmacht uitgezonderd). Tegelijkertijd echter zullen volgens de berichtgeving pech of mankementen aan het vliegtuig in de nieuwe wetgeving zelden als overmacht worden beschouwd.

1. Is de Commissie bekend met het genoemde bericht over de vertrouwelijke plannen?

2. Klopt het bericht dat er een vertrouwelijk voorstel van de Commissie is over de bescherming van luchtreizigers bij vertraging? Wat is de aard van de vertrouwelijkheid? Waarom mag de EU-burger niet weten welke plannen de Commissie voorbereidt?

3. Klopt het dat de Commissie ook bij de nieuw in te voeren maatregel voor vertragingsvergoedingen wil vasthouden aan de regel dat pech en mankementen geen of nauwelijks reden kunnen zijn voor overmacht?

4. Is de Commissie het met de PVV eens dat deze maatregel economische nadelen met zich brengt voor luchtvaartmaatschappijen voor wie de veiligheid terecht de allerhoogste prioriteit heeft boven maatschappijen die uit economische overwegingen bereid zijn veiligheidsrisico's te nemen? Zo nee, waarom niet?

5. Is de Commissie het met de PVV eens dat met deze maatregel de veiligheid van de luchtvaart in het gedrang komt? Zo nee, waarom niet?

6. Is de Commissie bereid pech of mankementen als overmacht te beschouwen zodat veiligheid de allerhoogste prioriteit blijft? Zo nee, waarom niet?

Antwoord van de heer Kallas namens de Commissie
(2 april 2013)

1) en 2) In haar mededeling aan de Raad en het Parlement van 11 april 2011 ([2]) heeft de Commissie haar voornemen aangekondigd om in het licht van de arresten van het Europees Hof van Justitie (EHvJ) in de herziening van de verordening inzake de rechten van luchtvaartpassagiers ook expliciet in compensaties voor vertragingen te voorzien. Het document waar het geachte Parlementslid naar verwijst, is een werkdocument dat is opgesteld ter ondersteuning van de bespreking van herzieningsopties door de diensten van de Commissie. Werkdocumenten behoren per definitie niet tot het publieke domein omdat ze niet de definitieve conclusies van de Commissie weergeven. De Commissie heeft haar voorstellen tot wijziging van de verordening ingediend bij het Parlement en de Raad. De burgers van de Europese Unie zijn daarmee naar behoren geïnformeerd over de voorstellen.

3 tot en met 5) Neen. De Commissie volgt het arrest in de zaak-Wallentin-Hermann ([3]) van het EHvJ dat stelt dat het aan nationale rechtbanken staat om te beslissen of de technische mankementen van dien aard zijn dat een luchtvaartmaatschappij een compensatie voor langdurige vertragingen kan weigeren op basis van de omstandigheden van een individueel geval. De Commissie beschouwt veiligheid als de belangrijkste prioriteit en is van mening dat er reeds voldoende waarborgen bestaan om op te treden tegen luchtvaartmaatschappijen die zich niet aan de verplichtingen inzake veiligheid houden.

6) Overeenkomstig de verordening is het reeds toegestaan dat een luchtvaartmaatschappij weigert een compensatie voor langdurige vertragingen te betalen als zij kan aantonen dat de pech of het mankement te wijten was aan buitengewone omstandigheden.

([1]) http://www.telegraaf.nl/binnenland/21309116/__Luchtreiziger_beter_beschermd__.html
([2]) COM(2011) 174 definitief.
([3]) C-549/07.

js(English version)

Question for written answer E-001927/13
to the Commission
Patricia van der Kammen (NI)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: Commission wants to make airlines pay for delays caused by technical failures

De Telegraaf published an article on 20 February about a confidential Commission proposal that will soon be put on the agenda of the European transport ministers' meeting ([1]). The Commission wants to propose measures to improve protection for passengers in the event of delays. One of the proposals envisages compensation for delays of more than five hours (*force majeure* excepted). At the same time, according to the article, technical failures or defects affecting the plane will rarely be seen as *force majeure* under the new legislation.

1. Is the Commission familiar with the aforesaid report on the confidential plans?

2. Is the information in the report about the existence of a confidential Commission proposal on the protection of air passengers in the event of delays correct? What is the nature of this confidentiality? Why are EU citizens not allowed to know what plans the Commission is preparing?

3. Is it true that, in implementing the new measure on compensation for delays, the Commission wants to continue upholding the rule that technical failures and defects do not or barely constitute *force majeure*?

4. Does the Commission agree with the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV) that this measure entails economic disadvantages for airlines which see safety, quite rightly, as their highest priority *vis-à-vis* airlines which are prepared to take risks with safety out of economic considerations? If not, why not?

5. Does the Commission agree with the PVV that this measure compromises the safety of aviation? If not, why not?

6. Is the Commission prepared to regard technical failures or defects as *force majeure* so that safety will remain the highest priority? If not, why not?

Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission
(2 April 2013)

1 and 2. In its communication to the Council and Parliament of 11 April 2011 ([2]) the Commission announced its intention to expressly include within the revision of the air passenger rights Regulation compensation for delay in with the light of the rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The document to which the Honourable Member refers is a working paper developed to support discussion within the Commission's services as to possible revision options. Working papers by their nature are not within the public domain as they do not represent the Commission's final conclusions. The Commission has now submitted its proposals for the amendment of the regulation to both the Parliament and Council. EU citizens are now rightly aware of the proposals.

3-5. No. The Commission follows the ruling of the CJEU in the Wallentin-Hermann case ([3]) that it is for national courts to decide whether the extent of technical failures or defects are such that an air carrier can refuse compensation for long delay based on the circumstances of an individual case. The Commission considers that safety is the overarching priority and that appropriate safeguards are already in place to take enforcement action against any carrier that would compromise its safety obligations.

6. The regulation already allows an air carrier to refuse compensation for long delay where it can demonstrate that a technical failure or defect was due to extraordinary circumstances.

([1]) http://www.telegraaf.nl/binnenland/21309116/__Luchtreiziger_beter_beschermd__.html
([2]) COM(2011) 174 Final.
([3]) C 549/07.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-001928/13
aan de Commissie (Vicevoorzitter / Hoge Vertegenwoordiger)
Laurence J. A. J. Stassen (NI)
(22 februari 2013)

Betreft: VP/HR — oprichting Europese geheime dienst

Vicevoorzitter/hoge vertegenwoordiger Catherine Ashton werkt momenteel aan de oprichting van één inlichtingendienst voor de EU. Het Joint Situation Centre en de Watch Keeping Capability van de Europese Raad worden hierbij samengevoegd met de Crisis Room van de Europese Commissie. Het lijkt erop dat men een Europese tegenhanger van de Amerikaanse CIA probeert te vestigen.

1. Kan de vicevoorzitter/hoge vertegenwoordiger aangeven wat de status is van de samenvoeging van de drie inlichtingendiensten?

2. Kan de vicevoorzitter/hoge vertegenwoordiger uiteenzetten wat de wettelijke basis is voor het creëren van één grote „Europese" inlichtingendienst?

3. Kan de vicevoorzitter/hoge vertegenwoordiger aangeven wat de doelstelling en de taakstelling zullen zijn van deze „Europese" inlichtingendienst?

4. Is de vicevoorzitter/hoge vertegenwoordiger voornemens met deze samenvoeging van inlichtingendiensten een Europese tegenhanger van de CIA op te richten?

5. Is de vicevoorzitter/hoge vertegenwoordiger het met de PVV eens dat inlichtingendiensten en inlichtingenactiviteiten volledig onder de soevereiniteit van nationale lidstaten moeten blijven?

Antwoord van hoge vertegenwoordiger/vicevoorzitter Ashton namens de Commissie
(25 april 2013)

Het inwinnen van inlichtingen behoort niet tot de taken van het wachtdienstvermogen, noch tot die van het crisiscentrum van de Europese Commissie. Bovendien bestaan er geen plannen om het INTCEN van de EU (de opvolger van het SITCEN van de EU) samen te voegen met deze twee entiteiten.

Er zijn evenmin plannen om een „Europese" inlichtingendienst te creëren. Het spreekt voor zich dat elk initiatief op dit gebied zou vallen onder titel V van het Verdrag betreffende de werking van de Europese Unie, die reeds procedurele en materiële bepalingen over de prerogatieven van de lidstraten en van de Unie in dit verband bevat. In deze titel worden ook justitiële en politiële samenwerking behandeld.

Overeenkomstig artikel 73 van het Verdrag betreffende de werking van de Europese Unie, staat het de lidstaten vrij onderling en onder hun verantwoordelijkheid vormen van samenwerking en coördinatie te organiseren zoals zij het passend achten tussen hun bevoegde overheidsdiensten die verantwoordelijk zijn voor het verzekeren van de nationale veiligheid.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001928/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Laurence J.A.J. Stassen (NI)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — Creation of a European secret service

Vice-President/High Representative Catherine Ashton is currently working on the creation of a single intelligence service for the EU. This involves merging the European Council's Joint Situation Centre and Watch Keeping Capability with the European Commission's Crisis Room. This looks like an attempt to set up a European equivalent of the American CIA.

1. Can the Vice-President/High Representative indicate the status of the merger between the three intelligence services?

2. Can the Vice-President/High Representative explain the legal framework for the creation of one large 'European' intelligence service?

3. Can the Vice-President/High Representative indicate what targets and responsibilities this 'European' intelligence service will have?

4. Does the Vice-President/High Representative intend to create, by this merger of intelligence services, a European counterpart of the CIA?

5. Does the Vice-President/High Representative agree with the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV) that intelligence services and intelligence activities should remain under the full sovereignty of Member States?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(25 April 2013)

The functions of the Watch Keeping Capability nor of the European Commission's Crisis Room are not to collect intelligence. Moreover no plans exist to merge the EU INTCEN (successor of EU SITCEN) with these two entities.

There are no plans to create a 'European' intelligence service. Obviously any intiative in this field would be governed by Title V of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union which already contains a number of procedural and substantive provisions with regard to Member States and Union prerogatives in this regard. Furthermore Judicial and Police cooperation are addressed in this title.

Pursuant to Article 73 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Member States are free to organise between themselves and under their responsibility, cooperation and coordination as they deem appropriate between the departments responsible for safeguarding national security.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-001929/13
aan de Commissie
Auke Zijlstra (NI)
(22 februari 2013)

Betreft: Illegale eurobonds

Volgens Het Financieele Dagblad van 13 februari 2013 hebben de heren Dijsselbloem en Schäuble zich uitgesproken tegen eurobonds. De heer Schäuble heeft daarnaast gesteld dat ook de ECB van mening is dat eurobonds niet in overeenstemming zijn met het huidige Verdrag.

De Commissie heeft vandaag aangekondigd een werkgroep in te stellen om de voors en tegens van de introductie van eurobonds te onderzoeken.

In dit licht de volgende vragen.

1. Is de Commissie ook van mening dat eurobonds inderdaad in strijd zijn met het huidige Verdrag?

2. Zo nee, kan de Commissie toelichten waar de heren Schäuble en Dijsselbloem de mist ingaan?

3. Zo ja, wat is het nut van een werkgroep waarvan het werk onder de huidige omstandigheden niet implementeerbaar is?

4. Wat zijn de kosten van deze, blijkbaar onnutte, werkgroep?

5. Is de Commissie voornemens om, als de uitkomsten van de werkgroep daar aanleiding toe geven, een verdragswijziging voor te stellen?

Antwoord van de heer Rehn namens de Commissie
(17 april 2013)

In haar Blauwdruk voor een hechte economische en monetaire unie heeft de Commissie verklaard dat een aflossingsfonds en euroschatkistpapier („eurobills") onder bepaalde strenge voorwaarden op middellange termijn mogelijk deel kunnen uitmaken van een hechte economische en monetaire unie. In de Blauwdruk wordt gesteld dat voor beide mogelijkheden een aanpassing van de Verdragen nodig zou zijn. Het leidende beginsel moet zijn dat elke stap tot verdere wederzijdse risicowaarborging gepaard moet gaan met een grotere discipline en integratie op begrotingsgebied. Er zal een groep van deskundigen worden opgericht om de mogelijke voordelen, risico's, voorwaarden en belemmeringen van de gedeeltelijke vervanging van nationale emissies van schuldtitels door een gezamenlijke emissieregeling op basis van een aflossingsfonds en euroschatkistpapier, nader te analyseren. De taak van de groep zal erin bestaan grondig na te gaan hoe de wettelijke bepalingen en de financiële architectuur voor het verrichten van de emissies alsook hoe het vereiste aanvullend economisch en begrotingskader eruit moeten zien. De democratische verantwoordingsplicht is een essentieel punt dat de groep zal onderzoeken. De groep wordt verzocht haar eindverslag uiterlijk in maart 2014 aan de Commissie voor te stellen. De Commissie zal het verslag beoordelen en, indien nodig, vóór het einde van haar mandaat voorstellen indienen.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001929/13
to the Commission
Auke Zijlstra (NI)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: Illegal eurobonds

According to an article published in Het Financieele Dagblad on 13 February 2013, Messrs Dijsselbloem and Schäuble have spoken against eurobonds. Mr Schäuble has also stated that the ECB's position is that eurobonds are not consistent with the current Treaty.

The Commission announced today that a working group will be established to look into the pros and cons of the introduction of eurobonds.

In this light, please could you answer the following questions:

1. Does the Commission share the view that eurobonds are indeed inconsistent with the current Treaty?

2. If not, can the Commission explain where Messrs Schäuble and Dijsselbloem are going wrong?

3. If so, what is the use of a working group whose work cannot be implemented under the current circumstances?

4. What are the costs of this apparently useless working group?

5. Is the Commission going to propose amendments to the Treaty if the working group's findings warrant them?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission
(17 April 2013)

In its Blueprint for a Deep and Genuine EMU, the Commission considered that, in the medium-term, a redemption fund and eurobills could be possible elements of deep and genuine EMU under certain rigorous conditions. The Blueprint states that both of these possibilities would require amending the Treaties. The guiding principle would be that any steps to further mutualisation of risk must go hand-in-hand with greater fiscal discipline and integration. The Expert Group will be established to deepen the analysis on the possible merits, risks, requirements and obstacles of partial substitution of national issuance of debt through joint issuance in the form of a redemption fund and eurobills. The Group will be tasked to thoroughly assess, what could be their features in terms of legal provisions, financial architecture and the necessary complementary economic and budgetary framework. Democratic accountability will be a central issue to be considered. The Group will be invited to present its final report to the Commission not later than March 2014. The Commission will assess the report and, if appropriate, make proposals before the end of its mandate.

(Wersja polska)

Pytanie wymagające odpowiedzi pisemnej E-001930/13
do Komisji
Lena Kolarska-Bobińska (PPE)
(22 lutego 2013 r.)

Przedmiot: Subsydia dla energetyki odnawialnej

Niedawno w różnych wypowiedziach dyrektor DG Energy stwierdził, że:

„The whole idea of subsidies for renewables, was to get them to be scaled up, so that costs could be brought down. This has succeeded, so now subsidies can be reduced. Those who complain about this cannot expect to enjoy windfall profits." (4.2.2013, E-World conference, Essen, Germany)

Czy w związku z tym Komisja przedstawi plan wygaszania subsydiów dla energetyki odnawialnej?

Kiedy zostanie przedstawiony?

Odpowiedź udzielona przez komisarza Günthera Oettingera w imieniu Komisji
(2 kwietnia 2013 r.)

Komisja przygotowuje obecnie niewiążące wskazówki dotyczące najlepszych praktyk w zakresie opracowania i reformy systemów wsparcia, zapowiedziane w komunikacie w sprawie energii odnawialnej z 2012 r. ([1]). Wskazówki te będą miały na celu niedopuszczenie do nadmiernej kompensacji odnawialnych źródeł energii, większe ukierunkowanie rynkowe systemów wsparcia energii odnawialnej oraz stworzenie bardziej przewidywalnych i przejrzystych ram takiego wsparcia. Wskazówki powinny zostać przedstawione do połowy 2013 r.

([1]) Komunikat – Energia odnawialna: ważny uczestnik europejskiego rynku energii [COM/2012/271].

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001930/13
to the Commission
Lena Kolarska-Bobińska (PPE)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: Subsidies for renewable energy

Recently the Director-General of DG Energy stated:

'The whole idea of subsidies for renewables was to get them to be scaled up, so that costs could be brought down. This has succeeded, so now subsidies can be reduced. Those who complain about this cannot expect to enjoy windfall profits.' (4.2.2013, E-World conference, Essen, Germany)

In relation to this, is the Commission going to bring forward a plan to halt subsidies for renewable energy?

When will it be brought forward?

Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission
(2 April 2013)

The Commission is currently preparing non-binding guidance for best practice of support scheme design and reform as announced in the Renewables Communication from 2012 ([1]). This guidance will aim at avoiding over compensation for renewables, at making renewable energy support schemes more market based, and at creating a more predictable and transparent framework for such support. The guidance should be brought forward by mid-2013.

([1]) Communication — Renewable energy: a major player in the European energy market [COM/2012/271].

(Versiunea în limba română)

Întrebarea cu solicitare de răspuns scris E-001932/13
adresată Comisiei
Vasilica Viorica Dăncilă (S&D)
(22 februarie 2013)

Subiect: Meserii deficitare — renovarea clădirilor

Renovarea clădirilor din patrimoniul instituțiilor publice, dar și a celor cu altă destinație decât cea de locuit și a clădirilor comerciale, reprezintă un domeniu important de activitate, care poate contribui la crearea a circa 2 milioane de locuri de muncă.

Problema cu care se confruntă însă în prezent instituțiile publice și companiile implicate în acest gen de activitate este deficitul de forță de muncă calificată, care să poată acoperi toate ramurile activității. În plus, obținerea de atestate pentru persoanele interesate implică costuri semnificative.

Cum intenționează Comisia să sprijine programele de formare și reconversie profesională pentru acoperirea acestui deficit, cu scopul de a permite accesul unui număr cât mai mare de persoane aflate în șomaj, cu accent pe atragerea tinerilor aflați la început de carieră, cu costuri reduse din partea acestora?

Răspuns dat de Dna Vassiliou în numele Comisiei
(9 aprilie 2013)

Pentru depășirea obstacolelor din calea mobilității forței de muncă, Uniunea Europeană a adoptat legislația privind libera circulație a serviciilor, Directiva privind recunoașterea reciprocă a calificărilor profesionale și recomandări către statele membre cu privire la instrumentele aferente mobilității și învățării de-a lungul întregii vieți.

„Procesul de la Copenhaga" de cooperare europeană în domeniul formării profesionale pledează pentru mai multe oferte de educație personalizată, moduri flexibile de predare și sisteme bine stabilite de validare și recunoaștere a competențelor dobândite într-un context informal ([1]). Recunoașterea unor părți din procesul de certificare/calificare ar reduce costurile suportate de o persoană pentru obținerea unui certificat de calificare profesională.

În ceea ce privește deficitul de muncitori calificați din sectorul construcțiilor, inițiativa UE intitulată „Build up Skills" (din cadrul programului „Energie Inteligentă pentru Europa") sprijină elaborarea unor foi de parcurs în domeniul calificării forței de muncă din construcții, precum și crearea sau modernizarea programelor de formare.

Sectorul construcțiilor ar putea, la rândul său, să își îmbunătățească abilitatea de a identifica și a anticipa necesarul de competențe, după cum se precizează în Comunicarea „Strategie pentru competitivitatea durabilă a sectorului construcțiilor și a întreprinderilor sale" ([2]). Un studiu de fezabilitate privind crearea unui Consiliu european pentru competențe sectoriale este în prezent în curs de desfășurare, în vederea încurajării colaborării pentru o mai bună informare și guvernanță în domeniul competențelor profesionale. Analiza ar putea fi transpusă în programe de formare susținute, de exemplu, prin noua acțiune „Alianțe pentru competențele sectoriale" din cadrul programului propus „Erasmus pentru toți". Obiectivul Alianțelor pentru competențele sectoriale este de a concepe și a prezenta, după identificarea necesarului de competențe și a tendințelor, programe și metode comune de învățământ prin care cursanții să poată dobândi competențele cerute pe piața muncii.

([1]) Comunicatul de la Bruges: http://ec.europa.eu/education/lifelong-learning-policy/vet_en.htm
([2]) COM(2012) 433 final, 31.7.2012.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001932/13
to the Commission
Vasilica Viorica Dăncilă (S&D)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: Skills shortage — building renovation

The renovation of buildings that are part of the public heritage, as well as other buildings such as housing and commercial buildings, is an important sector that could help to create around 2 million jobs.

The problem currently confronting public institutions and companies involved in this type of activity is the shortage of qualified workers, which affects all branches. Furthermore, people wishing to obtain occupational skills certificates face significant costs.

How will the Commission support vocational training and retraining programmes to make good this shortfall, with the aim of providing access for as many unemployed people as possible and focusing on attracting young people who are starting out in their careers, while reducing the costs involved?

Answer given by Ms Vassiliou on behalf of the Commission
(9 April 2013)

In order to overcome obstacles to the mobility of professionals, the European Union has passed legislation on the free movement of services, the directive on mutual recognition of professional qualifications, and recommendations to Member States on instruments for mobility and lifelong learning.

The 'Copenhagen Process' for European cooperation in vocational training calls for more tailored training offers, flexible modes of delivery and well-established systems of validation and recognition of skills acquired in an informal context ([1]). Recognising parts of a pathway to a certification/qualification would reduce the costs for an individual to obtain an occupational skills certificate.

Considering the skills shortages among workers in the construction sector the EU initiative 'Build Up Skills' (Intelligent Energy Europe programme) supports the development of qualification roadmaps for building craftsmen and the set-up or upgrade of training programmes.

Furthermore, the construction sector could improve its ability to identify and anticipate skills needs as outlined in the communication Strategy for the sustainable competitiveness of the construction sector and its enterprises ([2]). A feasibility study for the creation of a European Sector Skills Council is currently ongoing in view of fostering collaboration for better skills intelligence and governance. Analysis could be translated into training programmes, supported, for example, by the proposed Erasmus for All programme through the new action Sector Skills Alliances. Drawing on evidence of skills needs and trends, Sector Skills Alliances are intended to design and deliver joint curricula and methods which provide learners with the skills required by the labour market.

([1]) Bruges Communiqué: http://ec.europa.eu/education/lifelong-learning-policy/vet_en.htm
([2]) COM(2012) 433 final of 31.07.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001933/13
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative)
Geoffrey Van Orden (ECR)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: VP/HR — European Union Training Mission (EUTM) Mali

We are told that the EU's training mission in Mali (EUTM Mali), launched on 18 February 2013, 'will provide advice and military training to the Malian Armed Forces'.

1. What is the composition and duration of the mission?

2. Who will the mission actually train? Will any distinction be made between those soldiers who were affiliated with the 2012 coup d'état, and those who were not?

3. Precisely what operational training will Malian soldiers be receiving from EUTM teams? What equipment will be used to train the Malians?

4. Is there an intention to provide equipment not already available to the Malians?

5. Once trained, will the Malian troops trained by EUTM be formed into new units or merely be absorbed into the Malian army?

Answer given by High-Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(24 April 2013)

EUTM Mali is up to 200 trainers plus the Mission HQ, Logistic support and Force Protection elements for a total of around 500 personnel. The Training site is located in Koulikoro (60 km North from Bamako) and the Mission HQ in Bamako. The mission is planned for 15 months including a hand-over phase. Currently 23 countries contribute to the mission.

The expertise and advice pillar of the mission has started 18 February, while the training one is expected for the 2 April with the training of a first Malian Battle group (650 personnel). The selection of the personnel remains the responsibility of the Malian Armed Forces.

Training will focus on Individual basic military trainings, plus platoon and company level trainings and manoeuvre. In addition some specific courses will be implemented such as C-IED, artillery, engineers, and human rights.

The Malians units trained by EUTM will use their own equipment and vehicles. However and due to the poor supply conditions of the Malian Armed Forces, several initiatives have been established to provide the necessary equipment, such as the UN trust fund, the EU Military Staff clearing house mechanism and bilateral actions.

Once trained the Malian units/battle group will be back to the Malian Armed Forces chain of command, it is assessed that they will remain as organic units.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta P-001934/13
alla Commissione
Matteo Salvini (EFD)
(22 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: Conseguenze sull'agricoltura e sull'industria agroalimentare europea della possibile abolizione dei dazi all'importazione del riso dalla Birmania/Myanmar

In considerazione della situazione politica ancora incerta, della totale mancanza di rispetto dei diritti umani fondamentali in Birmania/Myanmar, nonché dei rilievi sull'osservanza dei diritti dei lavoratori più volte avanzati dall'OIL (Organizzazione Internazionale del Lavoro), diversi osservatori evidenziano l'opportunità, nonostante l'avvenuto cambio di regime, di mantenere in vigore la sospensione in atto dal 1997 del trattamento di favore in campo economico (esenzione dei dazi sull'importazione di molti prodotti, incluso il riso) riservato a questo paese.

Tuttavia, la Commissione europea ha proposto di rivedere tale decisione e di ripristinare il trattamento preferenziale, sopprimendo, pertanto, i dazi sull'importazione del riso (del valore di circa 175 euro a tonnellata) e di un vasto numero di altri prodotti dalla Birmania/Myanmar.

Ciò premesso, chiediamo alla Commissione:

1. Quali saranno gli effetti della soppressione di tali dazi sul sistema produttivo e sull'industria agroalimentare europea ed italiana, in particolare in quei settori legati al ciclo produttivo e commerciale del riso?

2. È stato effettuato uno studio preliminare atto a quantificare quanto denaro dovrà utilizzare la Commissione per affrontare le conseguenze in termini sociali di questo eventuale provvedimento, al fine di sostenere i lavoratori e l'industria europea del settore e i produttori agricoli danneggiati? Se sì, quali sono i risultati di tale studio?

Risposta di Dacian Cioloş a nome della Commissione
(19 marzo 2013)

La normativa UE prevede che le preferenze tariffarie nell'ambito del sistema di preferenze generalizzate (SPG) siano accordate in modo non discriminatorio, a patto che i paesi beneficiari non siano responsabili di violazioni gravi e sistematiche delle convenzioni in materia di diritti fondamentali dell'uomo e diritto del lavoro. È per questo motivo che i privilegi EBA della Birmania/Myanmar sono stati sospesi, anche se temporaneamente, nel 1997. Tuttavia, poiché si ritiene che queste ragioni non sussistano più, non esiste alcuna motivazione giuridica per mantenere tale sospensione.

La Commissione è consapevole che la produzione di riso ha un'importanza fondamentale per la Birmania/Myanmar, ma non ritiene che sussistano rischi di turbative del mercato del riso, né a breve né a medio termine, in quanto tale paese non è assolutamente in grado di sfruttare al meglio il suo potenziale. In Birmania/Myanmar il settore del riso conoscerà probabilmente un rapido sviluppo. Tuttavia il fulcro degli scambi commerciali rimarrà l'esportazione di riso non trasformato nei paesi vicini e l'esportazione di riso di scarsa qualità e a basso costo nei paesi del terzo mondo, anche se a lungo termine vi sono i presupposti perché tale paese diventi uno dei principali esportatori di riso.

Se l'impennata delle esportazioni di riso dovesse provocare gravi turbative nel mercato dell'UE, sarà possibile fare ricorso agli strumenti di difesa commerciale, conformemente alle norme dell'OMC e alla normativa unionale.

Alla luce di quanto detto sopra, la Commissione non ritiene giustificata una proposta di indennizzo a favore del settore risicolo europeo.

(English version)

Question for written answer P-001934/13
to the Commission
Matteo Salvini (EFD)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: Effects on European agriculture and Europe's agri-food industry of the potential abolition of import duties on rice from Burma/Myanmar

In view of the still uncertain political situation in Burma/Myanmar and the total lack of respect for human rights there, as well as the criticisms levelled on several occasions by the ILO with regard to respect for workers' rights, many observers are pointing to the need, despite the change in regime, to maintain the suspension of preferential economic treatment (exemption from import duties on many products, including rice) first imposed on that country in 1997.

The Commission has nevertheless proposed a review of that decision and to reintroduce preferential treatment and hence abolish import duties on rice (worth around EUR 175 per tonne) and a vast number of other products from Burma/Myanmar.

Can the Commission state:

1. What the effects of abolishing those duties will be on agricultural production and the agri-food industry in Europe and in Italy, especially in those sectors connected with the production and marketing of rice?

2. Whether a preparatory study has been conducted to assess how much money the Commission will have to use to support the EU's agri-food industry and workers and the farmers affected by the social consequences of this potential measure? If so, what were the results of that study?

Answer given by Mr Cioloş on behalf of the Commission
(19 March 2013)

EU legislation stipulates that preferences under the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) must be granted on a non-discriminatory basis, unless countries engage in serious and systematic violations of core human and labour rights conventions. On this ground the EBA privileges of Myanmar were suspended only on temporary basis in 1997. However, as these reasons were found not to persist anymore, there is no legal ground to maintain the suspension.

The Commission is aware that rice production has special significance for Myanmar but does not see a risk of disturbances on the rice market at short or medium term, as Myanmar is not even near to exploiting its potential. Even if the rapid development of the rice sector in Myanmar is expected to continue, the bulk of the trade is expected to remain unprocessed rice exports to the neighbouring countries and exports of cheap, low quality rice to countries of the third world. Nevertheless, longer term, Myanmar does have the potential to become a leading rice exporter.

If evidence is provided that such rice export surges create serious disturbances on the EU market, trade defence instruments in accordance to WTO rules and EU legislation remain available.

In light of the above, the Commission does not consider that a proposal for compensation of the European rice sector would be justified.

(Versión española)

Pregunta con solicitud de respuesta escrita E-001935/13
a la Comisión
Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE)
(22 de febrero de 2013)

Asunto: Ayudas del FEDER desaprovechadas en España

Los medios de comunicación españoles han recogido recientemente una información en la que se detalla que este Estado de la Unión será en 2012 el que acumule el 82 % de los fondos del FEDER desaprovechados por los Estados europeos. En concreto se afirma que al no haberse concretado los programas para los que se solicitaron las ayudas correspondientes, deberán retirarse a España 66,83 millones de euros correspondientes a programas de 2010. La mayor parte de los programas no ejecutados se localizaban en Extremadura, seguidos por la Comunidad Valenciana y Madrid.

A la vista de estos datos,

¿Qué tipo de actuaciones iban a financiarse con estas ayudas?

¿Qué razones se han alegado para no poder desarrollar los programas previstos?

¿A qué se debe la especial concentración de los incumplimientos en una comunidad autónoma concreta, como en este caso Extremadura, que acumula 57 millones de los cerca de 67 que no van a utilizarse?

¿Ha recibido la Comisión peticiones en ejercicios sucesivos relacionadas con las mismas actividades?

Respuesta del Sr. Hahn en nombre de la Comisión
(4 de abril de 2013)

La pregunta se refiere a la aplicación de la denominada norma n + 2 en el año 2010 (cuya aplicación formal tuvo lugar por lo tanto a finales de 2012) en lo que respecta al Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional (FEDER).

La Comisión confirma que ninguna de las regiones citadas por su señoría (la Comunidad Valenciana, Extremadura y la Comunidad de Madrid) tuvo que aplicar una liberación presupuestaria automática dado que las tres regiones certificaron, a finales de 2012, las cantidades comprometidas en 2010.

De hecho, la Comisión puede confirmar que no hubo liberación presupuestaria en ninguna región española en 2012 por incumplimiento de la norma n + 2 en lo que respecta al FEDER.

Por ello, la Comisión no tiene constancia del problema planteado en la pregunta, no tiene preocupación particular por la aplicación en Extremadura ni ha recibido ninguna otra pregunta relativa a este asunto.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001935/13
to the Commission
Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (ALDE)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: Unspent ERDF appropriations in Spain

The Spanish media has recently reported that Spain accounted for a total of 82% of all unused ERDF funding in the EU in 2012. The reports added that Spain would have to repay EUR 66.83 million of the aid it was granted for programmes in 2010 that have yet to be implemented. The worst culprit for failing to implement programmes was Extremadura, followed by the Community of Valencia and Madrid.

What was this aid intended to finance?

What explanations have been given as to why the programmes have not gone ahead?

Why have so many programmes not been implemented in Extremadura, which accounts for EUR 57 million of the almost EUR 67 million that Spain neglected to spend?

Is this a recurring problem and has the Commission subsequently received any other questions about it?

Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission
(4 April 2013)

The question refers to the application of the so-called n + 2 rule for the year 2010 and thus formal application at the end of 2012 for the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF).

The Commission confirms that none of the regions mentioned by the Honourable Member (Comunidad Valenciana, Extremadura and Madrid) had to apply automatic decommitment because at the end of 2012 all three certified the amounts committed in 2010.

Furthermore, the Commission can confirm that no Spanish region suffered budgetary decommitment in 2012 on grounds of failure to abide by the n + 2 rule for the ERDF.

Consequently, the Commission does not recognise the issues raised in the question, has no particular concerns about implementation in Extremadura and has not received any other questions on this matter.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-001936/13
an den Rat
Evelyn Regner (S&D)
(22. Februar 2013)

Betrifft: Massenverhaftungen in der Türkei

In den letzten Jahren häufen sich unter der AKP-Regierung Massenverhaftungen und Polizeirazzien bei Gewerkschafterinnen, Journalistinnen, Künstlerinnen und Rechtsanwältinnen.

Den Festgenommenen werden Verstöße gegen die Anti-Terror-Gesetze vorgeworfen.

1. Sind dem Rat die Razzien und Verhaftungswellen bekannt?

2. Wenn ja, wie beurteilt der Rat diese Vorgehensweise?

3. Wie steht der Rat zu dem Vorwurf, die Türkei missbrauche das Anti-Terror-Gesetz, um Regierungskritiker mundtot machen zu wollen?

Antwort
(22. April 2013)

Der vom Rat angenommene Verhandlungsrahmen setzt voraus, dass die Türkei den Reformprozess fortsetzt und auf weitere Verbesserungen hinsichtlich der Achtung der Grundsätze der Freiheit, der Demokratie und der Rechtsstaatlichkeit sowie der Wahrung der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten hinarbeitet. Zu den von der Türkei umzusetzenden kurzfristigen Prioritäten im Rahmen der Beitrittspartnerschaft zählt auch, dass die Türkei die uneingeschränkte Achtung der Meinungsfreiheit gewährleistet, die Situation der wegen friedlicher Meinungsäußerung verfolgten oder verurteilten Personen verbessert und weitere Reformen im Bereich der Vereinigungsfreiheit und des Rechts auf friedliche Versammlung durchführt.

Der Rat hat die Türkei in seinen Schlussfolgerungen vom 11. Dezember 2012 aufgerufen, dafür zu sorgen, dass die Grundrechte und -freiheiten in der Rechtsetzung wie auch in der Praxis besser geachtet werden, insbesondere im Bereich der Meinungsfreiheit, und größere Anstrengungen zur Umsetzung aller Urteile des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte zu unternehmen. Der Rat hat insbesondere auf die große Zahl von Gerichtsverfahren gegen Schriftsteller, Journalisten, Akademiker und Menschenrechtsverteidiger, die häufigen Website-Sperrungen und die ausgedehnte Anwendung der Gesetzgebung zu Terrorismus und organisiertem Verbrechen hingewiesen und betont, dass diese Einschränkungen weiterhin Anlass zu ernster Besorgnis geben, die es auszuräumen gilt. Der Rat erwartet, dass mit dem jüngst vorgelegten vierten Justizreformpaket sämtliche Kernprobleme angegangen werden, die derzeit die Ausübung der Grundrechte und Grundfreiheiten einschränken.

Die Union misst diesen Themen als Teil des laufenden Reformprozesses in der Türkei große Bedeutung bei. Eine genaue Überwachung und Bewertung der Fortschritte vor Ort wird im Einklang mit dem Verhandlungsrahmen und der Beitrittspartnerschaft fortgesetzt, und die EU wird diese Thematik auch in Zukunft aufmerksam verfolgen.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001936/13
to the Council
Evelyn Regner (S&D)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: Mass arrests in Turkey

Mass arrests of, and police raids on, trade unionists, journalists, artists and lawyers have become more and more frequent in recent years under the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) Government.

Those arrested are accused of infringements of the anti-terror laws.

1. Is the Council aware of the raids and the wave of arrests?

2. If so, what is the Council's view of this practice?

3. What is its position with regard to the accusation that Turkey is misusing the anti-terror law in order to silence critics of the government?

Reply
(22 April 2013)

The general position of the EU regarding respect for and commitment to the basic principles of democracy and human rights, including freedom of expression and freedom of the media, is very clear. As a candidate country, Turkey has to meet the Copenhagen political criteria, including the stability of institutions guaranteeing the rule of law and human rights.

Under the Negotiating Framework adopted by the Council, Turkey is expected to sustain the process of reform and to work towards further improvement in respect for the principles of liberty, democracy, the rule of law and in respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The short-term priorities enshrined in the Accession Partnership to be implemented by Turkey require it to ensure full respect for freedom of expression, to remedy the situation of those persons prosecuted or sentenced for non-violent expression of opinion, and to continue the implementation of reforms concerning freedom of association and peaceful assembly.

In its conclusions of 11 December 2012, the Council called on Turkey to further improve the observance of fundamental rights and freedoms in law and in practice, in particular in the area of freedom of expression, and to enhance its efforts to implement all the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. The Council made special references to the large number of legal cases launched against writers, journalists, academics and human rights defenders, frequent website bans, as well as broad application of the legislation on terrorism and organised crime, noting that these restrictions continued to raise serious concerns that need to be addressed effectively. The Council expects that the recently presented fourth judicial reform package will address all the core issues currently affecting the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms.

The Union attaches great importance to these issues as part of the ongoing reform process in Turkey. Close monitoring and evaluation of progress on the ground will continue in accordance with the Negotiating Framework and the Accession Partnership, and these matters will continue to be closely followed by the EU.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-001937/13
an die Kommission
Evelyn Regner (S&D)
(22. Februar 2013)

Betrifft: Massenverhaftungen in der Türkei

In den letzten Jahren häufen sich unter der AKP-Regierung Massenverhaftungen und Polizeirazzien bei GewerkschafterInnen, JournalistInnen, KünstlerInnen und RechtsanwältInnen.

Den Festgenommenen werden Verstöße gegen die Anti-Terror-Gesetze vorgeworfen.

1. Sind der Kommission die Razzien und Verhaftungswellen bekannt?

2. Wenn ja, wie beurteilt die Kommission diese Vorgehensweise?

3. Wie steht die Kommission zu dem Vorwurf, die Türkei missbrauche das Anti-Terror-Gesetz, um Regierungskritiker mundtot machen zu wollen?

Antwort von Herrn Füle im Namen der Kommission
(24. April 2013)

Das Thema, auf das sich die Frau Abgeordnete bezieht, ist der Kommission bekannt und wird von ihr genau verfolgt.

Die Kommission hat wiederholt hervorgehoben, dass die türkischen Anti-Terror-Gesetze weiterhin Anlass zu ernster Besorgnis geben und in einer Weise angewandt werden, die zu Einschränkungen der Grundrechte führt.

Die Kommission begrüßt die Verabschiedung des 4. Justizreformpakets durch das Parlament, das auch die Bereiche Meinungsfreiheit und Rechte von Beschuldigten einbezieht. Dies ist ein sehr wichtiger Schritt auf dem Weg zur Achtung der Grundrechte in der Türkei im Einklang mit der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention (EMRK) und den Urteilen des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte (EGMR).

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001937/13
to the Commission
Evelyn Regner (S&D)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: Mass arrests in Turkey

Mass arrests of, and police raids on, trade unionists, journalists, artists and lawyers have become more and more frequent in recent years under the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) Government.

Those arrested are accused of infringements of the anti-terror laws.

1. Is the Commission aware of the raids and the wave of arrests?

2. If so, what is the Commission's view of this practice?

3. What is its position with regard to the accusation that Turkey is misusing the anti-terror law in order to silence critics of the government?

Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission
(24 April 2013)

The Commission is aware of and closely following the issue the Honourable Member is referring to.

The Commission has underlined on many occasions that terrorism-related provisions of Turkish legislation remain a cause of serious concern and are applied in a way which leads to restrictions on fundamental rights.

The Commission welcomes the adoption by the parliament of the 4th judicial reform package which addresses the issues of freedom of expression and rights of defendants. This is a very important development towards the respect for fundamental rights in Turkey in line with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001938/13
to the Commission
Chris Davies (ALDE)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: Application of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive

Through what measures has the UK transposed Article 7 ('Misleading Omissions') of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (2005/29/EC) into its national law?

What arrangements have been made in the UK to enable citizens to apply for redress if they believe that a commercial practice is, or has been, misleading?

In the case of a misleading commercial practice promoted through a website of a company located in one Member State but regarding the provision of products and services in another, can the Commission confirm that it would be the responsibility of the Member State in which the company was located to enforce the provisions of the directive?

What evidence would the Commission require to enable it to commence infringement proceedings against a Member State that allegedly failed to enforce the requirements of the directive?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(17 April 2013)

The United Kingdom (UK) implemented the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive ([1]) (UCPD) in the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (SI 2008/1277). In particular, Section 6 of the regulations deals with misleading omissions.

The UCPD requires Member States to ensure that adequate and effective means exist to combat unfair commercial practices and that penalties laid down for the infringement of national provisions are effective, proportionate and dissuasive.

In the UK, any citizen who feels his consumer rights under the regulations 2008 have been infringed, can file a complaint to the Office of Fair Trading, which can take legal action against a trader ([2]).

The Commission can open infringement proceedings if it has evidence for an infringement of EC law by a Member State, such as a lack or inadequate transposition of an EU Directive or an administrative practice which is not in compliance with EC law. The Honourable Member is invited to provide any information in his possession which may point to such a failure on the part of the UK.

As regards cross-border infringements, the regulation on Consumer Protection Cooperation (CPC) ([3]) establishes a network of enforcement authorities and empowers them to detect, investigate and stop such infringements. Under Article 8, the enforcement authority of the Member State where a trader responsible for such infringement is located, is responsible for bringing about the cessation of the practice.

Lastly, the report on the application of the UCPD ([4]) adopted on 14 March 2013 outlines key priorities to reach a coherent implementation of the directive in the Member States.

([1]) OJ L 149, 11.6.2005, p. 22.
([2]) Further information on the enforcement systems put in place in the Member States can be found on the UCPD legal database by clicking on the 'Country' rubric: https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/ucp/public/index.cfm?event=public.home.show.
([3]) OJ L 364 of 9.12.2004, p. 1.
([4]) COM(2013) 139 final.

(Deutsche Fassung)

Anfrage zur schriftlichen Beantwortung E-001939/13
an die Kommission
Jan Philipp Albrecht (Verts/ALE)
(22. Februar 2013)

Betrifft: Freier Zugang zu personenbezogenen Daten von 1,46 Millionen Kunden durch Datenleck bei SNCB Europe

Medienberichten zufolge ([1]) hat das belgische Bahnunternehmen SNCB Europe 1,46 Millionen Kundendatensätze auf einem unzureichend gesicherten Server gespeichert. Dadurch konnten die Datensätze seit Mai 2012 über eine einfache Suchanfrage bei einer Suchmaschine abgerufen werden. In den meisten Fällen handelt es sich um Datensätze von Kunden aus Belgien, Frankreich und dem Vereinigten Königreich, wobei auch tausende Angestellte der Kommission und des Europäischen Parlaments betroffen sind. Frei zugänglich waren dabei Vor- und Zuname, Geschlecht, Geburtsdatum, E-Mail-Adresse sowie in einigen Fällen Anschrift und Telefonnummer.

Daraus ergeben sich folgende Fragen:

1. Ist die Kommission von SNCB Europe darüber in Kenntnis gesetzt worden, dass aufgrund eines Datenlecks personenbezogene Daten von Angestellten der Kommission abrufbar waren?

2. Ist die Kommission tätig geworden, um gesicherte Informationen über die Anzahl der davon betroffenen EU-Beamten zu erhalten?

3. Die frei zugänglichen Daten betreffen oft Tätigkeiten im Rahmen von Dienstreisen. Ist die Kommission tätig geworden, um Mitarbeiter über die Datenpanne zu informieren und im Hinblick auf eine entsprechende Schadensbegrenzung zu beraten? Wenn nicht: Aus welchen Gründen?

4. Welche sonstigen Schritte beabsichtigt die Kommission diesbezüglich zu unternehmen?

Antwort von Frau Reding im Namen der Kommission
(3. Mai 2013)

Die Kommission ist von SNCB/NMBS Europe nicht darüber informiert worden, dass aufgrund eines Datenlecks personenbezogene Daten von Kommissionsbediensteten abrufbar waren.

Die Verarbeitung von Kundendaten durch die SNCB/NMBS, die als für die Verarbeitung verantwortliche Stelle betrachtet werden kann, fällt unter die Datenschutz-Richtlinie 95/46/EG ([2]); folglich muss jede Verarbeitung personenbezogener Daten im Einklang mit den nationalen Rechtsvorschriften zur Durchführung der Richtlinie erfolgen und den darin festgelegten Anforderungen entsprechen. Insbesondere muss der für die Verarbeitung Verantwortliche geeignete technische und organisatorische Maßnahmen treffen, „und zwar sowohl zum Zeitpunkt der Planung des Verarbeitungssystems als auch zum Zeitpunkt der eigentlichen Verarbeitung", um personenbezogene Daten vor der unberechtigten Weitergabe oder dem unberechtigten Zugang zu schützen ([3]).

Um die Sicherheit der Verarbeitung zu verbessern, hat die Europäische Kommission im Zuge der Reform der bestehenden Datenschutzregelung vorgeschlagen, den für die Verarbeitung Verantwortlichen zu verpflichten, Datenschutzverletzungen der zuständigen Aufsichtsbehörde zu melden und die betroffene Person zu benachrichtigen, wenn die Wahrscheinlichkeit besteht, dass der Schutz ihrer personenbezogenen Daten oder ihrer Privatsphäre dadurch beeinträchtigt wird ([4]).

Unbeschadet der Befugnisse der Kommission als Hüterin der Verträge liegt es in erster Linie in der Verantwortung der nationalen Datenschutzbehörden, dafür zu sorgen, dass die für die Verarbeitung Verantwortlichen die geltenden Vorschriften bzw. die vorgeschlagenen überarbeiteten Vorschriften einhalten, sobald diese erlassen sind.

([1]) http://www.lalibre.be/actu/belgique/article/788247/fuite-de-donnees-a-la-sncb-le-fichier-etait-disponible-depuis-mai.html
([2]) Richtlinie 95/46/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates zum Schutz natürlicher Personen bei der Verarbeitung personenbezogener Daten und zum freien Datenverkehr; ABl. L 281 von 1995, S. 31.
([3]) Artikel 17 und Erwägungsgrund 46 der Richtlinie 95/46/EG.
([4]) Artikel 31 und 32 des Vorschlags für eine Verordnung des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates zum Schutz natürlicher Personen bei der Verarbeitung personenbezogener Daten und zum freien Datenverkehr (Datenschutz-Grundverordnung), KOM(2012)11.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001939/13
to the Commission
Jan Philipp Albrecht (Verts/ALE)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: Personal data on 1.46 million customers disclosed in SNCB/NMBS Europe data breach

According to reports in the media ([1]), the national railway operator in Belgium, SNCB/NMBS Europe, has stored the data of 1.46 million customers on a non-secure server. In consequence, since May 2012 it has been possible to access these data externally by means of a simple search engine query. Most of the data belong to customers in Belgium, France and the UK, including thousands of Commission and Parliament employees. The data include first and last names, gender, date of birth, e-mail address and, in some cases, home address and telephone number.

This gives rise to the following questions:

1. Has the Commission been informed by SNCB/NMBS Europe of the leak of personal data belonging to Commission staff?

2. Has the Commission taken any steps to ascertain how many EU officials are concerned?

3. As the data often pertain to activities undertaken in the course of work-related travel, has the Commission taken any steps to inform staff of the breach and to offer advice on how to mitigate any negative consequences? If not, why not?

4. What other steps is the Commission envisaging in this regard?

Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission
(3 May 2013)

The Commission has not been informed by SNCB/NMBS Europe of the leak of personal data belonging to Commission staff.

The processing of customer data by SNCB/NMBS which can be considered a data controller falls under the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC ([2]) and thus any processing of personal data needs to be carried out in line with the national laws implementing the requirements laid down in this directive. In particular, any controller must implement appropriate technical and organisational measures, 'both at the time of the design of the processing system and at the time of the processing itself' to protect personal data against unauthorised disclosure or access ([3]).

In its efforts to reform the current legislation on data protection, the European Commission has sought to strengthen the security of processing by proposing the introduction of an obligation on the controller to notify personal data breaches to the competent supervisory authority and, where the breach is likely to adversely affect the protection of personal data or privacy of the data subject, to the data subject ([4]).

Without prejudice to the powers of the Commission as guardian of the Treaties, the responsibility to ensure that controllers comply with the current provisions and once adopted the ones proposed for reform lies primarily with the data protection authorities of the Members States.

([1]) http://www.lalibre.be/actu/belgique/article/788247/fuite-de-donnees-a-la-sncb-le-fichier-etait-disponible-depuis-mai.html
([2]) Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data; Official Journal, 1995, L 281, p. 31.
([3]) Article 17 and Recital 46 of Directive 95/46/EC.
([4]) Articles 31and 32 of the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation), COM(2012) 11.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001940/13
to the Commission
Fiona Hall (ALDE)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: Research into the adverse health effects of blue/UV lighting and compact fluorescent lights

In 2008, the Scientific Committee on Emerging and Newly Identified Health Risks (SCENIHR) published a Scientific Opinion on Light Sensitivity which confirmed that some pre-existing conditions (epilepsy, migraine, retinal diseases, chronic actinic dermatitis and solar urticaria) could be exacerbated by flicker and/or UV/blue light. In addition to this, it concluded that not enough evidence existed to suggest that compact fluorescent lamps (CFLs) could be a significant contributor to light-sensitive symptoms. In March 2012, the SCENIHR published a Scientific Opinion on the Health Effects of Artificial Light, which paid particular attention to skin-related photosensitivity.

1. Since the 2008 SCENIHR opinion, has the Commission conducted or received any further evidence or research regarding the adverse health effects associated with flicker and/or UV/blue light, or CFLs?

2. Does the Commission plan to conduct any further research into the adverse health effects of lighting in order to better determine what factors (e.g. wave length, lamp frequency, flicker rate, electromagnetic fields emitted, etc.) are responsible for aggravating symptoms for light-sensitive persons?

3. Has any more research been found or carried out with particular regard to the relationship between artificial lighting and increased migraines?

4. When does the Commission expect the SCENIHR to review the most recently available scientific evidence with regard to light sensitivity and the health effects of artificial light?

Answer given by Mr Oettinger on behalf of the Commission
(15 April 2013)

1. In 2012, the Scientific Committee on Emerging and Newly Identified Health Risks (SCENIHR) published an opinion on 'Health Effects of Artificial Lighting' ([1]). The Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answer to written questions 4836/2012 and 7245/2012 for further information.

2. The Commission previously issued mandates to SCENIHR to review the adverse health effects of artificial lighting, which revealed that all light-sensitive patients can choose light sources suitable to prevent an aggravation of symptoms. In case new findings reveal the need to revise this statement, the Commission will evaluate the necessity to possibly issue mandates for research projects.

3. The Commission is not aware of any novel research findings in contradiction to SCENIHR's opinion that there exist suitable light sources for every light-sensitive patient. If such new research findings reveal the need for any new research, including on patients with increased migraines, the Commission would act accordingly and evaluate the necessity to possibly undertake Commission research projects.

4. The Commission currently does not see the need to issue any further mandate for a scientific review due to the absence of novel research findings.

([1]) SCENIHR opinion on Health Effects of Artificial Lighting: http://ec.europa.eu/health/scientific_committees/emerging/docs/scenihr_o_035.pdf

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001941/13
to the Commission
Fiona Hall (ALDE)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: NGO Report — 'Trading Away Peace: How Europe helps sustain illegal Israeli settlements'

In October 2012, a report entitled 'Trading Away Peace: How Europe helps sustain illegal Israeli settlements,' was published by a number of European NGOs.

This report outlines the economic links between Europe and the illegal settlements, naming the most common settlement products sold in Europe and detailing the involvement of European companies. The report also analyses European and national policies relevant to trade and other linkages with these settlements.

Given that the EU regards the Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory as illegal under international law and an obstacle to peace, will the Commission take any of the measures proposed in this report to ensure that the policies and actions of the EU and its Member States do not directly or indirectly support entrenchment and expansion of illegal settlements?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(12 April 2013)

The Commission is undertaking a number of measures proposed in this report, and had started to prepare these before the publication of the report.

The May 2012 Foreign Affairs Council conclusions on the Middle East peace process reaffirmed the EU's 'commitment to fully and effectively implement existing EU legislation and the bilateral arrangements applicable to settlement products', covering both labelling and the exclusion of settlement products from preferential market access.

The EU also makes every effort to ensure its policies are implemented in a manner consistent with its position on settlements. In replies to parliamentary questions (E-9975/2011, E-7076/2012 and E-7066/2012), the Commission has committed to preparing precise operational guidelines addressing the issue of non-participation of settlement-based entities in EU-funded activities for the 2014-2020 period.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001942/13
to the Commission
Geoffrey Van Orden (ECR)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: Research on bee health

In view of the decline in the bee population, what research funds are still available to enable more progress to be made in identifying the causes of the decline and in developing remedies? How should application for such funding best be made at this stage?

What steps are being taken, including realistic field trials, to ensure that unnecessary or premature action is not taken by the Commission on the basis of poor evidence?. I have in mind suggestions that have been made to ban pesticides such as neonicotinoids, the effect of which may be devastating for our farmers, with few significant benefits for bees. What is the current status of these suggestions, and what steps does the Commission now expect to take?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission
(8 April 2013)

The Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answer to written questions E-000450/2013 ([1]) and E-000875/2013 ([1]). The Commission draft implementing measures was discussed and put forward for a vote at the Standing Committee on the Food chain and Animal Health on 15 March 2013. The Committee did not deliver an opinion. Therefore, the Commission is considering the next steps and the possibility to refer the draft implementing act to the appeal committee for further deliberation.

Research on bee health has received considerable attention during the 7th Framework programme with a total budget reaching EUR 15 million. In particular the Bee Doc project ([2]) is quantifying the impact of the interactions between parasites, pathogens and pesticides on honeybee mortality. They address sublethal and chronic exposure to pesticides both at the colony and at the individual level. The STEP project ([3]) is looking at the nature and extent of declines in both wild and domesticated pollinators. The COLOSS ([4]) COST action is a network of researchers and stakeholders following the evolution of colony losses and joining forces of participants in national research programmes. A last research proposal will be funded this year to tackle another major threat for bee, the varroa mite, in order to reduce the pressure of this parasite on honeybee health.

Also, the Single CMO Regulation ([5]) provides EU financial support for cooperation with specialised bodies for the implementation of applied research programmes related to beekeeping in the frame of the national apiculture programmes put in place by the Member States. Member States have to submit their national apiculture programmes for the next three years by 15 April 2013.

([1]) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html
([2]) http://www.bee-doc.eu/
([3]) www.step-project.net
([4]) http://www.coloss.org/
([5]) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:2007R1234:20121121:EN:PDF

(Version française)

Question avec demande de réponse écrite E-001943/13
à la Commission
Marc Tarabella (S&D)
(22 février 2013)

Objet: Gaz réfrigérant

D'après les résultats des tests réalisés chez onze constructeurs, les inquiétudes soulevées par Daimler au sujet du gaz réfrigérant HFO-1234yf ne sont pas fondées, estime l'association mondiale d'ingénieurs automobiles «SAE International».

Depuis cette année, le gaz HFO-1234yf, développé par Honeywell, doit remplacer dans les systèmes de climatisation le R134a, qui n'est plus autorisé dans les nouveaux véhicules, parce qu'il présente un potentiel de réchauffement planétaire (PRP) supérieur à 150 (soit 150 kg de CO_2). Le HFO-1234yf a un PRP de 4 seulement.

Pourtant, depuis son arrivée sur le marché, ce gaz est très controversé. Daimler a ensuite annoncé en septembre qu'il n'utiliserait pas ce gaz parce qu'il est inflammable. Le constructeur a réalisé des tests en laboratoire démontrant que ce gaz pouvait s'enflammer en cas de collision frontale, voire en cas de simple surchauffe du compartiment moteur, assurait-il.

Pourtant, pour les experts de SAE International, qui ont mis sur pied un projet de recherche et de coopération (CRP) pour répondre aux inquiétudes de Daimler, ce réfrigérant ne pose aucun problème de sécurité. L'association a rendu hier les résultats définitifs des tests réalisés chez onze constructeurs dans le cadre du CRP et réitéré les conclusions de sa première évaluation: le réfrigérant «ne présente pas plus de risques que les autres liquides du compartiment moteur».

Selon les experts, cette polémique vient du fait que les tests de Daimler étaient «irréalistes» et s'étaient déroulés dans des «conditions extrêmement idéalisées (…) en faisant fi des scénarios réels de collision».

«Il est hautement improbable que le fluide frigorigène s'enflamme» et «son inflammation nécessite des conditions extrêmement idéalisées», ajoute encore SAE International.

Elle ajoute que le HFO-1234yf présente «une inflammabilité légère», à des niveaux largement inférieurs à ceux des matières hautement inflammables présentes sous le capot d'une voiture (huile de moteur, liquide de transmission, antigel du radiateur, liquide de frein, lubrifiant, carburant) et ce, dans de rares conditions.

1. Quelle est la position de la Commission sur ce dossier?

2. L'entreprise Daimler, de son côté, pourrait-elle faire l'objet d'une procédure d'infraction en cas d'utilisation de ce gaz?

Réponse donnée par M. Tajani au nom de la Commission
(26 mars 2013)

La directive 2006/40/CE sur les systèmes de climatisation des véhicules à moteur prévoit que, à compter du 1er janvier 2011, les systèmes de climatisation des types de véhicules nouvellement réceptionnés doivent contenir un réfrigérant à faible PRP, ce qui revient à interdire, de fait, l'utilisation du gaz actuel R134a. À la suite d'essais et d'évaluations des possibles produits de remplacement et d'une évaluation de risques exhaustive au cours du processus de standardisation, les constructeurs automobiles sont convenus d'utiliser le gaz R1234yf afin de se conformer à la directive. Celle-ci est pleinement en vigueur depuis le 1er janvier 2013.

Un constructeur automobile (Daimler) a informé la Commission qu'il avait effectué des essais qui ont suscité des préoccupations en matière de sécurité concernant l'utilisation du gaz réfrigérant R1234yf dans ses véhicules. L'autorité allemande compétente a confirmé que ces véhicules n'étaient pas sûrs et analyse actuellement le degré de sécurité de l'utilisation de ce gaz réfrigérant dans d'autres véhicules.

La Commission fait valoir que rien ne permet, à ce jour, d'affirmer qu'il n'existe pas de solutions techniques pour limiter les risques d'inflammabilité liés à l'utilisation du gaz R1234yf dans les systèmes de climatisation des véhicules à moteur. Les constructeurs automobiles sont équipés pour traiter les substances inflammables et la conception des systèmes de climatisation des véhicules à moteur est soumise aux standards internationales. Toutefois, les autorités nationales compétentes continuer d'examiner cette question.

La Commission n'agit pas contre des opérateurs économiques spécifiques. En cas de non-respect de la législation de l'Union européenne, l'État membre responsable de la réception du type de véhicule doit prendre des mesures correctives pertinentes directement par rapport au constructeur. La Commission peut engager une action appropriée contre l'État membre qui n'applique pas la législation de l'UE.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001943/13
to the Commission
Marc Tarabella (S&D)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: Refrigerant gas

According to SAE International, the global association of automotive engineers, the results of tests carried out by 11 manufacturers prove that the concerns raised by Daimler about the refrigerant gas HFO-1234yf are unfounded.

From this year, HFO-1234yf, developed by Honeywell, will be used in air-conditioning systems in place of R134a, which is no longer permitted in new vehicles as its global warming potential (GWP) is more than 150 (150 kg of CO_2). HFO-1234yf has a GWP of just four.

However, the gas has been the subject of much controversy since it arrived on the market. Daimler responded by announcing in September that it would not be using the gas because it is flammable. The manufacturer carried out laboratory tests, which demonstrated that the gas could ignite in the event of a head-on collision or even, it maintained, if the engine compartment simply overheats.

However, SAE International's experts, who established a cooperative research project (CRP) in order to address Daimler's concerns, believe that the refrigerant poses no safety problems. Yesterday the association published the definitive results of the tests carried out by 11 manufacturers as part of the CRP and reiterated the conclusions of its first assessment: the refrigerant 'poses no greater risk than other engine compartment fluids'.

According to the experts, this controversy stems from the fact that Daimler's tests were 'unrealistic' and had been carried out in 'extremely idealised conditions … while ignoring actual real world collision scenarios'.

SAE International also says that 'the refrigerant is highly unlikely to ignite' and that 'ignition requires extremely idealised conditions'.

It adds that, under rare conditions, HFO-1234yf exhibits 'mild flammability', at levels significantly lower than highly flammable materials already present under the bonnet of a car, including engine oil, automotive transmission fluid, radiator antifreeze, brake fluid, lubricant and fuel.

1. What is the Commission's opinion on the matter?

2. Could infringement proceedings be launched against Daimler if this gas is used?

Answer given by Mr Tajani on behalf of the Commission
(26 March 2013)

Directive 2006/40/EC on mobile air-conditioning (MAC) stipulates that, as of 1 January 2011, MAC of newly approved types of vehicles have to be filled with a refrigerant with a low GWP, a *de facto* ban on the use of the current gas R134a. Following tests and evaluations of products as potential replacements, and having performed an extensive risk assessment during the standardisation process, automotive manufactuers agreed to use R1234yf as the means to comply with the directive. The directive is fully in force since 1 January 2013.

The Commission has been informed by one manufacturer (Daimler) that it performed tests that raised safety concerns regarding the use of the refrigerant R1234yf in their vehicles. The relevant German authority confirmed that these vehicles were not safe and is currently analysing the safety of the use of the refrigerant in other vehicles.

For the Commission there is no evidence, until today, that there are no technical solutions to mitigate the flammability risks associated to the use of the R1234yf gas in MAC systems. Vehicle manufacturers are equipped to deal with flammable substances, and the design of MAC is subject to international standards. However, the competent national authorities are still evaluating this issue.

The Commission does not take action against specific economic operators. In cases of non-compliance with EU legislation, the Member State responsible for the vehicle type-approval needs to apply appropriate corrective measures directly with the manufacturer. The Commission may take appropriate action against Member States not applying EU legislation.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001944/13
alla Commissione
Oreste Rossi (EFD)
(22 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: Auto elettrica e strutture adeguate: un beneficio per pochi

Il mercato delle auto elettriche sta subendo una forte flessione negativa. Le cifre di vendita delle principali case produttrici parlano di 67.723 vetture vendute da quando sono state messe in commercio, più di due anni e mezzo fa. Il mercato automobilistico in assoluto perde migliaia di dollari per ogni esemplare consegnato, le case produttrici hanno investito molto per proporre al mercato autoveicoli elettrici, ma il ritorno economico è stato, a oggi, tutt'altro che positivo. Alcune case produttrici attente all'ambiente hanno persino preferito incentrare le loro ricerche su vetture ibride e su auto a idrogeno a celle di combustione. È, infatti, molto interessante notare come le vetture ibride, a differenza di quelle totalmente elettriche, rappresentino ormai una tecnologia consolidata ed accettata dai clienti. Nel 2012, secondo un'associazione di categoria in Italia sono state consegnate appena 524 auto elettriche pure, delle quali solamente 25 a privati cittadini. In Italia sono stati stanziati incentivi per il triennio 2013-2015 con una cifra globale di 120 milioni di euro destinati alla diffusione di veicoli ad alimentazioni alternative (elettrici, ibridi, a metano, a biometano, a GPL, a biocombustibili, a idrogeno) con emissioni di anidride carbonica (CO_2), allo scarico, non superiori a 120 g/km.

Considerato che: — il mercato dell'auto elettrica stenta a decollare in ambito privato poiché il prodotto in sé non è ancora maturo e sono carenti o quasi assenti le strutture in cui sia possibile effettuar rifornimento di energie verdi; — mancano standard comuni, l'autonomia è limitata, il prezzo è elevato, i tempi di ricarica lunghi; — il settore privato deve accettare il motore dell'innovazione, altrimenti l'auto elettrica resterà un bene utilizzabile da pochi eletti; — in Italia viene considerato sperimentale il finanziamento statale, per cui non vengono privilegiate particolari tecnologie, ma si rimanda ai limiti oggettivi di emissione, nel rispetto delle ultime raccomandazioni sulla «neutralità tecnologica» espresse dalla Commissione europea (CARS 21) e dall'OCSE;

può la Commissione far sapere se ritenga necessario favorire la diffusione capillare sul territorio di punti di rifornimento di energie verdi e opportuno incentivare la pratica del carsharing impiegando veicoli elettrici nelle maggiori città europee quale progetto pilota, come pure informare la popolazione su quelli che sono i reali benefici in termini economici e ambientali delle auto elettriche, tanto da svilupparne e sostenerne l'acquisto anche impiegando incentivi diretti?

Risposta di Siim Kallas a nome della Commissione
(4 aprile 2013)

Il 24 gennaio 2013 la Commissione ha adottato una proposta di direttiva sulla realizzazione di un'infrastruttura per i combustibili alternativi ([1]). Essa stabilisce una copertura infrastrutturale minima per i combustibili alternativi destinata a veicoli elettrici, a idrogeno, con pile a combustione e veicoli alimentati a GNC o GNL, nel caso di veicoli pesanti e imbarcazioni. Essa propone anche delle norme comuni per tali infrastrutture. Il pacchetto «Energia pulita per il trasporto» mira a favorire lo sviluppo di un mercato interno, comprendente le infrastrutture necessarie, per i veicoli che utilizzano combustibili alternativi, eliminando le barriere tecniche e normative all'interno dell'UE.

Le linee guida della Commissione sugli incentivi finanziari per i veicoli puliti e a basso consumo energetico ([2]) sono state adottate il 28 febbraio 2013 ed indicano come gli Stati membri possono utilizzare gli incentivi finanziari per promuovere la domanda di veicoli a basse emissioni di CO_2.

Inoltre, la Commissione rinvia l'onorevole parlamentare alle riposte alle interrogazioni scritte E-03580/2012, E-01046/2013, E-011211/2012 e E-08869/2012, rispettivamente degli onorevoli Liam Aylward (ALDE), Patricia van der Kammen (NI), Petru Constantin Luhan (PPE) e Sergio Silvertis (PPE) ([3]).

([1]) COM(2013)018 definitivo.
([2]) http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/automotive/environment/financial/index_en.htm
([3]) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/it/parliamentary-questions.html

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001944/13
to the Commission
Oreste Rossi (EFD)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: The electric car and appropriate facilities: a benefit for few

The electric car market is undergoing a strong decline. The biggest manufacturers report a total of 67 723 vehicles sold since the time they were placed on the market more than two and a half years ago. The automobile market loses thousands of dollars for each model sold, the manufacturers have invested a lot to introduce electric cars onto the market, but the economic returns have been, up to now, anything but positive. Some environmentally aware manufacturers have even chosen to focus their research on hybrid models and hydrogen fuel cell cars. It is indeed very interesting to note how the hybrid models, in contrast with the entirely electric models, now represent a proven technology that is accepted by consumers. In 2012, according to an Italian trade organisation, only 524 true electric cars were sold, of which only 25 were purchased by private citizens. In Italy, initiatives have been put in place for 2013-2015 with an overall total of EUR 120 million allocated to the promotion of alternatively powered vehicles (electric, hybrid, methane, biomethane, GPL, biofuel, hydrogen) with carbon dioxide (CO_2) exhaust emissions no greater than 120 g/km.

Given that: the electric car market has been sluggish in the private sector because the product itself is not yet mature and the facilities for providing green energy are either lacking or practically absent; common standards are lacking, autonomy is limited, prices are high and charging times are long; the private sector must accept the driver of innovation, otherwise the electric car will remain something to be used by a few elect people; in Italy, state financing is considered experimental, which is why certain technologies are not favoured, but objective exhaust limits are followed, in compliance with the latest recommendations on 'technological neutrality' set out by the European Commission (CARS 21) and by the OECD;

can the Commission comment as to whether it deems it necessary to promote widespread dissemination of green energy charging points and whether it finds it appropriate to incentivise car sharing, using electric vehicles in larger European cities as a pilot experiment, and to inform the population on the real economic and environmental benefits of electric cars, so as to develop and sustain the market for them, even by offering direct incentives?

Answer given by Mr Kallas on behalf of the Commission
(4 April 2013)

The proposal for a directive on the deployment of alternative fuels infrastructure ([1]) was adopted by the Commission on 24 January 2013. The directive establishes a minimum coverage for alternative fuels infrastructure for electric vehicles, hydrogen and fuel cells vehicles, CNG vehicles and LNG for trucks and vessels for the European Union. It also proposes common standards for these infrastructures. The Clean Power for Transport Package aims to facilitate the development of an internal market for alternative fuel vehicles including the necessary infrastructure, by removing technical and regulatory barriers across the EU.

Commission guidelines on financial incentives for clean and energy efficient vehicles ([2]) were adopted on 28 February 2013. These guidelines indicate how Member States could use financial incentives to best increase demand for low CO2 emission vehicles.

In addition, the Commission would refer the Honourable Member to its answer to written questions E-03580/2012, E-01046/2013, E-011211/2012 and E-08869/2012 by respectively Mr Liam Aylward (ALDE), Mrs Patricia van der Kammen (NI), Mr Petru Constantin Luhan (PPE) and Mr Sergio Silvertis (PPE) ([3]).

([1]) COM(2013) 018 final.
([2]) http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/automotive/environment/financial/index_en.htm
([3]) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/plenary/en/parliamentary-questions.html

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001945/13
alla Commissione
Oreste Rossi (EFD)
(22 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: Calamità naturali ed effetti a lungo termine sulla sfera psicofisica della popolazione: misure di prevenzione da attuare in condizioni di emergenza

La penisola italiana nell'ultimo decennio è stata teatro di catastrofi naturali generate dall'intensa attività sismica: il crollo di edifici e i disagi seguenti si riflettono sulla salute psicofisica e sulla vita quotidiana delle persone. Recenti studi hanno dimostrato che l'esposizione al sisma può comportare, a lungo termine, effetti sul funzionamento dell'encefalo, nonché lo sviluppo di sindrome metabolica e complicanze cardiovascolari. Anche dopo un paio d'anni le persone coinvolte dimostrano un significativo deterioramento della qualità del sonno e una maggiore incidenza di incubi. La gravità del disturbo psichico, a differenza di quello meramente fisico, è prolungata nel tempo ed è direttamente proporzionale alla distanza geografica. Una recente ricerca ha sottoposto a fRMI un campione di sopravvissuti al terremoto confrontandoli con un gruppo di soggetti sani: nei soggetti con diagnosi di PTSD era presente una compromissione della connettività funzionale tra le aree cerebrali coinvolte nell'elaborazione di stimoli con forte valenza emotiva. In particolare una situazione traumatica di questa portata implica uno stravolgimento sulla salute metabolica e cardiovascolare, con effetti anche psicologici per le persone coinvolte. Nella medesima regione, prendendo in considerazione peso, circonferenza addominale, livelli di colesterolo e glicemia, pressione arteriosa e abitudini alimentari, è stata riscontrata sul gruppo in esame una prevalenza maggiore di sindrome metabolica. In particolare, è stata notata una significativa differenza negativa per chi ha vissuto per mesi in tendopoli o hotel, ossia non nella propria abitazione e distante dal luogo di residenza, con la seguente perdita di contatti sociali e familiari.

Considerato che: — lo stress e il PTSD causato da calamità e dai successivi avvenimenti hanno determinato disturbi tangibili alla popolazione; — la sindrome metabolica comporta alterazioni antropometriche del metabolismo che possono elevare il rischio di diabete e malattie cardiovascolari; — vivere fuori casa, perdere contatti sociali e familiari e cambiare alimentazione determinano disagi psichici e psicofisici scientificamente dimostrati;

Può la Commissione far sapere se ritenga indispensabile considerare che, in caso di eventi calamitosi, gli interventi necessari non debbano limitarsi al primo soccorso, ma dovrebbero porre maggiore attenzione al vivere quotidiano delle persone, fatto di rapporti sociali, abitudini di vita ed alimentari e se sia ammissibile che una calamità di origine naturale possa avere effetti negativi a lungo termine, tanto da incidere significativamente sulla salute della popolazione?

Risposta di Kristalina Georgieva a nome della Commissione
(22 aprile 2013)

La Commissione ha il mandato di coordinare il Meccanismo europeo di protezione civile, che si occupa della risposta tempestiva alle calamità nell'Unione europea e al di fuori di essa.

La Commissione e gli Stati membri che partecipano al Meccanismo europeo di protezione civile sono consapevoli dei rischi che incombono sulla salute psicosociale delle persone colpite dai terremoti. Nel 2010, il Consiglio ha adottato conclusioni sul sostegno psicosociale in caso di emergenze e catastrofi e sull'uso del Meccanismo europeo di protezione civile in caso di gravi accadimenti nell'Unione europea. Stando a tali conclusioni, i responsabili della protezione dei propri cittadini e dell'adeguata preparazione a eventi gravi sono in primo luogo gli Stati membri. L'Unione europea interviene a sostegno e a complemento della loro azione, per sviluppare, fra l'altro, la resilienza personale e sociale a fronte di minacce e catastrofi.

Nell'ambito del suo mandato, la Commissione ha assicurato che gli aspetti psicosociali siano stati integrati nelle attività del Meccanismo europeo di protezione civile, al fine di sviluppare la resilienza psicosociale.

La Commissione ha inoltre incluso contenuti psicosociali nei corsi di formazione organizzati nell'ambito del Meccanismo europeo di protezione civile.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001945/13
to the Commission
Oreste Rossi (EFD)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: Natural disasters and their long-term psychological and physical effects on the population: security measures to implement in emergency situations

Over the past 10 years, the Italian peninsula has been host to natural disasters caused by intense seismic activity: the collapse of buildings and the resulting difficulties are reflected in the psychological and physical health and daily life of those affected. Recent studies have shown that earthquakes can have long-term effects on brain functioning, as well as the development of metabolic syndrome and cardiovascular complications. Even after a couple of years, those concerned have a significantly worse quality of sleep and more nightmares. The severity of the psychological disturbances, in contrast to those of a merely physical nature, is prolonged and directly proportional to the geographical distance from the epicentre. A recent study performed fMRI scans on a sample of earthquake survivors, comparing them with a group of healthy subjects. The subjects who had been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) presented with an impairment of the functional connectivity between areas of the brain involved in processing strong emotional stimuli. In particular, a traumatic situation of this magnitude affects metabolic and cardiovascular health, with psychological effects for those involved. In the same region, taking weight into consideration, along with waistline measurements, cholesterol and blood sugar levels, blood pressure and eating habits, the study group presented with a higher rate of metabolic syndrome. In particular, a significant negative difference was noted for those who had lived for months in tent cities or hotels, that is, not in their own homes and far from their places of residence, with a resulting reduction in social and family contact.

Given that: stress and PTSD caused by natural disasters and subsequent events have tangibly affected the population; metabolic syndrome leads to anthropometric changes in metabolism that can increase the risk for diabetes and cardiovascular ailments; living away from home, the loss of social and family contact, and a change in diet lead to scientifically proven mental, psychological and physical ailments;

can the Commission state whether it deems it imperative to consider that, in cases of disasters, the necessary intervention must not be limited to first aid, but that a greater emphasis must be placed on the daily life of those involved, including social relations and life and dietary habits, and whether it is acceptable for a natural disaster to have negative long-term effects that significantly affect the health of those involved?

Answer given by Ms Georgieva on behalf of the Commission
(22 April 2013)

The Commission has a mandate to coordinate the European Civil Protection Mechanism ('the Mechanism'), which deals with short-term response to disasters within and beyond the European Union.

The Commission and Member States participating in the Mechanism are aware of the potential threats to pyscho-social health of people affected by earthquakes. In 2010, the Council adopted conclusions on 'psychosocial support in the event of emergencies and disasters and on the use of the European Civil Protection Mechanism in major events in the European Union'. According to the conclusions, responsibility for protecting their citizens as well as for adequate preparation to major events lies primarily with the Member States. The European Union's activities aim to support and complement their action *inter alia* to develop personal and social resilience in the face of threats and disasters.

Within its mandate, the Commission has ensured that psychosocial aspects have been integrated in the Mechanism's activities in order to develop psychosocial resilience.

Furthermore, the Commission has included psychosocial content in training courses organised in the framework of the Mechanism.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001946/13
alla Commissione
Oreste Rossi (EFD)
(22 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: Robin Tax e possibile violazione del divieto di traslazione quali effetti distorsivi sul mercato della concorrenza e quale tutela per il consumatore

Un recente rapporto dell'Autorità nazionale per l'energia rileva i dati allarmanti dell'attività di vigilanza svolta in Italia sulla cosiddetta Robin Tax, ossia l'addizionale Ires imposta alle imprese energetiche nel giugno del 2008 che secondo la normativa nazionale non può essere traslata sui consumatori e quindi né in bolletta né, per esempio, sulla benzina e il gasolio. La normativa nazionale del 2008 vieta, infatti, «di traslare l'onere della maggiorazione d'imposta sui prezzi al consumo» e affida proprio all'Autorità per l'energia elettrica e il gas il controllo «sulla puntuale osservanza della disposizione». Il rapporto evidenzia 199 casi, per un totale di circa 1,6 miliardi di euro, su cui è stata riscontrata una variazione positiva del margine di contribuzione semestrale riconducibile, almeno in parte, alla dinamica dei prezzi, che potrebbero costituire una possibile violazione del menzionato divieto. Le criticità della Robin Tax del 2008 sono state accentuate con il D.L. n. 138 del 3.8.2011, recante «Ulteriori misure urgenti per la stabilizzazione finanziaria e per lo sviluppo», in modifica dell'art.81 del D.L. n. 112 del 25.6.2008. Quest'ultima modifica ha introdotto un incremento di aliquota dell'addizionale di imposta di 4 punti percentuali per il triennio 2011-2013 (dal 6,5 % al 10,5 %) e nuove soglie per l'assoggettamento alla maggiore imposta (volume dei ricavi superiore a 10 milioni di euro e reddito imponibile superiore ad un milione di euro), prevedendone la conseguente estensione del campo di applicazione ad altri settori del comparto energetico.

Considerato che: — solo nel 2011 il settore dell'energia elettrica e del gas ha contribuito all'86 % del gettito dell'intero settore in Italia con 1.250 milioni di euro, mentre il settore petrolifero, con 207 milioni di euro, ha contribuito solo per il 14 %; — rispetto alle disposizioni iniziali del D.L. n. 112/08, l'intervento normativo del 2011 ha comportato una modifica strutturale degli effetti economici dell'imposizione sul consumatore finale; — la Robin Tax ora, di fatto, costituisce un provvedimento a tempo illimitato, con carattere di tributo autonomo e ordinario, e non risponde più ad una situazione d'urgenza e straordinaria; — il potere di vigilanza dell'Autorità nazionale nell'accertamento del divieto di traslazione d'imposta ha una valenza «conoscitiva» e «dichiarativa» nel rispetto della fiscalità territoriale degli Stati membri;

può la Commissione verificare gli effetti indiretti e le discriminazioni a contrario provocate dalla normativa nazionale in questione sul mercato interno e se le politiche di prezzo attuali sono tali da costituire una possibile violazione del divieto di traslazione e, comportando uno svantaggio economico per i consumatori finali, non restringano o falsino il gioco della concorrenza in maniera consistente?

Risposta di Algirdas Šemeta a nome della Commissione
(18 aprile 2013)

In risposta all'interrogazione dell'onorevole parlamentare riguardante gli effetti indiretti della cosiddetta *Robin tax* e un'eventuale violazione del divieto di traslare l'onere dell'imposta sui consumatori, la Commissione non è per ora a conoscenza di nessuna incidenza sul mercato interno, né di potenziali distorsioni di concorrenza derivanti dai casi segnalati di eventuali violazioni della normativa fiscale italiana sulla *Robin tax*.

Inoltre, quando una relazione di un'autorità nazionale di regolamentazione segnala potenziali violazioni delle norme nazionali e/o pratiche inaccettabili da parte di imprese che operano in un settore regolamentato, spetta al governo dello Stato membro interessato valutare i riscontri, trarre le debite conclusioni ed esaminare l'opportunità di modificare la normativa in materia o di introdurre misure intese a rendere più efficiente il quadro amministrativo ai fini dell'applicazione delle disposizioni.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001946/13
to the Commission
Oreste Rossi (EFD)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: Robin Tax and possible violation of the ban on passing it on: the effect on distorting competition and on consumer protection

A recent report by the National Regulatory Authority for Energy presents alarming data on control activity carried out in Italy on the so-called Robin Tax, that is, additional IRES (corporate income tax) imposed on energy companies as of June 2008 which, according to the national regulation, cannot be passed on to consumers in any form, therefore not in bills or in petrol or diesel prices. The national regulation of 2008 in fact prohibits the 'passing on of the tax burden to prices paid by the consumer' and appoints the Regulatory Authority for Electricity and Gas to monitor 'the strict adherence to the regulation'. The report highlights 199 cases, totalling approximately EUR 1.6 billion, where six-monthly gains were found that were attributable, at least in part, to pricing, constituting a possible violation of the aforementioned prohibition. The critical points of the Robin Tax of 2008 were highlighted by Decree Law No 138 of 3 August 2011, which sets down 'Further urgent measures for economic stabilisation and development', amending Article 81 of Decree Law No 112 of 25 June 2008. This last amendment introduced an increase in the tax rate of 4 percentage points for the years 2011-2013 (from 6.5% to 10.5%) and new thresholds for tax brackets (profits greater than EUR 10 million and taxable income greater than one EUR 1 million), providing for the resulting extension of its scope to other sectors within the energy industry.

Given that: in 2011 alone, the electricity and gas sectors contributed 86% of the revenue for the entire industry in Italy with EUR 1 250 billion, while the oil sector, with EUR 207 million, contributed only 14%; with regard to the initial provisions of Decree Law No 112/08, the regulatory intervention of 2011 led to a structural change on the economic effects of the tax on end consumers; the Robin Tax is now, in fact, a permanent measure in the form of an autonomous and ordinary tax, and is no longer in place in response to an emergency or extraordinary situation; the National Regulatory Authority's power to monitor the ban on passing on tax has 'cognitive' and 'declarative' importance with regard to taxation within the territory of the Member States;

can the Commission verify the indirect effects and the discrimination to the contrary created by the national regulation in question on the internal market and verify whether the current pricing policies are such to constitute a possible violation of the ban on passing on and, given that they lead to an economic disadvantage for end consumers, whether they substantially restrict or distort competition?

Answer given by Mr Šemeta on behalf of the Commission
(18 April 2013)

In reply to the question of the Honourable Member on the indirect effects of the so-called Robin Hood Tax and a possible violation of the ban on passing the charge on to consumers, the Commission is currently not aware of any impact on the internal market or any potential distortions of competition resulting from the reported cases of possible violations of the Italian Robin Hood Tax legislation.

Furthermore, when a report by a national regulatory authority reveals potential violations of national rules and/or unacceptable practices by companies active in a regulated sector, it is for the government in that Member State to analyse the findings, draw appropriate conclusions and to consider amending the relevant legislation or introducing measures to improve the administrative framework for enforcing the provisions.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001947/13
alla Commissione
Oreste Rossi (EFD)
(22 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: Senso identitario e culturale del proprio paese di origine: prospettive per le nuove generazioni

L'identità culturale e linguistica del proprio paese d'origine è un aspetto da non trascurare nel momento in cui una famiglia con figli minorenni si sposta in un altro paese per questioni di ordine sociale o lavorativo. È importante che, al fine di preservare l'identità di ogni membro della famiglia e dei suoi successori, siano i genitori stessi a tramandare il senso identitario e culturale del proprio paese di origine. Questo è ancora più difficile nel caso in cui si incontrino alcune difficoltà nella realtà del paese ospitante.

Tutelare l'identità dei giovani residenti all'estero dovrebbe essere uno dei messaggi principali delle ambasciate verso i propri cittadini residenti in Europa. È opportuno che le rappresentanze degli Stati europei nei vari paesi membri organizzino attività formative (a distanza e miste) volte alla valorizzazione dell'identità linguistica e culturale dei giovani emigrati. Sarebbe opportuno organizzare corsi di lingua e cultura del proprio paese, all'interno dei quali predisporre moduli di insegnamento incentrati su più ambiti culturali (demo-antropologico-musicale, artistico-figurativo, teatrale, cinematografico) per garantire una conoscenza globale del contesto culturale e linguistico d'origine, sia nelle sue espressioni regionali relative alle aree di provenienza dei nuclei familiari di origine, sia nelle sue espressioni contemporanee.

Alla luce di quanto sopra, può la Commissione far sapere se intende proporre linee guida per sensibilizzare gli Stati membri, e le rappresentanze degli stessi, a sviluppare programmi specifici per i giovani tutti che, in un contesto multiculturale e multilinguistico, dovrebbero avere la possibilità di conoscere e apprendere le tipicità e le caratteristiche culturali del proprio paese di origine, all'interno delle scuole o di istituti nazionali presenti sul territorio ospitante?

Risposta di Androulla Vassiliou a nome della Commissione
(16 aprile 2013)

Conformemente al trattato sul funzionamento dell'Unione europea, gli Stati membri dell'UE hanno la responsabilità esclusiva del contenuto dell'insegnamento e dell'organizzazione dei sistemi educativi e della loro diversità culturale e linguistica. Il ruolo dell'Unione si limita a sostenere e integrare la loro azione.

In tale contesto la Commissione condivide la sollecitudine dell'onorevole deputato per l'erogazione di un'istruzione di qualità mirata sui bisogni dei discenti in una dimensione transfrontaliera, valorizzando anche le opportunità offerte dalle nuove tecnologie.

Operando di concerto con gli Stati membri sulla base di un metodo di coordinamento aperto, le politiche unionali aiutano gli Stati membri ad affrontare le sfide comuni come l'invecchiamento della società, le carenze di qualifiche, la promozione del multilinguismo, l'innovazione e l'adozione delle TIC. Un esempio di tale collaborazione è dato dalla rete eTwinning, patrocinata dal programma per l'apprendimento permanente e che ha incoraggiato 100.000 scuole in 33 paesi europei a dialogare via internet e a sviluppare assieme un contenuto educativo. Vi sono numerosi esempi di scuole che cooperano a progetti con scuole site nel paese d'origine dei loro allievi migranti. Il sistema verrà ulteriormente esteso grazie al nuovo programma «Erasmus per tutti» proposto dalla Commissione.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001947/13
to the Commission
Oreste Rossi (EFD)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: Sense of identity and culture in one's country of origin: the outlook for the new generations

The cultural and linguistic identity of one's country of origin cannot be overlooked when a family with young children moves to another country for social or work-related reasons. In order to preserve the identity of each family member and their future children, it is important for parents to pass on a sense of the national identity and culture of their country of origin. This is all the more difficult if hard times are encountered in the host country.

Protecting the identity of young people living abroad must be one of the main messages from the embassies to their citizens living in Europe. Representatives from EU Member States in different countries should organise educational activities (at a distance and mixed) aimed at developing linguistic and cultural identity among young emigrants. Language and culture courses relating to the country of origin should be organised, with lessons focusing on multiple cultural topics (demo-anthropological, musical, artistic-illustrative, theatrical, cinematographic) in order to provide an overall understanding of the cultural and linguistic context of the country of origin, both in terms of its regional expressions relating to the areas that families originally came from and in terms of its modern-day expressions.

In light of the above, can the Commission state whether it intends to propose guidelines to help Member States and representatives of the same to develop specific programmes for young people who, in a multicultural and multilingual context, should be given the opportunity to know and learn about the typical practices and cultural characteristics of their own countries of origin, within schools or national institutions present in the host country?

Answer given by Ms Vassiliou on behalf of the Commission
(16 April 2013)

According to the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, the EU Member States are solely responsible for the content of teaching and the organisation of education systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity. The Union's role is limited to supporting and supplementing their action.

In this context, the Commission shares the Honourable Member's concern for the provision of quality education tailored to the learners' needs across borders, including by taking advantage of the opportunities offered by the new technologies.

Working with the Member States through an open method of coordination, Union-level policies help Member States address common challenges such as ageing societies, skills deficits, promoting multilingualism, innovation and adoption of ICT. An example of this work is the eTwinning network, supported by the Lifelong Learning programme and which has encouraged 100 000 schools in 33 European countries to talk to each other via the Internet and to develop educational content together. There are numerous examples of schools cooperating on projects with schools in the country of origin of their migrant pupils. The scheme will be further expanded with the new programme 'Erasmus for All' as proposed by the Commission.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001948/13
alla Commissione
Pino Arlacchi (S&D)
(22 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: Respingimenti di migranti nei porti italiani

Il 22 gennaio *Human Rights Watch* ha pubblicato il rapporto «Restituiti al mittente: le riconsegne sommarie dall'Italia alla Grecia dei minori stranieri non accompagnati e degli adulti richiedenti asilo». Stando al rapporto, in più di un'occasione, i migranti arrivati clandestinamente sui traghetti provenienti dalla Grecia sulle coste italiane sarebbero stati respinti nel giro di poche ore senza che venissero prese in considerazione le richieste di asilo o lo status di minori. La mancanza di screening volti a identificare le persone bisognose di protezione nelle procedure della Polizia di frontiera italiana nei porti di Ancona, Bari, Brindisi e Venezia è in totale violazione dei principi del diritto internazionale. Il rapporto di HRW documenta anche le condizioni disumane di detenzione dei richiedenti asilo in Grecia. Una volta tornati indietro, infatti, i bambini migranti non accompagnati subiscono abusi e i richiedenti asilo sono esposti a condizioni di detenzione degradanti.

1. È la Commissione al corrente dei fatti denunciati da HRW?

2. Può accertarsi se l'Italia non stia violando la normativa comunitaria in materia di rimpatri e la normativa concernente l'accoglienza e il rispetto dei diritti dei minori che arrivano sul territorio italiano?

3. Può valutare se intraprendere eventuali azioni volte a far sì che l'Italia rispetti gli obblighi assunti nell'ambito della Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell'UE e rispetti anche il divieto di respingimenti collettivi, sancito dall'articolo 4 del Protocollo 4 allegato alla Convenzione europea dei diritti dell'uomo e ribadito all'articolo 19 della Carta dei diritti dell'uomo dell'Unione europea?

Risposta di Cecilia Malmström a nome della Commissione
(11 aprile 2013)

La Commissione è a conoscenza del rapporto di *Human Rights Watch* e ha richiesto ulteriori chiarimenti alle autorità italiane. Qualora necessario, in qualità di custode dei trattati, la Commissione non esiterà ad agire, nel rispetto dei poteri ad essa conferiti dai trattati stessi.

La normativa europea, in particolare la direttiva relativa alle procedure in materia d'asilo, impone agli Stati membri l'obbligo di garantire ai cittadini di paesi terzi un accesso effettivo alle procedure di richiesta di protezione internazionale. Queste disposizioni devono essere rispettate in qualsiasi circostanza. Gli Stati membri, inoltre, devono garantire che qualsiasi trasferimento di un richiedente asilo in un altro Stato membro rispetti le disposizioni del regolamento Dublino, che stabilisce i criteri e i meccanismi di determinazione dello Stato membro competente per l'esame di una domanda d'asilo.

Quando agiscono nell'ambito della legislazione europea, gli Stati membri devono sempre rispettare il principio dell'interesse superiore del minore. A questo riguardo, un corretto accertamento dell'età è essenziale per far sì che il soggetto benefici delle particolari garanzie previste per i minori dalla normativa in materia di asilo.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001948/13
to the Commission
Pino Arlacchi (S&D)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: The rejection of migrants at Italian ports

On 22 January, Human Rights Watch (HRW) published a report entitled 'Turned away: Summary Returns of Unaccompanied Migrant Children and Adult Asylum Seekers from Italy to Greece'. The report cites more than one occasion of migrants arriving illegally at the Italian coast on ferries from Greece, only to be returned within a few hours without their requests for asylum or the status of minors being taken into consideration. The lack of screening aimed at identifying those in need of protection in the procedures carried out by the Italian border police at the ports of Ancona, Bari, Brindisi and Venice is in complete violation of the principles of international law. The HRW report also documents the inhumane conditions in which those requesting asylum in Greece are detained. In fact, once they are turned away, unaccompanied migrant children become objects of abuse and those requesting asylum are exposed to degrading detention conditions.

1. Is the Commission aware of the facts reported by HRW?

2. Can it confirm that Italy is not violating EU legislation concerning the return of migrants or legislation concerning their reception and that the rights of minors arriving on Italian territory are being respected?

3. Can it evaluate whether any action should be taken to ensure that Italy fulfils its obligations under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and that it also respects the ban on summary returns set out in Article 4 of Protocol 4 to the European Convention on Human Rights and reiterated in Article 19 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union?

Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf of the Commission
(11 April 2013)

The Commission is aware of the Human Rights Watch report and has sought further clarifications from the Italian authorities. If necessary, as guardian of the Treaties, the Commission will not hesitate to take action in conformity with the powers conferred on it by the Treaties.

EC law, in particular the Asylum Procedures Directive, imposes obligations on Member States to ensure effective access to procedures enabling third-country nationals to seek international protection. These provisions must be respected in all circumstances. Furthermore, Member States must ensure that any transfer of an asylum-seeker to another Member State is consistent with the provisions of the Dublin Regulation, establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining the application of an asylum-seeker.

When acting within the scope of EC law, Member States must always respect the principle of the best interests of the child. In this respect, a correct age determination is essential in view of ensuring that minors benefit from the specific guarantees provided to them by the asylum legislation.

(Versione italiana)

Interrogazione con richiesta di risposta scritta E-001949/13
alla Commissione
Niccolò Rinaldi (ALDE)
(22 febbraio 2013)

Oggetto: Tutela degli habitat marini/costieri: dissuasori

Il Parlamento europeo ha votato recentemente la risoluzione (P7_TA(2013)0040) del 6 febbraio 2013 sulla proposta di regolamento del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio relativo alla politica comune della pesca che ha definito gli obiettivi per gli stock di pesce e che ridurrà l'impatto della pesca industriale. In assenza di opportuni controlli, i pescatori artigianali continuano ad ogni modo a vedere minacciata la propria attività a causa di chi pratica la pesca con le reti a strascico.

Contro queste pratiche scorrette che determinano inoltre l'estinzione delle specie ittiche a ridosso della costa sembra che esista un metodo realmente dissuasivo che consisterebbe nell'installazione di dissuasori di cemento nel fondo del mare. Tali dissuasori non permetterebbero alle reti a strascico di violare i limiti previsti dalla legge. In Italia, l'unico tratto protetto con questo metodo è quello tra Talamone e Porto Santo Stefano, nell'Argentario, e ciò ha apportato notevoli benefici per la ricostituzione dell'habitat marino.

Ritiene la Commissione possibile raccomandare l'uso dei dissuasori in cemento agli Stati membri per la tutela degli habitat marini/costieri, anche attivando i fondi europei?

Risposta di Maria Damanaki a nome della Commissione
(18 aprile 2013)

Nel corso dell'attuale periodo di programmazione 2007-2013, gli Stati membri possono decidere di concedere aiuti per l'installazione di dissuasori di cemento sul fondo del mare al fine di salvaguardare l'habitat marino/costiero nell'ambito delle misure di interesse comune applicabili a norma dell'articolo 38, paragrafo 2, lettera a), del regolamento relativo al Fondo europeo per la pesca. Tali misure devono riguardare «la costruzione o l'installazione di elementi fissi o mobili destinati a preservare e potenziare la fauna e la flora marine».

Per il prossimo periodo di programmazione 2014-2020, la Commissione ha proposto al Parlamento europeo e al Consiglio, con l'articolo 38 della sua proposta di regolamento relativo al Fondo europeo per gli affari marittimi e la pesca, di mantenere la possibilità di fornire sostegno pubblico alla «costruzione o installazione di elementi fissi o mobili destinati a preservare e potenziare la fauna e la flora marine» nell'ambito delle misure intese a garantire la protezione e il ripristino della biodiversità e degli ecosistemi nell'ambito di attività di pesca sostenibili.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001949/13
to the Commission
Niccolò Rinaldi (ALDE)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: Protection of marine and coastal habitats: bollards

Parliament recently adopted resolution P7 TA (2013)0040 of 6 February 2013 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the common fisheries policy, which lays down objectives in relation to fish stocks and which will reduce the impact of industrial fishing. In the absence of appropriate controls, the activity of small-scale fishermen remains under threat because of those who fish with bottom trawler nets.

There appears to be a way of genuinely discouraging these bad practices, which also cause the extinction of fish species living close to the coast, and that is to install concrete bollards at the bottom of the sea. Those bollards would prevent trawling nets from violating the limits prescribed by law. In Italy, the only stretch protected in this way is that between Talamone and Porto Santo Stefano, in Argentario, and its protection has yielded significant benefits with regard to the recovery of the marine habitat.

Would the Commission consider recommending that Member States use concrete bollards in order to safeguard marine/coastal habitats, including through the use of EU funds?

Answer given by Ms Damanaki on behalf of the Commission
(18 April 2013)

In the current programming period 2007-2013, Member States may decide to grant aid for the installation of concrete bollards at the bottom of the sea to safeguard marine/coastal habitat as measures of common interest pursuant to Article 38(2)(a) of the European Fisheries Fund, provided that they involve 'the construction or installation of static or movable facilities intended to protect and enhance marine fauna and flora.'

For the next 2014-2020 programming period, the Commission has proposed to the European Parliament and the Council under Article 38 of its proposal for a regulation on the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund, to renew the possibility to provide public support to 'the construction or installation of static or movable facilities intended to protect and enhance marine fauna and flora' as a measure for the protection and restoration of marine biodiversity and ecosystems in the framework of sustainable fishing activities.

(Nederlandse versie)

Vraag met verzoek om schriftelijk antwoord E-001950/13
aan de Commissie
Judith A. Merkies (S&D)
(22 februari 2013)

Betreft: Alternatieven voor antibiotica bij dieren

Resistentie voor microbiële substanties is een groot probleem, waaraan met name de veehouderij bijdraagt. Het is goed dat de Europese Unie met voorstellen komt rondom deze ontwikkelingen, zoals het nu voorliggende rapport over toenemende dreiging van microbiële resistentie (P7_TA(2012)0483).

In Nederland zijn goede resultaten geboekt met het vervangen van antibiotica door knoflook. De werkzame stof hier is allicine, een stof met een sterke anti-bacteriële, anti-virale en anti-parasitaire activiteit.

1. Volgt de Commissie de ontwikkelingen omtrent natuurlijke alternatieven voor antibiotica?

2. Is de Commissie op de hoogte van de werking van allicine en wil zij deze innovatie actief ondersteunen, bijvoorbeeld via regelgeving?

Antwoord van de heer Borg namens de Commissie
(15 april 2013)

De Commissie volgt de ontwikkeling van natuurlijke alternatieven voor antibiotica en verleent actief steun voor onderzoek en innovatie op dit gebied. Voorbeelden daarvan zijn de door de EU gefinancierde projecten PharmaSea ([1]) en Terpmed ([2]). Bovendien onderhandelt de Commissie op dit ogenblik over onderzoeksprojecten met het oog op de ontwikkeling van nieuwe antimicrobiële stoffen, vaccins en natuurlijke alternatieven voor de behandeling van (resistente) infecties. Naar aanleiding van het Europese verbod op het gebruik van antimicrobiële groeibevorderaars en in verband met de mogelijke gevolgen daarvan is specifiek op het gebied van de veehouderij bij diverse projecten met EU-financiering uit het zesde kaderprogramma onderzoek verricht naar alternatieven. Het ging daarbij met name om plantaardige extracten (bij het Replace-project ([3]) werden ongeveer 500 extracten getest), bacteriofagen of vaccins. De Commissie heeft onlangs het startsein gegeven voor een proefproject op verzoek van het Europees Parlement voor de „Coördinatie van het onderzoek naar het gebruik van homeopathie en fytotherapie in de veehouderij".

De Commissie steunt innovatie op dit gebied met diverse maatregelen. Op 15 november 2011 heeft zij een actieplan tegen het toenemende gevaar van antimicrobiële resistentie ([4]) gepubliceerd. Dit actieplan telt twaalf acties, waaronder de versterkte stimulering van passend gebruik van antimicrobiële stoffen in alle lidstaten en de versterking van het regelgevingskader voor diergeneesmiddelen en gemedicineerde diervoeders. Een van de belangrijkste doelstellingen bij de herziening van de wetgeving inzake diergeneesmiddelen is het verhogen van de beschikbaarheid van diergeneesmiddelen. De Commissie overweegt in dit verband verschillende opties om innovatie op dit gebied beter te belonen.

([1]) http://www.pharma-sea.eu/.
([2]) https://www.terpmed.eu/.
([3]) http://www.replace-eu.com/.
([4]) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0748:FIN:NL:PDF.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001950/13
to the Commission
Judith A. Merkies (S&D)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: Alternatives to using antimicrobials in animals

Antimicrobial resistance is a major problem in which animal husbandry plays a significant role. It is good for the European Union to bring forward proposals concerning these developments, such as the present report on the rising risk of antimicrobial resistance (P7_TA(2012)0483).

The Netherlands has achieved good results by replacing antibiotics with garlic. The active ingredient there is allicin, a substance with strong antibacterial, antiviral and antiparasitic properties.

1. Does the Commission follow developments in connection with natural alternatives to antibiotics?

2. Is the Commission aware of allicin's effects and does it want to support this innovation actively, for example through legislation?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission
(15 April 2013)

The Commission follows the development of natural alternatives to antibiotics and actively supports research and innovation in this area. Examples of this are the EU-funded projects PharmaSea ([1]) and TERPMED ([2]). Furthermore, the Commission currently negotiates research projects that aim to develop novel antimicrobials, vaccines as well as natural alternative approaches to treat (resistant) infections. Specifically in the area of livestock, several EU funded projects under the 6th Framework Programme looked into alternatives following the European ban on the use of antimicrobial growth promoters and its possible consequences. These included in particular plant extracts (around 500 extracts tested under the REPLACE ([3]) project), bacteriophages, or vaccines. Recently, the Commission launched a pilot project requested by the European Parliament to 'Coordinate research on the homeopathy and phytotherapy in livestock farming'.

The Commission supports innovation in this field through various measures. It has issued an action plan against the rising threats from antimicrobial resistance ([4]) on 15 November 2011. This action plan contains 12 actions including strengthening the promotion of appropriate use of antimicrobials in all Member States, as well as strengthening the regulatory framework on veterinary medicines and on medicated feed. A key objective in revising the legislation on veterinary medicines is to increase the availability of veterinary medicines. In this context the Commission considers various options to better reward innovation in this field.

([1]) http://www.pharma-sea.eu/
([2]) https://www.terpmed.eu/
([3]) http://www.replace-eu.com/
([4]) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0748:FIN:EN:PDF

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-001952/13
à Comissão
Nuno Melo (PPE)
(22 de fevereiro de 2013)

Assunto: Reino Unido defende resposta internacional na Síria

Segundo notícia veiculada pela comunicação social internacional, o ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros britânico, William Hague, defende que a comunidade internacional deve estar preparada para uma maior intervenção na Síria se a violência se mantiver este ano.

Pergunto à Comissão:

Qual é a posição da UE relativamente a esta matéria?

Resposta dada pela Alta Representante/Vice-Presidente Catherine Ashton em nome da Comissão
(12 de abril de 2013)

As últimas conclusões do Conselho sobre a Síria, de 18 de fevereiro de 2013, contêm a posição política oficial mais recente sobre o regime de sanções da UE. A decisão do Conselho que prorroga as medidas restritivas contra a Síria por mais três meses e altera o regime de embargo a fim de permitir a exportação de equipamento não letal para a Síria e a prestação de assistência técnica à coligação da oposição síria foi publicada no Jornal Oficial em 1 de março de 2012.

A UE participa em ações preparatórias destinadas a reforçar o seu apoio à oposição e à população civil da Síria, com base nos apelos dos Conselhos Europeus de dezembro de 2012 e de fevereiro de 2013.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001952/13
to the Commission
Nuno Melo (PPE)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: UK calls for international response in Syria

According to a news story reported in the international media, the British Foreign Secretary, William Hague, has called for the international community to be prepared for greater intervention in Syria if the violence continues this year.

What is the EU's position on this issue?

Answer given by High Representative/Vice-President Ashton on behalf of the Commission
(12 April 2013)

The last Council Conclusions on Syria from 18 February 2013 contain the latest official political position on the EU's sanctions regime. The Council Decision extending the restrictive measures towards Syria for another three months and amending the embargo regime to allow exportation of non-lethal equipment to Syria and the provision of technical assistance to the Syrian Opposition Coalition was published in the Official Journal on 1 March 2012.

The EU is engaged in preparatory actions to increase its support to the opposition and civilian population in Syria based on the call of the December 2012 and February 2013 European Council taskings.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-001953/13
à Comissão
Nuno Melo (PPE)
(22 de fevereiro de 2013)

Assunto: Farmácias: Cortes no fornecimento de medicamentos

Considerando que:

— Os cortes orçamentais impostos pela Troika nas despesas com a saúde têm vindo a agravar muito a já difícil situação financeira em que as farmácias portuguesas se encontram;

— Desde 2010, o valor das vendas das farmácias reduziu já 20 %, sendo que só em dezembro do ano passado a queda das vendas face ao mesmo mês de 2011 chegou aos 48,3 milhões de euros. Esta queda agravou a dívida das farmácias aos grossistas, que em 2012 atingiu os 330 milhões de euros;

— Só no último trimestre de 2012 houve 313 estabelecimentos com o fornecimento suspenso, quase tantos como no ano inteiro de 2011. Em dezembro de 2012, mais de metade das farmácias existentes em Portugal relataram terem problemas na reposição de stocks.

Assim, pergunto à Comissão:

Tem conhecimento desta situação?

De que forma a Comissão poderá colmatar este corte efetuado pelo Governo Português e exigido pelas medidas de austeridade impostas pela Troika, de forma a evitar que esta situação venha a prejudicar seriamente o acesso dos cidadãos aos medicamentos?

Resposta dada por Olli Rehn em nome da Comissão
(17 de abril de 2013)

A reforma do setor da saúde no âmbito do Programa de Ajustamento Económico para Portugal visa abordar a ineficiência e a ineficácia existentes, simultaneamente assegurando o acesso universal e equitativo a cuidados de saúde. Estão a ser implementadas reformas importantes que melhoram o acesso dos doentes aos cuidados de saúde em geral e mais especificamente aos medicamentos. Em matéria de medicamentos, a redução dos obstáculos jurídicos à entrada de genéricos no mercado e um uso mais alargado de receitas por substância ativa vão gerar um aumento da disponibilidade de medicamentos e reduzir despesas efetuadas pelo doente neste domínio. Além das recentes alterações jurídicas que asseguram que as farmácias têm nas suas prateleiras os medicamentos mais baratos, espera-se que a melhoria dos sistemas de controlo existentes contribua para um melhor controlo dos grossistas e da distribuição de medicamentos realizada pelas farmácias e, portanto, garantir o acesso dos doentes aos medicamentos.

A Comissão vai continuar a ponderar seriamente sobre as questões levantadas pelo Senhor Deputado durante uma série de reuniões a realizar com o governo português no âmbito do Programa de Ajustamento Económico.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001953/13
to the Commission
Nuno Melo (PPE)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: Pharmacies: cuts in the supply of medicinal products

— The health spending cuts imposed by the Troika have greatly worsened the already difficult financial circumstances of Portuguese pharmacies.

— Since 2010, the value of pharmacy sales has fallen 20%, while last year, in December alone, sales fell by EUR 48.3 million compared to the same month in 2011. This fall in sales has increased pharmacies' debts with wholesalers, which in 2012 amounted to EUR 330 million.

— In the last quarter of 2012 alone, 313 establishments had their supply suspended, almost as many as in the whole of 2011. In December 2012, more than half of pharmacies in Portugal said they had problems replenishing stocks.

Is the Commission aware of this situation?

How might it offset the effects of these cuts in Portuguese Government spending imposed by the Troika, so as to prevent the situation from seriously compromising people's access to medicinal products?

Answer given by Mr Rehn on behalf of the Commission
(17 April 2013)

Health sector reform under the Economic Adjustment Programme to Portugal aims at addressing existing inefficiency and ineffectiveness while ensuring universal and equitable access to care. Important reforms are being implemented which improve patients' access to care in general and to medicinal products more specifically. In the area of medicinal products, the reduction of legal barriers to the entry of generics and a greater use of the prescription by active substance will generate a wider availability of medicines and reduces patients' expenditure. In addition to recent legal changes ensuring that pharmacies have the cheapest medicinal products in stock, improvements in the existing monitoring systems is expected to contribute to a better control of wholesalers and pharmacies' dispensing behaviour and, therefore, to ensuring patients' access to medicines.

The Commission will continue to look carefully into the issues raised by the Honourable Member during the series of meetings to be held with the Portuguese Government under the Economic Adjustment Programme to Portugal.

(Versão portuguesa)

Pergunta com pedido de resposta escrita E-001954/13
à Comissão
Nuno Melo (PPE)
(22 de fevereiro de 2013)

Assunto: Escândalo alimentar na Europa

Considerando que:

— O escândalo da carne de cavalo teve o seu primeiro episódio há cerca de um mês na Irlanda, depois de terem sido detetados vestígios em hambúrgueres de marcas irlandesas e britânicas

— A verdadeira extensão deste problema só surgiu alguns dias depois com o aparecimento de casos semelhantes noutros países europeus. Em Portugal, a ASAE (Autoridade de Segurança Alimentar e Económica) detetou também erros na rotulagem de preparados e produtos à base de carne, que foram apreendidos e retirados do mercado.

— Foi aprovado pelo Comité da Cadeia Alimentar e Saúde Animal da União Europeia um plano para despistar a presença de carne de cavalo não declarada em alimentos transformados por toda a Europa, e prevê-se que em casa Estado-Membro sejam testados entre 10 e 150 produtos. Segundo o comissário europeu da Saúde e do Consumo os resultados dos testes serão apresentados dentro de dois meses.

Assim pergunto à Comissão:

Até que sejam conhecidos os resultados do estudo, e uma vez se trata de uma fraude de rotulagem à escala europeia, que medidas pondera tomar para restaurar a confiança do consumidor europeu?

Resposta dada por Tonio Borg em nome da Comissão
(5 de abril de 2013)

Até à data, não há indícios de uma preocupação em termos de segurança; no entanto, de acordo com regras da UE em vigor, a falsificação de rótulos em alimentos constitui uma fraude de rotulagem dos géneros alimentícios ([1]). A esse respeito, cabe às autoridades nacionais competentes garantir a conformidade com os requisitos em matéria de legislação alimentar da UE, incluindo casos de práticas fraudulentas, mediante a realização de controlos adequados e impondo sanções eficazes e dissuasivas, em conformidade com o Regulamento (CE) n.° 882/2004 do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, de 29 de abril de 2004, relativo aos controlos oficiais realizados para assegurar a verificação do cumprimento da legislação em matéria de alimentos para animais e géneros alimentícios, saúde e bem-estar dos animais ([2]).

A Comissão tem trabalhado ativamente tanto a nível político como a nível técnico na coordenação dos inquéritos pendentes nos Estados-Membros em causa. Para o efeito, a Comissão adotou recentemente uma recomendação relativa a um plano de controlo coordenado ([3]), que é cofinanciado pela UE a uma taxa de 75 %, que exige controlos à escala da União sobre os alimentos comercializados como contendo carne de bovino, com vista a detetar rotulagem fraudulenta e carne de equídeos destinada ao consumo humano, bem como para detetar fenilbutazona, um medicamento veterinário cuja utilização é permitida apenas em animais não utilizados na alimentação humana. Todos os resultados positivos devem ser imediatamente comunicados à Comissão, estando a síntese de todos os resultados disponível em abril de 2013. As medidas suplementares adotadas pela Comissão dependerão dos resultados das conclusões acima referidas.

A Europol também está envolvida nos inquéritos em curso, com um forte apoio por parte dos Estados-Membros.

Além disso, a futura proposta sobre os controlos oficiais deve visar um maior reforço do sistema existente, incluindo as disposições em matéria de sanções.

([1]) Diretiva 2000/13/CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, de 20 de março de 2000, relativa à aproximação das legislações dos Estados-Membros respeitantes à rotulagem, apresentação e publicidade dos géneros alimentícios, JO L 109 de 6.5.2000, p. 29.
([2]) JO L 165 de 30.4.2004, p. 1.
([3]) Recomendação da Comissão, de 19 de fevereiro de 2013, relativa a um plano de controlo coordenado com vista a determinar a prevalência de práticas fraudulentas (2013/99/UE), JO L 48 de 21.2.2013, p. 28.

(English version)

Question for written answer E-001954/13
to the Commission
Nuno Melo (PPE)
(22 February 2013)

Subject: Food scandal in Europe

— The first chapter in the horsemeat scandal occurred about a month ago in Ireland, after traces of horsemeat were found in Irish and British brands of beefburgers.

— The full extent of the problem only became apparent several days later, with the appearance of similar cases in other European countries. In Portugal, the ASAE (Food and Economic Safety Authority) also found mislabelled meat products and preparations, which were seized and withdrawn from the market.

— The EU Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health has approved a plan to investigate the presence of undeclared horsemeat in processed foods throughout Europe, and each Member State is to carry out tests on between 10 and 150 products. According to the European Commissioner for Health and Consumer Protection, the results of the tests will be presented within two months.

Until the test results are known, what measures does the Commission intend on taking to restore European consumer confidence, in view of this Europe-wide labelling fraud?

Answer given by Mr Borg on behalf of the Commission
(5 April 2013)

To date, there is no indication of a safety concern; however, falsifying labels on foods constitutes fraud in food labelling under existing EU rules ([1]). In that respect, it is for the national competent authorities to ensure compliance with Union food law requirements including cases of fraudulent practices by conducting appropriate controls and imposing dissuasive and effective penalties, in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on official controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules ([2]).

The Commission has been active both on political and technical levels in coordinating the pending investigations in the Member States concerned. To this end, the Commission has recently adopted a recommendation on a coordinated control plan ([3]), which is co-financed by the Union at a rate of 75%, calling for EU-wide controls on foods marketed as containing beef to detect fraudulent labelling and on horse meat destined for human consumption to detect phenylbutazone, a veterinary drug whose use is allowed only in non-food producing animals. Any positive findings should be reported immediately to the Commission while a summary of all findings will be available by April 2013. Further action by the Commission will depend on the results of the above findings.

Europol is also involved in the ongoing investigations with a strong support by the Member States.

In addition, the forthcoming proposal on official controls will aim at further strengthening the existing system, including the provisions on sanctions.

([1]) Directive 2000/13/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 20 March 2000 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the labelling, presentation and advertising of foodstuffs, OJ L 109, 6.5.2000, p. 29.
([2]) OJ L 165, 30.4.2004, p. 1.
([3]) Commission Recommendation of 19 February 2013 on a coordinated control plan with a view to establish the prevalence of fraudulent practices (2013/99/EU), OJ L 48, 21.2.2013, p. 28.